SECOND EDITION

CHRISTIAN
ETHICS

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES & OPTIONS

NORMAN L.

GEISLER

0 1989, 2010 by Norman L. Geisler

Published by Baker Academic

a division of Baker Publishing Group

P.O. Box 6287, Grand Rapids, M149516-6287
www.bakeracademic.com

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Geisler, Norman L.
Christian ethics : contemporary issues and options / Norman L. Geisler.-2nd ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and indexes.
ISBN 978+8010-3879-2 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Christian ethics. 1. Title.
BJ1251.G4 2010
241—dc22 2009025638

Unless otherwise indicated, Scripture quotations are from the HOLY BIBLE, NEW INTERNATIONAL
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All rights reserved.

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Scripture quotations labeled NEB are from The Nov English Bible. Copyright O 1961,1970,1989 by the Delegates of
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Scripture quotations labeled NKJVare from the New KingJames Version. Copyright 0 1982 bylhomas Nelson,
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Scripture quotations labeled RSV are from the Revised Standard Version of the Bible, copyright 1952 [2nd
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Scripture quotations labeled TLB are from The Living Bible, copyright 1971. Used by permission of Tyndale
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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 7654321

CONTENTS

List of Tables and Chart 9
Preface 11

Part1 Ethical Options
1. All the Options 15

2. Antinomianism 22

3. Situationism 35

4. Generalism 52

5. Unqualified Absolutism 66
6. Conflicting Absolutism 83

7. Graded Absolutism

8. The Basis for Ethical Decisions 16

Part 2 Ethical issues
9 Abortion-131

10 Infanticide and ‘Euthanasia 160
11. Biomedical Issues 180
12.Capital Punishment 199
13.War 220

Contents

14. Civil Disobedience 244
15. Sexual Issues 260

16. Homosexuality 280
17.Marriage and Divorce 299
18.Ecology 314

19. Animal Rights 335

Appendix 1: Drugs 359

Appendix 2: Is Gambling Unethical? 374
Appendix 3: Pornography 381

Appendix 4: Birth Control 396

Glossary 407

Bibliography 412

Index of Scripture 421

Index ofAuthors 431

Index of Subjects 435

TABLES

1.1 Two Views of Ethics 18

9.1 Three Views of Abortion 131

10.1 The Non Judeo-Christian and Judeo-Christian Worldviews 171
10.2 Active and Passive Euthanasia 175

11.1 The Judeo-Christian and Secular Humanist Worldviews 180
11.2 Christian and Humanist Approaches to Biomedical Issues 185
14.1 Two Views of When to Disobey Government 248

14.2 Two Views of How to Disobey Government 251

CHART

1.1 Six Major Ethical Views 21

PREFACE

This book is a thorough revision of its precursor of two decades ago. All chapters
have been updated, and new chapters and appendixes have been added. With
moral decay inside and outside the church, never has there been a greater need for
an understanding and application of sound ethical principles. I wish to thank my
able assistant Bill Roach, who greatly assisted in research and in writing of the
extensively revised sections and new chapters in this book. Also, I want thank my
faithful wife, Barbara, for help in preparation of the manuscript, especially for her
meticulous proofreading. While deeply grateful for their contributions, I take
responsibility for the contents.

11

Part 1

ETHICAL OPTIONS

ALL THE OPTIONS

Ethics deals with what is morally right and wrong. Christian ethics deals with
what is morally right and wrong for a Christian. This is a book on Christian ethics.
Since Christians base their beliefs on God's revelation in Scripture, the Bible will
be cited as an authority for conclusions drawn here (see chap. 8).

God has not limited himself to revelation in Scripture; he also has a general
revelation in nature (Rom. 1:19-20; 2:12-14). Since God's moral character does
not change, it should be expected that there will be similarities and overlaps
between God's natural and supernatural revelations. However, the focus of this
book is not God's natural law for all people, but his divine law for believers.

Definitions of Ethics

Ethics deals with what is right and wrong morally. Numerous theories have been
proposed concerning what is meant by a morally good action (see chap. 8). But it
is sufficient here to note the distinguishing characteristics of Christian ethics,
each of which will be briefly discussed here.

Christian Ethics Ils Based on God's Will

Christian ethics is a form of the divine-command position. An ethical duty is
something we ought to do. It is a divine prescription. Of course, the ethical
imperatives that God gives are in accord with his unchangeable moral character.
That is, God wills what is right in accordance with his own moral attributes. "Be

15

16 Ethical Options

holy, because I am holy," the Lord commanded Israel (Lev. 11:45). "Be
perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect: Jesus said to his disciples
(Matt. 5:48). "It is impossible for God to lie" (Heb. 6:18). So we should not lie
either. "God is love" (1 John 4:16), and so Jesus said, "Love your neighbor as
yourself" (Matt. 22:39). In brief, Christian ethics is based on God's will, but
God never wills anything contrary to his unchanging moral character.

Christian Ethics Is Absolute

Since God's moral character does not change (Mal. 3:6; James 1:17), it
follows that moral obligations flowing from his nature are absolute. That is,
they are always binding everywhere on everyone. Of course, not everything
God wills flows necessarily from his unchanging nature. Some things are
merely in accord with his nature but flow freely from his will. For example,
God chose to test Adam and Eve's moral obedience by forbidding them to eat a
specific fruit on a tree (Gen. 2:16-17). Although it was morally wrong for
Adam and Eve to disobey that command, we are no longer bound by that
command today. That command was based on God's will and did not flow
necessarily from his nature.

On the other hand, God's command not to murder (Gen. 9:6) applied before
the law was given to Moses, under the law of Moses (Exod. 20:13), and also
since the time of Moses (Rom. 13:9). In brief, murder is wrong at all times and
all places and for all people. This is true because humans are created in the
"image of God" (Gen. 1:27; 9:6). This includes a moral likeness to God (Col.
3:10; James 3:9). And whatever is traceable to God's unchanging moral
character is a moral absolute. This includes such moral obligations as holiness,
justice, love, truthfulness, and mercy. Other commands flowing from God's
will, but not necessarily from his nature, are equally binding on a believer, but
they are not absolute. That is, they must be obeyed because God prescribed
them, but he did not prescribe them for all people, times, and places. Absolute
moral duties, on the contrary, are binding on all people at all times and in all
places.

Christian Ethics Is Based on God's Revelation

Christian ethics is based on God's commands, the revelation of which is both
general (Rom. 1:19-20; 2:12-15) and special (2:18; 3:2). God has revealed
himself both in nature (Ps. 19:1-6) and in Scripture (19:7-14). General reve-
lation contains God's commands for all people. Special revelation declares his
will for believers. But in either case, the basis of human ethical responsibility is
divine revelation.

Failure to recognize God as the source of moral duty does not exonerate
anyone, even an atheist, from their moral duty. For "when Gentiles, who do not
have the law [of Moses], do by nature things required by the law, they are a law
for themselves, even though they do not have the law, since they show that the
requirements of the law are written on their hearts" (Rom. 2:14-15). That is,
even if unbelievers do not

All the Options 17

have the moral law in their minds, they still have it written on their hearts. Even if
they do not know it by way of cognition, they show it by way of inclination.

Christian Ethics Is Prescriptive

Since moral rightness is prescribed by a moral God, it is prescriptive. For there
is no moral law without a moral Lawgiver; there is no moral legislation without a
moral Legislator. So Christian ethics by its very nature is prescriptive, not
descriptive. Ethics deals with what ought to be, not with what is. Christians do not
find their ethical duties in the standard of Christians but in the standard for
Christians—the Bible.

From a Christian point of view, a purely descriptive ethic is no ethic at all. De-
scribing human behavior is the task of sociology. But prescribing human behavior
is the province of morality. The attempt to derive morals from mores is, as we have
already noted, the "is-ought" fallacy. What people actually do is not the basis for
what they ought to do. If it were, then people ought to lie, cheat, steal, and murder,
since these things are done all the time.

Christian Ethics Is Deontological

Ethical systems can be broadlydivided into two categories, deontological
(duty-centered) and teleological (end-centered). This is sometimes called
consequential-ism since the value of an act is determined by its consequence.
Christian ethics is deontological. Utilitarianism is an example of a teleological
ethic. The nature of a deontological ethic can be seen more clearly by contrast with
a teleological view (see table 1.1 on the next page).

A couple of illustrations will clarify this point. Someone tries to rescue a drown-
ing person but fails. According to one form of teleological ethic, this was not a good
act because it did not have good results. Since the results determine the goodness of
the act, and the results were not good, then it follows that the attempted rescue was
not a good act.

Yet a more sophisticated form of teleological (utilitarian) ethic might argue that
the attempt was good, even though it failed, because it had a good effect on
society. People heard about it and were encouraged to help rescue others in the
future. But even here the attempted act of rescue that failed was not good in itself.
Rather, it would have been good if and only if it had brought some good results,
either for the drowning person or for someone else.

By contrast, the Christian ethic is deontological and insists that even some acts
that fail are good. Christians believe, for example, that it is better to have loved and
to have lost than not to have loved at all. Christians believe that the cross was not a
failure simply because only some will be saved. It was sufficient for all even if it is
efficient only for those who believe. The Christian ethic insists that it is good to
work against bigotry and racism, even if one fails. This is so because moral actions
that reflect God's nature are good whether they are successful or

18 Ethical Options

not. Good for the Christian is not determined in a lottery. In life the winner is
not always right.

TABU 1.1
Two Views of Ethics

Deontological Ethic Teleological Ethic

Rule determines the result. Result determines the rule.
Rule is the basis of the act. Result is the basis of the act.
Rule is good regardless of result. Rule is good because of result.

Result is always calculated within the rules. Result is sometimes used to break rules.

However, Christian ethics does not neglect results. Simply because results do
not determine what is right does not mean that it is not right to consider results.
Indeed, results of actions are important in Christian ethics. For example, a Chris-
tian should calculate in which direction a gun is pointing before he pulls the trig-
ger. Drivers need to estimate the possible consequence of their speed in relation to
other objects. Speakers are responsible for calculating the possible effects of their
words on others. Christians have a duty to anticipate the results of not being
immunized to serious diseases, and so on.

In all the foregoing illustrations, however, there is an important difference be-
tween the deontological use of results and a teleological use of them. In Christian
ethics these results are all calculated within rules or norms. That is, no anticipated
result as such can be used as a justification for breaking any God-given moral law.
Utilitarians, on the other hand, use anticipated results to break moral rules. In fact,
they use results to make the rules. Existing rules can be broken if the expected
results call for it. For example, while Christian ethics allows for inoculation for
disease, it does not allow for infanticide to purify the genetic stock of the human
race; in this case the end result is used to justify the use of an evil means. In brief,
the end may justify the use of good means, but it does not justify the use of any
means, certainly not evil ones.

Various Views on Ethics

There are only six major ethical systems, each designated byits answer to the
question Are there any objective ethical laws? That is, are any moral laws not
purely subjective but actually binding on humans in general?

In answer, antinomianism says there are no moral laws. Situationism affirms there
is one absolute law. Generalist?! claims there are some general laws but no absolute
ones. Unqualified absolutism believes in many absolute laws that never conflict.
Conflicting absolutism contends there are many absolute norms that sometimes
conflict, and we are obligated to do the lesser evil. Graded absolutism holds that

All the Options 19

many absolute laws sometimes conflict, and we are responsible for obeying the
higher law.

Differences between Various Views

Of the six basic ethical views, two deny all objectively absolute moral laws. Of
them, antinomianism denies all universal and general moral laws. Generalism, on
the other hand, denies only universal moral laws but holds to general ones. That is,
there are some objective moral laws that are binding most of the time but not
necessarily all the time.

Four ethical views claim to be forms of absolutism. Of these, situationism be-
lieves in only one absolute, while the others believe in two or more absolutes. Of
them, unqualified absolutism contends that these absolute moral principles never
conflict, while the other two believe that they sometimes do conflict. Of the two
that believe these moral principles sometimes conflict, conflicting absolutism
contends that we are responsible to do the lesser evil but guilty for whichever one
we break. On the other hand, graded absolutism holds that our responsibility is to
obey the greater commandment. Consequently, we are not guilty for not following
the lesser commandment in conflict with it.

Examples of the Six Major Ethical Views

Corrie ten Boom tells how she lied to save Jews from the Nazi death camps.
During U.S. Senate hearings on the Iran-Contra issue, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver
North testified that, in the process of performing his duties, he had lied to save
innocent lives. North said, "I had to weigh lying and lives."

In a number of biblical stories, people lied to save lives. The Hebrew midwives
lied to save the baby boys Pharaoh had commanded them to kill (Exod. 1:15-19).
Rahab lied to save the lives of the Jewish spies in Jericho ( Josh. 2).

Is it ever right to lie to save a life? This issue will serve to focus the
differences among the six basic ethical positions.

1. Lying is neither right nor wrong: there are no laws. Antinomianism asserts that
lying to save lives is neither right nor wrong. It affirms that there are no
objective moral principles bywhich the issue can be judged right or wrong.
The issue must be decided on subjective, personal, or pragmatic grounds,
but not on any objective moral grounds. We are literally without a moral
law to decide the issue.

2. Lying is generally wrong: there are no universal laws. Generalism claims that
lying is generally wrong. As a rule, lying is wrong, but in specific cases this
general rule can be broken. Since there are no universal moral laws, whether a
given lie is right will depend on the results. If the results are good, then the lie
is right. Most generalists believe that lying to save a life is right because

20 Ethical Options

in this case the end justifies the means necessary to attain it. However,
lying in general is wrong.

3. Lying is sometimes right: there is only one universal law. Situationism
claims that there is only one absolute moral law, and telling the truth is not it.
Love is the only absolute, and lying may be the loving thing to do. In fact,
lying to save a life is the loving thing to do. Hence, lying is sometimes right.
Indeed, any moral rule except love can and should be broken for love's sake.
Everything else is relative; only one thing is absolute. Thus the situationist
believes that lying to save lives is morally justified.

4. Lying is always wrong: there are many nonconflicting laws. Unqualified
absolutism believes that there are many absolute moral laws, and none of
them should ever be broken. Truth is such a law. Therefore, one must always
tell the truth, even if someone dies as a result of it. Truth is absolute, and
absolutes cannot be broken. Therefore, there are no exceptions to telling the
truth. Results are never used as a rationale to break rules, even if the results
are desirable.

S. Lying is forgivable: there are many conflicting laws. Conflicting absolutism
recognizes that we live in an evil world, where absolute moral laws some-
times run into inevitable conflict. In such cases it is our moral duty to do the
lesser evil. We must break the lesser law and plead mercy. For instance, we
should lie to save the life and then ask for forgiveness forbreaking God's
absolute moral law. Our moral dilemmas are sometimes unavoidable, but we
are culpable anyway. God cannot change his absolute moral prescriptions
because of our moral predicaments.

6. Lying is sometimes right: there are higher laws. Graded absolutism holds that
there are many moral absolutes, and they sometimes conflict. However,
some laws are higher than others, so when there is an unavoidable conflict, it
is our duty to follow the higher moral law. God does not blame us for what
we could not avoid. Thus he exempts us from responsibility to follow the
lower law in view of the overriding obligation to obey the higher law. Many
graded absolutists believe that mercy to the innocent is a greater moral duty
than telling truth to the guilty. Hence, they are convinced that it is right in
such cases to lie in order to save a life.

The diagram on the next page is a logical summary of the six major views.

In summary, antinomianism sets forth its view to the exclusion of all objective
moral laws. Generalism claims that there are exceptions to moral laws. Situationism
holds one moral absolute to the exclusion of all others. Unqualified absolutism insists
that there is always an escape from the apparent conflict in absolute moral laws.
Conflicting absolutism contends that when moral laws conflict, doing the lesser evil
is excusable. And graded absolutism holds that when moral laws conflict, God grants
an exemption to the lower law in view of our duty to obey the higher law. Each of
these views will be examined in the next several chapters.

All the Options 21

CHART 1.1
Six Major Ethical Views

Moral Principles
1

es

None Some
Antinomianism

1
General Absolute

Genera:ism

One Many
Situationisin is

Never Conflict Conflict
Nonconflicting

Absolutism

1
Guilty Not Guilty
(lesser evil) (greater good)
ConflictingAbsolutism Graded Absolutism

Select Readings

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. In The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford T'rans-
lotion, edited by Jonathan Barnes. 2 vols. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Bourke, Vernon. History of Ethics. New York: Doubleday, 1968.

Fedler, Kyle D. Exploring Christian Ethics: Biblical Foundations for Morality. Louisville:
Westminster John Knox, 2006.

Fletcher, Joseph. Situation Ethics: The New Morality. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966.

Gula, Richard M. What Are They Saying about Moral Norms? Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press,
1982.

Flume, David. Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Edited by Eugene F. Miller.
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985.

Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals: Text and Critical Essays.
Edited by Robert P. Wolff. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969.

Plato. The Republic. Translated by Francis Macdonald Cornford. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1967.

Rae, Scott B. Moral Choices: An Introduction to Ethics. 3rd ed. Grand Rapids: Zondervan,
2009.

Z

ANTINOMIANISM

Broadly speaking, ethical systems fall into two categories: nonabsolutisms and
absolutisms. In the first category are antinomianism (chap. 2), situationism (chap.
3), and generalism (chap. 4). In the second category are unqualified absolutism
(chap. 5), conflicting absolutism (chap. 6), and graded absolutism (chap. 7). Since
Christian ethics is firmly rooted in the unchanging moral character of God (Lev.
11:45; Mal. 3:6), the first three are not options for the Christian. Nonetheless, since
they challenge Christian ethics, they must be addressed.

Background ofAntinomianism

Antinomianism, which literally means "against/instead of law," holds that
there are no binding moral laws, that everything is relative.

Antinomianism in the Ancient World

Ethical antinomianism has a long history. There were at least three
movements in the ancient world that influenced the rise of antinomianism:
processism, hedonism, and skepticism.

Processism. The ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus said, "No man steps into
the same river twice, for fresh waters are ever upon him." Everything in the world,
he believed, is in a constant state of flux. A later Greek thinker, Cratylus, carried
this philosophy one step further, contending that no one steps into the same river
once. He argued that the river and everything else have no "sameness"

22

Antinomianism 23

or unchanging essence. So convinced was Cratylus that all is flux that he was not
even sure that he existed. When asked about his existence, he would simply wiggle
his finger, indicating that he too was in flux. It is clear that if this is applied to the
realm of ethics, there can be no abiding moral laws. Every ethical value will
change with the situation.

Hedonism. The ancient Epicureans gave impetus to a relativistic ethic, which
makes pleasure the essence of good and pain the essence of evil, known as he-
donism (from the Greek Wane, pleasure). But pleasures are relative to persons,
places, and periods. An airplane ride is pure pleasure for some and sheer agony
for others. Sometimes the same music is relaxing, and at other times annoying.
Applied to the realm of morals, this view contends that what is morally good for
one person may be evil for another.

Skepticism. The central thesis of skepticism is to suspend judgment on all mat-
ters. Sextus Empiricus was a famous skeptic in the ancient world, as was David
Hume in modern times. The skeptic insists that every issue has two sides and every
question can be argued to a stalemate. Since no firm and final conclusion can be
drawn, we must suspend judgment in all matters. In ethics this would mean that
nothing should ever be considered absolutely right or wrong.

Antinomianism in the Medieval World

Although the medieval Western world was dominated by a Christian point
of view, it still generated several strains of thought that contributed to antino-
mianism. The most notable among these were intentionalism, voluntarism, and
nominalism.

Intentionalism. In the twelfth century, Peter Abelard argued that an act is right if
it is done with good intention and wrong if done with bad intention. Hence, some
acts that seem bad are really good. For example, someone who accidentally kills
another is not morally culpable. Neither is giving money to the poor a good act if it
is done for the wrong motives (e.g., to be praised by others). This being the case, it
would seem that the rightness or wrongness of an act is relative to a person's
intentions.

Voluntarism. The fourteenth-century thinker William of Ockham argued that all
moral principles are traceable to God's will. Thus God could have decided dif-
ferently about what is right and what is wrong. Ockham believed that something is
right because God wills it; God does not will it because it is right. If this is so, then
what is morally right today may not be so tomorrow. Although Christian
voluntarists took comfort in the belief that God would not change his will on basic
moral issues, they could not be sure that morals would not change. In this way
voluntarism helped pave the way for antinomianism.

Nominalism. Another aspect of Ockham's thought was called nominalism, or
the denial of universals. Nominalists believe there are no universal forms or es-
sences, that only particular things exist. Universals exist only in the mind, not in

24 Ethical Options

reality. The real world is radically individual. There is, for example, no such
thing as the essence of 'humanness!' Individual humans exist in the real world,
but "humanness" exists only as a concept in the mind. It is not difficult to see
that if the same reasoning is applied to ethics, then there is no such thing as
goodness or justice. There are only individual acts of justice that differ from
others, but no such thing as justice itself.

Antinomianism in the Modern World

The growth of relativism in the modern world is manifest in three movements:
utilitarianism, existentialism, and evolutionism. Each of these contributes in its
own way to antinomianism.

Utilitarianism. Building on ancient hedonism, Jeremy Bentham (d. 1832) laid
down the principle that one should act so as to produce the greatest good for the
greatest number of persons in the long run. This is sometimes called the "utilitarian
calculus." He understood this in the quantitative sense of what brings the greatest
amount of pleasure and the least amount of pain.

John Stuart Mill (d. 1873) used the same utilitarian calculus, only he
understood it in a qualitative sense. He believed that some pleasures were of
higher quality than others. He even went so far as to say it would be better to be
an unhappy human than a happy pig, for the intellectual and aesthetic qualities
of human life are qualitatively superior to the mere physical pleasures of an
animal. In any event, there are no absolute moral laws. It all depends on what
brings about the greatest pleasure. And this may differ from person to person
and place to place.

Existentialism. Soren Kierkegaard (d. 1855) is the father of modern existen-
tialism. Although he was a Christian thinker, many believe that he opened the
door for antinomianism by claiming that our highest dutygoes beyond moral law.
Kierkegaard earnestly believed the moral law, which says, "Thou shalt not kill";
yet he also believed that God told Abraham to kill his son Isaac (Gen. 22). He
believed there was no moral reason or justification for such an act, but that it was
necessary in this case to transcend the ethical by "a leap of faith:'

Following Kierkegaard, non-Christian thinkers such as Jean-Paul Sartre (d.
1980) took existentialism a step closer to antinomianism. Sartre argued that no
ethical acts have any real meaning. He concluded Being and Nothingness by
saying, "It amounts to the same thing whether one gets drunk alone or is a
leader of nations”

Evolutionism. After Darwin (d. 1882), men like Herbert Spencer (d. 1903)
expanded evolution into a cosmic theory. Others, such as T. H. Huxley (d. 1895)
and Julian Huxley (d. 1975), worked out an evolutionary ethic. The central tenet is
that whatever aids the evolutionary process is right and whatever hinders it is

1. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Bames (New York: Philosophical Library,
1956), 627.

Antinomianism 25

wrong. Julian Huxley laid down three principles of evolutionary ethics: it is right
to realize ever-new possibilities in evolution; it is right to respect human
individuality and to encourage its fullest development; it is right to construct a
mechanism for further social evolution.

Adolf Hitler (d. 1945) worked out an evolutionary ethic in Mein Kalnpf (1924).
Applying Darwin's principle of natural selection or survival of the fittest to human
ethnic groups, Hitler concluded that since evolution has produced the superior
(Aryan) stock, we must work to preserve it. Likewise, he believed that inferior
breeds must be weeded out. On this basis he killed six million Jews and about five
million other non-Aryans.

Antinomianism in the Contemporary World

Several movements in the contemporary world contribute to a lawless
morality. Three that stand out are emotivism, nihilism, and situationism. In
their extreme forms, all of these are antinomian.

Emotivism. A. J. Ayer (d. 1989) argued that all ethical statements are emotive.
That is, they really only express our feelings. Thus statements like "Thou shalt not
kill" really mean 'T dislike killing" or 'I feel killing is wrong." Ethical statements are
merely expostulations of our subjective feelings. There are no divine imperatives.
Everything is relative to one's individual feelings. Hence, there are no objective
moral laws that are binding on all persons everywhere.

Nihilism. The famous German atheist Friedrich Nietzsche (d. 1900) said, "God
is dead and we have killed him." When God died, all objective values died with
him?. The Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoyevsky (d. 1881) noted correctly that if
God is dead, then anything goes. For Nietzsche, the death of God meant not only
the death of God-given values but also the need for humans to create their own
values. In doing so, he argued, we must go "beyond good and evil." Since there is
no God to will what is good, we must will our own good. And since there is no
eternal value, we must will the eternal recurrence of the same state of affairs. In
the last line of The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche said that he would rather will
nothingness than not to will at all. This willing of nothingness is what is called
nihilism (nothingness-ism).

Situationism. According to this view, everything is relative to the situation in
which one finds oneself. Although the ethicist Joseph Fletcher (d. 1991) claims to
believe in one absolute ethical norm (see chap. 3), he has no absolute moral
principles with substantive content. In this sense, his view contributes heavily to
antinomianism. Fletcher says we should avoid words such as "never" and "always."
There are no moral principles that apply to all people at all times. All ethical deci-
sions are expedient and circumstantial.

2. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann
(New York: Viking, 1960,95.

26 Ethical Options

Basic Beliefs of Antinomians

Antinomians are without moral law. This can be understood in an absolute or in a
limited sense. In an absolute sense, they are without any moral law whatsoever,
though few claim to hold this view. This is usually something said of ethical rela-
tivism byway of critique. It is a view that they are charged with holding byway of
inference, not by their explicit confession.

Limited antinomianism is more widely held. This is a form of ethical relativism
that denies any objective, absolute, or God-given laws. It does not deny all moral
laws, but it does deny all laws anyone might impose on others. Let us examine
some of the basic beliefs of antinomianism in more detail.

There Are No God-Given Moral Laws

Antinomians are either theoretical or practical atheists because they do not
believe that any moral principles have divine sanctions. Either there is no God,
or else there is none that has enjoined universal moral laws on us.

There Are No Objective Moral Laws

Most antinomians do not deny that persons can choose to live by some moral
standards. They simply refuse to accept that these are more than the subjective
choices of the individual. Whatever moral laws there may be are relative to indi-
viduals who choose to live by them. There are no objective moral laws binding on
all human beings.

There Are No Timeless Moral Laws

Antinomians are also opposed to any timeless moral laws, whether they
derive from some God or are just there. Whatever moral laws there may be are
temporal, not eternal. Humankind is literally without any abiding laws. Morals
are simply mores, and they change from place to place as well as from time to
time.

There Are No Laws against Laws

Most antinomians are not against law but simply without law. They are not
necessarily opposed to laws but feel that there are not any objective moral laws.
This does not mean that they are without any kind of law. Most antinomians accept
the need for family rules as well as civil laws. They realize that without some kinds
of laws, society cannot operate. But while they accept positive social law, they
insist that it is not based on any divine or natural law. It is this kind of moral law
behind the civil law that they believe human beings are without. And in this sense,
they are antinomian, or without law.

Antinomianism 27

Positive Contributions olAntinomianism

Few positions are totally without any merit. There is usually enough truth in any
false view to make it float. Hence, even the antinomian view contains some frag-
ments of truth. Different forms of antinomianism make different contributions,
but all of them make some contribution. These positive aspects of antinomianism
include the following.

It Stresses Individual Responsibility

In taking their focus off the universal, antinomians often place emphasis on the
individual. This points out the truth that ethics is ultimately a matter of personal
responsibility. No reference to God as the source of moral principles can be used to
excuse humans from taking responsibility for their own actions.

Likewise, stress on the individual avoids absolving personal responsibility in a
collectivity. The individual cannot escape into the group. The individual cannot hide
in the crowd. No one can rightfully blame society for their own moral actions.

It Recognizes an Emotive Element

Some antinomians rightfully point to an emotive dimension in much of what
passes for moral prescription. Not everything that takes the linguistic form
of" Thou shalt not" or "You ought not" is really a divine imperative. Many such
statements are merely expressions of some individual's feelings. Not all alleged
imperatives are really prescriptive; some are merely emotive. We often couch our
own personal feelings in the more powerful language of divine injunctions. The
antinomians can be thanked for helping us to be conscious of such abuses.

It Stresses Personal Relations

Some forms of antinomianism, existentialism for example, stress personal re-
lations instead of merely prescriptive regulations. In so doing, they focus on an
important dimension of morality. After all, our primary ethical responsibility is to
persons, not to mere laws. Jesus made this point when he said, "The Sabbath was
made for man, not man for the Sabbath" (Mark 2:27; man = humankind). Persons
are ends, not means to an end. By putting the focus on persons rather than on mere
prescriptions for persons, the antinomian has served to refocus an important
aspect of moral responsibility.

It Stresses the Finite Dimensions of Ethics

Absolutists often overstate their case, acting as though they have an absolute
understanding of absolutes.Antinomians make a contribution to ethics by stressing
the relative dimension. Finite humanity does not have an infinite understanding of
the infinite. Paul said, "Now I know in part” (1 Cor. 13:12). The basic ethical

28 Ethical Options

principles are absolute, but our human perspective on them is less than absolute.
In pointing to our changing understanding of God's unchanging moral law, anti-
nomians have rendered an unwitting service to Christian ethics.

Some Criticisms of Antinomianism

Although many antinomians are not necessarily irresponsible in their actions, there
are nonetheless some irredeemable difficulties with the view as a whole.A number
of views from ancient times to the present gave rise to antinomianism. Each was
discussed earlier, and a brief response will be made to each here.

A Response to Processism

Two points can be made in response to the view, springing from Heraclitus, that
all is in flux. First, Heraclitus himself did not believe that everything is relative. In
fact, he held that there was an unchanging logos beneath all change, by which
change could be measured. He saw this as an absolute law by which all humans
should live.

Second, if one carries the idea of change all the way, as Cratylus tried, then
he uses change to destroy change. For if everything is changing and nothing is
constant, then there is no way to measure the change. Everything cannot be
changing, or we would not be able to know it.

A Response to Hedonism

Claiming that pleasure is the essence of good is subject to several criticisms. First,
not all pleasures are good. For example, the sadistic pleasure some deranged
individuals get from sexually abusing or torturing little children is not good; instead, it
is grossly evil. Second, not all pain is bad. Pains that warn of impending disease or
damage, for instance, are good pains. Third, it is a confusion of categories to reduce
good to pleasure. A person is not virtuous because of feeling good, nor is one
necessarily sinful because of suffering pain. Finally, personal happiness maybe
relative to happenings, but values are not. Many martyrs have suffered adversely for
their values. Hence, the good cannot be equated with the pleasurable.

A Response to Skepticism

There are numerous problems with skepticism. First, consistent skepticism is
self-defeating. If skeptics were really skeptical about everything, then they would
be skeptical about skepticism. If they do not doubt their own doubting, then they
really are not skeptics but are dogmatic and want us to suspend judgment on
everything except their skeptical views. Second, some things ought not to be
doubted. Why, for example, should I doubt my own existence? Some things are

Antinomianism 29

obvious, and it is frivolous to deny the obvious. Third, ethics has to do with the
way we live, but no skeptic can consistently live out real skepticism. Skeptics
cannot suspend judgment on whether they need food and water—at least not
for long. And if they are married, they dare not suspend judgment on whether
they love their spouse!

A Response to Intentionalism

Perhaps the easiest way to state the fundamental objection to intentionalism is to
point out that the road to hell is paved with good intentions." Furthermore, even
Hitler had what he considered good intentions for the Holocaust: he wanted to
weed out Inferior" strains of the human species. In addition, intentionalism
wrongly assumes that because bad intentions are always bad, good intentions are
always good. Bad intentions are always bad, even if they do not result in bad ac-
tions. Trying to kill an innocent person is surely bad, even if the attempt does not
succeed. However, killing handicapped people to alleviate the financial burden on
society is not good no matter how noble the intention may be.

A Response to Voluntarism

Contrary to voluntarism, an act is not good simply because God wills it. First,
this would make God arbitrary and not essentially good. Second, it exalts God's
will above his nature and allows it to operate independent of his nature. This is
questionable theology at best. Third, voluntarism provides no security that God
will remain constant in his ethical concerns, since he could change his mind at any
time and will (decide) that hate is right rather than love. Fourth, an act is not good
simply because it flows from the choice of some sovereign being. As we all know,
sovereigns can be capricious about their will. Something is not good simply
because someone else has the power to perform it. For something to be a good act,
it must come from a good power. A will alone is not a sufficient basis for good; it
must be a good will.

A Response to Nominalism

First, if nominalists are correct in saying there is no universal form or essence of
meaning, then meaning could not be translated from one language to another. But
translation of meaning from language to language occurs daily around the world.
Thus there must be some universal basis for meaning that transcends any given
language. Second, when applied to ethics, this means that all good acts must
participate in some universal goodness by which they are designated good acts. So
there must be some universal good that is common to all good acts. Third, for the
Christian this universal good is the moral character of God. To deny that God has
such a transcendently good nature that it is the basis of all creaturely good is
contrary to the Christian view of God.

30 Ethical Options

A Response to Utilitarianism

The first problem with utilitarianism is that it implies that the end justifies any
means necessary to attain it. If this were so, then Stalin's slaughter of some
eighteen million or more could be justified in view of the communist utopia he
hoped would eventually be achieved. Second, results alone do not justify an action.
When the results come, we must still ask whether they are good results or bad
ones. The end does not justify the means; the means must justify themselves.
Infanticide of children thought to be carriers of genetic Impurities" is not justified
by the goal of a purified genetic stock. Third, even utilitarians take the end as a
universal good, showing that they cannot avoid a universal good. Otherwise from
whence do they derive the concept of a good that should be desired for its own
sake? Finally, desired results alone do not make something good. Often we desire
what is wrong. Even desires for ends thought to be good are subject to the question
Are they good desires? So even here there must be some standard outside the
desires by which they are measured.

A Response to Existentialism

Many criticisms can be leveled at an existential ethic. First, if everyone literally
"did their own thing; there would be chaos, which would hinder anyone from
doing their own "thing." Second, even free choices need a context or structure.
Absolute freedom for two or more persons is impossible, for if one person chooses
to do to others what they choose not to have done to them, then an unavoidable
conflict emerges. This is why law is necessary to structure free choice, thus
maximizing the freedom of all without negating the freedom of any. Third, no free
act is without justification; otherwise one is unjustified in performing it. No action
escapes the first principle of justice any more than a thought can escape the first
principle of noncontradiction. Both thought and action are justified by first
principles, and whoever breaks first principles will in the end be broken by first
principles.

A Response to Evolutionism

The response to an evolutionaryethic is similar to the response to a process ethic.
First, on what basis do we decide what the goal is? What is meant by "development"? Is
this to be understood biologically, politically, culturally, or morally? Second, how do
we know that the desired development is really good development? One can also
develop in an evil direction. Third, who decides what will hinder or help the
evolutionary process? Some standard outside the evolutionary process must be
assumed in order to measure it. Otherwise, we could not know whether the change is
for better or for worse. Since no stage in the process is final or perfect, there must be
some standard beyond it by which we can measure the progress. Otherwise we do not
know the difference between mere change and real progress.

Antinomianism 31

A Response to Emotivism

The first difficulty with emotivism is that it tries to prescribe that ethical state-
ments are not prescriptive. It dictates that "ought" statements do not mean one
ought to do such and such, but simply, "I feel it is wrong:' This is legislating
meaning rather than listening to meaning. It prescribes what an ethical statement
should mean, rather than listening to what it does mean. Second, even emotivists do
not really believe that everything is a matter of subjective feeling. Like everyone
else, emotivists believe some things really are wrong, such as robbing humans of
their freedom of thought and expression. Third, the way emotivists react to being
cheated, robbed, assaulted, or tortured reveals that they really believe these are
wrong.

A Response to Nihilism

Nihilism is hard-core antinomianism. It negates all objective value. Such a view
is subject to severe criticism. First, it is self-destructive, for nihilists value their
right to negate all value. They value their freedom to hold their view and not to be
forced to hold another position. Second, even Nietzsche could not help making
value judgments, both negative and positive. For example, he considered Chris-
tianity to be "the highest of all conceivable corruptions,"* but by what standard did
he make this judgment?

A Response to Situationism

A situational ethic that denies all absolute norms is vulnerable to the same
criticisms that all total relativisms are. First, situationists have no place to stand to
make value judgments. They cannot relativize everything else unless they have
some nonrelative place to stand. It is clearly self-destructive to make an absolute
claim that there are no absolutes. Second, even situationists cannot avoid making
such universal ethical statements as "No unwanted baby should ever be born" or
"Love only is always good.:" Third, situationism is really a form of utilitarianism
and as such is subject to the same criticisms.

Criticisms of Antinomianism in General

In addition to the criticisms that can be leveled at the particular views that have
contributed to antinomianism, several general criticisms can be made of
antinomianism as a whole. Let us examine them in turn.

3. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, in Portable Nietzsche, 655.
4. Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966), 39, 57.

32 Ethical Options

It Is Self-Defeating

The denial of all moral value is self-destructive. One cannot deny all value with-
out presupposing some value. There is no way to be consistently total relativists, for
they cannot move the world unless they have some place to put their fulcrum.
Relativists really stand upon their own absolutes in their attempts to relativize
everything else. This becomes more obvious when one reduces to its common
denominator their basic claim, which amounts to saying, We should never use the
word never," or ““* should always avoid the word always!" But if they are absolutely
sure there are no absolutes, then there must be some. Moral absolutes cannot be
denied unless they are implied. Everyone who denies all value believes there is value
in the denial, or they would not take the trouble to make the denial.

It Is Too Subjective

There may be a subjective element in much of ethics, but this does not mean
that all ethical statements are subjective. There no doubt is a subjective element in
the application, but the principle itself is objective. For example, the understanding
of love varies from person to person, but love itself does not change. There may be
progress in a society's application of justice to its members, but justice is not purely
subjective. A purely subjective ethic is like a game without rules. In fact, it is not a
game at all; it is a free-for-all.

It Is Too Individualistic

Not only is an antinomian ethic like a ball game without rules; it is also like
a game without umpires. Everyone is really their own umpire, since there are
no objective moral laws that bind everyone. Each individual is really their own
authority, because there is no binding external moral authority. Each person
can literally do what is right in their own eyes, and there is nothing that
everyone ought to do.

It is one thing to stress the value of each individual's responsibility but quite
another to say there is no real responsibility for any individual. In such an ato-
mistic ethic, each situation is distinct. There is no real community of value that
transcends the individual, no meaningful moral milieu for interpersonal relations.
Each individual lives in a hermetically sealed moral vacuum jar perched on their
own isolated shelf.

It Is Ineffective

As long as there are two or more persons in the world, there will be conflicts. But
if there are no objective moral laws, there are no ways to adjudicate these clashes.
Moral laws regulate the ways in which persons relate to each other. Even
antinomians want to be treated with respect. But why ought anyone else treat them
with this respect, unless there is a moral law that says they ought to do so?

Antinomianism 33

Unless there is a moral standard outside of two individuals in conflict, there is no
way to resolve their moral conflict. It is simply insufficient to appeal to a different
standard within each individual in order to judge between them. Voluntarily as-
sumed moral standards are no moral standards at all. Amoral duty is an obligation,
not an option. People cannot simply choose whether they will be just and loving;
they are obligated to be just and loving.

It Is Irrational

Antinomianism does not make peace with such laws of rationality as, for ex-
ample, the laws of noncontradiction. It makes no sense to say everything is right
for people to do, even opposites. If love is right for one person, hate cannot be right
for another person. If kindness to children is right in one culture, then cruelty to
them cannot be right in another. These are contradictory actions, and contradic-
tories cannot both be true. It is irrational to contend that opposite moral duties can
both be equally binding.

Summary and Condusion

Antinomianism is a radical form of ethical relativism. It denies not only that there
are any valid ethical absolutes, but also that there are any binding moral laws
whatsoever. It is literally "without law." This does not mean that it is without any
value. Antinomians do stress the value of the individual in making ethical
decisions, as well as the value of personal relations. Furthermore, they often point
out an obviously emotive dimension in much of our ethical exhortation.

However, as an adequate ethical system, antinomianism falls far short of the
mark for many reasons. First, it is self-defeating to deny all binding moral values.
The one denying all values certainly values their right to deny them. Second, it is
also purely subjective, providing no objective rules for the game of life. For
antinomians life actually turns out not to be a serious game at all; it is a
free-for-all. Third, it is too individualistic. Everyone does what is right in their
own eyes. Fourth, it is ineffective, since two or more people cannot function in a
society without objectively binding rules. Finally, it is irrational, since it entails
the belief that opposing views are both right.

Select Readings

Beauvior, Simone de. The Ethics of Ambiguity. New York: Citadel, 1962.

Bloom, Allan. The Closing of the American Mind. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988.
Budziszewski, Jay. The Revenge of Conscience. Dallas: Spence, 2004.

Fletcher, Joseph. Situation Ethics: The New Morality. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966.

34 Ethical Options

Heraclitus. Cosmic Fragments. Edited by G. S. Kirk. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1954.

Huxley, Julian S. Essays of a Biologist. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1939.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals. Translated
by Francis Golffing. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956.

Sartre, JeanePaul. Being and Nothingness. Translated by Hazel E. Barnes. New York:
Philos sophical Library, 1956.

Sextus Empiricus. Against the Dogmatists. In Sextus Empiricus, translated by R. G.
Bury. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935-49.

3

SITUATIONISM

Contrary to what the word situationism might seem to imply, it is not a completely
normless ethic. According to one of its most vigorous proponents, Joseph Fletcher,
author of Situation Ethics, situationism is located between the extremes of legal-
ism and antinomianism. The antinomians have no laws, the legalists have laws for
everything, and Fletcher's situationism has only one law.

There are a number of situationists whose works might have been examined here,
among them Emil Brunner (The Divine hnperative), Reinhold Niebuhr (Moral Man
and Immoral Society), and John A. T. Robinson (Honest to God). But Fletcher's
position has been more influential than these.

Situationism Explained

Since Fletcher's situationism claims allegiance to one unbreakable norm, it will be
treated here as a one-norm absolutism. According to Fletcher, his position is
neither a lawless relativism, which says there is no law for anything, nor a
legalistic absolutism, which has laws for everything. Rather, he contends that there
is one law for everything, the law of love.

Avoiding the Extremes of Legalism and Antinomianism

Fletcher fears both the radical right and the radical left in ethics. However, his
position yields more readily to the criticism that it, too, is not distinguishable from

35

36 Ethical Options

antinomianism. Between these two poles, he tries to firmly establish one
absolute norm that can be applied to every ethical situation.

The legalist is one who enters every decision-making situation encumbered
with a bundle of predetermined rules and regulations. For such, the letter and not
the spirit of the law prevails. The post-Maccabean Pharisees can be singled out as
classic examples of legalists. With their 613 (or 621) laws, they were pre-armed
for any moral predicament. They had a preset and prescribed manual for
morality. Fletcher considers Judaism, along with both classical Catholicism and
Protestantism, to be legalistic, though Judaism is less so than the latter two. The
Jews stoned homosexuals and the church burned them, says Fletcher. Both put
law over love. The legalist believes in the love of duty; the situationist holds to
the duty of love.

At the other end of the ethical spectrum, Fletcher locates the antinomians, who
are complete libertines, with no norms whatsoever. Each of their moral decisions is
spontaneous and unprincipled, based only on the situation of the moment. Some
antinomians claim to have a clairvoyant conscience, a kind of direct moral insight
into right and wrong. As examples of the antinomian view, Fletcher cites the New
Testament libertines, with their lawlessness; the early gnostics, with their 'special
knowledge"; the modern Moral Rearmament movement, with its "spiritual
power"; and Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialism (discussed here in chap. 2). Common
to all these views, says Fletcher, is the rejection of all moral rules, even any
generallyvalid ones. No norm is accepted, not even a norm of love. From Fletcher's
point of view, the antinomians throw out the ethical baby (love) with the legalistic
bathwater.

Between the polar opposites of legalism, with laws for everything, and antino-
mianism, with its lack of laws for anything, Fletcher posits his situational abso-
lutism, with its one law for everything. The situationist comes into every ethical
battle armed with but one moral weapon—love: "Only the command to love is
categorically good."" Every other decision is hypothetical: do this if it is loving.
"We are ‘obliged’ to tell the truth, for example, only if the situation calls for it; if a
would-be murderer asks his victim's whereabouts, our duty might be to lieflAs far
as other moral rules are concerned, they are helpful but not unbreakable. The only
ethical imperative one has is "'Act responsibly in love:" Literally "everything else
without exception, all laws and rules and principles and ideals and norms, are only
contingent, only valid if they happen to serve love in any situation" (emphasis
original)?

The situationist has the one law of love (agape); many general rules of wisdom
(sophia), which are more or less reliable; and the particular moment of decision
(kairos), "in which the responsible self in the situation decides whether the sophia

1. Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality (Philadelphia: Westminster,
1966), 26. 2.1bid., 27.
3.1bid., 28, 30, emphasis original.

Situationism 37

can serve love there or not." The "legalists make an idol of the sophia, antinomians
repudiate it, situationists use it," writes Fletcher.’ The solidification of these
generally valid rules into absolute norms is legalism, and the rejection of all value
in them is antinomianism.

There are at least two basic reasons for accepting only one universal norm.
First, universals cannot be derived by deduction from other universals like "middle
axioms"—one cannot derive an underived norm. Second, each situation is so
different from every other situation that it is questionable whether a rule that ap-
plies to one situation can be applied to all situations like it, since the others may not
really be like it. Only the single axiom or norm of love is broad enough to be
applied to all circumstances and contexts.

Setting Forth the Presuppositions

According to Fletcher, there are four working principles of situationism: prag-
matism, relativism, positivism, and personalism. He does not, however, intend that
we should conclude that situationism is totally relativistic and nonnormative. He
means, rather, that within the framework of this absolute norm of love, everything
else is pragmatic, relativistic, positivistic, and personalistic.

1. Pragmatism. By a pragmatic approach Fletcher means that "the right is only
the expedient in our way of our behaving." It is what "works" or "satisfies"
for love's sake. He wants to put love to work in order to make it successful
and to realize its "cash value."° The pragmatic approach disdains abstract,
verbal solutions to ethical problems; it seeks, rather, concrete and practical
answers.

2. Relativism. There is only one absolute; everything else is relative to it. As the
strategy is pragmatic, the tactics are relativistic."' The divine command of love
is changeless in its why, but contingent in its specific what and how. "The
situationist," writes Fletcher, "avoids words like 'never' and ‘perfect’ and
‘always’ and ‘complete’ as he avoids the plague, as he avoids ‘absolutely's Yet it
is impossible to be "absolutely relative "There must be an absolute or norm of
some kind if there is to be any true relativity." "In Christian situationism the
ultimate criterion is ... 'agapic love:"” But Christians should constantly remind
themselves that everything else is relative to this one norm.

3. Positivism. A positivistic position, as opposed to a naturalistic view, holds
that values are derived voluntaristically, not rationally. A person decides

Ibid., 33, emphasis original.
Ibid

Ibid, 41, 42.

Ibid. 43.

Ibid, 43,44.

Tbid., 45.

CORPNANDMNF

38 Ethical Options

on their values; one does not deduce them from nature. This is also called
"emotivism" because moral values are thought to be expressions of one's
feelings rather than prescriptions for one's life. Apositivistic or emotive ethic
places art and morals in the same camp: both call for a decision or leap of
faith. Ethical statements do not seek verification; they look forjustification.
And only in the one norm of Christian love do all other moral expressions
find their ultimate justification.

4. Personalism. Moral values are not only what persons express; persons are the
ultimate moral values. There are no inherently good things; only persons are
inherentlyvaluable. Value only "happens" to things. Things are of value only
to persons. "Things are to be used; people are to be loved:"° The reverse of
this—loving things and using people—is the perversion of morality.
According to Fletcher, considering only persons to have intrinsic value is
what Kant meant by treating persons always as ends and never as means. So
this is the meaning of love: relating everything to the good of persons, who
alone are good as such.

In brief, situationism is an ethic with a pragmatic strategy, a relativistic
tactic, a positivistic attitude, and a personalistic value center. It is an ethic with
one absolute, to which everything else is relative and which is directed toward
the pragmatic end of doing good to persons.

Explaining the Propositions

The situational position in ethics can be explained by six basic propositions.
Each proposition is an elaboration of what it means to live situationally with
only the one absolute norm of love. Let us examine them in the order in which
they are presented by Fletcher.

"Only one thing is intrinsically good; namely, love: nothing else at all." The
realist argues that God wills something because it is good. Fletcher follows the
voluntarists like Duns Scotus and Ockham, who saythat something is good because
God wills it so. Nothing is good in and for itself. It is good only if it helps persons
and bad if it hurts persons. The person "finding" the value maybe divine or human,
but only persons—God, self, neighbor—determine something to be valuable. No act
has intrinsic value. It gains its value only as it relates to persons. Apart from helping
or hurting persons, all ethical acts are meaningless. All value, worth, goodness, and
rightness are predicates, not properties. They may be predicated about persons, but
they are not real things in themselves. God is goodness and love; all other persons
merely have or do good.

Love is an attitude, not an attribute. Love is something that persons give and
something that persons should receive, because onlypersons have intrinsic value.

10. Ibid., 51.

Situationism 39

According to Fletcher, the image of God in the human being is not reason but
love. Love and personhood constitute humankind's characteristic similarity to
God. This is why the only human thing with intrinsic value is love—it makes
the human like God.

The other side of the proposition that only benevolence (love) is inherently good
is that only malevolence is intrinsically evil. However, for Fletcher the opposite of
love is not hate, which is really a perverted form of love, but rather indifference.
ference. Hate at least treats the other as a thou, or person. Indifference treats others as
inanimate objects. To totally ignore others and their needs is to depersonalize them.
It is worse than attacking them, for an attack presupposes at least that the attacker
considers the other person worth attacking.

Fletcher is opposed to calling some acts lesser and, therefore, excusable evils.
A spy's lie, for example, is not wrong at all. "If it [a lie] is told in love it is good,
right?’ "It is not an excusable evil; it is a positive good." "If love vetoes the truth, so
be it."" Whatever one must do for love's sake is good, for only love is intrinsically
good; nothing else whatsoever is good. Whatever is the loving thing to do in a
given situation is the right thing to do, even if it involves sacrificial suicide while
suffering torture, to avoid betraying one's comrades to the enemy.

"The ruling norm or Christian decision is love; nothing else." Love replaces the
law. The spirit replaces the letter. "We follow law, if at all, for love's sake.:"” One
does not follow love for the law's sake; one follows the law only for love's sake.
Traditionally, people believed that they kept love by obeying the law because the
two were identical. But love and law sometimes conflict, and when they do, it is
the Christian's obligation to put love over the law. It is not the love of the law but
the law of love that one ought to follow.

According to Fletcher, Jesus summed up the Mosaic law and the Ten Command-
ments in one word: Jove. Indeed, there is no one of the commandments that may not be
broken in some situation for love's sake. "There are no ‘universal laws' held by all men
everywhere at all times, no consensus of all men."" For 'any precepts all men can agree
to are platitudes such as ‘do the good and avoid the evil' or 'to each according to his
due?" There are no universal laws except love. Every other law is breakable by love.
As Augustine put it, "Love with care and then what you will, do." He did not say, adds
Fletcher, ‘Love with desire and do what you please?"

Christian love is a giving love. Christian love is neither romantic (erotic) love
nor friendship (philic) love. Christian love is a sacrificial (agapic) love. And it is
also a responsible love, which is no more subject to exploitation than to the evasive
motives of legalism. A legalistic refuge in the safety of universal laws can even be a
retreat from individual responsibility. One may wish for the security

11.Ibid., 65.

12.Ibid., 70, emphasis original.
13.Ibid., 76.

14. Ibid.

15.Ibid., 70.

40 Ethical Options

of absolutes rather than the responsibility of relatives. The classical pacifist is,
for Fletcher, escaping the responsibility of deciding which wars are just. It is an
easier ethic if someone else decides what is right or wrong and simply tells us
what to do.

"Love and justice are the same, for justice is love distributed; nothing else.""Love and
justice are identical. Love does more than take justice into account; love becomes
justice. Justice means to give others their due, and love is their due. Fletcher quotes
the apostle Paul's injunction, "Owe no man anything except to love" (Rom. 13:8).
Even if love and justice differed (and they do not), the least love could do would be to
give justice to every person. In loving, in being just, one must be multidirectional, not
just one-directional. The command is to love one's neighbors.

Love is not merely a present activity toward one's immediate neighbor. Love
must have foresight. It must borrow the utilitarian principle and try to bring the
greatest good (love) to the greatest number of people, for if love does not calculate
the remote consequences, it becomes selfish. In short, justice is love using its head.
Christian ethics welcomes law and order for love's sake and even foresees the need
at times for a loving use of force to protect the innocent. It makes "rights" practical.
Sometimes one may have the moral (loving) responsibility to disobey unjust civil
law. And on occasion love may demand a revolution against the state—if the state
has gone beyond love's pale.

"Love wills the neighbor's good whether we like him or not."' Fletcher's fourth
proposition stresses that love is an attitude and not a feeling, and in so doing it
stresses the distinctive characteristics of Christian love. In eras desire is the cause
of love, while in agape love is the cause of desire. Agapic love is not reciprocal. A
comparison of the three kinds of love reveals what Fletcher has in mind here.
Erotic love is egoistic. It says, "My first and last consideration is myself." Philic
love is mutual. It says, "I will give as long as I receive? Agapic love, on the other
hand, is altruistic, saying, 31 will give, requiring nothing in return? This kind of
love is the ruling norm in situational ethics. Agapic love holds that one ought to
love one's neighbor as oneself.

Fletcher sketches four interpretations of the command to love one's neighbor
as oneself. First, some say it means to love your neighbor just as much as you
love yourself. Second, it may mean to love others in addition to loving yourself.
Third, thinkers such as Soren Kierkegaard hold that it means to love your
neighbor in the way you ought to love yourself—rightly and honestly. Fourth, it is
said that the command is to love your neighbor instead of loving yourself (as you
have been doing but must now stop doing). Which is the true meaning of
self-love?

Following the ladder of self-love suggested by Bernard of Clairvaux—which
ascends from love of self for self's sake, to love of God for self's sake, to love of God
for God's sake, to love of self for God's sake—Fletcher outlines his own un-
derstanding of loving one's neighbor as oneself. We move, he says, from love of
ourselves for our own sake, to love of our neighbor for our own sake, to love of our

Situationism 41

neighbor for the neighbor's sake, to love of ourselves for the neighbor's sake.
The last is the highest and the best. It is the right kind of self-love: the love of
oneself for the sake of loving others.

When self-love and neighbor-love conflict, "the logic of love is that self-concern
is obligated to cancel neighbor-good whenever more neighbor-good will be served
through serving the self."" Ship captains and airplane pilots, for example, are to
keep themselves alive, even at the expense of some passengers, if need be, for the
sake of the safety of the rest of the passengers. In actuality, there is no real conflict
between self-love and neighbor-love. One is to love oneself only to the degree that
it maximizes neighbor-love.

All love is self-love, but it is the self loved for the sake of loving the most people
possible. Love is one, but there are three objects: God, neighbor, and self. Self-love
maybe either right or wrong. 'If we love ourselves for our own sakes, that is wrong.
If we love ourselves for God's sake and the neighbor's, then it is right. For to love
God and the neighbor is to love one's self in the right way ... ; to love one's self in
the right way is to love God and one's neighbors!"" And in no case does loving
one's neighbors imply that we must like them.

Love does not even necessarily involve pleasing our neighbor. Love demands that
we will our neighbor's good, whether or not the neighbor pleases us, and whether or
not our love pleases the neighbor. Calculating the neighbor's good, even if it
displeases them, is not cruel. A military nurse, for example, may lovingly treat
patients roughly so as to hasten their recovery and return them to battle.

"Only the end justifies the means; nothing else." Tf this were not true, no act would
be justified. There are no intrinsically good acts except the act of love. Hence, the
only thing that can justify an act is if it is done for loving ends or purposes. This is not
to say that any end justifies any means, but only that a /oving end justifies any means.
For example, it might be the loving thing to steal a murderer's gun or to lie to a
schizophrenic patient to keep him calm for treatment. What, asks Fletcher, justifies
slicing into a human body with a knife? Surely not hatred of him as one's enemy. But
would not the act of mutilating his body be justified if the end in view is to save his
life from a disease or a cancerous organ? Does not the end justify the means in this
situation?

In fact, what other than the end could possiblyjustifythe means, asks Fletcher?
The means cannot justify themselves. Only ends justify means. Indeed, "no act
apart from its foreseeable consequences has any ethical meaning whatsoever." is
The meaning of the act comes from its purpose or end. And the only justifiable
purpose for performing ethical acts is agapic love. Any means that is sought for its
own sake is wrong. All ends are actually only means to higher ends, until one
arrives at last at the ultimate end of love itself.

16.1bid., 113.
17.1bid., 114.
18.1bid., 120.

42 Ethical Options

In response to those who challenge, on the basis of the "wedge" principle (i.e.,
that it is dangerous to have exceptions to moral norms like telling the truth and sav-
ing lives), Fletcher argues that "abuse does not bar use." The fact that some people
will abuse the situationist position of responsible love by irresponsible actions does
not disprove the value of the love norm itself. And the so-called generalization
argument—"What if everyone did it?"—is no more than obscurantism, a delaying
tactic of static morality.

"Love's decisions are made situationally, not prescriptively.' The final expository
postulate of situation ethics strongly marks the difference between the basic ethical
principle of the love norm and the application of that principle in a given circum-
stance. The love principle is a universal but formal norm. It does not prescribe in
advance what specific courses of action will be loving. For the precise prescription of
love, a person will have to wait until they are in the situation. Love is free from
specific predefinition. One cannot know in advance the "existential particularity"
that love will take in a given situation. Love operates apart from a system of
pretailored, prefabricated moral rules. Love functions circumstantially and
neocasuistically. Love does not make up its mind before it has seen the facts, and the
jacts come from the situation.

What the situationist does have in advance is a general (though not specific)
knowledge of what one should do (love), why one should do it (for God's sake), and
to whom it should be done (one's neighbors). The situationist surely knows that love
is altruistic and not egoistic. And one knows that love should be exercised toward as
many neighbors as possible. The situationist knows in advance how this love will
probably operate in a general way by means ofsophia, or wisdom. But one cannot
say for sure what the loving thing to do will be in a particular case until all the
particulars are known. For example, if Fletcher is asked, "Is adulterywrong?" he
answers, "I don't know. Maybe. Give me a case:' (In fact, Fletcher himself provides a
case where adultery can be right if it is done in love; see below.)

In brief, the situationist holds that the general what and why are absolute, but
the how is relative. There is an absolute prescription, but it is only worked out in
the relative situation. Love is ultimate, but just how one is to love is dependent on
the immediate circumstances. By a closer examination of some difficult moral
situations, we will be able to understand even betterjust how Fletcher's one-norm
absolutism functions in different contexts.

Applying the Love Norm

By the use of provocative illustrations throughout his book, Fletcher is able
to explain more fully just why he holds to only one absolute norm and how it
would probably be applied under differing conditions. Some of these marginal
moral cases merit further examination.

Altruistic adultery. A German mother of two was captured by the Russians near the
end of World War II. The rules of her Ukrainian prison camp allowed her release

Situationism 43

to Germany only in the event of pregnancy, in which case she would be returned as
a liability. So the woman asked a friendly camp guard to impregnate her. She was
sent back to Germany, was welcomed by her family, gave birth to the baby, and
made him a part of their reunited family. Was her adultery justified? Fletcher does
not say explicitly that it was, but he implies the same by calling it "sacrificial
adultery." Elsewhere, however, Fletcher speaks approvingly of mate-swapping for
consenting adults, of a woman seducing a man pathologically attracted to a little
girl, and of a young couple forcing parental approval of their marriage by engaging
in intercourse. The direct implication is that all of these things can be done lovingly
and can, therefore, be morally right.

Patriotic prostitution. A young woman working for a United States intelligence
agency was asked to lure an enemy spy into blackmail by using her sexuality. In
the guise of a secretary, she was to become involved with a married man working
for a rival power. When she protested that she could not put her personal integrity
on the block by offering sex for hire, she was told, "It's like your brother risking his
life or limb in Korea. We are sure this job can't be done any other way." She was
patriotic and wanted to serve her country. What was the loving thing to do? Here
again Fletcher does not give his answer, but in view of the fact that he elsewhere
approves of spies lying and men dying for their country out of love, for him there
seems to be no reason why one might not be able to justify committing fornication
for the fatherland, too.

Sacrificial suicide. Is taking one's own life always morally wrong? According to
situation ethics, it is not; suicide can be done in love. For example, if a man has
only the two choices of taking an expensive medicine—a course of action that will
deplete his family's finances and cause his insurance to lapse—in order to live
three more years, or else refusing the medicine and dying in six months, thereby
leaving ample financial provisions for his family, which is the loving thing to do?
It is not difficult to see how a situationist could approve of this rather indirect kind
of sacrificial suicide. In fact, Fletcher speaks with approval both of Mother Maria's
substitutionary death in the Nazi gas chambers for a young Jewess, and of a
captured soldier's taking his own life to avoid betraying his comrades to the enemy.
Suicide can be done for love's sake, in which case it is morally right according to a
situationist ethic.

Acceptable abortion. Even though Fletcher favors birth control over abortion as
a means of controlling the population, nonetheless there are circumstances when
he comes out clearly in favor of abortion. He gives the example of an unmarried
schizophrenic patient who became pregnant after being raped. Her father requested
abortion but was refused by the hospital staff on the grounds that it was not a
therapeutic abortion and was, therefore, illegal. Fletcher castigates this refusal as
legalistic. "The situationist ... would almost certainly, in this case, favor abortion
and support the girl's father's request?”

19. Ibid., 38.

44 Ethical Options

In another case, Fletcher gives tacit approval to a Romanian Jewish doctor who
aborted three thousand babies ofJewish mothers in concentration camps because, if
pregnant, the mothers were to be incinerated. That means that the doctor saved
three thousand lives. And from the standpoint that the embryos were human lives
(which Fletcher rejects), the doctor, by "killing" three thousand, saved three
thousand and prevented the murder of six thousand. Surely this was the loving
thing to do, according to situationism.

Merciful murder. Should we actually turn our back on someone who is hope-
lessly caught in a burning airplane and begs to be shot? Would it not have been
right to assassinate Hitler? Fletcher offers both illustrations and seems to indi-
cate that either one could be a merciful, and therefore justifiable, murder. He
seems to favor the act of a mother smothering her crying baby in order to save
her group from being detected and killed by hostile Indians. The direct impli-
cation is that such an act might be performed in sacrificial love for the good of
the whole group.

Fletcher clearly approves of throwing some men out of an overloaded rescue boat
to save them all from sinking. In 1841, the first mate of the ship William Brown of
Liverpool was in charge of an overcrowded lifeboat and ordered most of the males
thrown into the sea to save the rest. Later, the seaman who threw them into the sea
was convicted of murder, with mercy recommended. "Situation ethics says it was
bravely sinful, it was a good thing."" According to Fletcher, the first mate actually
acted in love for the greater number of lives.

There are many other marginal cases that Fletcher offers, including refusing to
respirate a monstrously deformed child and carrying the inventor of a cancer cure
out of a burning building rather than one's own father. He also recommends
sterilizing someone marrying a syphilitic and providing motherhood for single
women by artificial insemination. I will not take space here to discuss more cases.
One point, however, arises from all of these situations and needs emphasis here: in
each situation there is a conflict of moral norms that the situationist feels can best
be resolved by appeal to a single higher norm.

Often the norms that conflict are held by some people to be unbreakable and
universal. But how can two or more norms be universal and unbreakable if they
conflict? One cannot follow two opposing paths; one must choose. Surely
persons cannot be held responsible for obeying two conflicting norms when
they can obey only one, can they? At this point the situationist's solution shines.
There is really only one universal and unbreakable norm: love. All the other
norms are at best general and can be broken for love's sake. The simplicity and
logic of the solution has strong appeal, but there are also some grave difficulties.
Let us turn our attention now to an evaluation of the one-norm absolutism of
situation ethics.

20. 1bicl., 136.

Situationism 45

Situationism Evaluated

The goal in what follows is not to evaluate the whole of situational ethics compre-
hensively, but only insofar as it bears on the question of moral laws. In this respect
the evaluation will be both positive and negative. First, there are some clear merits
to holding only one absolute norm such as love.

Some Advantages of the Situational Position

Critics from more traditional and absolutistic viewpoints tend to overreact to
Fletcher's relativism, pragmatism, emotivism, and radical examples. But what is
sometimes forgotten is that all of this is in the context of a clear claim that his ethic
is an absolutism, a one-norm absolutism. In this latter regard, many of the merits of
the situational position emerge.

It is a normative position. First to be commended is Fletcher's attempt to lay
down a normative approach to ethics. His second proposition states, "The ruling
norm of Christian decision is love; nothing else:' In view of the fact that he
spends a whole chapter elaborating this, as well as repeatedly referring to this
one absolute throughout the book, it seems quite unfair to summarily dismiss
Fletcher as totally normless and antinomian. Indeed, Fletcher spends much of
his first chapter explaining that his view is not antinomian but rather a
one-norm absolutism. (In "What Is a Rule?" Fletcher later denies that his
approach has any universal norms)"

Fletcher distinguishes between formal principles, such as "Act as lovingly as
possible"; substantial principles, such as "The good which should be sought or done
is utility"; and normative principles, such as "Loving concern for our neighbors calls
for telling them the truth:' Only formal principles, he says, are universal." Possibly
Fletcher means that there are no universals with substantive content, and that the
love principle, which he calls "the ruling norm of Christian ethics," is only
formally universal."

The reasons for commending a normative approach to ethics have alreadybeen
given and need not be repeated here. It is sufficient to note in passing that norms
are both inescapable and essential to a meaningful ethic. Without them, one has
no objective basis or guide for ethical decisions.

It is an absolutism. Fletcher's view is not only normative; it is also absolute. There
is one unbreakable law, the law of love. And even though Fletcher deliberately
avoids such words as "never" and "always" with regard to every other norm, he
does not hesitate to emphasize that there are no exceptions to the love norm. Only
love and nothing else justifies what one does, he argues. Furthermore, there

21. Joseph Fletcher, " What Is a Rule? A Situationist's View; in Norm and Context in
Christian Ethics, ed. Gene H. Outka and Paul Ramsey (New York: Scribner's, 1960,325.
22x Fletcher, Situation Ethics, 337-38.

23. Ibid., 69.

46 Ethical Options

is no such thing as total relativity. Relative norms must be relative to a norm that is
not relative. What, why, and who are the Christian's three universals, Fletcher says.
That is, the Christian knows that the neighbor should be loved for God's sake.
These three universals are absolute; only the circumstances are relative. He clearly
holds that one ought always to love and should never hate or be indifferent to one's
neighbors. "Christian situation ethics has only one norm ... that is binding and
unexceptional, always good and right regardless of the circumstances": agapic
love."

It resolves the issue of conflicting norms. Whatever one maythink of the
situationist's solution to the marginal cases where conflicting norms are involved,
at least it presents a logical possibility. All other ethical norms are subordinate to
the one absolute norm, in view of which it is ethically right to break any of them for
the sake of this love norm. This solution is both logical and simple. It is simple
because it does not involve a complicated series of exceptions to norms, nor does it
present a pyramid of moral values. It posits a single norm that takes precedence
over all others. It is logical in the sense that it is not internally contradictory. It
never leaves any ethical dilemmas in conflict or tension; they are always resolvable
(at least in theory) by appeal to the single law of love. In other words, situationism
is never faced with the dilemma of having two absolute or universal norms in
conflict, since it does not have two absolute norms. There is one absolute norm, no
more and no less.

It gives due value to differing circumstances. Another merit of situationism not
to be undervalued is its emphasis on the fact that the circumstances or context of an
ethical decision have a bearing on the rightness or wrongness of the act. However
morally wrong falsifying may or may not be, surely it differs from context to
context. Falsifying in fun to a friend is probably amoral, whereas serious falsifying
before a judge and a jury is not. The circumstances do make a difference in the
moral rightness or wrongness of the act. Likewise, taking another life accidentally,
or in self-defense, or letting one die as an act of mercy are all markedly different
situations from an intentional and malicious murder of another human being. The
situation does condition the way one's norm (or norms) should be applied. Without
due stress on the conditioning influence of the moral situation, one's ethics become
legalistic and even inhuman.

Indeed, as will be seen later, it is very difficult (if not impossible) to contend for
a many-norm absolutism of any kind, unless contextual qualificationsbecome part
of the definition of the norm. Truthfulness and the duty to avoid or prevent taking
life (or at least letting someone die) invariably come into conflict unless one has
the prerogative to say that lying and taking life in certain contexts are wrong. This
will be discussed more fully later. For now it is sufficient to note that giving
attention to the circumstances or context o f ethical decisions is both unavoidable
and desirable in elaborating a good ethical position.

24. Ibid., 38.

Situationism 47

It stresses love and the value of persons. From a Christian point ofview (and even
from many non-Christian perspectives), the stress on agapic love as the ruling norm
is certainly commendable. Bertrand Russell wrote Why I Am Not a Christian, but he
also said elsewhere, "What the world needs is Christian love or compassion."'s
Seldom do strong voices arise in defense of selfish love, that is, self-love, or
self-centered love. And from the Christian point of view, love is the absolute moral
character of God. "God is love" and love is of God," the New Testament says (1 John
4:7-8).And when all else fades, love will abide forever. Jesus summarized the whole
of the Old Testament in the one word love. Indeed, according to Jesus, love was to be
the earmark of his disciples. By this all men will know that you are my disciples, if
you love one another" (John 13:35).

In view of this and from a Christian point of view, it is quite difficult to criticize
the preeminence Fletcher gives to Christian agapic love. Implied in this stress on
loving others is the fact that they are to be treated as persons in the image of God
and not as mere things. The neighbor is a thou, not an it. The other is a person to be
loved, not a thing to be used. Others are ends in themselves and not merely means
for our own ends. Fletcher's emphasis that humans are persons (like God) who have
God-given value is commendable from a Christian perspective.

Some Inadequacies of One-Norm Situationism

From both a moralistic viewpoint in general and a Christian perspective in
particular, not everything in Fletcher's situationism is praiseworthy. We will not
take time here to elaborate on his critical and inconsistent view of the Gospel
records of the New Testament,”° nor the implications of holding that God can be
loved only through one's neighbor. We will rather center our attention on the
inadequacy of having only one norm for an ethic.

One norm is too general. A one-norm ethic, especially when the norm is as broad
and general as Fletcher's love norm, is in most (though not all) cases little better than
having no norm at all. By its very nature, a single universal norm must be broad and
adaptable, or else it could not apply to all circumstances. But its versatility is also a
liability, for it necessitates an ambiguity about what the norm means as far as
concrete relationships are concerned. And if the absolute love norm is without
concrete content apart from the relative situation, then the specific meaning of love is
relative and not absolute.

Indeed, Fletcher admits that the content of love varies from situation to situ-
ation. Therefore, the command "Love in all cases" means little more than to X in
all cases:' For unless there is advanced cognitive content to the term Jove, then one
does not really know what one is being commanded to do. Fletcher clearly

25. Bertrand Russell, The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russel:, ed. Robert E.
Egner and Lester E. Denonn (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961), 579.
26. See Norman L. Geisler, A Popular Survey of the New Testament (Grand

Rapids: Baker Books, 2007), chap. 2.

48 Ethical Options

confesses that the love principle is empty of factual content: "This is why I say
it is a ‘formal’ principle, which rules us and yet does so without content.""

In actual practice, Fletcher does seem to implythat there is some understanding
of what love means in advance of the situation. But the question is How much
understanding? Is there enough content in the universal love norm to raise it above
a mere platitude? "Do the /oving thing" is scarcely more specific than "Do thegood
thing." In both instances the question is What kinds of acts are good or loving? So
his one moral law is too general to be helpful.

Fletcher's one-norm ethic of love is not more helpful than a view that says
"Follow nature" or "Live according to reason:' Instead of'"What does ‘love’ mean?"
the question becomes "What does ‘nature’ mean?" The result is the same, and one is
left without any specific ethical direction. An appeal to the situation to provide
content or meaning for love will not suffice. Fletcher admits that situations are
relative and even radically different. If the meaning of love is dependent on the
circumstances, then the significance of love is really relative to the situation and
therefore not absolute. This leads to a second criticism.

The situation does not determine the meaning of love. The meaning of the love
norm is not completely determined by the particulars of the situation but is merely
conditioned by them. Circumstances do not effect (determine) norms; they only
affect (influence) them. The context in which a norm is applicable does not dictate
how the norm will be applied but only influences its application. If the complete
determination of meaning came from the situation, then the alleged ethical norm
would not really be normative at all. The situation would be determining the norm
rather than the norm being determinative for the situation. Actually, the situation
does not determine what is right; God does. The situation simply helps us discover
which of God's laws is the one applicable there.

Fletcher does not claim that the situation completely determines what the norm
means. He says only that what love will mean in advance of the situation cannot be
known with any "existential particularity"; it can be known only in general.
However, what is known in advance, "in general: may turn out to be the wrong
meaning of love in a particular circumstance. No general wisdom (sophia) or
norms are universal and unbreakable. There is no rule apart from the general (and
ambiguous) rule of love, which ought never be broken. But this is precisely the
problem. The meaningful norms are breakable, and the only unbreakable norm is
not meaningful in any specific or practical sense of the word. Perhaps Fletcher
should not have so summarily dismissed the possibility that there are many
universal and unbreakable norms.

The possibility of many universal norms. There seem to be several reasons why
situationism dismisses the possibility of having many universal norms, though none
of these reasons is definitive. First, Fletcher argues that the many-norm position
would be legalistic. This does not follow. A many-norm ethic may be legalistic, but

27. Fletcher, "What Is a Rule; 337.

Situationism 49

there is no reason why it must be legalistic. Whether or not the view is legalistic
all depends on what the norms are, how they are related to each other, and how
they are applied to life. One could actually be legalistic with one absolute norm
such as Keep the Sabbath?

Second, it is implied that there is no other way to resolve the conflict of norms
unless there is one absolute norm to which all other norms are only relative. But
this is not so. There are at least three others ways to relate many universal norms:
show how they really do not conflict, show why it is wrong to break either when
they do conflict, or show how one of the norms is of a higher order and takes
priority over those of a lower order.

Third, Fletcher sees no way to derive universal norms from a universal norm.
He thinks that the concept of "middle axioms" is a contradiction in terms; they are
"derived underiveds."But there is no reason why a deduction cannot be as uni-
versal as its premises. Apart from whether there really are many universal norms,
Fletcher certainly does not eliminate the possibility that there are such. He does
not disprove that they can be arrived at by deduction the way postulates are de-
rived from axioms in geometry. He does not disprove that they could come from
revelation such as many Christians find inscripturated in the Bible. Nor does
Fletcher definitely dismiss the possibility that many universal norms could be
known intuitively to have a separate status of their own.

In brief, the possibility of there being many universal norms should not be given
up until either it is shown to be logically impossible, or no universal norm other
than love is ever found. In view of the fact that candidates for universal norms will
be introduced and evaluated in subsequent chapters, we will withhold judgment
until then whether or not there really are many universal norms. At this point, it is
enough to observe that Fletcher does not prove that "there is only one universal
norm," since he does not prove that it is impossible that there may be many
universal norms.

A different universal norm is possible. Not only is it possible that there are many
universal norms in contrast to Fletcher's single norm, but it is also possible to opt
for a different single norm than the love norm Fletcher uses. Why not a one-norm
ethic built on hate instead of love? Why not Buddhist compassion instead of
Christian love? Why not a Confucian "negative Golden Rule" that mandates, "Do
not do to others what you do not want them to do to you," rather than the positive
one? Or a New Age principle of harmony with nature? Surely Fletcher has not
demonstrated that all ethical principles mean exactly the same thing (at any rate,
not those as different as love and hate). Then on what basis is one to choose the
single norm on which to build a whole ethic? There m ust be some way to justify
one's basic ethical presupposition if it is not to be entirely arbitrary.

In brief, the problem of a one-norm ethic arises: Which norm? Prima facie, there are
many ethical norms that claim obedience. Which one should be given the special
position ofbeing absolute and unbreakable? Could not a case be made forusing truth-
fulness at any cost as the single absolute? Could not such a position be worked out

50 Ethical Options

with intemal consistency in the same way as Fletcher's love norm can be developed?
And if one absolute norm can be just as internally consistent as another, then on what
basis is one norm to be preferred over another? By evaluating the consequences of
each? If the one absolute norm is chosen on the ground that it brings the best
consequences for most people in the long run, then there are several problems.

First, we do not know the long run, and some things that are not reallybest in the
long run work well for many people in the short run (e.g., dishonesty and dictator-
ships). Manythings distinctly wrong on almost any ethical basis obviouslywork too
well for too many people for too long a time (e.g., cheating, lying, and stealing).

Second, to choose the norm on the basis of its consequences (if this were pos-
sible) would be to depart from a normative basis for ethics in favor of a utilitarian
basis, with all the problems that view entails. Yet utilitarianism actually depends
on norms for its own operation, which brings the argument full circle. This would
thus be saying that ends are needed to justify norms, and these ends in turn depend
on norms to establish them. But this really demonstrates that norms are the basis of
ethics in either event. Norms are necessary. The questions remain: Which norms?
How many are there? Next we turn to an examination of the many-norm view to
seek an answer to these questions.

A many-norm ethic is defensible. A number of contemporary writers have shown
how one may defend the validity of many ethical norms. On a popular level this has
been done by C. S. Lewis in Mere Christianity and in a philosophical way by William
K. Frankena in Ethics. In this latter category one may also place the works of Paul
Ramsey (see Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics). Indeed, there do seem to be many
universally binding moral laws. Rape, cruelty, hatred, and genocide are universally
frowned upon. And even if all do not practice them toward others, nevertheless all do
seem to believe that others should treat them in accordance with these norms. (For an
answer to this problem from a Christian point of view, see chap. 7.) And in view of
the fact that Fletcher frankly but reluctantly admits that his view is utilitarian,
perhaps this criticism should be stressed more.

Fletcher is really a utilitarian. Fletcher admits that his view is utilitarian. As such,
then, it is not really a one-norm absolutism but a form of generalism. This being the
case, it is subject to the criticisms of utilitarianism (see chap. 4). As he says, the end
justifies the means. He believes in the greatest love (good) for the greatest number
of people in the long run. Not only do we not know the long run, but what is good
for many may rob the minority of rights. Furthermore, just because an end is good
does not make an act good. There are evil acts, such as rape, cruelty, child abuse,
and murder. No amount of good intentions can make an evil act good.

Summary and Condusion

Situationism claims to be a one-norm absolutism. It believes that everything should
be judged by one absolute moral law: love. However, it turns out that this one moral

Situationism 51

principle is really only formal and empty. It has no content that can be known in
advance of or apart from the situation. Different situations really determine what it
means. So in the final analysis the one moral law turns out to be no moral law.
Situationism reduces to antinomianism, for in practice one empty absolute moral
law is no better than no absolute moral law. And the denial of all value is
self-defeating. It values the right to say that there are no values.

Select Readings

Bloom,Allan. The Closingof theAmerican Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy
and Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988.

Brunner, Emil. The Divine Imperative. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1947.
Eletcher, Joseph. Moral Responsibility. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974.

— Situation Ethics: The New Morality. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966.
he Forbidden Fruit: The Ethics of Humanism. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books,

— — ed. Humanist Manifestos I and IL Buffalo: Prometheus, 1973.

MacKinnon, Barbara. Ethics: Theory and Contemporary Issues. 6th ed. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth, 2009.

Robinson, ohn A. T. Honest to God. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963.
Singer, Peter. Practical Ethics. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

4

GENERALISM

Ethical positions can be divided into two broad classes: those that believe in
binding ethical rules and those (such as antinomianism) that do not. The first
group can be subdivided into those who believe that there are universally
binding ethical laws, and those who believe they are only generally binding.
This latter position is called generalism, and traditional adherents of this view
include utilitarians.

Generalism Explained

Utilitarians are not antinomians, since they believe in the value of ethical laws
in helping individuals determine which action will probably bring the greatest
good for the greatest number of people. On the other hand, utilitarians are not
absolutists, since they usually deny that there are universally binding ethical
norms that represent intrinsic values.

It is true that some utilitarians (e.g., Rule Utilitarians) say that rules should not
be broken, but this is only because of the extrinsic value of the good results from
keeping rules. The rule is kept, not because it is really intrinsically wrong to
perform the forbidden act, but only because making exceptions to any ethical law
is a practice that leads to greater evil than good. In other words, the act is judged
not by its intrinsic and universal value, but by its results. Even the utilitarians who
value rules, then, have no universal norms in the deontological and normative
senses discussed in chapter 1.

52

Generalism 53

Yet this does not mean that utilitarians have no absolutes. They may have ab-
solute ends, but they claim to have no absolute norms. They may have an
absolute or ultimate result by which they judge all actions, but they confess no
absolute rules enabling one to realize this ultimate end of the greatest good for
the greatest number of people.

Jeremy Bentham: Quantitative Utilitarianism

Modern generalists is heir to ancient hedonism, which believed that pleasure is
the greatest good (summum bonurn) for humans. Although the popular "Eat, drink,
and be merry" is a perversion of what Epicurus himself taught, his ancient
followers set forth the classic doctrine that seeking physical pleasure and avoiding
physical pain is the chief aim in life.

The pleasure calculus. eremyBentham (d. 1832) developed this ancient hedonistic
pleasure calculus into a utilitarian position in his Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation (1789). According to Bentham, "Nature has placed mankind
under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure," and "it is for
them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as what we shall do:" These are
summed up in the principle of utility, which affirms that "the greatest happiness of all
those whose interest is in question ... is the right and proper, and only right and
proper and universally desirable, end of human action:*

In view of this, "an action then may be said to be conformable to the principle of
utility... when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is
greater than any it has to diminish it."" Furthermore, "when thus interpreted, the
words ought, and right and wrong, and others of that stamp, have a meaning: when
otherwise, they have none." That is, no acts or words have any ethical meaning
apart from their consequences. Everything is to be justified by its end, by whether
it brings more pleasure than pain. But how is the principle of utility itself to be
justified? Bentham answers that it is not susceptible to any direct proof, "for that
which is used to prove everything else, cannot itself be proved." People
everywhere naturally tend to embrace the principle of utility, although some have
inconsistently rejected it. However, "when a man attempts to combat the principle
of utility, it is with reasons drawn, without his being aware of it, from that very
principle itselr

Further, if a person rejects the utilitarian principle in favor of his own feeling,
"in the first case, let him ask himself whether his principle is not despotical, and

1. Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (reprint, New
York: 1-lafner, 1965),1.
2. Ibid., 5, note added by Bentham, July 1822.
3. Ibid., 3.
4. Ibid., 4.
5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., 4-5.

54 Ethical Options

hostile to all the rest of the human race," and "in the second case, whether it is
not anarchical, and whether at this rate there are not as many different standards
of right and wrong as there are men?"

Calculating pleasure. If pleasure and the avoidance of pain are the ends of
ethically good acts, then it is reasonable to ask how one is to measure relative
amounts of these two elements. Bentham divides his answer into two parts, one
for individuals and one for groups.

To an individual person, the value of pleasure or pain in itself will be determined
by six factors: intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty, propinquity or
remoteness, fecundity (the chances of producing others of its kind), and purity (the
chances of not producing the opposite kind of sensation). When applying the
pleasure calculus to a group of people, a seventh factor of extent (the number of
persons to whom it extends) must be considered in determining the value of
pleasure or pain. So, to make a final calculation of the good of an act for a group,
one must first determine how much more pleasure than pain it will give to each
individual and then add all these together. The total balance of pleasure over pain
will give the general good tendency of the act. If there is more evil than good, then
the general evil tendency will be revealed.

Bentham admits that "it is not to be expected that this process should be strictly
pursued previously to every moral judgment, or to every legislative or judicial
operationfsPresumably this is because it is too psychologically and mathematically
complex to be practical. At this point the need for some kind of general norms is
most obvious in Bentham's position. For if one cannot always calculate the balance
of pleasure, then how is one to determine a course of action? The answer becomes
more explicit in the utilitarian position of Bentham's successor.

John Stuart Mill: Qualitative Utilitarianism

John Stuart Mill (d. 1873) made at least one modification to Bentham's position
conceming how pleasure (the end) is conceived and developed a fuller statement
regarding how general moral laws could function in a utilitarian context.

Pleasure is defined qualitatively. Bentham's hedonistic calculus (or pleasure prin-
ciple) lends itself easily to a materialist interpretation. He seems to be speaking of
physical pleasure and pain, since they are measured by intensity and duration.
Although in later years Bentham tried to soften the hedonistic implications o f this by
noting that "happiness" or "felicity" may be better words for describing what he
meant by "pleasure," he did not deny the materialist way this "happiness" was to be
measured nor the mathematical way it was to be calculated.

Mill, on the other hand, argued that pleasures differ in kind, and higher plea-
sures are to be preferred over lower ones (Utilitarianism [1863]). Pleasures do
not differ merely in their amount or intensity. One is higher and more valuable

7. Ibid., 6.
8. Ibid., 31.

Generalism 55

than another simply because most people who experience both decidedly prefer
one over the other.

The reason humans give marked preference to some pleasures is that they have
higher faculties than animals. "No intelligent human being would consent to be a
fool, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is
better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs.” Indeed, says Mill, "it is better
to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied, better to be Socrates
dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.’ And if the fool and the pig are of a different
opinion, says Mill, it is because the pig knows only one side of the question; the
fool knows both sides.

Cultured pleasures are higher than uncultured pleasures. Intellectual pleasures
are higher than sensual pleasures, and so on. There is a qualitative difference
between them, and one is obligated to seek the highest kind of pleasure for the
greatest number of people. But again it maybe asked How can one know what will
bring about the highest good for the greatest number unless there are some guides
or norms for the decisions? Surely the individual is seldom if ever in a position of
being able to foresee the long-range results of his actions. Mill's answer to this
question leads to the need for norms.

Pleasure is determined normatively. The utilitarian position is not without
norms. Mill refers to the great usefulness of the veracity norm. "Yet that even this
tule, sacred as it is, admits of possible exceptions is acknowledged by all
moralists" Truthfulness is a general rule, with some exceptions (lying is right to
save a life), that can guide one in doing what will bring the greatest good to the
greatest number of people.

Mill admits that one cannot always calculate the consequences of one's actions.
This is preciselywhy rules and norms are needed. Humankind has had ample time
to formulate a fund of human experience on which one may draw to help calculate
the consequences of actions. "During all that time, mankind have been learning by
experience the tendency of actions," Mill writes.” And unless we assume humans
to be complete idiots, they "must by this time have acquired positive beliefs as to
the effects of some actions on their happiness." And "the beliefs which have thus
come down are the rules of morality for the multitude, and for the philosopher until
he has succeeded in finding better."

In short, there are valid moral rules, beliefs, and codes to guide human decisions
toward maximizing the good in society, but none of these are universal rules. None
of these is exceptionless; all of them can and should be broken for the principle of

9. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in The Utilitarians (Garden City, NY: Dolphin Books, Doubleday,
1960,409.

10.1bid., 410.

11.1bid., 424.

12.1bid., 42$.

13.1bid,425-26.

14.1bid,425.

56 Ethical Options

utility when the greater good is in jeopardy. For "the received code of ethics is by
no means of divine right.."'s It admits of indefinite improvement. ‘But to consider
the rules of morality as improvable is one thing; to pass over the intermediate
generalization [i.e., rules and codes] entirely and endeavor to test each individual
action directly by the first principle [of utility] is another."' Just because there is
only the one ultimate goal of happiness, toward which all morality is directed, does
not mean there cannot be many moral norms directing us toward that one goal. It
means only that these many norms are not absolute, and when they conflict, the
conflict must be resolved by the utilitarian principle. There is only one
fundamental principle of morality, and all others are subordinate to it.

The problem with exceptions. Mill admits that his position is open to the criti-
cism that exceptions to moral rules will present a temptation to break moral rules
indiscriminately fo r the supposed utility of it. His reply is twofold. First, this same
criticism may be made of all moral systems. "It is not the fault of any creed, but of
the complicated nature of human affairs, that the rules of conduct cannot be so
framed as to require no exceptions."" And "there is no ethical creed which does not
temper the rigidity of its laws by giving a certain latitude ... for accommodation to
peculiarities of circumstances; and under every creed, at the opening thus made,
self-deception and dishonest casuistry get in."" The utilitarian no more than other
moralists must overcome the misuse of exceptions by intellect and virtue. To be
utilitarian has a standard of morality, and though the application of it may be
difficult, it is better than none at all. "While in other systems the moral laws all
claim independent authority, there is no common umpire entitled to interfere
between them."

Second,Mill acknowledges that exceptions ought to be recognized as exceptions
and have their limits defined. The reasons for this, he says, are so that exceptions will
not be multiplied beyond their need and so that they may not weaken one's
confidence in the general rule. Mill merely mentions but does not elaborate on these
points. Other utilitarians have adopted an alternate approach to that of Mill, arguing
for exceptionless moral rules, or at least rules, though not exceptionless in
themselves, that should never be broken for utilitarian reasons.

G. E. Moore: General Rules and Universal Obedience

Utilitarians handle the problem of exceptions in two basic ways. One school,
sometimes called act-utilitarians, holds that each particular ethical act must be
judged by its consequences. Hence, there maybe exceptions to any ethical rule or
norm that in a particular case would justify breaking it. Another group, known as

15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 426.
17. Ibid., 427.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.

Generalism 57

rule-utilitarians, argues that rules should never be broken (unless there is a conflict
between them), since the consequences of rule breaking are bad. In some respects,
the position of G. E. Moore (d. 1958) seems to combine a bit of each view.

Rules are only generally valid. According to Moore the assertion "I am morally
bound to perform this act" means that the action will produce the greatest possible
amount of good in the universe. The results of acts thus determine their morality.
Furthermore, "with regard then to ethical judgments which assert that a certain
kind of action is good as a means to a certain kind of effect, none will be
universally true; and many, though generally true at one period, will be generally
false at others... . Hence we can never be entitled to more than a generalization—to
a proposition of the form 'This result generally follows this kind of action: And
even this generalization will only be true, if the circumstances under which the
action occurs are generally the same."" Rules and norms are generally useful but
are not really universal.

In fact, ethical rules are not really categorical but prove to be only hypothetical.
They say that if we act this way under these circumstances, then the greatest good
will probably result. But since other circumstances may interfere, it is not possible
to know this with any more than probability. So then "an ethical law has the nature
not of a scientific law but of a scientific prediction: and the latter is always merely
probable, although the probability may be very great7”!

Murder, for example, cannot be known to be universally wrong, since awe do, as a
matter of fact, only observe its good effects under certain circumstances; and it maybe
easily seen that a sufficient change in these would render doubtful what seem the
most universally certain of general rules:" Thus, the general disutility of murder could
be proved only if the majority of the human race persists in believing that life is
worthwhile. "In order to prove that murder ... would not be good as a means, we
should have to disprove the main contention of pessimism—namely that the
existence of human life is on the whole an evil."r° So "when... we say that murder is in
general to be avoided, we only mean that it is so, so long as the majority of mankind
will certainly not agree to it, but will persist in living:' * However, as long as most
people continue to value life, the ethical consideration that "it is generallywrong for
any single person to commit murder seems capable of proof."*s The same holds true
for other rules such as temperance and keeping promises.

Chastity, likewise, is only a general rule whose universal utility depends upon
certain conditions that are considered necessary for the conservation of society. For
instance, it is usually presupposed that chastity is necessary to avoid conjugal
jealousy and to preserve paternal affection, and that both of these are necessary

20. G. E. Moore, Principia Aka (reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 22.
21.1bid., 155.

22.1bid., 156.

23.1bid.

24,1bid.

25. Ibid.

58 Ethical Options

conditions to preserve society. "But it is not difficult to imagine a civilized society
existing without them "26 Hence, the rule of chastity is only a general and condi-
tional rule, which could be relinquished if society could survive without it.

Some general rules should never be broken. Notwithstanding the fad that moral
norms are only general rules that have individual exceptions, Moore argues that the
individual ought never disobey a rule that is held by most people to be true in
general. He gives the following reasons. First, "if it is certain that in a large majority
of cases the observance of a certain rule is useful, it follows that there is a large
probability that it would be wrong to break the rule in any particular case?" Further,
"the uncertainty of our knowledge both of effects and of their value, in particular
cases, is so great, that it seems doubtful whether the individual's judgment that the
effect will probably be good in his case can ever be set against the general probability
that that kind of action is wronrAlso, "added to this general ignorance is the fact that,
if the question arises at all, our judgment will generally be biased by the fact that we
strongly desire one of the results which we hope to obtain by breaking the rule."!9 In
view of these factors, "it seems, then, that with regard to any rule which is generally
useful, we may assert that it ought always to be observed: wrote Moore. This
observance is "not on the ground that in every particular case it will be useful, but on
the ground that in any particular case the probability of its being so is greater than
that of our being likely to decide rightly that we have before us an instance of its
disutility... In short, though we may be sure that there are cases where the rule
should be broken, we can never know which those cases are, and ought, therefore,
never to break it "3°

Even if one were to perceive clearly that in one's own case breaking the rule
would be advantageous, yet insofar as such a rule-breaking action tends to encour-
age other unadvantageous breaches of the rule, it has a bad effect. For "in cases ...
where example has any influence at all, the effect of an exceptional right action will
generallybe to encourage wrong ones."J! According to Moore, the logic of this
should be carried even one step further. For "it is undoubtedlywell to punish a man,
who has done an action, right in his case but generally wrong, even if his example
would not be likely to have a dangerous effect. For sanctions [punishments] have, in
general, much more influence upon conduct than example; so that the effect of
relaxing them in an exceptional case will almost certainly be an encouragement of
similar action in cases which are not exceptional?”

The position that one ought always obey rules that are admittedly only gener-
ally applicable is limited only to the rules or norms known "certainly" to be of

26. Ibid., 158.
27. Ibid. 162.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid, 163.
32. Ibid, 164.

Generalism 59

general usefulness. In cases where there is doubt of the general utility of a rule,
Moore appears to agree with the approach of the act-utilitarians. He says, it seems
that, in cases of doubt, instead of following rules, of which he is unable to see the
good effects in his particular case, the individual should rather guide his choice by
a direct consideration of the intrinsic value of vileness of the effect which his action
may produce."

In either event, there are no actions or kinds of action that really are universally
wrong; there are only some things generally wrong, which one ought (for utilitarian
reasons) to avoid universally. So there are at least two ways in which Moore's
position does not provide any truly universal norms. First, the norms that one should
always follow do not represent acts really universally right or wrong, but only acts
that are generally wrong. In specific cases an exception may be justified. But since it
brings more evil than good to claim that any given case qualifies as a legitimate
exception, it follows that the rule should never be broken.

Second, Moore's general rules that should always be obeyed are not really nor-
mative universals in a categorical sense, since they are norms justified onlyby their
results. They are not deontological. They do not represent kinds of actions with
intrinsic value. Moore is very clear in holding that no acts have intrinsic value; all
acts are to be judged by their results?’

John Austin: No General Rules Should Be Broken

In the rule-utilitarianism of John Austin, the question of unbreakable rules is
carried one step further than in the thinking of G. E. Moore. Moore argued only
that some rules ought never to be broken, because of their general utility and
because one could not be sure a certain case was a legitimate exception, and even if
it were, other offsetting bad consequences and influences would result from
making an exception of it. Austin, on the other hand, argues that certain rules
involve a class of actions that if generally done would bring bad results; such rules
should never be broken.

Rules are justified by general results. Austin's position is decidedly utilitarian because
the only justification for keeping the rules is the good result that keeping rules
brings. In The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832), he says, "Our rules would
be fashioned on utility; our conduct on our rules!" According to Austin's view, "our
conduct would conform to rules inferred from the tendency of actions, but would not
be determined by a direct resort to the principle of general utility.""" Hence,
“utilitywould be the test of our conduct, ultimately, but not immediately!"

33. Ibid., 166.

34. See ibid, 92-93, 104-5.

35. John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832; reprint, London: Weidenfeld
& Nicolson, 1954), 47.

36.1bid.

37. Ibid.

60 Ethical Options

Rules are justified if keeping them brings greater good, or if breaking them brings
greater evil, on society. However, rules are not about specific or individual acts but
about classes or kinds of acts.

Universal rule-keeping is justified by general results. Each individual act is not
to be justified by its specific results as in act-utilitarianism. But the whole class of
acts of that kind is judged by the results that those kinds of acts bring. As Austin
states it, "If we would try the tendency of a specific or individual act, we must not
contemplate the act as if it were single and insulated, but must look at the class of
acts to which it belongs."’ Further, "we must suppose that acts of the class were
generally done or omitted, and consider the probable effect upon the general hap-
piness or good?" For "the particular conclusion which we draw, with regard to the
single ad, implies a general conclusion embracing all similar acts.""

The only exception to this is when rules conflict or when a particular act falls
under no rule. Furthermore, these general rules are always to be obeyed only if
they are generally observed and generally useful. If either (or both) ceases to be a
fact, then they lose their force and need not always be obeyed. Austin gives a
number of examples of his position. A poor person should not steal from the rich
neighbor on the grounds o sthe utility of this particular act (as an act-utilitarian
would say), for if stealing were general, the effect on society would be disastrous.
Nor should one evade the payment of a tax to devote the money to some good
purpose, for "regular payment of taxes is necessary to the existence of the
government. And I, and the rest of the community, enjoy the security which it
gives, because the payment of taxes is rarely evaded."

In a similar way, the punishment of an individual as a solitary event may do
more harm than good. "But, considered as part of a system, a punishment is
useful or beneficent. By a dozen or score of punishments, thousands of crimes
are prevented:" The individual punishment is justified by the good results of the
general practice. Exceptions should not be made because the general results of
disobeying general rules is generally bad.

Traditionally, utilitarians argued that an action should be judged on whether it
would bring the greatest good to the greatest number of people. Professor Joseph
Barnhart offers a modification to this utilitarian calculus. He believes we should
act so as to bring the greatest good (happiness) to every individual, including one-
self:" From a libertarian perspective, he believes this will better safeguard each
individual's rights.

38. Ibid., 47-48.

39. Tbid,48.
40.1 bid.

41. Ibid, 39.

42. Ibid, 40.

43. Joseph E. Barnhart, "Egoism and Altruism; Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 7, no.I
(Winter 1976): 101-10.

Generalism 61

Generalism Evaluated

There are some positive values as well as serious drawbacks to generalism. Let us first
consider some of the positive features of the generalist approach to ethical norms.

Some Values of Generalism

The values of generalism vary with its representations. But taken as a whole, there are
at least three that relate to a normative approach to ethics such as that taken by Christians.
First, generalism reflects a need for norms. Second, it offers a possible solution to
conflicting norms. Finally, some generalists even argue for "unbreakable" norms.

The need for norms. Generalists are not antinomian. They recognize the need for
norms, for even utilitarian ends need normative means for attaining them. There must
be a road map to one's ultimate goal. Moral ends are not self-attaining, and there is an
evident need for criteria to guide one's conduct. To the credit of the utilitarians, they
have recognized that without norms or other normative bases taken from the fund of
human experience, there is no way of determining the long-range results of one's
actions. They thus are aware of the fact that in the absence of predictive powers, people
must draw upon principles that are known to produce good results when followed.

Moore argued that in view of the fact that a person does not know the long-range
future, one must gauge one's actions on the basis of the known short-range future,
assuming they will be the same. But he frankly acknowledges that this is an unproved
assumption. He adds, alt will be apparent that it has never yet been justified—that no
sufficient reason has ever yet been found for considering one action more right or more
wrong than another [via results]:"" In view of this, it is understandable that utilitarians
resort to norms to save their position from collapsing.

A solution to conflicting norms. Generalism offers a solution to the problem of what
to do when there is a conflict of duty, such as that between truthfulness and saving lives.
For apart from rule-utilitarians, generalists believe that there are no universal rules that
are really exceptionless. At best they are only general norms that maybe broken if the
occasion calls for it. In this way, lying to save a life can be right, even though lying is
generally wrong. There is only one absolute end ("the greatest good"), and all the means
(rules, norms) are relative to that end. In any given instance, when there is a conflict of
means or norms, it maybe resolved by a direct appeal to the utilitarian end. If lying in a
situation would be more useful or helpful to most people, then one ought to lie.

As has been mentioned, the generalistic solution is neither antinomian nor situational.
Antinomians admit of the value of no laws at all, not even general ones.

44, Moore, Principia ethica, 153.

62 Ethical Options

Situationists such as Joseph Fletcher claim to have one absolute norm, whereas
generalists claim no absolute norms at all. Yet generalism has one absolute end
that functions like a norm in helping to determine a given course of action when
there is a conflict of general norms. Technically, the greatest good for the greatest
number is not considered by generalists to be a norm by which the best end can
be attained, but it is the end itself in view of which the best norm should be
chosen. So generalism evades the no-norm position and offers a reconciliation
when there is a conflict among accepted norms. Its answer is simple: when moral
principles conflict, the conflict is not absolute; there is always a possible excep-
tion. Moral duties are only general, not universal. And general principles admit
of exceptions.

Some generalists have a "universal" norm. Some generalists offer a case for rules
or norms that should never be broken. Even though they admit to exceptional cases
that might in isolation justify breaking a general rule, they offer practical arguments
for never breaking a rule such as saving lives or keeping promises (unless there is a
conflict of norms). The very desire to have meaningful and unbreakable norms for
conduct is a commendable aspect of their ethic. It is a recognition of the many
difficulties of an exceptive approach on the practical level.

Furthermore, generalists are not complete relativists. They have an absolute,
even though it is not always considered to be an absolute norm. It is an absolute
end, and it is used by them to discern among their relative means. Without an ab-
solute end, it certainly is difficult to see how generalists could justify their choice
among means or how they could argue that some rules should never be broken. For
if there is no ultimate criterion for deciding on these issues, then how could one
relative means be chosen over another? Ranking separate actions by intrinsic value
is not something that generalists of the utilitarian stripe are prone to do, for it is
contrary to their premise of judging things by their extrinsic value (namely, their
usefulness).

Some Inadequacies of Generalism

Despite some positive things that maybe said of generalism, there are some seri-
ous problems with the position. Several of these will be briefly considered here.

The end does not justify the means. Utilitarianism believes that the end justifies
the means. But this is clearly wrong. Hitler's goal to have a more perfect race was
good, but his means of attaining it were evil. President Nixon's goal of national
security was a noble one, but the criminal and unethical activity of Watergate was
not justified to reach it. The end never justifies the means; the means must justify
themselves. Thus, an act is not automatically good simply because it has a good
goal. The means to achieve it must be judged good by some objective standard of
good. The road to destruction is paved with good intentions (Prov. 14:12).
Something is not good because the intentions underlying it are good; it is good only
if the actions are also good. From a Christian perspective, we must agree

Generalism 63

with Paul when he writes, "Shall we go on sinning so that grace may increase?
By no means!" (Rom. 6:1-2).

Generalism has no universal norms. There is a distinct difference between a
general norm, which for practical reasons one ought always to obey, and a truly
universal norm, which is always intrinsically right to follow. The latter represents
an intrinsically good act. But the generalist offers only norms that have less than
universal extension. There are always unspecifiable exceptions or else cases that
are not covered by the rules. And even though generalists sometimes opt not to
break these rules because of general utility, nevertheless the rule itself is not es-
sentially unbreakable.

If a person is in search of meaningful norms for conduct that one ought always
to follow because they will be a guide toward performing acts that are always the
right thing to do, then this person will be disappointed in generalism. The best a
generalist can offer is a set of general norms that neither cover all cases nor are
nonconflicting; in order for these norms to be effective, one must have some other
means of applying them in specific and often crucial cases.

Utilitarian acts have no intrinsic value. Another criticism maybe directed toward
the utilitarian generalists: the norms that they do have do not represent any acts with
intrinsic value. For example, the attempt to save a life is not an intrinsically valuable
act. It has value only if the person is actually saved or if some other good comes from
the futile attempt. According to the utilitarian premise, a gift of charity that never
reaches the poor or an act of kindness to which there is no favorable response is not a
good act. Indeed, no act is good in and of itself unless good results from it. And no
act is morally right unless it brings the greatest good to the greatest number of
people. No benevolence, no sacrifice, no love has any value unless it happens to have
good results. And conversely, if an act brings about good, it is a good act, whether it
was intended that way or not.

Thus the utilitarian position reduces the ethical value of acts to the fates and
fortunes of life. All is well that ends well. And what ends well is good. This would
mean that the intentions of one's actions have no essential connection with the
good of those actions. Presumably, one could will and perform an evil act that by
chance turns out for good and hence be credited with performing a good act. Surely
fortuity and morality do not belong in such proximity.

The need for an absolute norm. It is not possible to consistently maintain a group
of general norms that may and do conflict without having an absolute norm by which
the conflict can be resolved. This point seems to be evidenced by the need among
utilitarian generalists to appeal to the end to resolve the conflict between norms. But
when the end is so used, it serves a normative function. The end (the greatest good)
becomes the norm for determining which means will be best for attaining the end. Not
only is there a manifest circularity in appealing to the end; there is also an obvious
need for an ultimate principle to resolve the tension among the less-than-ultimate
principles or norms. To state the point another way, relative norms do not stand alone.
They must be relative to something that is not relative.

64 Ethical Options

So unless there is an assumed nonrelative standard, the relative standards cannot
function properly. General rules presuppose a universal norm or norms.

Whether the number of absolute or universal norms is one or many will be
discussed more fully in the next three chapters. For now it is sufficient to note
that there must be at /east one norm that is true under all conditions if the other
norms are to be true under any conditions.

The"end'is an ambiguous term. The generalists ethic is based on what willbring the
best results in the long run. But how long is "long"? A few years? A lifetime? Eternity?
Anything beyond the immediate present is outside the human purview. Only God
knows the future. Hence, only God could be a utilitarian, and he is not.

Certainly God knows that his moral principles will bring the best results in
the long run. But he does not will them for this reason. Rather, God wills what
is right because it is right. And it is right because it is in accord with his own un-
changeable moral character. So appealing to long-range consequence as the
basis for determining what rules we follow is out of the range of humans and
out of the question for a morally perfect God.

The debate about whether the "greatest good" should in the end be understood
quantitatively or qualitatively brings an ambiguity in the phrase into focus. How
do we determine what is meant by "good"? As we saw in chapter 1, unless good
has a divinely determined meaning, there is no real basis for holding that anything
is objectively good. And if moral good is not objective, then we are left with
antinomianism.

The further ambiguity in the word end is brought to light by the disagreement
about whether it means "for the greatest number" or "for all individuals," as some
have suggested. Which view is taken will make a significant difference, particularly
with respect to minority rights. For in many cases, more good could be achieved for
the most people if basic rights were denied to some people.

The need for absolute ethical norms. Even generalism does not avoid the need
for some absolute norm or norms. First, without some basic value standard, there is
no means by which to measure the consequences to determine whether ethical
norms are really good or bad. How can we know whether the results are better or
worse unless we have some standard for what is best?

Second, the fund of human experience cannot serve as the ultimate measure.
We cannot know what to put in this fund unless we have some moral standard
outside of the fund by which to measure it.

Third, in utilitarianism the end serves as a norm by which actions are measured.
It is the ultimate by which all else is measured, and hence its role is normative.

Summary and Conclusion

Generalism, in contrast to antinomianism, argues that there are some binding moral
principles. But in contrast to absolutism, generalism insists that none of these

Generalism 65

moral laws is really absolute. Since every moral principle admits of exceptions, the
generalist has an easy solution to moral conflicts. However, since generalists have
no absolute moral principles, their view tends to be reducible to antinomianism.
Unless there are some objective moral prescriptions of substantive content that are
binding on all persons at all times, then at any given time any action could be
justified.

Select Readings

Austinjohn. The Province offun sprudence Determined. 1832. Reprint, London:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1954.

Bentham, Jeremy. Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Reprint,
New York: Hafner, 1965.

Kurtz, Paul. Forbidden Fruit: The Ethics of Humanism. Buffalo: Prometheus, 1988.

Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism. In The Utilitarians. Garden City, NY: Dolphin Books,
Doubleday, 1961.

Moore, G. E. Principia ethica. 1903. Reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1962.

Mulgan, Tim. Understanding Utilitarianism. Stocksfield: Acumen, 2007.

Singer, Marcus G. Generalization in Ethics. New York: Knopf, 1961.

West, Henry R. Mill's Utilitarianism: A Reader's Guide. London: Continuum, 2007.

5

UNQUALIFIED ABSOLUTISM

There are two basic kinds of ethical views: absolutism and relativism. The
preceding three chapters (2-4) have examined ethical relativism. The next three
chapters (5-7) will look at three forms of ethical absolutism.

Perhaps the most influential and widely held view among Christians is unquali-
fied absolutism. The position was given its classic presentation by Augustine of
Hippo and has been defended by the notable philosopher Immanuel Kant and the
noted theologians John Murray and Charles Hodge.

An Exposition of Unqualified Absolutism

The basic premise of unqualified absolutism is that all moral conflicts are only
apparent; they are not real. Sin is always avoidable. There are moral absolutes that
admit of no exceptions, and these never actually come into conflict with one
another. On the classic question as to whether or not one should ever lie to save a
life, the unqualified absolutist answers with an emphatic "No!" The importance of
this issue to Augustine can be measured by the fact that he dedicated two works to
it, Against Lying and On Lying, and made numerous other references to it
throughout his writings.

Augustine's Unqualified Absolutism

The bishop Augustine of Hippo (d. 430) has sometimes been misunderstood to
be a situationist because of his statement "Love [God], and do what you will"

66

Unqualified Absolutism 67

(Tractates on 1 John 7.8). While it is true that Augustine cast his whole ethical
system in terms of love, it is not true that he based that system only on the one
command of love. Augustine believed that love consummates the virtues, but it
does not consume them. Rather, charity implies the other virtues.

Augustine's arguments against lying. There are many arguments offered
byAugustine against ever telling a lie. For him, telling the truth is an absolute, and
absolutes cannot be broken. Augustine is quick to point out that not all
falsifications are lies. Onlythose falsifications with intention to deceive qualify as
lies. A person is to be judged as lying or not lying according to his intention, not by
the truth or falsity of his expressions. Thus something said in jest or even
something false, spoken by one who intends the hearer to understand something
true by it, is not a lie. For example, if a man wants to reach a certain city and asks
directions of a friend he knows is a perpetual liar, the liar would give him
directions that take him along the bandit-infested route. Hence the friend will take
the opposite route and avoid the robbers and possible death. This is not a lie.

Lying to ward off rape, or even to save a life, is strictly forbidden byAugustine's
unqualified absolutism, for one's choice is really between the permission of
an-other's sin or the commission of one's own sin. Of a certain heretical group, the
Priscillianists, who were lying to keep themselves from being discovered, Augus-
tine insisted that Christians ought to condemn the impiety of lying as well as the
heresy. Further, Christians ought not to lie to expose liars. In short, committing one
sin to avoid another sin is still a sin.

Some had suggested that lying would be permissible as a means of getting
another to heaven. But Augustine maintained that no eternal good could be ac-
complished by a temporal evil. He insisted that no one for any reason whatsoever
ought to be deceived into the kingdom of Truth. Christian teaching is truth, and no
falsehood should be part of Christian teaching.

Augustine insists that lying breaks down regard for the truth because lying
destroys all certainty. When regard for the truth has been broken down or even
slightly weakened, all things will remain doubtful. In brief, without truthfulness
there is no integrity, and without integrity there can be no certainty. Once falsity is
admitted into communication, then one can never again be certain that the speaker
is telling the truth.

Lying is a web that entangles more and more because lying necessitates
more lying to explain and cover up for itself. Eventually, argued Augustine,
this will lead to perjury or even blasphemy. One who becomes a habitual liar
might lie even to God.

Lying would weaken the Christian faith, for if we are untruthful in one area,
then how can people believe us when we teach them Christian doctrine? When
we are teaching the faith to them, they will say, "How do I know whether you
are not lying to me now?"

Augustine borrowed a Platonic premise as a basis for his argument that one
should never lie, even to avoid rape. He contended that one should endeavor to

68 Ethical Options

preserve chastity in both soul and body, but when both cannot be protected, he
insisted that the latter must give way to the former because everyone knows
intuitively that the soul is to be preferred to the body, and sins of the soul are
worse than sins of the body.

Augustine cites numerous passages from the Bible and Apocrypha to support
his unqualified absolutism. Psalm 5:5-6 is rendered, "Thou dost hate, 0 Loan, all
who work iniquity; thou shalt destroy all who speak a lie:' Wisdom 1:11 is also
quoted byAugustine: "The mouth that lies slays the soul" (On Lying 6) Thus
Augustine concludes that since eternal life is lost by lying, a lie should not be told
for the preservation of the temporal life of another. In short, why lose eternal life in
order to save a temporal life?

Augustine admitted that some acts are not good or bad in themselves. For ex-
ample, giving to the poor is good at some times and bad at other times, depending
on the motive for giving. But when the works themselves are already sin, such as
theft, impurity, blasphemy, and the like, who would say that these evil acts should
be done for good reasons? Some moral acts are intrinsically good, and hence their
violation can never be for a good purpose.

In his Retractions, Augustine confessed that some of his arguments were
"obscure," but he never revised or corrected them. He apparently went to his
reward firmly believing in an unqualified moral absolutism.

Augustine's treatment ofdifficult passages. On the face of it, the Bible seems to
record many cases ofjustified lying. Augustine was aware of these passages and tried
to explain them in terms of his unqualified absolutism. Let us examine his
interpretations of the stories about Rahab, the Hebrew midwives, Lot, David's oath to
kill Nabal, and the alleged falsehoods and deceptions of Abraham, Jacob, and Jesus.

The Hebrew midwives lied to Pharaoh, and yet God apparentlyblessed them for
it (Exod. 1). Rahab's lie saved the Jewish spies (Josh. 2), and she is commended for
her faith in the hall of fame found in the Letter to the Hebrews (11:31). Augustine's
answer was that God blessed these women for their mercy but did not condone their
impiety. God did not praise them because they lied but because they were merciful
to the people of God. So it was not their deception that was rewarded, but their
kindness. God blessed in spite of their lie, not because of it.

Lot faced a moral conflict when the Sodomites demanded his guests for im-
moral purposes (Gen. 19:1-11). To some, Lot's action of giving his daughters to
appease the Sodomites seemed like an avoidance of a greater sin (homosexuality)
by allowing a lesser one (rape). But Augustine emphatically rejects this position.
His answer to this dilemma is to observe two things. First, a person must never
commit a great crime of one's own in order to avoid someone else's greater crime.
Second, and more directly to the point of the dilemma, Augustine insisted that Lot
himself did not sin; he was merely allowing the Sodomites the opportunity to sin
by raping his daughters.

The Bible seems to say that an oath before God is inviolable (see Eccles. 5:1-6),
and yet the Bible (and common sense) suggests that one should not keep a foolish

Unqualified Absolutism 69

or sinful oath.Augustine's response is that not everything done by righteous
people of the past should be taken as normative. In short, the Bible records but
does not approve of David's making such a sinful oath (1 Sam. 25:21-22; To
Consentius, Against Lying 22).

The Scriptures say that Abraham claimed Sarah to be his "sister" (she was his
half sister) in order to protect himself from being killed if the king discovered she
was his wife (Gen. 20). Augustine insisted that Abraham was not lying here since
he only concealed something of the truth but did not really say anything that was
false. As to Jacob's alleged deception of his father, Isaac, in order to obtain God's
blessing, Augustine argues that what Jacob did at his mother's bidding in seemingly
deceiving his father was not a lie but only a "mystery" (Gen. 27:1-29; To
Consentius, Against Lying 24)

The Gospel account tells us that Jesus asked, "Who touched me?" as though he
didn't know (Luke 8:45). Later he indicated to the two disciples on the Emmaus
road that he would go farther when he had not mentioned doing so (Luke 24:28).
Augustine's answer here is that this was not really deception but instruction. Jesus
pretended not to know who touched his garment in order that he might teach his
disciples something they did not know. Since this teaching was true, no lie was
involved. This answer seems to imply that as long as a person conveys what is true
in the light of one's intentions, even if some deception is necessarily involved in
doing so, then the person has not lied.

Kant's Unqualified Absolutism

Immanuel Kant (d. 1804) was one of the most influential thinkers of modern
times. He was agnostic about knowing reality in itself, but he was a devout believer
in God and was a moral absolutist.

A universal moral duty. Kant called the universal moral obligation a categorical
imperative. By that he meant that the duty was unconditional, not conditional. He
eschewed any hypothetical ethics such as if one does this, then this or that will
result. He favored a categorical (deontological) ethic where "one ought to do thus
and thus." Duties are duties regardless of the consequences. Kant stated the
categorical imperative several ways. First, we should always treat others as an end
and never as a means to an end. And second, we should act so that we could will
our action a rule for all people.

Kant gave both proclaiming truth and protecting life as examples of the categorical
imperative. That is, both lying and murder are universally wrong. His justification for
this position is as follows. If one were to will lying as a universal rule, then there
would be no more truth to lie about. Hence, it would be self-destructive to lie. But
whatever we cannot will as a universal rule, we should never do, for this is what the
categorical imperative demands. Likewise, we should never kill, for if we do so, then
we must will that all can kill. But if all kill, then there will be no one left to kill.
Therefore, murder should never be permitted in even one instance.

70 Ethical Options

The defense of universal moral duties. There are at least three reasons stated
or implied by Kant for his unqualified absolutism. All of them reveal his strong
commitment to a deontological (duty-centered) ethic.

Moral duties by their nature admit no exceptions, since any exception to a moral
law would indicate that it was not truly a rule. Kant believed that moral laws, like
Newton's law of gravitation, have no exceptions. God does not tolerate the
breaking of any of his laws, whether ethical or natural. The universe runs ac-
cording to universal law.

Moral duties are intrinsic, not extrinsic, and whatever is intrinsically good can-
not be evil. It is as absurd to call an intrinsically good act evil as it is to call light
darkness. Only what is neither good nor bad in itself but dependent on something
else for its goodness or evil can be called evil at one time and good at another. In-
trinsically good actions are not like this; they are always good in and of
themselves. Since telling the truth is an intrinsic good and a lie is an intrinsic evil, it
follows that there can never be a good lie.

Kant's defense of universal moral laws is a kind of transcendental argument. He
argues that it is absolutely necessary to posit moral duties as categorical and
universal in order to live moral lives. Society cannot function without law, and law
must be universal in order to be law. If it does not apply to everyone, then it is not a
law. Hence, universal moral law, not what is simply socially or personally
desirable, is rationally necessary to posit for /ife.

Lying to save a life is always wrong. The fact that one should neither lie nor murder
leads to the dilemma that Kant addressed in his tractate "On a Supposed Right to Tell
Lies from Benevolent Motives" (1787). His response to that supposition, like
Augustine's response, was a categorical no. He wrote, "Whoever then tells a lie,
however good his intentions may be, must answer for the consequences of it ... however
unforeseen they may have been?’ For "to be truthful (honest) in all declarations is
therefore a sacred unconditional command of reason, and not to be limited by any
expediency."! Kant makes several points in elaborating his view.

All social duties are moral contracts, and truth is the basis of all contracts.
Unless there is mutual trust in each other's word, there can be no contract.
Therefore, truth is the very foundation of all social duties. Without it, all law is
rendered useless and uncertain.

Kant is strongly opposed to the view that it is a duty to tell the truth only to
those who have a right to it. First, he insists that truth is not a possession the
right of which can be granted to one person and refused to another. Second, the
duty to tell the truth makes no distinction between persons but is an uncondi-
tional duty that holds in all circumstances. Therefore, it is a duty to be truthful
to everyone.

1.1mmanuel Kant, 'On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives, in The Critique
of Practical Reason, trans. Thomas Kinsman Abbot, 6th ed. (London: Longman Green, 1963), 363.
2. Ibid.

Unqualified Absolutism 71

By lying to one person, we do injury to all persons, for falsehoods violate the
principle of justice, which protects all from harm. Veracity constitutes the
condition ofjustice in utterances, and by lying one offends all persons through
violating the principle necessary for justice in general.

Kant argues, it is possible that while you have honestly answered Yes to the
murderer's question, whether his intended victim is in the house, the latter may
have gone out unobserved, and so not have come in the way of the murderer." Or,
if you had spoken the truth as well as you knew it, perhaps the murderer while
seeking for his enemy in the house might have been caught by neighbours coming
up and the deed been prevented."" Consequently, lying may not be necessary to
protect the innocent.

John Murray's Unqualified Absolutism

One of the best modern examples of unqualified absolutism in the evangelical
tradition is that ofJohn Murray (d. 1975) of Westminster Seminary. In Principles of
Conduct (1957), Murray elaborates how he would maintain "the sanctity of truth"
even in situations that would seem to call for a justifiable lie. There are two basic
reasons for this: God is absolute, and truth is of the essence of God.

God's law is absolute. Like Augustine, Murraybelieves that God's law is absolutely
binding. The will of God is a sovereign reflection of his unchanging character. Since
God is truth and cannot ever lie (Heb. 6:18), then neither should we. The moral
standard in Scripture is "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in
heaven is perfect." (Matt. 5:48 KJV).

Lying is always wrong. Because the command to tell the truth flows from the
absolute law of God, no exceptions can be made to it. Murray writes,"The necessity
of truthfulness in us rests upon God's truthfulness. As we are to be holy because God
is holy, so we are to be truthful because God is truthful."”

The explanation of alleged biblical lies. Murray offers an explanation for some
of the difficult biblical passages, along the same lines as Augustine. With regard to
Rahab's lie, he says, "Although our purpose be to assist our brethren, to consult for
their safety and to relieve them, it never can be lawful to lie, because that cannot be
right which is contrary to the nature of God."°After reviewing several biblical
examples of lying, Murray concludes, "We see, therefore, that neither Scripture
itself nor the theological inferences derived from Scripture provide us with any
warrant for the vindication of Rahab's untruth and this instance, consequently, does
not support the position that under certain circumstances we may justifiably utter
an untruth..""

3. Ibid., 362-63.

4. Ibid., 363.

S. John Murray, Principles of Conduct (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971), 127.
6.1bid., 139.

7. Ibid.

72 Ethical Options

One significant qualification. Murray believes all lying is wrong, but he does not
hold that every intentional deception is a lie. For example, a general's troop
maneuver may lead his enemy to an erroneous conclusion without lying. For ac-
cording to Murray, it is a "fallacious assumption [to hold) that to be truthful we
must under all circumstances speak and act in terms of the data which come within
the purview of others who may be concerned with or affected by our speaking or
acting."® In brief, we may without lying intentionally act or speak in a way that we
know will be misunderstood by others.

The Providence of God

Implied in unqualified absolutism is another premise: the providence of God.
Deontologists believe that the result does not determine the rule; unqualified
absolutists stress that in God's providence he always makes "a third alternative"
in every apparent moral dilemma.

Several examples supplied from Scripture and elsewhere are used to show that
God delivers his faithful from these dilemmas. The implication (seldom, if ever,
stated) is that there are no real, unavoidable moral dilemmas. Daniel is often used
as a prime example. The pagan king commanded Daniel to violate the law of God
by partaking of forbidden meat and wine. But Daniel proposed "a third alternative"
of vegetables and water, which God blessed and which thus brought him into the
king's favor (Dan. 1).

It is also said that Sarah followed God's law and obeyed her husband's command,
trusting that God would intervene and save her from having to commit adultery. This
God did (Gen. 20). Of the many biblical examples where God did not intervene, it is
implied that he would have intervened if the believer had asked in faith for the
deliverance, since "God is faithful; he will not let you be tempted beyond what you can
bear" (1 Con 10:13). Those who admit there are some cases in which God does not
intervene claim that this is because there was antecedent sin in the person's life. For
example, someone driving too fast might have to choose between hitting a school bus
or hitting a pedestrian when there is no waybetween or around them. But the dilemma
arises from the driver's own evil choice of fast driving.

In short, sometimes we make our own moral bed and then have to lie in it. But
many of God's people do (and all could) manifest the kind of faithfulness that says,
"I will tell the truth and leave the consequences to God:' A case in point can be
found in the story of Corrie ten Boom's life ( The Hiding Place). When the ten Boom
family told the truth to the Nazis, they said the Jews were hiding "under the table,"
but the Nazis did not see the fugitives because they were under the floor under the
table. This, say some unqualified absolutists, is the sort of protection God will give
if we trust him and never lie. Hence, there is never a need to lie or break any moral
law in order to save a life or do any other moral good.

8.1bid., 145, emphasis original.

Unqualified Absolutism 73

Summary of Unqualified Absolutism

There are several major premises that make up the unqualified absolutist's posi-
tion, at least as it is held by Christians. Briefly stated, they include the following:

1. God's unchanging character is the basis of moral absolutes.
2. God has expressed his unchanging moral character in his law.
3. God cannot contradict himself.

4. Hence, no two absolute moral laws can really conflict.

5. All moral conflicts are only apparent, not real.

Positive Aspects of Unqualified Absolutism

Unqualified absolutism has much to commend it as a Christian ethic. It is based
in God's unchanging character, its nature is deontological, it has trust in God's
providence, and it holds the belief that there is always a way to avoid sinning.
Let us examine these in a little more detail.

It Is Based in God's Unchanging Nature

Most unqualified absolutists realize the need to anchor their universal moral
duties in the unchanging character of God. Indeed, it is difficult to see how
there can be any absolute moral prescriptions unless there is an absolute moral
Prescriber. Absolutely binding moral laws come only from an absolute moral
Lawegiver. This most commendable emphasis of unqualified absolutism points
up the inconsistency of any form of moral relativism, such as antinomianism
(chap. 2), situationism (chap. 3), or generalism (chap. 4).

It Stresses Rule over Result

Unqualified absolutism is a deontological ethic (see chap. 1). As such it rightly
holds that the rule determines the result, and not the reverse. Here again, this is a
necessaryingredient in an adequate Christian ethic. Something is not good simply
because it brings about desired results. An act is good because it is good, regardless
of the results. Surely G od designed good acts so that they would bring about good
results. Moses told Israel "to observe the LoRD's commands and decrees that I am
giving you today for your own good" (Deut. 10:13). However, even though doing
good is intended to bring good, nonetheless good is good no matter what evil may
come from it. And evil is evil no matter what good may result from it.

It Shows Trust in God's Providence

Another positive dimension of unqualified absolutism is its manifest confidence
in the providence of God. This is revealed clearly in the attitude of believers who,

74 Ethical Options

in the face of death, can say with Esther, "If I perish, 1 perish" (Esther 4:16), or
with the three Hebrew young men, "The God we serve is able to save us from it
[the fiery furnace].... But even if he does not, we want you to know, 0 king, that
we will not serve your gods or worship the image of gold you have set up" (Dan.
3:17-18). Since an absolute ethic is based in a God who is in absolute control, the
believer can trust him absolutely. God's providence makes it unnecessary to take
things into our own hands. The Christian can confidently believe that since God
made the rules, it is simply our duty to keep them and leave the results in his
hands.

There Is Always a Way to Avoid Sinning

Another commendable feature of unqualified absolutism is its belief that it is not
necessary to sin. God has so designed our moral laws and our duty that it is never
necessary to sin. Ultimately, there is no moral conflict in the self-consistent God,
nor are there any unresolvable conflicts in this moral world. There is always "a
way to escape" (1 Cor. 10:13 KJV). It is never necessary to literally do the lesser
evil. There is always "a third alternative." That is to say, the believer is never
duty-bound to sin in order to avoid sin. God has set it up that way.

Negative Aspects of Unqualified Absolutism

Critics have pointed out a number of difficulties with unqualified absolutism.
Since not all unqualified absolutists hold identical views, not all of these
criticisms are applicable to all proponents. However, many of them will apply
to all forms of the position.

Some Disputable or False Premises

Let us begin by examining presuppositions that are either unnecessarily or
unjustifiably held by some proponents of unqualified absolutism.

Are sins of the soul greater? This Platonic premise held by Augustine has by no
means experienced a universal acceptance. To be sure, many Christians still adhere
to a dualistic hierarchy of this variety. This has led, not without justification, to the
charge that such Christians neglect social concern because they are more interested
in saving souls than helping bodies. The biblical teaching on the unity of the human
being is the best corrective to this false dichotomy.

If Augustine were correct in this ethical dualism, then a "white lie" or minor
"evil thought" would be worse than rape or murder, for any spiritual offense
would be worse than a physical one. Furthermore, Augustine was not consis-
tent in applying this principle. Otherwise he would not have rejected the view
that David should have killed Nabal (the body) in order to keep his oath (the
soul).

Unqualified Absolutism 715

Can the lie to save lives be separated from mercy? Augustine says that God blessed
the mercy but not the lie. However, it was by means of the lie that Rahab's mercy was
expressed and the spies were saved. The same is true of the Hebrew midwives' lie
(Exod. 1:15-16). There was no actual separation between the lie and the act of mercy.
And a mere formal distinction will not suffice as an explanation, since in actuality
there was only one act (which included the lie) under consideration, and this act was
praised by God.

Are acts intrinsically good? Augustine argued that some acts are intrinsically
good, apart from one's intentions or motives. If this is so, then theft or lying would
indeed always be wrong. However, there are several objections to this view. First,
if some acts were intrinsically good or evil, then an act of killing committed by an
animal or an imbecile would have to be considered morally wrong. It will not
suffice to add that only human acts of killing could be morally wrong, or else we
would have to deny that imbeciles are human, since they are not morally culpable
for their acts. Furthermore, this would mean that they were wrong only because
they were so intended by someone, which is tantamount to saying that the act as
such is not evil, but only the act as intended is evil. But this is contrary to their view
that the act as such is evil.

Can a lie be defined without intention? Augustine defined a lie as an intentional
falsehood. But if intention needs to be added to the act of falsifying in order to
make it a lie, then it follows that the act of falsifying as such is not a lie. Further, if
acts are intrinsically evil apart from intentions or motives, then any falsification or
action contrary to a moral prescription in Scripture would be an evil. This would
include unintentional falsehoods as well as accidental injury or death inflicted on
persons. But this is not so. Finally, Augustine admitted that not all acts are
intrinsically good or evil, as, for example, giving to the poor. If so, then he has
already qualified his absolutism; perhaps the other acts, such as lying, are not
intrinsically evil either.

Does lying destroy all certainty? Augustine argued that lying would destroy
all certainty. At best, this argument only proves that lying undermines some
certainty, undermining information based on the testimony of one known to
have lied. Furthermore, the same argument could be made against anyone
known to have made unintentional mistakes, which we all do. So Augustine's
argument would prove to be too much. It would prove that one cannot be
certain of anything that depends on any person. But his own Christian beliefs
depended on the testimony of the apostles, which Augustine did not consider
uncertain.

Is the choice between permission and commission? Unqualified absolutists
believe there is no real moral dilemma in the case of lying or permitting a murder.
They believe there is really only one moral obligation in this situation: to tell the
truth. The only other duty, they say, belongs to the person threatening to do the
killing. Such threatening persons are responsible for what they do with the truth we
give them. But is this overlooking the fact that there is also a duty to save innocent

76 Ethical Options

lives, to show mercy? In short, is there a real conflict between truthfulness and
mercifulness? In other words, the choice is really between an act of commission
and one of omission. And a sin of omission can be just as much a sin as a sin of
commission (James 4:17).

Does lying condemn a person to hell? Few Christians really believe, as Augustine
suggests, that a single lie (even a few lies scattered through one's life) will send a
believer to hell. Indeed, anyone who believes in salvation by grace alone, as
Scripture teaches (Eph. 2:8-9), will not trouble themselves long with this point. It
is only those lives characterized by untruthfulness that eventuate in the lake of fire
(Rev. 21:8). And these unsaved find themselves right alongside those who are
"fearful." Yet who would say that everyone who has ever (or even occasionally)
been fearful will be in hell?

Will God always save us from moral dilemmas? There are several reasons to suppose
that divine intervention is not the solution to all moral dilemmas. First, nowhere
does Scripture promise this to every faithful believer all the time. First
Corinthians 10:13 is only a promise for victory in temptation—not a guarantee of
divine intervention to avoid moral conflicts. Second, neither Scripture nor the
history of the martyrs supports the position that God always delivers the faithful
from moral conflicts. God did deliver Daniel and Sarah, but he did not deliver
Abraham (Gen. 22), the midwives (Exod. 1), Rahab Josh. 2), the three Hebrew
youths (Dan. 3), or the apostles (Acts 4). And yet the conflicts were just as real
and the believers were just as faithful in these cases.

Further, not all real moral conflicts are brought on by a person's prior sin(s).
Jesus seemed to face real conflicts between obeying his heavenly Father and
obeying his earthly parents (Luke 2), between showing mercy and keeping the
Sabbath (Mark 2:27), and even between justice and mercy on the cross; yet he was
without sin (Heb. 4:15). In fact, moral conflicts are often brought on by one's
faithfulness to God. This was so of the midwives, of Daniel, of Abraham, of the
apostles, and even of Corrie ten Boom. If she had not cared so much about those
innocent Jews, she would never have found herself in the dilemma of needing to
lie to save their lives.

WasAbraham's concealment a lie? Augustine insisted that Abraham's concealment
of Sarah's identity as his wife was not a lie, since she was really his half sister. But
what about Isaac, who also claimed Rebekah was his sister, though she was not
(Gen. 26:7)? Surely this was not even half true. Augustine does not address this
problem, nor would his explanation for Abraham suffice for Isaac.

While one can agree that there is not always an obligation to tell the whole
truth, as we have in the divinely approved case of Samuel's half truth (1 Sam.
16), nonetheless concealment sometimes is a lie. If one knows exactly what the
questioner wants and yet conceals the information by intentionally misleading
him (though without direct falsification), is this not intentional deception? And
an intentional deception is a lie.

Unqualified Absolutism 77

Fatal Qualifications

Unqualified absolutism does not need a thousand qualifications to kill it; it can
die "a death by one qualification?’ As Kant acknowledged, even one exception to a
rule proves that the rule is not genuinely universal. By the absolutists' own
definition, an absolute rule has no exceptions, and yet there are many ways the
proponents of unqualified absolutism have qualified their view or made exceptions
to it.

Augustine's exceptions. Augustine admitted many exceptions to divine com-
mands. He excused Abraham from the charge of intending to murder Isaac
because Abraham was going to sacrifice his son "in obedience to God." Likewise,
sacrifice of his daughter and Samson's sacrifice of his own life are "justified only
on this ground, that the Spirit, who wrought wonders by him, had given him secret
instructions to do this."” But even one exception kills a universal rule as unquali-
fied absolutists understand it; it is shown not to be genuinely universally binding,
without exception. Likewise, Augustine argues that there were exceptions to the
divine command to obey human government. It should be noted in this connection
that the Bible not only enjoins submission to the consequences of a law (for
example, going to prison for disobedience, as in Dan. 6) but also demands obedi-
ence to the rules of government (1 Pet. 2:13-14). Paul enjoins both submission and
obedience, saying, "Remind the people to be subject to rulers and authorities, to be
obedient" (Titus 3:1).

John Murray's qualification. Murray contended that an intentional deception is
not a lie. He claimed that it is a "fallacious assumption [to hold] that to be truthful
we must under all circumstances speak and act in terms of the data which come
within the purview of others who maybe concerned with or affected by our
speaking or acting."'y But once this qualification is made, there are two momentous
problems. First, how do we keep from allowing a thousand similar qualifications?
At least Augustine limited the allowable instances of intentional deceptions to
special cases involving supernatural intervention; Murray leaves the door wide
open to all kinds!

Second, if a lie by definition is an intentional falsification, as Augustine said, then
Murray is playing ball in another park, since he no longer defines a lie in the same
way. But if one allows Murray this new definition of a lie, then Murray is no longer
an unqualified absolutist in the original Augustinian sense. What is more, Murray, by
virtue of his tactic of redefinition, is subject to the criticism that he salvages
"unqualified absolutism" by stipulative redefinition. But is this move really justified?
Would it not be more honest to admit that there are actually times when one believes
that a lie (an intentional deception) is justified, rather than redefining a lie to avoid
admitting that lies are sometimes justified?

9. Augustine of Hippo, City of God, in A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the
Christian Church, ed. Philip Schaff (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956), 2:15.
10. Murray, Principles of Conduct, 145, emphasis original.

78 Ethical Options

Hodge's limitation. Charles Hodge makes a distinction that would rescue Au-
gustinian unqualified absolutism from collapse. He suggests limitations on what
counts as a lie. These limits are contextual. That is, an intentional deception counts
as a lie if and only if it is told in a context in which the truth is expected." Since one
does not expect a spy to tell the truth, it would follow that lying" in spying is not
really lying.

However, this solution presents unqualified absolutism with several serious
problems. First, once this qualification is made, the view is no longer an unquali-
fied absolutism. It is an admission that there are exemptions from the moral rule
"Thou shalt not intentionally falsify," which is what Augustine originally meant by
a lie. Second, the only way one can know which moral law should be qualified is if
one has knowledge of which is higher and which is lower. But this is a form of
graded absolutism (see chap. 7), not unqualified absolutism.

Unsuccessful Qualifications

"Unqualified" absolutism is not really unqualified. It always seems to find some
way to qualify divine commands. So-called absolutists reduce certain divine com-
mands to less than an absolute level either by insisting that they flow only from
God's will, not from his nature, or by saying that some are purely civil or ceremo-
nial in nature and not moral, or by claiming that the command applies only ceteris
paribus, other things being equal.

There are, however, several problems with these solutions. First, not all moral
commands fit into these categories. Some are between two moral principles re-
flective of God's nature, such as truth and mercy. Second, even civil commands
(such as "Obey government") are a moral duty. Third, such a move to subordinate
some commands to others is not an unqualified absolutism but is a form of graded
absolutism (see chap. 7). Finally, subordination or qualification of any kind is a
capitulation of unqualified absolutism, since it admits there are occasions when
moral commands must be qualified.

Punting to Providence

An appeal to the providence of God to avoid moral conflict is ill-advised for
several reasons. First, God does not always intervene and spare all the faithful from
moral dilemmas. There is no evidence for this premise of unqualified absolutism
either inside or outside the Bible. Indeed, the premise of supernatural intervention is
in conflict with other premises held by these absolutists. To begin with, what need is
there for divine intervention if all conflicts are only apparent and not real? The need
for divine intervention is a concession to the position that there are real conflicts,
which is contrary to the tenets of unqualified absolutism. For once one admits that
there are real moral conflicts and that they can be resolved by divine

11. Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (reprint, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952), 3:439-44.

Unqualified Absolutism 719

intervention, then one is no longer an unqualified absolutist but is some kind of
graded absolutist.

Further, why the need for intervention if all moral dilemmas are caused by
antecedent sin? Sometimes in his mercy, God may desire to intervene, but there
is no reason to believe that he must (or will) always do so. We should not
always expect miracles to help us out of real moral conflicts.

Many unqualified absolutists "solve" the ethical dilemma with recourse to
the belief that God will always spare the faithful. This, however, meets with
several serious objections.

1. God nowhere promises that he will always intervene to save us from
moral conflicts.

2. The three Hebrew youths did not expect God to bail them out of their
moral dilemma (Dan. 3).

3. Jesus spoke against expecting a miracle to get one out of difficult
situations (Man. 4:7).

4. Expecting a miracle shifts the responsibility from us to God. It is an
ethic of "If in trouble, punt to God."

S. We should not base the reality of a present decision on the possibility that

God may perform a miracle in the future.
6. Believing that God will intervene if we do right begs the question. It
assumes that there is always a way to do right without real moral conflict.
7. Such a view would demand frequent miraculous intervention. But frequent
miraculous intervention would make both life and miracles impossible,
since both depend on regular patterns of activity for their operation.

. Finally, there are some pertinent questions to answer if one always expects
God to intervene. In the case of the Christian called upon to reveal the
whereabouts of an innocent victim to a would-be assassin, why not trust
God to intervene before speaking the truth (by making us temporarily
mute)? That way the hiding place of the innocent is not disclosed. Or why
not trust God to intervene and cause deafness in the would-be assassin?

oo

Third Alternatives Are Not Always Available

It is both unrealistic and unbiblical to assume that moral obligations never
conflict. Real life reveals this kind of conflict daily in hospitals, courtrooms, and
battlefields. Sometimes one must kill or be killed. Other times the baby must die,
or both the mother and baby will die (as in tubal pregnancies). Likewise, the
Bible tells of no third alternative for Abraham in killing Isaac (Gen. 2.2), or for
the Hebrew midwives (Exod. 1), or the three Hebrew youths (Dan. 3). It is naive
to assume that these kinds of situations never happen. And if the Christian ethic
is adequate for all situations, it must have an answer for these real moral
conflicts.

80 Ethical Options

Not All Moral Conflicts Are Self-Made

Further, prior personal sin does not cause all moral dilemmas. Even if Adam's
sin (Rom. 5:12) is the ultimate cause of original sin and imputed sin, it cannot be
blamed for each personal sin since then. And it is certainly not the cause of every
individual moral dilemma since then; otherwise there would be no need for
confession of personal sins (1 John 1:9). To argue to the contrary would be to
confuse total depravity and ethical responsibility. At best, prior personal sins cause
only some of one's personal moral conflicts, not all of them. Some are caused by
others who force the conflict on the innocent. Indeed, sometimes just the opposite
is true: personal moral dilemmas are precipitated by one's faithfulness or
righteousness.

A Basic Inconsistency

Most unqualified absolutists are inconsistent. For while they condemn lying to
save a person, they engage in intentional deception to save their property. Most
people, for example, leave their lights on while away from home in order to deceive
potential thieves. But if one will lie to save his property from a potential thief, then
why not lie to save an actual life from a murderer? While condemning Corrie ten
Boom for lying to protect Jews from being killed, they lie to save their jewels from
being stolen. But persons have more value than things.

Falling into Sins of Omission

Another problem is that the unqualified absolutist often ends up committing
unmerciful acts. Absolutists perform greater sins of omission to avoid what they
believe to be sins of commission. Plato's example is instructive." Who would
return a weapon one had borrowed from a man if he requested it back in order to
kill someone with it? The law of mercy is higher than the law of property.
Likewise, Scripture indicates that saving the lives of the innocent (mercy) is a
greater duty than telling the truth to the guilty (Exod. 1:15-16). So, in failing to
show mercy to the innocent by withholding truth from the guilty, the unqualified
absolutist falls into a sin of omission while trying to avoid a sin of commission.

The Tendency to Legalism

Another difficulty with unqualified absolutism is that it often tends toward
legalism by neglecting the spirit of the law in order to avoid breaking the letter of
the law. This attitude is precisely what Jesus condemned when he said, "The
Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath" (Mark 2:27; man = hu-
mankind). After Corrie ten Boom's torturous internment experience, is it not a

12. Plato, The Republic, trans. Francis Macdonald Comford (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1967), 1.330.

Unqualified Absolutism SI

cold indifference to demand that she not sign the prison release stating that she
had been "treated humanely"? When lying and lives are weighed, are not lives
more important?

Silence Is Not Always Possible

It is not always possible, as some unqualified absolutists suggest, to avoid fal-
sification by partial truths or silence. Samuel was able to avoid Saul's wrath by the
partial truth that he had come to offer a sacrifice, when he had really come to anoint
David as king. But what if Saul had asked him what other mission he had in mind?
At that point he would have had to either lie, be silent (which would have implied
that he had another purpose for coming), or else risk the death of the innocent and be
unmerciful. Even silence before an interrogator who says, will kill these people
unless you speak," can be an unmerciful sin of omission.

Summary and Condusion

Despite the positive aspects of unqualified absolutism, and its noble efforts to
preserve unmodified absolutes, there are some serious deficiencies in the position.
It is unrealistic, unmerciful (even legalistic at times), and unsuccessful in avoiding
the inevitable modification of its absolutes in order to give an adequate answer to
numerous biblical and real-life conflicts of divine commands.

Though it is no doubt true that moral conflicts are not God's ideal, it is also a
fact that this is not an ideal world. It is a real and fallen world. And if the
Christian ethic is adequate for this real world in which we live, then it must not
retreat into unqualified absolutes. It must find a morally acceptable way to
preserve absolutes while honestly and adequately providing an answer for
every moral situation.

Select Readings

Augustine. On Lying and To Consentius: Against Lying. In vol. 2 of A Select Library of the
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, edited by Philip Schaff. Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956.

Griffiths, Paul J. Lying: An Augustinian Theology of Duplicity. Grand Rapids:
Brazos, 2004.

Hodge, Charles. Systematic Theology. 3 vols. Reprint, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952.

Kant, Immanuel. "On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives: In The
Critique of Practical Reason. Translated by Thomas Kinsmill Abbot. 6th ed. London:
Longmans Green, 1963.

Lutzer, Erwin W. The Necessity of Ethical Absolutes. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1981.

82 Ethical Options

Murray, John. Principles of Conduct. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971.

Plato. The Republic Translated by Francis Macdonald Cornford. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1967.

Rae, Scott B. Moral Choices: Au Introduction to Ethics. 3rd ed. Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 2009.

6

CONFLICTING ABSOLUTISM

Evangelicals have generally held to some form of ethical absolutism. In contrast to
situationism, they have claimed that there are many moral absolutes. Within the
camp of those holding to two or more absolutes, a special problem arises: What
about moral conflicts? What should one do when two or more of one's absolute
obligations come into unavoidable conflict?

Basically, there are three answers to this question. First, unqualified absolutism
affirms that all such conflicts are only apparent, not real. In short, no two absolute
obligations ever come into unavoidable conflict. Second, conflicting absolutism
admits to real moral conflicts but claims that a person is guilty no matter which way
one goes. Third, graded absolutism (or the greater-good position) agrees with the
view that real moral conflicts do sometimes occur, but maintains that one is
personally guiltless for doing the greatest good and choosing the lesser evil in that
situation. This chapter will consider the second view.

An Explanation of Conflicting Absolutism

The central assumption of the ethical position of conflicting absolutism is that we
live in a fallen world, and in such a world real moral conflicts do occur. The
accompanying premise, however, is that when two duties conflict, we are morally
responsible to both duties. God's law can never be broken without guilt. In such
cases, therefore, one must simply do the lesser evil, confess that sin, and ask for
God's forgiveness.

83

84 Ethical Options

The Historical Background of Conflicting Absolutism

Conflicting absolutism has roots in the Greek world, was incorporated into
Reformation thinking, and finds expression in both modern existential and
popular thought. The colloquial "I did the lesser of two evils" is an expression
of it. It can even be called the lesser-evil view.

Although there are Christian roots for conflicting absolutism, they grow in
Greek soil. The ancient Greek tragedies often portrayed lesser-evil situations.
In the fifth century BC, Sophocles and Euripides wrote dramas about heroes
who contended against forces of fate they could not avoid. These dramatized
dilemmas reflected the nature of the real world of moral conflicts, with which
conflicting absolutism struggles.

The concept of lesser evils was given a new dimension with the Reformation
doctrine of depravity, particularly as that was developed by Martin Luther (d. 1546).
Two things embedded in Lutheran thought give rise to a form of conflicting abso-
lutism, the first being Luther's theory of two kingdoms. He believed that Christians
live simultaneously in two kingdoms, the kingdom of G od and the kingdom of this
world. Since they are opposed and since Christians have responsibility in both, it is
inevitable that there will be conflicts.

Second, Luther's famous statement to Melanchthon that we must "sin boldly" is
amenable to a lesser-evil interpretation. Luther wrote: "Be a sinner and sin boldly,
but believe even more boldly and rejoice in Christ, who is victor over sin, death
and the world:" The Lutheran scholar Helmut Thielicke (d. 1986) comments on
this quote: "It is not a case of compromise being justified.... The truth is rather that
Christ conquers and overcomes the schema [form] of the world, the structure
within which such compromise is necessarca In short, even though sin is
sometimes unavoidable, it is conquerable through the cross. In a fallen world sin is
inevitable, but in a redeemed world it is also forgivable.

Helmut Thielicke

Perhaps the most comprehensive contemporary exposition of the conflicting
absolutist view is found in Thielicke's works. There are several elements in
Thielicke's form of conflicting absolutism. Fundamental to his view is the belief
in real, unavoidable moral conflicts, for "to deny the conflict situation is to deny
decision.’ In conflict situations, says Thielicke, "I may have to face the
possibility that what is involved here is a borderline situation which does not
allow of any easy solutionf And "I can reach such a decision only by going

1. Letter to Melanchthon, August 1, 1521, in Letters 1, vol. 48 of Luther's Works, ed. and
trans. Gottfried G. Krodel (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1963), 282.
2-5 Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics, ed. William
H. Lazareth (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966), 1:504.
3.lhid., 610.

Conflicting Absolutism 85

through the conflict and enduring it, not by evading it in the name of some kind
of perfectionism."’

In the conflict situation sin is unavoidable, for we "constantly fall into sin in the
borderline situation."" In view of human depravity, these kinds of conflicts should
be expected, since "the form of this world is no more able to produce absolute
righteousness than our human heart" The consequence is that in this fallen world
"conduct is de facto a compromise between the divine requirement and what is
permitted by the form of this world, ... by the manifold conflicts of duty'" Even the
so-called just war unavoidably involves injustices. For "there is no such thing as a
wholly just war, and my decision to endorse a given war and participate in it can be
made only from the standpoint that I see, or think I see, greater wrong on the one
side than the other.""

Moral depravity is the cause of moral dilemmas. A moral conflict is "not
due to the character imparted to the world by creation, as though ‘from the
beginning’ (Matt. 19:8)7 No, "it is due rather to the complex of wrong decisions
which lie behind us, which have their ultimate root in that primal decision
recorded in the story of the fall's In brief, moral conflicts arise out of the fact
that this is a fallen world. In a sinless world there would be no moral dilemmas.
There will be none in heaven. God did not design, nor does he desire, moral
dilemmas. They are not his ideal. But on the other hand, this is not an ideal
world; it is a real and fallen world. In such a world, there will be times when we
cannot avoid evil.

When decisions are made in conflict situations, we must choose the lesser evil,
for "there are heavier sins and lighter sins:' They both are sins, but "they do not have
the same weight." Thielicke makes it clear that there is no justification for doing the
lesser evil.'; Neither is there any pragmatic justification. For "the slogan 'to prevent
something worse’ is always ethically destructive because it subjugates our action to
a non-Christian pragmatismf " In fact, "readiness to do wrong in order to ‘prevent
something worse' is a very dubious principle, because it implies that the end justifies
the meansf "We must simply recognize that in conflict situations both commands
are our moral duty and that sin is inevitable." Nonetheless, since there are lesser and
greater sins, the Christian should do the lesser sin, knowing that forgiveness is
available. "He knows that here in this world there is no perfect righteousness, but he
does not therefore draw the conclusion

4. Ibid., 612.

5. Ibid., 653.

6. Ibid., 499.

7. Ibid., 414-15.

8. Ibid., 596.

9. Ibid., 620.

10.1bid., 602.

11.1bid, 625.
12. Ibid., 590.
13. Ibid., 488.

86 Ethical Options

that everything is under the same condemnation and that everything is equally
permissible? On the contrary, a Christian realizes that there is a "quantitative
distinction between reprehensible and less reprehensible, between good and
less good possibilities?"

According to Thielicke, "we can undergo and endure borderline situations and
... inescapable conflicts only under forgiveness?" The Christian knows "that even
in a war which—given things as they are—is ‘just,’ [one] must always stand in need
of forgiveness."'s Thus our "certainty that acts done under the guidance of the
Spirit are, despite their ‘crooked’ form, done in God's name as his affair, and that at
the same time they nonetheless stand in need of forgiveness."" In the conflict
situation, the Christian "acts in the knowledge that even those actions which
conform to the ultimate norms perceptible in this aeon must stand under
forgiveness.:"° In short, even our best effort in obeying God's commands is an evil
that needs to be forgiven.

The Basic Tenets of Conflicting Absolutism

There are four basic premises in conflicting absolutism. First, God's law is absolute
and unbreakable. Second, in a fallen world unavoidable conflicts between God's
commands occur. Third, when moral conflicts happen, we should do the lesser
evil. Fourth, forgiveness is available if we confess our sins.

God's Moral Law Is Absolute

"The law of the LORD is perfect" (Ps. 19:7). The psalmist confessed to God,
"Every one of thy righteous ordinances endures for ever" (119:160 RSV). God
has not made his law to be broken. The psalmist exclaims, "Thou [God] hast
commanded thy precepts to be kept diligently” (119:4 RSV). "The ordinances of
the Lox") are true, and righteous altogether"; and "in keeping them there is great
reward" (19:9, 11 RSV). Further, "the LORD will not hold him guiltless" who
breaks his commands (Exod. 20:7 RSV).

In short, God is absolutely perfect, and his law is a reflection of his character.
"You, therefore, must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matt. 5:48
RSV). Anything that does not measure up to the absolute perfection of the law of
God is sin. Whenever God's law is broken, the lawbreaker sins, for "sin is lawless-
ness" (1 John 3:4). God does not change (Mal. 3:6), nor does the moral law that

14. Ibid., 501.

IS. Ibid., 654.
16. Ibid., 655.
17. Ibid., 659.
18. bid, 431.

Conflicting Absolutism 87

reflects his character. "It is impossible for God to lie" (Heb. 6:18). Therefore, it
is inexcusable for us to lie, even if it is necessary to save a life.

Moral Conflicts Are Unavoidable

The second premise of conflicting absolutism springs from the depravity of
humanity. Humans have broken God's law and find themselves inextricably bound
in a web of sinful relationships, in which sin is unavoidable. Before the fall of hu-
mankind, Adam was able not to sin, but since the fall, humans are unable to avoid
sin. Not only can humankind not avoid sinning in general; there also are tragic
moral dilemmas in this fallen world in which all alternatives are wrong. Sometimes
no matter what we do, we cannot avoid breaking one of God's laws. That is the
reality of a fallen world. Sometimes one must sin. Certainly one must choose the
lesser evil, but one must sin, regardless.

Conflicting absolutism runs contrary to the Kantian dictum: "Ought implies
can:' Humans are always called upon to obey a standard of perfection they cannot
reach: "You, therefore, must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matt.
5:48 RSV). Further, in moral dilemmas a person is morally obligated to keep both
laws, even though one of them must be broken. Such it is in this sinful world, says
the conflicting absolutist. Ideally, God did not design it this way. But then again,
this wicked world is far from ideal.

The Duty to Do the Lesser Evil

Not all sins are created equal. Jesus said to Pilate, "The one who handed me
over to you is guilty of a greater sin" ( John 19:11). One sin is so bad that it is
unpardonable: the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit (Matt. 12:32). This being the
case, there is an obligation to do the lesser evil. Whenever our moral duties
conflict, we should obey the greater one, realizing that breaking the other is a sin.
Nonetheless, it is the lesser sin in the situation. It is always our responsibility to do
our best, even when it is not good. We must maximize the good even when it is
minimal.

Forgiveness Is Available

The fourth premise associated with conflicting absolutism is that even though sin
is sometimes unavoidable, God's forgiveness is always available through the cross of
Christ. One of the happy by-products of this sad world is that the unavoidability of
sin drives people to the cross for forgiveness. There is a way out of the dilemma. It is
not a way to avoid sin; by the nature of the case, sin is unavoidable. Rather, it is a
way to avoid bearing the guilt of the sin for long. In brief, the way out is, on our part,
confession, and on God's part, the sacrifice of Christ on the cross. All we need to do
in lesser-evil situations is to do the lesser evil, confess

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that we have broken God's law, and receive forgiveness through Jesus Christ.
Sin is unavoidable, but salvation is available.

Some Positive Contributions of Conflicting Abso lut ism

Conflicting absolutism has many merits as a form of moral absolutism, but it is
subject to some serious objections as well. First, let us consider four of the
positive contributions it makes to Christian ethics.

It Preserves Moral Absolutes

Whatever its weaknesses, conflicting absolutism preserves moral absolutes
intact. God's law is absolute, and there are absolutely no occasions when it is
morally justifiable to break it. God is absolutely good, and his law is a reflection
of his nature. This being so, the breaking of a moral law is an attack upon his
character. Hence, God can no more allow a moral law to be broken than he can
allow his character to be violated. Conflicting absolutism is to be commended for
this strong stand upon the unchangeable and unbreakable nature of moral
absolutes.

It Has a Moral Realism

In spite of their tenacious grip on transcendent moral values, conflicting ab-
solutists are in touch with the real world of moral conflicts and borderline cases.
Not every decision is neat and clean. Everything is not black or white. There are
real moral conflicts. This realistic recognition of moral dilemmas is commendable.
There is no effort to explain away all conflicts as apparent, not real. Conflicting
absolutists may have their heads in a heavenly cloud of moral perfection, but their
feet are planted solidly in the clay of earthly imperfection.

It Sees Moral Conflicts as Rooted in Humanity's Fallenness

Another important dimension ofconflicting absolutism is its attempt to explain
the nature of moral conflicts. It sees moral dilemmas as rooted in moral depravity.
In an unfallen world there would be no unavoidable moral conflicts. It is only
because of sin that such conflicts occur. There are no moral conflicts in God, and
there will be none in heaven. So conflicting absolutism claims that moral dilem-
mas are of humankind's own making. This does not mean that each individual
makes his or her own moral bed and has to lie in it. Some moral dilemmas result
from Adam's sin (Rom. 5:12), some from the sins of others, and some from our
own sins. However, sin lies at the root of moral conflicts. God did not design the
world this way.

Conflicting Absolutism 89

It Is a Solution without Exception

There is an unadulterated simplicity about conflicting absolutism. It is a
solution without exceptions. It cannot be accused of casuistry. It is simply
always wrong to break an absolute moral law of God. There are no exceptions,
exemptions, or divine immunity. Absolute moral laws are absolute, and that is
that. In a complex world of confused circumstances, there is an admirable
simplicity about conflicting absolutism. In this respect it has an uncluttered and
unadorned appeal.

Some Criticisms of Conflicting Absolutism

In spite of its many appealing features, a number of objections have been
leveled against the lesser-evil view. We will consider four of them here. The
first two may be called moral and the latter two christological.

A Moral Duty to Sin Is Morally Absurd

According to conflicting absolutism, in real moral conflicts we have a moral
duty to do the lesser of the two evils. That is, one is morally obligated to do evil.
But how can there ever be a moral obligation to do what is immoral? It seems to
be a morally absurd claim.

There are three basic alternatives for the proponent of the lesser-evil position in
view of this criticism. First, a Christian might claim that there is no moral ob-
ligation or divine command to do the lesser evil. It is simply what one "ought" to
do, on some kind of pragmatic or utilitarian grounds, for personal or social reasons.
This alternative would seem to be particularly embarrassing for biblical Christians,
since they would be faced with some of life's most difficult situations without any
direction or command from God. Christianity would have an incomplete ethic. It
would be able to handle the ordinary situations, but for the really difficult
ones—the ones involving tragic moral choices—it would give absolutely no divine
direction.

There is another way out of the dilemma for the lesser-evil proponents. They
may admit that there is a moral obligation—an obligation not to do evil, but
simply to maximize good or minimize evil in an evil situation. But if they take
this route, then their position really collapses into the greater-good view. For if
they are actually obligated to do a maximal good, then why call it evil? For
example, the doctor who amputates a leg to save the patient's life is not guilty of
the sin of mutilation, but is to be commended for doing the maximal good. As
tragic as amputation is, surely there is no basis in Christian ethics to consider
amputation done to save a life as a culpable act. Likewise, why call the act evil,
as the lesser-evil view would seem to do, when it is the greatest good under the
circumstances?

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Finally, surely the proponent of the lesser-evil view could simply admit the
absurdity and unavoidability of sin and claim that one is morally obligated to
do what is morally wrong, absurd as this is.

The Unavoidable Is Not Morally Culpable

This leads to a second criticism, that conflicting absolutism holds that one is
personally responsible for what is personally unavoidable. Those who espouse this
view challenge the underlying premise of their opponents that responsibility
implies ability, that "ought implies can." They may point to biblical instances
where God commands the impossible, such as "Be perfect, ... as your heavenly
Father is perfect" (Matt. 5:48). They may point to the doctrine of depravity, which
declares it to be impossible for a human not to sin even though God commands
humankind not to sin.

But in these cases one need simply note that "ought implies can" only in the
sense that one can, by the enabling grace of God, do what is utterly impossible by
human standards. In this sense, the ought-implies-can thesis is not a violation of
these biblical truths. Furthermore, to focus on the ought-implies-can principle
misses the real issue. The moral absurdity of the lesser-evil position is not based on
the truth or falsity of "ought implies can?' From a Christian standpoint it is morally
absurd to say, "One ought to do an evil," since "ought" means "God has
commanded it"; and God does not (I would say, cannot) command one to do what
is morally evil. God is good, absolute good, and as such he can neither perform nor
promote anything evil. For God to command one to do evil would contradict his
very will, his very nature.

Yet one might respond here by claiming that whatever God commands is ipso
facto good and not evil, since one could define good as that which God commands.
However, this response would be fatal to the lesser-evil view, for if what God
commands in so-called lesser-evil situations is really good simply because he has
commanded it, then it is not an evil. Actually, if the act is good in this conflict
situation because God has commanded it, then the lesser-evil view has really col-
lapsed into the greater-good view. The good act one performs at the command of
God is not sinful but commendable because it is done in obedience to God.

Before we leave this point, we notice making a distinction between good and
right does not help the lesser-evil position. One cannot simply claim that the lesser
evil is the "right" thing to do in a given situation, for one can always ask Was the
"right" act morally good or evil? Was the act culpable or not? If it is a morally evil
or guilt-inducing act, then we are back where we started, and the preceding criti-
cisms apply. If, on the other hand, the "right" act was good or guiltless, then the
view has collapsed into the greater-good view.

The essential difference between these two positions is that according to con-
flicting absolutism, the tragic moral act is guilt-inducing and calls for confession
and forgiveness, whereas according to the greater-good view the tragic moral act

Conflicting Absolutism 91

is guiltiness. A person may regret having to make the decision, but one need not
repent of it. Indeed, according to the greater-good view, doing the greatest good
leads to reward, not to punishment. At any rate, the lesser-evil view is not redeemed
from its difficulties by calling the lesser evil the "right" act in contrast to a "good" act.
The question still remains: Is one personally guilty or not guilty for performing this
act? If one is guilty, then God is commanding an act that is unavoidably sinful. If one
is not guilty, then the act is morally acceptable, and we are driven to the greater-good
position.

Another distinction is sometimes made in an attempt to rescue the lesser-evil
position. It is occasionally claimed that people are not blamed for doing their best
in conflicting situations, but rather they are blamed in doing their best, for even
the most faithful servant is unworthy (Luke 7:6-10). In this sense some might
claim that it would be morally absurd to blame people for doing their best, but it
is not necessarily absurd to blame them for doing evil in the process of doing
their best. Might it not be that the act of lying is evil but that the whole process of
showing mercy to the innocent is the greater good? Hence, a person should
confess the lie in particular even though the act as a whole was the greater good.
Perhaps God blames a human for whatever sinful acts are part of an overall good
performance.

In response to this distinction, we simply observe that the ethical complex must
be thought of as a whole. Certain things done in one context are morally good and
in another are morally evil. For example, cutting off a person's leg is good if done
by a doctor as a necessary means to save a life, but evil if done as an act of sadism.
It is the moral context as a whole that gives meaning to the act. Hence, one cannot
separate specific evil parts from an overall ethical performance and call the whole
act good. As an intention-act complex, amputation is either good or evil. One
cannot claim that the overall amputation process was good but actually cutting off
a human leg was evil.

This discussion brings up a more principled issue beneath the whole discussion:
the relation of intention to action in judging the morality of an act. The difficulty
with much of the discussion on these issues seems to hinge on the question of
whether an act is intrinsicallygood or evil, or whether it is the intention-act
complex that must be considered. An adequate discussion of this is beyond the
scope of this volume. Suffice it to say here that it seems reasonable to assume that
we must consider the intention-act complex. Good intentions alone are not
sufficient to make an act morally right. Hitler may have intended to produce a
better world by enacting genocide, but the murder of millions of Jews and others
was not made morally good by admirable motives. Likewise, an act as such apart
from its motive or intention is not necessarily good. For instance, those who give to
the poor in order to receive the praise of others are not to be morally commended.
If this is the case, then the lesser-evil position is wrong in separating an act from its
total intention-act complex, pronouncing that act evil, and then declaring the
overall process good.

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Jesus Must Have Sinned

According to conflicting absolutism, sin is unavoidable in real moral conflicts.
However, according to the Bible, Jesus was "tempted in every way, just as we
are—yet without sin" (Heb. 4: Is). So if there are real moral dilemmas; then either
Jesus faced them or else he did not. If he did face them, then according to the
lesser-evil view, which states that evil is indeed unavoidable, Jesus must have
sinned. But the Bible says that Jesus did not sin (2 Cor. 5:21; Heb. 4:15). Hence, the
only alternative here is that Jesus never faced real moral conflicts. If we assume that
there are real moral conflicts, several explanations for this dilemma can be offered.
First, perhaps the lesser-evil view is incorrect, and Jesus never sinned when he
faced real moral conflicts because one is not held to be sinful when doing the
greatest good in a moral conflict. Perhaps "stealing" bread from the temple (taking it
without permission from the proper authority) is not morally wrong when starvation
of God's servant is the other alternative. Is this not what Jesus implied in Matthew
12:3-8?

But let us not so readily assume that conflicting absolutism is defenseless in the
face of this charge. Perhaps Jesus never sinned in the area of moral conflicts
simply because he never faced any moral conflicts. There are two explanations for
this position. First, it maybe that God providentially spared Jesus from facing
moral conflicts in order to preserve his sinlessness. But if this is the case, then
Christians may ask why they, too, are not spared from moral conflicts if they are
faithful to God. In fact, this is precisely what many nonconflicting absolutists
hold: there is always a third alternative for the faithful. Daniel did not have to
either eat the pagan meat and drink the pagan wine or suffer the consequence of
his disobedience (Dan. 1). There was a prayerful third way out. Is this not what 1
Corinthians 10:13 seems to imply, that there is always a "way of escape” (RSV)?
If the conflicting absolutists wish to take this alternative of arguing that God will
always provide a way out for those who are faithful to God's will, as Jesus was,
then their view really collapses into nonconflicting absolutism. For in the final
analysis, the lesser-evil view is saying that there never is an unavoidable moral
conflict for those who do God's will. It would be special pleading to declare that
the providential way out applies only to Christ but not to other servants of God
who are faithful to his will.

Another suggestion is that Jesus never faced any moral dilemmas simply be-
cause he never committed any antecedent sin to get himself into these tight spots.
Only those who make their moral beds have to lie in them. Jesus never sinned, and
hence he never found himself in unavoidable moral conflicts. On the face of it, this
view has merit. Often our previous sins seem to get us into a moral pickle. We do
reap what we sow. However, in order for this obvious truth to rescue the lesser-evil
position from collapse, it must be universally true: it must always be true that
moral dilemmas we face are created by our own antecedent sins. This seems
patently false by counterexample. Sometimes even the innocent are faced with
moral difficulties. What sin did innocent German Christian families com-

Conflicting Absolutism 93

mit that placed them in the dilemma of either lying or watching Jews go to the
gas chamber? Were these believers more sinful than others in the world? One is
reminded here ofJesus's statement about those on whom the tower fell: to you
think that they were worse offenders than all the others who dwelt in
Jerusalem?' (Luke 13:4 RSV).

Indeed, not only is it not true that moral dilemmas are always brought about by
antecedent sin: sometimes it also is antecedent righteousness that precipitates the
dilemma. Daniel and the three Hebrew youths were not confronted with their
dilemma because theywere backslidden (Dan. 1, 3, 6). Nor were the apostles doing
evil when religious authorities commanded them not to preach, thus forcing a choice
between the command to obey government and the command to preach the gospel
(Acts 4). The same is true ofAbraham's dilemma over whether to kill his son or to
disobey God (Gen. 22). Indeed, many times in life it is one's dedication to God that
precipitates moral conflicts. It may be a person's righteousness, not antecedent sin,
that occasions the moral conflict. If this is the case, then the lesser-evil position has
not redeemed itself against the criticisms. It has not explained away the
christological dilemma. It has not shown that Jesus never faced moral dilemmas
simply because he never committed any previous sins.

Before the opponents of the lesser-evil view rejoice too quickly, there is another
point to consider. Perhaps there is always antecedent sin in our case, but never in
Christ's case—because we are fallen and he is not. Adam's sin is antecedent in the
case of all humankind except Christ. Hence, because we are part of a fallen world,
previous sin (that is, Adam's; see Rom. 5:12) is responsible for subsequent moral
dilemmas that we will face but that Christ did not.

There is a certain plausibility about this suggestion that cannot be denied. It
seems to point to a clear difference in Christ's case, as well as to recognize ante-
cedent sin in our case. There are, however, at least two problems here. First, moral
conflicts due to the antecedent sin of Adam are not unique to fallen humanity;
Christ also lived in this fallen world. And even though he never personally sinned,
Christ was nevertheless immersed in a world of moral conflicts due to Adam's and
others' sins. Anyhow, not all moral conflicts are due to one's own antecedent sin.
The sins of others can force a dilemma on those who did not personally create the
tragic situation. Thus a key question appears: Why did Christ not face any moral
conflicts forced on him by the sins of others?

Second, the attempt to explain why Christ did not face moral conflicts by way of
Adam's fall confuses collective and personal guilt. There is a corporate sense in
which everything done by fallen humanity is sinful. In this sense, sin is inevitable
for all fallen people. This, however, is quite different from saying that a person is
personally guilty for creating the situation or that any particular sin is unavoidable.
The immediate moral choice may not induce guilt because it is unavoidable.
However, if it were not for Adam's fall, that kind of situation would never have
occurred. For example, one would never have to kill in self-defense if it were not for
Adam's fall. In a paradise, presumably there would be no need to kill for any

94 Ethical Options

reason. Nonetheless, killing in self-defense is not a personally culpable act
according to the law of God (Exod. 22:2).

We may still ask: Did Jesus really face moral dilemmas in which two or more
commands of God came into unavoidable conflict? An examination of the Gospels
yields several illustrations. At age twelve Jesus faced a conflict between his earthly
parents and his heavenly Father. Although he later submitted to his earthly parents,
initially he left them in order to fulfill God's will (Luke 2). Also, Jesus justified his
disciples’ action of taking grain by approving David's "stealing" of the consecrated
bread in the tabernacle (Matt. 12:3-4). In this regard Jesus said to others,
"[Whoever] loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me" (Matt.
10:37). On many occasions, Jesus faced conflict between obeying the religious
authorities, which he taught his disciples and others to do (Matt. 23:3), and
following the law of mercy by helping those in need (Luke 14:1-6). For example,
he chose to heal a man on the Sabbath. When challenged, he said that the law of the
Sabbath should be subordinated to humankind, not vice versa. On another
occasion Jesus approved of the disciples’ plucking grain on the Sabbath (Luke
6:1-5).

The greatest moral conflict that Jesus faced, however, was his trial and cross,
where mercy and justice came into direct and unavoidable conflict. Should he
speak in defense of the innocent (himself), as the law demands (Lev. 5:1), or
should he show mercy to the many (humankind) by refusing to defend himself?
Further, should he take his own life in a self-sacrifice for others (cf. John 10:10), or
should he refuse to die innocently for others? In both cases, esus chose mercy over
justice. But did he sin in so doing? God forbid! The cross was not the lesser of two
evils; it was the greater good ("Greater love has no one .. 7 [ John 15:13]). It
appears that the lesser-evil view, then, literally stands at the crossroads. If it is a sin
to do the greatest good in a morally conflicting situation, then Jesus would have
been perhaps the greatest sinner who ever lived. Perish the thought! Indeed, God
himself faced a moral conflict in the cross: Should he sacrifice his Son, or should
he allow the world to perish? Thank God, mercy triumphed over justice. Surely the
sacrifice of Christ was not a lesser evil; it was indeed the greatest good that God
could do (cf. John 15:13; Rom. 5:8-9).

Christ Must Have Faced Moral Contlicts

The fourth objection is another christological problem with the lesser-evil view.
If Christ is our complete moral example, then he must have faced morally
conflicting situations in which both alternatives were sinful. But if Christ never
sinned, then Christ never faced them. Hence, we have no example from Christ to
follow in some of life's most difficult moral decisions. But does not Hebrews say
Jesus was "tempted in every way, just as we are" (4:15)? Does not Paul exhort us to
be followers of Christ (1 Cor. 11:1-2)? How can we follow Christ in ethical
dilemmas if he never faced ethical dilemmas?

Conflicting Absolutism 95

Some proponents of conflicting absolutism frankly admit that Christ is not our
complete moral example. But it is unacceptable to grant this point. It concedes that
the ethic of following Christ is incomplete for the followers of Christ. Indeed, a
proper understanding of the New Testament would dictate that we give up claims
of the lesser-evil view rather than sacrifice the completeness of Christ's moral
example.

The proof that one can face real moral dilemmas without sinning is that Jesus
faced them but never sinned. If this is so, then it follows that moral dilemmas do
not necessitate personal guilt. There is always a "way of escape" through doing
the greater good. In conflicting situations, keeping the higher law (for example,
obedience to God over government) is the guiltless way out.

Summary and Condusion

Conflicting absolutism believes that there are many moral absolutes that some-
times conflict. This view is rooted in the premise that God's laws are absolute and
hence can never be violated. On the other hand, it recognizes that this is a fallen
world. And in such a world there are real moral dilemmas. When such a real,
unavoidable conflict occurs, it is our obligation to do the lesser evil. However, we
must recognize such an act for what it is, confess our sin of breaking God's law,
and accept his forgiveness.

Conflicting absolutism has the merit of retaining absolutes and yet being realistic
about the fallen world in which we live. However, it does not appear to have
successfully defended itself against either the moral or the christological charges
leveled against it. It seems morally absurd to say that there is a moral duty to sin or to
blame someone for what was unavoidable. Furthermore, if Christ was tempted in all
ways as we are, then he must have faced moral dilemmas. But if he did face moral
dilemmas, then he must have sinned, because either alternative was sinful according
to this view. If he did not face moral dilemmas, then he is not our perfect moral
example. In short, when pushed to the wall, this position seems to collapse into either
nonconflicting absolutism by claiming special providential intervention for Christ to
save him from moral dilemmas, or into graded absolutism by claiming that one is
morally obligated to maximize good. In short, in spite of its helpful insights, it seems
to have no firm ground of its own on which to stand.

Select Readings

Fletcher, Joseph F., and John Warwick Montgomery. Situation Ethics: True or False?
A Dialogue between Joseph Fletcher and John Warwick Montgomery. Minneapolis:
Dimension Books, Bethany Fellowship, 1972.

96 Ethical Options

Luther, Martin. "Letter to Melanchthon." In Letters I, vol. 48 of Luther's Works, edited
and translated by Gottfried G. Krodel. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1963.
Lutzer, Erwin W. The Morality Gap. Chicago: Moody, 1972.

Thielicke, Helmut. Theological Ethics. Edited by William H. Lazareth. Vol. 1.
Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966.

7

GRADED ABSOLUTISM

Total ethical relativism is not an option for an evangelical. God's character is un-
changing, and his law reflects his character (see chap. 1). Of the options within
ethical absolutism, evangelicals must choose between unqualified absolutism (see
chap.5), conflicting absolutism (see chap. 6), or graded absolutism (see chap. 7).
Our previous analysis, however, has indicated serious problems with the first two
of these views. There remains one alternative to discuss: graded absolutism.

The Historical Roots of Graded Absolutism

Of the three forms of absolutism held by evangelicals, unqualified absolutism
is associated with the Anabaptist tradition, conflicting absolutism with the Lu-
theran tradition, and graded absolutism with the Reformed tradition. Before we
examine the basic premises of graded absolutism, a brief look at some of its
roots is in order.

Augustine of Hippo

Like most Reformed traditions, the roots of graded absolutism can be traced to
Augustine of Hippo (d. 430). Although he defends the unqualified absolutist position
on the issue of lying (see chap. 5), at times Augustine's answers to conflicting
situations are similar to those ofgraded absolutism. For example, both views hold
that there is a hierarchy of virtue, that moral duties sometimes conflict, and that we
are not culpable for obeying the higher duty.

97

98 Ethical Options

Like graded absolutists, Augustine believes there is a hierarchy of sins, some
being worse than others.’ Since Augustine's ethic is centered in love, he sees an
ordered priority in the things we are to love. God is certainly to be loved more
than humans, and humans more than things? Thus, there is a pyramid of value
with God on the top, persons in the middle, and things on the bottom.

Augustine also believes that moral duties sometimes come into conflict. Even
in his advocacy for never telling a lie (see chap. 5), Augustine recognizes the class
of different duties, which is one of the central premises of graded absolutism.
Likewise, he sees moral conflicts in other life-and-death situations. Even though
he views suicide as morally wrong, Augustine nevertheless justifies Samson's
suicide: "However, there are some exceptions made by the Divine Authority to its
own law, that men may not be put to death. These exceptions are of two kinds,
being justified either by a general law, or by a special commission granted for a
time to some individual.."" In this latter category Augustine places Abraham,
Jephthah, and Samson, all of whom he believes were given a divine command to
kill that overrode the general moral law against intentionally killing another
human being.

In harmony with graded absolutists, Augustine believes that it is the greater
good, not the lesser evil, to follow the higher moral duty in conflicting situations.
For example, Abraham and Samson are commended for their willingness to kill at
God's command. When two moral duties clash, the believer is exempt from the
lower duty by virtue of obedience to the higher. In this sense, Augustine is a
precursor to the graded absolutist.

Charles Hodge

In his Systematic Theology, Charles Hodge (d. 1878) defends a form ofgraded
absolutism, as is illustrated by his discussion of uttering intentional falsehoods. In
spite of the fact that Hodge holds that truth is absolute, being based on God's very
nature, he still believes that it sometimes is right to intentionally falsify. He believes
that "truth is at all times sacred, because it is one of the essential attributes of God, so
that whatever militates against or is hostile to truth is in opposition to the very nature
of God." However, there are occasions when one is justified in intentionally
deceiving another: An "intention to deceive, therefore, is an element in the idea of
falsehood. But even this is not always culpable."® Hodge uses both

1. Augustine of Hippo, Enchiridion, in A Select Library of the Nicene and
Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, ed. Philip Schaff (Grand Rapids: Eerclmans,
1956), 3:245.

2. Augustine of Hippo, On Christian Doctrine, in Select Library of the Nicene and
Post-Nicene Fathers, 2:530.

3. Augustine of Hippo, City of God, in Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene
Fathers, 2:15.

4. Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (reprint, Grand Rapids:

Eerdmans, 1952), 3:437. S. Ibid, 440.

Graded Absolutism 99

the Hebrew midwives (Exod. 1) and Samuel (1 Sam. 16) as examples of
justifiable deception. (The latter is a divinely appointed falsehood.)

Hodge also believes "it is lawful not only to conceal intended movements from
an enemy, but also to mislead him as to your intentions "© He reasons that "there
maybe any combination of circumstances under which a [hu]man is not bound to
speak the truth, [and] those to whom the declaration or signification is made have
no right to expect ... [one] to do so." For example, "if a mother sees a murderer in
pursuit of her child, she has a perfect right to mislead him by any means in her
power, because the general obligation to speak the truth is merged or lost, for the
time being, in the higher obligation." According to Hodge, "the principle that a
higher obligation absolves from a lower stands fine’

Hodge believes this kind of graded absolutism is a "dictate even of the natural
conscience." For example, "it is evidently right to inflict pain in order to save a life. It
is right to subject travellers to quarantine... to save a city from pestilence:’ Indeed, he
believes that "the principle itself is clearly inculcated by our Lord when He said, 'T
will have mercy and not sacrifice;' and when he taught that it was right to violate the
Sabbath in order to save the life of an ox, or even to prevent its suffering." "°

Furthermore, Hodge contends that when one subordinates a lower moral duty
to the higher, he has not sinned. He rejects the position that "it is ever right to do a
wronen However, he believes that it is right to intentionally deceive in order to
save a life. And even though Hodge does not wish to call this a "lie," a term he
reserves for an unjustified intentional deception, he does believe it is morally right
to intentionally falsify in these circumstances. It is right because there is "no right
for expectation" and "no obligation to speak the truth" in those cases where there is
a greater duty.*"

Soren Kierkegaard

Soren Kierkegaard's "teleological suspension of the ethical" in his book Fear
and Trembling also serves as a forerunner of graded absolutism. For in it he speaks of
Abraham facing the dilemma of God saying through the law "Thou shalt not kill,"
and yet God commanded him to kill his son Isaac. In this case, Kierkegaard (d.
1855) held that Abraham was supposed to transcend his lower duty by his higher
religious obligation of obeying God. The only difference was that Abraham did not
see this as a higher moral obligation but as a religious one that went beyond the
ethical (by temporally suspending one's duty to it) while he fulfilled

6. Ibid. 441.
7. Ibid.

10. Ibid., 442.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., 447.

100 Ethical Options

his transcendent duty to God by faith. This difference noted, Kierkegaard's main
point is the same: obeying the higher duty does not negate the lower duty. It is still
there and still binding (thus causing the tension). Further, a person facing this
transcendent duty is only to temporarily suspend one's duty to the universal
ethical command not to kill an innocent person. As soon as the conflict with the
higher duty is resolved (by obeying the higher duty), one immediately falls back
on the universal rule against murder.

W. David Ross

In his book The Right and the Good’ David Ross (d. 1971) also embraces a
kind of graded absolutism. Ross lists seven prima facie obligations, which he does
not claim are all-inclusive: fidelity, reparation, gratitude, nonmalfeasance, justice,
beneficence, and self-improvement. In the case of ethical dilemmas, these duties
may conflict with one another, but there can never be a true ethical dilemma. There
is always a higher obligation, which means a deontological (not a utilitarian) sense.
It is one's absolute obligation to follow this over lower duties. One does not decide
which is higher in the utilitarian sense of which will bring the greatest good in the
long run. In short, Ross was not a consequentialist (see chap. 4 above). He believed
in a kind of graded absolutism.

The Essential Elements of Graded Absolutism

Hodge's analysis sets forth the essential elements of a graded absolutism or
ethical hierarchicalism. There are three essential premises in the biblical
argument for graded absolutism, and each is based on relevant Scripture.

There Are Higher and Lower Moral Laws

Not all moral laws are of equal weight. Jesus spoke of the "weightier" matters
of the law (Matt. 23:23 RSV) and of the "least" (5:19) and the "greatest" com-
mandment (22:36). He told Pilate that Judas had committed the "greater sin"
(John 19:11). Despite a rather widespread evangelical distaste for a hierarchy of
sins (and virtues), the Bible does speak of the 'greatest" virtue (1 Con 13:13) and
even of "greater" acts of a given virtue (John 15:13).

The common myth that all sins are equal is often based on erroneous
interpretations of James 2:10, which does not speak of the equality of all sins but
rather of the unity of the law: "Whoever ... fails in one point has become guilty of
all of it" (RSV). It does not say that the transgressor is equally guilty of all, nor
that all infractions bring equal guilt (cf. 3:1). However, it is true that any violation
of the law brings some guilt.

13. Oxford: Clarendon, 1930.

Graded Absolutism 101

Others have wrongly supposed that simply because Jesus said that one can lust
and even murder "in his heart" (Matt. 5:28), this means it is equally evil to imagine
a sin as it is to do it. In the same sermon, Jesus rejected this view, indicating there
are at least three levels of sins with corresponding judgments (5:22). Indeed, the
whole concept of degrees of punishment in hell (5:22; Rom. 2:6; Rev. 20:12) and
graded levels of reward in heaven (1 Cor. 3:11-15) indicates that sins come in
degrees. The fact that some Christians’ sins call for excommunication (1 Cor. 5)
and others for death (1 Cor. 11:30) also supports the general biblical pattern that all
sins are not equal in weight. There actually is one sin so great as to be unforgivable
(Mark 3:29).

Perhaps the clearest indication of higher and lower moral laws comes in Jesus's
answer to the lawyer's question about the "greatest commandment" (Matt.
22:34-40). Jesus clearly affirms that the "first and greatest" is above the "second,"
that loving God is of supreme importance, and then below that comes loving one's
neighbor. This same point is reaffirmed when our Lord says, "[Whoever] loves
father or mother more than me is not worthy of me" (Matt. 10:37 RSV).
Numerous other scriptural passages maybe cited to support this same point (see
Prov. 6:16-18; Matt. 5:22; 1 Tim. 1:15; James 2:13; 1 John 5:16). The popular
belief is wrong; all sins are not created equal, for there are clearly higher and
lower moral laws.

It is significant that both other Christian options admit the truth of this same
point. The conflicting absolutist speaks of the lesser evil, plainly implying that not
all evils are equal. Likewise, the unqualified absolutist admits that moral laws are
higher than civil or ceremonial laws commanded by God, and that many laws are
binding only if all things are equal, which they sometimes are not. The real ques-
tion, then, is this: Are the moral laws hierarchically graded?

The answer is affirmative for several reasons. First, all ethical obligations are
moral laws, and Christians do have an ethical obligation to obey civil laws (see Rom.
13:1-6; Titus 3:1; 1 Pet. 2:13-14). It is not simply a civil duty to obey civil laws, since
such obedience is enjoined by the moral Lawgiver (God) "for conscience’ sake"
(Rom. 13:5 NASB). Second, even the commands to obey government or perform
ceremonial duties are divine commands and, as such, involve a moral duty. By its
very nature, a divine command is one that we ought to obey; it is an ethical
responsibility. Otherwise it would be a merely declarative or descriptive statement,
not an imperative. Third, the distinctions between civil, ceremonial, and moral laws
are not rigid. The law of God is unified and interpenetrating, so that there are moral
implications to civil and ceremonial commands. Whatever God commands his
children to do—whether to love their neighbors or offer sacrifices—demands moral
obedience. Finally, some of the conflicts in commands are clearly between two
commands that are both moral in nature, which is true even for those who distinguish
between moral and civil or ceremonial laws (Gen. 22; Exod. 1; Man. 22). We
conclude, then, that there are graded levels of moral commands in Scripture.

102 Ethical Options

There Are Unavoidable Moral Conflicts

Some personally unavoidable moral conflicts exist in which an individual
cannot obey both commands. The arguments in support of this observation
come from many sources—both inside and outside the Bible. Several of them
will suffice to establish this point.

First, the story o f Ab raham and Isaac (Gen. 22) contains a real moral conflict.
"Thou shall not kill" is a divine moral command (Exod. 20:13 KJV), and yet God
commanded Abraham to kill his son Isaac. That Abraham intended to kill Isaac is
clear from the context (and from Heb. 11:19, which informs us that Abraham
believed God could raise Isaac from the dead). Further, the fact that Abraham was
not required to go through with the act does not eliminate the reality of the moral
conflict, since the intention to perform an act with moral implications is itself a
morally responsible act (cf. Matt. 5:28). Neither will it suffice to say that this is a
specially approved divine exception, because the "exception" (or exemption) must
be made in view of some higher moral law; this is precisely the point that graded
absolutism wishes to make. Furthermore, the very fact that an "exception" (or
exemption) is called for indicates that the two laws are in genuine conflict.

Second, the story of Samson contains a conflict of two divine commands. Sam-
son committed what appears to be a divinely approved suicide ( Judg. 16:28-30)
despite the moral prohibition against killing a human being, including oneself. The
commands were divine and moral—"You shall not kill" (Exod. 20:13 RSV) and
~Take your life" (inferred from the fact that God answered Samson's prayer)—yet
when there was a real conflict between commands, God apparently approved of
Samson disregarding one in order to obey the other.

Third, there are several biblical illustrations in which individuals had to choose
between lying and not helping to save a life (that is, not showing mercy). The
Hebrew midwives (Exod. 1) and Rahab ( Josh. 2; Heb. 11:31; James 2:25) will
suffice as examples. Regardless of whether they were right or wrong in lying, the
point here is that the conflict was genuine and both obligations were moral ones. It
is not sufficient to claim silence as a "third alternative," because even silence can
lead to murder when deception is necessary to ward off an assassin. This is often
the case, and it is unmistakably the case if the assassin says of the victim, "Either
speak up or I will kill him." Nor will it do to claim that there is no real conflict in
these cases on the grounds that in telling the truth, the midwives would not be
murdering the babies (Pharaoh would). For in the very act of telling the truth, the
midwives would be unmerciful. To avoid what they believed to be the lesser sin of
commission (lying), they would be engaging in a greater sin of omission (not
showing mercy).

Fourth, there is a real moral conflict in the cross, one so great that many have
considered the doctrine of the substitutionary atonement to be essentially immoral.
The two moral principles are that innocent persons should not be punished for sins
they did not commit (Ezek. 18:20), but Christ was punished for our sins (Isa. 53; 2
Cor. 5:21; 1 Pet. 2:24; 3:18). Some have tried to solve the problem by

Graded Absolutism 103

suggesting that Christ submitted to this punishment voluntarily, and hence the
moral responsibility for the conflict disappears. But this is like saying that it was
not immoral forpn Jones to order the Jonestown suicide because his followers did it
willingly! Other attempted explanations make God's actions in relation to the cross
entirely arbitrary, with no necessarybasis in his unchanging moral character. But
this reduces God to an unworthy being and takes away the need for the cross. If
God could save humankind apart from the cross, then Christ's death becomes
unnecessary (Rom. 3:21-23).

Fifth, in Scripture are numerous cases in which there is a real conflict between
obeying God's command to submit to civil government and keeping one's duty to
some other higher moral law. For example, the Hebrew midwives disregarded
Pharaoh's command to kill all male infants (Exod. 1); the Jewish captives disre-
garded Nebuchadnezzar's command to worship the golden image of himself (Dan.
3); Daniel disregarded Darius's command to pray only to the king (Dan. 6). In each
case there was plainly no other alternative; those involved had to follow one or the
other of the two commandments. Even unqualified absolutists admit the
unavoidability of the conflict, since they reduce one command (the civil one) to a
lower level. This maneuver, however, does not take away from the fact that both
(higher and lower directives) are commands of God, with moral implications, and
that the situations were personally unavoidable. That is, there was no prior sin on
the part of those in the dilemmas that precipitated them. In ail these cases, it was
because they were moral, godly people that they found themselves in the
dilemmas.

There are many other biblical examples of genuine, unavoidable moral conflicts,
but the foregoing examples suffice. Even one clear case of an unavoidable conflict is
enough to prove the point. Let us move, then, to the next premise.

No Guilt Is hnputed for the Unavoidable

God does not hold the individual responsible for personally unavoidable moral
conflicts, providing that one keeps the higher law. There are a number of ways of
seeing the truth of this point. First, reason dictates that a just God will not hold a
person responsible for doing what is actually impossible. And it is actually im-
possible to avoid the unavoidable. It is impossible to take two opposite courses of
action at the same time.

Second, persons are not morally culpable if they fail to keep an obligation they
could not possibly keep without breaking a higher obligation. This is evident to all,
even to those who hold opposing ethical views. Clearly a person is not blamewor-
thy for breaking a promise to meet his wife for dinner at six o'clock if he has been
delayed by helping to save a life. Likewise, who would blame a man for refusing to
retum a gun to an angry neighbor who wants to kill his wife? In each case, the
praiseworthy and exemplary conduct of keeping the higher obligation absolves
one of any responsibility to the lower duty.

104 Ethical Options

Third, the Bible includes many examples of persons who were praised by God
for following their highest duty in situations of conflict. God commended Abraham
for his willingness to sacrifice (kill) his son Isaac for God (Gen. 22; Heb. 11).
Likewise, Daniel (Dan. 6) and the three Hebrew youths (Dan. 3) received divine
approval for their disobedience of human government. The Hebrew midwives were
blessed by God for their disobedience to the king's command (Exod. 1). David and
his men—who entered the house of God? asked the priest for bread, and "ate the
consecrated bread"—were declared guiltless by Christ (1 Sam. 22:3-5; Matt.
12:3-4). In each case there was no divine condemnation for the moral law they did
not keep; instead, there was evident divine approval. The same is true of other,
similar cases in which moral commands to obey parents (Luke 2:41-49) or
God-ordained authorities are concerned (e.g., Exod. 12; Acts 4-5; Rev. 13).

Graded Absolutism Is the Right View

Therefore, in real, unavoidable moral conflicts, God does not hold a person
guilty for not keeping a lower moral law so long as one keeps the higher law. God
exempts one from his duty to keep the lower law since he could not keep it without
breaking a higher law. This exemption functions something like an ethical
right-of-way law. In many states, the law declares that when two cars
simultaneously reach an intersection without signals or signs, the car on the left
must yield the right of way to the car on the right. Common sense dictates that both
cars cannot go through the intersection at the same time; one car must yield.
Similarly, when a person enters an ethical intersection where two laws come into
unavoidable conflict, it is evident that one law must yield to the other.

An Elaboration of Graded Absolutism

The most obvious and basic of all divisions or levels of duty is between the
command to love God and the command to love one's neighbor. The former
always takes precedence over the latter.

Love for God over Love for Humankind

Jesus explicitly declares the commandment to love God to be the ‘first and
greatest? Further, he teaches (Matt. 22:36-38) that one's love for God should be so
much more than one's love for parents that the love for the latter would look like
"hate" by contrast (Luke 14:26). One implication of this is that if parents teach a
child to hate God, the child must disobey the parents in order to obey God. This is
true despite the fact that the Bible enjoins children to be obedient to parents in all
things (Col. 3:20). The parallel passage in Ephesians (6:1) adds "in the Lord" and
thus envisions a hierarchy that places filial duty on a lower level, under the duty to
love and obey God.

Graded Absolutism 105

Obey God over Government

God ordained human government and commands the Christian to "submit" to
and "obey" those in authority, even if they are evil rulers (Rom. 13:1-2; Titus 3:1).
Peter goes so far as to say we should submit to "every ordinance of man for the
Lord's sake" (1 Pet. 2:13 KJV). The attempt of some to differentiate between
submission and obedience—and thus claim that Christians need only to submit to
but not to obey government—fails for several reasons. First, it is plainly opposed to
the spirit of the passages that enjoin Christians to follow the laws of their land.
Second, the passage in 1 Peter demands submission to "every ordinance; not merely
to the consequences of disobeying an ordinance. And submission to a law is
obedience. Third, the word submission as used in the New Testament implies
obedience. It was, for example, what slaves were to do toward their masters (Col.
3:22). Finally, the words submission and obedience are used in parallel in Titus
(3:1); thus Christians are told "to obey" governmental authorities.

It is clear that God commands Christians to obey government. Hence, when
disobedience to government is approved by God, it is clearly in view of a higher
moral law. Several biblical instances illustrate this point. First, worship of God is
higher than any command of government (Dan. 3). Second, no governmental law
against private prayer should be obeyed (Dan. 6). Further, if a government com-
mands a believer not to preach the gospel (Acts 4-5), or if it decrees participation in
idolatry (Dan. 3) or even the murder of innocent victims (Exod. 1), it should not be
obeyed. In each case the moral obligation to pray, worship God, preach the gospel,
and so forth is a higher duty than the one to obey government.

Mercy over Veracity

There is no question that the Bible commands Christians to not "give false tes-
timony" (Exod. 20:16). We are also told to "put off falsehood and speak truthfully to
.. [our] neighbor" (Eph. 4:25). Indeed, deception and lying are repeatedly
condemned in Scripture (see Prov. 12:22; 19:5). On the other hand, the Bible
indicates that there are occasions when intentionally falsifying (lying) is justifiable.
Rahab intentionally deceived to save the lives of Israel's spies and was immortalized
in the spiritual hall of fame (Heb. 11). Nowhere does the Bible condemn Rahab for
this deception; second, her falsehood was an integral part of the act of mercy she
showed in saving the spies' lives; third, the Bible says, "Rahab ... shall be spared,
because she hid the spies we sent" ( Josh. 6:17). But the real concealment was ac-
complished by deceiving the authorities at her door. God blessed her because of the
deception, not in spite of it. Hence, her "lie" was an integral part of her faith, for
which God commended her (Heb. 11:31; James 2:25).

In the story of the Hebrew midwives we have an even clearer case of divinely
approved lying to save a life. For Scripture says, "God dealt well with the mid-
wives; and ... he gave them families" (Exod. 1:20-21 RSV). Nowhere in the text
does God ever say they were blessed only for their mercy and in spite of their lie.

106 Ethical Options

Indeed, the lie was part of the mercy shown. For mercy sometimes supersedes
justice ( James 2:13).

It should not be surprising that mercy is considered to be higher than truth.
Common sense dictates that Corrie ten Boom's acts of mercy to the Jews, which
involved lying to the Nazis, were not evil but good. Indeed, those who say that one
should not lie to save a life are inconsistent, for they leave their lights on when
they are away from home. This is an intentional deception to save their property.
Why not do the same to save a life? Is not a life worth more than a lamp? Are not
persons more valuable than property? Why lie to save jewels but refuse to lie to
save Jews?

There are other biblical examples of graded absolutism, but these will suffice
to illustrate that there are "weightier matters" of the law and greater and lesser
commands of God. It is the Christian's obligation in every morally conflicting
situation to search Scripture for an answer. One who does not know what to do in
certain situations should heed Jesus's words: "You are mistaken, because you
know neither the scriptures nor the power of God" (Matt. 22:29 NEB).

Objections to Graded Absolutism

Like all other views, graded absolutism is subject to evaluation, both positive
and negative. A number of objections have been raised against this kind of
graded absolutism, and a brief discussion of each is now in order.

How Does Graded Absolutism Differ from Situationism?

First, oseph Fletcher's situationism (see chap. 3) does not hold that there are any
absolutes with substantive content; graded absolutism does. According to graded
absolutism, the universal commands of Scripture such as the prohibitions against
blasphemy, idolatry, adultery, murder, lying, and so forth are absolute, and these are
binding on all people at all times and all places. Second, graded absolutism holds that
there are more absolutes than one. Fletcher believes in one and only one absolute, and
that absolute is formal and empty. Third, Fletcher believes that the situation
determines what one should do in a given case; graded absolutism holds that
situational factors only help one to discover what God has determined that we should
do. The situation does not fill an empty absolute with content and thereby determine
what one should do. Rather, the situational factors merely help one discover which
command of God is applicable to that particular case.

Do Graded Absolutism and Situationism Agree in Practice?

This question suggests that the two views differ only in theory but not in prac-
tice. This criticism, however, is unfounded. First, even if the two views agreed on
given courses of action, nevertheless the reasons for that accord would be quite

Graded Absolutism 107

different. Hence, the similarities are only accidental and not essential. Fletcher
concludes that something is right or wrong because the "existential particularities"
of the situation determine it. Graded absolutism, on the other hand, concludes that
something is right or wrong because God has declared it so. Second, there are
numerous and significant differences in conclusion between situationism and
graded absolutism. For example, in contrast to Fletcher, graded absolutism does
not approve of mate-swapping, adultery to get out of prison, blasphemy, abortion
of unwanted babies, harlotry to teach maturity, premarital intercourse, or a host of
other sins. In belief, whether in principle or practice, any relation to situationism is
purely coincidental. Indeed, the same accidental similarities could be drawn
between most other views and situationism.

Is Graded Absolutism a Form of Subjectivism?

Doesn't each person have to decide for oneself what is the greatest good? And
doesn't this amount to subjectivism? In response, two things should be recognized.
First, if someone makes up one's own hierarchy of values based on one's own
subjective choices, then this is subjectivism. But this is emphatically not what
Christian graded absolutism holds. Second, in graded absolutism, Christians do not
decide for themselves what the ethical priorities are. God establishes the pyramid of
values in accordance with his own nature. These are recorded in Scripture, and
hence they are no more subjective than anything else revealed in Scripture (see chap.
8). The priority of values is objective and determined by God; the only subjective
factor is our understanding and acceptance of God's values. But this is a limitation
shared by the other Christian views as well.

In What Sense Is Graded Absolutism an Absolutism?

If obedience to lower commands is sometimes unnecessary, then in what sense
is it proper to call this view an absolutism? In response to this question, two things
should be observed. To begin with, there are three ways in which graded absolut-
ism involves absolutes. First, it is absolute in its source. All norms are based in the
absoluteness of God. God does not change, and principles based on his nature are
likewise unchanging. Furthermore, each particular command is absolute in its
sphere. Each moral law is absolute as such. It is only when there is a conflict
between two of them that appeal must be made to the higher in order to resolve the
conflict. Finally, itis absolute in its order of priority. The very gradation of values
by which the conflicts are resolved is absolute. For example, it is absolutely
established by God that in an unavoidable conflict between God and parent, one
must put God first.

Second, there surely is a sense in which graded absolutism is not an unqualified
absolutism (see chap. 5). Graded absolutism may be called qualified absolutism or
contextual absolutism, as some do call it. However, it is still proper to designate it as
a form of absolutism because it does maintain, in contrast to situationism,

108 Ethical Options

that moral laws are absolute in their source, in their sphere as such, and in their
order of priority.

If God Is One, How Can There Be Many Moral Laws?

If God is one in essence, then how can there be many moral laws based on his
nature? The response is quite simple: God is one in nature, but he has many moral
attributes. Each absolute moral law is traceable to one of God's unchangeable moral
attributes. Each of these is absolute insofar as it reflects his nature, but there are
many of them. Just as the many radii of a circle are based in and spring out of the one
center, even so God's many moral characteristics are rooted in his one essence. For
example, God is unchanging love, and he is also immutably holy. Love and holiness
are two different moral attributes, but they are both true of God's one essence. Just as
arock has many attributes (like round, solid, and gray) but yet is one, so also God is
one with many attributes.

Is There a Hierarchy within God?

If there is a gradation of moral principles that are based on God's moral nature,
then is there a hierarchy within God? By way of response, two things can be ob-
served. First, there is no hierarchy within God's essence. God is absolutely one in
essence, and any form of hierarchy implies two or more things. So whatever
ordering of values there maybe would have to be within his attributes, not his es-
sence. For example, mercy as an attribute of God could take priority over justice
when two moral principles based on them come into an unavoidable conflict (
James 2:13).

Second, it is not necessaryto graded absolutism that there be a hierarchyin God's
attributes. The hierarchy maybe only in God's laws based on those attributes. Thus
the priority may be not on the basis of the values but on their expression in moral
laws. So the real hierarchy maybe not in God's attributes but in the application of his
attributes to his creatures. For example, light is one, yet when it passes through a
prism, it is manifest in a whole array of colors from higher to lower wavelengths. In
like manner, all the many moral attributes are one in God, but as they pass through
the prism of the finite world, they diffuse into many laws, ranging from higher to
lower. In any case, graded absolutism does not need the hierarchy to be in God but
simply to be revealed by God and reflect the attributes of God.

Did Jesus Face Real Moral Conflicts?

The Bible teaches that Jesus was tempted in all points as we are and that he is our
complete moral example. Certainly there would be something lacking in the basis
for Christian ethics if the model of our morality did not face the most difficult kinds
of situations that we his followers face. Yes, Jesus faced real moral conflicts
without ever sinning (Heb. 4:15). Specific examples in Jesus's life are the

Graded Absolutism 109

moral conflicts between obedience toward parents and God (Luke 2.), Sabbath
regulations and healing (Mark 2), and government and God (Matt. 22). But the
greatest conflict Christ faced—the conflict of the cross—is often overlooked. Here
he was squeezed between the demands of justice for the innocent (himself) and
mercy for humankind (the guilty). He chose mercy for the many over justice for the
one. This conflict was without question the greatest ever faced by any human
being, and it dramatizes the supremacy of mercy over justice in unavoidable moral
conflicts.

Do We Create Our Own Moral Conflicts?

Are not our moral dilemmas of our own making, and therefore shouldn't we be
held responsible for them rather than being exempted from them by some "greater
good"? Two things should be pointed out in response. First, it is true that we do
sometimes create our own conflicts, and in those cases we are guilty. If we make
our moral bed, then we must lie in it. Many moral conflicts can be avoided, and
when they are not, we are responsible for the resulting dilemma.

Second, while some moral conflicts are avoidable, it is a mistake to suppose that
all of them are a result of prior personal sins. Sometimes it is actually one's virtue
that precipitates a moral conflict. This was true of the Hebrew midwives (Exod. 1),
the three Hebrew youths (Dan. 3), and Daniel (Dan. 6). On other occasions it is
neither one's sin nor righteousness that occasions the moral conflict. For example, an
abortion to save a mother's life or a crisis caused by too many people in a lifeboat is
not usually the result of the prior sins of the individuals involved. It is to these kinds
of personally unavoidable conflicts that graded absolutism is addressed. And both
Scripture and human experience provide significant and numerous examples of
these real but unavoidable conflicts.

How Can a Lesser Evil Ever Be the Good Thing to Do?

Is not graded absolutism nothing more than pronouncing evil good, which the
prophet forbade (In. 5:20)? This question confuses graded absolutism with
conflicting absolutism. The latter believes that the right thing to do in unavoidable
moral conflicts is a lesser evil, but graded absolutism believes we should do the
greater good. The graded absolutist does not proclaim that the evil is a good thing
to do, but rather that the highest obligation in the conflict is the good thing to do.
For example, in falsifying to save a life, it is not the falsehood that is good (a lie as
such is always wrong), but it is the act of mercy to save a life that is good—despite
the fact that intentional falsification was necessary to accomplish this good. In
other words, it is unfortunately true that what is called "evil" sometimes
accompanies the performance of good acts. In these cases God does not consider a
person culpable for the concomitant regrettable act in view of the performance of
the greater good.

110 Ethical Options

In this respect, graded absolutism is similar to the principle of double effect,
which states that when two results—a good result and an evil result—emerge from
one act, the individual is held responsible only for the intended good result and not
the evil result that necessarily resulted from the good intention. For example, a
doctor who amputates to save a life is not morally culpable for maiming but is to be
morally praised for saving a life.

Is Graded Absolutism Really Utilitarianism?

Isn't doing the greatest good what utilitarianism holds? How does graded ab-
solutism differ from it? There is a basic difference between graded absolutism and
utilitarianism. First, utilitarianism is a teleological (end-centered) ethic, but graded
absolutism is a deontological (duty-centered) ethic (see chap. 1). When graded
absolutists speak of "greater good; they do not mean greater results but the higher
rule. They are not referring to a higher end but a higher norm. Furthermore, the basis
for their action is not future consequences (the long run) but present commands (the
short run). Yet any ethic is obliged to consider the possible results of actions, but this
does not make them utilitarian (see chap. 4). But graded absolutism, in contrast to
utilitarianism, holds that following the moral rules that God has established will
bring about the best results. It does not believe that human calculation of the best
results will determine what the best rules should be. We keep the rules and leave the
long-range consequences to God. Third, graded absolutism has many absolute
norms; utilitarianism has no absolute norms.

How Do Exemptions Differ from Exceptions?

Graded absolutism does not believe there are any exceptions to absolute laws,
only exemptions (see chap. I ). But is not this merely a semantic difference rather
than a real one? No, the difference is more than verbal. First, an exception would
violate the universality and absoluteness of a moral law, whereas an exemption
does not. If there is an exception, then the law is not absolute and hence does not
reflect the nature of God but at best describes only what is generally the right
course of action. Absolute norms, on the contrary, are based on God's unchanging
nature and have no exceptions. If they did, it would be much like saying that God is
truthful or loving only at certain times but not at other times.

Second, an exception means that lying as such is sometimes right. Not so with an
exemption. Lying as such is always wrong; it is only the lifesaving activity for
which the falsehood may be a necessary concomitant that is good, not the lie as
such. Third, in an exception, the general rule is not binding on that particular case,
and so there is no real conflict. However, when there is an exemption from
following a universal law, the law is still binding; this is what makes the conflict
real. For instance, the law of filial piety is still binding on the child who refuses to
obey the parents’ command to worship an idol; that is precisely what makes the
conflict so real.

Graded Absolutism 111

Finally, an exemption only eliminates the individual's culpability in not per-
forming the demands of that lower law; it in no way changes either the basis or the
nature of the law as an absolute in its domain. An exception, on the other hand,
would prove that the law is not absolute. The difference between an exemption and
an exception can be illustrated as follows. Whoever kills another human being in
self-defense is exempt from guilt (Exod. 22:2). Yet there is no exception made to the
law, which requires us to always treat another person—even a would-be
murderer—as a human with God-given value. There is never a moment when the
murderer ceases to be human. If there were, then there would be a legitimate
exception to the law of demanding respect for humans. However, despite the fact
that a would-be murderer is always human and that the law to treat that person as
human still stands, the potential victim is exempt from the moral consequences of
disobeying this law in view of the overriding value of defending one's own in-
nocent life.

How Can Conflicts Be Real Yet Resolvable?

This question wrongly assumes that a conflict is not real if it is resolvable.
But this overlooks several things. First, if this were so, then anyconflict that is
ultimately resolved would turn out to be only apparent or illusory. But surely no
biblical theist would seriously hold that the conflict between good and evil is
not real simply because it will be resolved in the eschaton (end). Nor does the
fact that one triumphs over temptation make the sin's allurement unreal, for this
would make Christ's temptation unreal.

Second, to claim that a conflict is not real because it is resolvable is justification
by stipulation. It is simply a decree by definition. If we stipulate that whatever is
resolved is not a real conflict, then this question seems pointless. Moral conflict can
be real and unavoidable and yet be capable of a final resolution, with the lower
norm yielding to the higher norm.

Third, the conflict is real because it is unavoidable, but it is not irresolvable,
because in such a case we are exempt from obedience to the lower command. The
conflict is real because neither law "backed down": both continued to be binding
even though one was more binding than the other. Thus God's absolute nature does
not change simply because finite and fallible humans find themselves in
unavoidable moral conflicts. But in moral conflicts God's justice provides a way
out of the dilemma, since the conflict was not of our making.

How Can a Moral Law Be Absolute Yet Not Obeyed?

It seems contradictory to claim that a moral principle is absolute when it can
sometimes be broken. For what has exceptions is not universal, and what is
broken is not absolute.

In response to this criticism, several things can be said in defense of graded
absolutism. First, the lower command is not really broken when the higher com-

112 Ethical Options

mand is followed. Just as a magnet does not break the law of gravity in attracting a
nail, killing in self-defense does not violate the law of respect and preservation of
human beings. The overriding duty to keep the higher law simply renders it
unnecessary for us to perform the demands of the lesser command.

Second, as was already noted, there are no exceptions to absolute moral
laws, only exemptions from obeying them in view of higher laws. So a law's
universality is not contradicted by an exemption.

Third, the command remains absolute even when it is not followed, for its
absoluteness is based in the nature of God, which does not change. The nature of
truth does not change when humans tell justifiable falsehoods in order to save
innocent lives. If the real conflict is between truthfulness and mercifulness, both of
which are grounded in God's nature, then there is no conflict between these in the
nature of God. God is one, and all his attributes are harmonious. The real conflict
is that on some occasions a human being cannot perform both. In these cases God
withholds culpability from the human who shows mercy to the innocent rather
than telling the truth to the guilty. But this in no way means that both commands
are not binding at all times; God never ceases to manifest absolutely what is
absolutely right. However, in unavoidable clashes, God does not demand
obedience to lower laws, nor amid such clashes does God charge humans with
personal culpability for failing to obey a lower law.

How Can Lying Flow from the Nature of God as Truth?

If all moral laws are rooted in God, then how can lying ever be right, since God
is absolute truth? Quite simply, the answer to this is that lying as such does not flow
from God's nature. A lie can never be justified by an appeal to him who is truth.
However, though lying as such is never justified, lying to save a life is. But “lying to
save a life" is really an act of mercy, and love is an attribute of God (1 John 4:16).
Cutting off a human leg as such is not right either; it is called mutilation. But cutting
off a leg to save a life is right; it is called amputation. Second, God is both loving
and true. So even though lying to save a life cannot be based in God as true, it still
can be based in God as merciful. Lifesaving is an act of love, even if deception is
necessaryto accomplish it. Graded absolutism holds that when truth and mercy
conflict, the necessary act of mercy (in this case, lying) finds its basis in God's
nature as love. Hence, justifiable lies are based not in God's truthfulness but in his
love.

Doesn't Graded Absolutism Deny Total Depravity?

This objection assumes that sin is unavoidable for fallen human beings. Hence,
unavoidable moral dilemmas are merely an extension of our depraved condition.
But for several reasons, this is a misunderstanding of depravity.

First, total depravity does not mean that sin is unavoidable. This would con-
tradict 1 Corinthians 10:13, which states that in every temptation there is always

Graded Absolutism 113

a "way of escape" (RSV). Depravity means that it is inevitable that fallen
humans will sin but not that it is necessary that they sin.

Second, sin maybe unavoidable byfallen humans on their own, but all sin is avoid-
able by God's grace. That is, what we ought to do, we can do, by God's grace.

Third, to insist that sin is inescapable is to negate human responsibility. God
is rational and moral, but it is neither rational nor moral to blame someone for
doing something they could not avoid.

Fourth, responsibility implies the ability to respond. And culpability implies
avoidability. Depravity does not make sin unavoidable. If it did, then depravity
would destroy humans' ability to sin and would destroy God's ability to hold
humans accountable for their sin.

Does Graded Absolutism Involve a Contradiction?

It is charged that graded absolutism involves a contradiction because it holds
that two opposing courses of action should be done at the same time. But the law
of noncontradiction says it is impossible to do opposites at the same time.

First, this is a misstatement of the law of noncontradiction. To be contradictory,
the two opposing commands would have to be binding at the same time and in the
same sense. But according to graded absolutism, the commands are not binding in
the same sense: one is binding in a higher sense.

Second, this criticism is a misunderstanding of graded absolutism. It does not
hold that one can do opposites at the same time and in the same sense, but only that
one ought to do both as such. God certainly knows that we cannot actually do
opposites, so he exempts us from doing the lower duty, even though we ought to
do it. It thus is still binding on us even when we cannot do it because of our higher
obligation. But since it is binding only in a lower sense, our obligation is to follow
the greater duty.

Does Graded Absolutism Undermine the Truthfulness of Scripture?

According to graded absolutism, it is sometimes justifiable to lie to save a
life for a greater good. The redemption of human beings is a greater good. From
this it would appear to follow that God could lie in Scripture in order to get
people saved.

First, moral conflicts arise only in a finite/fallen world, but God is not part of
such a world. The Bible says, "It is impossible for God to lie" (Heb. 6:18; cf. Titus
1:2). So God could not lie even if he wanted to, and he does not want to do so. Also,
his "word is truth" ( John 17:17), and there is no error in truth. What is more, a lie is
contrary to fact, and it is impossible for God to act contrary to fact. For in his
omniscience, God knows what the facts are, and he can't speak contrary to what he
knows. Thus, God cannot lie or utter falsehood. Finally, if the Bible could contain
divinely expressed falsehoods (for a good end), it would undermine assurance in
anything God said. But God assures us that his Word is trustworthy

114 Ethical Options

(2 Tim. 2:13; 3:16-17). In fact, we would have no way to know that it is false, since
we have no higher standard than God's revelation by which we could test it for
falsehood. In his revelation, God adapts to human finitude, but he never accom-
modates to human error. In summation, graded absolutism does not undermine the
truthfulness of Scripture.

The Values of Graded Absolutism

There are a number of values of graded absolutism. Each value emerges from
the foregoing discussion.

It Avoids Relativism

In contrast to antinomianism, situationism, and generalism (see chaps. 2-4),
graded absolutism avoids the pitfalls of relativism. It stands firmly on moral prin-
ciples based in the absolute, unchanging character of God. These moral principles
are absolute in their source, absolute in their sphere, and absolute in their order of
priority. They are objective, propositional, and substantive in content. God's moral
laws are specific and known in advance of the situation. Furthermore, there are no
exceptions to them as such; they apply to all people in all places and all times.

It Successfully Answers Moral Conflicts

Another value of graded absolutism, in contrast to unqualified and conflicting
absolutism, is that it gives a realistic and successful answer to the problem of moral
conflicts. It neither closes its eyes to their reality nor blames an individual because of
their unavoidability. It looks squarely at the total moral circumstance and acts
responsibly, without forsaking the absolute nature of moral principles. It avoids both
legalism and antinomianism. It acts courageously but not recklessly.

It Makes Sense of the Cross

Apart from graded absolutism, it is difficult to make moral sense of the cross.
From the standpoint of nonconflicting absolutism, the cross is a moral injustice, for
on the cross "the just" was punished "for the unjust" (1 Pet. 3:18 NASB; 2 Cor. 5:21).
There is no moral justification for this unless there are higher and lower moral laws.
In this way, mercy can take precedence overjustice. The one (Christ) can suffer for
the many that they maybe saved (Rom. 5:6-18). But if mercy and love are not higher
moral values than justice ( James 2:13), then what God did to Christ, when it pleased
him to "bruise" his son (cf. Isa. 53:5 RSV), was a great injustice. But God cannot be
unjust. Therefore, the cross makes sense only if the demands of justice are satisfied
but subordinated to the desires of mercy. Yet God can't lie for a higher good since a
lie is contrary to fact, which is impossible. Nonetheless,

Graded Absolutism 115

God can show love over mercy since it is not contrary to fact. It would actually be
contrary to God's just nature not to punish sin. This is precisely why the cross is
necessary, so that God's justice can be satisfied and his mercy released.

Summary and Conclusion

Graded absolutism is distinct from antinomianism, situationism, and generalism
(chaps. 2-4) in that it believes in moral absolutes. Moral laws are absolute in their
source; absolute in their own sphere, where there is no conflict; and absolute in their
order of priority when there is a conflict. In contrast to nonconflicting absolutism,
graded absolutism believes that there are real moral conflicts. But in distinction
from conflicting absolutism, it holds that in these circumstances one is not culpable
for subordinating the lower duty to the higher duty.

The essential principles of graded absolutism are these: There are many moral
principles rooted in the absolute moral character of God. There are higher and lower
moral duties—for example, love for God is a greater duty than love for people.
These moral laws sometimes come into unavoidable moral conflict. In such
conflicts we are obligated to follow the higher moral law.When we follow the higher
moral law, we are not held responsible for breaking the lower law.

Select Readings

Augustine. City of God. In vol. 2 ofA Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of
the Christian Church, edited by Philip Schaff. Reprint, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956.
Enchiridion. In vol. 3 ofA Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of
the Christian Church, edited by Philip Schaff. Reprint, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956.
Davis, ohn Jefferson. Evangelical Ethics: Issues Facing the Church Today. Phillipsburg, NJ:
Presbyterian & Reformed, 1985.
Erickson, Millard J. Relativism in Contemporary Christian Ethics. Grand Rapids: Baker
Academic, 1974.
Feinberg, John S. The Many Faces of Evil: Theological Systems and the Problems of
Evil. Rev. and expanded ed. Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2004.
Feinberg, John S., and Paul D. Feinberg. Ethicsfor a Brave New World. Wheaton:
Crossway Books, 1993.
Hodge, Charles. Systematic Theology. 3 vols. Reprint, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952.
Kierkegaard, Soren. Fear and Trembling. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, Doubleday,
1954.
Ross, W. David. Doing Evil to Achieve Good. Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1978.
Foundations of Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon, 1951.

8

THE BASIS FOR ETHICAL
DECISIONS

There are numerous views on the basis for ethical decisions. These vary greatly. Space
does not permit a detailed account of each. So first each view will be briefly stated and
evaluated. Then an evangelical view on the basis for ethics will be set forth: that it is
based on divine commands in God's general and special revelations.

Different Views about the Basis for What Is Morally Right

For centuries philosophers have debated over what is the basis for ethical action.
Each view will be stated and then briefly evaluated.’ Then the divine command
view will be explained, and one form of it will be defended from both reason and
Scripture.

Might Is Right

The ancient Greek philosopher Thrasymachus is supposed to have held that
"justice is the interest of the stronger party," stated more simply as "Might is right."
That is to say, right is defined in terms of power. This may mean political power (cf.
Machiavelli), although it could mean physical, psychological, or any other kind

I. This is a modified version of chapter 23 in Norman L. Geisler and Paul a Feinberg, Introduction to
Philosophy: A Christian Perspective (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1980).

116

The Basis for Ethical Decisions 117

of power. This is not a widely held ethical view, even though it seems too often
to be the de facto view of many dictators.

In response, several things may be briefly noted. First, most people see a dif-
ference between power and goodness. It is possible to be good without power and
powerful without goodness. An evil tyrant is sufficient practical disproof of
Thrasymachus's "theory" of right. Second, some have insisted that almost the
opposite is the case, arguing that "power tends to corrupt, and absolute power
corrupts absolutely" (Lord Acton [1887]). There is much evidence in human
experience for rejecting the view that right is might.

Morals Are Mores

Some hold that right is determined by the group to which one belongs. Ethics is
identified with the ethnic; moral commands are considered community demands.
This surely implies a cultural relativity of morality. Any overlapping of ethical
principles between cultures and societies that would seem to give the appearance of
universality is accidental. The most one can say for apparently universal ethical
norms is that all groups "happen" to come up with similar codes (probablybecause
of common aspirations or situations).

This view has several problems. First, it is based on what Hume called the
"is-ought" fallacy. Just because something is the practice does not mean it ought to
be. It is the case that people are cruel at times; they hate and kill. This in no way
means that ought to be the case. Second, if each community is right, then there is no
way to solve conflicts between communities and nations. Whatever each one
believes is right; even if it means the annihilation of the other, it is right.

Man Is the Measure

The ancient Greek philosopher Protagoras said, "Man is the measure of all
things." If this is taken in an individual sense, then right is measured by an indi-
vidual's will. The right is what is right to me. What is right for one may be
wrong for another, and vice versa.

The most common criticism of this is that it would lead to chaos. If every
person literally "did their own thing," then there would be no community, no unity
in society. Further, what particular aspect of humanity should be taken as the
"measure"? One cannot answer, "the 'good' aspects." For in that case it presupposes
that "good" apart from the human is really the measure of the human, and not that
the human is the measure of what is good.

The Race Ls Right

One way to avoid the individualism and ethical solipsism of the former two views
is to insist that neither individuals nor individual communities are the ultimate arbiters
of what is right; rather, the whole human race is the final court of appeals.

118 Ethical Options

In this way the part does not determine the whole; the whole race determines
what is right for the individual members. In short, humankind rather than a
human is the measure of all things.

The first objection to this view is that just as groups are often wrong, so the whole
race could be wrong. Communities have committed mass suicide. What if the race
decided that suicide was right, and all dissenters were forced to do likewise? Second,
the race is in a state of flux. If the race were the ultimate norm, then how could one
make judgments such as "Humanity is not perfect;’ or "The world needs
improvement"? These statements are meaningless unless there is some standard
outside the race by which its degree of goodness can be measured.

Right Is Moderation

According to the ancient Greek view, especially exemplified in Aristotle, the
meaning of right is found in the path of moderation. The "golden mean;' or mod-
erate course between extremes, was considered to be the right course of action. For
instance, temperance is the mean between indulgence and insensibility. Pride is the
mean between vanity and humility. And courage is the mean between fear and
aggression.

There certainly is much wisdom in generally taking the path of moderation. The
question is, however, whether the middle course should be seen as a definition of
what is right. First, the right sometimes seems to call for extreme action, as in
emergencies, self-defense, war, and so on. Even some virtues, such as love, seem
best expressed not moderately but liberally. Second, the "middle of the road" is not
always the wisest (or safest) place to be. It all depends on how extreme the situation
is. One extreme sometimes calls for another extreme. For instance, extreme
sickness (cancer) often calls for an extreme operation (removing the diseased
tissue). Finally, moderation seems at best to be only a general guide for practice, not
a universal definition of right.

There Is No Right

Some philosophers simply deny that anything is right or wrong (see chap. 2
above). They are called "antinomian" (against law). Few actually claim to be
complete antinomians, but many views can be reduced to this. A. J. Ayer insisted
that all "ought" sentences actually translate to feel" sentences. Hence, "You ought
not to be cruel" means "I do not like cruelty." Ethics is not prescriptive; it is simply
emotive. There are no commands; there are only ejaculations of one's personal
feelings.

The first objection to this view is its radical solipsism. The right is reduced to
"what I like," which reduces truth to mere taste. The ethical content of "Hitler should
not kill Jews" is considered no different in kind from "I do not like chocolate? Second,
the view does not listen to the meaning of "ought" statements; rather, it legislates what
they must mean. In other words, on what basis is "ought" reduced

The Basis for Ethical Decisions 119

to "I feel"? 'There are things I ought to do (such as be loving and just) whether
I feel like it or not.

Right Is What Brings Pleasure

The Epicureans (4th century BC) are credited with the original philosophy
of hedonism. Simply put, hedonism claims that what brings pleasure is right
and what brings pain is wrong. Actually, the formula for right is a little more
complicated: What brings the maximal pleasure and the minimal pain is the
right thing to do.

There are obvious difficulties with this theory. First, not all pleasures are good
and not all pain is bad. Sadistic pleasure obtained from torturing people is bad.
The pain of study or hard work can be good. Second, one may ask, Pleasure for
whom and for how long? Pleasure for the individual and for the moment? What
about for all humankind and for all time?

Right Is the Greatest Good for the Race

Utilitarians answer the last problem of the hedonistic view by claiming that the
right is what brings "the greatest good for the greatest number of persons (in the
long run)." Jeremy Bentham (d. 1832) suggested that good should be understood
in a quantitative sense. That is, it depended on how much pleasure was obtained,
for how long, and for how many. John Stuart Mill accepted utilitarianism, but he
insisted that good be understood in a qualitative sense as well. Some goods are
higher than physical (and other) goods. An unhappy human is better than a happy
pig, said Mill.

Clearly, Mill's view is an improvement over both hedonism and Bentham's
quantitative utilitarianism. There are, however, other difficulties. First, how does a
human being—who can only rarely predict short-run consequences—determine
what will result from one's actions in the long run? Many evil actions (lying and
cheating, for example) seem to "work" for people for long periods of time. Does this
make them right? Second, how long is the long run? If it means the remote future or
the end of the world, then it is too far out of reach to be of any help in making
decisions today. But if it means the near future, then that would justify obviously
evil things that seem to work well for a short time (corrupt governments, cruelty, and
deception). Finally, even when the results are obvious, how does one know they are
"good" results without some standard of good beyond the results? But if there is a
norm for rightness or wrongness beyond the results, then the results as such do not
determine rightness.

Good Is What Is Desired for Its Own Sake

The difficulty that has emerged from the above criticism is this: no matter how
one defines right or good in terms of something else, one can still ask, "But is that

120 Ethical Options

right?" If good is defined as pleasure, one can ask, "But is the pleasure good or bad?"
If right is defined in terms of results, then one can still ask, "Are the results good or
bad?" Perhaps the solution to this is to follow Aristotle and define the night or good in
terms of itself. Maybe the good is that which is desirable for its own sake, that which
has intrinsic value in and of itself. In other words, good should never be desired as a
means but only as an end.

Critics of this view have pointed out several problems. First, people seem to
desire some evil ends for their own sake. How can the desire to annihilate a race be
called a good desire? Aristotle would answer that every evil action is performed
for a good end. Even those committing suicide act for the alleged "good" it will
bring them by eliminating all their problems. However, this answer leads to an-
other criticism: some "goods" are only apparent goods and not real ones. If we
define "good" simply in terms of the end, then what we call "good" is often not
really good at all but evil.

Finally, there is a problem with providing content for the meaning of good. If
good were simply the object of what is desired, then logically one should be able
to examine the object (s) o f one's desires and discover the content of the meaning
of good. But this will not do, since, as has alreadybeen observed, what we desire is
not always genuinely good; sometimes it is only apparently good but actually evil.
We are faced with the dilemma that good cannot be defined in terms of anything
else, and yet it seems to have no content when understood in terms of itself. Is
there any way out?

Good Is Indefinable

G.E. Moore (d. 1958) insisted that the good is an unanalyzable and indefinable
concept. Every attempt to define good in terms of something else commits what he
called the "naturalistic fallacy." This fallacy results from assuming that because,
for example, pleasure can be attributed to good, then it is of the nature of Good,
that is, identical with Good. All that we can say is that "the Good is good,” nothing
more. Thus Good is known only. intuitionally.

There are grounds for what Moore says, but there are also dangers. The first
problem is that apparently not all people "intuit" the same content in the good or
right. Further, many argue that intuitions are vague. They lack clarity, which is one
of the things a philosopher pursues. Further, there is the problem of how to avoid
the charge of tautology when all one can say is "Good is good.’

There is some truth to Moore's position, however, especially since he
recognized that the ultimacy of "good" makes it resistant to definition in terms of
something else. For eventually, every discipline and point of view must
acknowledge something as its ground or source, in terms of which everything else
is understood. To the Christian, who thinks of God in terms of the ultimate Good,
this is very appealing.

The Basis for Ethical Decisions 121

Good Is What God Wills

One solution to the problem of defining good or right is to proclaim that some-
thing is right if God wills it right, and wrong if God wills it wrong. This would
solve the problem of determining content in the meaning of good, as well as the
difficultyinvolved in defining good in terms of something not ultimate. Christians
claim that God's sovereign will is ultimate, and the Bible spells out the content of
that will to us.

Two Divine Command Views. Although this does solve the problems above, it
creates a new one. First, is something right because God wills it (voluntarism), or
does he will it because it is right (essentialism)? If one takes the voluntarism
alternative, then it seems to make God arbitrary. If one takes the essentialism al-
ternative, then God is acting according to a standard beyond himself (goodness).
This would contradict the Christian definition of God as the Ultimate Good.

A Defense of Essentialism. It seems best to follow the essentialists who insist
that God can will only in accordance with his unchangingly good nature, which is
not beyond himself. There are several reasons for this: First, God cannot change
his basic nature (Mal. 3:6; Heb. 6:18; James 1:17; 2 Tim. 2:13). Second, God's un-
changingly good nature is the basis for his unconditional promises (Heb. 6:13-18;
Ps. 89:26-35; 2 Tim. 2:13). Third, it is contrary to God's moral perfection (Matt.
5:48) to claim that he could will that hatred, rape, and cruelty be the right things to
do. Fourth, if God changed, it would undermine all moral stability, for how could
we make an ultimate commitment to love, justice, and mercy if we thought they
could change? Fifth, God's changing would make him untrustworthy since,
contrary to Scripture (1 Sam. 15:29; Rom. 11:29), God could not be counted on to
keep his word (Isa. 55:11). Sixth, if God changed, it would make good and evil
arbitrary since he could change his mind about which is which. Seventh, God's
changing would destroy the basis for all moral absolutes since any one of them
could change. Eighth, if essentialism is not true, then God could change his mind
about his predictions and, hence, what is now true prophecy could be false. Ninth,
God's changing would invalidate the test for a false prophet (Deut. 18:22), which
demands that a true prophecy come to pass. Tenth, voluntarism makes good out to
be arbitrary. Nothing would be essentially or ultimately good, because it could
change at God's will.

In brief, a Christian view of the basis of moral action is an essentialist's form
of the divine-command view. God wills it to be good because it is good in
accordance with his own unchangeably good nature.

Elements of Truth in the Other Views

Even though the various non-Christian views of ethics were found unable to
provide an adequate ethical system as such, there is an element of truth within
each view

122 Ethical Options

First, it was discovered that "right" cannot be defined in terms of something else
ad infinitum. The good is a basic category of its own. Feeling, pleasure, com-
munal code, the consensus of the race, or the results—all have been found to be
unreliable at times. Good is what has intrinsic value and should be desired for
its own sake.

Second, we found that when good is so defined, it has ultimacy but lacks con-
tent. We cannot supply the content by simply studying the object of our desires,
since not everything desired is genuinely good. Some things that are desired for
the good one sees in them are only apparently good but actually evil.

Third, it is inadequate to claim that the ultimate content ofgood can be defined
by claiming that whatever God wills is good. This assumes an arbitrariness in a
Being considered to be ultimately and essentially good. Something is not good
simply because God wills it; rather, God wills it because it is good. And it is
good because it is in accordance with God's unchangeably good nature.

Fourth, there is some truth, however, in relating good to long-range results. If
there is an absolutely good God, then surely he is interested in bringing about
the greatest good for the greatest number in the long run. However, the results
(in the long run) do not determine right; rather, what is right according to God's
will determines what the results will be. Further, since only an omniscient God
can know what will bring the greatest good to the greatest number in the long
run, only God is in a position to determine the right way to bring about these
best results.

Fifth, the same kind of argument applies to pleasure. Surely a good God is in-
terested in maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. But only God really knows
what will bring "fullness ofjoy ... [and] pleasures for evermore" (Ps. 16:11
KJV). What we think is good is often no more than the "fleeting pleasures of
sin" (Heb. 11:25 RSV).

Sixth, there is a good deal of truth to the emotive theory of ethics. Many of what
are passed off as universal ethical "oughts" are no more than personal feel-
ings. Not everything claimed to be prescriptive is actually more than emotive.
We often strengthen our personal preferences by putting them in a divine
imperative form.

Seventh, there is even some truth to voluntarism. For not all commands of God
are unchangeable, only those that are bound by his unchangeable nature. For
example, in the Old Testament the people were not to eat ceremonially unclean
meat (Lev. 11), but this was revoked in the New Testament (Acts 10, Is).

Finally, not all aspects of ethical codes have universal applicability. Some rules
are local and communal, such as speed laws. The mores of cultures do vary from
place to place and from group to group; what is wrong in one place is right in
another. Ethnocentricity, however, is a fact of life. We tend to judge other
groups in terms of our own less-than-universal standards.

Christian ethics recognizes these cultural differences and does not demand
that people give up their own culture in order to keep God's commands. Chris-

The Basis for Ethical Decisions 123

tianity asks only that people implement God's commands within that culture. For
example, early Christians kissed one another in greeting. American Christians,
however, usually shake hands as a greeting. Others embrace.All of this is
culturally relative. However, we cannot conclude from this that there is nothing
ethically binding on all Christians. Actually, within this cultural relativity is a
universally binding imperative: greet one another in love.

An Evangelical View of the Basis for Moral Decisions

As is clear from the above discussion, the only valid basis for ethical decisions is a
form of the divine-command view. The residual difficulty with this view is how
one can know the content of the divine commands. Evangelicals offer two words
in response: God's revelation. Whatever God reveals is right (as rooted in his
moral nature) and hence is the basis for our ethical decisions.

Evangelicals recognize two spheres of God's revelation: general and special.
The former is revealed in nature, the latter in Scripture.

God's General Revelation in Nature
THE NATURE OP NATURAL REVELATION

God knew that not all people would have access to the truths of Scripture at all
times, so he inscribed a law upon their hearts. Paul wrote, "When Gentiles who
have not the law do by nature what the law requires, they are a law to themselves,
even though they do not have the [written] law. They show that what the law
requires is written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness ..."
(Rom. 2:14-15 RSV). Some have described this knowledge of the law as "innate"
or as "a natural inclination."*

THE EVIDENCE FOR NATURAL LAW

First, even some non-Christians admit to the universality of moral law. Immanuel
Kant called it a categorical imperative: willing for all people what we desire to be
done to ourselves. For example, willing that we should treat others as an end, not as a
means to an end.

Second, the great moral creeds of humankind's civilizations give testimony
to the general revelation of God in the striking resemblance of their basic
ethical principles. C. S. Lewis has assembled many of these creeds in the
excellent appendix to his book The Abolition of Man

Third, the evidence of the universal availability of God's natural revelation
comes to light by examining not what one does but by assessing what one wants to
have done to oneself What person does not expect to be treated as a person?

2. Thomas Aquinas, Samna Theotogica 1.103.8.
3. C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (New York: Macmillan, 1947), 93-121.

124 Ethical Options

Who actually believes that it is right to take what belongs to anyone at any time?
Who truly believes that murder, rape, or cruelty to children is morally right? So the
true moral law can be derived not from our actions (for we all fall short) but from
our expectations.

Fourth, we find the moral law not in what people do or even in what they say
ought to be done; rather, we see the moral law in what they expect others to do to
them. In order to discover whether or not a man (or woman) really believes one has
a right to take anyone's property (or mate) at anytime, do not ask him what he
wishes to do, nor what he says one has the right to do. Just watch carefully how he
reacts when someone tries to seize what he dearly loves. In this sense, the moral
law can be discovered more by one reactions than by one's actions.

Fifth, without a universal moral law common to all people, there would be no
grounds for meaningful and moral communication, for action adjudication between
divergent societies. For example, international commerce would not be possible
without mutually accepted moral principles. Neither would international justice.
The Nuremberg trials after the Second World War were based on a superintending
natural law, by which one could know that the genocidal actions of the Nazis were
morally wrong.

Sixth, without a universally known moral law, there would be no just basis
on which God could judge nonbelievers' actions. But as Paul put it, there is such
a standard for all people, "written on their hearts" (Rom. 2:15), so that they are
"without excuse" (1:20).

ANSWERING SOME OBJECTIONS TO NATURAL LAW

Several objections have been leveled against the belief in natural law. Upon
examination, however, they fail to give sufficient evidence to deny the
existence or validity of natural law.

Divergence in understanding it reveals that there is no universal natural law.
This objection fails for several reasons. First, human finitude, to say nothing of
human sinfulness, can account for much diversity of interpretation. After all,
scientists have been studying the same objective world for centuries and often have
come to very different interpretations of it. But this is insufficient basis for denying
that there is an objective world. So it should not be surprising that the objective and
universal moral world (God's natural revelation) should be viewed somewhat dif-
ferently by different people at different times. Even so, as C. S. Lewis showed, there
is a surprising unanimity of understanding of ‘natural revelation," as is indicated by
the great moral creeds of humankind.

Widely divergent practices show that there is no universal natural law. This
objection entails a kind of "is-ought fallacy" Yet as noted above, one cannot reason
from what people do to what they believe ought to be done. Our practices always fall
short of our principles. It is simply fallacious to argue that what people do is what they
ought to do. We can no more legitimately move from "do" to "ought" than we

The Basis for Ethical Decisions 125
can from "is" to "ought." People do things such as lie, steal, rape, and kill. But
from this we cannot argue that they ought to do these things.

Atheists are moral without believing in natural law. Most atheists insist that mo-
rality is possible without belief in a universal moral law or a Law Given. But this
objection confuses belief and basis for belief. True, there are many moral atheists,
and they do not accept the natural law view. However, this only shows that belief in
a natural law is not necessary for being moral. It does not show that the existence of
a moral law is not necessary for moral behavior. Atheists do not believe in a
universal natural law. However, they cannot justify such a belief unless there is a
Moral Law Given.

God's Special Revelation in Scripture

In addition to general revelation available to all rationally and morally responsible
persons, God has a special revelation in Scripture. Evangelicals believe that this is
the only written infallible record of the basis for moral decisions. The revelation of
God in nature is not written or infallible. Nonetheless, it is sufficient and reliable
when properly understood.

The Bible claims to be the divinely inscripturated truth of God (2 Tim.
3:16-17). It is a special revelation of the same moral character of God that is
revealed in nature and the hearts of people.

The Relation of General and Special Revelation

This raises the questions of the purpose of and relationship between the two
revelations. First, since God is the author of both, there can be no real conflict
between the two.

Second, the Bible indicates a unity between them, insisting that "when Gentiles
who have not the law [of Moses] do by nature what the law [of Moses] requires,
they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have the law [of Moses]; for
"they show that what the law [of Moses] requires is written on their hearts" (Rom.
2:14-15 RSV).

Third, esus summarized the Old Testament law in one command: "Whatever
you wish that men would do to you, do so to them, for this is the law and the
prophets” (Matt. 7:12 RSV). Third, even non-Christians like Confucius set forth a
negative form of the "Golden Rule" that Jesus said summarized the law of Moses.
Confucius said, "Do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you."

Fourth, even pagans were judged byGod for immorality (also condemned in the
Mosaic law) without their having anyknowledge of the Scriptures (Lev. 18:26-28).
Fifth, all the moral principles of Moses's law were reaffirmed in the New Testament.
Forexample, nine of the Ten Commandments are reaffirmed.All but the Sabbath were
restated, and even here the principle of setting one dayin seven was reaffirmed—only
the day had changed from Saturday to Sunday (Acts 20:7; 1 Cor. 16:2).

126 Ethical Options

Sixth, this harmony was perceived by early American fathers who spoke alter-
natively of "Nature's Laws," which came from "Nature's God" (The Declaration of
Independence), and the moral principles in the Ten Commandments. James Madison,
“the Father of the U.S. Constitution,” recognized this: "Before any man can be
considered as a member of Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of the
Governor of the Universe." Indeed, from the beginning the New Haven colonial law
(1644) declared, "The Judicial laws of God as they were delivered by Moses ... [are
to] be a rule to all the courts in this jurisdiction?’ President John Adams said, "Our
Constitution was made only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate
to the government of any other:' In his second inaugural address, President Jefferson
declared: "I shall need, too, the favor of that Being in whose hands we are, who led
our fathers, as Israel of Old, from their native land flowing with all the necessities and
comforts of life." President John QuincyAdams affirmed explicitly: "If "Thou shalt
not covet' and 'Thou shalt not steal’ were not commandments of Heaven, they must
be made inviolable precepts in every society before it can be civilized or made free"
(The Right Constitution... , Letter VI). Indeed, The New England Primer, used in
American schools from about 1700-1850, contained a Shorter Catechism and taught
the Ten Commandments, along with Bible history, doctrine, and prayer. It was the
most widely read schoolbook in America for over a hundred years. Before 1980,
when the Ten Commandments were banned from displayin public schools (Stone v.
Graham), the Supreme Court had upheld virtually every one of the Ten
Commandments.

The Uniqueness of Special Revelation

All of this is not to say that both general and special revelation are identical.
There are some significant differences, several of which may be identified here.

GENERAL REVELATION IS AVAILABLE TO ALL PEOPLE

A unique feature of general revelation is that it is available to all human beings.
Indeed, it is "written on their hearts" (Rom. 2:15). Thus there is a common moral
law making interethnic and international communication, commerce, and justice
possible. Also, it provides a basis for divine justice in that all people are "without
excuse" (Rom. 1:20). This is not true of special revelation, which is available only
to those who have the Bible or parts of it.

SPECIAL REVELATION IS UNIQUE

There are, however, several unique features of special revelation. This is
true in general, as well as in the realm of ethics.

First, only special revelation is written. The Bible is a verbal revelation from
God. All Scripture is God-breathed" (2 Tim. 3:16). In it "every word ... comes out
of the mouth of God" (Matt. 4:4). For "no prophecy [of Scripture] was ever

4. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments (1785), remonstrance I.

The Basis for Ethical Decisions 127

produced by the will of man, but men spoke from God, as they were carried along
by the Holy Spirit" (2 Pet. 1:21 ESV). David confessed, "The Spirit of the LORD
speaks by me; his word is upon my tongue" (2 Sam. 23:2 RSV). By contrast, there
is no inspired written record of general revelation.

Second, there is no infallible record of the natural law. Only Scripture is infal-
lible. Only the Bible is the very Word of God (Matt. 15:6; Rom. 3:2). Only the
Bible is unbreakable. Jesus said, "The Scripture cannot be broken" ( John
10:35). He added, "Till heaven and earth pass away, not an iota, not a dot, will
pass from the law" (Matt. 5:18 RSV).

Third, special revelation has more explicitstatements of the moral law. Clearly, the
Ten Commandments are more explicit than the mere Golden Rule. They spell out
what it means in various spheres of life. What is more, Moses gave many more moral
instructions (see Exod. 21-23) than those contained in the Ten Commandments
(Exod.20).Alsojesus brought out some implications of the moral law that the Jews
had missed in his Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 5). And Paul applied the moral law
to some areas on which Jesus had not explicitlyspoken (1 Cor. 7). Yet none o f
these are explicitly part of the natural law (though they surely are not contrary to it).
Fourth, only special revelation, not natural law, provides salvation (salvific)
information. The moral law at best instructs us about our condemnation (since
we do not keep it perfectly), but it tells us nothing about our salvation ( John
15:6; Acts 4:12; 1 Tim. 2:5). Natural law is sufficient to tell us what not to do,
but it does not tell us how to overcome our failure to do it. Indeed, this was true of
Moses's moral laws as well: "For what the law could not do, in that it was weak
through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and
for sin, condemned sin in the flesh" (Rom. 8:3 KJV), "in order that he might
fulfill the righteous requirement of the law in us" (Rom. 8:3-4 ESV alt.) .s

Conclusion

In short, there is a harmony between God's moral law in the Old and New Testa-
ments, as well as between general and special revelation. After all, there is only one
and the same moral God who is behind all these expressions of his one and the
same moral nature. Hence, the same moral principles that reflect the moral nature
of G od are embedded in Moses's law and also expressed in the natural law. This
natural law has one distinctive advantage over God's special revelation in Scripture:
it is available to all rationally and morally accountable persons. For not everyone
has a Bible or part of one. However, the written law of God is superior in that it is
written, infallible, and more explicit than the natural law. And with its greater light
comes greater responsibility for the believer.

S. This is a slight rewording of the ESV.

Part 2

ETHICAL ISSUES

9

ABORTION

We turn now from ethical options to ethical issues. Of all the moral issues, the most
pressing are those involving life and death. And of the life-and-death issues, the one
that involves the taking of the most lives is abortion. So we will begin our
discussion by examining when, if ever, it is right to terminate a /ife in the womb.

There are three basic positions on abortion, and they all center around the
question of the human status of the unborn. Those who believe the unborn are
subhuman favor abortion on demand. On the other hand, those who hold that
the unborn are fully human are against all forms of abortion as such. And those
who argue that the unborn is a potential human favor abortion in specified
circumstances. The three views are outlined in table 9.1.

raBLe 9, |
Three Views of Abortion
Status of unborn | Fully human Potentially human Subhuman
Abortion Never Sometimes Anytime
Basis Sanctity of life Emergence of life Quality of life

Mother's rights Life over privacy Combination of rights Privacy over right to life

The status of the unborn is crucial to the various views, for if the unborn are
truly human, then the prohibition against taking human life applies to them as
well. On the other hand, if the unborn are merely appendages or extensions of their
mothers’ bodies, then abortion is no more serious than an appendectomy.

131

132 Ethical Issues

Another important issue is the relationship between the right to life and the right
of privacy. If human life takes precedence over personal privacy, then aborting a
human fetus on the basis of the right to privacy is unjustified. If, on the other hand,
the mother's right to privacy takes priority over the baby's right to life, then
abortion is justified.

Abortion at Any Time: The Belief That the Fetus Is Subhuman

Abortion on demand was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in two major
decisions (Doe v. Rotten and Roe v. Wade) in 1973. In these decisions, the Court
argued that the woman's right to privacy prevails over the states’ interest in regulat-
ing abortions. As a result of these two decisions, abortion for any reason became
legal in all fifty states. The Webster decision (1989) gave states more regulatory
rights but did not outlaw abortion. Likewise, the Gonzalez partial-birth abortion
prohibition (2000) only forbids abortion for babies partly but not completely out of
the womb.

The pro-abortionist's self-designation as "pro-choice" places emphasis on the
right of the mother to decide whether she wants to have a baby. It reveals the belief
that the right to privacy is dominant in the decision. Many proponents believe that
no unwanted baby should ever be born. No woman should be forced to have a
child against her will.

The Supreme Court clearly based its decision on this assumption, referring to the
unbom as merely "a potential [human] life." At the same time, the Court also
recognized explicitly that if the right of personhood is established, the "appellant's
case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life is then guaranteed specifically
by the [Fourteenth] Amendment.:" Hence, the pro-abortion position is dependent
on the belief that the unborn is not an actual human person.

Biblical Arguments Used to Show the Fetus Is Subhuman

Abortion is opposed by both general and special revelation. First, we will look
at biblical texts used by some abortionists to support the viewthat an unborn child
is not fully human. Brief comments can be made about and conclusions drawn
from the most significant biblical passages used for this position.

Genesis 2:7 declares that the first human "became a living being” only after
God gave him life. Since breathing does not occur until birth, it is argued that
the unborn are not human until they are born.

Job 34:14-15 says that if God "withdrew his spirit and breath, all [hu]
mankind would perish." Here again, since life is connected with breath, it is
reasoned that there is no human life before breath.

1. Roe t Wade, 410 US. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973).

Abortion 133

Isaiah 57:16 refers to "the breath of [hu]man that I [God] have created." This
also seems to make the beginning of breath to be the point of a human being's
creation.

Ecdesiastes 6:3-5 declares that "a stillborn child" comes into the world ‘without
meaning, it departs in darkness, ... it never saw the sun or knew anything.” This is
taken to indicate that the unborn are no more than the dead, who also know
nothing but lie in the darkness of the grave (9:10).

Matthew 26:24 records Jesus's statement about Judas: "It would have been better
for him if he had not been born." The implication drawn from this is that human
life begins at birth. Otherwise, Jesus should have said it would have been better for
him never to have been conceived.

Other Arguments for Viewing the Fetus as Subhuman

There are several extrabiblical arguments presented by proponents of abortion.
The most significant ones will be briefly considered here. Others will be considered
later when objections to the pro-life view are discussed.

The argument from self-consciousness. It is argued by some that a baby is not a
human until it possesses self-consciousness. Since no infant in the womb is
self-conscious, this would argue in favor of a subhuman status for the unborn,
and on this ground abortion would be permissible.

The argumentfrom physical dependence. Another reason sometimes given by pro-
ponents of abortion is that the baby is an extension of the mother's body, and the
mother has the right to control her own body and reproductive system. Since the
baby is intruding on the mother's physical domain, she has the right to abort it.

The argument from the transmission of hormonal signals. Many pro-choice ad-
vocates argue that the unborn are not human beings until implantation (which
takes place about a week or so after conception). Before implantation the unborn
may have its complete genetic structure, but it lacks interface with the human
community and the ability to communicate that fact, which, it is argued, is an
essential element of human life. This begins only when the implanted conceptus
sends out hormonal signals to the mother's body for its housing and development
for the next nine months.

The argument from the zygote's reliance on material molecules for its development.
Many pro-choice advocates argue that since the zygote's genes are activated by the
mother, it does not have an independent existence of its own. For in the initial
stages of the cell division, it does not rely upon its own genes, but rather upon the
messenger ribonucleic acid (mRNA) from the mother's ovum, and that is what
directs the cell through its development from the four-cell to eight-cell stage.
Hence, it is argued that the mother should be able to choose if she would like to
keep the zygote in existence or not.

The argument from the safety of the mother. Here it is argued that illegal abortion is
dangerous. Figures ranging between five thousand and ten thousand maternal

134 Ethical Issues

deaths from illegal abortions are offered as evidence. By legalizing abortion, thou-
sands of mothers can be saved from death by rusty coat hangers in back alleys.

The argument concerning the autonomous rights of the mother's body. Many
pro-choice advocates argue that the mother has her rights to privacy and autonomy.
This means that if a woman does not want to use her bodily organs to sustain the
life of the unborn, then she has the right to abort the child. The reason given is that
bodily autonomy outweighs the unborn's right to life. Therefore, if the woman feels
that her rights are being imposed upon, she has the option of aborting the unborn
child.

For example, a person has a right to evacuate an intruder from taking residence
in one's home and attaching self to one's refrigerator for nine months. Likewise,
the baby is an unwanted intruder who takes up residency in the mother's womb
and feeds off the mother for nine months.

The argument from abuse and neglect. Another argument given in favor of
abortion is the need to prevent child abuse and neglect. Unwanted pregnancies
lead to unwanted children, and unwanted children become abused children.
Abortion will help prevent child abuse.

The argument from deformity. Why should any child be born deformed? Why
should the family or society be forced to care for deformed children? Abortion
based on prenatal tests can eliminate these unnecessary and undesirable births.
Furthermore, abortionists argue that concern for the genetic purity of the human
race should lead us to weed out bad genes from the human gene pool, from which
all future human beings will come.

The argument from the right to privacy. The Supreme Court declared in Roe v.
Wade (1973) that a woman's right to privacy over her own body is guaranteed by
the U.S. Constitution. Others argue the same thing on ethical grounds. They reason
that just as we have the right to evict an unwanted guest from our home, a woman
likewise has the right to eject an unwanted baby from her womb.

The argument from rape. Pro-choice advocates insist that no woman should
be forced to have a child against her will. It is immoral to add the necessity of
pregnancy to the indignity of being raped. No women should be forced to have
a baby against her will.

Argument from the inability to know when human life begins. Many pro-choice
advocates argue that even if the law protects the life of a human being, and abortion
would be morally wrong if it is the killing of an innocent human being, still we
cannot know with absolute certainty when a new human organism/being has been
formed. Therefore, because we do not 'mow when the germ-cell progenitors cease to
be and the new individual organism begins to exist, forming a new human being, it
would be foolish dogmatism to rule in favor of the fetus being a person.

The argument concerning the autonomous rights of the mother and her consent to
sex. This claim is that a woman's consent to sex is not thereby a consent to pregnancy.
In the same way that it is wrong to force a person to have sex, it is wrong to force a
person to consent to pregnancy. Just as rape should be stopped immediately in

Abortion 135

order not to violate the rights and liberty of the individual, so should the pregnancy
be stopped immediately in order not to violate the rights and liberty of the woman
who has been forced into pregnancy against her will.

The argument from the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Blackmun argued that
according to the Fourteenth Amendment, individuals have a right to privacy and
liberty, and that to pass laws outlawing abortion is to infringe upon an individual's
right to privacy and liberty. He also argued that the unborn are not considered
persons under the Fourteenth Amendment. The reasons are that the U.S. Consti-
tution does not define a person. He then argues that in all of the instances where
the term "person" is used, it is always in reference to a postnatal individual with no
possible prenatal applications. The second reason he offers is that the Texas court
could not cite a case in which the court ruled that an unborn human being is a
person under the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, he says that throughout most of
the nineteenth century, not only was abortion practiced, but there also were fewer
legal restrictions than those that were issued in 1972.

The argument that society determines when a person's life begins. Some abortionists
insist that an individual becomes a person only when a society accepts one as a person.
And since our society dictates that someone is a person at birth, it follows that only then
does someone have human rights. They claim that this is evident since only after a
person's birth is one named, allowed to fulfill societal functions, and accepted into the
family.

The argument that intrinsic values are insufficient to determine human value.
Some abortionists claim that even if the unborn have a human nature, this is not
sufficient for them to have a right to life. In addition to that, they must be engaged
in certain value-giving functions in the present to have a right to live. Having the
present capacity for such values to be expressed only in the future is insufficient. It
is insisted that the so-called intrinsic value of the unborn is not enough, since it is
only a potential value, not an actual one.

An Evaluation of the View That the Fetus Is Subhuman

Now that the arguments have been outlined in favor of abortion, a brief
evaluation of each is in order. First, a reply to the biblical arguments.

A Response to the Biblical Arguments for Viewing the Fetus as Subhuman

Breath is not the beginning of humanness. There are several reasons for not
taking breath as the point of human life's beginning. If breath is equated with the
presence of human life, then the loss of breath would mean the loss of humanness.
But the Bible is clear that human beings continue to exist in another realm after they
stop breathing (Phil. 1:23; 2 Cor. 5:6-8; Rev. 6:9). The Scriptures speak of human
life in the womb long before breathing begins, even from the point of conception.
David said, "In sin did my mother conceive me" (Ps. 51:5 RSV). And

136 Ethical Issues

the angel said of Mary, "What is conceived in her is from the Holy Spirit"
(Matt. 1:20). Also, on the medical scene, many who stop breathing later revive
or live while aided by a machine.

Furthermore, the verses on breath speak not of the beginning of human life but
simply of the initial coming-out event. Birth is the human debut into the world.
These passages speak about the beginning of observable human life, not the
beginning of an actual human life. Even in Bible times people knew that the baby
was alive in the womb. The mother could feel the unborn baby move, at times
even jump (Luke 1:44). Birth was not seen as the beginning of human life but
simply as the beginning or emergence oflife in the naturallyvisible world—as the
human debut.

Adam was a unique case. Since Adam was directly created by God, he was a
special case. Thus, the fact that he did not become human until he breathed is not
decisive for determining when individual human life begins, and that for several
reasons. First, Adam was never conceived and born like other humans; he was directly
created. Second, the fact that Adam was not human until he began to breathe no more
proves when individual human life begins today than does the fact that he was created
as an adult prove that individual human life does not begin until we are adults. Third,
"breath" in Genesis 2:7 means "life" (see Job 33:4). So this means that life began when
God gave human life to Adam, not simply because he began breathing. Human life
was later given to his posterity at fertilization, or conception (Gen. 4:1). Fourth, other
animals breathe but are not human (Gen. 7:21-22).

Knowledge is not necessary to humanness. When Ecclesiastes 6:3—S speaks of a
"stillborn child" as not knowing anything, this does not mean the stillborn is not
human. If this were the case, then adults would not be human after they die either,
for the same book also says there is no "knowledge" in the "the grave, where you
are going" (9:10). In context, this passage is simply making the obvious point that
people not in the world cannot enjoy its opportunities (see v. 9). If lack of knowl-
edge rendered an individual subhuman, then the ignorant would not be human, and
the educated would be more human than the uneducated.

A Response to the Extrabiblical Arguments for Viewing the
Fetus as Subhuman

Most extrabiblical arguments in favor of abortion beg the question. They all
assume what they are to prove, that unborn children are not really human.

Self-consciousness is not necessary to humanness. If self-consciousness is essen-
tial to humanness, then those who are in a state of dreamless sleep or in a coma are
not human. But people do awake from comas. In which case, they would be
nonhumans becoming humans again, which is absurd. This carries the additional
absurd implication that if a wife were to awaken her sleeping husband, she would be
calling him back into existence! Furthermore, little children do not gain
self-consciousness until they are about a year and a half of age. This would mean,
then,

Abortion 137

that infanticide would be justified on any child going on two years of age!
Finally, on this ground killing an unconscious person would be justified.

An embryo is not an extension of the mother. It is a scientific fact that embryos are
not physical extensions of their mothers. From the moment of conception, they have
their own sex, and slightly more than half are male, while the mother is female.
Beginning about forty days after conception, they have their own individual brain
waves, which they keep until death. Within a few weeks of conception, they have
their own blood type, which may differ from the mother's, and their own unique
fingerprints, which do differ from the mother's. Finally, the embryo is only "nesting"
in the mother's womb. Birth simply changes the method of receiving food and
oxygen.

Hence, embryos are no more a part of the mother's body than a nursingbaby is
part of the mother's breast or a test-tube baby is part of a Petri dish. So distinct is an
embryo from a mother's womb that if a fertilized ovum from a black couple is
transplanted into a white mother, she will have a black baby, and vice versa.

Response to the transmission of hormonal signals. First, this argument confuses
when life begins (at conception) with how it is protected and nourished after it
begins and until birth.

Second, no new genetic information is added to a human being after the point
of conception. The mother aids in the development of the embryo after concep-
tion but does not add anything to its human nature after conception. And just
because the mother is not aware the baby is there before implantation does not
mean it is not there.

Third, both scientifically and metaphysically, there is no difference between
the communicative unborn after implantation and the noncommunicative unborn
before implantation. The only differences are accidental difference of location
and relation, but these have no bearing upon the essential nature of the unborn.
The abortionists' argument is akin to saying that a radio is not a radio until it is
plugged into the socket. Or better yet, that a baby is not human until the mother is
nursing the infant. Implantation is like "nesting." It is necessary for growth and
development, but it is not necessary to define humanness.

Response to the argument on the reliance of material molecules. First, this view
seems to rest upon the notion that an entity is an individual being if and only if
one can rely upon one's own genes for its sustenance. But there is no necessity
to accept this premise.

Second, the abortion argument does not demonstrate that an embryo is not a
unified being that needs sustenance from an exterior being or source. This argument
shows rather that the zygote is a living substance and a unified being, which has
within itself the capacity to be acted upon to be directed toward its final cause.

Third, even postnatal individuals seem to rely upon the genetic information of
other beings for their sustenance. For instance, a sick individual may rely on the
genetic information of antibiotics to kill bacteria and microorganisms infecting the
body. Further, all individual human beings rely on the genetic structure of

138 Ethical Issues

other beings for sustenance when they consume food and water, which are the
basic genetic necessities of life.

Thus a zygote is no less human than any other being that receives material
molecules from an exterior source. Otherwise, they must claim that all human
beings who have taken any exterior material source (including medicine and
food) are no longer human, which none of them would claim.

Legalized abortion does not save lives. Legalizing abortion has not saved thousands
of mothers from dying, but it has killed millions of babies. Before the legalization of
abortion in 1973, there were not thousands of women dying each year from illegal
abortions. The U.S. Bureau of Vital Statistics reported that in 1973 there were only
forty-five maternal deaths from abortion. One of the original leaders of the abortion
movement, Dr. Bernard N. Nathanson, later admitted that proponents of abortion
lied about the statistics.”

However, the maternal death rate for childbirth is only 1 in 10,000 births, or
1/100 of 1 percent. Childbirth one of the safest medical procedures in the country.
But the child mortality rate from successful abortions is 100 percent; it is the most
fatal operation in America. If the embryo is human, then saving even hundreds of
mothers would not justify killing millions of babies. Abortion has taken the lives
of near 1.3 million babies a year since Roe v. Wade (1973) in the United States. So
the net effect of legalizing abortion has been to arrange that these deaths occur
more sanitarily and professionally.

Response to the autonomous rights of the mother's body. This position
wrongly assumes that only the mother's rights are in view. True, a mother has the
right to control her own body under normal circumstances. But when she is
carrying another human being within her body, there is a conflict of two rights: the
baby's right to live conflicting with the mother's right to control her own body.
And the right to life takes precedent over the right to control one's own body. In
short, this argument fails to deal with the human status of the unborn in order to
substantiate its main claim.

Further, it is true that one has a right to evacuate an intruding adult from taking
residence in one's home and attaching self to one's refrigerator. However, if one
drops a newly born baby on one's doorstep, it would be a crime of negligent
homicide to toss the baby into the garage to die! But this is precisely what abortion
does. Certainly the baby has intruded into the mother's body. Truly this can be an
unwanted inconvenience. Likewise, it will involve the baby feeding off the mother
for nine months. But none of these are moral grounds for expelling a human baby
to certain death because of these inconveniences.

Response to the argument from child abuse. The argument for preventing child
abuse as a rationale for abortion takes the focus off the issue of whether the unborn
child is human. I f the unborn is human, then abortion does not avoid child abuse.
Rather, abortion is child abuse of the worst kind—abuse by a cruel death. Accord-

2. Bernard N. Nathanson, Aborting America (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1979), 193.

Abortion 139

ing to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' figures, between 1973
(when abortion was legalized) and 1982, child abuse increased more than 500
percent. Further, research reveals that the vast majority of battered children were
wanted by their parents. One study showed that 91 percent of abused children were
wanted children.’

Response to the deformity argument. Once again, this argument for abortion
makes sense only if the unborn are not human, which begs the question. If the
unborn are human, then abortion of the deformed is no more justified than
infanticide or euthanasia for genetic reasons. Abortion of the handicapped is not
promoted by handicapped people. At last count, there was not a single
organization for parents of handicapped children on record as favoring abortion of
the handicapped. In short, it is not the handicapped or their parents who want
abortions of babies who may be born handicapped; it is those who are not
handicapped (and not their parents) who favor abortions. Let's allow the
handicapped to live and speak for themselves.

Response to the privacy-rights argument. The problem with the right-to-privacy
argument for abortion is that it brings us face-to-face again with the basic issue:
Are the unborn human? In other words, justifying abortion on the grounds of
privacy makes good sense only if the embryo is not a human being. This is obvious
for several reasons. First, we do not have the right to privately kill human beings.
Abortionists would have to argue that we also have the right to engage in child
abuse or rape as long as it is done privately. But certainly we have no right to kill
privately. Second, abortion of human beings is significantly different from
evicting someone from our home. Abortion is more like killing an indigent person
in our home because that person will not leave. After all, evicting a nonviable
embryo is fatal. It is tantamount to killing it, since it cannot live on its own outside
the womb. Third, with the exception of criminal rape, no pregnancy is unwilled. If
one consents to intercourse, then one is responsible for the result of that free act.
So, to carry the illustration through, in 99 percent of abortions the "guest" was
invited to begin with. This being the case, abortion is more like inviting indigent
guests to our home and then killing them (or evicting them to a sure death) simply
because they are not wanted.

Response to the argument from rape. Rape is understandably an emotionally
charged issue. But the rape of the mother does not justify the murder of the child.
If the unborn is a human, then intentionally taking its innocent life is murder. So
here again the real issue is the human status of the unborn. But appealing to
sympathy for the rape victim does not avoid the question of justice for the abor-
tion's victim.

Abortion does not take away the evil of the rape; it adds another evil to it. The
rape problem is not solved by killing the baby. We should punish the guilty rap-

3. E. Lenowski, Heartbeat 3-4 (December 1980), quoted in J. C. Willke and Barbara Willke,
Abortion: Questions and Answers (Cincinnati: Hayes, 1985), 138.

140 Ethical Issues

ist, not the innocent baby. Furthermore, even if abortion were justified in a few
extreme cases such as rape (and it is not), this would in no way justify abortion
on demand, such as the Roe v. Wade court permitted.

If a rape victim receives immediate medical treatment, then conception can be
avoided in all cases (since conception does not occur immediately). Further, due
to understandable physical and psychological circumstances, few pregnancies
ever occur from rape. The figure for criminal rape is well under 1 percent. But in
the cases where pregnancy does occur, about half of rape victims want to have the
baby. Should the mother not want the baby, there are people waiting to adopt
babies. Adoption, not abortion, is the better alternative.

Ironically, the woman (Norma McCorvey) whose generic name was "Jane
Roe," whose alleged rape led to the Roe v. Wade (1973) case that overthrew
antiabortion laws in the United States, has subsequently admitted that she lied,
thus undermining the original claim behind the case.

Response to the argument from the inability to know when human life begins.
First, in response to this, one should follow the commonsense approach of Ronald
Reagan, the only sitting president to write a book on abortion: "If you aren't sure,
then don't shoot!" If there is something in the bushes with a bright orange coat and
carrying a gun, then don't shoot. It probably is not a deer!

Second, the laws of logic demand that we know either that it is a human organ-
ism and person or that it is not; either our knowledge is a fact or it is not. Hence,
there are four possibilities: (1) The organism is a person, and we know it. (2) The
organism is a person, and we do not know it. (3) The organism is not a person, and
we do not know it. (4) The organism is not a person, and we do know it.

1. From the first case, it is clear that if we know it is a person and we kill
it, then it is a homicide.

2. From the second case, it would at least be manslaughter. People cannot
plead ignorance because they didn't know a person was there; they didn't
know there wasn't one there either. That would be the height of irrespon-
sibility. In the Pastor Rick Warren preelection interview, President Barak
Obama claimed that it is "above my pay grade" to know whether life begins at
conception; if so, then it is also above his pay grade to know that it does not
begin at conception and that it thus is permissible to kill millions of babies,
which is what his pro—Roe v. Wade position allows.

3. From the third case, the fetus is not a person, but that is not known with
certainty. This seems to be just as irresponsible as the second case. The
abortionists should be charged with manslaughter, for they did not know,
but it is still an act of criminal negligence.

4. Only in the fourth case would abortion be reasonable, legal, and responsible.
But it is contrary to fact, since nobody really knows this with any kind of

4. See Ronald Reagan, Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation (Nashville: Nelson, 1984).

Abortion 141

certainty. The organism may be a human person, and if it may be a human
person, then killing it is still a culpable crime. Thus, in the end, the skeptical
argument fails because abortionists are still culpable in all cases. For if the
unborn is or maybe a human person, then abortion is either homicide,
manslaughter, or a heinous crime. Certainly, what is conceived by a human,
born as a human, and grows as a human should be given the benefit of the
doubt that it is a human.

Response to the consent to sex. First, if it is known that pregnancy is a possible
result of sex (which nearly all women know), then the mother is giving tacit con-
sent to having the baby when she has sex. At the minimum, she is playing Russian
roulette and is responsible if the trigger goes off. More importantly, this view begs
the question by assuming that the unborn is not human. For if the unborn is human,
then the mother has no right to kill the fetus on the grounds that she did not consent
to the fetus coming into being. The unborn's right to life takes precedence over the
mother's desire not to be pregnant, whether she knew she was going to become
pregnant or not.

Response to the Fourteenth Amendment argument. First, the difficulty with
Justice Blackmun's Roe vy. Wade citations is that he refers only to cases that applied
to already-existing persons. For instance, he cites the U.S. Constitution's Fugitive
Slave Clause (Article 4, Section 2, Clause 3) and the Migration and Importation
provision (Art. 1, Sec. 9, Cl. 1). But both of these provisions had already been
eliminated by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, and their application
was clearly only for already-existing individuals. He also cites the reference to the
qualifications of a congressman (Art. 1, Sec. 2, Cl. 2; Art. 1, Sec. 3, Cl. 3), which
state that a senator must be at least 30 years old and that a representative must be at
least 25 years old. But again, these references seem to beg the question because
they imply that because a fetus cannot hold these offices, then that individual is not
a person. Along this line of reasoning, anyone who is not at least 25 to 30 years old
would not be a person.

Further, Justice Blackmun is correct in stating that Texas did not cite a case
holding that the unborn is a person according to the Fourteenth Amendment. But
he failed to recognize that the Steinberg v. Brown (1970) case, cited in the Roe v.
Wade decision, states that in the case of a controversial issue, a legal principle
has universal application. This means that if the unborn is a person, then the
Fourteenth Amendment is meant to protect that individual, even if it is not
explicitly stated in the Fourteenth Amendment. But what can be drawn from this
Texas decision is that the U.S. Supreme Court accepted the premise of universal
application, but then it legislated incorrectly in its ruling concerning the
person-hood of a fetus.

Finally, Blackmun's statement that nineteenth-century abortion not only was
practiced but that the law also had fewer legal restrictions does not stand. By the
end of the nineteenth century, abortion was prohibited throughout the entire

142 Ethical Issues

pregnancy. Not only were common laws recognized, but even state-legislated laws
were recognized. For instance, the state of Texas suggested, as did Steinberg, that
the unborn are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment because they are
persons. So, even ifJustice Blackmun was correct that the unborn never had been
considered a full person under the law, what the Texas ruling did argue for is that
the humanity of the unborn be recognized by the Court in the present, and the
Fourteenth Amendment should be interpreted in light of that decision. Hence, all
beings that have the essential attributes and properties of those in the Fourteenth
Amendment should be considered persons and be protected by the law.

Response to the argument that society determines when the person has
rights. First, this view confines a social convention with one's actual
(metaphysical) status. Further, there are many Eastern cultures that celebrate
the personhood of a fetus from conception. If society determines personhood at
the same time, an Eastern child would be a person and a Western child would
not. What then of Eastern children living in the West?

Second, this view fails to make the distinction between essential and accidental
characteristics. Essentially the fetus does not change from conception until death.
The only changes that take place are accidental, such as location, size, and shape.
And accidental changes do not affect the nature of a being, but only its secondary
qualities.

Third, not all cultures allow children to be accepted into society at the same time
and in the same way. Different religions use different events at different times to
bring one into society. For instance, some Christians baptize infants; some Jews
perform a bar mitzvah at the age of thirteen. Should we assume that they are not
human until then? On this ground, some Christian children would be persons while
some Jewish kids would not. But this is clearly inconsistent, because there is no
essential difference between the nature of the individual people of the Christian
and Jewish faiths. It should be clear that events after conception do not determine
nature, for the individuals all remain essentially the same throughout the entire
process.

Response to the argwnentfrom insufficiency of intrinsic values. First, this
argument grants the human nature of the unborn. But the moral law extends to
protecting all human life. Second, requiring an additional test for humanness other
than having a human nature—that is, determining humanness on the basis of what
one does rather than on the basis of what one is—has fatal consequences for the
handicapped and elderly who can do little or nothing for themselves or anyone
else.

Third, who decides what kind of activity and/or how much is necessary? On this
view, the criteria for humanness—and for life—become social, not metaphysical.
Given thousands of years of history as a precedent, the predictable results of this
view are fatal.

Fourth, given this view, then some beings have more intrinsic value than others.
For instance, some adults have a better capacity to reason and learn than others.

Abortion 143

This would mean that some adults are more intrinsically valuable than others.
But if this is so of adults, then it would also be true of the unborn.

Finally, according to this position, there would be degrees of humanness since there
are degrees of human activity that determine humanness. But this is absurd, since
natures do not come in degrees. Either a figure is a triangle or it is not a triangle. There
are no degrees of triangleness. Neither are there degrees of humanness.

Abortion Sometimes: The Belief’ hat the Fetus Is Potentially Human

According to this opinion on abortion, the unbom child is merely a potential
human being. Proponents argue that the humanness of the individual develops
gradually between conception and birth. The fetus begins as a potentially human
person and gradually becomes fully human. Yet even as a potential human being,
the fetus has more value than mere things or even animals. However, this emerging
value must be weighed against such other considerations as the mother's rights and
society's rights. Whether abortion is justified in a given case will depend on where
the greater weight of these rights falls in the balance. Generally, those who hold
this view favor abortion to save the mother's life, for rape, for incest, and (in many
cases) for genetic deformities. The arguments offered in favor of this view can be
categorized as biblical and nonbiblical.

Biblical Arguments for Viewing the Fetus as Potentially Human

Several passages are used to support the position that the unborn are only
potentially human. The one most often appealed to is Exodus 21. Exodus
21:22-23. This passage reads as follows.

If men strive, and hurt a woman with child, so that her fruit depart from her, and yet
no mischief follow: he shall be surely punished, according as the woman's husband
will lay upon him; and he shall pay as the judges determine. And if any mischief
follow, then thou shalt give life for life. (KJV)

These verses are taken to mean that only a monetary fine was exacted for the death
of the fetus, but capital punishment for the death of the mother. If so, then the
mother's actual life was considered of more value than the fetus's potential life.
Adherents argue that "her fruit depart from her" means a miscarriage, in which the
baby dies. That "no mischief follow" would thus refer to the mother, since the
miscarriage has already brought death to the fetus. If this is so, then the mere fine,
as opposed to capital punishment, for the death of the fetus would indicate that the
fetus was not considered fully human.

Psalm 51:5. David confessed, "Surely I was sinful at birth, sinful from the time
my mother conceived me." In what sense was David a sinner at the moment of
conception? He obviously was not an actual sinner, because he had not yet actually

144 Ethical Issues

sinned. So, it is reasoned, David was a potential sinner. He was a potential
sinner because he was only a potential person. Later, when he became an actual
person, he became an actual sinner.

Psalm 139:13, IS-16. The psalmist wrote of the process by which we are
formed in our mother's womb:

For you created my inmost being;
you knit me together in my mother's womb.... When
I was woven together in the depths of the earth, your
eyes saw my unformed body.

From these verses it is argued that the fetus is not fully human because it is in
the process of being "knit ... together" and is called "unformed:' Add to this the
verses from Ecclesiastes (6:3-5) that the fetus does not know anything, and the
image develops of a potential but emerging human being in the womb. Yet it is
argued from this that the fetus is not yet fully developed or fully human.

Romans 5:12. The Bible declares that "sin entered the world through one man
[Adam], and death through sin, and in this way death came to all ... , because all
sinned [in Adam]." However, it is evident that all people were not actually in
Adam. Hence, it is argued that all humans were in Adam only potentially. Thus it
is concluded that we are only potentially human before we are born and only
become actual human beings later.

Hebrews 7:9-10 says that Levi ... paid the tenth through Abraham, because ...
Levi was still in the body of [Abraham]:’ But since Levi lived hundreds of years
after Abraham, it is clear that he was not actually in Abraham's body. He must have
been there only potentially. Thus, it is argued by comparison that the unborn are
only potentially human when they are in the body of the mother.

Other Arguments for Viewing the Fetus as Only Potentially Human

In addition to the biblical evidence, there are several reasons offered to support
the view that a fetus is only potentially human. Some of the most significant ones
are summarized here.

Human personality develops only gradually. Observation reveals that human
personality goes through a gradual process of development. One is not
conceived with a sense of personal identity. This develops gradually through
relationships with other persons. Thus it is urged that one becomes a person
only as the personality develops. Before that, one is only potentially and
emergently human.

Human development is interconnected with physical development. It is evident that
there is physical development between conception and birth. Not all bodily organs
and functions are present at conception; they gradually develop throughout the
prenatal period. But it is equally true that there is an interrelation between psy-
chological and physical development. For example, a one-day-old baby's body

Abortion 145

does not have an eighteen-year-old's mind. This being the case, some argue that
human personhood develops along with the human body.

The analogy with other living things. An acorn is not an oak tree, nor is an egg a
chicken, and an embryo is to a human being what an acorn is to an oak tree, or an
egg to a chicken. Just as an egg is not a chicken, so neither is a fetus a human. An
acorn is a potential oak tree, and an embryo is a potential human being. Yet a fetus
has the potential to become human, and the egg does not. This potential is of great
value, of more value than an actual chicken. However, a potential human is no
more an actual human than an acorn is an oak tree.

The legal argument. The Supreme Court referred to a fetus as "a potential
[human] life, Some pro-abortionists claim that this idea is implied in the
Fourteenth Amendment:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.

Since the amendment extends the rights of citizenship only to those who are
born, pro-abortionists reason that the Constitution implies that the unborn are
not fully human. Hence, the right to life of those already born would not apply
to the unborn.

An Evaluation of the View That the Fetus Is Potentially Human

There are several fatal problems with the position that the unborn are only poten-
tially human. First, the interpretations of the biblical passages are questionable.

A Response to the Biblical Arguments Viewing the
Fetus as Potentially Human

Exodus 21 does not teach that a fetus is a potential human. Neither can this be
legitimately inferred from the passage. The Hebrew word for "come forth" isydsd,
which means "to give birth." It is the same word regularly used for live birth in the
Old Testament. Hence, in this passage it refers to a live premature birth, not a
miscarriage. The separate Hebrew word for miscarriage, idkol, is not used here.
The word used for the mother's offspring here is yeled, which means "child" It is
the same word used of babies and young children (Gen. 21:8; Exod. 2:3). If any
harm came to either the mother or the child, the same punishment was given: "life
for life" (v. 23). This reveals that the unborn was considered of equal value with the
mother.

5. Roe v. Wade.

146 Ethical Issues

The famous Hebrew scholar Umberto Cassuto rendered this passage as
follows:

When men strive together and they hurt unintentionally a woman with child, and
her children come forth but no mischief happens—that is, the woman and the
children do not die—the one who hurts her shall surely be punished by a fine. But
if any mischief happens, that is, if the woman dies or the children die, then you
shall give life for life .*

This makes the meaning clear; it is a strong passage affirming that the unborn
are of equal value to adult human beings.

Psalm S1:5 does not support the potential-human view for several reasons.
Even if it were teaching that humans are potential sinners from conception, it
would not follow that they are potential humans. The very fact that humans are
declared sinners from conception reveals that they are human, part of the fallen
human race. It is only by virtue of being part of the Adamic human race that we
are conceived in sin (see comments on Rom. S:/2, below).

Psalm 139 is a strong support of the view that the unborn are fully human, not
merely potentially human. "Unformed" (v. 16) does not mean unhuman anymore
than deformed does. The baby in the womb is referred to as being made by God
just as Adam was made (Gen. 2:7) in the image of God (Gen. 1:27). The unborn is
referred to by personal pronouns ( Jen 1:5 LXX), and the unborn is "known" by
God in the womb, a term implying personal relationship. Each unborn child in the
womb is also written down in God's book in heaven (Ps. 139:16).

Romans 5:12 implies that all humans were in Adam potentially, but not that
they were potential humans before they were born. The passage is not speaking
about an embryo in the womb but about the fact that all humans were in Adam.
The fact that we were all genetically or representatively in Adam, and therefore
responsible in his sin, reveals that there is a corporateness about human nature.
That is, there is a unity in humanity, so that we cannot totally cut off one member
from another (Rom. 14:7), wherever we are located. The very fact that we are all
declared sinners from conception (Ps. 51:5) by virtue of being in Adam reveals
that even at the point of conception, one is considered to be part of the human
race.

Hebrews 7:9-10 is not speaking of an embryo, to say nothing of it being a po-
tential human being. Levi was probably there potentially, representatively, or figu-
ratively. But even if Levi was potentially in Abraham, it certainly does not follow
that he was an embryo in Abraham. If Levi, who was not even conceived when he
was said to be "in Abraham," was a potential human being, then we are potential
humans before we are even conceived. If this is so, then even human sperm (before
they fertilize an ovum) are potential human beings. But this is genetically incor-

6. Umberto Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Exodus, trans. Israel Abrahams
(Jerusalem: Magnes, 1974), 275.

Abortion 147

rect. Sperm have only twenty-three chromosomes, while embryos have
forty-six. Embryos have human souls, but sperms do not.

A Response to the Nonbiblical Arguments for Viewing the
Fetus as Potentially Human

The extrabiblical arguments for viewing the fetus as only potentially human
suffer from many of the same weaknesses as the arguments for viewing the
fetus as subhuman. Let us consider them in turn.

Personality differs from personhood. Arguing that the unborn are only potential
persons because personalitydevelops is a confusion of personality and personhood.
Personality is a psychological concept; personhood is an ontological category.
Personalityis a property, but personhood is the substance of being human. Person-
alities are formed by their surroundings, but personhood is created by God. Thus,
personalityis developed gradually, but personhood comes instantly at conception.
If personhood is identified with personality, then an improperly adjusted person is
not properly human. Since personality involves consciousness, those who lack
consciousness would cease to be human. On this ground, killing people who are
unconscious would be justified.

Thesoul does not have to change with the body. Simply because the body
develops does not mean the soul does. Ajar can have the same form whether it is
small or big. This sentence could be magnified (enlarged) without changing its
meaning (form). Likewise, the small body of a fertilized ovum can have the same
soul as the somewhat bigger one of a fetus, or even the much bigger one of an
adult. So simply because the human body undergoes obvious development does
not mean that the human person animating that body must also develop gradually.
The soul can be present wholly and completely from the very beginning of the
body's development.

Neither an acorn nor an embryo is a potential life. It is a misunderstanding
of botany to say an acorn is a potential oak tree. An acorn is a tiny living oak
tree inside a shell. Its dormant life does not grow until properly nourished by
planting and watering, but it is a tiny living oak tree in a shell nonetheless. All
the genetic information that comprises an oak tree is in the acorn. And all the
genetic information that comprises an adult human being is in the fertilized
ovum. All that is added to make an adult human from this tiny human is water,
air, and food. An embryo is not a potential human life; it is a human life with
great potential.

The unborn are constitutionally protected. There are a number of significant
reasons why the Supreme Court was wrong when it declared that unborn children
are not persons with a protected right to life. It is not simply those who are born in
the United States who are protected under the Constitution. Otherwise, it would be
legal to kill any alien within our borders. But the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly
says that the state shall not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or

148 Ethical Issues

property, without due process of law; nor deny any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law:'

Even corporations have been considered "persons" under the Fourteenth
Amendment (Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394
[1886]), and the Supreme Court also once mistakenly said that blacks did not fully
count as "persons" or citizens (Dred Scott v. (John F. A.] Sandford, 60 U.S. [19
How.] 393, 15 L. Ed. 691 [1857]) and was tragically wrong then too. The right to
life is an inalienable God-given right, according to The Declaration of
Independence (1776), our national birth certificate. The fact that abortions were
forbidden by law at that time and that an embryo was defined as a "child in the
womb" shows that this right to life included unborn children as well. And only
three years before Roe v. Wade, a federal court referred to the unborn as persons
(Steinberg v. Brown [1970]).

No Abortions: The Belief That the Fetus Is Fully Human

The final view holds that the fetus is fully human. Therefore, any intentional
taking of an unborn's life is homicide. This position is supported by both
biblical and nonbiblical evidence.

Biblical Arguments for Viewing the Fetus as Fully Human

Since most of the biblical data has already been presented, the arguments
pertinent to this position will simply be summarized here.

1. Unborn babies are called "children," the same word used of infants and
young children (Exod. 21:22; Luke 1:41,44; 2:12,16) and sometimes even
of young adults (1 Kings 17:21; cf. 3:17).

2. The unborn are formed by God (Ps. 139:13), just as God formed Adam
and Eve in his image (Gen. 1:27; cf. 2:7).

3. The life of the unborn is protected by the same punishment for injury or
death (Exod. 21:22-24) as that of an adult (Gen. 9:6).

4. Christ was human (the God-man) from the point that he was conceived
in Mary's womb (Matt. 1:20-21; Luke 1:26-27, 31).

5. The image of God includes "male and female" (Gen. 1:27), but it is a
scientific fact that maleness or femaleness (sex) is determined at the
moment of conception.

6. Unborn children possess personal characteristics, such as sin (Ps. 51:5)
and joy, that are distinctive of humans.

7. Personal pronouns are used to describe unborn children (Jer. 1:5 UDC;
Matt. 1:20-21) just as any other human being.

8. The unborn are said to be known intimately and personally by God as
he would know any other person (Ps. 139:15-16; Jer. 1:5).

Abortion 149

9. The unborn are even called by God before birth (Gen. 25:22-23; Judg.
13:2-7; Isa. 49:1, 5; Gal. 1:15).

Taken as a whole, these Scripture texts leave no doubt that unborn children are
just as much persons in God's image as little children or adults are. They are
created in God's image from the very moment of conception, and their prenatal
life is precious in God's eyes and protected by his prohibition against murder.

Nonbiblical Arguments for Viewing the Fetus as Fully Human

The extrabiblical evidence that prenatal life is fully human falls into the
categories of scientific and social.

Scientific evidence for the humanity of the unborn. Modern science has placed a
window in the womb. As a result, the evidence is now clearer than ever that indi-
vidual human life begins at the very moment of conception, or fertilization.

It is a genetic fact that a fertilized human ovum is 100 percent human. From the
very moment of fertilization, all genetic information is present. All the physical
characteristics of an individual being are contained in the genetic code present at
conception. The sex of the individual child is determined at the moment of
conception as well. A female ovum has only twenty-three chromosomes, and a
male sperm has twenty-three chromosomes, but a normal adult human being has
forty-six chromosomes. At the very moment of conception, when the male sperm
and female ovum unite, a new, tiny, forty-six-chromosome human being emerges.
From the moment of conception until death, no new genetic information is added.
All that is added between conception and death is food, water, and oxygen.

Ata U.S. congressional hearing in 1981, scientific experts from around the
world testified about the beginning of an individual life:

In biology and in medicine, it is an accepted fact that the life of any individual or-
ganism reproducing by sexual reproduction begins at conception, or fertilization.
(Dr. Micheline M. Matthews-Roth)'

To accept the fact that after fertilization has taken place a new human has come into
being is no longer a matter of taste or opinion. The human nature ofthe human being
from conception to old age is not a metaphysical contention, it is plain experimental
evidence. ( Jerome LeJeune)t

But now we can say, unequivocally, that the question of when life begins is no longer a
question for theological or philosophical dispute. It is an established scientific fact.
Theologians and philosophers may go on to debate the meaning of life or the

7. Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, report to Senate Judiciary
Committee S*158, 97th Congress, Ist session, 1981.
8. Ibid.

150 Ethical Issues

purpose of life, but it is an established fact that all life, including human life,
begins at the moment of conception. (Dr. Hymie Gordon)’

Modern fetology has brought to light some amazing things about the growth of
this tiny person in the mother's womb. The following summary is vivid testimony
to the full humanness of the prenatal child (a girl in this instance).

First Month: Actualization
Conception: All her human characteristics are present.
She implants or “nests" in her mother's uterus (one week or so later).
Her heart muscle pulsates (three weeks).
Her head, arms, and legs begin to appear.

Second Month: Development
Her brain waves can be detected (40 to 42 days).
Her nose, eyes, ears, and toes appear.
Her heart beats and blood (her own type) flows.
Her skeleton develops.
She has her own unique fingerprints.
She is sensitive to touch on her lips and has reflexes.
All her bodily systems are present and functioning.

Third Month: Movement
She swallows, squints, and swims.
She grasps with her hands and moves her tongue.
She can even suck her thumb.

She can feel organic pain (8-13 weeks).

Fourth Month: Growth
Her weight increases six times (to one-half birth weight).
She grows up to eight to ten inches long.

She can hear her mother's voice.

Fifth Month: Viability
Her skin, hair, and nails develop.
She dreams (REM sleep). She
can cry (if air is present).

9. Ibid.

Abortion 151

She can live outside the womb.
She is only halfway to her scheduled birth date.

These characteristics make the identity of human embryos unmistakable.
Human embryos are not mineral, vegetable, or animal. They are fully human.

Social evidence for the humanity of the unborn. In addition to the biblical and
scientific evidence, there are many social arguments for protecting the human
rights of unborn children. These are the most significant ones among them.

First, no one disputes that human embryos have human parents. Why then
should anyone argue that a human embryo is not human? No biologist has any
difficulty in identifying an unborn pig as a pig or an unborn horse as a horse.
Why should an unborn human be considered anything but human?

Second, human life never stops and then starts up again. There is a continuous
flow of human life from generation to generation, from parent to child. This flow
of human life is uninterrupted. The way new individual human life appears is
through conception. Hence, the new life that appears at that point is every bit as
human as its parents. Otherwise, human life would have a discontinuity between
conception and birth (or whenever it would begin again).

Third, the father of modern fetology, Dr. A. Liley, observed that 'this is the
same baby we are caring for before and after birth, who before birth can be ill
and need diagnosis and treatment just like any other patient?" But if it is the
same baby and the same patient both before and after birth, then it is just as
human before it is born as after.

Fourth, modern medical care has made it possible for premature babies to live
outside the womb much earlier—some twenty-week-old fetuses have survived.
But if they are human when they come out of the womb at five months, then they
must be human if they stay in the womb. Thus there are no grounds for killing
them up to nine months, which is what U. S. law permits. This contradiction is
often dramatized in a modern hospital, where staff members in one room rush to
save a five-month-old preemie, while in another room others may be killing (by
abortion) a baby.

Fifth, all the arguments for abortion apply equally as well to infanticide and
euthanasia. If unborn children can be killed because of deformity, poverty, or
undesirability, then both infants and the aged can be disposed of for the same
reasons. There is no real difference between abortion and infanticide or eutha-
nasia: they all involve the same patient and the same procedure and end in the
same result.

Sixth, abortion has been declared wrong by many societies and moralists,
whether Christian or pagan, since the dawn of civilization. The Code of Hammu-
rabi (18th cent. BC) had a penalty for even unintentionally causing a miscarriage.
Mosaic law (16th-15th cent. BC) exacted the same penalty for injury to baby or

10. Quoted in Will ke and Willke, Abortion, 52.

152 Ethical Issues

mother. Tiglath-Pileser of Assyria (12th cent. BC) punished women who caused
themselves to abort. The Greek physician Hippocrates (Sth-4th cent. BC) opposed
abortion with an oath: aI will neither give a deadly drug to anyone if asked for, nor
will I make a suggestion to this effect. Similarly I will not give to a woman an
abortive remedy." Even Seneca (AD Ist cent.), whose Stoic compatriots allowed
abortion, praised his mother for not aborting him. Augustine of Hippo (4th-Sth
cent.), Thomas Aquinas (13th cent.), and John Calvin (16th cent.) all considered
abortion immoral. English common law exacted punishment for taking life by
abortion, as did early American law. Before 1973, actually, laws in nearly all fifty
states opposed abortion.

Seventh, discrimination against anyone's life based on circumstantial matters
such as size, age, location, or functional ability is morally wrong. Yet these are the
same grounds on which abortionists consider the unborn child to be nonhuman. On
these same grounds we could discriminate against the lives of pygmies or preemies
because they are too small, or against minorities because of where they live. Why
then discriminate against babies who still live in the womb? Or we could
discriminate against the handicapped or elderly because they lack certain
functional abilities. And if we can eliminate babies from the human community
because they are unwanted, then why not discard other undesired segments of
society, such as AIDS victims, drug addicts, or derelicts?

Pragmatic Argument against Abortion

For those who may not accept the biblical, metaphysical, epistemological, or
scientific arguments against abortion, a pragmatic argument can be offered.
The economic value of each person should warrant the preservation of the life
of the unborn.

First, the economic value of each individual is worth hundreds of thousands of
dollars over the span of a person's lifetime. This money from these individuals
could be used to sustain and, in many cases, boost the economy.

Second, after the baby-boomer generation, there was a rise in the population
of children and a rise in the amount of money in the economic system. Because
of this rise, the United States was able to institute and finance programs like
Social Security to fund many of the elderly and individuals who are not able to
work. If there is a sudden drop in the economic workforce (which abortion will
bring because those who would fill the jobs of the previous generations will no
longer be there), then there would be a drop in the amount of funds available for
programs such as Social Security. In short, abortion will undermine the
economic stability, deplete federal funds," and ultimately help bankrupt Social
Security.

11. E. Calvin Beisner, Prospects for Growth: A Biblical View of Population, Resources, and the Future
(Westchester, IL: Crossway Books, 1990), 189-92.

Abortion 153

A Response to Criticisms of the View That the Fetus Is Fully Human

Granting that a fertilized ovum is fully human leads to some difficulties. The
most important ones are briefly noted here.

What If the Mother's Life Is Threatened?

Thanks to the advances of modern medicine, it is seldom necessary to initiate a
drastic procedure that will lead to the death of the unborn in order to save the
mother's life. However, when it is necessary (such as in tubal pregnancies), it is
morally justified to take every medical precaution to save the mother's life. This is
not abortion as such, and for several reasons. First, the intention is not to kill the
baby; it is to save the life of the mother. It is justified on by the principle of double
effect, which affirms that if one action (say, to save a life) leads to two consequences,
one good (saving the life of the mother) and the other bad (leading to the death of the
fetus), then the act is justifiable if one wills the good result. Second, it is a
life-for-a-life issue, not an abortion-on-demand situation. Actually, it is not really an
abortion at all since it is not an operation aimed at killing an embryo. Third, when
one's life is threatened, as the mother's is, she has a right to preserve it on a
self-defense basis (see Exod. 22:2) since the presence of the fetus in a fallopian tube
(an ectopic pregnancy) is threatening her life. Either the baby dies or else both will
die. And it is better to save one life than none.

Half of All Conceptions Spontaneously Abort

It is objected that if a fertilized ovum is a human being, then about half of all
human beings are killed spontaneously anyway, for they never make it to the uterus
to develop. However, this is not a legitimate ground for abortion. It fails to make the
crucial distinction between spontaneous death and homicide. We are not morally
culpable for the former, but we are for the latter. There is also a high infant mortality
rate in some underdeveloped countries, but this does not justify intentionally killing
these babies before they are born. There is a 100 percent mortality rate among people
who are terminally ill, but this does not justifykilling them. From a biblical
standpoint, God is sovereign over life, not humans. The believer's attitude should be
"the LORD gave, and the LORD hath taken away; blessed be the name of the LORD" (
Job 1:21 KJV; see also Deut. 32:39).

If All Fertilized Ova Are Human, We Should Try to Save Them

It is argued that if every fertilized ovum is human, then we are obligated to try to
save all spontaneous abortions as well. But if we did, it would lead to over-
population, death by medical neglect, and starvation. In response, several points
should be made. There is no unqualified moral duty to interfere with natural death.
Protecting life is a moral obligation, but resisting natural death is not necessar-

154 Ethical Issues

ily a moral duty (see chap. 10). This also rejects God's sovereignty over life and
death. God has appointed death for all persons (Rom. 5:12; Heb. 9:27), and we
have no unqualified moral duty to interfere with God when he carries out these
appointments. There is no inconsistency between preserving natural life by
opposing artificial abortion and allowing natural death by spontaneous
abortion. Both respect God's right over human life (Deut. 32:39; Job 1:21).

Twins Prove That Life Begins at Conception

Identical twins come from one fertilized ovum that does not divide until after
conception. On this basis it is argued that human life could not begin at conception,
since each twin's life did not begin until after conception. But this does not follow for
several reasons. The original ovum was 100 percent human, with forty-six
chromosomes. From the instant the ovum split in two, each twin has 100 percent
human characteristics and forty-six chromosomes. Twin splitting may simply be a
nonsexual way of parenting (reproduction). And we do not consider the parents of
humans to be subhuman. The "parent" of a twin is just as human as would be the
‘parent" of a human clone. Both have human genetic characteristics. The fact that
some are reported to rejoin after splitting does not diminish the humanness of either
the united or separated forms. For at no time is there a loss of the 100 percent human
genetic characteristics that constitute the human nature involved.

Some Fertilized Ova Do Not Have Forty-six Chromosomes

Some babies have only 45 chromosomes (Turner's syndrome) and some have 47
(Down syndrome). This is used by some pro-abortionists to justify abortion of
genetically imperfect babies, but this does not follow for many reasons. On this
same ground we could also kill little children and adults with these same genetic
imperfections. Further, many people with other than 46 chromosomes live
relatively normal lives. What is more, we do not treat the physically impaired as
subhuman, and neither should we treat the genetically impaired that way. Finally,
having 46 chromosomes makes one human. Not having 46 chromosomes does not
necessarily make one subhuman—especially when one comes from humans, has a
human nature, and has the potentiality to function in a uniquely human way.

A Human Being Is Not Necessarily a Person

This distinction admits the humanness of the embryo but denies that the embryo
is a person. Yet for many reasons, this will not help the pro-abortion cause. First,
the distinction is arbitrary. There are no really essential differences between being
human and being a human person, only functional ones. Second, on the same
grounds the personhood of the severely retarded, the unconscious, and the senile
could be denied. Third, even if an embryo were not yet a person, it still would be
wrong to kill an innocent human being, such as they are. And they are

Abortion 155

unmistakably human in both parentage and genetic characteristics. Fourth, it is
a false distinction without a real difference. Fifth, it is an artificial distinction
that makes a fatal difference. Finally, if having a human nature does not make
one a human person, then society will be at a loss to decide who qualifies as a
person, which may lead to tyranny and discrimination.

The Quality-of-Life Argument

Some abortionists argue that a child who is deformed or defective should not have
to suffer through life and that death would be a better option. The quality of life
maybe for the unborn or it maybe for the parents. The qualityoflife may range from
the housing conditions to physical defects in the child. But the main point is that if
the child cannot have an acceptable quality of life, then it should be aborted.

In response to this argument, several points are made.” First, if the fetus is
actually a person, then the fetus has the same moral rights, and we have the
same obligations to the fetus, as any other person. Also, it would be an act of
discrimination to kill the deformed or defective child purely because they are
deformed or defective.

Second, quality-of-life adherents use a subjective standard for judging the quality
of life. This view assumes that certain lives are not worth living just because they do
not meet a certain standard. But not one handicapped or disability group has come
out in favor of abortion for those who are deformed or defective."

Third, this view has an inherent logical problem. It is basically arguing that no
life is better than any life. But this is a false comparison: to compare two things,
they both must exist and have properties to compare. Fourth, this view does not
believe that there is any value to suffering. But this is clearly not always the case,
because many individuals have been able to learn more, grow more, and draw
closer to God through trials and pain (Rom. 5:3-5; James 1:2-4).

The Brain-Development Argument

Many pro-abortionists claim that a fetus should not be considered a person until
it has a developed brain and consciousness. They also argue that because a human
being is considered dead at brain death, the person no longer exists in the physical
body; it thus seems logical to make the same comparison for a fetus: when it is
developing in the womb, it is not a person until it has consciousness.

In response to this argument, several points are made." First, this position has a
false view of symmetry by comparing brain death and brain life. Its proponent
says, "If the 'person is gone at brain death, then he must not be there until the

12. Mark Foreman, Christianity and Bioethics; Confronting Clinical Issues
(Joplin, MO: College Press, 1999), 75-76.
13. Ibid., 75.

14. Ibid., 90-92.

156 Ethical Issues

brain is alive." As much as this symmetry seems to exist, there is no a priori
reason to assume it really exists. There is no evidence for it; it may just be our
tendency to be symmetrical."

Second, this view fails to recognize that the unborn possess the ontological
structure and capacity to have brain activity, but it is in a latent form. It is within
the basic inherent capacity of an unborn fetus to develop cognitive activity.

Third, the function or actions of the fetus do not determine the essence of the
fetus. This argument is based upon the notion that 'to do is to be," in which the
actions determine the essence of the individual. Yet since the fetus is a human or a
person, it will express the actions for being human, even if at the moment they are
in a latent form. If someone denies this argument, they need to account for why
nonhuman fetuses do not have or develop human activities such as language,
discursive thought, and so forth.

Finally, this view falsely assumes that consciousness is a physical act instead of a
nonphysical cognitive power; but because it is a nonphysical power, ontologically
inherent within the nature of a person, it is not dependent upon a physical brain. It
could exist apart from a physical brain.

Argument That the Fetus Lacks Human Appearance

Some abortionists believe that a fetus is not a person and does not have rights
until it has the appearance of a human being. Many pro-life advocates argue in the
same way, though, claiming that because it looks like a human being, it must
therefore have the same rights as a human being.

First, this view seems to forget the fact that an accidental or extrinsic charac-
teristic does not change the essential substance of the being. In other words, one
could still be a human being even if they do not have the appearance of what we
typically see a human being have. For instance, there have been many individuals
who have been badly burned or deformed in some type of an accident, and we still
consider them human beings. This is because ontologically they are still human
beings, even if their accidental qualities such as shape, color, size, and so forth do
not bear the usual marks of a human being.

Second, this view assumes that a human being is reserved to a narrow and par-
ticular form. On the same ground one could argue that some children, adolescents,
and mature adults are not human beings because they do not all look the same.

Finally, if appearance determines personhood or humanity, then it could
lead to extreme forms of bigotry. This is exactly what Hitler did when he
defined the Jews and all others who did not have blond hair and blue eyes to be
nonpersons because they did not have characteristics that he defined as the
proper human appearance.

15. Ibid., 91.

Abortion 157

Argument from Sentience (Ability to Feel Pain)

Some abortionists argue that a fetus does not become a person before being
able to experience physical sensations such as pain. This view argues that when a
being can feel pain, it has interests, and anything that has interests can be harmed."
And because they can be harmed and have interests, they are human beings and
have a right to life.

First, this view confuses being and being affected. Metaphysically the fetus
does not undergo a substantive change from the moment of conception until death.
This is because the being or the type of existence in accordance with the essence of
the fetus is inherently the same throughout the whole of its life. The only thing that
changes is the extrinsic accidental qualities.

Second, the being is only affected or changed in the sense that something can
act upon the substance. In order for the fetus to experience sensations, it has to exist
and have the potentiality or capacity to be acted upon in this manner. But the
actions upon the being do not determine the essence of the being; rather, the
essence of the being determines the actions or reactions that can flow from that
being.

Third, this view fails to define what it might mean to "hurt" or "harm" an indi-
vidual. Professor Foreman says, "Hurt implies an awareness of pain; harm is the
obstruction or prevention of the legitimate interests of one party by the invasive
actions of another party. You can harm someone without ever hurting them.... If
the fetus already is a person, you are harming it by aborting it, whether it feels it or
not."

Argument front Lack of Viability

Many abortionists argue that a fetus becomes a person when it is viable or
able to live outside the womb. The argument rests upon the notion that it is not
a person until it is completely able to survive on its own. This was actually the
argument used in Roe v. Wade.

First, pro-abortionists fail to understand the difference between substance
and accidents. There is no substantial difference between the unborn before it is
in the womb and after it leaves the womb.

Second, the viability of the unborn can change with the rise of medical progress.
With the rise and improvement of medical procedures and capability, it is evident that
unborn children are able to survive at much earlier terms. But again, this only credits
the progress and improvements of medical technology, not the substantial nature of
the unborn fetus.

Third, the same argument can be applied to many individuals outside the womb.
For instance, is an individual still a human or a person if they are unable to live in

16. Ibid., 92.
17. Ibid., 93.

158 Ethical Issues

a certain environmental climate? If they cannot live in an extremely cold environ-
ment or in a place with no oxygen, are they still human beings? According to this
view, these individuals would not be human beings or persons. This is because
they cannot survive on their own in their own environment's

Argumentfrom Gradualism

One writer summarizes the gradualism argument this way: "Gradualism is the
view that says there is no one specific moment when personhood begins. Instead it
is a gradual change that occurs over the entire pregnancy. In the beginning, at
conception, there is no person and by the end, at birth, there is a person. There is no
decisive moment between conception and birth, personhood slowly develops as
the fetus develops?"

This argument seems to rest upon hypotheticals and logical absurdities that, if
properly addressed, remove the strength of the argument. First, this view does
not offer any evidence or criteria on why one could declare that an unborn child
is not a person and a born child is a person. Rather, the view is contingent upon
an arbitrary and personal declaration of personhood.

Second, again this view does not understand the difference between substantial
and accidental change. The only difference ontologically and scientificallybetween
an unborn fetus at conception and a baby at birth is its accidental or extrinsic
physical features, not its substantial nature.

Third, if this view were true, it would lead to a logical contradiction. This is
because a fetus would be both a person and not a person at the same time and in
the same sense.

Finally, if this view were true, why would the development of personhood stop
at birth? It seems as though if personhood can develop, an individual would be
more of a person at fifty than at twenty-five. This is because there is no way for
anyone to draw the line and declare when a person stops developing and actual
personhood begins. Thus the same arguments used in favor of gradualism inside
the womb of a mother can be used for an individual outside the womb of a
mother."

Summary and Condusion

The abortion debate focuses the whole issue of the sanctity of human life. Both
Scripture and science support the view that an individual human life begins at
conception, and both special and general revelation declare that it is wrong to kill
an innocent human life. Furthermore, the same arguments used to justify abortion

IS. Ibid., 94.
19. Ibid. 95.
20. Ibid., 96-97.

Abortion 159

may also be used to justify infanticide and euthanasia. These reasons all violate the
sanctity of human life.

Abottion is not just a threat to the unborn. As the English poet John Donne
declared, 'Any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind; and
therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee." In America it
tolls more than three thousand times per day, once every thirty seconds!

Select Readings

Beckwith, Francis. Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case against Abortion Choice. New York :

Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Politically Correct Death, Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1992.

Beisner, E. Calvin. Proghects for Growth: A Biblical View of Population, Resources, and the Future.
Westchester, IL: Crossway Books, 1990.

Brennan, William. The Abortion Holocaust: Today's Final Solution. St. Louis: Landmark,
1983.

Burtchaell, James Tunstead. Rachel Weeping: The Case against Abortion. San Francisco:
Harper & Row, 1984.

Foreman, Mark. Christianity and Bioethics: Confronting Clinical Issues. Joplin, MO:
College Press, 1999.

Gardner, R. F. R. Abontion: The Personal Dilemma. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972.

Krason, Stephen MZ Abonton : Politics, Morality, and the Constitution. New York: University Press of
America, 1984.

Moreland, J. P., and Norman L. Geisler. The Life and Death Debate. New York:
Praeger, 1990.

Nathanson, Bernard N. AbortingAnterica. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1979.

The Abortion Papers: Inside the Abortion Mentality. New York: FP. Fell, 1983. Ree ».

Wade, 410 US. 113, 93 S. Ct.705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973).

Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989).

Wennberg, Robert N. Lit in the Balances Exploringthe Abortion Controversy. Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1985.

Willke,.1. C., and Barbara Willke. Abortion: Questions and Answers. Cincinnati: Hayes,
1985.

10

INFANTICIDE AND EUTHANASIA

In the previous chapter, we dealt with the reasons for and against abortion. Nearly all
the arguments pertaining to abortion are equally good arguments with reference to
infanticide and euthanasia. Both deal with the same patient and have the same result
(death), for most of the same reasons. For example, if it is justified to kill an unborn
human because the fetus is not wanted, might be deformed, or might not be able to
function fully as a human being, then by the same logic some infants and most of the
elderly maybe eliminated for the same reason. Thus, if abortion is morally right, then
so is infanticide and euthanasia for the same reasons. In short, ‘today, no unwanted
baby; tomorrow, no unwanted infant or grandparent?

Indeed, what follows logically is already beginning to actually happen. First it
begins with the young and helpless, then it occurs with the elderly and helpless.
The principal arguments on which both infanticide and euthanasia rest are already
in play—legally—in abortion.

Passive Infanticide

Infanticide refers to the killing of an infant human being after birth. Active infanticide
involves a procedure that actually takes the life ofthe infant. Passive infanticide
simply allows an infant to die bywithholding needed treatments. In the final analysis
there is no real difference for the infant since it dies a preventable death.

In 1982, the Supreme Court in Indiana ruled that parents could permit their
Down syndrome baby to starve to death. It is not an uncommon practice in hos-

160

Infanticide and Euthanasia 161

pitals to allow deformed or handicapped infants to die without food, water, or

treatment. Others get a DNR (do not resuscitate) order. A professor of pediatrics at

the University of Wisconsin stated boldly, "It is common in the United States to

withhold routine surgery and medical care from infants with Down Syndrome for
hn : 217

the explicit purpose of hastening death..""" It is even more so today.

Active Euthanasia

Some infants are not merely allowed to die; procedures are actually employed to
take their life. The most notorious of these is the so-called partial-birth abortion.
Under this method, the baby is allowed to come out of the womb feet first until a
hole can be drilled in its head and its brain sucked out. After many failed attempts
to outlaw this form of active euthanasia, the Supreme Court ruled five to four
against it (in the Gonzales 2007 case). Hidden from view are instances where the
unwanted infant is drowned to death or suffocated. Again, both by logic and actual
results, there is no real difference between taking the life of a born or an unborn
human being. The main difference seems to be social acceptability, and that is
fragile and quickly changing.

There are also numerous cases of botched abortions that result in a live baby.
These have been disposed of byboth active and passive forms of infanticide. But it
matters not how the baby arrived here alive. Once a human is here, then any act to
take their life or approve of procedures that will lead to their death is infanticide.
And intentionally taking the life of an innocent young human is just as morally
culpable as taking the life of an older human.

The Arguments for Active Infanticide

Imperiled Newborn Children and Who Should Make the Choke

It is argued by many in favor of infanticide that the parents should have the first
and initial right to make the choice about imperiled children." Thus, if the parents
do not want the imperiled child, then the child should not be born.

Imperiled Children Are Nonpersons

Many in favor of euthanizing imperiled children believe that they are human
beings, but they are not persons in the full sense of the term. This is because they

21. N. Post, "Passive Euthanasia of Patients with Down's Syndrome," Archives of Internal Medicine
142 (December 13, 1982): 2295-96.

22:Imperiled children’ are those born with an impairment that will cause death if not immediately
treated. Not to repair it is a form of infanticide. By contrast, an Impaired child’ is one born with an im-
pairment that does not necessarily entail immediate death if left untreated.

162 Ethical Issues

do not exhibit self-consciousness or other human functions. Moreover, they
also believe that these children will never have the ability to exhibit
characteristic human activities.

The Quality of the Life of a Child

Some argue that it is morally permissible to euthanize (either through active
or passive euthanasia) an imperiled child if it does not exhibit a certain quality
of life. They insist that it is more merciful to kill a child in this condition than it
is to allow them to suffer.

The Quality of Life of the Caregivers

A second form of the quality-of-life argument claims that it is morally permis-
sible to euthanize an imperiled child if that child is going to infringe on the quality
of life for the parents, community, government, the medical field, and so forth.
This is because it would be more merciful to kill a child in this condition than to
allow for the burdens to be placed on someone else.

Response to the Arguments for Active Infanticide
Parental Rights Do Not Mean Absolute Rights

First, the parental right to make the decision can be overridden if the decision is
in conflict with a higher fundamental right (see chap. 7, "Graded Absolutism"). For
instance, if the parents’ choice severely endangers the health or life of a child, then
their right can be overridden.

Second, it can be argued that the physicians and the legal system have a
duty to override the parental decision in such cases. This is because physicians
have the responsibility not to harm their patients, but to protect their best
interests.

Third, these are still human beings, and they have the moral rights of a human
being. We need to examine the direct cause of the imperiled newborn's death. If the
direct cause is the doctor, then it is infanticide. If the direct cause is the disease or
physical defect, then it is a natural death. But just because an individual does not
exhibit all of the characteristics of a fully functioning human being does not mean
that they are not human, but only that their human characteristics are in a latent or
defective form.

Fourth, because the imperiled child is a human person, it would be infanticide to
also withhold treatment of the child if it is known that medical intervention would
fix the problem. For instance, some children are born with a closed esophagus, and
through a simple medical procedure, this problem can be fixed. If the parents or the
physicians in charge neglect to perform this treatment, they would be committing a
form of infanticide.

Infanticide and Euthanasia 163

Imperiled Children Are Still Persons

First, there is a distinction between being a human being and functioning as a
human being. The view that imperiled children are nonpersons errs since it be-
lieves that actions determine essence instead of essence determining actions. One
is a human being that exhibits human actions, not a bundle of actions that, when
collected, become a human being.

Second, this view does not understand the difference between being human
and being able to function as a human. In order for there to be any actions, there
first must be a being that can exhibit those actions.

Third, the logic of this argument is not only valid for imperiled children but also
for any individual at any stage of life who does not or cannot exhibit all of the
characteristics that one deems to be human. If this were the case, then parents or
any person with rights over an individual should be allowed to kill or allow them to
die because they do not exhibit the characteristics of a human being. If this were
the case, then many elderly, sick, bedridden, and other individuals who are not
exhibiting human characteristics would be candidates to be euthanized.

Killing a Sufferer Is Not an Act of Merry

Some individuals argue that it is morally permissible to euthanize (either
through active or passive euthanasia) an imperiled child if it will not exhibit a
certain quality of life. But when considered, this view fails for many reasons.

First, the ‘quality of life" is defined only vaguely. It is a subjective definition,
and it will have subjective results. For a universal criterion, an objective definition
of "quality of life" is needed.

Second, many times people who are suffering are not in a sufficiently
healthy emotional state to make a proper decision about their condition.

Third, many people determine the quality oflife from personal subjective
experiences. For instance, what a poor person in a third-world country would
consider quality housing will differ from the standards of someone raised in a rich
family. In the same way, many individuals who are advocating the quality-of-life
argument have a subjective rather than an objective standard on what determines a
quality of life.

Fourth, it is wrong to assume that non-life is better than a life with suffering. It is
acategory mistake to affirm that non-life is better than an imperfect life or that life
and non-life have something in common to enable us to compare them.

Fifth, much moral good can result from suffering. In fact, few enduring lessons
in life are learned through pleasure, and most enduring lessons are learned through
pain (Heb. 12:11). This is not to say that we should promote pain so that pleasure
may come (by beating our head on the wall so that we may feel better when we
stop!). But we can permit unavoidable or necessary suffering so that good may
come—we do every time we go to the dentist! Suffering can produce good quali-
ties such as patience (Rom. 5:3-4).

164 Ethical Issues

Sixth, the quality of life does not take precedence over the sanctity of Jife.
Life is a gift from God. He gave it, and only he has the right to take it (Deut.
32:39; Job 1:21). So allowing unavoidable suffering is better than killing the
sufferer. We certainly should utilize available pain relief. Unnecessary pain is
just that: unnecessary.

Finally, if advocates of the quality of life are wrong in their definition and
practice, the result has fatal consequences. For if they are wrong, they are
committing acts of infanticide, which is the killing of an innocent child.

It Is Not Merciful toto Kill Another to Relieve My Burdens

The second form of the quality-of-life argument holds that it is morally permis-
sible to euthanize an imperiled child if its suffering infringes on the quality of life
for the parents, community, government, medical field, and so forth.

First, this view falls under the critiques for the quality-of-life view
mentioned above.

Second, this view wrongly regards children as a means to an end, not as an end
in themselves. But this violates a fundamental moral principle that persons should
be treated as ends and not as means (see chap. 4, on Generalism).

Third, this view fails to recognize that we have a duty to protect those who can-
not protect themselves. Certainly, suffering children fall into this category.

Fourth, if it is acceptable to kill a child just because they are a burden and will
infringe on someone's quality of life, then one could argue that nearly any child at
anytime would be a candidate for infanticide, especially when they are teenagers!
At one time or another, most persons are a burden to the quality of life of someone
else. So by this logic we could kill almost anyone at some time in their life.

Arguments against Infanticide

The arguments against infanticide are the same as those against homicide. The infant
is an innocent human being. And it is morally wrong to intentionally kill an innocent
human being. Two reasons suffice. First, human beings are made in the image of
God. So killing them is killing God in effigy. For "whoever sheds the blood of man,
by man shall his blood be shed, for God made man in his own image" (Gen. 9:6
RSV; man = humankind; cf. 1:27). The sixth commandment pointedly says, "You
shall not commit murder" (Exod. 20:13 NEB).

The second reason for not killing an innocent human being is that God is sov-
ereign over life. Only God gave life (Gen. 1:21), and only God has the right to take
life (Deut. 32:39; Job 1:21). Just because an infant is not fully developed does not
mean it is not fully human. As noted above, arguments to the contrary are
fallacious because they are based on accidental differences, not substantial ones.
An infant human is a human by essence, not by accidental characteristics. Here,
intentional infanticide is a morally culpable form of homicide.

Infanticide and Euthanasia 165

Active Euthanasia: Taking Lives to Avoid Suffering

Euthanasia means "good (or happy) death." There are two kinds of euthanasia:
active and passive. The former is taking a life to avoid suffering, and the latter
is simply allowing death to occur in order to avoid suffering.

Euthanasia can be either voluntary or not voluntary. In the voluntary kind,
the patient consents to this death; in the latter, the patient does not consent. The
death can be self-caused or caused by another. In the former case, it is a form of
suicide; in the latter case, it is a homicide.

Those subjected to humanly initiated death can be young or old. The former
is infanticide, and the latter is called euthanasia. In this section the discussion is
concerned with active euthanasia, or the intentional taking of another life,
whether by oneself or another, whether one is young or old. None of these are
natural deaths; all are unnatural. They are not the result of natural processes,
but are humanly initiated deaths.

The very word "euthanasia" gives a positive connotation to the act. It is an at-
tempt to have a happy or painless death. The most basic reason for this is to avoid
suffering, usually of a physical nature. The proponents of active euthanasia offer
the following reasons in favor of it.

Arguments for Active Euthanasia

There is amoral right to die with dignity. It is argued that everyone has a right to
die with dignity and that this is part of what it means to have a human kind of life.
Death is a part of that life, albeit the last part. But a slow, painful, and merciless
death is not a dignified death. Rather, it is a dehumanizing death, like that of an
animal (or even a vegetable, in some cases). Thus, proponents of active euthanasia
insist that it is a necessary means to guarantee a dignified death. Without it, we
humans have no choice in our own destiny or demise. We have no control over
catastrophe. We are mere pawns on the chessboard of pain.

The constitutional right of privacy includes death with dignity. The argument for
euthanasia is an extension of the one used by the Supreme Court to justify abortion
(Roe v. Wade, 1973). The Court contends that there is a constitutional right to
privacy implied in the Fourteenth Amendment. This guarantees a woman's right to
have her unborn baby put to death by abortion. But if the right to privacy includes
taking the life of the unborn, then why not also the life of the newly born
byinfanticide or the almost dead by euthanasia? If we have the constitutional right
to decide who lives, then why not also the right to decide who dies?

It is an act of mercy to the sufferer. We shoot horses trapped in burning barns to
prevent their suffering. Why not be at least as humane with humans? Not allowing
euthanasia merely prolongs suffering. Why must we perpetuate human misery? The
most compassionate thing to do is to put sufferers out of their misery. It is not kind
or considerate to insist that one must go through endless pain for nothing. Mercy
dictates that we alleviate the pain in the most effective and permanent way

166 Ethical Issues

possible, that we give a suffering person a good death. Indeed, the once governor
Richard Lamm of Colorado asserted that as elderly people, "We've got a duty to
die and get out of the way'w

It is an act of mercy to the suffering family. The patient is not the only one suffering;
the family suffers also. Hastening an inevitable death will not only relieve untold
suffering for the patient but will also take an incalculable burden from the family.
Their social sacrifice and psychological suffering can be every bit as great as the
physical suffering of the one dying. Thus, it is also an act of mercy to the family to
“pull the plugf In 1983 the Supreme Court of Indiana agreed with this reasoning
and upheld the parents’ right to allow 'Baby Doe" to starve to death. Defenders of
the decision considered it the compassionate thing to do. The same logic applies to
the elderly.

It relieves the family of heavy financial strain. Besides the social and psychological
burden, the family also may be carrying a heavy financial load. Severe illness can
wipe out a lifetime of savings in a short period. Often these are funds badly needed
by the survivors for their own sustenance. At other times sickness can drain funds
needed for the future education or health care of other members of the family.
Hence, euthanasia not only is an act of mercy to the dying but also shows mercy to
the living who are responsible for them.

It relieves society of a great social burden. As medical costs soar and the number of
elderly increases in society, the burden of caring for the suffering increases. If the
elderly have a duty to die and get out of the way, then there are now groups to help
them. A voluntary euthanasia group in England is called Exit. In the United States
one is called the Society for the Right to Die, and another is called the Hemlock
Society. The founder of the latter group, Derek Humphry, helped his wife to
commit suicide in England in 1975. The society's book Let Me Die before I Wake
includes case studies of suicides as well as the amount of drugs necessary to end
one's life. Humphry boasts, "We have made it respectable to debate and discuss
euthanasia. We've also helped a lot of people die well."""

It is the humane thing to do. Before a presidential commission appointed to study
biomedical ethical issues (1982), philosopher Mary Anne Warren compared a
severely disabled newborn child to a horse with a broken leg, which should be
killed to spare it from the agony of a slow and painful death? Professor Peter Singer
insists that "the life of a fetus is of no greater value than the life of a nonhuman
animal at a similar level of rationality... Now it must be admitted that these
arguments apply to the newborn baby as much as to the fetus? Thus he concludes
that "the life of a newborn baby is of less value than the life of a pig, a dog, or a

23. toy. Lamm Asserts Elderly, If Very Ill, Have 'Duty to Die,’ New York Times, March
29, 1984, final edition, sec. A.
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/03/29/us/gowlamm.asserts.eldedrilverrill.
have.duty.to.die.htm.

24, Derek Humphry, Reader, June 29, 1983.

25. William Brennan, The Abortion Holocaust; Today's Final Solution (St. Louis: Landmark,

1983), 83.

Infanticide and Euthanasia 167

chimpanzee?" A 1982 Newsweek article proclaimed in large print, "Biologists say
infanticide is as normal as the sex drive—and that most animals, including man,
practice it.”’ This logic applies also to the mentally impaired elderly.

Argument from autonomy. It is argued that people have an autonomous right to
make their own decisions in all areas and aspects of life. This right also includes
the right to determine the timing and type of their death. Many in support of eu-
thanasia use this to argue that their decision to take their life is not wrong because it
is their choice and they are not hurting anyone else.

Argumentfrom the distinction between biographical and biological life. It is
argued that there is a distinction between a person's biographical and biological
life. A biographical life is one where the individual has certain aspirations, can
make personal decisions, have human relationships, and so forth.” On the basis of
this distinction, it is reasoned that individuals may have biological life, but they do
not have biographical life. And if they can no longer live the active kind of life that
they desire, then they should be euthanized.

An Evaluation of Active Euthanasia

The response to these arguments from a Christian perspective has been
strong, for they are based on utilitarian presuppositions that deny deeply held
Christian convictions about the sovereignty of God and the sanctity of human
life made in his image.

There is no moral right to kill an innocent human being. The euthanasia
proponents assume that there is a moral right to intentionally kill an innocent human.
But the Bible says, "You shall not kill" (Exod. 20:13 RSV). They believe that
humankind is sovereign over human life, but Scripture declares that God is
sovereign. 'T put to death and I bring to life, ... and no one can deliver out of my hand"
(Deut. 32:39). As Job declared, "The LORD gave and the LORD has taken away" ( Job
1:21). God created human life (Gen. 1:27), and he alone has the right to take it (Heb.
9:27). So the basic fallacy of active euthanasia is in presuming upon God's sovereign
right over human life. The proponents presume to play God rather than simply to be
human.

The Constitution gives no right to kill. First, there is no explicitly stated right to
privacy in the U.S. Constitution; it is at best only implied. Second, even if there is an
implied right of privacy, it does not take precedence over the emphatically stated
right to life in the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments. The Declaration of
Independence calls the right to life an "unalienable" right for all people, with which
they are "endowed bytheir Creator? So the right to life is absolute, but the right to
privacyis limited. For example, the Constitution grants no right to abuse children

26. Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979),
122-23.

27. Sharon Begley, "Nature's Baby Killers," Newsweek, September 6, 1982,78.

28. Mark W Foreman, Christianity and Bioethics: Confronting Clinical Issues

(Joplin, MO: College Press, 1999), 129.

168 Ethical Issues

or commit rape, even when it is done privately. And certainly there is no right
to kill privately. But active euthanasia is killing. It is taking innocent human
lives, and this is both unconstitutional and unchristian.

It is not merciful to kill a sufferer. First, the argument for euthanasia, like the argu-
ment for abortion, is misdirected. Killing an unborn human does not avoid child
abuse; it is abuse of the worse kind! Likewise, killing deformed infants and suffering
adults does not avoid human misery; it inflicts the misery of death. Second, even if
euthanasia avoids more suffering, this does not justify it. The end does not justify any
means; the end only justifies good means. And killing innocent people is not a good
act; it is evil (Exod. 20:13). Third, if any good end (avoiding suffering) justifies the
means (killing), then killing abortion and euthanasia proponents could save millions
of lives. Yet no euthanasia proponent would allow this.

Much can be learned through suffering. Much of the pro-euthanasia rhetoric
emphasizes the avoidance of suffering, calling it a great evil to be avoided at all
costs, even the cost of one's life. This is not a Christian view of suffering. James
wrote, "Consider it pure joy, mybrothers, whenever you face trials of manykinds,
because you know that the testing of your faith develops perseverance.
Perseverance must finish its work so that you may be mature and complete, not
lacking anything" ( James 1:2-4). The apostle Paul told the Christians at Rome,
"We know that suffering produces perseverance; perseverance, character; and
character, hope" (Rom. 5:3-4).

Far from being an evil to avoid at all costs, suffering can be a time of refining
and character building ( Job 23:10). James said of Job's suffering that "the Lord is
full of compassion and mercy" (5:11). Surely "no discipline seems pleasant at the
time, but painful. Later on, however, it produces a harvest of righteousness and
peace for those who have been trained by it" (Heb. 12:11).

There is no price tag on human life. The pro-euthanasia argument concerning
the relief of financial strain is based on the fallacious premise that a price tag can be
placed on human life. It wrongly assumes that we should protect and preserve life
only if we can afford it. But this is materialist, not moral. It is a confusion of
categories. No material value can be placed on a spiritual value such as life made in
God's image. Jesus said, "What good is it for a man to gain the whole world, yet
forfeit his soul?" (Mark 8:36). One human life is more valuable than anything in
this world (Matt. 6:26). Hence, to argue that we should take life in order to save
money is a distorted and materialist view of human life.

The end does not justify the means. The same basic utilitarian errors (see chap. 4
also) lie behind the argument that euthanasia will relieve society of a great burden.
First, this overlooks the intrinsic value of an individual human life. Second, it
wrongly assumes that the end justifies the means (killing). Third, it calculates
results in only material and not spiritual terms. Fourth, euthanasia can be a tyran-
nical tool (consider Hitler) with which to rob millions of their human rights.

Humans are not animals. Another fatal assumption behind the pro-euthanasia
arguments is that humans are basically animals. Thus, just as we weed out and breed

Infanticide and Euthanasia 169

out undesired traits in animals, even so we should eliminate undesired strains in the
human race. Yet actually, the reason a Christian could shoot a horse hopelessly
trapped in a burningbarn but not kill a suffering human being is preciselybecause a
human is not a horse! Once we reduce human beings to mere animals, then a host
of horrendous evils follow logically, including human experimentation, killing
AIDS victims, and even genocide. But even the most ardent proponents of
euthanasia oppose these practices.

Indeed, Hitler applied a similar logic to human beings. The result was one of
the largest mass murders in human history. He left an estimated eleven million
dead Jews and other "unfit" members in the wake of his evolutionary ethic,
which demanded weeding out inferior breeds of humankind."

Response to the argument from autonomy. On the surface this argument
seems to be in favor of a person's autonomous rights, but in actuality it is an
argument against their autonomous rights." There are several reasons for this.

First, just because those considering suicide or using euthanasia are not hurting
anyone else does not relieve them from the moral obligation not to hurt any person,
including themselves. The moral law demands that we not hurt any person. But
candidates for suicide or euthanasia are persons. Hence, all are morally obligated
not to hurt themselves or others.

Second, their view of autonomy is distorted and overextended. People do have a
certain right to their own bodies, but this does not mean they have the right to do
anything with it that they want to do. Just because they have the "unalienable right
to life" (as in The Declaration of Independence) does not mean they have the right
to death, the right to kill their body.

Third, this argument overlooks God's sovereignty over life. The Bible declares
that "the LORD gives and the LORD takes away; blessed be the name of the Lou)" (
Job 1:21 NEB; cf. Deut. 32:39). Even general revelation informs us that we are not
the creator of our life. Hence, it does not belong to us (Acts 14:17; 17:24-25). We
did not create life, and therefore we have no right to take an innocent life, even our
own.

Fourth, in order for a person to have a "right to die it would have to be a natural
right because no legal rights to die have been established. But it would be
self-defeating to say that a person has a natural right to die because of nature's
inclination toward preservation. As one writer said, "For one to argue that one has
a right to die is to argue that one has the right to annihilate the very basis of all
rights including the right to die. Therefore, to propose such an annihilation would
ultimately be self-defeating."

Fifth, to say that one has rights is to presuppose that someone is obligated to
uphold those rights. This means that if a person has a right to die, then physicians

29. See Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. James Murphy (1924; reprint, London: Hurst &
Blackest,
1939), 3°,
30. Foreman, Christianity anti Bioethics,
124-25. 31.1bid., 124.

170 Ethical Issues

(and/or the state) are obligated to kill their patients when their patients insist on it.
But this is clearly against the main premise of the argument, that a person has
autonomous rights. The right to eliminate all rights (by suicide) is not a right but
a wrong: it is an act of freedom by which someone eliminates any further acts of
freedom.

Finally, as one writer said, "If the argument from autonomyis valid and can really
stand on its own, then one would have to argue that any autonomous individual at
any time has the right to die and, as we argued, has the right to ask others for help....
Even most suicide advocates would disagree [with this extreme view of autonomy],
... yet if one agrees with the view of autonomy that is offered here, one must take
this position to remain consistent.”

Response to the argument from the distinction between biographical and
biological life First, the basic problem with this argument is its failure to recognize
that actions do not determine humanness, but essence does. Some elderly and ill
have lost certain functions associated with human personhood, but it does not
mean they are less than human. They still have a human nature, even though they
lack the ability to express it in certain human actions. The lack of these functions
does not make them nonhuman. Rather, it is the presence of a human nature that
makes them human.

Second, the definition of a biographical life is too broad and subjective. It lacks
a real objective standard by which biographical life can be determined. For one
person's goals and aspirations are different from another's. But if this is going to be
a universal argument, then it needs a universal criterion by which to judge and
determine the standards by which euthanasia can be determined.

Finally, if certain elderly or ill individuals have lost their status as real
human beings, then they have lost their moral rights as well. The implications
of this distinction mean that persons in this condition would be proper
candidates for experimental and medical treatments and so forth." But it is clear
from the person's reaction and that of most family members that they do not
like to have experimental medical treatments performed on them or on their
family members.

Different Kinds of Passive Euthanasia

Now that we have examined and evaluated active euthanasia from a Christian
perspective, it is time to look at what is often called passive euthanasia. Two
distinct views go by this name and must be differentiated.

Active euthanasia means to produce death. Passive euthanasia, on the other
hand, means to allow death. The former is morally wrong, but the latter may be

32. Ibid., 125.
33. Ibid., 130-31.

Infanticide and Euthanasia 171

morally right, depending on whether it results from withholding natural means of
sustaining life or from withdrawing unnatural means of resisting irreversible
sickness. Passive euthanasia that withdraws natural means of life support in order
to "allow" the death is called unnatural passive euthanasia. Passive euthanasia that
withdraws unnatural life support is called natural passive euthanasia.

Unnatural Passive Euthanasia

Unnatural passive euthanasia is allowing someone to die by deliberately with-
holding natural means of sustaining life. Natural means are normal methods of life
sustenance such as food, water, and air. Unnatural means include mechanical
devices such as respirators and artificial organs. In view of this distinction, an
important point must be made: not all so-called passive euthanasia is morally
justified from a Christian point of view. For example, withholding food is passive
euthanasia, for by "allowing" the person to die, one is really responsible for taking
their life. This is morally wrong.

Natural Passive Euthanasia

Since the withholding o f food, air, and water leads directly to the person's death, it
is negligent homicide. On the other hand, withholding unnatural means leads only
indirectlyto the individual's death. So withholding natural means is tantamount to
active euthanasia, since the act leads directly to the death of the individual. Hence,
when we speak about morally justified cases of passive euthanasia, we are referring
only to those that fall into the category of natural passive euthanasia. Onlyin cases
of irreversible disease should a person be allowed to die naturally by withholding
unnatural life-sustaining equipment.

A Question of Woridview

The debate over euthanasia is basically a clash of worldviews. From a secular
humanist perspective, euthanasia makes sense; within a Judeo-Christian context, it
is morally unacceptable. In order to understand the differences, it will be helpful to
contrast them in table 10.1.

TABLE 10.1
The Non-Judeo-Christian
and Judeo-Christian Worldviews

Non-Judeo-Christian View Judeo-Christian View

No Creator A Creator
Humans not created Humans are created
No God-given values God-given values

Humankind determines right Humankind discovers right

172 Ethical Issues

Arguments against Unnatural Passive Euthanasia

It ls Contrary to God's Sovereignty over Life

Both active euthanasia and unnatural passive euthanasia (such as starving
someone to death) are a direct human cause of death. This is morally unacceptable
from a Christian perspective because it rejects God's sovereignty over human life.
According to the Bible, God is the Creator and owner of all things (Gen. 1:1; Ps.
24:1). He made humans in his own image (Gen. 1:27) and holds them responsible
to him for human life.

When Cain killed Abel, the blood of Abel cried directly to God for vengeance
(Gen. 4:10). God told Moses, "I put to death and I bring to life, ... and no one can
deliver out of my hand" (neut. 32:39). When Pharaoh challenged God's sov-
ereignty, saying, "Who is the LORD, that I should obey him?" he soon found the
answer when God took the life of all Egypt's firstborn sons, including Pharaoh's
(Exod. 5:2; 11:4-7; 12:29). When God (through Moses) produced life out of the
dust, the magicians of Pharaoh cried out, "This is the finger of God" (Exod. 8:19).
God alone is sovereign over life. And since human life is in his image, he has
placed a social sanction upon it. God alone created human life, and God alone has
the right to take an innocent life. Euthanasia is an attempt to preempt God of his
sovereign right over human life.

It ls Contrary to the Sanctity of Human Life

Not only is God sovereign over human life, but human life is also sacred. Hu-
mans are made in the image and likeness of God (Gen. 1:27). Because of this, it is
wrong to kill an innocent human being. When bloodshed and violence filled the
earth, God destroyed it with a flood (Gen. 6:11, 17) and then instituted human
government with the authority of capital punishment. The reason for this was
stated explicitly by God: "Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood
be shed; for in the image of God has God made man" (Gen. 9:6; man =
humankind). Human life is sacred and godlike. For this reason it is even wrong to
curse another human being ( James 3:9).

Unlike animals, human beings are rational (Col. 3:10; Jude 10), moral beings.
They resemble God and are morally responsible to him (Gen. 2:16-17). They can
be holy as he is holy (Lev. 11:44) and are exhorted to moral perfection, just as their
"heavenly Father is perfect" (Matt. 5:48). Because of the sacredness of human life,
God has forbidden any person to kill another, for such a killer thereby indirectly
attacks God.

It ls a Form of Suicide or Murder

Scripture is emphatic in proclaiming that murder is wrong. It is one of the Ten
Commandments: "You shall not murder" (Exod. 20:13). The penalty for violating
this command is death (Exod. 21:12-13). Since suicide is also a form of homi-

Infanticide and Euthanasia 173

cide, it too comes under the prohibition against murder. Killing oneself is both a
rejection of God's sovereignty over life and an attack upon the sanctity of life. It
matters not whether the human life is our own or another's; it is still in God's
image, and he is sovereign over it. Euthanasia is either voluntary or not voluntary.
But whether it is self-inflicted or inflicted by another, it is still a form of homicide.
In either case, the Bible prohibits it.

It Is Specifically Condemned in Scripture

Even the most desperate believer in the Bible who wished to die never contem-
plated taking his own life but prayed, like Jonah, "0 Loan, please take my life from
me, for death is better to me than life" ( Jon. 4:3 NASB; cf. Job 3). And the few
cases of suicide recorded in the Bible are condemned by God. King Saul's suicide
is a case in point (1 Sam. 31; 2 Sam. 1). So horrible was the crime that Saul's armor
bearer refused to obey his mortally wounded master's command to kill Saul. As a
result, "Saul took his own sword and fell on it" (1 Sam. 31:4). The same is true of
Abimelech's assisted suicide ( Judg. 9:54), of which the Bible says, "Thus God
repaid the wickedness that Abimelech had done" (v. 56).

Suicide is a particularly abhorrent crime because it not only violates God's
sovereignty and life's sanctity but reflects a refusal to take responsibility for the
life that God has entrusted to us. It fails to show the basic self-respect of which
Paul spoke when he declared, "No one ever hated his own body, but he feeds
and cares for it" (Eph. 5:29).

It Is Based on a Humanistic Ethic

Humanist Manifesto II specifically recommends abortion, suicide, and euthana-
sia. This flows naturally from humanists’ rejection of G od-given values and accep-
tance of a situational ethic. They claim that "the nature of the universe depicted by
modern science makes unacceptable any supernatural or cosmic guarantee of human
values." This follows from their belief that "the universe is self-existing and not
createdf™ If there is no Creator, then he cannot be the source or guarantor of any
values. Thus it would follow, as they claim, that "moral values derive their source
from human experience. Ethics is autonomous and situational, needing no
theological or ideological sanction."*»

Once God and God-given values are denied, then Fyodor Dostoyevsky (d. 1881)
was right in The Brothers Karamazov when he claimed that if God is dead, then
"everything is lawful." Indeed, the Humanist Manifesto II goes on to demand "an
individual's right to die with dignity, euthanasia, and the nght to suicide:'"® This
actually confirms what is logicallyinherent in their position, that euthanasia follows

34. Paul Kurtz, ed., Humanist Manifestos land II (Soffit: Prometheus, 1973), 8.
35. Ibid., 17.
36. 1bid., 19.

174 Ethical Issues

from a denial of divine sanctions on human life. Conversely, if God has created
humanity in his image, then the reality of God is the basis for the sanctity of life
and the dignity of humans. Since a secular humanistic ethic rejects this, it destroys
the barriers that protect human life.

It Cheapens the Value of Human Life

Euthanasia, like abortion that leads to it (see chap. 9), cheapens the value of human
life. A classic example is that of Dr. Bernard N. Nathanson, who operated one of the
largest abortion clinics in the Western world, responsible for killing some sixty
thousand unborn babies. According to his own testimony, what guided him was "a
humanistic philosophy drawn from modern biological data, not from religious
creeds."*’Using his own "humanistic" ethic, Nathanson was dehumanized by the
process of performing abortions. Euthanasia is even more dehumanizing since, unlike
abortion, the actual death is not usually seen by the doctor or nurses.

A society cannot engage in the wholesale slaughter of innocent life without
paying a sobering price. The value of life is significantly cheapened bysuch
callous disregard for human beings. When we do not respect life before birth, it
affects our attitude toward life after birth. When we do not respect the dying, it
affects our attitude toward the living. Human life is a continuous and communal
web. "For none of us lives to himself [or herself] alone and none of us dies to
himself [or herself] alone" (Rom. 14:7). Hence, what affects one member of the
race affects all.

It Produces Guilt in the Family and Society

The decision to remove artificial life support from a loved one is a heavy load to
bear, even when, as in some cases of indirect passive euthanasia, it maybe morally
justified. But when it is a humanly initiated act deliberately aimed at extinguishing
a life that God in his sovereignty has not chosen to take, then the load of guilt is
heavy. A society that permits the slaughter of innocents, whether young or old, will
bear this heavy load of guilt.

Discussion of Natural Passive Euthanasia

Taking a human life by euthanasia is morally wrong no matter how well intended
the motives are for doing so. It is always wrong to intentionally take another in-
nocent human life as such. However, it is not always wrong to allow someone to
die, especially if it is a natural death. Yet withholding food and water to starve a
person to death is murder, even though it is by definition a form of passive eu-
thanasia. This is because withholding these natural life-sustaining elements leads

37. Bernard N. Nathanson, Aborting America (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1979), 259.

Infanticide and Euthanasia 175

directly to death. However, this leaves open the discussion of when, if ever, it is
morally right to withhold unnatural life-sustaining means and allow someone
to die naturally.

Some Important Differences

As we have already seen, taking a human life byinfanticide or euthanasia is never
right, but allowing someone to die is not always wrong. If we "allow" a person to die
by deliberately withholding food and water, then it is murder, even though it is called
"passive" euthanasia. This is because the action leads directly to death. But
withholding unnatural means of sustaining life is not always wrong. It now remains to
discuss precisely where the line is drawn between cases of passive euthanasia that are
justified and those that are not. Table 10.2. summarizes the situation.

TABLE 10.2
Active and Passive Euthanasia
Active Euthanasia Passive Euthanasia
Taking life Allowing death by withholding

natural means unnatural means

Guidelines for the Decision

It is never right either to take a life or to withhold ordinary life-sustaining means
such as food, water, and air. The only time allowing a death can be justified is when
we are withdrawing unnatural lifesaving mechanisms or for cases of irreversible
disease. There are times when the heroic use of unnatural means is a hindrance, not
a help, to the process of natural death, which is under God's sovereign hand (Eccles.
3:2; Heb. 9:27). This is when extraordinary human efforts are really prolonging
death rather than prolonging life. When artificial life supports are interfering with
the natural process of death rather than enriching the person's natural life, then their
use is wrong. It is resisting the hand of God, which is involved in the very process of
death.

Keeping a comatose person alive by a machine, one who has an incurable
disease and is irreversibly dying, is unnecessary. In fact, it could be viewed as
unethical because it is opposing the very processes of natural mortality, which
God has ordained. God has appointed that all must die (Gen. 2:16-17; Rom.
5:12). He has declared that there are natural limits to life (Ps. 90:10). Hence,
extraordinary efforts to fight the divinely appointed limits of our mortality are
really working in opposition to God.

Usually the most important decision is the one made to put a person on a
life-sustaining machine. Sometimes this is unnecessary, and it creates a later ethical
dilemma concerning when the machine should be disconnected. Life has become so
mechanized that technology has created its own new morality. The scientific
advances that have made the extension of life possible have also made the process

176 Ethical Issues

of dying longer; technology is a mixed blessing. Hence, an important moral
decision should be made at a very early stage concerning whether it is
necessary to put someone on a life-support machine or not.

Who makes these crucial decisions to connect individuals to or disconnect
them from a life-sustaining machine? Some guidelines are in order.

The disease must be irreversible. No one should be allowed to die if we have
the means at hand to save that life. If possible, correctable situations should be
corrected. Unless the process of the disease is irreversible, even natural passive
euthanasia is not justifiable.

The patient has veto power. First and foremost, the patient who is conscious
and rational thus has veto power over any decision not to extend one's life by
artificial means. If the patient is not conscious, then all other things being equal,
one's living will on the matter should be respected. If the patient is not conscious
and has expressed no will on the matter previously, then others responsible for
the patient must make the decision. In short, representative decisions for the
unconscious patient, but not substitute decisions, can be made regarding
procedures.

A collective decision. But who should make the decision when others cannot
make it for themselves? The Bible says there is wisdom in joint decisions (Num.
35:30; Prov. 24:6). Since there are spiritual, legal, moral, and family implications
to the decision, it seems wise to consider all aspects. So the decision should not be
made until there is consent from pastor, doctor, lawyer, and family members. But
even before this—pray. God should be consulted first, before any decision is
contemplated. After all, he is sovereign and supernatural. It may be God's will to
heal, and he is waiting for us to ask ( James 4:2.; 5:14-15). God is able to perform
miracles, and he should be sought first on behalf of the sufferer. But if after fervent
and repeated prayer, medical science is not able to improve a patient's condition
and God does not perform a miracle, then we must rest assured that God's grace is
sufficient (2 Cot 12:9).

An Evaluation of Natural Passive Euthanasia in Irreversible Sickness

Even in this carefully circumscribed sense of limited passive euthanasia, there
are some significant problems. The two most prominent ones deal with the
meaning of Irreversible" and "unnatural means."

What Does Dying Mean?

The definition of irreversible" is important to the decision because it cir-
cumscribes the legitimate occasions when withholding extraordinary means is
called for. In practical terms a condition is "irreversible" when there are no known
available medical means to correct the injury or disease process leading to death. In
other words, there is no medical hope for recovery, and it is only a matter of

Infanticide and Euthanasia 177

time before a person dies. Medically, this means that even the best unnatural
(mechanical) means will not stop death.

What Are Unnatural Means?

Natural means include food, water, and oxygen. Unnatural means include a
respirator, an artificial heart, a kidney machine, or the like. However, certain things
do not clearly fall into one of these two categories, such as intravenous feeding,
oxygen masks, and antibiotics, and thus pose a problem. Although intravenous
feeding is not natural in the sense of being produced by nature, neither is it purely
artificial, since it is food, and food is a natural means of sustaining life. Hence,
withdrawing someone's intravenous feeding can be tantamount to starving them to
death. The same would apply to artificially supplied oxygen. In these cases the
morality of the decision will be conditioned by the availability of the technology.
Obviously, if the special equipment is not available, there is no moral obligation to
use it. The same is true of all technology and drugs. Heroic efforts with unnatural
means are not a moral duty when one is irreversibly ill.

Is It Unmerciful Not to Relieve Pain by Death?

Are not some people suffering so intensely that only death will relieve their
pain? Isn't it unmerciful to refuse to relieve their extreme pain? In response,
several things should be recognized. First, the Bible provides an answer to this
question. Solomon wrote:

Give strong drink to him who is perishing,
and wine to those in bitter distress;
let them drink and forget their poverty,
and remember their misery no more. (Prov. 31:6-7 RSV)

Although strong drink is condemned as a beverage that causes drunkenness (Prov.
20:1; Isa. 5:11), it is recommended as a medicine for those who are dying so that it
can relieve them of their suffering. In brief, the Bible recommends that the dying
should be shot with a sedative but not with a bullet.

What If Pain Relievers Hasten Death?

Sometimes the treatment used to reduce pain (e.g., morphine) also hastens death.
Is this then an unjustified use of passive euthanasia? Not necessarily. In such cases
the principle of double effect maybe invoked. Where two effects, one good and one
evil, follow from the same action, it is our moral responsibilityto will the good one.
The evil effect is simply a necessary concomitant of the good action that is taken;
there is no moral culpability for it. For example, when it is necessary to amputate a
gangrenous leg, there are two effects. First, the life of the individual can be saved.

178 Ethical Issues

Second, the body will be mutilated and handicapped. But this evil consequence of
amputation is offset by the saving of a life. Likewise, sometimes the pain is so great
that the medicine necessaryto counter it will also hasten death. Patients sometimes
die from surgery, but the potential benefits outweigh the risks.

Is There a Right to Refuse Treatment?

Many moral dilemmas are created by the decision to place persons on lifesaving
mechanical devices. Is it morally wrong to refuse this kind of treatment? In
responding to this, an important distinction should be made: the difference between
repairing life to function naturally and sustaining life artificially. Under most
circumstances, it certainly is morally wrong to refuse treatment that would save one's
life. Lifesaving is an essential part of the medical service. Refusing treatment for cuts
and wounds that could cause one's death is tantamount to suicide. These are all
ordinary medical treatments. It is the extraordinary treatment, involving
life-sustaining or life-prolonging mechanisms, that is the question.

While there is clearly a moral obligation to accept treatment to repair life, there
is no absolute obligation to accept treatment that would sustain life artificially. We
should accept treatment that would preserve life, but we need not accept treatment
that really will only prolong death. There would be, for example, no moral duty for
Christians to take a pill (if it were available) to double their life span. Likewise,
there is no absolute moral duty to take kidney dialysis or even chemotherapy. It
may be desirable or even wise to accept such treatment, but it is not morally
necessary as such. One can accept the natural consequences of disease and
mortality that God has appointed (Gen. 3; Rom. S). Indeed, eventually we must all
do so.

Summary and Conclusion

"Euthanasia" means good or painless death. Active euthanasia is taking a human
life, and passive euthanasia is simply allowing death. The former is morally wrong
from a Christian perspective, but the latter may be morally acceptable, as long as it
is a natural and irreversible death, not an unnatural or reversible one.

Natural passive euthanasia is allowing death to occur naturally by withholding
unnatural means of sustaining life, such as heart-and-lung machines. Natural
means of sustaining life include food, water, and air. Deliberatelywithholding
these is unnatural passive euthanasia, and it is morally unacceptable from a
Christian perspective.

Even in morally acceptable natural passive euthanasia, there are difficult deci-
sions. It should be exercised only when someone is irreversibly dying, and then not
against the patient's expressed will. Also, the decision should be by consensus of
pastor, doctor, lawyer, and family. God should be sought first and repeatedly in
prayer for healing. When the course of death is medically irreversible and no

Infanticide and Euthanasia 179

divine intervention is forthcoming, it is morally justified to stop unnatural efforts to
prolong the process of dying.

Select Readings

Foreman, Mark W. Christianity and Bioethics: Confronting Clinical Issues. Joplin,
MO: College Press, 1999.

Gomez, Carlos. Regulating Death: Euthanasia and the Case of the Netherlands.
New York: Free Press, 1991.

Grisez, Germain, and Joseph M. Boyle Jr. Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A
Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1980.

Hauerwas, Stanley. Suffering Presence: Theological Reflections on Medicine, the Mentally
Handicapped, and the Church. Notre Dante, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986.

Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf. Translated by James Murphy. 1924. Reprint, London:
Hurst & Blackett, 1939.

Humphry, Derek. Let Me Die before | Wake. Los Angeles: Hemlock Society, 1985.

Koop, C. Everett. The Right to Live, the Right to Die. Wheaton: Tyndale House, 1976.

Moreland, J. P. "James Rachels and the Active Euthanasia Debate." Journal of the
Evangelical Theological Society 31, no. 1 (March 1988): 81-90.

Moreland, J. P., and Norman L. Geisler. The Life and Death Debate: Moral Issues
of Our Time. New York: Praeger, 1990.

Rachels, James. Active and Passive Euthanasia: New England Journal of Medicine
292 (January 9, 1975): 78-80.

11

BIOMEDICAL ISSUES

Technology has created new ethical issues. Artificial insemination, test-tube
babies, surrogate mothers, organ transplantation, organ harvesting, gene-splicing,
and cloning are all medical realities. There is no longer a question of whether they
can be done; it is only a question of whether they ought to be done. Here again the
viewpoints can be broadly divided between two categories: a secular humanist
approach and a Judeo-Christian perspective. There are intramural debates in each
camp that will emerge as the discussion unfolds.

A Secular Humanist Perspective: Playing God

Nowhere are the lines of demarcation between the secular humanist and Christian
perspectives clearer than inbiomedical issues. This is because ethical decisions are not
made in a vacuum. They are made from within a worldview. And it is in the human role
of deciding what is right and wrong that the two positions are most evidently in conflict.
The differences are summarized in table 11.1. Given these differences, conflicts are
inevitable. Such conflicts manifest themselves in many areas of biomedical concern.
These will become evident as the two positions unfold in our discussion.

TABLE 11.1
The Judeo-Christian and Secular Humanist Worldviews
Judeo-Christian Secular Humanist
There is a Creator. There is no Creator.
“Humankind was specially created. Humankind evolved from animals.
God is sovereign over life. Humankind is sovereign over life.

180

Biomedical Issues 181

Judeo-Christian Secular Humanist
Sanctity of life is a key principle. Quality of life is a key principle.

The end does not justify the means. The end justifies the means.

Secular humanists have stated their beliefs repeatedly and clearly. Their Humanist
Manifestos (1933; 1973) support abortion, euthanasia, and suicide. They speak
glowingly about technology and emphatically denythat there is any God in control.
They affirm: "We need to extend the uses of scientific method.... Confronted by
many possible futures, we must decide which to pursue." They disavow any Creator
or divine aid, boasting, "No deity will save us; we must save ourselves:!z Hence,
they "affirm that moral values derive their source from human experience. Ethics is
autonomous and situational, needing no theological or ideological sanctions."" From
this context several crucial elements of their position emerge in relation to
biomedical issues.

Humans Are Respottsible for the Quality of Life

Paul Kurtz, the author of Humanist Manifesto II, set forth the humanist posi-
tion well in Forbidden Fruit:

We, not God, are responsible for our destiny. Accordingly we must create our own
ethical universes. We should seek to transform a blind and conscious moralityinto a
rationallybased one, retaining the best wisdom of the past but devising new ethical
principles and judging them by their consequences and testing them in the context of
lived experience.'

One consequence to be kept in mind is the "quality of life which according to
Kurtz can justify in vitro fertilization and even active euthanasia.’ Indeed, the
same principle is behind the right to abortion and the right to suicide.

Genetic improvement of the race is also based on the so-called
quality-of-life principle. Nobel prizewinner Dr. James Watson argued that no
newborn infant should be declared human until it has passed certain tests
regarding its genetic endowment: "If a child were not declared alive until three
days after birth, then all parents could be allowed the choice ... [to] allow the
child to die ... and save a lot of misery and suffering,

1. Paul Kurtz, ed., Humanist Manifestos I and II (Buffalo: Prometheus, 1973), 14.
2. Ibid., 16.
3. Ibid., 17.
4. Paul Kurtz, Forbidden Fruit: The Ethics of Humanism (Buffalo: Prometheus, 1988), 18.
5. Ibid., 217, 222.
6. Ibid., 217, 220.
7.J.C. Willke and Barbara Willke, Abortion: Questions and Answers (Cincinnati: Hayes, 1985),
204.

182 Ethical Issues

Individuals Have Sovereignty over Their Own Lives

For secular humanists, God is not sovereign over life—humankind is. Each
individual has the right to live and the right to die. Although most humanists en-
courage life, they insist that they have the right to end it as well. Thus suicide and
voluntary euthanasia are defended as moral rights. Ironically enough, abortion is
also considered a right; this generally is based on the grounds of the mother's
freedom of choice. Although some admit that the unborn are human, others
confess difficulty in knowing when human life begins. Some claim that human life
does not begin until birth, and others say it begins when one becomes a
self-conscious individual, which normally occurs at nearly two years of age.

Euthanasia is another manifestation of the humanist's belief that the individual is
sovereign over their own life. This belief has given rise to voluntary euthanasia
groups like the Society for the Right to Die and the Hemlock Society, whose book
Let Me Die before I Wake provides information for those who wish to commit
suicide. Its founder, Derek Humphry, boasts that he has helped make euthanasia
respectable and also helped a lot of people die well."’

The Duty to Create a Superior Race

All secular humanists believe in biological evolution. Manybelieve that because
humans have advanced to such a technological level, they have a duty to guide the
future evolution of the race. For some, the hope goes beyond a bionic human to
genetically engineered humans. Gene-splicing holds the promise of creating and
patenting new animals. Sperm banks, artificial insemination, and surrogate mothers
now make it possible to breed superior human beings. The ultimate goal is a human
being totally engineered to specifications, the creation of a superior breed. Prenatal
tests can already warn parents of genetically impure offspring, and abortion can
eliminate them. The final goal is for a completely fabricated human being.

One signer of Humanist Manifesto II, Joseph Fletcher, believes that coercive or
compulsory genetic control is justified in cases where carriers of genetic disease do
not abstain voluntarily from having children. Here the end justifies the means. That
is, the goal of a genetically purified race justifies the compulsory sterilization
necessary to achieve it.

The End Justifies the Means

In Situation Ethics, Fletcher states flatly, "Only the end justifies the means;
nothing else" Although few humanists are this frank, most operate on the same
principle, particularly when it comes to advances in medical science. For example,
when it was discovered that brain tissue from aborted babies could aid in treating
Parkinson's disease, this good end was considered by many to be justification for

8. Derek Humphry, Reader, June 29, 1983.
9. Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966), 120.

Biomedical Issues 183

the means necessary to obtain the tissue (from an aborted baby). The brisk business
in organ transplants has likewise created a need for more organs. Since fresh
tissues are better, tissues are taken from live babies aborted by hysterotomy.
Because the advancement of medical science depends on experimentation,
many have taken advantage of the abortion business to use the live babies for ex-
perimentation. Some scientists speak openly of growing fetuses for spare parts.

An Evaluation of the Humanist Biomedical Ethic

The humanists’ approval of certain biomedical procedures for the supposed benefit
of the individual or the race flows from their presuppositions. If there is no God and
the human is simply a higher animal, then there seems to be no logical reason to deny
many o f their conclusions. There are, however, some good rational grounds for
challenging their presuppositions.

The Quality-of-Life Principle Is Utilitarian

The so-called quality-of-life principle is a thinly veiled form of utilitarianism. In
addition to the arguments already given against ethical utilitarianism (see chap. 4),
there are good reasons for rejecting this medical form of it. First, what does "quality
of life" mean? Is it a physical, social, or spiritual quality? If a combination, then in
what proportion? Often it is an ill-defined and ambiguous catchall term used to
justify actions that lack any proper ethical qualitywhatsoever. Second, who decides
what "quality" means? The patient? The doctor? Society? Third, which people
receive this "quality" treatment? On what basis do we discriminate? Age? Race?
Social rank? Fourth, how do we know for sure what procedures will bring about this
elusive quality of life? One would have to be God in order to know all the factors
necessary to predict that our genetic tinkering would really improve the race. It might
cure some problems and cause greater ones.

We Are Not Sovereign over Life

The Bible makes it unmistakably clear that we are not sovereign over our own
life. "The LORD gave and the LORD has taken away" ( Job 1:21). God said to
Moses, "I put to death and I bring to life" (Deut. 32:39). God created life (Gen. 1:21,
27), and he alone sustains it (Acts 17:28). Hence, we have no right to take innocent
life (Gen. 9:6; Exod. 20:13).

But in addition to these scriptural truths, there are many other obvious reasons for
concluding that we do not possess sovereignty over life. First, it is evident to all that
we did not create life. Life was here before humankind arrived on earth, and human
life clearly did not begin as a result of human activity. Second, in spite of all our
medical advances, we cannot avoid death. This too is out of human hands. Third,
humans have not been able to create life, certainly not human life. Thus far

184 Ethical Issues

human brilliance has produced only some biologically interesting chemicals
(e.g., amino acids) and crossed and spliced existing forms of life. But humans
have not created from scratch their own new living things, to say nothing of a
full-fledged human being.

Even if we could produce some simple forms (and therefore had some kind of
claim on them), there is no realistic prospect of creating anything like a human life.
But if we did not bring human life into this world, then we have no right to claim
sovereignty over when it leaves. The secular humanist pretension to sovereignty
over life collapses in the face of the facts of life.

There Is No Duty to Produce a Superior Race

Evolutionists often boast of their desires to forward the evolutionary process and
produce a superior race. Indeed, the subtitle of Darwin's famous book On the Origin
of Species by Means of Natural Selection (1859) has racist overtones: ThePres-
ervation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life. Carrying Darwin's idea forward,
Adolf Hitler used natural selection as his model for producing the superior race. He
wrote, "If nature does not wish that weaker individuals should mate with stronger,
she wishes even less that a superior race should intermingle with an inferior one:'
Why? "Because in such a case all her efforts, throughout hundreds of thousands of
years, to establish an evolutionary higher stage of being, may thus be rendered
futile.""y The famous evolutionist Julian S. Huxley (d. 1975) contended, "In the light
of evolutionary biology man can now see himself as the sole agent of further
evolutionary advance on this planet, and one of the few possible instruments of
progress in the universe at large:' Huxley sees man as "the business manager for the
cosmic process of evolutionf"

Yet for several reasons, the exaggerated expectations of producing a superior
race are unfounded. First, there is no real evidence that the present race was pro-
duced by any naturalistic evolutionary process. Both Scripture and the scientific
evidence point to God as the cause of the human species. " Second, science, with all
its technology and touted brilliance, has not been able to permanently improve even
a fruit fly. We have a long way to go to "improve" humankind. Third, even if we
could make permanent changes in the human species, there is no ethical reason why
we should. "Can" does not imply "ought" any more than "is" implies "ought:' Just
because we can do something does not mean that we should do it. Ability does not
imply morality. Fourth, even if we were able actually to produce changes in the
human species, how would we know they were better, not merely different? By
what standard would we judge them better? It would beg the question

10. Adolf Hider, Mein Kampf, trans. James Murphy (1924; reprint, London:
Hurst & Blacicett, 1939), 2.39-40.

11. Julian S. Huxley, Essays of a Biologist (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1939),
132.

12. | Norman L. Geisler and J. Kerby Anderson, Origin Science (Grand Rapids:
Baker Books, 1987), 127-57.

Biomedical Issues 185

to answer, "by the desired human standard:' For the secular humanist, as we
will see, there is no revealed standard that sanctions such a procedure.

The End Does Not Justify the Means

Since the "end justifies the means" ethic has already been critiqued (see chaps. 3
and 4), we will only summarize the problems here. First, ends do not justify means.
Means must have their own justification. Second, even ends need justification. Not
every goal is good, even if it is highly desired by many people. Many Germans
desired the obliteration of the Jews, but this desire does not justify it. Third, if good
ends justified any means, then killing political dissenters to produce greater
national harmonywould be justifiable, and killing AIDS patients in order to curb
the spread of this deadlydisease would be morally justified. Simple reflection
reveals numerous similar illustrations of morally unacceptable consequences that
would follow from applying such an ethic.

A Christian Perspective on Biomedical Ethics: Serving God

While the humanist approach to biomedical ethics is to play God, the Christian
approach is to use medical advances to serve God. Humanists believe that
humankind is sovereign over life; Christians hold that God is sovereign over life.
This certainly does not mean that there is no role for technology and medicine to
improve human life. It means, rather, that we do not use this wisdom to create
human life. This accumulated learning should be used to cultivate what God has
given but not to control it.

A comparison of the two approaches to biomedical issues will help to focus the
differences and serve as a springboard for articulating the basic principles of a
Christian approach to biomedical issues. Table 11.2 notes the major differences.

Tans 11.2
Christian and Humanist Approaches to Biomedical Issues

Christian View: Serving God Humanistic View: Playing God

Voluntary treatment Compulsory treatment
Improving human life Creating human life
Repairing human life Re-creating human life
Maintenance of life Engineering of life
Genetic fitness Genetic fabrication
Cooperation with nature Control over nature
Conformity to nature Power over nature

There is a marked difference between Christian and humanist approaches to
biomedical ethics. Christians believe that God is sovereign over life; humanists

186 Ethical Issues

think humankind is sovereign. Hence, Christians believe that we should serve God,
not play God. Treatment should always be voluntary, not compulsory. The medical
task is to improve life, not to create it. God has only made us the maintenance crew,
not the engineers of life. Our goal is the more modest one of genetic fitness, not the
grandiose one of genetic fabrication. We work in cooperation with nature, not to
have control over it. We conform to nature as God's creation; we do not seek power
over it as our creation. In short, the legitimate role of the Christian in biomedical
areas is therapeutic, not eugenic.

Some Basic Fallacies Exposed

Some basic assumptions in the modern humanistic approach to biomedical
ethics need to be exposed and analyzed from a Christian perspective. Often
they are implied, not stated. But they are operative nonetheless.

What is being done ought to be done. As any student of logic knows, this is the
famous is-ought fallacy. Just because we are aborting babies does not mean we
should be doing so (see chap. 9); by the same rationale, the fact that rape and child
abuse are occurring does not mean that they ought to be happening. Likewise, the
fact that scientists are cloning, splicing genes, and harvesting organs does not
automatically mean that theyshould be doing so. These activities need some moral
justification of their own. "Is" does not imply "ought."

If it can be done, it should be done. Another similar and common ethical fallacy is
that what can be done, ought to be done. There seems to be an implied ethic in the
progress of science dictating that whatever humans can invent, they should invent
and use. Scientific progress has been absolutized. Just because something is
technologically possible does not make it morallypermissible. It is technologically
possible to destroy the human race by nuclear war, but no one in their right mind
believes the race should be destroyed! Technological progress is not necessarily
ethical progress. It may be ethical regress instead.

The end justifies the means. This fallacy, already examined, becomes emotionally
appealing when the factor of suffering is added. Why, we are asked, should not
brain tissue from aborted babies be used to help cure those with Parkinson's
disease? Why should people be allowed to suffer when we have the means of
alleviating it? The answer surely is that the means are evil. Killing an innocent
human being to alleviate the suffering of another is not a morally justifiable means
of attaining this end.

Two wrongs make a right. Scarcely anyone admits to believing this, but many
people act upon it. It is never right to correct a wrong by doing a wrong. Adding a
wrong to a wrong does not take away the first wrong: it simply adds another wrong
to it. Hence, the fact that the wrong of abortion is occurring does not justify adding
to it the additional wrong of experimentation with the live aborted babies, regardless
of the information that may be gained from doing so. There is no ethical obligation
to know everything no matter how we get the information. If this

Biomedical Issues 187

were so, then governmental invasion of privacy would be justified by the
wealth of helpful information it could provide to curb crime and help society.

Some Basic Principles Stated

Now that we have examined the difference between a Christian and a humanist
approach to biomedical issues and exposed some fallacious humanist principles,
let us state some of the basic principles involved in a Christian approach to these
problems.

The sovereignty of God. First and foremost is the principle of God's sovereignty
over life. God created every living thing (Gen. 1:21) and human beings in his
image and likeness (1:27). God controls both life and death. He gives life and he
takes it away ( Job 1:21). From dust we come, and to dust we return (Gen. 3:19).
The Lord kills and makes alive (Deut. 32:39). We are not our own but his. God has
made us, and we belong to him. This being the case, humans have no right to seek
control of human life, to try to "advance" its evolution or to tinker with it
genetically.

The dignity of humanity. Another principle at the heart of a Christian biomedical
ethic is the dignity of humankind. Humans are made in God's image and likeness
(Gen. 1:27). They are the crown of his creation. Human beings both represent and
resemble God. For this reason, murder is such a heinous crime, for it is killing God
in effigy. This is why God instituted capital punishment for capital crimes (see
chap. 12), saying, "Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be
shed; for in the image of God has God made man" (Gen. 9:6; man = humankind).
Human beings have such dignity that it is even wrong to curse them, because they
"have been made in God's likeness" ( James 3:9). This dignity of human life
includes the body, which should be cared for (Eph. 5:29) and even buried with
respect, anticipating its final resurrection (1 Cor. 15).

The sanctity of life. Human life has both dignity and sanctity. The dignity calls
for respect, the sanctity for reverence. This is not to say that human life should be
worshiped, but only that it should be considered holy. Human life should not be
adored as the Creator is, but it should be respected as one of God's creations.
Humans are not God, but we are godlike. We were made "a little lower than the
heavenly beings [angels]" and were also "crowned ... with glory and honor" (Ps.
8:5). Since God is holy (Lev. 11:44) and we are made in his likeness (Gen. 1:27), it
follows that in some sense we share in this moral likeness. This sacredness of life,
as it uniquely reflects the very character of God, is the basis for a pro-life stance
from conception to death. No matter how badly human life may be scarred or
disfigured, it is still godlike and deserves to be treated as the sacred thing it is.

Principle of the greater good. When two or more moral principles conflict
unavoidably, follow the higher obligation (see chap 7).

Principle of double effect. When an act has both good and bad consequences, it
can be preferred if (1) the act is good or indifferent, (2) a good effect also follows

188 Ethical Issues

from the ad, (3) one intends the good effect and only tolerates the evil effect,
and (4) the good effect is at least equal to the evil effect.

The mortality of life. Another principle endemic to a Christian approach to
biomedical issues is the fact of human mortality. This is a fallen world, and the
consequence o f the fall is death. Adam was told of the tree of knowledge that when
you eat of it you will surely die" (Gen. 2:17). The apostle Paul added, "Sin entered
the world through one man, and death through sin, and in this way death came to all
men, because all sinned" (Rom. 5:12). Thus the human being "is destined to die
once, and after that to face judgment" (Heb. 9:27). Moses spoke of the limits of
human life: "The length of our days is seventy years—or eighty, if we have the
strength ... for they quickly pass, and we fly away" (Ps. 90:10). In short, there are
limits to human life in this world. Humans are mortal, and human attempts to avoid
mortality or overcome this fact are futile and misdirected.

Charity toward human life. Love is the essence of Christian ethicsjesus said that
the greatest commandment is first to love God and then to love other human beings
as ourselves (Matt. 22:37-39). Therefore, it is necessary to apply this love toward
human beings in every area of ethical responsibility, including biomedical issues.
Christian love (agape) is not selfish love. It comes from God, who is love (1 John
4:16), and is to be directed toward others ( John 15:13). It is a responsibility we
have to God (Matt. 25:45) and to all who are less fortunate than we. Love is not an
empty, vacuous feeling or attitude. It is fleshed out in specific commandments.
Jesus said, "If ye love me, keep my commandments" (John 14:15 KJV). Hence, the
Christian looks to Scripture for guidance in bioethical issues, as well as in other
moral matters.

Some Basic Guidelines for Crucial Issues

The preceding discussion has presented a number of biblical guidelines that can
be applied to a range of biomedical issues. We will first state the principle and its
biblical support and then apply it to specific issues.

Voluntary versus compulsory procedures. Flowing from the fact of freedom and
dignity is the principle of autonomy, which entails informed consent. Even other-
wise legitimate medical procedures are morally wrong unless there is informed
consent to them. The patient should be informed about the nature and possible
consequences of the medication or operation, and then must give free and unco-
erced consent to it. Where the patient is not able to do this because of irrationality
or unconsciousness, no organs should be taken and no medical procedure
undertaken except what is necessary to preserve the person's life. This is called a
best-interest judgment, as opposed to a substituted judgment. The latter takes away
the autonomy of the patient.

A forced cure, no matter how beneficial it may be for society, is immoral. This
includes forced abortions, sterilizations, and a lobotomy.Abstinence, birth control,
or voluntarysterilization are proper alternatives. A forced cure is immoral, whether

Biomedical Issues 189

it is imposed on citizens or prisoners. It is in the very nature of morally responsible
human acts that they be free and uncoerced. Yet it is sometimes necessary to
restrain and even punish violent patients against their will for the protection of
those around them in the same way we restrain and punish criminals."

Informed consent is a necessary foundation for all bioethical decisions, includ-
ing abortion. It is a tragic moral irony to require informed consent before a teenager
in a public school can put an aspirin in her mouth, but not require informed consent
before she can kill a baby in her womb.

Mercy killing versus mercifully allowing death. As previously noted, there is
an important difference between taking an innocent life and allowing a death. The
former is always wrong; the latter is sometimes right. Intentionally taking an in-
nocent human life is murder, but allowing a natural death may be an act of mercy.
Thus mercy killing is always wrong, but mercifully allowing death is sometimes
right.

Preserving life versus prolonging death. The command "You shall not
murder" (Exod. 20:13) implies that we should help prevent the unnatural death of
innocent people as well. The Bible declares that sins of omission are wrong, as are
sins of commission ( James 4:17). Failing to prevent such a death is as culpable as
actually causing it. In this sense, there is a duty to prolong human life, and if
medical or technical aids are available, they should be rightly utilized. However,
the duty to preserve life should be distinguished from a supposed obligation to
prolong death. Nowhere does the Bible declare a duty to prolong the agony of
death. Actually, trying to avoid the inevitability of death is contrary to the principle
of human mortality (Rom. 5:12; Heb. 9:27).

Artificial means versus natural means. Every attempt should be made to
preserve a human life, by whatever means are available. Certainly food, water, and
air should never be withheld from human beings, no matter how small, old, or sick
they are. Taking away these natural means of sustaining life is tantamount to causing
death. And knowingly causing the death of innocent human beings is murder.
Furthermore, when heroic means (technology) are available, they should be used to
preserve human life. However, there is no divine duty to use heroic or unnatural
means to prolong human death. This is contrary to the principles of human mortality
and Christian charity. There is no duty to prolong misery or to fight mortality. Hence,
when sustenance of life is artificial and the process of death is irreversible, there is no
moral obligation to prolong life by artificial means.

Birth control versus abortion. Some Christians oppose both abortion and birth
control (see appendix 4). Historically, Roman Catholics have opposed birth con-

13. In the Mosaic law, even animals known to have killed others were to be restrained or
put away, even though they were not morally accountable for their actions (Exod.21 :28-29). The
reasoning i s based on the moral responsibility of those in charge who knew they were killers. Similarly, those
in charge of violent patients must have means of keeping them from killing others. These means may include
isolation, drugs, and other medical involuntary procedures. In this case, graded absolutism (see chap. 7) allows
for the higher law of lifesaving to take precedence over the lower law of the patient's rights.

190 Ethical Issues

trol, and Protestants have favored it. Today, these lines are crossed. However, both
sides agree that there is a qualitative difference between taking a human life by
abortion and preventing more human lives by birth control. Whatever one can say
for or against birth control, it is not murder. It is simply a method of limiting how
many children are born, not a method of killing unborn children. Yet some
methods of what is called birth control are really methods of abortion (see chap. 9),
since they lead directly to the death of a fertilized ovum (which is a human being).
But methods of birth control, natural or artificial, that simply prevent fertilization
from taking place are not murder. Both Catholics and Protestants agree that it is
right to use birth control; the debate is over the legitimacy of artificial forms of
birth control.

Correcting versus creating life. This is an imperfect world. God did not plan it
that way; humankind has made a mess of it. The effects of humanity's fall are evident
in the physical world (Gen. 3; Rom. 5, 8) and have taken their toll on human health.
There is no biblical imperative saying that we cannot work to correct these
imperfections. The Bible actually recommends medicine (1 Tim. 5:23) and prayer
for healing ( James 5:14-15).

Jesus manifested his approval of a medically corrective ministry by spending
much of his time healing those who were sick. Likewise, he gave his apostles the
ability to "heal the sick" (Matt. 10:8). However, there is a significant difference
between correcting imperfect humans and creating perfect ones of our own. Al-
leviating human suffering due to the fall is a moral duty, but fabricating human
beings is not.

Some Basic Issues

Now that the basic principles and guidelines of Christian bioethics have been
outlined, it remains to apply them to some of the pressing issues made possible by
modern technological advances. Since we have already discussed abortion (chap.
9) and euthanasia (chap. 10), we will not include them here.

Organ transplants. Organ transplantation has become a reality. Heart, lung, and
kidney transplants are now common. Hundreds of people have had their lives
prolonged because of this corrective technology. Transplantation is in accordance
with many biblical principles. First, the principle of charity (love): "Greater love
has no one than this, that he lay down his life for his friends" (John 15:13). I find it
hard to imagine giving an eye, lung, or kidney to someone who has none, yet some
living human beings have done this. How little sacrifice is required to do so when
we are dead and no longer in need of these organs! Organ transplantation need not
be, as some suggest, a violation of the mortality principle. It can and should be used
as a means to prolong life, not as a means to avoid the eventuality of death. In this
regard it can be questionable when used on the very elderly. In this case, the
chances for surviving the operation are lessened, as is the need for the operation.
Also, there are younger candidates in need of the procedure.

Biomedical lssues YL

Serious moral questions are involved in the transplantation procedure. First,
it should involve informed consent. No one should be forced to donate one's
organs, and no organ should be taken without permission of the donor,
especially from those who are unable to make this decision (such as the
handicapped). No one else has the right to give away another person's organs
against the donor's will. In this sense my body belongs to me, and death does
not erase this right. It is still my body and is put in my grave. Respect for
human dignity demands that the body, which is the remaining symbol of the
person, not be pilfered. Just as a national flag is the symbol of the nation and
should be treated with respect, even so the body is a symbol of the person and
should be treated with the respect due the person who occupied it.

Second, there is a moral question about the life-and-death status of the
donor. The fresher the organ, the greater chances of success in the transplant,
and organs from living donors are the best. However, if taking the organ
causes death, then it is wrong. Yet after the person dies, the body may
justifiably be kept "alive" by machine to prevent organ decay. It simply
means that we should not hasten death in order to harvest a fresh organ.

With the exception of cases of taking "spare" organs, such as one kidney or
one eye, the donor must be brain-dead before the organ is taken. Death is
difficult to define, but in general terms it means vital signs are lacking, such
as breathing, pulse, nerve reaction, or brain wave (EEG).

Genetic surgery. Genetic surgeryis now medically possible, but does this in
itself make it morally permissible? Here again the answer depends on
whether it is an attempt to correct and restore life as God created it or an
attempt to reconstruct it in the way we want it. Is the surgery correcting or
creating? Is the procedure maintaining the life that God created, or is it
engineering life the way humans want it? If the surgery is for repairing, not
for creating, then it is morally permissible. After all, God created perfect
human beings, and he wants us to be as perfect as we can be, even in this
fallen world.

Trans-gender (sex-change) operation. These are morally objectionable
from a Christian perspective. God created 'male and female" (Gen. 1:27). The
fact that they were told to reproduce their kind (v. 28) reveals that this was
understood as biological maleness and femaleness. For this reason genetic
surgery to change one's sex is morally wrong. Whatever our psychological or
sociological tendencies, we should seek to bring them into conformity to the
way God made us physically.

Sex detection and selection. \t is now possible to know the sex of the
unborn well before birth. Hence, selection of the desired sex is possible. Is
this morally right? In the light of the Christian principles stated above, the
appropriate response seems to be: sex detection, yes; sex selection, no. There
is nothing inherently wrong with knowing in advance whether the baby is a
boy or a girl. Sooner or later we will know anyway. Science has now made it
possible to knowsooner. Science has made it possible to know a lot of things
sooner—storms, earthquakes, tornadoes,

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Ethical Issues

hurricanes. Few of us would reject this knowledge, but neither should we use
it to do evil.

There is an inherent danger in sex-detection methods: theyoften become
means of sex selection. Unfortunately, the only way to select the desired sex
after it has been detected is by abortion, and that is morally wrong (see chap.
9). So if one chooses to know the sex of one's child before birth (and there is
no obligation to do so), one is just as morally obligated to accept it from God's
sovereign hand as one is the day it is born. Sex selection before conception is
not necessarily morally wrong, but it can be both socially and psychologically
harmful.

Artificial insemination. There are two forms of artificial insemination:
artificial insemination bythe husband (AIH), and artificial insemination bya
donor (MD). There seem to be no valid moral objections from a Christian
perspective to the former. Once one accepts the premise that it is morally
permissible to correct impediments to fulfilling God's command to propagate
life, then Al I-I would seem to fit in this category. If not, then one would have
to argue against other corrective operations, including those to restore sight.

Sometimes Exodus 4:11 is cited in defense of accepting all our
imperfections, even if they are correctable. God said to Moses, Who makes
him deaf or mute? Who gives him sight or makes him blind? Is it not I, the
Lora'?" However, to so use this verse is to wrench it out of context and to
ignore much other clear Scriptures. First, the verse is descriptive, not
prescriptive. It is describing the situation the way it is, not necessarily the way
it ought to be. Second, in context, it is a statement about God's ability to
overcome these difficulties, not about the undesirability of doing so. God said
this to Moses because Moses complained to God that he was not eloquent
enough to fulfill God's command to speak to Pharaoh (v. 10). Third, if
correcting blindness and deafness was wrong, then Jesus often sinned
byhealing these very imperfections (Mark 7; John 9).

But AID raises some moral questions not involved in AIH. Some object that
it is "adulteryby proxy," since the sperm is not from the woman's husband.
However, this objection is a bit far-fetched, since no sexual act with another
man is involved, nor need there be any lust entailed. Others consider the
so-called one-flesh principle to be opposed to MD, but simplybecause the
conception was not born of sexual intercourse between husband and wife
does not mean they are not "one flesh" in their marriage. Actually, the "one
flesh" is possible without sexual intercourse; it refers to the intimacy of
marriage, not just to sexual intercourse (Gen. 2:24).

Still others object that in AID the baby is not really the husband's child, only
the wife's. But if this is pressed, it would also be an argument against
adoption, where the child is neither the husband's nor the wife's.

Finally, some object because of the use of an autosexual act in obtaining the
sperm necessary for the insemination. However, if the donor collects the
sperm in the context of his own marital relationship, the objection loses its
force. First, inside a marriage the act need not be autosexual; it can be mutual.
Second, as long

Biomedical lssues 195

as the act is done without lustful intentions toward a woman other than one's
wife, the objection loses its force. Masturbation is wrong as a form of lust and
when it is done outside a marital relationship. It is also unnecessary since
there are other alternatives, such as abstinence and marriage.

In short, whatever social, psychological, and legal arguments can be urged,
and these should be considered, there seems to be no moral reason against
either AIH or AID from a biblical perspective. Nevertheless, a childless
couple may choose to remain that way or to adopt, but there is no moral duty
to do so. They may also choose pregnancy of the wife through artificial
insemination.

The morality of artificial insemination within the bounds of marriage does
not automatically extend to the unmarried. For example, the Bible does not
recommend a believer marrying an unbeliever (1 Cor. 7:39), yet it forbids
divorcing an unbelieving spouse unless the unbelieving partner initiates it
(vv. 12, IS). Likewise, one-parent families maybe necessitated by death or
other circumstances. But they are less than ideal under any circumstance and
should not be promoted by artificial insemination. Hence, lesbian or bachelor
motherhood by artificial insemination is not God's ideal for a home. Children
need a father and a mother. And while God takes special care of wives who
once had a husband (widows: Deut.14:29; 1 Tim. 5:9), the Bible repeatedly
bemoans fatherlessness (Pss. 10:18; 82:3). Fatherless homes are tragedies to
be avoided, not models to be encouraged.

Surrogate motherhood. Even for Christians who accept artificial
insemination, surrogate motherhood poses some more difficult problems. In
effect, it is a 'womb for hire," for the mother carrying the baby is not the wife
of the husband. And even though there is no adultery involved, nevertheless
there are serious social, legal, and psychological problems to be considered.
As notable court cases have dramatized, the maternal instinct is strong, and
the biological mother often has a difficult time giving up her child.

Theoretically, surrogate motherhood isonlythe reverse of artificial
insemination and is like an adoption. In this respect there is nothing
inherently immoral about it. However, we do not live in a theoretical world.
Deep-seated human feelings are involved. Surrogate motherhood carries with
it tremendous potential for exploitation of womanhood and the degradation of
motherhood. Ethical considerations notwithstanding, wisdom seems to argue
that adoption is a wiser course. And if abortion on demand were not practiced,
there would be plenty of babies to adopt. Overseas babies and minority babies
are more readily available.

Certainly, surrogate motherhood for convenience is wrong. Motherhood
should not be for hire or rent anymore than wifehood should be. In this
regard, surrogate motherhood is no better than harlotry. God created a place
for sex with one's own spouse. And God created a place for having babies: in
one's own wife's womb. If we cannot have them there, then maybe we should
consider whether it is God's will for us to have one of our own genetic
offspring. Perhaps there are other babies to adopt, or maybe God wants us to
help with the care of the fatherless and not to have our own.

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Ethical Issues

In vitro fertilization (IVF). Although in vitro fertilization isknown by the
popular expression "test-tube babies," it is more accurately test-tube
conception. Sperm and ovum are united in a Petri dish and later transplanted
into a mother's womb. Many babies have already been born of this method
where otherwise the couple was unable to have children. It can be done, but
here again the question is whether it should be done.

Granted that artificial insemination is permissible, from a Christian
perspective the main question in IVF relates to the 'wasted" embryos.
According to present methods, the majority of embryos are sacrificed in order
to get one that will survive. This means that we are knowingly causing the
death of many tiny human beings in order to find one to develop. Since the
end does not justifythis means, in vitro fertilization that wastes embryos is
morally wrong. The fact that many naturally fertilized ova spontaneously
abort is not relevant, for there is a significant moral difference between a
natural death and a homicide. So IVF is not a natural death; it is an
artificiallycontrived and unnecessary death. It goes without saying that IVF
for the purposes of research and experimentation on humans is doubly wrong.

There is the possibility of perfecting the method so as not to waste human
life or to use a natural form whereby a husband's sperm is artificially placed in
his wife's womb. But until or unless this kind of thing is done,1 VF is morally
wrong.

Organ and tissue harvesting. There is an increasing traffic in human organs
and tissues created by medical technology and corresponding human demand.
Organs from aborted babies are used for transplantation. Brain tissue is
utilized in treating Parkinson's disease. Other body fluids have medicinal
value. Here again we must be careful not to argue from "can" to 'ought." The
question is not whether it can be done or is being done, but whether it should
be done.

Several principles come into play on the question of harvesting. Certainly if
there are legitimate instances of harvesting, it should never be done without
informed consent. Then there is the question of human dignity. A human
body is not a chemical factory or an organic pharmaceutical company. Its
purpose is not to function as an organ farm but as the body of an immortal
person, who can worship and glorify God (1 Cor. 6:19-20).

Though there is no objection to giving our organs after we are dead, it is
contrary to our dignity and mortality to keep bodies alive simply for the
purpose of harvesting from them. The only sense in which harvesting is
legitimate is in onetime donor gifts by informed consent after death. But
growing embryos or keeping bodies alive artificially for this purpose is a
denigration of human dignity.

Stem cell cures. Human stem cells have proved to be a valuable source for
curing diseases. This has raised a crucial debate over the ethics ofusing
embryo stem cells, which offer the prospect of treating or curing some
otherwise incurable diseases. In response, an important distinction must be
made between the use of nonembryonic ("adult") stem cells, which does not
involve the destruction of human life, and the use of embryonic stem cells,
which does. The latter is unacceptable for the same reason abortions are not
acceptable: it involves taking an innocent human

Biomedical Issues 195

life. In addition, it violates several other ethical principles, such as these: (1)
The end does not justify the means. (2) That we can do something doesn't
mean that we should do it. (3) We should not cause death to lengthen life.

The fact is that there are other ethical ways to approach solving this
problem. First, other forms of treatment are possible. Still others mayyet be
discovered. And most importantly for the present, nonembryonic cells have
already proved to be more valuable, especiallythose from umbilical cords.
Thus, it is unnecessary to use embryonic stem cells. Further, even if no other
cures were presently available, it is morally wrong to sacrifice innocent
human life to forward the progress of science. Some have asked, "What's
wrong with harvesting parts from embryos destined to die anyway?" The
response is this: Just because death-row prisoners are going to die anyway
does not justify using them as a sacrificial medicine for the so-called progress
of science. Hitler used this same bad argument (which embryonic stem cell
proponents are using) to justify his experimenting on Jews, and the results
were inhumane, unchristian, and barbaric! Closer to home, some African
American men in Tuscaloosa, AL, were allowed to suffer with untreated
syphilis in order to study its effects. But good ends are not justified by evil
means.

Cryonics. It is possible to deep-freeze human bodies at death with the hope
of resuscitating them someday. This could prolong life considerably,
especially for those who die of diseases for which we maylater find cures.
Once more we must not ask if this can be done, but whether it ought to be
done. It can and is being done, but should we do it? For several reasons, the
Christian response is negative.

There is no evidence that a person can be brought back to life this way. Even
if the body can be biologically resuscitated, there is no evidence that the
person who occupied it will return. The Bible seems to indicate that when the
person leaves the body (Phil. 1:23; 2 Cor.5:8), only God can bring the person
back to that body, and that God will do this at the resurrection (John 5:25-29;
1 Cor. 15; Rev. 20). The purpose behind deep-freeze death is a desire to avoid
the eventuality of human mortality. But the Bible is clear that God has
appointed death (Rom. 5:12; Heb. 9:27) and has limited our life span (Ps.
90:10). Attempts to avoid or deny death are not of God (see Gen. 3:4). We
should accept the limits of natural life and the eventuality of natural death and
not engage in vain attempts to avoid death.

Cloning. 'Carbon-copy" human beings are genetically possible. It has
already been successfully done with other mammals. Each cell in the body
has the blueprint for that life. Hence, it is theoreticallypossible to produce an
identical twin by nonsexual parenting. Given the humanistic quest for
scientific progress, someone eventually will apply the advanced technology
to produce a human clone. From a Christian standpoint, there are serious
objections to cloning. First, it is playing God, not serving God. It violates the
fundamental principle that we are only the custodians of human life, not its
creators. It is the ultimate in human presumption and pride, human's
technological Tower of Babel (Gen. 11:1-9). Second, clones would generate
unprecedented psychological and social problems ofidentityand sibling
rivalry. Third, it bypasses the God-ordained means of human propagation,

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Ethical Issues

fertilization in a mother's womb. In this sense it is a denial of the sanctity of
sex, which God has created, hallowed, and ordained (Gen. 1:28; Heb. 13:4).
Fourth, it is a futile attempt to avoid mortality by having one's identical 'twin"
live on after one's death, and so on infinitely. So even if it were possible, it
would be morally objectionable.

Gene-splicing. It is now possible to produce new kinds of biological
organisms by splicing the genes of one into another. These laboratory hybrids
are already being patented. One such artificially constructed "superbug"
(pseudomonas) is said to have value in eliminating large oil slicks, since it
feeds and multiplies in oil. Many other highly touted uses are in view,
including medical cures, higher food production, environmental purification,
more useful animals, and even more productive human beings!

Gene-splicing has some serious problems. J. Kerby Anderson identifies
many of these in his excellent book Genetic Engineering. First, there are
serious scientific problems includingthe possibility of escaped organisms,
creating newdiseases, and creatingan imbalance in the delicatelyarranged
microworld." Second, there are social and legal problems. Anderson
comments, 'No one would welcome the spread of an infectious disease that
destroys car, truck, and airplane lubrication systems:"

Finally, there are serious ethical problems. Human gene-splicingviolates
several principles. First, the anticipated benefits (ends) do not justify the
means. Gene-splicing is another example of the humanistic ‘end justifies the
means" ethic. Second, God made man "in his image:' Gene-splicing is a
mixing of the created categories of human and animals. Third, human
gene-splicing is a classic example of the human desire to be sovereign over
creation, rather than being a servant in it. It is a rejection of the Creator and an
effort to redesign nature. The creation mandate (Gen. 1:28) does not include
destruction or reconstruction of what God created (see chap. 18). It means
service in creation, not sovereignty over it.

Answering Some Objections to a Christian Biomedical Ethic

Many objections have been raised to a Christian biomedical ethic. Some of
them have already emerged in the preceding discussion and been addressed.
Here we will summarize the more important ones.

It Holds Back Scientific Progress

It is objected that opposing genetic engineering, cloning, and gene-splicing
retards scientific progress. However, this objection has serious problems of
its own.

14. J. Kerby Anderson, Genetic Engineering: The Wiwi Issues (Grand
Rapids: Zonderran, 1982), 87-91.
15.161,1,92.

Biomedical lssues 19/

For one, it assumes that these inventions are really progress rather than
merely changes. Further, not everything new is morallybetter.Also, ‘scientific
progress" is an ambiguous term used to justify almost anything we desire to
do. What is more, this argument absolutizes scientific progress as the norm by
which all else is justified. But science is not morally normative. Science deals
with what is, not with what ought to be. Finally, the proper standards for
science do not come from within but from beyond. This became painfully
evident when German scientists in the Nazi regime engaged in ghastly human
"research" at the expense of human respect.

It Lacks Proper Compassion for the Suffering

It is also argued that failing to utilize these advances in science to alleviate
human suffering lacks proper concern for human suffering. Why allow some
to suffer from Parkinson's disease when the brain tissue from aborted babies
can lessen their misery?

In response, the end does not justify the means. Extending the life ofone
person does not justify exterminating the life of another. Evil means are not
justified by good ends. Only good means are to be used for good ends.
Further, respecting human life and dignity is a proper concern. And violating
human dignity, sanctity, and responsibility is not the way to showthis
concern. What is more, the humanists’ standard for proper compassion is
ultimately without justification. Humanists have a moral prescription without
a moral Prescriber. They can believe in compassion, but they have no real
justification for that belief. If they try to justify their moral laws, they find
themselves face-to-face with a moral Lawgiver. But if there is a divine
imperative about human life, then the humanists whole case for utilitarian
compassion collapses.

Summary and Conclusion

Biomedical issues clutter the stage of crucial ethical decisions. The conflict of
opinion on these issues arises out of two opposed worldviews: the secular
humanists’ perspective and Christian perspective. The former denies that
there is a Creator, that humans were created, and that they have God-given
moral obligations. Humans are merely higher animals with greater
intelligence. This intelligence should be used to improve the human species.
Hence, secular humanists favor abortion, euthanasia, and genetic engineering
to do so.

By contrast with the humanist biomedical ethic, Christians believe that God
specially created humans in his own likeness and gave them moral
imperatives to preserve the dignity and sanctity of human life. Hence, the
Christian obligation is to serve God, not to play God. We are not the
engineers of life but merely its custodians. Medical intervention, therefore,
should be corrective, not creative. We should repair life, not try to reconstruct
it. Technology must serve morality, not the reverse.

198 Ethical Issues
Select Readings

Anderson, J. Kerby. Genetic Engineering: The Ethical Issues. Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 1982.

Anderson, Norman. Issues of Life and Death. Downers Grove, IL:

InterVarsity, 1977. Ashley, B. M., and K. D. O'Rourke. Health Care Ethics.

St. Louis: Catholic Health Association of the United States, 1982.

Beaucltamp,Tom L., andJames F. Childress. Principles of Biomedicalahins.
2nd. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.

Beckwith, Francis, and Norman L. Geisler. Malta's of Life and Death. Grand
Rapids: Baker Books, 1991.

Blocher, Mark. Vital Signs: Decisions Thal Determine the Quality of Life and
Health. Chicago: Moody, 1992.

Feinberg, ohn S., and Paul D. Feinberg. Ethics fora Brave New World.
Wheaton: Crossway Books, 1993.

Foreman, Mark W. Christianity and Bioethics: Confronting Clinical
Issues.Joplin, MO: College Press, 1999.

Gish, Duane. Manipulating Life: Where Does It Stop?San Diego: Master,

1981. Lammers, Stephen, and Allen Verhey, eds. On Moral Medicine. Grand

Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987.

Lester, Lane P., and James C. Hefley. Cloning: Miracle or Menace?
Wheaton: Tyndale House, 1980.

Mappes, Thomas A., and Jane S. Zembaty. Biomedical Ethics. 2nd ed. New
York: McGraw. Hill, 1986.

Monagle,John F., and David C.Thomasma. Medical Mks: A Guide forHealth
Professionals. Rockville, MD: Aspen, 1977.

Rae, Scott B., and Paul M. Cox. Meet/lies: A Christian Approach in a
Pluralistic Age. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999.

Ramsey, Paul. Fabricated Main The Ethics of Genetic Control. New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1970.

12
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

There are three basic views on capital punishment: reconstructionism, which
insists on the death sentence for all serious crimes; rehabilitationism, which would
not allow it for any crime; and retributionism, which recommends death for some
(capital) crimes. Forms of all three views are held by Christians. Since two views
share a belief in capital punishment for capital crimes, our discussion will begin
with the opposing view, rehabilitationism.

Rehabilitationism: No Capital Punishment for Any Crimes

Proponents of this view include both Christians and non-Christians, those who
appeal to the Bible for justification and those who do not. Both types of
arguments will be presented. The essence of this position is that the purpose of
justice is rehabilitation and not retribution. Justice is remedial, not retributive.
We should try to reform criminals, not punish them, or at least not with capital
punishment.

Biblical Arguments for Rehabilitationism

Christian rehabilitationists appeal to Scripture in support of their position,
and what follows is a summary of the biblical arguments used in defending
their conclusions. Although their reasoning has wider application to crime in
general, it is applied specifically to capital punishment here.

Thepurpose of justice is to reform, not punish. Ezekiel declared that God
takes no "pleasure in the death of the wicked" and instead desires "that he
should turn from his way and live" (18:23 RSV). God wants to cure the sinner,
not kill him. 199

200 Ethical Issues

Capital punishtnent was abolished with Moses's law. It is argued that capital
punishment was part of the Old Testament legalistic system abolished by Christ. In
particular, an appeal is made to Jesus's rejection of Moses's "eye for eye" principle
(Matt. 5:38). Instead of retribution, Jesus declared, "Do not resist an evil person"
(v. 39).

Mosaic capital punishment is not practiced today. The Old Testament prescribed
capital punishment for some twenty crimes, including breaking the Sabbath, striking
one's parents, cursing God, homosexual relations, kidnapping—and rebellious
children! But no one really believes that all these should still be prosecuted today.
Thus none of them should be practiced.

Jesus abolished capital punishment for adultery. One of the crimes deserving
of capital punishment in the Old Testament was adultery (Lev. 20:10), but it is
argued that Jesus set this aside when he told the woman taken in adultery, "Go,
and sin no more" ( John 8:11 KJV). In 1 Corinthians 5, only excommunication
from the church, not execution by the state, was recommended by Paul for the
gross case of immorality there.

Cain was not given capital punishment. Even in the Old Testament, capital
punishment was not always exacted for capital crimes. Cain killed Abel (Gen.
4), and yet God put a mark upon him and protected his life against anyone who
would retaliate against him (v. 15).

David was not given the death sentence. David committed two capital crimes,
adultery and murder, and yet he was not given capital punishment. As a matter of
fact, when he confessed his sin (Ps. 51), he was forgiven (Ps. 32) and even restored
to his throne (2 Sam. 18-19).

New Testament love rules out capital punishment.It is argued that the idea that we
can love someone's soul while killing their body is inconsistent. As Christians we are
enjoined to love even our enemies, and we cannot love them by killing them. Love
would constrain us to sacrifice our own life for them ( John 15:13), but it would
never take their life from them.

The cross was capital punishment for all people. Most Christian rehabilitationists
admit that capital punishment was sometimes used in the Old Testament. But they
insist that whatever place there may have been for it before Christ came, there is no
place for it since then. Because sin brings death (Rom. 6:23), and since Christ died
for all people (Rom. 5:12-18), it follows that he has already taken capital punishment
for all. In view of his suffering the death penalty for all persons, there should be no
death penalty for any person.

Other arguments include the following: (1) Capital punishment is killing
God in effigy (Gen. 1:27). (2) God alone gives and takes life (Deut. 32:39). (3)
It costs more to kill than to keep. (4) Mistakes made are fatal.

Capital Punishment 201

Moral Arguments for Rehabilitationism

In addition to the biblical arguments, several moral arguments are used to
reject capital punishment. Most of them have been used by Christians as well as
non-Christians to defend this position.

Capital punishment is unjustly applied. A disproportionate number of minorities
are given capital punishment. This being the case, rehabilitationists insist that capital
punishment should not be applied at all if it is not applied fairly to all. Otherwise, it is a
tyrannical tool to subdue minority groups, a tool to promote racism.

Capital punishment is not a deterrent to crime. It is argued that capital punish-
ment does not really deter crime, for even where it is in effect, capital crimes still
continue. In fact, some argue that capital punishment encourages serious crime
because it gives state sanction to the violent taking of human life. Thus, by using
capital punishment, the state encourages crime rather than deterring it.

Capital punishment is antihumanitarian. We provide shelters and adoption
for stray animals; why should we kill wayward humans? It is an inhumane form
of punishment. It is cruel and unusual punishment in the extreme.

Criminals should be cured, not killed. Criminals are socially ill and need to be
treated, but we cannot cure them by killing them. Patients need a doctor, not a
funeral director, and socially sick people need a psychiatrist, not an executioner.

Capital punishment sends unbelievers to hell. Capital punishment is an especially
cruel sentence for a Christian to support, for according to the Bible, the unbelievers
will be eternally damned (Matt. 25:41-46; 2 Thess. 1:7-9; Rev. 20:11-15). If God is
"longsuffering, ... not willing that any should perish" (2 Pet. 3:9 KJV), then so
should we be. To will that unbelievers be given capital punishment is to will that
they go to their eternal doom.

An Evaluation of Rehabilitationism

Since rehabilitationists use both biblical and moral arguments for their view,
the response will be divided accordingly. First, a reply to their arguments from
the Bible.

An Evaluation of the Biblical Arguments

The primary purpose of justice is not rehabilitation. The primary purpose of justice
is not reformation but punishment. This is clear in both Old and New Testaments.
God himself punishes sin (Exod. 20:5; Ezek. 18:4, 20), and he demands that proper
authorities do it also (Gen. 9:6; Exod. 21:12). The heart of the penal view is manifest
in the death of Christ, who was punished as "the just for the unjust" (1 Pet. 3:18
NASB). As Paul put it, "The wages of sin is death" (Rom. 6:23).

While it is hoped that those who commit noncapital crimes will reform as the
result of their incarceration, this is not its primary purpose. Since capital crimes

202 Ethical Issues

demand a capital punishment, there is no place for reform, only for a just
punishment. And the only just punishment for taking someone's life is giving
one's own life. Only in this way is justice satisfied.

Capital punishment was prior to Moses's law. The Mosaic lawwas fulfilled by Christ
(Matt. 5:17; Rom. 10:4), but capital punishment was not unique to it. God instituted
capital punishment for all murderers in Noah's day (Gen. 9:6), long before Moses
gave the law to Israel (Exod. 20). Hence, in fulfilling Moses's law for Israel (Heb.
7-8), Jesus did not destroy the moral law for all people (Rom. 2:2-14).

Not onlywas capital punishment instituted before Moses's law, but it has
continued in effect after Moses's time. Paul stated it in principle (Rom. 13:4) and
implied it in practice (Acts 25:11). And Jesus stated it in principle ( John 19:10-11)
and accepted it in practice when he died on the cross. So capital punishment was
not limited to the Mosaic law or abolished with it.

The Mosaic laws are not in effect today. It is true that few Christians (except
re-constructionists) really advocate the position that governments should practice
capital punishment for all the religious and moral crimes mentioned in the Old
Testament. However, just because one rejects capital punishment for noncapital
crimes does not mean that we should reject it for capital crimes. In fact, capital
punishment was prescribed in the Bible for capital crimes both before and after
the time of Moses.

Jesus's response to the adulterous woman did not revoke capital punishment. Jesus's
forgiving attitude toward the woman taken in adultery (John 8) is not proof that he
rejected capital punishment, and for several reasons. This was not a capital crime,
and therefore, even at best, it would not here reject the law of Moses, which
demanded at least two witnesses to accuse the woman (Num. 35:30), and none
were willing to accuse her ( John 8:10-11). Jesus's charge, "Go, and sin no more"
(8:11 KJV), was a declaration not of the invalidity of capital punishment but of his
forgiveness for her sin.

Cain's punishment implies capital punishment. Cain's murder of Abel is a special
case (Gen. 4). There are good reasons why he was not given capital punishment.
First, who would do it? There was no human government other than the family, and
his only brother was dead. God would certainly not expect his father or mother to kill
their only remaining son. In view of these special circumstances, God personally
commuted Cain's death sentence. God has the right to do this because he is the
author of life (Deut. 32:39; Job 1:21). But even in God's protection of Cain, there is
an implication of capital punishment in the sevenfold vengeance to be taken on
anyone who would kill Cain (Gen. 4:15). Cain himself seemed to expect capital
punishment when he said, "Whoever finds me will kill me" (4:14).

There were specific reasons whyDavid was not given capitalpunishment. David com-
mitted two sins worthy of death, according to Moses's law: murder and adultery.
Why then was his life spared? There is no record that anyone pressed charges, and
according to the law, there had to be two witnesses (Deut. 17:6). Capital punish-
ment was executed by the government, but Israel was a monarchy, and David was

Capital Punishment 203

the monarch. In effect, capital punishment of David would need to be
carried out by David himself.

Perhaps this special circumstance is why God intervened and gave his own
sentence through Nathan the prophet. Just as God said, David paid "fourfold," and
some of the penalty involved lives. First, the baby of David's adulterous act died.
Then David's son Absalom was killed, and David's daughter was defiled as he had
defiled another man's wife. And finally, David lost his kingdom for a while. David
paid severely for his offenses (2 Sam. 12-16).

Love and capital punishment are not contrary. If love and capital punishment are
mutually exclusive, then the sacrifice of Christ was a contradiction. For "God so
loved the world that he gave his one and onlySon" ( John 3:16). Jesus said, "Greater
love has no one than this, that he lay down his life for his friends" (15:13).

Not only are love and punishment compatible, but the very principle behind
capital punishment is the one that made the cross necessary: It is the principle of
"a life for a life." The concept behind substitutionary atonement, that it takes life
to atone for life (Lev. 17:11), is what makes capital punishment necessary for
capital crimes. If there were any other way to satisfy justice and release grace,
then surely God would have found it rather than sacrificing his only beloved Son
(2 Cor. 5:21; 1 Pet. 3:18). In fact, if capital punishment had not been in effect in
the first century, then Jesus could not have died for our sins. Thus capital pun-
ishment elevates the value of life rather than lowering it. For the more serious the
punishment for a murder, the more value we place on the person who was
murdered.

The cross didn't abolish capital punishment. It is still commended in the New
Testament after the cross (Rom. 13:4; Acts 25:11). As just noted, the cross did
not destroy the life-for-a-life principle; it exemplified it perfectly. The cross
provided forgiveness of sins, but it did not thereby destroy all the consequences
of our sins. Even though Jesus tasted death for every person, nevertheless all
people will still die (Rom. 5:/2). If a Christian jumps off a high cliff, confessing
his sins on the way down will not avert death at the bottom. The truth is that,
forgiven or not, there are social and physical consequences of sin. A Christian
who commits a capital crime can receive forgiveness but should not expect to
avoid the appropriate penalty. And the fitting penalty for taking another life is
giving one's own life.

An important distinction should be made here. Although all who commit capital
crimes deserve death, it is not necessary that all should get death as a sentence.
God's justice is tempered with mercy, and so should human justice be. Room
should be left in special circumstances for a pardon. This, however, is the exception
that establishes the rule, not one that destroys the rule. As a rule, capital crime
should be given capital punishment. On the other hand, if we see the extenuating
circumstances of the crime and/or the thorough repentance of the criminal, we may
call for justice mingled with mercy.

204 Ethical Issues

An Evaluation of the Moral Arguments

In addition to the biblical arguments against capital punishment, there are
several moral arguments. These too call for comment.

Unequal justice does not negate the need for justice. Several things should be rec-
ognized in response to the argument against capital punishment on the grounds of
its unequal distribution. Ifjustice is applied unequally, then we should work to
assure that it is applied equally, not abolish justice altogether. The same thing holds
true for capital punishment. We do not argue that all medical treatment should be
abolished until everyone has it equally, even though more poor and minoritypeople
will die from lack of treatment than others. Why then should capital punishment be
abolished until equal percentages of all races are executed?

A disproportionate number of capital punishments is not in itself a proof of
inequity any more than a disproportionately high number of minorities in profes-
sional basketball is proof of discrimination against majority ethnic groups. This is
not to say that one group of people is more sinful than another, but simply that
conditions may occasion different social behavior. However understandable and
regrettable this may be, a society cannot tolerate violent social behavior, and it
must protect its citizens.

Capital punishment affirms human dignity. Punishing persons for their wrong is
a compliment, not an insult, to their freedom and dignity. As C. S. Lewis aptly
put it, "To be punished, however severely, because we deserved it, because we
“ought to have known better,’ is to be treated as a human person made in God's
image."' The very fad that God places such a high price tag on taking another's
life shows what great value he places on human life. Capital punishment, then, is
the ultimate compliment to human dignity; it implies the most affirmative stance
possible.

Criminals should be treated as persons, not patients. The working assumption of the
view opposing capital punishment is that it is dehumanizing. Prisoners are not
patients; they are persons. They are not objects to be manipulated, but human
beings to be respected. The criminal is not sick but sinful. It is tyrannical to submit
persons to compulsory cure against their will, an illusory humanitarianism with
sinister political implications. It dehumanizes individuals by treating each as a
"case" or patient rather than as a responsible person. As Lewis put it, "To be 'cured'
against one's will ... is to be put on a level with those who have not yet reached the
age of reason or those who never will; to be classed with infants, imbeciles, and
domestic animals."’ On the other hand, to be punished, however severely, is to be
respected as persons created in God's image, who know better and therefore
deserve to be punished for their wrongdoing.

Capital punishment does not send people to hell. It is not capital punishment that
sends people to hell; their unbelief does ( John 3:36). If capital punishment is

1. C. S. Lewis, God in the Dock, ed. Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970), 226.
2. Ibid.

Capital Punishment 205

wrong because unbelievers end in hell as a result, then it could also be argued that
capital punishment is right because it sends believers to heaven. Should it then be
given only to Christian murderers? If anything, knowing the sure moment of one's
approaching death should be an incentive to belief. It certainly eliminates
procrastination and encourages sober thinking about life after death.

Reconstructionism: Capital Punishment for All Major Crimes

Reconstructionism is on the opposite end of the spectrum from rehabilitationism.
While the latter does not permit capital punishment for anycrime, reconstructionism
requires it for every major crime. More precisely, reconstructionists believe that
capital punishment should be exacted for every nonceremonial crime designated in
Moses's law, which included some twenty different offenses.

Classical reconstructionists believe that society should be reconstructed on the
basis of Old Testament Mosaic law. Thus, their position is called theonomist
because they are governed by the law of God. God's moral law was revealed to
Moses and never abrogated. Only ceremonial aspects of the Old Testament law
were done away with by Christ. The moral law, however, is eternal since it reflects
the very character of God. Jesus said of the Old Testament Law and Prophets, "I
have not come to abolish them but to fulfill them" (Matt. 5:17).

The primary purpose ofjustice is retribution, not rehabilitation. It is to punish,
not to reform. Reconstructionist Greg L. Bahnsen makes this clear in Theonomy in
Christian Ethics; he contends that "we are to understand the prescription of the death
penalty on the basis that such a civic punishment is what the crime warrants in
God's eyes.""

Although they can be numbered differently, there are more than twenty
offenses that call for capital punishment in the Old Testament:

Murder (Exod. 21:12)

Contemptuous act against a judge (Deut. 17:12)

Causing a fatal miscarriage (Exod. 21:22-25)

False testimony in a potentially capital crime (Deut. 19:16-19)
Negligence by the owner of an ox that kills people (Exod. 21:29)
Idolatry (Exod. 22:20)

Blasphemy (Lev. 24:15-16)

Witchcraft or sorcery (Exod. 22:18)

False prophecy (Deut. 18:20)

Apostasy (Lev. 20:2)

Breaking the Sabbath (Exod. 31:14)

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3. Greg L. Bahnsen, Theanoney in Christian Ethics, expanded ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian &
Reformed, 1984), +N.

206 Ethical Issues

12. Homosexual relations (Lev. 18:22, 29)

13. Bestiality (Lev. 20:15-16)

14. Adultery (Lev. 20:10)

15. Rape (Deut. 22:25)

16. Incest (Lev. 20:11)

17. Cursing parents (Exod. 21:17; Lev. 20:9)

18. Rebellion by children (Deut. 21:18-21; Exod. 21:15)

19. Kidnapping (Exod. 21:16)

20. Drunkenness by a priest (Lev. 10:8-9)

21. Unanointed individuals touching the holy furnishings in the temple
(Num. 4:15)

22. Striking parents (Exod. 21:15)

23. Having sex during woman's menstrual period (Lev. 18:19, 28)

A careful look at this list reveals several interesting things. Only the first five
involve capital offenses, either actually or potentially. The remaining sixteen are
for noncapital crimes, even though some of them (rape) could lead to murder and
others (rebellion by a son) could prevent murders that he could do in his rebellion.
The next six (6-11) are for religious offenses, while the next eight (12-19) are for
various moral issues. The next two (20-21) relate to ceremonial duties, though
drunkenness is also a moral issue (Prov. 20:1; 23:21). Since 20-21 are part of the
ceremonial law, some theono mists do not believe that they are binding today
because of their ceremonial nature.* But with this exception, they believe that
capital punishment is still binding today. Theyinsist that human governments are
under divine obligation to implement capital punishment for these offenses. In
short, they believe in capital punishment for virtually every major kind of offense,
social, religious, or moral.

Arguments for Reconstructionism

The defense of this Old Testament use of capital punishment boils down to the
question of whether the Old Testament law is still binding today. Hence, the
reconstructionists' case is basically biblical in nature, though many point to the
social consequences of not following what they believe to be God's law for today.
Let us examine the most basic reasons for justifying their view.

God's law rejects his unchanging character. The moral law of God is a
reflection of the moral character of God. "Be holy, because I am holy," said the Lord
(Lev. 11:44). God is just; therefore, he requires justice of us (Ezek. 18:5-6). But if
God's law reflects his moral character, and if God's moral character does not change,
then God's law given through Moses is still in effect today. It must be, because God
has not changed.

4. Ibid., 213.

Capital Punishment 207

The New Testament repeats the Ten Commandments. The very commands
given to Moses on Sinai are repeated in the New Testament. Paul states many
of them in Romans 13:9. Others appear elsewhere (Eph. 6:2-3). If the Old
Testament law is not in effect today, then it is strange that the New Testament
repeats these commandments.

The Old Testament was the Bible of the early church. The early Christian
church had no New Testament; it was not written until the last half of the first
century. When Paul told Christians that "all Scripture is God-breathed and is useful
for teaching, ... and training in righteousness," he was referring to the Old
Testament (2 Tim. 3:16). This is clear from verse 15, which refers to the "holy
Scriptures” that Timothy learned from his Jewish mother and grandmother (1:5).
This being the case, reconstructionists argue that the New Testament church used
the Old Testament as its standard for righteousness. And the Old Testament taught
that capital punishment should be given for the offenses noted above.

Jesus said he did not come to abolish the lawiesus said clearly, "Do not think that
Ihave come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them but
to fulfill them? He added, "TI tell you the truth, until heaven and earth disappear, not
the smallest letter, not the least stroke of a pen, will by any means disappear from the
Law" (Matt. 5:17-18). On this basis Bahnsen insists that we are bound by the entirety
of Old Testament moral law on capital punishment.

Capital punishment is repeated in the New Testament. Furthermore, argue
re-constructionists, the New Testament explicitly reaffirms capital punishment
in Romans 13:4, where it declares that God has given the sword to human
governments. Likewise, both Jesus ( John 19:10-11) and Paul refer to capital
punishment (Acts 25:11).

The Mosaic law applied to Gentiles. Many Old Testament verses speak of
non-Jews being under the Mosaic law (see below).

An Evaluation of Reconstructionism

Though many Christians have a high view of the profitability of the Old Tes-
tament for believers (Rom. 15:4; 1 Cor. 10:11), most do not believe that the
Mosaic legislation is still binding on human governments today. There are
many reasons for this, but first a response should be made to the arguments
given by reconstructionists in favor of capital punishment for everything from
breaking the Sabbath to rebellious children.

Not all of Moses's law is necessitated by God's character. While all of Moses's
law is in accord with God's character, not all of it is necessitated by God's character.
God never legislates contrary to his character, but neither does everything flow of
necessity from it. God can and has willed different things at different times for
different people, all of which are in accord with his nature but not all of which are
demanded by it.

208 Ethical Issues

Reconstructionists believe that the ceremonial laws of Moses are not binding
today. They believe that Christ fulfilled the sacrificial and typological system (1
Cor. 5:7), and it therefore is unnecessary to bring a lamb to a temple. It is also
unnecessary to abstain from eating pork or shrimp, because Christ revoked the
laws of ceremonial unclean meats (Mark 7:19; Acts 10:15). But if this is so, then
there is no reason that God could not will that Old Testament laws about capital
punishment could change too.

Furthermore, capital punishment is not a law; it is a penalty or sanction for
disobeying a specific law Hence, one need not argue that God's basic moral
principles change when he no longer requires capital punishment for all the
offenses listed in the Old Testament.

It is not sufficient to argue that all offenses deserve death (Rom. 1:32; 6:23), for
God never gave capital punishment for all offenses, even in the Old Testament.
But if God did not require capital punishment for some offenses that deserved
death, even in the Old Testament system of law, then there is no reason why he
cannot do the same for other offenses in the New Testament. So it is not a question
of whether all of these twentysome offenses deserve death, but whether God has
designated death as their punishment today. And as we will see, there is no
evidence that God has designated capital punishment for any but capital offenses
in the New Testament.

Not all of the Ten Commandments are repeated in the New Testament. Recon-
structionists err in claiming that the Ten Commandments of Moses are restated in
the New Testament for Christians. First, only nine of the Ten Commandments
are restated in any form in the New Testament. The command to worship on Sat-
urday is not repeated, for obvious reasons: Jesus rose, appeared to his disciples,
ascended into heaven, and sent the Holy Spirit on Sunday. Thus, the early church
met on the first day of the week (Acts 20:7; 1 Cor. 16:2), not the last day. So the
command to worship on Saturday is no longer binding on Christians (see Rom.
14:5; Col. 2:16).

Even when one of the basic moral principles embodied in the law of Moses is
restated in the New Testament, it is repeated with a different promise. For ex-
ample, when Paul told the children in Ephesians 6:2 to "honor your parents,” he
added a different promise than the one given to Israel. Israel was promised that
they would "live long in the land [of Palestine] the LoRD your God is giving you"
(Exod. 20:12). The Christians at Ephesus were not given Israel's promise of land
and blessing but simply told to honor their parents "that it may go well with you ...
on the earth" (Eph. 6:3). But if different blessings are attached to keeping laws in
the New Testament, then there is no reason why different punishments cannot be
listed for breaking them. Capital punishment is not a law but a punishment for
breaking a law. Hence, changing a punishment for a law from the Old Testament
times is not changing any moral law.

Nowhere does the New Testament state, as does the Old Testament, that capital
punishment should be given for adultery. In fact, Paul told the church at Corinth to

Capital Punishment 209

have the adulterer excommunicated, not to have him executed (1 Cor. 5:5). Later
he even told the church to restore the repentant adulterer to its fellowship. This is a
significant change in penalty from the Old to the New Testament.

The Old Testament is for but not to the church. It is true that the very early church
did not have the entire New Testament. The church began in AD 33, and the first
books may not have been written for about twenty years. They did not need a writ-
ten New Testament, since they had living apostles (Acts 2:42; Eph. 2:20) who could
perform special miracles to confirm their divine authority (2 Cor. 12:12; Heb.
2:3-4).

Their use of the Old Testament reveals that they did not believe it was all written
to them but only that it was for them. Paul said, "For whatever was written in
earlier times was written for our instruction" (Rom. 15:4 NASB). He told the
Corinthians that the Old Testament was for their example (1 Cor. 10:11). But
nowhere is it stated in the New Testament that the whole of Old Testament law is
directed to the Christian, to say nothing of civil governments. In fact, as previously
noted, even reconstructionists admit that some parts of the Mosaic legislation no
longer apply to us today.

Jesus did away with the Old Testament laws. First, it is true that Jesus came to
fulfill the righteous demands of the Old Testament law (Matt. 5:17-18; see also Rom.
10:2-3). He did not do away with it by destroying it, but rather by fulfilling it.

The New Testament is clear that the law of Moses was superseded by Christ.
Paul said that which was written in stone (the Commandments) has faded away (2
Cor. 3:7,11). The writer of Hebrews declares that "there must also be a change of
the law" (7:12). The old covenant was replaced by the new covenant (8:13), just as
Jeremiah had predicted (31:31). Paul told the Galatians that "we are no longer under
the supervision of the law" since Christ has come (Gal. 3:25). To the Romans he
wrote, "We are not under law but under grace" (Rom. 6:15 NASB). And in
Colossians he affirms that in view of Christ's death and resurrection, God has
"canceled the written code, with its regulations" (Col. 2:14).

Just because there are similar moral laws in the New Testament does not mean
we are still under the Old Testament. There are also similar traffic laws in North
Carolina and Texas. But when a citizen of North Carolina disobeys one of its traf-
fic laws, he has not thereby broken the similar law in Texas. Since God's moral
nature does not change from age to age, we should expect that many of the moral
laws will be the same. But this does not mean that we are still bound by the Mosaic
codification simply because Moses received them from the same God who
inspired Paul and Peter.

Again there is a confusion here between what the law prohibits and the penalty
for disobeying it. Even though the basic moral principles embodied in the Mosaic
legislation are the same as those expressed in New Testament law for Christians,
nevertheless it does not follow that the punishment for breaking these principles
will be the same. And capital punishment is a question of punishment, not a ques-
tion of moral law as such. For example, it is granted that the moral prohibition

210 Ethical Issues

against adultery has not changed from age to age. God has always opposed it. The
question is whether he has always demanded the same punishment for it in every
age. There is no indication that he has. In fact, there is indication that he has not.

Not all Old Testament dentandsfor capital punishment are repeated in the New
Testatnent. It is mistaken to imply that capital punishment is not reaffirmed in the
New Testament since all the offenses for which it was demanded in the Old
Testament are not in effect in the New Testament. As noted earlier, even
reconstructionists admit that some cases of Old Testament capital punishment do not
apply today. The cases where capital punishment is implied John 19:11; Acts 25:11;
Rom. 13:4) do not include all those offenses in the Old Testament. It can actually be
argued that all of these were for capital offenses or the equivalent, such as treason
(see Luke 23:2; Acts 17:7). There is indication that capital punishment was not
demanded in the New Testament for some offenses listed in the Old Testament, for
example, adultery. In the New Testament, only excommunication was required for
the unrepentant offender, not capital punishment (I Cor. 5:5), and he was to be
restored to the church after repentance (2 Cor. 2:6-10).

Reconstructionists object that even non Jews in the Old Testament were obli-
gated to keep the law of Moses. They cite passages like Jeremiah 12:14-17: And it
shall come to pass, if they will diligently learn the ways of my people, to swear by
my name, As the LORD lives; even as they taught my people to swear by Baal, then
they shall be built up in the midst of my people’ (v. 16 RSV). But this is speaking
of heathen converting from idolatry to Judaism. It says nothing about their being
under the law of Moses as heathen.

Another text cited is Ezekiel 5:7-8: "Because you are more turbulent than the
nations that are all around you, and have not walked in my statutes or obeyed my
rules, and have not even acted according to the rules of the nations that are all around
you, therefore thus says the LORD GOD: Behold, I, even I, am against you" (ESV).
But there is a distinction between the "statutes" God gave to Israel and the "rules" of
the heathen around them, who did not have the same standard.

Isaiah 24:5 is also used to support theonomy: "The earth lies defiled under its
inhabitants; for they have transgressed the laws, violated the statutes, broken the
everlasting covenant" (ESV). But a look at the context reveals that Israel is in view
here, not the heathen. Verse 15 refers to "Israel," and "Mt. Zion" in verse 23
supports this, as does the reference to "the wasted city [of Jerusalem]" in verse 10
(ESV).

There are also texts in the law of Moses that refer to "sojourners" (foreigners)
living by the law of Moses. Exodus 12:49 declares: "There shall be one law for
the native and for the stranger who sojourns among you" (ESV). But the context
indicates that offering a Jewish sacrifice was voluntary on their part. It says only,
"Tf a stranger ... would [wants to] keep the Passover: then that person must "be
circumcised" (v. 48 ESV). However, the stranger (alien) was under no obligation
to keep the Jewish Passover (which was about Israel's deliverance from bondage

in Egypt).

Capital Punishment 211

Likewise, other verses (Lev. 20:2-5; cf. 24:22) speak only of sojourners abid-
ing by the Jewish laws of the land while they are visiting Israel. But this does not
mean that the law of Moses is given for the alien any more than keeping Islamic
law while traveling in a Muslim country shows that God intends everyone to be a
Muslim.

Yet Jews and non Jews alike surely are under the natural law (general revelation),
which forbids murder, adultery, sodomy, and the like (Lev. 18:24). This is precisely
what Paul says in Romans 2:12-15: those "who do not have the law [of Moses]"
nevertheless have a "law written on their hearts." It also is what America's founding
fathers meant by "Laws of Nature" that come from "Nature's God" (in The
Declaration of Independence).

A Biblical Critique of.Reconstructionism

Many of the critiques of reconstructionism have already been implied in re-
sponding to the arguments. The reconstructionist argument for capital punish-
ment is based on the belief that the Old Testament law of Moses is still binding
on believers today. In response to this, there are many arguments showing that
the law of Moses is not binding today.

The separation between ceremonial and moral categories is problematic.
Nowhere does the Bible divide the law into distinct ceremonial, civil, and moral
categories. No such hard-and-fast lines are drawn. Jesus did cleanse all meat (Mark
7:19), and the New Testament writers follow in doing away with the designation of
some foods as unclean (Acts 10:15; 1 Tim. 4:3-4). However, the ceremonial aspects
of the law are broader than clean and unclean foods. They include regulations on
clothes, sacrifices, rituals, and even sanitation (Lev. 11-27). Hence, the cleansing of
certain foods cannot be equated with the so-called ceremonial law. Furthermore, the
laws against idolatry, immorality, eating blood, and strangled animals enjoined on
Christians (Acts 15:29) were not unique to the Mosaic legislation; they were earlier
(see Gen. 9:4).

The law of Moses was a unit. There were civil aspects to the moral law and
moral dimensions of the civil law. Indeed, there were moral aspects of the cer-
emonial law, as is evident from the fact that it was said to reflect God's holiness
(Lev. 11:45). Surely God's holiness is not a strictly amoral issue. Nowhere in the
Old Testament is a separation made between the moral and the civil aspects of
Moses's law, or between the civil and the ceremonial aspects. And nowhere in the
New Testament does it declare that only the ceremonial and sacrificial aspects of
the law of Moses have been abolished. Any moral law reflective of the very nature
of God applies to all people at all times because God does not change (Mal. 3:6;
Heb. 1:10-12; James 1:17).

5. The Westminster Confession of Faith (1647) speaks of "ceremonial laws, [as] containing ... divers
instructions of moral duties’ (19.3).

212 Ethical Issues

The apostles set aside the law. The apostles ruled against the contention that Gen-
tiles must be circumcised and required to "obeythe law ofMoses" (Acts 15:5). They
insisted only that Christians should "abstain from food sacrificed to idols, from blood,
from meat of strangled animals and from sexual immorality" (v. 29). But these were
not unique to Moses's law (Gen. 9:4), and they were not all that was required by
Moses's law. Hence, the very fact that the apostles did not insist on "anything beyond
the ... [stated] requirements” (Acts 15:28) proves they did not believe that Christians
were under the law of Moses. Further, the prohibitions the apostles gave to Christians
in Acts 15 cannot be considered as rules against purely ceremonial matters, for one of
them was against idolatry and another against immorality.

James affirmed the unity of the law. The unity of Moses's law is so strong that
James insists that "whoever keeps the whole law and yet stumbles at just one point is
guilty of breaking all of it" ( James 2:10). And in the next verse he quotes the laws
against adultery and murder, which everyone agrees are moral laws. The law of
Moses was considered a unity. So if any of it is thrown out, then all of it is thrown
out. Yet this is not to say that the moral principles based on the character of God and
embedded in Moses's law were also thrown out. Those moral principles must not be
discarded, because God's moral nature does not change.

Paul said Christians are not under the law. New Testament believers "are
not under law, but under grace" (Rom. 6:14). John said, "The law was given
through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus Christ" ( John 1:17). Here
the law given by Moses is contrasted to the grace brought by Christ. Hence, we
cannot be under both at the same time.

The Ten Commandments have faded away Paul told the Corinthians that what
"was carved in letters on stone [the Ten Commandments] ... was being brought to
an end" through Christ and the Spirit (2 Cor. 3:7, 11 ESV). It has been replaced
by"that which lasts!" (v. 11). Hebrews declares that "when there is a change in the
priesthood, there is necessarily a change in the law as well" (Heb. 7:12 RSV).

How was the law of Moses done away with by Christ? He did it "by abolishing
in his flesh the law with its commandments and regulations" (Eph.2.:15). The law
condemned us, but Christ redeemed us. For "there is now no condemnation for
those who are in Christ Jesus" (Rom. 8:1).

Christ is the end of the law. "Christ is the end [telos, goal] of the law" for
believers (Rom. 10:4). Christ did not simply end the law; rather, he is the End
of the law. He finished it by fulfilling it. He did not do away with the law by
destroying it (Matt. 5-17-18) but by completing it. He is the perfect goal of the
law because he perfectly kept it (Matt. 3:15; Rom. 8:3-4).

The law was in place only until Christ came. The "law was put in charge to lead us
to Christ that we might be justified by faith:’ But "now that faith has come, we are no
longer under the supervision of the law" (Gal. 3:24-25). Here too it is clear that Paul
includes the moral law of Moses, because he refers to it as what was given at Sinai
some 430 years after the promise was confirmed to the patriarchs (v. 17). And what
was given at Sinai were the Ten Commandments, which contain the

Capital Punishment 213

very heart and basis of the moral law. So the whole law of Moses as given to
Israel was taken away by Christ.

The law of Moses was given only to Israel. The book of Hebrews is emphatic about
the fact that "the law was given to the people" of Israel (7:11). And of that law it
declares "there must also be a change of the law" (v. 12). By the new covenant "the
former regulation is set aside" (v. 18). The old covenant is replaced by the new cov-
enant (8:10-12). And this new one, said the Lord, "will not be like the covenant I
made with their forefathers" (8:9). By the very fact of "calling this covenant 'new,' he
has made the first one obsolete" (8:13).The language could hardly be clearer: the
whole covenant given to Israel through Moses, which included moral laws, has been
done away with. The psalmist said explicitly that the Mosaic law was given to Israel
and not to any other nation. For "He declares His word to Jacob, His statues and
judgments to Israel. He has not dealt thus with any nation; and as for His ordinances,
they have not known them" (Ps. 147:19-20 NASB).

As for the reconstructionists' claim that foreigners were under the same law
as Israel (Exod. 12:48; Num. 15:16), two things are important. First, when it
came to morally based civil laws, sojourners in Israel had to obey its laws just
as Christians traveling in Muslim countries do today (cf. Lev. 20:1-2). God's
moral law "written on their hearts" (Rom. 2:15) applies to all persons wherever
they are. Murder is wrong everywhere, and whoever commits it is subject to the
law of the land in which they do it.

Second, when it came to the sacrificial system unique to Israel, there was no
obligation for non-Jews to offer Jewish sacrifices. It was only necessary that if they
voluntarily decided to participate, then it must be done according to Jewish law.
Exodus 12:48 declares: "Jfa stranger shall sojourn among you and would keep the
Passover to the Loan, let all his males be circumcised" (ESV). Sojourners had no
obligation to do so, but if they did take part, then they must do so according to Jewish
law. This is contrary to reconstructionism, which claims that all persons are subject
to the moral law of Moses and its capital penalties today.

We cannot take the law without its curses. Those who believe Christians are still
under the law are reminded by Paul, yCursed is everyone who does not continue to
do everything written in the Book of the Law" (Gal. 3:10). One thus cannot take
the blessings of the law without its curses (see Deut. 27). According to Paul, with
the law it is either all or nothing. So on the one hand, if any of the law is binding on
Christians, then all of it is. On the other hand, if some of the Mosaic law does not
applyto Christians, then none of it does. But Christ has taken the curse of the law
for us (Gal. 3:13). So to accept the law of Moses as binding on us is to reject what
Christ has done for us (Gal. 3:21).

A Social Critique of Reconstructionism

From a strictly social point of view, there are serious problems with recon-
structionism. First, it would eliminate our constitutional freedom of religion by

214 Ethical Issues

establishing one religion as preferred. Thus it would be a violation of the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

Second, it has already been tried and has failed. Calvin's Geneva and the
Puritans' early America are cases in point. Baptists had to flee to Rhode Island
because they were persecuted by the reconstructionists.

Third, since reconstructionism is government based on religious revelation, the
question can always be asked: "Whose revelation?" It is simply bigotry to answer
"Mine!" And it is presumption to respond "God's:' Lest Christians be tempted to say
"a Christian revelation," we need only be reminded that there is a Muslim revelation
too. In a pluralistic world, no one's religious revelation is going to be accepted by all
others as the basis for government. The Bible (plus other religious books) can
certainly be informative yet not normative for government. It can be a source
without being used as a divinely authoritative source.

Retributionism: Capital Punishment for Some Crimes

The third major view is retributionism, which holds that capital punishment is
legitimate for some crimes: capital ones. Since the essence of this position has
already emerged in the critique of the other two views, the discussion here will
be more brief. Unlike rehabilitationism, retributionism believes that the
primary purpose of capital punishment is to punish. Unlike reconstructionism,
retributionism does not believe that civil governments today are bound by the
Mosaic legislation regarding capital punishment.

Retributionism holds that criminals are sinful, not sick. Their capital offense is
moral, not pathological. Since they are rational and morally responsible beings,
they know better and therefore deserve to be punished. Though capital punishment
also protects innocent people from repeated violent crimes, this is not its primary
purpose. Furthermore, even though capital punishment will deter crime, at least by
those offenders, nonetheless this is not its primary purpose. Its primary purpose is
penal, not remedial. Its purpose as such is to punish the guilty rather than protect
the innocent.

When God instituted human government and gave it capital authority, it was
for the purpose of dealing with capital crimes. God told Noah explicitly:

From each man, too, I will demand an accounting for the life of his fellow man.
Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image
of God has God made man. (Gen. 9:5-6; man = humankind)

When this mandate was later incorporated into the Mosaic law, a number of
capital crimes were spelled out, including murder (Exod. 21:12), avenging a death,
causing a miscarriage (Exod. 21:22-23), false testimony in a capital case (Deut.
19:16-19), and not killing an ox that killed people (Exod. 21:29). In each case the

Capital Punishment 215

person who received capital punishment was responsible for the death of an innocent
person or persons. In principle this would include treason, since many lives are at
stake in treasonous acts. In short, capital punishment is for capital crimes.

When capital punishment is mentioned in the New Testament, it is also in the
context of capital crimes. Government was the sword God gave to Noah for capital
crimes (cf. Rom. 13:4). Jesus acknowledged Rome's capital authority over his life (
John 19:10-11), but here again the alleged offense was a capital crime: treason
(Luke 23:2). Likewise, Paul's alleged crime for which he was willing to receive
capital punishment if guilty was treason (Acts 25:11; cf. 17:7).

The Biblical Basis for Capital Punishment

Capital punishment is implied from the very beginning of the Old Testament.
It is repeated over and over again throughout the Scriptures, including the New
Testament.

The need for capital punishment is implied in human nature. Human beings,
male and female, are created in God's image (Gen. 1:27). Theyboth resemble and
represent God on earth. Killing them is an attack on the God who made them. It is a
rejection of his sovereignty over human life (Deut. 32:39). For this capital crime,
God later explicitly declared that he demanded a capital punishment (Gen. 9:6). But
such a punishment is implied in the very nature of the crime, even before it is
explicitly stated. This becomes obvious in the case of Cain, the first murderer.

Cain deserved and expected capital punishment. There are many indications in
the text that when Cain killed his brother, Abel, he both expected and deserved
capital punishment. God said, "Your brother's blood cries out to me from the
ground" (Gen. 4:10). This cry for blood (life) vengeance is a clear indication that
justice demanded a life in return. Cain himselfplainly expected vengeance against
his life: "Whoever finds me will kill me" (v. 14). Even God's pronouncement of
protection on Cain implied capital punishment by its reference to "vengeance seven
times over" on anyone who later killed Cain (v. 15). Since there was no government
or anyone left (except Cain's father and mother) to execute Cain, God personally
commuted Cain's deserved death sentence. Since God is the author of life, he has the
right to do it. But the text nonetheless makes it evident that capital punishment was
both expected and deserved.

God gave the power of capital punishment to human government. There was
capital punishment before the time of Noah, but it was left to relatives to avenge
the murderer (Gen. 4:14). By instituting capital punishment, God took justice out of
the hands of the families of the deceased and placed the sword in the hands of
human government. In this way justice could be more objectively exercised by
eliminating the personal revenge factor and the emotional anger. So Noah was not
the first to be given the right to capital punishment (Gen. 9:6). This was simply the
point at which God instituted human government, which was thereby to assume
the capital authority already being exercised by families.

216 Ethical Issues

Capitalpunislunentwas incorporated into theMosaiclaw. When God enjoined
capital punishment on Israel (Exod. 21), it was not the first time he had instituted it. It
was implied from the beginning (Gen. 4) and given to human government under Noah
for capital crimes (Gen. 9:6).What Moses's law did was simplyto incorporate it and
extend it to manyother noncapital crimes, including certain religious and ceremonial
offenses. Israel was a chosen nation, whom God was to rule in a special way (Exod. 19).
Hence, since Israel was a theocracy, these additional reasons for capital punishment were
not intended for other nations (Ps. 147:19-20). For example, God never commanded
other nations to worship on the Sabbath or to paytithes to the temple in Jerusalem.
Hence, Gentile nations are not condemned for not doing this, even though they are
judged for a whole host of sins from pride to injustice (see Obad. 1). Israel, however, is
often condemned by God forbreaking these special laws. Individuals were even given
capital punishment for not keeping the Sabbath (Exod. 31:14).

Under God, Moses did not institute capital punishment for capital crimes;
he simply incorporated it into his law. But he did extend capital punishment to
certain noncapital crimes. Moses did not give capital punishment to the nations
in general, but he did apply it to God's chosen nation in special ways.

If capital punishment for capital crimes was not given with the law of
Moses, then it did not thereby pass away with the Mosaic law. It abides when
that which was unique to Moses's law has passed away (Heb. 7-8).

Capital punishment is reaffirmed in the New Testament. Capital punishment
for capital crimes was not given by God simply to Israel, as was the law of Moses
(Deut. 4:8; Ps. 147:19-20). It was given to Noah for the whole human race (Gen.
9:6, 9-10). And since God has never abolished this punishment on the race, any
more than he has ever abolished his promise to Noah for the whole race that he
would "never again" flood the whole earth (Gen. 9:11), then divinely instituted
capital punishment is still in effect for the whole race.

The sword that was divinely given to human government for capital punish-
ment (Gen. 9:6) is explicitly reaffirmed in the New Testament (Rom. 13:4). Jesus
acknowledged it before Pilate ( John 19:10-11), as did Paul before the Roman
authorities (Acts 25:11). So capital punishment, at least for capital crimes, is
stated before the law of Moses and repeated after it. Hence, whatever additions
were made in Moses's law regarding capital punishment for other reasons are not
binding on the human race today.

An Evaluation of Retributionism—Negative Criticisms

Many criticisms have been leveled at capital punishment, even for crimes in-
volving the loss of life. Most of these have already been implied in the response to
rehabilitationism. Hence, they will be only briefly summarized here.

It is cruel and unusual punishment. If it is, then so is the murder of an innocent
person, and justice demands a /ife for a life. Those who take a life should give their
life. What we take, we owe. There is nothing cruel or unusual about this.

Capital Punishment 217

It is unfairly applied. Not administering justice for any capital crime is not the
answer to injustice for some real crimes. Two wrongs do not make a right. Just
because some people die from a lack of proper distribution of medical care does
not mean it should be withheld from all. Likewise, just because some people die
from an unjust distribution of capital punishment does not mean that justice should
be withheld from all.

It does not deter crime. God said it will deter offenses. When justice is done, "all
the people will hear and be afraid, and will not be contemptuous again" (Deut.
17:13). One thing is certain: capital punishment will deter that particular violent
criminal from ever repeating another crime. If capital punishment does not deter as
much other crime as it could, it is probably because it is not exercised widely and
speedily enough to be a real threat (Eccles. 8:11).

It is not biblical, at least not today. As we have seen, capital punishment is not
biblical today for noncapital crimes. Those were unique to the Mosaic legislation,
which is no longer binding. But capital punishment for capital crimes was given to
human government before Moses's law (Gen. 9:6), and it was reaffirmed after
Moses's law ( John 19:10-11; Acts 25:11; Rom. 13:4).

The criminal should be cured, not killed. This is based on the mistaken notion
that justice is remedial, not penal. However, the remedial view dehumanizes
criminals by making them into patients or objects to be treated, rather than persons
to be respected. It is an illusory humanitarianism that is really antihuman. It has
horrendous tyrannical potential in the hands of an elite, who can pronounce who is
"sick" and must be treated by the state.

Some murderers are not rationally responsible. If this refers to children before
they are socially accountable, to imbeciles, or to people who do not have the moral
and rational capability to understand their actions, then capital punishment is not an
appropriate punishment. Moral responsibility assumes someone is morally
responsible. A person who is not rational cannot be held rationally accountable.

It is contrary to the concept of pardon. First, pardon makes no sense in a reme-
dial view of justice. Someone who is sick cannot be pardoned; only a sinner can be
forgiven. Hence, the concept of pardon makes sense only in a penal view of justice.
All capital crimes deserve death, but not all criminals deserving death should
necessarily die. For that matter, all offenses are worthy of death (Rom. 1:32; 6:23).
But even the old law did not demand capital punishment for all offenses. In
Genesis 4, God personally commuted the death sentence for Cain. So suspending
the deserved death penalty in special cases, especially where there is genuine
repentance and restitution, is not without biblical precedent. But the very concept
of mercy to the genuinely repentant presupposes the framework of justice that calls
for capital justice in capital crimes.

It overlooks those who are insane. No one who is really insane (not in control of
one's faculties) should be given capital punishment, because such are not morally
responsible. However, so-called temporary insanity is often only a fit of rage. And
we are responsible for getting angry and for what we do in anger. Being irrational

218 Ethical Issues

(insane) and acting irrationally (criminally) are two different things. In one
sense, all sin is irrational, including capital sins.

An Evaluation of Retributionism—Positive Contributions

In spite of many criticisms, capital punishment for capital crimes has many
positive dimensions. Several will be summarized here.

It is based on a high view of humanity. The retributionist position behind capital
punishment presupposes a high view of human freedom and dignity. Itis based on
the assumption that normal adult human beings are rational and moral beings who
know better, who could do otherwise, and yet who chose to do evil anyway and
therefore deserve to be punished.

It treats criminals with respect. By punishing those who deserve it, the state is
rendering respect to them. But submitting criminals to compulsory cures against
their will is treating them as infants, imbeciles, or domestic animals. Persons who
knowingly do wrong deserve to be punished, not to be treated like an object to be
manipulated.

It operates on a correct view ofjustice. As noted earlier, the biblical view ofjustice
is penal, not remedial. The primary purpose ofjustice is moral, not therapeutic. It is
ethical, not pathological. This is true whether the crime is incidental or capital.
Punishment should be given only because people deserve it.

It does deter crime. All the protests notwithstanding, punishment does deter
crime. The Bible says it does (Deut. 17:13), and the facts support it, especially in
the case of capital punishment. Dead offenders cannot repeat their crimes. And
even common sense dictates that average persons will think twice about breaking
the law if they really believe they will be severely punished.

It protects innocent lives. Capital punishment protects innocent lives in three
ways. First, it is a strong advance premium placed upon human life that generates
our respect in preserving and protecting life. Second, when it is properly exercised,
it puts the fear of God into other would-be murderers. Finally, it prevents repeat
crimes by capital offenders.

Summary and Conclusion

There are three basic views on capital punishment held by Christians: rehabilita-
tionism, reconstructionism, and retributionism. Rehabilitationism opposes capital
punishment for any crime. Reconstructionism insists on capital punishment for all
major crimes, whether moral or religious. Retributionism holds that capital
punishment is appropriate for certain crimes: capital offenses.

Rehabilitationism is based on a remedial (reformatory) view of justice. The
criminal is seen as a patient who is sick and in need of treatment. The other two views
hold that justice is retributive. Theyview the criminal as a morally responsible person
who deserves punishment. Retributionism differs from reconstructionism

Capital Punishment 219

and does not believe that offenses calling for capital punishment under Moses's law
are still binding today. Rather, retributionism contends that capital punishment is
based on the biblically stated principle of a life for a life that is applicable to all
persons in all places and at all times.

Select Readings

Bahnsen, Greg L. Theonomy in Christian Ethics. Expanded ed. Phillipsburg, NJ:
Presbyterian & Reformed, 1984.

Baird, Robert M., and Stuart E. Rosenbaum, eds. Punishment and the Death Penalty: The
Current Debate. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1995.

Baker, William H. On Capital Punishment. Rev. ed. Chicago: Moody, 1985.

.Wordy of Death: Capital Punishment—Unpleasant Necessity or Unnecessary Penalty?

Chicago: Moody, 1973.

Davis, ohn Jefferson. Evangelical Ethics: Issues Facing the Church Today. Phillipsburg, NJ:
Presbyterian & Reformed, 1985.

Endres, Michael E. The Morality of Capital Punishment: Equal Justicefor All under
the Law? Mystic, CT: Twenty-third Publications, 1985.

Lewis, C. S. God in the Dock. Edited by Walter Hooper. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970.

Megivern, James J. The Death Penalty: An Historical and Theological Survey. New
York: Paulist Press, 1997.

Moberly, Walter. The Ethics of Punishment. Hamden, CT: Archon, 1968.

Owens, Erik C., John D. Carlson, and Eric P. Elshtain. Religion and the Death
Penalty: A Call for Reckoning. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004.

Van den Haag, Emest. The Death Penalty: A Debate. New York: Plenum, 1983.

WAR

What should the Christian's attitude be toward war? Is it ever right to take the life of
another person under the command of one's government? Is there a biblical basis for
engaging in war? These questions have found varying responses among Christians.
Basically, views regarding taking the life of another in war fall into three categories.
First, there is activism, which holds that the Christian ought to participate in any war
engaged in by one's government because government is ordained of God. Second,
there ispacifism, which contends that Christians should never participate in war to
the point of killing others because God has commanded people never to take the
lives of others. Finally, there is selectivism (the just-war view), which argues that
Christians should participate in some wars—the just ones. To do otherwise is to
refuse to follow the just course commanded by God.

Activism: It Is Always Right to Participate in War

Activism holds that Christians are duty-bound to obey their government and to
participate in everywar for which that government enlists their support. Adherents of
this position offer two different kinds of arguments in favor of their view, biblical
and philosophical (or social). We will begin by examining the biblical data.

The Biblical Argument: Government Is Ordained of God

Scripture seems emphatic on this point. Government is of God. Whether in
the religious or the civil realm, God is the God of order and not of chaos (Gen.
9:6; 1 Cor. 14:33, 40).

220

War 221

Old Testament data on God and government. From the very beginning, Scripture
declares that humankind is to "have dominion over... every living thing that moves
upon the earth" (Gen. 1:28 RSV). Humankind is to be king over all the earth. After
the fall the woman is told, "Your desire shall be for your husband, and he shall rule
over you" (Gen. 3:16 RSV). When Cain killed Abel, the text implies that he failed to
realize that he was his "brother's keeper" (Gen. 4:9-10). Finally, when the whole
antediluvian civilization had become corrupt and "the earth was filled with violence"
(Gen. 6:11 RSV), God destroyed it and instituted human government. God said to
Noah and his family after the flood, "For your lifeblood I will surely require a
reckoning ... ; of every man's brother I will require the life of man:' For "whoever
sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for God made man in his
own image" (Gen. 9:5-6 RSV; man = humankind).

In brief, God ordained human government. Adam was given the crown to
reign over the earth. And then evil became rampant, and Noah was given the
sword to enforce that rule. Government is of God both because order is from
God and because disorder must be put down for God. Humans have the right
from God to take the lives of unruly human beings who shed innocent blood.
Government is invested with divine power.

The sword given to Noah was used byAbraham when he engaged in war
against the kings who had committed aggression against Abraham's nephew
Lot (Gen. 14). This passage indicates God's approval of wars that protect the
innocent from aggressors.

Although the specific form of government changed throughout the Old Tes-
tament, there is a reiteration of the principle that government is of God. In the
Mosaic theocracy, the powers of government are quite explicit: "You shall give
life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn,
wound for wound, stripe for stripe" (Exod. 21:23-25 RSV). Even when Israel set
up its monarchy contrary to God's plan (1 Sam. 8:7), God nevertheless anointed
their choice of a king. God said to Samuel the prophet, "Hearken to their voice,
and make them a king" (1 Sam. 8:22 RSV). Later Samuel said, "Do you see him
whom the Loan has chosen?" (1 Sam. 10:24 RSV). Even before David was king,
he was commanded to fight against the Philistines, who were robbing Israel (1
Sam. 23:1).

As far as the governments of Gentile nations were concerned, the Old Testament
declares that "the Most High is sovereign over the kingdoms of men and gives them
to anyone he wishes" (Dan. 4:25). And from the rest of Daniel's prophecy, it is clear
that God ordained the great Babylonian, Medo-Persian, Greek, and Roman
governments (Dan. 2-7). Thus the text indicates that God has ordained government
wherever it is found. And since government is given by God, it follows that to
disobey government is to disobey God. If, therefore, the country's government
commands a person to go to war, biblical activism argues that one must respond in
obedience to the Lord, for the Lord has ordained the government with the sword, the
power to take lives.

222. Ethical Issues

New Testament data on God and government. The New Testament confirms
the view of the Old Testament that God has ordained government. Jesus declares
that we should "give to Caesar what is Caesar's" (Matt. 22:21). That civil authority
is God-given is further acknowledged by Jesus before Pilate: "You would have no
power over me if it were not given to you from above" ( John 19:11). Paul ad-
monishes Timothy to pray and give thanks "for kings and all those in authority" (1
Tim. 2:2). Titus is exhorted to "remind the people to be subject to rulers and
authorities, to be obedient" (Titus 3:1). Peter is very clear: "Be subject for the
Lord's sake to every human institution, whether it be to the emperor as supreme, or
to governors as sent by him" (1 Pet. 2:13-14 RSV).

The most extensive passage in the New Testament on the relation of the Christian
to government is found in Romans 13:1-7. The first verse makes it clear that all
government is divinely established: "Everyone must submit himself to the governing
authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established: Therefore,
"he who rebels against the authorityis rebelling against what God has instituted, and
those who do so will bring judgment on themselves" (vv.1-2).The further reason
given for obeying a ruler is that "he is God's servant to do you good.... He is God's
servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer" (v. 4).

Paul writes, "This is also why you pay taxes, for the authorities are God's ser-
vants, who give their full time to governing" (v. 6). In view of this, the Christian is
urged to "pay all of them their dues, taxes to whom taxes are due, revenue to
whom revenue is due, respect to whom respect is due, honor to whom honor is
due" (v. 7 RSV). What is especially significant about this passage of Scripture is
that it is the New Testament's reiteration of the power of government to take a
human life. Christians are urged to obey the existing governor or king, "for he
does not bear the sword in vain" (v. 4 RSV). Government, with its power over life,
is "ordained of God: and whoever resists one's government is resisting God (Rom.
13:1-2 KJV). It would follow from this, according to biblical activists, that one
ought to respond to the government's call to take part in war because God has
given the authority of the sword to the governing authorities.

The Philosophical Argument: Government Is Humans' Guardian

Activism is defended by arguments outside the Bible as well. One of the most
powerful defenses of this position comes from Plato's dialogue Crito. In it, he of-
fers three explicit reasons (and two more implied ones) why a person should not
disobey even a government that is unjustly putting him to death. The scene is the
prison where Socrates awaits his death after lie has been charged with impiety and
sentenced to drink the cup of poison. Socrates' young friend Crito urges him to
escape and evade the death penalty. In reply, Socrates gives five reasons for
obeying an unjust government, even to the point of death:

Government is the human's parent. One ought not disobey even an unjust govern-
ment. "First, because in disobeying it he is disobeying his parent:' By this Socrates

War 223

means that under the sponsorship of government, the individual is brought into the
world. One is not born into a lawless jungle but comes into this world under the
parentage of the state. The state makes one's very birth more than barbaric: it is a
birth into a state of civilization rather than into anarchy. Just as parents spend
months in preparation and anticipation for a child, many years have likewise been
spent in maintaining the state, which makes a civilized birth possible, and these
years may not be lightly regarded later because a person finds oneself at odds with
the government. If one were to disobey the government, says Socrates, would it not
reply, "In the first place did we not bring you into existence? Your father married
your mother by our aid and begat you. Say whether you have any objection to urge
against those of us who regulate marriage. None, I should reply.’

Government is the human's educator. Socrates offers another reason for obedience to
one's government. "Second, because it is the author of his education.” The im-
plication here is that the very education making persons what they are (including
their knowledge of justice and injustice) was given to them by their government.
They are civilized, and not barbarian, not only by birth but also by training. And both
the birth and training were made possible by the government that is now demanding
one's life. What can one reply against governments that "after birth regulate the
nurture and education of children, in which you also were trained? Were not the laws,
which have the charge of education, right in commanding your father to train you in
music and gymnastic? Right, I should reply." From this it follows that government
could say to us, "Since you were brought into the world and nurtured and educated
by us, can you deny in the first place that you are our child and slave, as your fathers
were before you?" And if this is true, people are not on equal terms with their
government. They have no more right to strike back at it and revile it than one does to
hit one's mother or father. Even if government would destroy us, we have no right to
destroy it in return. Persons who think that they do have such a right have "failed to
discover that [their] country is more to be valued and higher and holier far than
mother or father or any ancestor."" Government is not only prior to the individual
citizen, but also superior to the citizen as well.

The governed have a duty to obey government. The third reason Socrates gives for a
person obeying the government is that "he has made an agreement with [it] that he
will duly obey [its] commands?’ That is, people's consent to be governed, given by
pledging allegiance to that government, binds them to its laws. By the very fact that
one takes a given country as one's own country, that person has thereby made a tacit
covenant to be obedient to its commands. Hence, "when we are punished by [our
country], whether with imprisonment or stripes, the punishment is to be endured in
silence; and if she lead us to wounds or death in battle, thither we follow as is
right?" For if people accept the privileges of education and protec-

ip Plato, Crito, in The Dialogues of Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowen, vol. 7 of The
Great Books of the Western World (Chicago: Encyclopedia Buitannica, 1952), 217.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

226 Ethical Issues

by attaching divine sanctions to them. Since this option seems to clearly reject the
authority of the Old Testament, it is not a viable alternative for an evangelical
Christian. Some pacifists suggest that these wars were unique in that Israel was
acting as a theocratic instrument in the hands of God. These were not really Israel's
wars at all but God's wars, as is evidenced by the special miracles God performed
to win them (see Josh. 6, 10; Ps. 44).

Other pacifists argue that the wars of the Old Testament were not God's perfect
will but only his permissive will. God is represented as commanding war in the
same secondary and concessive sense that he is said to have commanded Samuel to
anoint Saul the king (I Sam. 10:1) even though God had not chosen Saul but David
to be king. Wars are commanded by God in the same sense in which Moses
commanded divorce—because of the hardness of people's hearts (Matt. 19:8). It is
not that God really desires and commands war any more than he likes disobedience
or divorce. God has a better way than that, and it is obedience and love. God could
have accomplished his purposes in Israel and Canaan without war if they had been
more obedient to him.

No war as such is ever God's command. What God commands clearly and
unequivocally is "You shall not killf This command applies to all people, friends,
or enemies. All persons are made in God's image, and it therefore is wrong to kill
them. The Old Testament clearly teaches that one should love one's enemies (Lev.
19:18; Jon. 4), and Jesus reaffirmed this: "Love your enemies and pray for those
who persecute you" (Matt. 5:44). War is based in hate and is intrinsically wrong.
Taking the life of another person is contrary to the principle of love and is therefore
fundamentally unchristian.

Resisting evil with force is wrong. Closely connected with the first basic premise
of pacifism, that killing is wrong, is another. Evil should never be resisted with
physical force, but rather with the spiritual force of love. Did not Jesus say, "Do not
resist one who is evil. But if any one strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the
other also" (Matt. 5:39 RSV)? Did not Christ also teach in this passage that "if any
one forces you to go one mile, go with him two miles" (v. 41 RSV)? The Christian is
not to retaliate or payback evil with evil, for vengeance belongs to God (Deut.
32:35). Paul wrote, "Beloved, never avenge yourself, but leave it to the wrath of
God.... No, ‘if your enemy is hungry, feed him; if he is thirsty, give him drink. ... Do
not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good" (Rom. 12:19-21 RSV). The
Christian is to "repay no one evil for evil... If possible, so far as it depends on you,
live peaceably with all" (vv. 17-18 RSV).

The story ofJesus's driving the money changers from the temple is not incom-
patible with this position, some pacifists argue, for physical force (the whip) was
used only on the animals, not the people. Furthermore, the authority Jesus used was
his own and that of Scripture, not that of a strong-armed band of disciples ( John
2:15-16). Finally, pacifists argue that the kind of physical force used by Jesus in the
temple falls far short of proving that Jesus would sanction using extreme physical
force to the point of taking human life.

War 227

Jesus's statement "I have not come to bring peace, but a sword" cannot be used to
support war (Matt. 10:34). When Jesus commanded Peter, "Put your sword back
into its place; for all who take the sword will perish by the sword; he was defining
not the purpose but the result of his ministry (Matt. 26:52 RSV). He was saying that
the effect of allegiance to him would "set a man against his father, and a daughter
against her mother" (Matt. 10:35 RSV). The effect of Christ's ministry would be to
divide families as if by a sword (Luke 12:51), even though this was not the intent of
his coming.

Pacifism is committed to the premise that it is essentially wrong to use physical
force, at least to the point of taking life, in order to resist evil. This does not mean
that pacifists repudiate all force. It means only that they believe in affirming the
greater force of spiritual good when faced by the forces of physical evil. Pacifists
believe basically that "we are not contending against flesh and blood but against ...
the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places" (Eph. 6:12 RSV).

When pressed to the wall by a militant activist asking whether a pacifist would
kill a would-be murderer of his wife, the consistent pacifist's reply is simple: Why
kill a wicked murderer and send him to his eternal doom, when permitting the
murderer to kill his believing wife will result in her eternal bliss? The less stringent
pacifist (or perhaps one with a non-Christian wife) might argue that wounding or
disarming the murderer would be sufficient, but that one should never aim to kill
even a murderer.

Another basic premise of pacifism is that there is no real distinction between
what one should do as a private citizen and what one should do as a public official.
What is wrong for a person to do in one's own neighborhood is wrong in any other
neighborhood in the world. Putting on a military uniform does not revoke one's
moral responsibility. The distinction between person and office is rejected as
unbiblical and inconsistent. No person is exonerated from God's command not to
kill simply because they have changed uniforms. The command against murder is
not abrogated by one's obligation to the state. Only God holds the power o f life
and death. The powers of the state are social but not capital. The right to take a life
belongs only to the Author of life himself (see Job 1:21). No human authority has
the right to transcend God's moral law. Indeed, what authority government has is
derived from God's moral law.

The Social Arguments: War Is Always Wrong

There are strong social arguments against war. It is not the best way to settle
human disputes. Down through history, a river of human blood flows in the wake
of wars. Evils of all kinds result from war: starvation, cruelty, plagues, and death.

War is based on the evil of greed. As far back as Plato's Republic, thinking people
recognized that the desire for luxury was the basis of warfare. Plato observes. "We need
not sayyet whether war does good or harm, but only that we have discovered its origin
in desires which are the most fruitful source of evils both to individuals

War 229

resistance. Even the otherwise pacifist Dietrich Bonhoeffer finally concluded
that Hitler should have been assassinated. Out of dissatisfaction with the easy
solutions of declaring all wars just or unjustifiable, a view is emerging called
selectivism, which holds that some wars are justifiable and some are not. This
view offers a more satisfactory alternative for a Christian ethic.

Selectivism as a Response to Activism: Some Wars Are Unjust

Both activism and pacifism claim the support of Scripture. Each view represents
some truth. The truth of pacifism is that some wars are unjust, and Christians ought
not participate in these. The truth of activism is that some wars are just, and
Christians ought to fight in those. Selectivism, then, is committed to the position that
one ought to participate only in a just war. There actually is a point of agreement (at
least theoretically) with all three views. All could assent to the following ethical
proposition: One should not participate in an unjust war.

The pacifist believes that all wars are unjust. The activist holds that no war is
unjust (or at least if there are some unjust wars, then participation in them is not
wrong). And the selectivist contends that in principle some wars are unjust and
others are just. Thus, it is often called the just-war view. To support a Christian
selectivism, one must showboth that at least some wars are just in principle, show-
ing that total pacifism is wrong, and that some wars are unjust in principle, thus
showing that activism is wrong.

The rejection of total activism is supported by Scripture. The Bible teaches that
it is not always right to obey one's government in everything it commands,
particularly when its commands contradict the higher moral laws of God. There
are clear instances of this in the Bible. The three Hebrew youths disobeyed the
king's command to worship an idol (Dan. 3). Daniel broke a law commanding him
not to pray to God (Dan. 6). The early apostles disobeyed orders not to preach the
gospel of Christ (Acts 4-5).And in a clear case of divinely approved disobedience
of civil law, the Hebrew midwives in Egypt disobeyed the command to kill all the
male babies born. It is written, "The midwives feared God, and did not do as the
king of Egypt commanded them, but let the male children live.... So God dealt
well with the midwives; and the people multiplied and grew very strong.” Further,
"because the midwives feared God he gave them families" (Exod. 1:17, 20-21
RSV).

This passage clearly teaches that it is wrong to take the life of an innocent human,
even if the government "ordained of God" (Rom. 13:1 KJV) commands it. The
government commanding it may be ordained of God, but the morally unjustifiable
command is not ordained of God. The parents of Jesus evidenced the same
conviction that government has no rights over the life of an innocent human being:
under God's direction, they fled Herod's attempt to kill the Christ child (Matt.
2:13-14). The inevitable conclusion from these Scriptures is that government is not
always to be obeyed, especially when its command conflicts with the higher

War 231

use. While he opposed the use of force on religious grounds, he approved of it
on social grounds to protect life.

The story of Abraham's battle against the kings of Genesis 14 lends support
to the conclusion that unjust national aggressors should be resisted, as should
unjust individual aggressors (see 1 Sam. 23:1-2). Nations as well as individuals can
rob and murder. And it is faulty logic to argue that one should resist a murderous
individual with the sword but let a murderous country run roughshod over
thousands of innocent people.

Further support for the position that defensive military power is sometimes
justifiable may be deduced from the life of the apostle Paul. When his life was
threatened by unruly men, he appealed to his Roman citizenship and accepted the
protection of the Roman army (Acts 22:25-29). On one occasion, certain men
dedicated themselves to kill Paul, but he was escorted under the protection of a

small army of soldiers (Acts 23:23). Paul considered it his right as a citizen to be
protected by the army from unjust aggression against his life. His actions clearly
demonstrate that he demanded protection as a Roman citizen.

The principle of using military power in self-defense can be extended to a nation
as well as to individuals. As pacifists also acknowledge, there is not a double
standard of morality in the New Testament, with one rule for the individual and
another for the country. After all, countries are made of many individuals. Not all
killings or wars are unjust. God sometimes commands that the sword be used to
resist evil people. Another support for just wars is evident in the words of John
the Baptist. When asked by soldiers who had become believers "What shall we
do?" his answer was not "Leave the army." Rather, it was in essence "Be a good
soldier? They were simply told, "Don't extort money and don't accuse people
falsely—be content with your pay" (Luke 3:14). Surely if it had been wrong to
engage in military activity, they would have been told so. The military is not an
evil occupation as such. It is really a ministry of God to execute justice on behalf
of the government (Rom. 13:4).

Selectivism as a Response to Pacifism: Some Wars Are Just

Christian pacifists appeal to Scripture in support of their position, but in each
case the passage is capable of interpretation in another way. When taken in their
proper contexts, these passages do not really support the claims of pacifists.

Were commands to kill only concessions? The attempt by pacifists to explain God's
commands to kill in the Old Testament as simply divine concessions to human sin-
fulness is unacceptable. This kind of hermeneutic would undermine the Christian's
confidence in all the commands of Scripture. When a command is conditional or
cultural, the Scriptures label it as such. For example, Jesus pointed out that Moses
had not really commanded divorce but merely allowed it (Matt. 19:8). There actually
is no command to divorce anywhere in Scripture. The passage simply says, "If a man
matries a woman who becomes displeasing to him" (Deut. 24:1).

232 Ethical Issues

This is a concession but not a command to divorce. Even in the Old Testament,
God made his view on divorce very clear: "I hate divorce; says the LORD God of
Israel" (Mal. 2:16).

The Bible also clearly indicates that God's order to anoint Saul king over Israel
was a concession and not God's real desire for Israel (1 Sam. 8:6-9), at least not at
that time and in that way. However, when God commanded Israel to exterminate the
wicked Canaanites, there is no indication that God really wanted Israel to "make
love, not war" with them. In fact, they were past the period o f God's forbearance;
the cup of their iniquity was MI (Gen. 15:16). Like a gangrenous leg, they were
incurably wicked, and God ordered Israel to perform the "amputation" (see also
Lev. 18:25-27; Deut. 20:16-17).

Neither is there any indication in the Old Testament that capital punishment was
used on murderers simply because the prevailing culture taught this or because the
people did not love the murderer enough. On the contrary, the Scriptures state plainly
that capital punishment is the very thing that God wanted to be done to such
murderers. This is evident from the reason God gave for instituting capital
punishment, that "in the image of God has God made man" (Gen. 9:6).

Likewise, God specifically ordered Israel to wage war on Canaan; in this theoc-
racy, Israel was an instrument in the hand of God, who was fighting his war through
them. Hence, "He left none remaining, but utterly destroyed all that breathed, as the
LORD God of Israel had commanded" ( Josh. 10:40 RSV). Before Israel entered
Canaan, they were told, "But in the cities of these people that the LORD your God
gives you for an inheritance, you shall save alive nothing that breathes, but you shall
utterly destroy them" (Deut. 20:16-17 RSV). Yet since these were theocratic wars,
they cannot be used as a models for wars today.

Nonetheless, with regard to all cities outside of Canaan, there are lessons for just
wars today. For example, the Israelites were told, "When you draw near to a city to
fight against it, offer terms of peace to it. And if its answer to you is peace and it
opens to you, then all the people who are found in it shall do forced labor for you
and serve you. But if it makes no peace with you, but makes war against you, then
you shall besiege it; ... you shall put all the males to the sword, but the women and
the little ones, the cattle, and everything else in the city, all its spoil, you shall take as
booty for yourselves" (Deut. 20:10-14 RSV). In this case waging war was
conditional, and the innocent were spared, but this was not so with the command of
God to wage war on the unrepentant Canaanites.’ Another example for a just war
can be learned from instructions for war against non-Canaanites: "You shall not
destroy its trees by wielding an axe against them. You may eat from them, but you
shall not cut them down" (Deut. 20:19 ESV; cE wv. 15-16).

From the above passages we may conclude that God not only sanctioned ex-
terminating the Canaanites but also approved other just wars against peoples who

7. See Lee Strobel, The Case for Faith: A journalist Investigates the Toughest Objections to
Christianity (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2000), chap. 4.

War 233

would not accept a just peace. In brief, God's command to engage in just warfare
cannot be limited to the special theocratic command of God to exterminate the
wicked Canaanites. Even in the later monarchies, God is seen as approving of
Israel's war against threatening aggressors (2 Chron. 13:15-16; 20:29). Indeed,
throughout the Old and New Testaments, God ordained war as an instrument of
justice. Even apostate Israel itself, despite its special covenant relation to God,
became the victim of governments raised up by God to defeat Israel (Dan. 1:1-2).
Nebuchadnezzar (Dan. 4:17), Cyrus (Isa. 44:28), and even Nero are described as
servants of God, empowered with the sword. Paul wrote of Nero, "But if you do
wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword in vain; he is the servant of God to
execute his wrath on the wrongdoer" (Rom. 13:4 RSV). From these Scriptures it is
evident that Gentile rulers in both Testaments were given the sword to promote
good and resist evil. While not all did it with justice on their side, they nevertheless
had the authority of God to do so and were responsible to God for how they used
the sword.

Is all life-taking murder? Pacifists argue that one should never take another human
life, because the Bible says, "Thou shalt not kill" (Exod. 20:13 KJV). But this is a
misunderstanding of the passage, which the New International Version correctly
translates: "You shall not murder." All murder involves the taking of life, but not all
taking of life is murder. Capital punishment takes life, but it is not murder. In fact,
capital punishment is divinely enjoined in the very next chapter of the Bible (Exod.
21:12). Likewise, killing in self-defense is not murder and is approved in the
following chapter (Exod. 22:2). War in defense of the innocent is not murder. And
a war against an unjust aggressor is not murder (Gen. 14).

The pacifist is not facing squarely all the data of Scripture. Rather, while paci-
fists cling to the prohibition against murder, they overlook the verses where God
commands taking the lives of wicked people in defense of the innocent. In brief,
from Scripture one cannot justify a view that it is never right to take another human
life.

Should evil be resisted with physical force? The Sermon on the Mount is the paci-
fist's stronghold. Did not Jesus say, "Turn the other cheek" and "Do not resist evil"
(cf. Matt. 5:39 KJV)? Yes, but the question is What did Jesus mean by these state-
ments? From the total context, it is clear that Jesus did not mean that we should
never use the sword in self-defense or in civil justice. If one takes this passage too
literally, then Jesus is also recommending that we actually pluck out our physical
eyes or cut off our hands (5:29-30)! Further, the blow on the cheek was probably
only a slap on the face with the back of the hand, as indicated by the fact that the
normal right-handed person could only use the back of his hand to slap another on
the "right cheek" (5:39). So Jesus is speaking more of insult than injury. The Greek
word is rhapizo, meaning to "strike with open hand" or "slap on the cheek"

Indeed, Jesus himself never turned the other cheek to a blow. When he was struck
(rhapisma) in the face ( John 18:22), he rebuked those who did it: "If 1 spoke the
truth, why did you strike me?" (v. 23). Finally, the Sermon on the Mount

War 235

Third, turning biblical commands into concessions (as pacifists do) is a
hermeneutical violation that will undermine evangelical orthodoxy on
fundamental doctrines of Scripture. After all, ideally (and this is not an ideal
world) we would not need to kill animals and have animal sacrifices. But the Bible
commands both. To make these into concessions is to make the sacrifice of Christ
only a divine concession rather than an eternal plan (Rev. 13:8; Acts 2:23).
Twisting the plain and obvious meaning of Scriptures that command a certain
behavior (in this case killing the violent to protect the innocent) into a divine
concession to our fallenness stands the historical-grammatical hermeneutic on its
head and potentially undermines an orthodox understanding of all of Scripture.
Why, by the same logic, can we not assume that other commands of Scripture
(like loving one's enemies or preaching the gospel) are mere concessions to a
fallen world? Certainly the world is fallen, and if it were not, then there would be
no enemies to love and no heathen to preach to; but that is not the point. The point
is that these are commands, not concessions. They are things God really is
commanding us to do. Likewise, we would not have to defend the innocent if the
world were not fallen. But it is fallen, and we are commanded to kill if necessary
to protect the innocent. The same is true of capital punishment (see chap. 12),
saving the mother in tubal pregnancies (see chap. 9), killing in self-defense (Exod.
22:2), and wars against aggressors.

The Basis of Selectivism

The arguments in favor of selectivism can be grouped into two categories:
biblical and moral. Since many of the biblical precedents have already been
discussed, they need only be summarized here.

The biblical basis of selectivism. There are several instances of morally justified
killing in the Bible. Some of these refer specifically to individuals and can be ex-
tended to nations, and others refer specifically to a country or countries.

First, there is killing in self-defense that is approved in Exodus 22:2, which
says, "If a thief is caught breaking in and is struck so that he dies, the defender is
not guilty of bloodshed." Then there is killing in capital punishment mentioned in
Genesis 9:6: "Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed;
for in the image of God has God made man" (man = humankind).

There are also divinely approved wars, such as the one Abraham fought against
the kings of the Valley of Siddim (Gen. 14). When they took aggressive action and
"carried off Abram's nephew Lot and his possession" (v. 12),Abraham "attack[ed]
them and routed them.... He recovered all the goods and brought back his relative
Lot and his possessions" (vv. 15-16). After this, Abraham was blessed by
Melchizedek, who said, "Blessed be Abram by God Most High, Creator of heaven
and earth. And blessed be God Most High, who delivered your enemies into your
hand" (vv. 19-20). Thus, Abraham's military activity in defense of the innocent was
clearly blessed by God.

236 Ethical Issues

This divinely sanctioned war is an especially important case because it occurred
before Israel was established as a theocracy (Exod. 19). Hence, it cannot be argued
that this war is a special case of a theocratic war such as God commanded Joshua
to wage in exterminating the wicked residents of Canaan ( Josh. 10). (It can be
justifiably argued that what applied uniquely to Israel as God's chosen instrument
is not normative for any other nation since then.)

The New Testament reaffirms that the sword is still a divinely appointed means
of human justice. Paul wrote to the Romans, But if you do wrong, be afraid, for [the
one in authority] does not bear the sword in vain" (Rom. 13:4 RSV).

John the Baptist sanctioned the role of the military when he was asked by
soldiers what they should do after they had become believers. He did not tell
them to leave the army but simply to be good soldiers (Luke 3:14).

Jesus recognized that Pilate had God-given authority over his life. When Pilate
said to him, "Don't you realize I have power either to free you or to crucify you?"
he replied, "You would have no power over me if it were not given to you from
above" ( John 19:10-11).

The apostle Paul showed both his acceptance of the government's right to kill
and his acceptance of the military. He said to Caesar's court, "If... Iam guilty of
doing anything deserving death, I do not refuse to die" (Acts 25:11). But when his
life was threatened by militant Jews, he demanded and received the protection of
the Roman army as a Roman citizen (Acts 23).

Themoralbasisof selectivistn. The moral arguments forselectivism emerge naturally
out of the arguments against activism and pacifism. They may be stated briefly.

In an evil world, force will always be necessary to restrain evil persons. Ideally,
killings by police and military should not be necessary, but this is not an ideal
world: it is an evil world. Ideally, we should not need locks on our doors or pris-
ons. But it is simply unrealistic to presume that we can get along without them in
this wicked world.

It is evil not to resist evil; it is morally wrong not to defend the innocent. Some-
times only physical force and taking lives are sufficient to accomplish this. All too
often in our violent world, hostages are taken and all efforts at negotiation fail.
Sometimes military action is the only way to save these innocent lives.

To permit a murder when one could have prevented it is morally wrong. To
allow a rape when one could have hindered it is an evil. To watch an act of cruelty
toward children without trying to intervene is morally inexcusable. In brief, not
resisting evil is a sin of omission, and sins of omission can be just as evil as sins of
commission. In biblical language, "Anyone, then, who knows the good he ought
to do and doesn't do it, sins" ( James 4:17). Any man who does not protect his wife
and children against a violent intruder fails them morally. Likewise, any country
that can defend its citizens against evil aggressors and does not do it is morally
remiss.

Just as the cause of justice demands a life for a life in capital crimes (see chap.
12), the same logic can be extended to the unjust actions of nations. Other na-

War 239

noted in response. First, it is a matter of factual dispute whether full-scale nuclear
war would irreparably and permanently destroy the world. With proper warning
and shelter, much of a population could be salvaged from an all-out nuclear attack.
And with proper food storage and equipment, the fading effects of radiation can be
survived.”

Nuclear war does not have to be that massive. It could be more tactical and
limited in scope. This is especially true if a defensive shield or system like the
Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars") can be developed to deflect the major
impact of an all-out nuclear attack. Furthermore, even if a tyrant could, it is not
likely that anyone desiring more power would choose to destroy the world over
which one wants power. Thus, it is more likely that the tyrant would engage in
tactical or limited nuclear war.

While the stakes are higher in nuclear war, the principles are the same. Nuclear
weapons should be used justly and discriminatingly. They should be directed, for
example, at military targets, not civilian populations. Yet more innocent people may
be accidentally killed in nuclear war than by conventional warfare. Collateral
damage is one of the necessary by-products of war. But it is justified on the basis of
the principle of double effect (see glossary). However, just because the stakes are
higher does not mean that the weapons are automatically illegitimate.

If nuclear warfare is ruled unjust, then the unjust will rule. Declaring nuclear
weapons unjust makes nuclear blackmail possible. Even the threat of their use by
an evil power can make innocent people submit to tyrannical demands." The only
realistic way to overcome this is to retain nuclear weapons as a real threat against
aggressors. For any tyrant who knows that the opponent will not retaliate with
similar nuclear force has alreadywon the war. Once nuclear weapons are outlawed
for countries, then only outlaw countries will have them.

The very fact that there is a balance of power among opposing nations with
nuclear capabilities is a stabilizing factor for peace. As long as no one nation has
unparalleled power, then each nation is automatically restrained by the realistic
expectation that an opposing nation can retaliate in kind. This fad has had a sober-
ing effect on the international superpowers for nearly half a century now. Once this
balance is upset by unilateral disarmament or by one of the superpowers declaring
that it will not use nuclear force, then the real threat of tyranny emerges. Hence,
maintaining a real balance o f power, including nuclear power, is important to
world peace.

The problem of who decides. One of the most difficult problems for selectivism is
establishing who has the authority to decide which wars are just and which are
unjust. Would not confusion result if every individual in a country were allowed to
make up their mind whether they should obey a given law? What if everyone

9. Ermest W. LeFever and E. Stephen Hunt, eds., The Apocalyptic Attila
(Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1982).

10. | Myron S. Augsburger and Dean C. Curry, Nuclear Arms (Waco: Word, 1987),
114-24.

War 243

Holmes, Arthur F., ed. War and Christian Ethics: Classic and Contemporary Readings
on the Morality of War. 2nd ed. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005.

LeFever, Ernest W., and E. Stephen Hunt, eds. The Apocalyptic Premise. Washington,
DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1982.

Mohler, R. Albert, Jr. Culture Shift: Engaging Current Issues with Timeless Truth.
Colorado Springs: Multnomah Books, 2008.

Ramsey, Paul. The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility. New York: Scribner's,
1968.

Speak Up for Just War or Pacifism. University Park: Pennsylvania State

University Press, 1988.

Vanderhaar, Gerard A. Christians and Nonviolence in the Nuclear Age. Mystic, CT:
Twenty-third Publications, 1982.

14

CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

Should Christians ever disobey their government? If so, when? If not, why not?
Is it ever right to revolt against an unjust government or to assassinate a tyrant?
These questions are important for Christians in free countries, but are acutely so
for believers in oppressive nations.

There are three basic positions on civil disobedience: it is always right, never
right, or sometimes right. The first view is called anarchism, the second is radical
patriotism, and the third is biblical submissionism. Since the first view lacks any
Christian justification, our attention will be focused on the latter two.

Radical Patriotism: Civil Disobedience Is Never Right

Radical patriotism is similar to the activism (chap. 13) arguing that all wars are just so
long as the government commands one to participate. Here, however, the focus is not
on war against another country but on the citizen's duties to his or her own country.
Should one ever disobey any law of the land? Radical patriotism says no.

An Explanation of Radical Patriotism

"My country, right or wrong!" cries the radical patriot. To the degree that some
Christians adopt this stance, they appeal for justification to certain Scriptures. Let's
take a look at their arguments.

God ordained government. God established government after the flood (Gen.
9:6), and he expects this authority to be respected. Paul writes that "there is no

244

Civil Disobedience 245

authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have
been established by God" (Rom. 13:1).

God expects obedience to human government. Not only did God establish
government; he also expects us to obey it. This is obvious for two reasons. First,
we are told to "submit" to it. This implies obedience because 'submit" and "obey"
are used in parallel in other passages (e.g., 1 Pet. 3:5-6). Second, Paul explicitly
enjoins Christians to obey their government when he writes, "Remind the people to
be subject to rulers and authorities, to be obedient" (Titus 3:1).

Obedience is necessary even to evilgovernments. When Paul exhorted the
Romans to "submit ... to the governing authorities" as "God's servant" (Rom. 13:1,
4), Nero was emperor. He killed his mother to ascend to the throne, burned Rome,
and even burned Christians alive for streetlights. Nero was a brutal and wicked
man, yet Paul called him "God's servant" and asked Christians to obey him. God
told Daniel that 'the Most High is sovereign over the kingdoms of men and gives
them to anyone he wishes" (Dan. 4:32). Sometimes this includes "the lowliest of
men" (v. 17). But whomever God establishes is to be obeyed, good or evil. Peter
said plainly, "Submit yourselves for the Lord's sake to every authority instituted
among men" (1 Pet. 2:13).

On the basis of these and similar Scriptures, the Christian patriot believes that
obedience to government is obedience to God. To use Paul's words, the patriot
insists that "he who rebels against the authority is rebelling against what God has
instituted" (Rom. 13:2). Hence, civil disobedience is never justified.

An Evaluation of Radical Patriotism

There are several objections to the use of these Scriptures to justify
unqualified obedience to human government. The foremost reason is that they
are not taken in their proper context.

God ordained government but not its evil. God ordained human government but
does not approve of its evil. There is a hint of this even in the passage in Romans,
which says the ruler "is God's servant to do you good" (13:4). There is no indica-
tion here or anywhere else in the Bible that God is pleased with evil governments.
Actually, much of the thrust of the Bible, especially the prophets, is to condemn
evil governments (see Obad.; Jon. 1; Nah. 2). Isaiah said, "Woe to those who make
unjust laws, to those who issue oppressive decrees" (10:1). God appointed
government, but he surely does not approve of its evils.

Obedience to government is not unqualified. While it is true that God demands
obedience to human authorities, this obedience is not without some limitations.
Peter said to the authorities who commanded him not to preach the gospel, "Judge
for yourselves whether it is right in God's sight to obey you rather than God" (Acts
4:19). John spoke of the faithful remnant of the tribulation, who would not submit
to the idolatrous commands of the antichrist (Rev. 13). Indeed, as will be seen
shortly, there are many divinely approved instances of disobedience to civil

246 Ethical Issues

authorities (e.g., Exod. 1; Dan. 3, 6). In each case the implication is clear:
government should be obeyed as long as it takes its place under God, but not
when it takes the place of God.

We need not obey the evils of government. The Bible does enjoin obedience to
governments even if they are evil, but it does not demand obedience to the evils of
government. Indeed, it forbids doing evil no matter who says so. This is clear from
the midwives' refusal to kill innocent babies at the command of Pharaoh (Exod. 1)
and from the unwillingness of the three Hebrew youths to worship an idol (Dan. 3).
Christians can obey a government that permits evil, but not when one commands
them to do an evil. Blind obedience to the evils of government is not patriotic; it is
idiotic. Unqualified submission to an oppressive government is not patriotism. It is
patriolatry, and patriolatry is idolatry, an ultimate commitment to what is less than
ultimate.

An evaluation of anarchism. As in the case of activism in war (see chap. 13),
one should not be indiscriminate in action against governments with which one
disagrees. Not every war is justified (only the just ones), and not every action
against an evil government is justified. A right cause should not be undertaken
in the wrong way. The truth is that almost any law is better than no law. A
monarchy is better than total anarchy. This is why the Bible bids believers to
submit even to evil governments (Rom. 13:1-7; 1 Pet. 2:13). Anyone who has
lived through a lawless situation, like riots out of control, knows the terror of
such conditions.

As spelled out in the last chapter, there is a time and a place for disobedience to
government (Exod. 1; Dan. 3, 6; Acts 4-5; Rev. 13); however, it should not be
done in a violent manner. Citizens are not given the sword to use on the govern-
ment. Rather, the government is given the sword to use on rebellious citizens (Gen.
9:6; Rom. 13:4). In short, two wrongs do not make a right.

Saving the environment is a noble cause, but ecological terrorism is not a proper
way to do it. Groups like Earth Liberation Front (ELF) are really environmental
anarchists. Their tactics are as wrong as their goals may be right. Such also is the
Earth First! group that engaged in a series ofprotests and civil disobedience. How-
ever, in 1984, members introduced "tree spiking” (insertion of metal or ceramic
spikes in trees in an effort to damage saws) as a tactic to thwart logging. Resistance
to evil is necessary (as spelled out below), but the resistance should not itself be an
evil. One evil does not compensate for another.

Biblical Submissionism: Disobedience to Government Is Sometimes Right

There is general agreement among Christians that there are times when a Christian
should engage in civil disobedience. The real problem is where to draw the line, and
there are two positions on this. One view holds that government should be disobeyed
when it promulgates a law that is contrary to the Word

Civil Disobedience 247

of God. The other view contends that government should be disobeyed only
when it commands the Christian to do evil. Both views will be presented and
evaluated.

The Antipromulgation Position: Disobedience to Government When
It Promulgates Unbiblical Laws

Christians have the right to disobey their government when it promulgates laws
or actions contrary to the Word of God. (A broader version of this position would
say, when it contradicts the moral law or an individual's conscience. The deist
Thomas Jefferson espoused a form of this view.)

Since this is a book on Christian ethics, we will focus here on the Christian
form of this viewpoint. It was presented by Samuel Rutherford in his famous
Lex Rex (The Law Is King [1644]). Francis Schaeffer (d. 1984) adopted the
position in his widely circulated Christian Manifesto (1981), which presents
the essence of the view.

The power of government is not absolute. Following Rutherford, Francis Schaeffer
insisted that "kings then have not an absolute power in their regiment to do what
pleases them; but their power is limited by God'sWord:' In other words, "all men,
even the king, are under the law and not above it."" The law is king; the king is not the
law. Government is under God's law; it is not God's law.

The law is above the government. Schaeffer claimed that "the law is king, and if
the king and the government disobey the law they are to be disobeyed:" Thus the true
law is the law of God, which is not the government but is over the government. The
Christian's obedience, then, is to God's law and to government only insofar as it is in
accordance with God's law.

Governments that rule contrary to God's law are tyrannical. According to
Schaeffer, "the law is founded on the law of God:" Hence, "tyranny was defined as
ruling without the sanctions of God.' In other words, whenever a government rules
contrary to God's Word, it has ruled tyrannically. In such cases the Christian
should not obey the government.

Citizens should resist a tyrannical government. Not only should citizens
disobey a tyrannical government; they also should actively resist it. Schaeffer
declares that "citizens have a moral obligation to resist unjust and tyrannical
government." For "when any office commands that which is contrary to the Word
of God, those who hold that office abrogate their authority and they are not to be
obeyed, and that includes the state."

13. Francis A. Schaeffer, A Christian Manifesto (Westchester, IL: Crossway Books, 1981), 100.
14.1bid., 99

15.1bid.

16.1bid., 100.

17.1bid., 101.

18.1bid., 90.

Civil Disobedience 259

Summary and Conclusion

There are three basic views regarding civil disobedience. Anarchism approves of it
anytime. Radical patriotism never approves of disobeying government, and bibli-
cal submissionism holds that it is sometimes right to disobey government. While
most Christians believe the Bible supports the latter view, there is disagreement
about when disobedience is justified. Antipromulgationists insist on the right to
disobey any law that permits actions contrary to God's Word.Anticompulsionists,
on the other hand, hold that disobedience is justified only when the government is
trying to compel one to do an evil.

Even among those who agree that disobedience to government is sometimes
called for, there is a difference of opinion concerning how one should disobey.
Some believe in revolting against an unjust government, but the biblical view calls
for resisting it without rebelling against it. Such resistance is not passive accep-
tance of injustice in government, but it can involve an active spiritual, moral, and
political campaign against that injustice.

Select Readings

Andrusko, David, ed. To Rescue the Future. Toronto: Life Cycle, 1983.

Calvin, John. Institutes of the Christian Religion. Edited by John T. McNeill. Translated by
Ford Lewis Battles. 2 vols. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960.

House, H. Wayne. The Christian and American Law: Christianity's Impact on America's Founding
Documents and Future Direction. Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1998.

Jefferson, Thomas. The Declaration of Independence. http://www .usconstitution.net/dedar .html.

Plato. Phaedo. Translated by Hugh Tredennick. In The Collected Dialogues of Plato, edited by Edith
Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. New York: Pantheon, 1964.

Rutherford, Samuel. Lex Rex, or the Law and the Prince. 1644. Reprint, Harrisonburg, VA: Sprinkle,
1982.

Schaeffer, Francis A. .4 Christian Manifesto. Westchester, IL: Crossway Books, 1981.

Thomas Aquinas. On Kingship, to the King of Cyprus. Translated by Gerald B. Phelan. Toronto:
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949.

Titus, Herbert W. America's Declaration of Independence: The Christian Legacy. Virginia Beach,
VA: Forecast, 1995.

Whitehead, John W. The Second American Revolution. 2nd ed. Westchester, IL: Crossway
Books, 1985.

Yoder, John Howard. Christian Attitudes to War, Peace, and Revolution. Edited by Theodore
J. Koontz and Andy Alexis-Baker. Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2009.

15

SEXUAL ISSUES

We live in a sex-saturated society. The secular views of sexual license have penetrated
the Christian church. This is true in spite of the fact that Christians are urged by
Scripture: "Do not be conformed to this world" (Rom. 12:2 RSV). John added, "All
that is in the world [is] the lust of the eyes and the lust of the flesh and the pride of life”
(1 John 2:16). Typical of the prevailing secular view of sex is that whatever is done
between consenting adults is okay. The Bible, on the other hand, condemns adultery,
fornication, homosexuality, and other forms of sexual perversion.

However, since the sexual revolution of the 1960s, Christians have largely
abandoned biblical imperatives about sexual activity. As Scott Rae asks,

If the sexual revolution [of the 1960s] was over, why are sexually transmitted diseases
and unwanted pregnancies, especially among teenagers, nOW at an all-time high?
Why are there more abortions being performed to day than in any other period since it
became legal in 1973? Why are reports out of the nation's junior high and high
schools indicating that the average age of a person's first sexual encounter is getting
younger and younger, even as young as age 13? Why do further studies show that the
great majority of teenagers have been sexually active long before graduation from
high school?’

Further, the notion of abstinence until marriage is considered outdated, and it
can be assumed that even many committed Christian couples are sleeping
together before marriage.

1. Scott B. Rae, Moral Choices: An Introduction to Ethics, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan,
2000), 225.

260

Sexual Issues 261

One of the difficulties in the Christian context is that Christians often take their
guidance from what other Christians do, rather than what they ought to do. They
neglect the fact that our basis for activity should not be the norm of Christians, but
the norm for Christians (which is God's revelation). Yet since we have rid our
public schools of the God, prayer, and the Ten Commandments as sources of guid-
ance for our lives, we should not be surprised that the sexual morals have changed
radically in the past generation or so. Rather than spelling out various views on sex
and its many ramification, we will develop a Christian view of sex over against our
sexual society, based on what Scripture mandates for believers.

The Rise of the Sexual Revolution

For the purpose of this chapter, we will discuss sexual ethics in two broad catego-
ries: secular and Christian. By the former is mean the widespread cultural belief and
practice known in general as the sexual revolution. Others call it "the Playboy ethic:’
It is really a contemporary form of hedonism. Also, it is part of situation ethics,
discussed earlier (in chap. 3). Several factors gave rise to this secular and relativistic
view of sex.

Nihilism

The most significant root of the sexual revolution in the modern world is what
Nietzsche (d. 1900) called "the death of God." He said, "God is dead and we have
killed him."’ But when God dies, then all objective value dies with him. As the
Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoyevslry (d. 1881) observed in The Brothers Kara-
mazov, when God dies, then anything is permitted. The truth is that when we kill
the moral Lawgiver, then there is no basis left for the moral law.

Emotivism

Out ofA. J. Ayer's (d. 1989) logical positivism arose an ethic called emotivism.
Ayer tried to reduce all ethical statements to an expression of our feeling. So state-
ments like "You shall not kill" really mean "I don't like killing" or "T feel killing is
wrong." There are no divine imperatives. Everything is relative to our individual
feelings. Hence, there are no objective moral laws binding on all persons.

Existentialism

Atheistic existentialism also contributed to the rise of the new ethic. Jean-Paul
Sartre (d. 1980) wrote: "No sooner had you (God] created me than I ceased to be
yours.... [knew myself alone, utterly alone.... I was like a man who's lost his

2. Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Madman" in The Gay Science, in The Portable Nietzsche, trans.
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking, 1960, 125.

Sexual Issues 263
Zen Buddhism

The more recent influence of Eastern religions in the West has also contributed
to moral relativism. As Alan Watts noted, "Buddhism does not share the Western
view that there is a moral law, enjoined by God or by nature, which it is man's duty
to obey. The Buddha's precepts of conduct—abstinence from taking life, taking
what is not given, exploitation of the passions, lying, and intoxication—are
voluntarily assumed rules of expediency. ... Generally speaking, the conventionally
‘bad’ actions are rather more grasping than the ‘good. But the higher stages of
Buddhist practice are as much concerned with disentanglement from ‘good karma’
as from bad."

These and other influences (like Hugh Hefner's Playboy ethics and pornographic
photos) set the stage for the sexual revolution. If there are no moral absolutes, then
absolutely anything goes. When the moral Lawgiver is expelled from the culture,
then so is the moral law. And as Sartre noted, without God and his law, we must
make up our own law.

A Defense of a Biblical Ethic of Sex

Objective ethics, even as they apply to sex, can be defended from a natural law
perspective, as well as from special revelation in the Bible. While the emphasis
here is on the latter, arguments from the former will be interwoven with the bibli-
cal reasons.

Sexuality in the Old Testament

Sexuality affects all aspects of one's life. A person's gender (or sex) is a teleo-
logical, or designed, factor of an individual's life. There exists what is considered
a complementary difference between men and women. This means that men are
physically and spiritually created to fulfill the role of males, husbands, fathers,
and so forth; and that women are physically and spiritually created to fulfill the
role of female, wives, and mothers (Gen. 1:26-27; 2:21-25; Eph. 5:22-32; Col.
3:18-24). Both sexes are created in the image of God (Gen. 1:26-27), and they
both possess equal dignity.

GENESIS

Genesis 1-2. God instituted marriage and officiated at the first marriage. Sex
was not only created by God's making humans "male and female" (Gen. 1:27); it
was also ordained as the means for propagating the race. "Be fruitful and multiply"
(Gen. 1:28 RSV). The union of a man and woman in marriage is a way of imitating
God's generosity by fulfilling the command to populate the earth. The limits

6. Man Watts, The Way of Zen (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), 57.

264 Ethical Issues

for the use of sex, however, were within marriage. This is implied in several ways.
First, the creation of sex is part of the union of "male and female" (Gen. 1:27).
Second, the instruction of God is for male and female to "cleave" to one another as
"one flesh" (Gen. 2:18-25 RSV). Third, the use of the sexually intimate word
"know" describes the means of propagation (Gen. 4:1, 25 RSV).

From Genesis 2:18-25 it is clear that marriage was created so that the man would
not be alone and that he would have a comparable helper. This is also indicated in the
institution of marriage, in which the two should "leave" their parents and be joined
("cleave") to one another (RSV). From this passage it is clear that it was not good for
the man to be alone and that he needed a suitable helper. This points to Adam's
insufficiency (1 Con 11:9), not Eve's, and indicates that God created the woman to
meet man's deficiency in being unable to bear children (1 Tim. 2:15) and form an
interdependence (1 Cor. 11:11-12).

The marriage relationship was established as the first human institution. It is the
only institution coming to us from before the fall (Gen. 3). Thus it is still binding
on all people (Heb. 13:4). Genesis 2 says that children are to leave their parents and
let their own one-flesh union carry with it the marital partners’ new primary
responsibility to each other instead of to their parents. It also says that they are to
be joined together with each other. The term "joined" (Gen. 2:24 NASB) carries
with it the sense of a solid and unbreakable union, meaning that divorce should not
be an option (see chap. 17, "Marriage and Divorce"). The one flesh that is joined
together carries with it the connotation of being whole and complete. The
implication is that the marital union is complete with the two individuals. The idea
of a perfect monogamous relationship is what is established in this passage, and
monogamy continues to be the proper design found throughout the Old and New
Testaments (Matt. 19:4-6; 1 Con 7:2).

Genesis 4. The first abuse of God's pattern for marriage came in Genesis 4, when
"Lamech took two wives" (v. 19). God had ordained only one for Adam. Even the
Ten Commandments (Exod. 20:17) speak of one "wife" (singular) when it urges,
"You shall not covet your neighbor's wife" (singular). Polygamy, like divorce, was
permitted "because of [their] hardness of heart: but "from the beginning it was not
so" (Matt. 19:8 ESV). Indeed, Moses commanded against multiple wives, saying,
"[Do] not multiply wives" (Deut. 17:17 NASB). Solomon paid bitterly for his
polygamy, for "his wives turned away his heart" from God to idols (1 Kings 11:4-6
RSV).

Genesis 9. Noah's son Ham apparently engaged in a perverse sexual act with his
father while he was drunk. For it says that "when Noah awoke from his wine and
knew what his youngest son had done to him, he said, ‘Cursed be Canaan! .. :"(Gen.
9:24-25). The text also says that Ham, Canaan's father, "saw the nakedness" of Noah
(v. 22 RSV) and that the other sons "covered the nakedness of their father" (v. 23
RSV). For several reasons, homosexuality seems to be implied here. First, surely,
inadvertently seeing a nude parent was insufficient grounds for such a severe
punishment of all his posterity for generations to come (v. 25). Second, to

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brother (18:14); father's brother's wife, or aunt (18:14); daughter-in-law, or son's
wife (18:15); both a woman and her daughter (18:17) or her son's daughter or her
daughter's daughter (18:17); or one's wife's sister while the wife is still alive
(18:18).

Sex during a woman's menstrual period was forbidden. Leviticus 18:19 instructs against
having sex during a woman's "menstrual uncleanness" (RSV; customary impurity).
No physical reason is explicitly stated, but Leviticus 15:24 says, And if any man lies
with her, and her impurity [natural menstrual discharges] is on him, he shall be unclean
seven days; and everybed on which he lies shall be unclean" (RSV). At a minimum it
caused ceremonial uncleanness and possibly more problems.

Homosexuality was forbidden. As noted above, homosexual and incestuous
activity was forbidden even before Moses and was later incorporated into Moses's
law. Among these, God clearly forbade both Israel and "the nations" to participate
in homosexual activity. God said, "You shall not lie with a male as with a woman;
it is an abomination" (Lev. 18:22 RSV). The consequences stated are "lest the
land vomit you out ... as it vomited out the nation that was before you" (Lev.
18:28 RSV). Thus homosexual practices are wrong for those who do not have the
law of Moses, because they have the natural law "written on their hearts" (Rom.
2:12-15).

Bestiality was forbidden. Bestiality, or sexual union with animals, was also forbidden
in the Levitical law. Leviticus 18:23 says, "Nor shall you mate with any animal, to
defile yourself with it. Nor shall anywoman stand before an animal to mate with it. It
is perversion" (NKJV; cf. Exod. 22:19; Lev. 20:15, 16; Deut. 27:21).

Fornication was forbidden. Fornication, or premarital sex, was also forbidden in the
Old Testament. It is implied in the commands against adultery since it was wrong
even if one partner was not married. Further, it is implicit in the condemnation of
prostitution (Lev. 19:29; Isa. 23:17; Ezek. 16:15,26,29), also described as being a
"whore" (KJV) or "harlot" (RSV; Lev. 21:7; Deut. 23:18).

SONG OP SOLOMON

While there are restrictions on sex, it is also celebrated within the beauty of
marriage. The literal interpretation of Song of Solomon reveals the beauty of
courting (1:2-3:5), cleaving (3:6-5:1), and marriage (5:2-8:14). This book depicts
the interaction between Solomon and his beloved. What is found in this passage
reflects the proper sanctions and boundaries of marriage. First, this is a
relationship between one man and one woman. Second, this is a relationship that
during the courtship (1:1-3:5) did not involve premarital sex. It is clear that
Solomon had the natural desires and emotions for sexual intercourse but that he
demonstrated restraint by refraining until after the wedding ceremony took place
(3:6-5:1; cf. 2:7; 3:5). Third, there was a wedding ceremony that took place
before the consummation of the marriage (3:6-5:1; esp. 3:6-7,11). This shows
that marriage is not a private event, but that it should be a ceremony before both
God and humans.

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HOSEA

Some have pointed out that God commanded Hosea, "Take to yourself a wife of
harlotry" (Hos. 1:2 RSV). Yet according to Exodus 20:14, adultery is a sin, and
according to 1 Corinthians 6:15-18, having sexual relations with a harlot is immoral
(cf. Lev. 19:29). How, then, could a holy God command Hosea to take a harlot as his
wife? While some have taken this as an allegory, there is no reason it cannot be
understood literally without violating Old Testament sexual standards.

First, when God commanded Hosea to take Gomer, the daughter of Diblaim, to
be his wife, Gomer may not yet have actually committed adultery. However, God
knew what was in her heart, and he knew that she would ultimately be unfaithful
to Hosea.

Second, the passage does not condone harlotry. It actually is a strong condem-
nation of harlotry, of both the physical and spiritual (idolatry) kind (cf. 4:11-19).
The fact that the grave sin of idolatry is depicted as spiritual harlotry reveals God's
disapproval of harlotry.

Third, Hosea was commanded to marry a harlot, not to commit adultery with her.
God said, "Go, take to yourself a wife” (Hos. 1:2 RSV). God did not say to go and
commit fornication with her. Rather, God said to marry her and be faithful to her,
even though she would be unfaithful to Hosea. Not only does this not violate the
commitment of marriage; it actually also intensifies it. Hosea was to be faithful to his
matriage vows even though his wife would become unfaithful to her vows.

Fourth, the command in Leviticus 21:7 not to marry a harlot was given to the
Levitical priests, not to everyone. Salmon apparently married Rahab the harlot
(Matt. 1:5), from whose legal genealogy Christ eventually came. At anyrate,
Hosea was a prophet, not a Levitical priest; hence, the prohibition not to marry a
harlot did not apply to him.

Finally, the command in 1 Corinthians 6:16 not to be joined to a harlot is not a
command never to marry a woman who was a harlot. Rather, the command is
directed against those who were having sexual relations outside of the marriage
relationship. But Hosea did not have sexual relations outside of marriage. God
commanded Hosea to marry Gomer and always to be faithful to her. Thus, Hosea
does not diminish the Old Testament sexual standards but exemplifies and
elevates them.

Sexuality in the New Testament

God set specific parameters for sexuality in the Old Testament, but he also
continued to uphold those same strict parameters in the New Testament. We do
not live under the Old Testament law as such today, but this does not mean that a
person is free from the moral law (Rom. 2:14-15). For Jesus said he did not come
to destroy the law but to fulfill it (Matt. 5:17). Indeed, nine of the Ten
Commandments are repeated in the New Testament (all but the one on keeping
the Sabbath). The moral principles embedded in the Ten Commandments are

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eternal since they reflect the unchangeable character of God. In this sense there
is a unity between Old and New Testaments on moral issues.

THE GOSPELS

Jesus upholds the Old Testament definition of marriage. God's standard for
marriage was the same from its inception: one man and one woman united till
death parts them. This can be seen from the fact that Jesus reaffirmed the clear
definition of marriage in Matthew 19:1-6 (cf. Mark. 10:1-12). Here Jesus quotes
from Genesis 1:27 and 5:2. In this passage Jesus affirms that marriage is defined as
between one man and one woman. The couple is to leave their parents and become
"one flesh" (cf. Gen. 2:24). Also, in this passage Jesus affirms the fact that marriage
is of the Lord and not merely a human institution: "So they are no longer two but
one flesh. What therefore God has joined together, let not man separate" (Matt.
19:6 ESV).

Jesus condemns fornication. Jesus clearly condemned "fornication" in the
Gospels (KJV: Matt. 5:32; 15:19; Mark 7:21). Fornication is understood to be
consensual sexual intercourse by an unmarried person. Adultery, by contrast, is
consensual sexual intercourse by a married person. Yet the same act can be
adultery for one person (the married one) and fornication by another (the
unmarried one). Probably the clearest case of the condemnation of fornication
in the New Testament comes from Matthew 15:19-20 (emphasis added) when
Jesus said, "For out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries,
fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphemies. These are the things which
defile a man, but to eat with unwashed hands does not defile a man" (NKJV).
From this passage it is clear that Jesus distinguishes between moral and
ceremonial standards. Jesus sees moral defilement as a means of corrupting the
soul. It is clear that Jesus sees the source of fornication to be from the evil inside
the heart of a human and that it is a means of defiling a human. Again,
prostitution or harlotry is a form of fornication. Paul said, "Do you not know
that he who is joined to a prostitute becomes one body with her?" (1 Cor. 6:16
ESV). He adds, "Flee from sexual immorality" (6:18); here "immorality"
translates the Greek word porneia, meaning fornication.

Jesus condemns adultery. Jesus also condemns adultery in the New Testament.
In the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 5-7), Jesus pointedly and clearly condemns all
forms of adultery. In this passage Jesus reaffirms the validity of the Old Testament
when in Matthew 5:27 he quotes from Exodus 20:14 and Deuteronomy 5:/8. In
this passage we find that Jesus not only condemns the external action of adultery,
but also the lust from which it grows (cf: Matt. 15:19). Jesus said, "But I say to you
that whoever looks at a woman to lust for her has already committed adultery with
her in his heart" (5:28 NKJV).

7. The word for "fornication’ is not limited to extramarital sexual relations. Its meaning is broader
than "adultery* and is not identical with it.

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In addition, Jesus speaks strongly against lustful desires and immoral actions: "If
your right eye cause you to sin, pluck it out and cast it from you; for it is more
profitable for you that one of your members perish, than for your whole body to be
cast into hell. And if your right hand causes you to sin, cut it off and cast it from
you; for it is more profitable for you that one of your members perish, than for your
whole bodyto be cast into hell" (5:29-30 NKJV). Jesus was not advocating a form
of self-mutilation, for this would not cure lust, which is from the heart. Rather, he
uses this hyperbole to demonstrate the seriousness of sin and how one needs to
drastically do away with immorality (or any sin) in one's life. Finally, Jesus speaks
to the fact that if a man wrongfully divorces his wife and marries another person, he
has committed adultery (5:32).

Jesus condemns adultery in a few other places as well. These can be found in his
interaction with rich young ruler (Matt. 19:16-26; Mark 10:17-27; Luke 18:18-27)
and with the woman taken in adultery in John 8, which he called a "sin" (8:11). In
the first story Jesus clearly affirms the Old Testament commandments by declaring
adultery to be wrong.

THE BOOK OF ACTS

Throughout the book of Acts, marriage is depicted as a union of man and female.
Despite the ungodly acts of Ananias and Sapphira in Acts 5, they are presented as a
married couple. Likewise, the godly couple of Priscilla and Aquila (Acts 18) are seen
as married. Also, Acts speaks of the households of Cornelius (10:33-48) and the
Philippian jailer (16:25-34).

The Jerusalem gathering in Acts 15 condemned sexual immorality in the early
church (Acts 15:20,29). This is found in their statement about how the
Gentiles—and for that matter, how Jews—should live their lives. The council held
it to be "necessary ... that you abstain from things offered to idols, from blood,
from things strangled, and from sexual immorality. If you keep yourselves from
these, you will do well" (Acts 15:28-29 NKJV). Sexual sins as such were
condemned, but in particular, sexual orgies associated with the worship of pagan
gods. These stipulations were provided so that the Gentiles would keep
themselves pure, so that they would avoid being an offense to the Jewish
sensibilities, either in their marriages or in any other type of relationship.

THE EPISTLES

Improper sex results from a depraved heart. Paul depicts improper sex as part of
the downward spiral of the wrath and abandonment of God in a person's life. In
Romans 1:24 Paul says, "Therefore God also gave them up to uncleanness, in the
lusts of their hearts, to dishonor their bodies among themselves" (NKJV). Accord-
ing to this passage, God has removed his restraint and is allowing these people's sin
to run its course, and the effects of their sin are seen as divine judgment. They are
given over to uncleanness, which speaks of sexual immorality (2 Cor. 12:21;

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Gal. 5:19-23; Eph. 5:3; 1 Mess. 4:7), which has begun in the heart, and then
proceeds to shame and produce an effect on the body.

This evident from Romans 1:28-29: "Even as they did not like to retain God in
their knowledge, God gave them over to a debased mind, to do those things which
are not fitting: ... sexual immorality? In this passage many things are listed as a
result of not keeping the knowledge of God. But in keeping with our theme, it is
clear that sexual immorality is considered to be an effect that comes from a person
turning away from their knowledge of God. This act of turning away from God is
manifest in sexual immorality, and it is considered to be debased, not fitting, and
deserving of death.

Homosexuality is condemned in the Epistles. For a longer defense against homo-
sexuality, see chapter 16, "Homosexuality." What needs to be briefly looked at
here is that homosexualitywas condemned in the New Testament Epistles. This is
found in Romans 1:18-32; 1 Corinthians 6:9-11; Galatians 5:19-21; Ephesians
5:3-5; 1 Timothy 1: 9-10; Jude 7. In Romans 1:26 Paul does not use the normal
Greek word for women, or a general word for female. The reason for this could
possibly be to show the extent of the immorality in the society and to typify the
abandonment by God, because in the Roman culture, like many cultures, women
are usually the last to be affected by a great moral collapse.

Adultery is condemned in the Epistles. Adultery is clearly condemned in the
New Testament Epistles. The references to their condemnation can be found in
Romans 2:22; 13:9; Galatians 5:19; James 2:11; 2 Peter 2:14; and Revelation
2:22. Adultery is the voluntary sexual intercourse between a married man and
someone other than his wife or between a married woman and someone other than
her husband. Each of this passages clearly reaffirms the Old Testament definitions
of improper sexuality. Also, texts such as Romans 13:9 actually quote the Ten
Commandments against committing adultery. This is a case and example to show
that the moral law found within the Old Testament ceremonial law still applies to
all peoples at all times. Furthermore, adultery is seen as being one of "the works of
the flesh" (Gal. 5:19 RSV) and thus is done by a person who does not "walk by the
Spirit" (5:16 RSV). In 2 Peter 2:14 the notion of adultery is associated with those
who are false teachers. These false teachers are considered to be so lost in their
moral control that they are found carousing (2:13); they are driven by an
uncontrollable lust, and their eyes are full of adultery, in which they cannot look
upon a woman without being a potential adulterer (2:14; Matt. 5:28). Finally, God
promised the church of Thyatira that unless they repent of their immorality and
adultery, they would be cast "into a sickbed" and experience "great tribulation"
(Rev. 2:22 NKJV). From these passages it is clear that adultery was condemned
and that it was a sign of ungodliness, whose punishment was the judgment of God.

Incest and fornication are condemned in the Epistles. First Corinthians 5:1 says,
"It is actually reported that there is sexual immorality among you, and such sexual
immorality as is not even named among the Gentiles—that a man has his father's

Sexual Issues 271

wife!" (NKJV). Instead of saying "sexual immorality; some translations use the
term "fornication" (KJV). This sin was so vile that even the nonbelieving Gentiles
(pagans) were disgusted at such horrendous acts. The Corinthians had tried to
suppress and minimize the severity of such sin, but theywere not able to hide that
immorality, and it was evident to all. This is known from 5:9, where Paul says, "I
wrote to you in my epistle not to keep company with sexually immoral people"
(NKJV).

The sin that these individuals were committing was a sexual sin between a man
and his father's wife. This is a form of incest, and it was comparable to a son having
a sexual relationship with his mother. The rebuke of this individual mirrors the Old
Testament condemnation (Lev. 18:7-8, 29; Deut. 22:30; 27:20). Finally, this type
of relationship was "not even named" among the Gentiles. This may be a reference
to the fact that it was both uncommon and illegal under the Roman law (which was
based on the natural law).

Sexual immorality received apostolic and ecclesiastical condemnation. In 1 Corinthians, it
is clear that the apostle Paul and the early church condemned sexual immorality.
Some were partaking in sexual immorality (5:1) and were becoming "puffed up"
with pride about it (5:2 NKJV). In response to this immorality, Paul had previously
written them a letter rebuking them for their sexual immorality (5:9). But now he is
calling for official church discipline to be performed upon such individuals. He
said they should have mourned over their sin (5:2). "When they are gathered
together, ... [they should] deliver such a one to Satan for the destruction of the flesh,
that his spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus" (5:4-5 NKJV). The
reasoning for this excommunication of the professed believer was for divine
chastening by throwing him into the realm of Satan (1 Tim. 1:20). But this person
was also cast out so that he did not affect the rest of the church

Cor. 5:6), so that it might be separated from the dominion ofsin and the old life;
hence, the church was to remove all things that are sinful, including all possible evil
influences upon itself. In 2 Corinthians (12:21), Paul expected and demanded that
these actions be taken in the church. Not putting these instructions into practice will
result in a church and a society that have been overcome with the "leaven" of
sexual immorality (1 Con 5:6 RSV).

Sexually immoral individuals are portrayed as unregenerate in the New Testament Epistles.
Sexual immorality was seen as acts done by the unregenerate and not by those who
have come under the Lordship of Christ. This is clearly seen in the Letter to the
Galatians, where sexual immorality and fornication are portrayed as being "works of
the flesh" (5:19 RSV). Another reference to the fact that those who portray these
characteristics are either unregenerate or have fallen into an unregenerate lifestyle is
found in the Letter to the Ephesians 5:3-7: "But fornication and all uncleanness or
covetousness, let it not even be named among you, as is fitting for saints; neither
filthiness, nor foolish talking, nor coarse jesting, which are not fitting, but rather
giving thanks. For this you know, that no fornicator, unclean person, nor covetous
man, who is an idolater, has any inheritance in the kingdom

272 Ethical Issues

of Christ and God. Let no one deceive you with empty words, for because of
these things the wrath of God comes upon the sons of disobedience. Therefore
do not be partakers with them" (emphasis added).

In other places it is clear that sexual immorality was considered to be part of the
old life and that it is to be done away with (Col. 3:5). It is also clear that it is the
will of God for a person's sanctification that they abstain from sexual immorality
and fornication (1 Thess. 4:3). The New Testament portrays unsanctified and
sometimes unregenerate individuals as being sexually immoral (Heb. 12:16; Jude
7). From the host of these passages, it is clear that sexual immorality does not befit
Christian believers. It shows the marks of ungodliness, a lack of restraint, and
living in the flesh; ultimately it might indicate that a person is not a regenerate
believer.

Believers are not to associate with the sexually immoral. Immorality was seen to be
such an infectious sin that believers were commanded to not associate with
anyone who professed to be a believer and lived in sexual immorality. Paul says,
"I wrote to you in my epistle not to keep company with sexually immoral people.
Yet I certainly did not mean with the sexually immoral people of this world, or
with the covetous, or extortioners, or idolaters, since then you would need to go
out of the world. But now I have written to you not to keep company with anyone
named a brother, who is sexually immoral, or covetous, or an idolater, or a
reviler, or a drunkard, or an extortioner—not even to eat with such a person" (1
Cor. 5:9-11 NKJV). There is a twofold purpose for this separation: one, so that
these sins would not affect the church; two, so that the sinning persons’ lack of
fellowship would drive them to repent and to be reinstated into the church's
fellowship.

Sexual immorality received divine judgment in the New Testament. Throughout the
New Testament, those who fell into sexual immorality received divine judgment
(Rom. 1:18-32). Also, being excommunicated from the church is a form of divine
judgment (1 Cor. 5:9-11). Some will receive the divine judgment of not inheriting
the kingdom of God (1 Cor. 6:9). Finally, the book of Revelation makes it clear
that those who are sexually immoral are going to receive divine judgment. Thus
the church of Thyatira is going to be cast "into great tribulation" (2:22 NKJV).
Later in the book we find that those practicing "sexually immorality" receive
judgment with the sixth trumpet (9:21). Fornication and sexual immorality are
portrayed as being in association with the spiritual prostitution of the antichrist's
false system, which will inevitably fail because of its immorality (14:8). The book
of Revelation then goes on to show that the nations and kings that have committed
adultery and fornication are going to receive divine judgment (17:2, 4;18:3, 9).
Finally, as the kingdom of heaven is coming down from God (21:1-2), the great
Babylon is judged for her fornication and immorality (19:2); then outside the gates
of heaven are those who are sexually immoral (22:15). It is clear from these
passages that God does not approve of sexual immorality. In itself sexual
immorality receives divine judgment, and it is also a

Sexual Issues 273

symbol of those nations and great systems of Satan that are coming against the
kingdom of God.

Improper Sexuality and the Trinity

There is a trinitarian reason for why Christians should not partake in any type of
sexual immorality. The reasons for this derive from the ministries of each
person of the Trinity: the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

The first theological reason involves God the Father. Sexual immorality a sin
against the body (1 Cor. 6:15-20), which God owns. The body has a prominent role
in the New Testament and Christian worldview. The body is not considered to be
less real, as the Platonists claimed, or evil, as the gnostics claimed. Rather, it has
real existence and is not an evil thing as such (even though sin does affect the
body). But because sexual sin is against the body, it is wrong to sin in this manner
(and any manner), especially because Paul says, "And God both raised up the Lord
and will also raise us up by His power" (1 Cor. 6:14 NKJV). In this passage sexual
immorality is wrong because God the Father ultimately owns the body, and he will
raise the faithful Christian's body to glory.

The second reason whysexual immoralityis wrong is because of a believer's union
and connection to the body of Christ. Christians should keep their bodies pure because
we are joined to Christ. First Corinthians 6:15-17 says, "Do you not know that your
bodies are members of Christ? Shall I then take the members of Christ and make them
members of a harlot? Certainly not! Or do you not know that he who is joined to a
harlot is one body with her? For ‘the two; He says, 'shall become one flesh: But he
who is joined to the Lord is one spirit with Him" (NKJV).

The third reason a believer should not commit sexual immorality is because it
defiles the temple of the Holy Spirit. First Corinthians 6:19-20 says, "Or do you not
know that your bodyis the temple of the Holy Spirit who is in you, whom you have
from God, and you are not your own? Foryou were bought at a price; therefore
glorify God in your body and in your spirit, which are God's" (NKJV).

In summation, the trinitarian reasons for believers not partaking in immorality are
clear. One, God is going to raise the body, and believers should keep their bodies pure
in light of the future resurrection. Two, Christians are joined to the body of Christ, and
thus committing sexual immoralityin essence defiles the body of Christ. Three, the
body of a Christian is now the temple of the indwelling Holy Spirit of God, and
defiling the body defiles the temple in which the Holy Spirit resides.

According to the New Testament, marriage is to be solely between one man
and one woman (1 Cor. 7:2). Because of God's concern for the family, he sets
regulations and sanctions upon proper and improper sexuality. This can be seen
from many passages, such as Leviticus 18; Song of Solomon 7-8; 1 Corinthians
5-6; Galatians 5:16-21; Ephesians 5:3; Colossians 3:5; 1 Thessalonians 4:3;
Hebrews 12:16; 13:4.

Sexual Issues 275

they may lie dormant for a while, sometimes tend to show their ugly head when
a person is in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Finally, sexual impurity before and after marriage sows the seeds of mistrust
and false commitments. Many couples think that if they are sexually active before
marriage, then it shows their commitment to each other. But in reality, it shows
their commitment to lust and not to the Lord. Many couples who have been
sexually impure are not really able to trust their spouse in marriage. As was said
above, it is hard to trust someone who you know (literally) has been living in sexual
immorality.

How to Stay Sexually Pure

In an age where individuals believe the old adage "The devil made me do it,"
one can seemingly justify any sexual behavior either because of temptation, lust,
or being in the wrong place at the wrong time. A person who looks into the
Scriptures, especially at the person and life of Joseph in the Old Testament, finds
a clear paradigm on how Christians should respond to sexual immorality. When
he was tempted by Potiphar's wife, he fled the scene in order to abstain from all
sexual immorality (Gen. 39). But in contrast, when David was tempted with
Bathsheba, he partook in the immorality instead of fleeing from the immorality
(2 Sam. 11-12). Sexual abstinence is 100 percent effective whenever it is
practiced.

A person who looks into the New Testament sees three imperatives: (1) be-
lievers are to resist the devil (1 Pet. 5:9), (2) believers are to flee sexual immorality
(1 Cor. 6:18), and (3) believers are to seek God's help: "No temptation has
overtaken you except such as is common to man; but God is faithful, who will not
allow you to be tempted beyond what you are able, but with the temptation will
also make the way of escape, that you maybe able to bear it" (1 Cor. 10:13 NKJV).
The stronger imperatives in the New Testament follow this line of thinking—that
one is to keep away from the schemes of the devil and to abstain and flee from all
immorality (1 Cor. 6:18; 1 Thess. 4:3).

Is Masturbation Morally Acceptable?

Since autosexual activitybrings no harm to anyone else, some consider it to be
acceptable for a Christian. After all, can it not help avoid unhelpful and unbiblical
forms of sex before marriage? In response, there are several serious problems with
masturbation. First, it does bring harm to oneself. For it can become an un-
wholesome habit to which one is bound. As the apostle said, we should "exercise
self-control in all things," for "I discipline my body and keep it under control" (1
Cor. 9:25, 27 ESV). Second, it usually involves lust toward someone to whom the
individual is not married. And sexual lust is a sin (Matt. 5:28; 1 John 2:16). Third, it
is a form of self-gratification, which is not helpful or holy. Fourth, God has
provided for a way to release male semen without this morally questionable

Sexual Issues 277

more important: risking one's life for "romance; or having a lifelong romance in
which you know that both individuals are free from sexual diseases?

Doesn't Sex outside Marriage Show a Commitment to Each Other?

Not really, at least not in any long-term sense. Sex outside of marriage does
not show a real commitment to another person; marriage does. Sex outside of
marriage shows a commitment to sin together and a lack of commitment to live
together in a God-ordained way. Sex outside of marriage is really a sign of no
real commitment either to God or to the other person.

Since Sex Is a Physical Need, Isn't It Right to Fulfill It
Like Other Physical Needs?

People are known to die for lack of food and water, but no one has ever died for
lack of sex! Sex is not a physical necessity; it is a luxury. Many people go a whole
lifetime without it and live a full life. Sex is not a need but a want—sometimes a
strong one—but it is not a need. And it is not going to kill anyone to wait for it until
marriage. In fact, waiting till marriage will help to develop one's character. And
they will enjoy it much more as a result.

An Experience So Pleasurable Cannot Be Morally Wrong

First, sex is a pleasurable experience, and God does want people to experience it.
But God also knows it is best experienced within the bonds of marriage. Further,
even if sex feels good outside marriage, that does not make it right. Overeating is
pleasurable but not desirable. Indeed, some of the greatest pleasures in life come
only after the pain of achieving them. Every great artist or athlete has experienced
this. Finally, those who seek pleasure and pleasure alone tend to find themselves in
the most unpleasurable situations. Looking for sexual pleasure outside marriage
finds the displeasure of sexually transmitted diseases, unwanted children, undue
burdens of wrecked relationships, and so forth. So while sex in and of itself is not
morally wrong, it nonetheless is more pleasurable, more safe, and more meaningful
within marriage.

Sex within the Confines of Marriage is Boring and Lacks Variety

First, a variety of partners is not necessary for sexual enjoyment. In fact, it tends
to lessen the enjoyment because of the risks and the lack of a secure, unique, and
enduring relationship. Second, sexual variety is possible within the confines of a
monogamous relationship. Continuous enjoyment will depend on the preparation,
place, approach, and passion of the relationship, not on the variety of partners. A
person can gain more pleasure out of driving the same good car every day than from
driving a series of poor vehicles. Likewise, a good sexual relation within a

278 Ethical Issues

secure, danger-free lifetime commitment is better than bad, temporal, and
dangerous relationships without any long-term commitment.

Sex before Marriage Is Okay If We Know for Sure That We Are Going to
Get Married

Simply stated, no, it is not! This is because sex before marriage is fornication,
and fornication is not okay. Fornication is sin, and sin is never right. You may
love each other, you may have your closet wedding ceremony, and you maythink
you are going to be committed to one another for life; but the truth is that all of
those things do not constitute a biblical marriage relationship. Marriage is always
a covenant relationship to God and before humans (see chap. 17), and not to
fulfill the biblical regulations for marriage and sexual relationships is sin.
Second, as was seen in the Song of Solomon, it is clear that the couple really
wanted to have sex before marriage, but they waited; and this produced a better
relationship for the couple. Third, a lot of people can make false commitments of
love and marriage in order to fulfill their sexual desires. But the truth is that talk is
cheap, and after they have what they wanted, you will realize that you were
betrayed with a kiss.

It Really Depends on What You Mean by "Sex"

Unfortunately, President Bill Clinton's relation with Monica Lewinsky has
redefined what is meant by "having sex" for years to come. It once meant adultery
(or fornication); now it can mean all kinds of sexual perversion short of penile
penetration. Yes, there are different kinds ofsexual relations, such as oral and anal.
But the Bible declares all extramarital sexual relations wrong, even those like por-
nography, which involve no sexual contact. Indeed, Jesus said, "But I say to you that
whoever looks at a woman to lust for her has already committed adultery with her in
his heart" (Matt. 5:28 NKJV). The Bible speaks of sexual sins in a broader sense
than adultery. There is fornication, masturbation, homosexuality, bestiality, and
other kinds of sexual perversity of body and mind. The Christian should remain
pure from all of them. To put it bluntly, in an age where our hedonistic culture is
constantly pushing the limits, the best advice to the unmarried is this: keep your
thoughts pure, keep your clothes on, and only allow a doctor to perform closer
examinations!

Conclusion

In a sexually saturated society, it is difficult to get people to think objectively, let
alone biblically, about the subject of sex. The hedonistic throng wants it—and
wants it now The truth is, however, that we appreciate things more when we have

Homosexuality 281

come under his roof. This attempt at sexual appeasement was necessary to save
their lives.

Further, it is argued that homosexuality was not envisioned in the request of
the men of the city to sknow" Lot's friends, since this Hebrew word ()Odd)
simply means "to get acquainted" (19:5). This term (yridd) occurs 873 times in
the Old Testament, and in the overwhelming number of occurrences it has no
sexual connotations whatsoever (see Ps. 139:1). Thus, it is concluded that the
sin of Sodom was inhospitality, not homosexuality.

The sin of Sodom was selfishness. The sin of Sodom is spelled out in these words:
"Now this was the sin of your sister Sodom: She and her daughters were arrogant,
overfed and unconcerned; they did not help the poor and needy" (Ezek. 16:49). No
mention is made of homosexualityor related sexual sins. Theywere condemned
simply because they were selfish, not because they were homosexuals.

The Levitical law is no longer applicable. The chief passage in the Old Testament
condemning homosexual practices is found in the Levitical law (Lev. 18:22). These
same Levitical laws also condemned eating pork and shrimp. However, such
ceremonial laws have been done away with (Mark 7:19; Acts 10:15). This being the
case, proponents have argued that there is no reason the laws prohibiting homosexual
activity should still be considered binding either.

Barrenness was a curse to Jewish women. According to Jewish belief,
barrenness was a curse (Gen. 16:1; 1 Sam. 1:3-8). Children were considered a
blessing from the Lord (Ps. 127:3). The blessing of God in the land was dependent
on having children (Gen. 15:5). Indeed, the hope ofJewish women was to bear the
promised Messiah (Gen. 3:15; cf. 4:1, 25). In view of the emphasis on having
children, it is not surprising that the Old Testament law would frown on homosexual
activity, from which no children come. However, it is reasoned, this in no way
condemns homosexual activity as such, nor is it condemned for those not included in
this Jewish expectation.

Homosexuality was connected with idolatry. It is also argued that the biblical
condemnations used against homosexuality fail to take into account that the pur-
pose of the passages is to prohibit idolatry. Since the temple (or cult) prostitutes
were associated with these idolatrous practices, they were condemned along with
idolatry (Deut. 23:17). However, proponents insist, homosexuality as such is not
thereby condemned, but only homosexuality associated with idolatry, as in the case
of the shrine prostitute (1 Kings 14:24).

The Pauline condemnations were private opinions. Most New Testament
passages against homosexuality come from the apostle Paul, who was only giving his
private opinion (1 Cor. 7:25). In fact, Paul admitted, "I have no command from the
Lord" (v. 25), and "I say this (I, not the Lord)" (v. 12). In this same book, only a
chapter earlier, Paul gives his condemnation of homosexuals (1 Cot 6:9). Thus, Paul's
opinion on these sexual matters is, by this own confession, not binding.

Paul also condemned long hair on men. According to homosexual proponents,
much of what the apostle Paul taught was obviously culturally relative. For example,

282 Ethical Issues

in | Corinthians the apostle also taught that "if a man has long hair, it is a disgrace
to him" (11:14). But since this was obviously a culturally relative statement, there
is no reason that Paul's statements against homosexuals should be considered to be
absolute moral prohibitions.

First Corinthians 6:9 speaks only against offenses. Some homosexuals appeal to the
fact that 1 Corinthians 6:9 speaks only against "homosexual offenders," not against
homosexuality as such. That is, the passage only condemns offensive homosexual
acts, but not homosexual activity per se. This being the case, Paul's apparent con-
demnation turns out to be an implied approval of inoffensive homosexual acts.

Heterosexuality is unnatural for homosexuals. According to some homosexuals,
when Paul spoke against what was "unnatural" in Romans 1:26, he was not
declaring that homosexuality was morally wrong, but simply that heterosexual
activity was unnatural for homosexuals. Thus, "unnatural" is used in a sociological
rather than a biological sense. So it is argued that, rather than condemning
homosexual practices, this passage in Romans actually approves of them for
homosexuals. Each person should act according to their own sociological
tendencies, whether these are heterosexual or homosexual.

Isaiah predicted homosexuals in the kingdom. Isaiah 56:3-5 declares that eu-
nuchs will be brought into the kingdom of God. The Lord said, "To them I will
give within my temple and its walls a memorial and a name better than sons and
daughters; 1 will give them an everlasting name that will not be cut off" (v. 5).
This is taken to mean that Isaiah predicted the day of acceptance of
homosexuals into God's kingdom, the fulfillment of which some homosexuals
now claim is occurring.

David and Jonathan were homosexual. First Samuel 18-20 records the intense
love David and Jonathan had for each other. Some see this passage as an
indication that they were homosexual, pointing out that it says Jonathan "loved"
David "as himself" (18:3), that Jonathan stripped in David's presence (18:4), that
they kissed each other (20:41), and that they "exceeded" (20:41 RSV footnote),
a term taken to mean ejaculation. David's lack of successful relations with
women is also taken to indicate his homosexual tendencies. Jonathan's love for
David was said to be "more wonderful than that of women" (2 Sam. 1:26). All
these factors considered together show, it is argued, that David and Jonathan
were homosexual.

Other Arguments for Homosexuality

In addition to these arguments drawn from the Bible, a number of other reasons
are offered in favor of homosexuality. They fall into the general category of social
and moral reasons.

There should be no sexual constraints among consenting adults. Many insist that
there should be no sexual prohibitions for consenting adults. While admitting that
forced sex and sexual abuse of children are wrong, many homosexuals contend

Homosexuality 285

no place in the Bible is any such connection stated. If homosexuals were punished
because they were barren, then why were they put to death (and thus could not have
any children)? Heterosexual marriage would have been a more appropriate
punishment! The same prohibition against homosexuality was not only for Jews
but also for Gentiles (Lev. 18:24), whose blessings were not dependent on having
heirs to inherit the land of Israel. If barrenness were a divine curse, then singleness
would be sinful. But both Jesus (Matt. 19:11-12) and Paul (1 Cor. 7:8) hallowed
singlehood by precept and practice.

Homosexuality is evil apart from idolatry. Homosexual practices are not con-
demned in the Bible simply because they were connected with idolatry. This is
made evident by several things. Condemnations of homosexuality are often made
apart from reference to any explicit idolatrous practice (Lev. 18:22; Rom. 1:26-27).
(Adultery was also considered immoral apart from female cult prostitutes.) When
homosexuality is associated with idolatry (such as in temple/cult prostitution), it is
not essentially connected. It is only a concomitant but not an equivalent sin. Sexual
unfaithfulness is often used as an illustration of idolatry (e.g., Hos. 3:1; 4:12), but it
has no necessary connection with it. Idolatry may lead to immorality (Rom.
1:22-27), but they are different sins. Even the Ten Commandments distinguish
between idolatry (first table of the law, Exod. 20:3-5) and sexual sins (second table,
20:14-17).

Paul's teaching is divinely authoritative. Paul's condemnation against homosexu-
ality is divinely authoritative, even in 1 Corinthians. Actually, Paul's clearest con-
demnation of homosexuality is in Romans 1, the divine authority of which is not
challenged by any Christian accepting the inspiration of Scripture. Paul's apostolic
credentials are firmly established in Scripture. He declared in Galatians that his
revelations were "not something that man made up" but were "received ... by
revelation from Jesus Christ" (1:11-12). To the Corinthians, Paul affirmed: "The
things that mark an apostle—signs, wonders and miracles—were done among you"
(2 Cor. 12:12). Even in 1 Corinthians, where Paul's authority is severely challenged by
his critics, his divine authority is made evident in three ways. He begins the book by
claiming that he has "words taught by the Spirit" (1 Cor. 2:13). He concludes the book
by claiming, "What I am writing to you is the Lord's command" (14:37). Even in the
disputed seventh chapter, where Paul is alleged to be giving his own uninspired
opinion, he declares, "I too have the Spirit of God" (v. 40). Indeed, when he says "I,
not the Lord; he does not mean his words are not from the Lord; this would contradict
everything he says elsewhere. Rather, it means that esus did not speak directly to this
matter while on earth. But esus promised his apostles that he would send the Holy
Spirit to "guide you into all truth" ( John 16:13). And Paul's teaching in Corinthians
was a fulfillment of that promise.

Homosexuality is an offense. When 1 Corinthians 6:9 speaks of "homosexual
offenders," it means the offense of homosexuality, not an offensive act by a ho-
mosexual as opposed to an inoffensive one. This is made plain by several factors.
"Homosexual" qualifies ‘offend ers," not the reverse. It speaks against a homosexual

288 Ethical Issues

one. Changing the location of an immoral act does not change its violation of a
moral law. Yet the reverse is not true. For example, just because marital sex is
good in private does not mean it is good in public. Finally, there is a difference
between the morality of performing a private homosexual act and the difficulty
of prohibiting it. Whatever the difficulty of enforcing the prohibitions against it,
it is still morally wrong.

There are no homosexual rights. As such, homosexuals have rights as citizens
but not as homosexuals. This is evident for several reasons. Homosexual acts are
morally wrong, and there is no right to do a wrong. That is moral nonsense. Neither
are there any civil rights to do a moral wrong. Homosexuality is morally wrong,
and the civil law should not encourage what is morally wrong. Civil law should be
based on moral law. Third, it is as meaningless to speak of homosexual rights as it
is to speak of rapists’ rights, child abusers' rights, or murderers’ rights. Rapists have
no civil (or moral) right to be rapists, and child molesters have no civil right to be
child molesters. Likewise, there are no civil rights to perform homosexual acts.
Homosexuality is a moral and civil wrong, and there is no civil right to do a civil
wrong. Finally, homosexuals have rights as citizens but not as homosexuals.
However, when the practice of homosexuality interferes with the nights of others
(as in solicitation of children), then their rights as citizens can be abrogated (by
prison).

Homosexual tendencies are not inherited. For several reasons, homosexual
acts cannot be justified on the grounds that they are inherited. There is no undis-
puted scientific evidence to support the contention that homosexual tendencies
are genetic. It shows every evidence of being a learned behavior. People are
recruited into the movement and taught to perform homosexual acts. Even if
there were an inherited tendency toward a homosexual attitude, this would not
justify homosexual acts. Some people seem to inherit a tendency toward
violence, but this does not justify violent acts. Some people are said to have an
inherited tendency toward alcohol abuse, but this does not justify drunkenness.
The Bible declares that homosexuality is "unnatural" and comes about only
when someone 'abandons" their natural inclinations (Rom. 1:26-27). The Bible
teaches that we all inherit a tendency to sin (Ps. 51:5; Eph. 2:3), but we are still
responsible for sinning.

Morality does not change. Basic moral principles do not change; what changes is
our understanding of them and our performance of them. To affirm that moral laws
themselves change is misinformed for many reasons. It confuses unchanging moral
values with changing moral practices. That is, it confuses morals and mores. It
confuses an absolute moral command with our relative comprehension of it. My
understanding of love has changed over the past fifty years, but love has not
changed. Claiming that morals can change confuses facts and values. The reason
witches were once killed but no longer are is not because morality has changed but
because we no longer believe that witches can kill people by their incantations. If
they could, then they should still be punished as murderers. To the degree that

Homosexuality 289

moral principles reflect the nature of God, they cannot change, for God cannot
change his basic moral character (Mal. 3:6; Heb. 6:18).

Animal behavior is not normative for humans. There are several objections to ap-
pealing to animal behavior as a justification for homosexual activity. For the most
part, homosexual acts among mammals are casual and temporary, not habitual and
lifelong. Thus the appeal to animal behavior to justify a homosexual lifestyle is
unfoundedjudging bythe perversion and violence of some human homosexual acts,
animals are receiving a bad deal in the comparison. Nothing like the human
degradation among hard-core homosexuals is known in the animal kingdom. Animal
behavior is not normative for human activity. One should not expect that the behavior
of brute beasts is exemplary for human conduct. Animals are not relationally and
morally responsible creatures. They act from instinct and, hence, are not ethically
culpable for their actions. Humans, on the other hand, are created in God's image and
are responsible to act in a godlike manner, not like animals.

The Arguments against Homosexuality

God loves alcoholics but hates alcoholism. Likewise, God loves homosexuals but
hates homosexual perversity. The case against homosexual acts can be made in two
ways: biblically and socially. The biblical arguments will be presented first.

Biblical Arguments against Homosexual Practices

There are many biblical arguments against homosexual practices,both implicit
and explicit. The implicit argument is derived from the fact that God ordained
heterosexual acts within the bonds of marriage, not homosexual activity. Since this
will be treated in the next chapter, it will only be touched upon here.

God ordained heterosexuality, not homosexuality. God ordained heterosexual
relationships when he created "male and female" and commanded them to have
children (Gen. 1:27-28). Sex was given a family context from the very beginning.
God said, "A man [male] will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife
[female], and they will become one flesh" (2:24). Paul makes it clear that "one
flesh" implies sexual intercourse (1 Cor. 6:15-17). The writer of Hebrews
proclaims that "marriage should be honored by all, and the marriage bed kept pure,
for God will judge the adulterer and all the sexually immoral" (Heb. 13:4). Indeed,
the Ten Commandments declare: "You shall not commit adultery" and "You shall
not covet your neighbor's wife" (Exod. 20:14, 17). These passages make it plain
that God has ordained sex to be used between a male and female within the bonds
of heterosexual marriage.

Canaan was condemned for a homosexual sin. Although the text does not ex-
plicitly say so, it appears that Noah's son Ham engaged in a homosexual act with
his drunken father. There are several indications in the Bible that this was the case.
The phrase "saw his father's nakedness" (Gen. 9:22) is used elsewhere of

Homosexuality 291

Homosexuality is condemned in the book of Judges. One of the most grotesque
and horrifying sins in the Old Testament was provoked by homosexuals. When a
man from Gibeah invited a traveler into his home, "some of the wicked men of the
city surrounded the house. Pounding on the door, they shouted to the old man who
owned the house, ‘Bring out the man who came to your house so we can have sex
with him" ( Judg. 19:22). The man urged the homosexual crowd: "Don't do such a
disgraceful thing" (v. 24). In an attempt to appease them, he offered his virgin
daughter and his guest's concubine to them. So the men "raped [the concubine] and
abused her throughout the night, and at dawn they let her go" (v. 25). When her
master found the concubine limp on the doorstep the next morning, he cut her in
twelve pieces and sent one piece to each of the twelve tribes. Everyone who saw it
said, "Such a thing has never been seen or done, not since the day the Israelites came
up out of Egypt. Think about it! Consider it! Tell us what to do!" (v. 30). It is difficult
to imagine a greater perversity growing out of homosexuality than this. But as
horrible as the rape and consequent evil that followed, the Levite saw giving his
concubine to them as a less "disgraceful thing" than homosexuality (v. 24).

The prophets condemned sodomy. Homosexual acts were condemned
throughout the Old Testament. The prophetic writer of Kings (perhaps Jeremiah)
speaks over and over of the evil of homosexuality. He wrote, "There were even
male shrine prostitutes in the land; the people engaged in all the detestable practices
of the nations the LORD had driven out before the Israelites" (1 Kings 14:24). Later,
one of Asa's reforms was that "he expelled the male shrine prostitutes from the land"
(15:12). Likewise, Jehoshaphat "rid the land of the rest of the male shrine prostitutes
who remained there even after the reign of his father Asa" (22:46). When the good
king Josiah later invoked a revival, "he also tore down the quarters of the male
shrine prostitutes, which were in the temple of the LOIUD" (2 Kings 23:7). The
prophet Ezekiel spoke out against the sensual sins of Sodom, calling them
"detestable things" (16:50). This is the same word used to describe homosexual acts
in Leviticus (18:22-23).

Romans I condemns homosexuality among pagans. The most descriptive passage
on homosexual acts in the Bible is recorded in Romans 1. Paul called it a sin for which
‘the wrath of God is being revealed from heaven" (v. 18). The descriptions of the sin of
homosexuality are virtually unrivaled anywhere in Scripture. It is called "sinful
desires: "sexual impurity," "degrading," "a lie; "shameful lusts," “unnatural,”
"inflamed ...lust," "indecent: and a "perversion" (vv. 24-27). As a result of these kinds
of wicked practices, God "gave them over to a depraved mind" (v. 28). They became
"filled with every kind of wickedness, evil, greed and depravity" (v. 29).

The Scriptures vividly describe homosexual acts in these terms: "Even their
women exchanged natural relations for unnatural ones. In the same way men also
abandoned natural relations with women and were inflamed with lust for one an-
other. Men committed indecent acts with other men, and received in themselves
the due penalty for their perversion" (vv. 26-27). Noteworthy are the two words
"exchanged" and "abandoned," both indicating that a free and sinful choice was

294 Ethical Issues

Homosexual practices are a threat to lives. One of the most powerful social
arguments against homosexual practices is AIDS. There is no question that this
deadly disease is spread by homosexual practices. Neither is there any doubt that it
is spread from homosexuals to such nonhomosexuals as hemophiliacs, users of
common needles, medical workers, wives of bisexuals, and others. Predictions are
that eventually millions of people will die as a direct or indirect result of
homosexual practices that pass on this fatal virus. The disease has reached
epidemic proportions. When the physical well-being of society is so threatened, it
is necessary for society to protect itself against such life-threatening practices. No
rational society would fail to defend itself against other activities that so
endangered the lives of its citizens.

One study reveals that male homosexuals live on the average about thirtyyears
less than do heterosexual males. Statistics on homosexual deaths show that the
average male homosexual lives to about age 40, but the average male heterosexual
lives to about 752Even chain-smoking is not that lethal. A widely accepted Hogg
study shows a life-span reduction of from eight to twenty years.

Some Objections Considered

Several objections have been leveled against the various arguments counter
to homosexuality. These will be briefly considered now

These arguments produce homophobia. Some object that the case against ho-
mosexuality produces an unnatural and unwarranted fear and generates a kind of
hysteria against homosexuals, and that it is an overreaction based on emotions.
However, this objection is not justified. The case against homosexuality is based
not on emotions but on Scripture and facts and sound reasoning. There is a differ-
ence between an appeal to emotions and an appeal based on emotions. Certainly, a
strong warning to leave a burning building is an appeal to the emotions, but if the
building is ablaze, no one should object, since it is an appeal based on facts. The
arguments against the homosexuals’ deviant behavior no more deserve to be called
productive of homophobia than arguments against stealing should be called
productive of kleptophobia. The real question is whether the behavior is morally
and socially acceptable, not whether it produces legitimate fear of a socially
damaging or dangerous practice.

It discriminates against homosexuals. There are two basic mistakes in this
argument. First, it fails to distinguish between homosexuals and homosexuality.
Laws against drunk driving do not thereby discriminate against drinkers. One can
be opposed to alcoholism without being opposed to alcoholics. We must
distinguish between the person and the practice. It is only homosexual behavior
that is objectionable, not homosexuals as persons.

2. See Norman L. Geisler and Frank Turek, Legislating Morality: Is It Wise? Is It
Legal? Is It Possible? (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 1998), 131-32.
3. Frank Turek, Correct, Not Politically Correct: How Same-Sex Marriage Hurts

Everyone (Charlotte: CrossExamined.org, 2008), 28.

Homosexuality 295

Second, this objection incorrectly assumes that all discrimination is wrong. It is
a discrimination against discrimination. Actually, the word "discrimination" is a
good word. All rational people discriminate. That is why we put skulls and cross-
bones on poisons and warning labels on cigarette packages. We also discriminate
against socially disruptive behavior by applying punishments and imprisonment.
In this sense it is legitimate to discriminate against homosexual behavior. Not to
discriminate against socially undesirable behavior is as unreasonable as claiming
that child abusers or rapists should not be imprisoned, since this would be dis-
criminating against them.

It lacks proper Christian love for all persons. This objection wrongly assumes that we
cannot love the sinner and yet hate the sin. There is no reason we cannot love an
alcoholic but hate alcoholism. Likewise, we can love homosexuals and hate
homosexuality. Admittedly, not all Christians consistently practice this distinction.
Many reject even their own children when they "come out of the closet." This is a
tragic mistake. It is both unchristian and unhelpful. It is unchristian because it is not
in the spirit of Christ, who ministered to publicans and sinners. Nor can one hope to
win them by rejecting them.

Yet if they are professing believers and members of a church, unrepentant prac-
ticing homosexuals must be given church discipline (cf. 1 Cor. 5). However, we
should still reach out in love as friends and relatives in order to help them. Total
rejection of them as persons only drives them further into their sin. Love reaches
out to people, even sinful ones; it does not reject them. Homosexuals need com-
passion as persons, not condemnation.

Homosexuals are born that way. This argument backfires for several reasons. First,
if homosexuals were also designed (born) as males or females, they why shouldn't
they follow the design of their bodies instead of their desires, which go against
God's design for their bodies? Failing to follow one's desires can be uncomfortable,
but failing to follow the design for one's body can be fatal.’

Second, science has not demonstrated that there is a genetic source or bio-
logical source for homosexual desires. At any rate, since homosexuals do not
and cannot reproduce, there is no way for the genetic desires to be passed on to
the next generation.s

Third, even if scientists were to find a biological cause for homosexual desires, it
still would not be grounds to accept or promote homosexuality. Even if we are born
with certain sinful tendencies, this is no excuse for performing these perverse
activities. The Bible is the final authority for our behavior (2 Tim. 3:16-17; 2 Pet.
2:5-6), and it clearly condemns homosexual practice:

God also gave them up to uncleanness, in the lusts of their hearts, to dishonor their
bodies amongthemselves, who exchanged the truth of God for the lie, and worshiped

4. Ibid., 82.
5. Ibid.

296 Ethical Issues

and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed forever. Amen. For
this reason God gave them up to vile passions. For even their women exchanged the
natural use for what is against nature. Likewise also the men, leaving the natural use
of the woman, burned in their lust for one another, men with men committing what is
shameful, and receiving in themselves the penalty of their error which was due; . . .
who, knowing the righteous judgment of God, that those who practice such things are
deserving of death, not only do the same but also approve of those who practice them.
(Rom. 1:24-27, 32 NKJV, emphasis added)

Fourth, even apart from the Bible there is evidence against yielding to homo-
sexual tendencies or practices. This is seen from the fact that homosexuals tend to
die earlier, have higher cases of HIV and AIDS, colon and rectal cancer, and
hepatitis. In fact, "according to the Center for Disease Control, more than 82
percent of all known sexually-transmitted AIDS cases in 2006 were the result of
male-to-male sexual contact. Moreover, gay and bisexual men account for more
than 60 percent of all syphilis cases,

Finally, most people would not apply this homosexual reasoning to other
areas of life. We know that rapists can fight their desires, as can murders and
adulterers. And experience (by ex-gays) shows that this tendency can be fought
too. Further, we should fight homosexual tendencies because, like other bad
tendencies, the practices they prompt are harmful not only to individuals but also
to society.

It is bigotry not to condone homosexuality. Bigotry is a prejudgment without any
reasons or grounds for the objection. But this is not the case with homo-
sexuality. Clearly there are good reasons for rejecting it. First, it is contrary to
Scripture (see above sections). Second, it is harmful to natural marriage. Third,
it is harmful to children. Fourth, it raises the cost of many insurance carriers
because of the sicknesses many homosexuals have. Fifth, it is dangerous to the
individuals themselves. Sixth, this argument presupposes a moral standard. But
if homosexual activists are going to apply this moral standard against those who
oppose homosexuality, why don't they use the same moral law against homo-
sexual behavior?’

Christians need to be more tolerant and loving of homosexuality. First, tolerance
assumes that something is wrong. We don't tolerate good; we happily accept it.
Second, homosexuals want more than tolerance. They are looking for a
full-fledged endorsement of their lifestyle. Third, it is an evil to accept or approve
evil action that is going to harm and endanger the individuals themselves. Finally,
homosexuals are not tolerant of the heterosexual lifestyle. This is evident from the
facts that they are in favor of revising the definition of marriage and in favor of
imposing same-sex marriage and all of its social effects upon people without their
consent. Therefore, it is not a question of tolerance, but a question of al-

6. Ibid., 19.
As Ibid., 84.

2.98 Ethical Issues

Scripture could scarcely be more emphatic. Homosexual practices are called
unnatural, impure, shameful, indecent, perverse, and an abomination.

In addition to the powerful biblical exhortations against
homosexuality, there are strong social arguments as well. Indeed, no
society, past or present, has ever accorded equal status to homosexuals. It
is not only psychologically and socially dangerous; it also has become an
epidemic threat to the physical lives of millions of people. In view of this,
it is necessary for rational societies to protect their citizens against the
contaminating influences of such sexually deviant behavior. Nonetheless,
as Christians we should love the sinner, even though we hate the sinner's
sin. Thus we should reach out in love to win homosexuals to Christ, who
loves them and has died for them.

Select Readings

Atkins, David. Homosexuals in the Christian Fellowship. 2nd ed. Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1981.

Bahnsen, Greg L. Homosexuality: A Biblical View. Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1978.

Bailey, D. Sherwin. Homosexuality and the Western Christian Tradition. Reprint,
Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1975.

Bathelor, Edward, Jr., ed. Homosexuality and Ethics. New York: Pilgrim, 1980.

Boswell, John. Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality: Gay People in Western
Europe from the Beginning of the Christian Era to the Fourteenth Century. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1980.

Cameron, Paul. "A Case against Homosexuality." Human Life Review 4, no. 3 (Summer
1978): 20-49.

Craven, S. Michael. Pornography: The Deconstruction of Human Sexuality. Cincinnati:
National Coalition for the Protection of Families, 2004.

Keyson, Edward. What You Should Know about Homosexuality. Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 1979.

Satinover, Jeffery. Homosexuality and the Politics of Truth. Grand Rapids: Baker Books,
1996.

Turek, Frank. Correct, Not Politically Correct: How Same-Sex Marriage Hurts Everyone.
Charlotte: CrossExamined.org, 2008.

Uldeja, Philip Michael. anheological Critique of the Contemporary Homosexual
Movement!’ ThD thesis, Dallas Theological Seminary, 1982.

17

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

Marriage is the most basic and influential societal unit in the world. It is difficult to
overestimate the importance of marriage, yet each year in the United States there
are about half as many divorces as marriages. In view of this, it behooves us to
consider the basis for marriage as God intended it. Likewise, since divorce has
become commonplace both inside and outside the church, we need to examine
when, if ever, it is justifiable.

A Biblical View of Marriage

Since divorce is the dissolution of a marriage, it is necessary to consider marriage
before discussing divorce. Just what is a Christian marriage, and should it ever be
dissolved? Christians have more agreement on the nature of marriage than they do
on divorce. Following are the basic elements of a Christian view of marriage.

The Nature of Marriage

Both the nature and length of marriage are important from a Christian
perspective. Marriage is a lifelong commitment between a male and a female,
which involves mutual sexual rights. There are at least three basic elements in
the biblical concept of marriage.

Marriage is between a male and a female. A biblical marriage is between a bio-
logical male and a biological female. This is clear from the very beginning. God
created "male and female" (Gen. 1:27) and commanded them to "be fruitful and

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Marriage and Divorce 305

now have is not your husband" (John 4:17-18). This is taken to imply that
one's first spouse is the only true one.

7. Divorce violates a sacred typology. According to Paul, a wife is to her hus-
band what the church is to Christ (Eph. 5:32). Hence, divorce violates that
beautiful typology of the heavenly marriage between Christ and his bride,
the church. That God takes a violation of a sacred type seriously can be
witnessed in his punishment of Moses for striking the rock (Christ) twice
(Num. 20:9-12).

In summary, this view argues that there are no grounds for divorce. The "ex-
ception" in Matthew 19:9 refers to premarital intercourse (fornication), not to
adultery after marriage. Since there are no grounds for divorce, then divorce is sin
and remarriage of a divorce (man) or divorcee (woman) is wrong.

There is only one ground for divorce. Many Christians believe that there is
only one justifiable ground for divorce: adultery. Remarriage of divorced
persons is not permitted, since they would be living in sin (Matt. 5:32). This
they base on several considerations.

1. Jesus explicitly stated that adultery is grounds for divorce. Proponents of
this view favor rendering Matthew 19:9 the way the New International Ver-
sion does: "I tell you that anyone who divorces his wife, except for marital
unfaithfulness, and matries another woman commits adultery" (emphasis
added). They point to several factors in favor of this rendering. The Greek
word used is porneia, which includes illicit sexual relations of married as
well as unmarried people (see Acts 15:20; Rom. 1:29). It is used in parallel
with the word "adultery" in this very passage, indicating that they have
overlapping usages.

2. Jesus repeated this exception in a parallel passage. Not only did Jesus state
adultery as the one ground for divorce when asked, but he stated the same
thing in the Sermon on the Mount, saying, "I tell you that anyone who
divorces his wife, except for marital unfaithfulness, causes her to become an
adulteress, and anyone who marries the divorced woman commits adultery"
(Matt. 5:32, emphasis added). In view of this repeated exception, it is argued
that the other reference (in Mark 10:1-9; Luke 16:18), where no exception is
mentioned, must be understood in the light of the clearly stated exception of
adultery in Matthew.

3. Paul agreed with Jesus's view on divorce. Paul affirmed Jesus's position on
divorce for adultery at least implicitly, if not explicitly. He was careful to
point to the authority and remembered words of Christ in these matters by
phrases like "not I, but the Lord" (1 Cor. 7:10). Even when he said "I, not the
Lord," he was not contradicting Christ but merely noting that though Christ
never spoke to that particular issue, Christ through the Spirit later gave
revelation to Paul (cf. 1 Cor. 2:13; 7:12, 40; 14:37). Furthermore, it is

Marriage and Divorce 311

married. Hence, living with another is adultery, since it is sexual intercourse
with a married person.

With respect to God's ideal for marriage, this seems to be a valid inference
from the passage. Yet for several reasons, it is wrong to assume that this
eliminates all remarriage.

First, Jesus obviously does not mean that the innocent party is actually com-
mitting adultery, for it is one's partner who has committed adultery. God is simply
treating the innocent party as if that person has committed adultery. In like man-
ner, 1 John 1:10 says, "If we say we have not sinned, we make [God] a liar"
(KJV). But it is clear that we cannot actually make God to be a liar. By claiming
sinlessness, we treat God as if he were a liar. Thus, since divorce violates God's
ideal for marriage, even the innocent party is treated as if an adulterer or
adulteress, even though one really is not.

Second, as all admit, the death of one partner would make remarriage valid. In
such a case the other party would not be committing adultery by remarrying.

Third, as the Westminster Confession argued, there are other situations than
divorce that are "as if the offending party were dead" (emphasis added).
Desertion, for example, is the virtual equivalent of death.

Fourth, as noted, forgiveness by confession cancels the state-of-sin status of the
divorced person ( Jer. 3:1,11-14). The only reason they are living in sin after a
divorce is that the divorce was a sin. And as long as they do not confess the sin of
the divorce, they are still living in sin. But if they do confess their sin, God will
forgive it like any other sin (1 John 1:9).

An Evaluation of the Position Allowing Divorce forMany Reasons

As we have already seen, there is no justification for divorce as such; yet the
position that permits divorce for many reasons has a good deal of merit. Its value is
not in the grounds it allows for the dissolution of a marriage, but in its arguments in
favor of encouraging a remarriage. These arguments cannot be used to justify
divorce; whatever value they have can only be used to justify remarriage. At best,
they are not arguments in favor of breaking an old marriage, but simply reasons for
making a new marriage. Some of the reasons deserve repetition.

Marriage is a mutual vow. Since marriage is a mutual vow, it is both impossible
and unnecessary for only one person to keep a vow when the other person has
irrevocably broken it. Yet a believer should seek reconciliation. As long as it is
possible to make the first marriage function, the believer has a responsibility to do
so. Following the example of Hosea, we should even forgive and receive back an
adulterous partner (Hos. 3). On the other hand, if the other person is dead (or the
equivalent) or has remarried, then there obviously is no possibility of
reconciliation. In such cases the other party is not bound by the wedding vows
since they were vows to another person with whom it is no longer possible to
fulfill them.

Marriage and Divorce 313

Small, Dwight H. The Right to Remarry. Old Tappan, NJ: Revell, 1977.
Steele, Paul E., and Charles C. Ryrie. Meant to Last. Wheaton: Victor, 1986.
Stott, John R. W. Divorce. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1971.

Strauss, Mark L., ed. Remarriage after Divorce in Today's Church: Three Views. Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 2006.

18

ECOLOGY

The Barna Group's research committee has found that a majority of Americans
(60 percent) believe that it is "absolutely necessary" to invest in environmental
protection. They then go on to say that 57 percent of adults believe that global
warming is a "major problem facing not only the nation but [also] the world.:" Yer
the care and concern for the environment is not a recent phenomenon. E. Calvin
Beisner gives the historical development of the environmental ethics debate? He
demonstrates that the debate is actually rooted in the ideas of writers like Henry
David Thoreau (1817-62) and in the studies of naturalists like John James
Audubon (d. 1851), Sierra Club founder John Muir (d. 1914), and John Burroughs
(d. 1921), and outdoorsmen like President Theodore Roosevelt (d. 1919) and
United States Forest Service founder Gifford Pinchot (d. 1946). As radical
environmentalist and Earth First movement founder David Foreman (b. 1947)
declared, The founders of the Sierra Club, the National Audubon Society, the
Wilderness Society, and the wildlife conservation groups were, as a rule, pillars in
American society."

Beisner addresses the church: "Environmentalism as a movement among
evangelicals, like its non-evangelical counterparts (Secular, New Age, mainline

I. Bara Group, "Americans Describe Their Moral and Social Concerns, Including Abortion and
Homosexuality" (Ventura, CA: Barna Group,January 21, 2008), http://www.barma.org/barna-update/
artide/13-culture/50-antericans.describe-their-moratand-social-concems-including-abortion-and
-homosexuality.

2. See. E. Calvin Beisner, Where Garden Meets Wilderness: Evangelical Entry into the Environmental
Debate (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997).

3.1bid., 2.

314

Ecology 315

Protestant, and Catholic), is a recent phenomenon.."’ By the late 1980s, a survey
of 125 church-related colleges revealed that 95 percent offered environmental
ethics courses.’ Today it would be almost an anomaly to find a school that does
not have a course addressing the issue of environmental ethics. There has also
been the rise and development of evangelical environmental ethics groups such
as Evangelicals for Social Action, Au Sable Institute for Environmental Studies,
Evangelical Environmental Network, Christian Society of the Green Cross, and
Christian Environmental Council.’ Beyond these groups, hundreds of churches
and Christian social groups have started to emphasize our responsibility toward
the environment.

In view of the ecological situation and the heightened awareness among
evangelicals, what is Christians’ ethical responsibility to the physical
environment in which we live? Certain countries are being charged with going
over their sanctioned amount of pollution levels, and other towns like
Greensburg, Kansas, want to be the first all-green town in America. What are the
moral implications of pollution destroying our world's natural resources? Some
atheists like Ayn Rand (d. 1982) extol the virtues of technology over nature and
show little concern for the natural environment. One of her disciples, Henry
Binswanger, even speaks blatantly of "raping" the environment to advance
society. At the other end of the spectrum from such humanists are pantheists,
who virtually worship nature. They oppose drilling for oil offshore, building
dams, killing animals for fur, using insecticides, and any other human
intervention that can disturb the natural environment.

Between the two extremes of the materialist's wastage of nature and the pan-
theist's worship of it, the Christian believes in the proper respect for and use of
natural resources. The respectful utilization of our physical environment grows
out of the Christian concept of creation and our divinely appointed obligation
to be good stewards of what God has given us.

A Materialist View of the Environment

Although not all materialists are atheists, most atheists are materialists of some kind.
Hence, the philosophical basis of a materialist view of the environment grows out of
an atheistic or secular humanist worldview. Such a view is expressed in Humanist
Manifesto 1 (1933). After denying a Creator and a distinctive spiritual aspect in
human beings, it affirms unbounded optimism in humans' ability to solve their own
problems: "Using technology wisely, we can control our environment, conquer
poverty, markedly reduce disease, extend our life-span, significantly modify our
behavior, alter the course of human evolution and cultural development, unlock

4. Ibid., 1.
S. Ibid.,
3. 6. Ibid.,
4.

Drugs 373
is a fact that nondrinkers live longer. Some SS percent of nondrinkers live till
age seventy-five or more, but only 40 percent of drinkers live to seventy-five.

Objection 10: Alcohol Makes One Relax and Feel Better

This objection highlights the height of our hedonism. Unfortunately, in our
feeling-centered and self-centered culture, this argument is more persuasive than it
deserves to be. In response, first, there are nonaddictive ways to relax. Meditation on
Scripture is an effective way (Ps. 1:2; cf. Isa. 26:3). Second, a person should not
make one's happiness depend on addictive drugs. Doing that is both deceptive and
dangerous. Third, if one wants a high without a hangover, Paul's advice is hard to
beat: "Do not be drunk with wine, wherein is excess; but be filled with the Holy
Spirit" (Eph. 5:18 KJV). Finally, God's plan for our nerves is a lot better than that of
the booze promoters. Paul exhorted, "Be anxious for nothing, but in everything by
prayer and supplication, with thanksgiving, let your requests be made known to
God; and the peace of God, which passes all understanding, will keep your hearts
and minds through Christ Jesus"(Phil. 4:6-7 NKJV).

Conclusion

To drink or not to drink? We have taken a sober look at the question. What is the
answer? Just say No! Why? Because drinking alcoholic beverages is unbiblical,
deadly, addictive, unhealthy, costly, a bad example, not edifying, and unnecessary.
Clearly, total abstinence is the safest policy regarding alcohol or other addictive
drugs. It is an indisputable fact that, without taking the first drink, no one ever
became drunk, became addicted, or had diseases such as heart attacks, cirrhosis, or
insanity from alcohol. Likewise, without taking the first drink, no one ever
engaged in spouse abuse or child abuse, killed anyone in an accident, caused any
debt or injury, or caused anyone to stumble in their faith while under the influence
of alcohol.

Why then is our society in general—and evangelical Christians not far behind
wider society—on such a self-destructive alcoholic course? Hosea gave part of the
answer: "My people are destroyed from lack of knowledge" (4:6). Most of the rest
of the problem lies in resisting temptation, but the Bible declares that no
temptation (including drugs) is too strong! "No temptation has overtaken you
except such as is common to man; but God is faithful, who will not allow you to be
tempted beyond what you are able, but with the temptation will also make the way
of escape, that you maybe able to bear it" (1 Cot 10:13 NKJV). Mark Twain once
said of the temptation to gamble that the best toss of the dice is to toss them away.
Likewise, the best use of the beer can is to toss it into the recycling bin—after the
contents have been poured down the drain!

APPENDIX 2

IS GAMBLING UNETHICAL?

Several years ago Boston College had a sports nightmare on campus. Just before the
big game, thirteen football players had to be disciplined for betting on games. Some
even wagered against their own team! Famous major league baseball player Peter
(Pete) Rose was denied the Hall of Fame because of his gambling habits, which
allegedly included betting on baseball games. This is only the tip of the iceberg.
Legal gambling is a more than $300-billion-a-year business. Illegal gambling is
estimated to be in the trillions of dollars—almost as high as the national debt! Legal
gambling now exists in forty-eight states (all but Utah and Hawaii).

Gambling can be defined as the transfer of something ofvalue from one person to
another primarily on the basis of chance. It differs from games of chance where
nothing of real value is transferred to others. Gambling also differs from other risks
(such as investing in stocks) where something of value is transferred but not
primarily on the basis of chance. There is risk in investing (and taking high risks
maybe unwise), but usually stock and bond investments invoke a calculated risk,
meaning a rational process is used to make the investment. Yet if someone simply
tossed a coin to decide which stock to invest in, then this would be gambling by
definition. The most widespread and popular form of gambling in the United States
is the lottery. But casino gambling is increasing, not only in Las Vegas and Atlantic
City, but also on Native American reservations around the country.

Tlie moral arguments against gambling can be divided into two categories: those
taken from special revelation (the Bible) and those drawn from general revelation
(see chap. 8). The latter arguments involve reason, common sense, and moral in-

374

Is Gambling Unethical? 375

tuition, and they are based on the law written on the heart (¢f. Rom. 2:15) of all
human beings.’ First, let's review the biblical data applicable to the subject.

Response to Biblical Arguments for Gambling

Many biblical principles exhort us not to gamble. But since some people have used
the Bible to support gambling, it is necessary to address their arguments. One
pro-gambling author declared, "Nowhere does the holyBible, bedrock of the
Judeo-Christian morality, in either the Old or New Testaments, take a stand against
gambling" z However, as we will see, there is no evidence for such a claim.

Casting Lots Was Approved in the Bible

Joshua cast lots to determine God's will in dividing up the land for Israel (
Josh. 14:2). The apostles used lots to choose another apostle (Acts 1:26). But
this was not wrong because Proverbs (16:33) declares, "The lot is cast into the
lap, but its every decision is from the LORD."

In response, although this was a divinely approved method, it was not gambling.
Why? Because nothing of value was hazarded in so doing. They were simply using
a divinely appointed means of determining God's will.

The Soldiers Gambled for Jesus's Garment

When Jesus was being crucified, the Roman soldiers gambled for his garment
(Matt. 27:35). This is true, but it is not a divinely approved activity. The Bible
simply describes what they did; it does not approve of the gambling. The soldiers
also crucified Christ, but this by no means made it right.

The Word "Gambling" Does Not Even Appear in the Bible

It is sometimes stated that the word "gambling" does not even appear in the Bible.
Surely, if it were that important, there would at least be some reference to it.

In response, this is a very weak argument since there are many things, both pro
and con, that are not mentioned by their current name in the Bible but that the Bible
has a clear teaching on, either for or against. For example, the word "Trinity" does
not occur in the Bible, yet the Bible emphatically proclaims that the doctrine is true
(Matt. 3:16; 28:18-20; John 1:1, 14; 2 Cor. 13:14; Col. 2:9; Heb. 1:8). The words
"rape," "sexual abuser or "spouse abuse" do not appear in the Bible either. But the
principles that oppose all of these are in the Bible. So just because the word
"gambling" does not appear in most translations does not mean

1. For a more extensive treatment of gambling, see Norman L. Geisler and Thomas
Howe, Gambing Isa BadBet (Old Tappan, NJ: Revell, 1990).

2. Richard Sasuly, Bookies and Bettors (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1982),
36.

376 Is Gambling Unethical?

the Bible is not opposed to it. Furthermore, the word "gambling" does appear in
some translations. The Living Bible says, "Wealth from gambling quickly
disappears" (Prov. 13:11). As will be shown below, the Bible speaks against
gambling by principle, if not by name.

Biblical Arguments against Gambling

There are many biblical principles, exhortations, and even commands that
oppose gambling. Indeed, at least three of the Ten Commandments are opposed
to gambling. Consider the following:

Gambling Is a Form of Coveting or Greed

The tenth commandment declares: "You shall not covet your neighbor's house
... hor anything that is your neighbor's" (Exod. 20:17 NKJV). Paul added, "The
love of money is a root of all kinds of evil" (1 Tim. 6:10). The motive for gambling
fits into this category: it is often a form of greed.

Gambling Is a Form of Stealing

The eighth commandment exhorts: "You shall not steal" (Exod. 20:15). But
gambling in the lottery is an indirect way of stealing from the poor. In the case
of government-sponsored lotteries, the poor play more, and therefore the poor
pay more. In contrast to the rich, the poor spend a larger portion of their income
on the lottery per capita. Thus, they are paying more taxes in proportion to their
income than the rich are. Supporting the lottery is supporting a regressive tax on
the poor.

Gambling Is a Font: of Idolatry

Gambling also violates the first commandment since it can become one's
god. Rather than following God's appointed way to earn wages (i.e., to work),
gamblers place their trust in gambling as their "god," who will provide for
them. But the first commandment declares: "You shall have no other gods
before me" (Exod. 20:3). Jesus said, "Seek first the kingdom of God, ... and all
these things shall be added to you" (Man. 6:33 NKJV). Gambling is the love of
gold more than God.

Gambling Is a Fonn of Oppressing the Poor

Another reason for opposing gambling is that it oppresses the poor. Isaiah
writes, "The LORD stands ... to judge the people.... "The plunder of the poor is in
your houses. What do you mean by crushing my people and grinding the faces
of the poor?" (3:13-14 NKJV). Amos adds, "Listen to me, you ‘fat cows'

Is Gambling Unethical? 377

of Bashan living in Samaria—you women who encourage your husbands to rob
the poor" (4:1 TLB). So gambling (especially the lottery) is wrong because it is
a form of oppressing the poor.

Gambling Is a Lack of Faith in God's Provision

Many people gamble to increase their means of living. Rather than working
hard and trusting God, they place their trust in Lady Luck to improve their lot
in life. Jesus said, "No one can serve two masters.... You cannot serve God and
mammon" (Matt. 6:24 RSV). But one should put faith in God, not in gambling
as a means of gain.

Gambling Is Bad Stewardship of God-Given Resources

The psalmist affirmed that "the earth is the LORD'S, and the fullness thereof"
(Ps. 24:1 KJV). Paul stated, "Moreover it is required in stewards that one be
found faithful" (1 Cor. 4:2 NKJV; cf. Matt. 25:21). Gambling fails to reckon
that everything we have comes from God and belongs to God. David said, "All
things come from you [God]" (1 Chron. 29:14 NKJV). Paul added, "Do you not
know that your body ... you have from God? ... So glorify God in your body” (1
Cor. 6:19-20 RSV). Hence, we should not waste or squander anything by
gambling.

Gambling Bypasses God's Appointed Way to Make a Living

From the first man, Adam, to the present, God's way to make a living is "by the
sweat of your brow" (Gen. 3:19). Paul told the Thessalonians, "If anyone will not
work, neither shall he eat" (2 Thess. 3:10 NKJ V).As the (Smith Barney) ad rightly
says, "We make money the old fashioned way. We earn it?' Earning, not winning,
is God's way to obtain gain. In fact, on the average and for the vast majority of all
gamblers, gambling is a way of losing money, not gaining money.

Gambling Destroys Human Dignity

Gambling for gain is an admission of one's inability to earn what one needs.
And a person who cannot earn a living loses self-respect. Thus, gambling can
destroy human dignity. The best way to restore one's self-esteem is to expend a
little steam by working. Gambling in place of working is a way of destroying one's
self-respect.

Gambling Has a Corrupting Influence on Society

Gambling is like yeast. As Paul said, "A little leaven [yeast] leavens the whole
lump” (1 Cor. 5:6 NKJV). Gambling has a corrupting effect on society. Paul ap-
provingly quotes Menander: "Evil company corrupts good habits" (1 Cor.15:33

378 Is Gambling Unethical?

NKJV). Gambling has a corrupting influence by leaching money from legiti-
mate businesses, robbing from the poor and needy, and breeding crime and
prostitution.

In brief, gambling breaks three of the Ten Commandments and several other
biblical principles. It may not be mentioned by name in most translations of the
Bible, but it is clearly forbidden by many other moral and spiritual principles in
the Bible.

Other Moral and Social Reasons Not to Gamble

Apart from belief in divine revelation in the Bible, there are numerous reasons not
to gamble. They are known by experience, intuition, common sense, and good
reason. These reasons against gambling include the following.

The Statistical Argument against Gambling

About 90 percent of Americans gamble in some form, and over 95 percent lose
more than they bet. Winners as a group get back less than half of what they bet—a
poor investment by any standard. One is more likely to survive 88 rounds of
Russian roulette than to win a typical state lottery. A person is 7 times more likely
to be hit by lightning and a half million times more likely to die in a plane crash
than to win the lottery. The typical odds against winning a state lottery are
between 5 and 10 million to 1. If you bought 50 lottery tickets every week, you
would win on the average of once in every 5,000 years! In short, the chances are
about the same if you don't play the lottery at all!

The Economic Argument against Gambling

Gambling has no product or service. It leeches billions from legitimate busi-
nesses. Money received by the gambling industry means less business for the
grocer, the gas station, the clothing store, restaurants, and so forth. In the end
lotteries add little or nothing to state treasuries. Most states take in no more than 2
percent of their budget from gambling. No state (except Nevada) takes in more
than 4 percent. And the cost for having gambling is many times more than what is
taken in from gambling. The increase comes in the form of more police, higher
court costs, increased welfare rolls, enlarged prisons, larger rehabilitation costs,
greater insurance costs, and the loss of tax dollars.

Funding for education usually does not go up as a result of gambling income. It
often goes down, since people tend not to support legitimate tax increases once
they believe gambling proceeds are supporting it. No state has experienced a tax
decrease because of income from gambling. Former Minnesota Senator Wiley
affirmed that the actual cost for gambling in his state was five times the amount of
revenue generated by the state's lottery!

Is Gambling Unethical? 379

The Cultural Argument against Gambling

Gambling penalizes the poor. Since the p oor play the lottery more, theypay propor-
tionately more than the rich. Lotteries are a regressive form of taxatio n because they are
not based on the ability to pay. The poor buy three and a half times more lottery tickets
than others. In New York, 7Opercent of the lottery tickets are bought by poor, black, and
Hispanic people. One-third of families with incomes less than $10,000 per year spend
one-fifth of their income ($2,000) on gambling. In Connecticut, those below $5,000 in
annual income spend fourteen times as much on gambling as those above $25,000
income, and many take in less. In Connecticut and Massachusetts, the lottery equals a
60-90 percent tax on lower income groups. The amount spent on the lottery equals the
amount not spent on groceries and other essentials.

The Social Argument against Gambling

Gambling has a bad influence on society. It breeds crime, drugs, and prostitution.
Up to 98 percent of compulsive gamblers commit crimes. Legal gambling breeds
illegal gambling because the odds are better with illegal wagering, people can play on
credit, and they can avoid taxes on earnings, which are not reported to the
government. The organized crime section of the U.S. Justice Department found that
"the rate of illegal gambling in those states which have some legalized form of
gambling was three times as high as those states where there was not a legalized form
of gamblingf? Legal gambling spawns compulsive gambling. Some 5 percent of the
population are now compulsive gamblers. One in twenty adults who gamble
regularly become gambling addicts, and one in ten teenagers do. Sadly, only one in
thirty compulsive gamblers ever recover completely! Charles Wells, the man who
broke the bank at Monte Carlo, gambled away all his winnings and died broke!

The Domestic Argument against Gambling

There are some 12 million compulsive gamblers in the United States. Over a third
are women, and the figure is growing. Each addict affects 10-17 other people.
Spouses of gamblers suffer greatly. Nearly? of 10 are harassed by creditors. Six of 10
creditors become violent toward the gambler. Almost 8 gamblers out of 10 suffer
from insomnia. Over 10 percent try suicide, which is 150 times the national average.
The average gambler's debt is $40,000 or more. Gamblers commit 40 percent of the
white-collar crimes. Families of addicted gamblers are emotionally devastated.

The Moral-Corruption Argument against Gambling
Gambling has a degenerating moral effect on society. It encourages irresponsibil-
ity. It robs the poor. It encourages greed. It is state-sponsored immorality because it

3. Emmett Henderson, State Lottery: The Absolute Worst Form of Legalized Gambling (Atlanta: Georgia
Council on Moral and Civil Concerns, n.d.), 26.

380 Is Gambling Unethical?

exploits the weaknesses in human nature. Wherever there is legal gambling, crime,
suicide, drugs, prostitution, and illegal gambling are also found. Nevada has more
houses of prostitution than libraries, more prostitutes than police officers. When
casinos were introduced in Atlantic City, crime increased 259 percent. George
Washington said, "Gambling is the child of avarice, the brother of iniquity, and the
father of mischief!’

Conclusion

Gambling is a serious problem and a widespread addiction in America. It has
penetrated every state in one form or another. God's special and general revelations
both speak strongly against it. Illegal gambling is a social parasite, corrupting the
culture wherever it takes hold. Gambling not only violates several of the Ten
Commandments; it is also a bad bet statistically, culturally, socially, and morally.
It destroys individuals, families, and society.

A word to the wise is sufficient: Those who never gambled have a 100
percent chance to never lose. As Mark Twain once wisely quipped, The best
toss of the dice is to toss them away"!

APPENDIX 3

PORNOGRAPHY

Pornography is a major problem both in society in general and among many
Christians in particular. Today TV, DVDs, and the Internet have made it readily
available to all who want it. But viewing pornographic material precipitates
marriage breakups and can produce cocaine-like addictions. It has contributed to
both common and violent crimes, including rape and murder. Like a rash, once it
is scratched, it grows worse. In 1972, Playboy magazine reached 25 percent of all
college men.' Ninety percent of children 8-16 years of age have been exposed to
pomography. By 2004, there were 23-60 million visitors to some type of
pomography Web site every day. In fact, one Internet search engine for KaZaA
has reported that 72 percent of its Internet searches are for pornography, and that
24 percent of those are for child pornography. In 1998 there were 14 million
Internet Web sites on pornography. By July of 2004 there were 420 million
pornographic Web sites.’ As one writer has put it, "America does not know the
difference between money and sex. It treats sex like money because it treats sex as
a medium of exchange, and it treats money like sex because it expects its money
to get pregnant and reproduce."

Just what is pornography? Webster defines it as “obscene literature or art." The
legal understanding includes three aspects as defined by the Supreme Court in

1. John Coleman, 'Porn in the USA: Examining Our National Addiction, Salvo
2 (Spring 2007): 21; http://xnew.salvomag.com/new/articles/salvo2/2coleman.php.

2: Ibid., 21-25.

3. Peter !Creek How to Win the Culture Wan A Christian Battle Plan for o Society in
Crisis (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2002), 15.

381

382 Pornography

1973: (1) When taken as a whole within community standards, it is something
that the average person believes does appeal to prurient (sensual) interests. (2)
It is material that depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way as specifically defined by applicable law. (3) Taken in its totality, the work
lacks serious literary, political, or scientific value.

Our purposes here are less technical and legal than this definition. Hence, we
view pornography as any writings or images that appeal to one's sexual desires
outside of one's marital partner. In brief, it is something that stimulates
extramarital lust or sensual desires.

The Social Case against Pornography

The are numerous arguments against pornography, both social and scriptural.
Pornography is not merely a lustful pastime. It is actually a sensual activity that has
devastating effects upon the individual, the family, and society at large. A leading
expert on this issue, Dr. Judith Reisman, "has devoted her life to
demonstrating—through irrefutable scientific evidence—that pornographic
images actually alter the chemical structures of the human brain, and not in a good
way. Moreover, she has proved beyond question (and to anyone who cares in the
least) that pornography can be as addictive as crack cocaine and is a key
contributor to rape, incest, pedophilia, and other forms of sexual assault."

Pornography Causes Aggression among Individuals

Pomography causes aggression because it destroys the natural relationships
found between individuals. A proper sexual relation provides a proper context for
sexual relations. But when a person views pornography, it can lead to aggression
because it destroys the normal spatial relationships between individuals. It starts to
build an aggression in the individual, which over long periods of time can foster a
state of aggression known to eventually act out in the public arena.’

Pornography Creates a Type of Animal Behavior in Human Beings

Pornography produces a type of estrus (heat, sexual excitability) that provokes
men to sexual lust. Reisman shows that in many cases this leads to sexual frus-
tration in men because it builds all the chemical and emotional conditions for
sexual intercourse, but they are not able to express those emotions.°Ihis habitual
emotional frustration eventual leads to long-term states of emotional frustration,
aggression, and sometimes even violence in other areas of life.

4. Bobby Maddex, 'The Naked Truth: An Interview with Dr. Judith Reisman; Salvo 2
(Spring 2007): 28; http://wvnv.salvomag.cominew/articies/salvo2/2maddex.php. S.
Ibid., 30.