SECOND EDITION

CHRISTIAN ETHICS

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES & OPTIONS

NORMAN L.

GEISLER

0 1989, 2010 by Norman L. Geisler

Published by Baker Academic

a division of Baker Publishing Group

P.O. Box 6287, Grand Rapids, M149516-6287 www.bakeracademic.com

Printed in the United States of America

All rights reserved. No part of this publication maybe reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form orby any means—for example, electronic, photocopy, recording—without the prior written permission of the publisher. The only exception is brief quotations in printed reviews.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Geisler, Norman L. Christian ethics : contemporary issues and options / Norman L. Geisler.-2nd ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and indexes. ISBN 978+8010-3879-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Christian ethics. 1. Title. BJ1251.G4 2010 241—dc22 2009025638

Unless otherwise indicated, Scripture quotations are from the HOLY BIBLE, NEW INTERNATIONAL VER/Qr. Copyright 0 1973,1978,1984 by International Bible Society. Used bypermission of Zondervan. All rights reserved.

Scripture quotations labeled KJV are from the King James Version of the Bible.

Scripture quotations labeled NASB are from the New American Standard Bible,copyright 0 1960, 1962,1963, 1968, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1975, 1977, 1995 by The Lockman Foundation. Used by permission.

Scripture quotations labeled NEB are from The Nov English Bible. Copyright O 1961,1970,1989 by the Delegates of Oxford University Press and the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press. Reprinted by permission.

Scripture quotations labeled RSV are from the Revised Standard Version of the Bible, copyright 1952 [2nd edition, 1971) by the Division of Christian Education of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 7654321

CONTENTS

List of Tables and Chart 9 Preface 11

Part1 Ethical Options 1. All the Options 15

2. Antinomianism 22

3. Situationism 35

4. Generalism 52

5. Unqualified Absolutism 66 6. Conflicting Absolutism 83

7. Graded Absolutism

8. The Basis for Ethical Decisions 16

Part 2 Ethical issues 9 Abortion-131

10 Infanticide and ‘Euthanasia 160 11. Biomedical Issues 180 12.Capital Punishment 199 13.War 220

Contents

14. Civil Disobedience 244 15. Sexual Issues 260

16. Homosexuality 280 17.Marriage and Divorce 299 18.Ecology 314

19. Animal Rights 335

Appendix 1: Drugs 359

Appendix 2: Is Gambling Unethical? 374 Appendix 3: Pornography 381

Appendix 4: Birth Control 396

Glossary 407

Bibliography 412

Index of Scripture 421

Index ofAuthors 431

Index of Subjects 435

TABLES

1.1 Two Views of Ethics 18

9.1 Three Views of Abortion 131

10.1 The Non Judeo-Christian and Judeo-Christian Worldviews 171 10.2 Active and Passive Euthanasia 175

11.1 The Judeo-Christian and Secular Humanist Worldviews 180 11.2 Christian and Humanist Approaches to Biomedical Issues 185 14.1 Two Views of When to Disobey Government 248

14.2 Two Views of How to Disobey Government 251

CHART

1.1 Six Major Ethical Views 21

PREFACE

This book is a thorough revision of its precursor of two decades ago. All chapters have been updated, and new chapters and appendixes have been added. With moral decay inside and outside the church, never has there been a greater need for an understanding and application of sound ethical principles. I wish to thank my able assistant Bill Roach, who greatly assisted in research and in writing of the extensively revised sections and new chapters in this book. Also, I want thank my faithful wife, Barbara, for help in preparation of the manuscript, especially for her meticulous proofreading. While deeply grateful for their contributions, I take responsibility for the contents.

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Part 1

ETHICAL OPTIONS

ALL THE OPTIONS

Ethics deals with what is morally right and wrong. Christian ethics deals with what is morally right and wrong for a Christian. This is a book on Christian ethics. Since Christians base their beliefs on God's revelation in Scripture, the Bible will be cited as an authority for conclusions drawn here (see chap. 8).

God has not limited himself to revelation in Scripture; he also has a general revelation in nature (Rom. 1:19-20; 2:12-14). Since God's moral character does not change, it should be expected that there will be similarities and overlaps between God's natural and supernatural revelations. However, the focus of this book is not God's natural law for all people, but his divine law for believers.

Definitions of Ethics

Ethics deals with what is right and wrong morally. Numerous theories have been proposed concerning what is meant by a morally good action (see chap. 8). But it is sufficient here to note the distinguishing characteristics of Christian ethics, each of which will be briefly discussed here.

Christian Ethics Ils Based on God's Will

Christian ethics is a form of the divine-command position. An ethical duty is something we ought to do. It is a divine prescription. Of course, the ethical imperatives that God gives are in accord with his unchangeable moral character. That is, God wills what is right in accordance with his own moral attributes. "Be

15

16 Ethical Options

holy, because I am holy," the Lord commanded Israel (Lev. 11:45). "Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect: Jesus said to his disciples (Matt. 5:48). "It is impossible for God to lie" (Heb. 6:18). So we should not lie either. "God is love" (1 John 4:16), and so Jesus said, "Love your neighbor as yourself" (Matt. 22:39). In brief, Christian ethics is based on God's will, but God never wills anything contrary to his unchanging moral character.

Christian Ethics Is Absolute

Since God's moral character does not change (Mal. 3:6; James 1:17), it follows that moral obligations flowing from his nature are absolute. That is, they are always binding everywhere on everyone. Of course, not everything God wills flows necessarily from his unchanging nature. Some things are merely in accord with his nature but flow freely from his will. For example, God chose to test Adam and Eve's moral obedience by forbidding them to eat a specific fruit on a tree (Gen. 2:16-17). Although it was morally wrong for Adam and Eve to disobey that command, we are no longer bound by that command today. That command was based on God's will and did not flow necessarily from his nature.

On the other hand, God's command not to murder (Gen. 9:6) applied before the law was given to Moses, under the law of Moses (Exod. 20:13), and also since the time of Moses (Rom. 13:9). In brief, murder is wrong at all times and all places and for all people. This is true because humans are created in the "image of God" (Gen. 1:27; 9:6). This includes a moral likeness to God (Col. 3:10; James 3:9). And whatever is traceable to God's unchanging moral character is a moral absolute. This includes such moral obligations as holiness, justice, love, truthfulness, and mercy. Other commands flowing from God's will, but not necessarily from his nature, are equally binding on a believer, but they are not absolute. That is, they must be obeyed because God prescribed them, but he did not prescribe them for all people, times, and places. Absolute moral duties, on the contrary, are binding on all people at all times and in all places.

Christian Ethics Is Based on God's Revelation

Christian ethics is based on God's commands, the revelation of which is both general (Rom. 1:19-20; 2:12-15) and special (2:18; 3:2). God has revealed himself both in nature (Ps. 19:1-6) and in Scripture (19:7-14). General reve- lation contains God's commands for all people. Special revelation declares his will for believers. But in either case, the basis of human ethical responsibility is divine revelation.

Failure to recognize God as the source of moral duty does not exonerate anyone, even an atheist, from their moral duty. For "when Gentiles, who do not have the law [of Moses], do by nature things required by the law, they are a law for themselves, even though they do not have the law, since they show that the requirements of the law are written on their hearts" (Rom. 2:14-15). That is, even if unbelievers do not

All the Options 17

have the moral law in their minds, they still have it written on their hearts. Even if they do not know it by way of cognition, they show it by way of inclination.

Christian Ethics Is Prescriptive

Since moral rightness is prescribed by a moral God, it is prescriptive. For there is no moral law without a moral Lawgiver; there is no moral legislation without a moral Legislator. So Christian ethics by its very nature is prescriptive, not descriptive. Ethics deals with what ought to be, not with what is. Christians do not find their ethical duties in the standard of Christians but in the standard for Christians—the Bible.

From a Christian point of view, a purely descriptive ethic is no ethic at all. De- scribing human behavior is the task of sociology. But prescribing human behavior is the province of morality. The attempt to derive morals from mores is, as we have already noted, the "is-ought" fallacy. What people actually do is not the basis for what they ought to do. If it were, then people ought to lie, cheat, steal, and murder, since these things are done all the time.

Christian Ethics Is Deontological

Ethical systems can be broadlydivided into two categories, deontological (duty-centered) and teleological (end-centered). This is sometimes called consequential-ism since the value of an act is determined by its consequence. Christian ethics is deontological. Utilitarianism is an example of a teleological ethic. The nature of a deontological ethic can be seen more clearly by contrast with a teleological view (see table 1.1 on the next page).

A couple of illustrations will clarify this point. Someone tries to rescue a drown- ing person but fails. According to one form of teleological ethic, this was not a good act because it did not have good results. Since the results determine the goodness of the act, and the results were not good, then it follows that the attempted rescue was not a good act.

Yet a more sophisticated form of teleological (utilitarian) ethic might argue that the attempt was good, even though it failed, because it had a good effect on society. People heard about it and were encouraged to help rescue others in the future. But even here the attempted act of rescue that failed was not good in itself. Rather, it would have been good if and only if it had brought some good results, either for the drowning person or for someone else.

By contrast, the Christian ethic is deontological and insists that even some acts that fail are good. Christians believe, for example, that it is better to have loved and to have lost than not to have loved at all. Christians believe that the cross was not a failure simply because only some will be saved. It was sufficient for all even if it is efficient only for those who believe. The Christian ethic insists that it is good to work against bigotry and racism, even if one fails. This is so because moral actions that reflect God's nature are good whether they are successful or

18 Ethical Options

not. Good for the Christian is not determined in a lottery. In life the winner is not always right.

TABU 1.1 Two Views of Ethics

Deontological Ethic Teleological Ethic

Rule determines the result. Result determines the rule. Rule is the basis of the act. Result is the basis of the act. Rule is good regardless of result. Rule is good because of result.

Result is always calculated within the rules. Result is sometimes used to break rules.

However, Christian ethics does not neglect results. Simply because results do not determine what is right does not mean that it is not right to consider results. Indeed, results of actions are important in Christian ethics. For example, a Chris- tian should calculate in which direction a gun is pointing before he pulls the trig- ger. Drivers need to estimate the possible consequence of their speed in relation to other objects. Speakers are responsible for calculating the possible effects of their words on others. Christians have a duty to anticipate the results of not being immunized to serious diseases, and so on.

In all the foregoing illustrations, however, there is an important difference be- tween the deontological use of results and a teleological use of them. In Christian ethics these results are all calculated within rules or norms. That is, no anticipated result as such can be used as a justification for breaking any God-given moral law. Utilitarians, on the other hand, use anticipated results to break moral rules. In fact, they use results to make the rules. Existing rules can be broken if the expected results call for it. For example, while Christian ethics allows for inoculation for disease, it does not allow for infanticide to purify the genetic stock of the human race; in this case the end result is used to justify the use of an evil means. In brief, the end may justify the use of good means, but it does not justify the use of any means, certainly not evil ones.

Various Views on Ethics

There are only six major ethical systems, each designated byits answer to the question Are there any objective ethical laws? That is, are any moral laws not purely subjective but actually binding on humans in general?

In answer, antinomianism says there are no moral laws. Situationism affirms there is one absolute law. Generalist?! claims there are some general laws but no absolute ones. Unqualified absolutism believes in many absolute laws that never conflict. Conflicting absolutism contends there are many absolute norms that sometimes conflict, and we are obligated to do the lesser evil. Graded absolutism holds that

All the Options 19

many absolute laws sometimes conflict, and we are responsible for obeying the higher law.

Differences between Various Views

Of the six basic ethical views, two deny all objectively absolute moral laws. Of them, antinomianism denies all universal and general moral laws. Generalism, on the other hand, denies only universal moral laws but holds to general ones. That is, there are some objective moral laws that are binding most of the time but not necessarily all the time.

Four ethical views claim to be forms of absolutism. Of these, situationism be- lieves in only one absolute, while the others believe in two or more absolutes. Of them, unqualified absolutism contends that these absolute moral principles never conflict, while the other two believe that they sometimes do conflict. Of the two that believe these moral principles sometimes conflict, conflicting absolutism contends that we are responsible to do the lesser evil but guilty for whichever one we break. On the other hand, graded absolutism holds that our responsibility is to obey the greater commandment. Consequently, we are not guilty for not following the lesser commandment in conflict with it.

Examples of the Six Major Ethical Views

Corrie ten Boom tells how she lied to save Jews from the Nazi death camps. During U.S. Senate hearings on the Iran-Contra issue, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North testified that, in the process of performing his duties, he had lied to save innocent lives. North said, "I had to weigh lying and lives."

In a number of biblical stories, people lied to save lives. The Hebrew midwives lied to save the baby boys Pharaoh had commanded them to kill (Exod. 1:15-19). Rahab lied to save the lives of the Jewish spies in Jericho ( Josh. 2).

Is it ever right to lie to save a life? This issue will serve to focus the differences among the six basic ethical positions.

1. Lying is neither right nor wrong: there are no laws. Antinomianism asserts that lying to save lives is neither right nor wrong. It affirms that there are no objective moral principles bywhich the issue can be judged right or wrong. The issue must be decided on subjective, personal, or pragmatic grounds, but not on any objective moral grounds. We are literally without a moral law to decide the issue.

2. Lying is generally wrong: there are no universal laws. Generalism claims that lying is generally wrong. As a rule, lying is wrong, but in specific cases this general rule can be broken. Since there are no universal moral laws, whether a given lie is right will depend on the results. If the results are good, then the lie is right. Most generalists believe that lying to save a life is right because

20 Ethical Options

in this case the end justifies the means necessary to attain it. However, lying in general is wrong.

3. Lying is sometimes right: there is only one universal law. Situationism claims that there is only one absolute moral law, and telling the truth is not it. Love is the only absolute, and lying may be the loving thing to do. In fact, lying to save a life is the loving thing to do. Hence, lying is sometimes right. Indeed, any moral rule except love can and should be broken for love's sake. Everything else is relative; only one thing is absolute. Thus the situationist believes that lying to save lives is morally justified.

4. Lying is always wrong: there are many nonconflicting laws. Unqualified absolutism believes that there are many absolute moral laws, and none of them should ever be broken. Truth is such a law. Therefore, one must always tell the truth, even if someone dies as a result of it. Truth is absolute, and absolutes cannot be broken. Therefore, there are no exceptions to telling the truth. Results are never used as a rationale to break rules, even if the results are desirable.

S. Lying is forgivable: there are many conflicting laws. Conflicting absolutism recognizes that we live in an evil world, where absolute moral laws some- times run into inevitable conflict. In such cases it is our moral duty to do the lesser evil. We must break the lesser law and plead mercy. For instance, we should lie to save the life and then ask for forgiveness forbreaking God's absolute moral law. Our moral dilemmas are sometimes unavoidable, but we are culpable anyway. God cannot change his absolute moral prescriptions because of our moral predicaments.

6. Lying is sometimes right: there are higher laws. Graded absolutism holds that there are many moral absolutes, and they sometimes conflict. However, some laws are higher than others, so when there is an unavoidable conflict, it is our duty to follow the higher moral law. God does not blame us for what we could not avoid. Thus he exempts us from responsibility to follow the lower law in view of the overriding obligation to obey the higher law. Many graded absolutists believe that mercy to the innocent is a greater moral duty than telling truth to the guilty. Hence, they are convinced that it is right in such cases to lie in order to save a life.

The diagram on the next page is a logical summary of the six major views.

In summary, antinomianism sets forth its view to the exclusion of all objective moral laws. Generalism claims that there are exceptions to moral laws. Situationism holds one moral absolute to the exclusion of all others. Unqualified absolutism insists that there is always an escape from the apparent conflict in absolute moral laws. Conflicting absolutism contends that when moral laws conflict, doing the lesser evil is excusable. And graded absolutism holds that when moral laws conflict, God grants an exemption to the lower law in view of our duty to obey the higher law. Each of these views will be examined in the next several chapters.

All the Options 21

CHART 1.1 Six Major Ethical Views

Moral Principles 1

es

None Some Antinomianism

1 General Absolute

Genera:ism

One Many Situationisin is

Never Conflict Conflict Nonconflicting

Absolutism

1 Guilty Not Guilty (lesser evil) (greater good) ConflictingAbsolutism Graded Absolutism

Select Readings

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. In The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford T'rans- lotion, edited by Jonathan Barnes. 2 vols. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Bourke, Vernon. History of Ethics. New York: Doubleday, 1968.

Fedler, Kyle D. Exploring Christian Ethics: Biblical Foundations for Morality. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2006.

Fletcher, Joseph. Situation Ethics: The New Morality. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966.

Gula, Richard M. What Are They Saying about Moral Norms? Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1982.

Flume, David. Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Edited by Eugene F. Miller. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985.

Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals: Text and Critical Essays. Edited by Robert P. Wolff. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969.

Plato. The Republic. Translated by Francis Macdonald Cornford. New York: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 1967.

Rae, Scott B. Moral Choices: An Introduction to Ethics. 3rd ed. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2009.

Z

ANTINOMIANISM

Broadly speaking, ethical systems fall into two categories: nonabsolutisms and absolutisms. In the first category are antinomianism (chap. 2), situationism (chap. 3), and generalism (chap. 4). In the second category are unqualified absolutism (chap. 5), conflicting absolutism (chap. 6), and graded absolutism (chap. 7). Since Christian ethics is firmly rooted in the unchanging moral character of God (Lev. 11:45; Mal. 3:6), the first three are not options for the Christian. Nonetheless, since they challenge Christian ethics, they must be addressed.

Background ofAntinomianism

Antinomianism, which literally means "against/instead of law," holds that there are no binding moral laws, that everything is relative.

Antinomianism in the Ancient World

Ethical antinomianism has a long history. There were at least three movements in the ancient world that influenced the rise of antinomianism: processism, hedonism, and skepticism.

Processism. The ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus said, "No man steps into the same river twice, for fresh waters are ever upon him." Everything in the world, he believed, is in a constant state of flux. A later Greek thinker, Cratylus, carried this philosophy one step further, contending that no one steps into the same river once. He argued that the river and everything else have no "sameness"

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Antinomianism 23

or unchanging essence. So convinced was Cratylus that all is flux that he was not even sure that he existed. When asked about his existence, he would simply wiggle his finger, indicating that he too was in flux. It is clear that if this is applied to the realm of ethics, there can be no abiding moral laws. Every ethical value will change with the situation.

Hedonism. The ancient Epicureans gave impetus to a relativistic ethic, which makes pleasure the essence of good and pain the essence of evil, known as he- donism (from the Greek Wane, pleasure). But pleasures are relative to persons, places, and periods. An airplane ride is pure pleasure for some and sheer agony for others. Sometimes the same music is relaxing, and at other times annoying. Applied to the realm of morals, this view contends that what is morally good for one person may be evil for another.

Skepticism. The central thesis of skepticism is to suspend judgment on all mat- ters. Sextus Empiricus was a famous skeptic in the ancient world, as was David Hume in modern times. The skeptic insists that every issue has two sides and every question can be argued to a stalemate. Since no firm and final conclusion can be drawn, we must suspend judgment in all matters. In ethics this would mean that nothing should ever be considered absolutely right or wrong.

Antinomianism in the Medieval World

Although the medieval Western world was dominated by a Christian point of view, it still generated several strains of thought that contributed to antino- mianism. The most notable among these were intentionalism, voluntarism, and nominalism.

Intentionalism. In the twelfth century, Peter Abelard argued that an act is right if it is done with good intention and wrong if done with bad intention. Hence, some acts that seem bad are really good. For example, someone who accidentally kills another is not morally culpable. Neither is giving money to the poor a good act if it is done for the wrong motives (e.g., to be praised by others). This being the case, it would seem that the rightness or wrongness of an act is relative to a person's intentions.

Voluntarism. The fourteenth-century thinker William of Ockham argued that all moral principles are traceable to God's will. Thus God could have decided dif- ferently about what is right and what is wrong. Ockham believed that something is right because God wills it; God does not will it because it is right. If this is so, then what is morally right today may not be so tomorrow. Although Christian voluntarists took comfort in the belief that God would not change his will on basic moral issues, they could not be sure that morals would not change. In this way voluntarism helped pave the way for antinomianism.

Nominalism. Another aspect of Ockham's thought was called nominalism, or the denial of universals. Nominalists believe there are no universal forms or es- sences, that only particular things exist. Universals exist only in the mind, not in

24 Ethical Options

reality. The real world is radically individual. There is, for example, no such thing as the essence of 'humanness!' Individual humans exist in the real world, but "humanness" exists only as a concept in the mind. It is not difficult to see that if the same reasoning is applied to ethics, then there is no such thing as goodness or justice. There are only individual acts of justice that differ from others, but no such thing as justice itself.

Antinomianism in the Modern World

The growth of relativism in the modern world is manifest in three movements: utilitarianism, existentialism, and evolutionism. Each of these contributes in its own way to antinomianism.

Utilitarianism. Building on ancient hedonism, Jeremy Bentham (d. 1832) laid down the principle that one should act so as to produce the greatest good for the greatest number of persons in the long run. This is sometimes called the "utilitarian calculus." He understood this in the quantitative sense of what brings the greatest amount of pleasure and the least amount of pain.

John Stuart Mill (d. 1873) used the same utilitarian calculus, only he understood it in a qualitative sense. He believed that some pleasures were of higher quality than others. He even went so far as to say it would be better to be an unhappy human than a happy pig, for the intellectual and aesthetic qualities of human life are qualitatively superior to the mere physical pleasures of an animal. In any event, there are no absolute moral laws. It all depends on what brings about the greatest pleasure. And this may differ from person to person and place to place.

Existentialism. Soren Kierkegaard (d. 1855) is the father of modern existen- tialism. Although he was a Christian thinker, many believe that he opened the door for antinomianism by claiming that our highest dutygoes beyond moral law. Kierkegaard earnestly believed the moral law, which says, "Thou shalt not kill"; yet he also believed that God told Abraham to kill his son Isaac (Gen. 22). He believed there was no moral reason or justification for such an act, but that it was necessary in this case to transcend the ethical by "a leap of faith:'

Following Kierkegaard, non-Christian thinkers such as Jean-Paul Sartre (d. 1980) took existentialism a step closer to antinomianism. Sartre argued that no ethical acts have any real meaning. He concluded Being and Nothingness by saying, "It amounts to the same thing whether one gets drunk alone or is a leader of nations”

Evolutionism. After Darwin (d. 1882), men like Herbert Spencer (d. 1903) expanded evolution into a cosmic theory. Others, such as T. H. Huxley (d. 1895) and Julian Huxley (d. 1975), worked out an evolutionary ethic. The central tenet is that whatever aids the evolutionary process is right and whatever hinders it is

1. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Bames (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), 627.

Antinomianism 25

wrong. Julian Huxley laid down three principles of evolutionary ethics: it is right to realize ever-new possibilities in evolution; it is right to respect human individuality and to encourage its fullest development; it is right to construct a mechanism for further social evolution.

Adolf Hitler (d. 1945) worked out an evolutionary ethic in Mein Kalnpf (1924). Applying Darwin's principle of natural selection or survival of the fittest to human ethnic groups, Hitler concluded that since evolution has produced the superior (Aryan) stock, we must work to preserve it. Likewise, he believed that inferior breeds must be weeded out. On this basis he killed six million Jews and about five million other non-Aryans.

Antinomianism in the Contemporary World

Several movements in the contemporary world contribute to a lawless morality. Three that stand out are emotivism, nihilism, and situationism. In their extreme forms, all of these are antinomian.

Emotivism. A. J. Ayer (d. 1989) argued that all ethical statements are emotive. That is, they really only express our feelings. Thus statements like "Thou shalt not kill" really mean 'T dislike killing" or 'I feel killing is wrong." Ethical statements are merely expostulations of our subjective feelings. There are no divine imperatives. Everything is relative to one's individual feelings. Hence, there are no objective moral laws that are binding on all persons everywhere.

Nihilism. The famous German atheist Friedrich Nietzsche (d. 1900) said, "God is dead and we have killed him." When God died, all objective values died with him?. The Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoyevsky (d. 1881) noted correctly that if God is dead, then anything goes. For Nietzsche, the death of God meant not only the death of God-given values but also the need for humans to create their own values. In doing so, he argued, we must go "beyond good and evil." Since there is no God to will what is good, we must will our own good. And since there is no eternal value, we must will the eternal recurrence of the same state of affairs. In the last line of The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche said that he would rather will nothingness than not to will at all. This willing of nothingness is what is called nihilism (nothingness-ism).

Situationism. According to this view, everything is relative to the situation in which one finds oneself. Although the ethicist Joseph Fletcher (d. 1991) claims to believe in one absolute ethical norm (see chap. 3), he has no absolute moral principles with substantive content. In this sense, his view contributes heavily to antinomianism. Fletcher says we should avoid words such as "never" and "always." There are no moral principles that apply to all people at all times. All ethical deci- sions are expedient and circumstantial.

2. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking, 1960,95.

26 Ethical Options

Basic Beliefs of Antinomians

Antinomians are without moral law. This can be understood in an absolute or in a limited sense. In an absolute sense, they are without any moral law whatsoever, though few claim to hold this view. This is usually something said of ethical rela- tivism byway of critique. It is a view that they are charged with holding byway of inference, not by their explicit confession.

Limited antinomianism is more widely held. This is a form of ethical relativism that denies any objective, absolute, or God-given laws. It does not deny all moral laws, but it does deny all laws anyone might impose on others. Let us examine some of the basic beliefs of antinomianism in more detail.

There Are No God-Given Moral Laws

Antinomians are either theoretical or practical atheists because they do not believe that any moral principles have divine sanctions. Either there is no God, or else there is none that has enjoined universal moral laws on us.

There Are No Objective Moral Laws

Most antinomians do not deny that persons can choose to live by some moral standards. They simply refuse to accept that these are more than the subjective choices of the individual. Whatever moral laws there may be are relative to indi- viduals who choose to live by them. There are no objective moral laws binding on all human beings.

There Are No Timeless Moral Laws

Antinomians are also opposed to any timeless moral laws, whether they derive from some God or are just there. Whatever moral laws there may be are temporal, not eternal. Humankind is literally without any abiding laws. Morals are simply mores, and they change from place to place as well as from time to time.

There Are No Laws against Laws

Most antinomians are not against law but simply without law. They are not necessarily opposed to laws but feel that there are not any objective moral laws. This does not mean that they are without any kind of law. Most antinomians accept the need for family rules as well as civil laws. They realize that without some kinds of laws, society cannot operate. But while they accept positive social law, they insist that it is not based on any divine or natural law. It is this kind of moral law behind the civil law that they believe human beings are without. And in this sense, they are antinomian, or without law.

Antinomianism 27

Positive Contributions olAntinomianism

Few positions are totally without any merit. There is usually enough truth in any false view to make it float. Hence, even the antinomian view contains some frag- ments of truth. Different forms of antinomianism make different contributions, but all of them make some contribution. These positive aspects of antinomianism include the following.

It Stresses Individual Responsibility

In taking their focus off the universal, antinomians often place emphasis on the individual. This points out the truth that ethics is ultimately a matter of personal responsibility. No reference to God as the source of moral principles can be used to excuse humans from taking responsibility for their own actions.

Likewise, stress on the individual avoids absolving personal responsibility in a collectivity. The individual cannot escape into the group. The individual cannot hide in the crowd. No one can rightfully blame society for their own moral actions.

It Recognizes an Emotive Element

Some antinomians rightfully point to an emotive dimension in much of what passes for moral prescription. Not everything that takes the linguistic form of" Thou shalt not" or "You ought not" is really a divine imperative. Many such statements are merely expressions of some individual's feelings. Not all alleged imperatives are really prescriptive; some are merely emotive. We often couch our own personal feelings in the more powerful language of divine injunctions. The antinomians can be thanked for helping us to be conscious of such abuses.

It Stresses Personal Relations

Some forms of antinomianism, existentialism for example, stress personal re- lations instead of merely prescriptive regulations. In so doing, they focus on an important dimension of morality. After all, our primary ethical responsibility is to persons, not to mere laws. Jesus made this point when he said, "The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath" (Mark 2:27; man = humankind). Persons are ends, not means to an end. By putting the focus on persons rather than on mere prescriptions for persons, the antinomian has served to refocus an important aspect of moral responsibility.

It Stresses the Finite Dimensions of Ethics

Absolutists often overstate their case, acting as though they have an absolute understanding of absolutes.Antinomians make a contribution to ethics by stressing the relative dimension. Finite humanity does not have an infinite understanding of the infinite. Paul said, "Now I know in part” (1 Cor. 13:12). The basic ethical

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principles are absolute, but our human perspective on them is less than absolute. In pointing to our changing understanding of God's unchanging moral law, anti- nomians have rendered an unwitting service to Christian ethics.

Some Criticisms of Antinomianism

Although many antinomians are not necessarily irresponsible in their actions, there are nonetheless some irredeemable difficulties with the view as a whole.A number of views from ancient times to the present gave rise to antinomianism. Each was discussed earlier, and a brief response will be made to each here.

A Response to Processism

Two points can be made in response to the view, springing from Heraclitus, that all is in flux. First, Heraclitus himself did not believe that everything is relative. In fact, he held that there was an unchanging logos beneath all change, by which change could be measured. He saw this as an absolute law by which all humans should live.

Second, if one carries the idea of change all the way, as Cratylus tried, then he uses change to destroy change. For if everything is changing and nothing is constant, then there is no way to measure the change. Everything cannot be changing, or we would not be able to know it.

A Response to Hedonism

Claiming that pleasure is the essence of good is subject to several criticisms. First, not all pleasures are good. For example, the sadistic pleasure some deranged individuals get from sexually abusing or torturing little children is not good; instead, it is grossly evil. Second, not all pain is bad. Pains that warn of impending disease or damage, for instance, are good pains. Third, it is a confusion of categories to reduce good to pleasure. A person is not virtuous because of feeling good, nor is one necessarily sinful because of suffering pain. Finally, personal happiness maybe relative to happenings, but values are not. Many martyrs have suffered adversely for their values. Hence, the good cannot be equated with the pleasurable.

A Response to Skepticism

There are numerous problems with skepticism. First, consistent skepticism is self-defeating. If skeptics were really skeptical about everything, then they would be skeptical about skepticism. If they do not doubt their own doubting, then they really are not skeptics but are dogmatic and want us to suspend judgment on everything except their skeptical views. Second, some things ought not to be doubted. Why, for example, should I doubt my own existence? Some things are

Antinomianism 29

obvious, and it is frivolous to deny the obvious. Third, ethics has to do with the way we live, but no skeptic can consistently live out real skepticism. Skeptics cannot suspend judgment on whether they need food and water—at least not for long. And if they are married, they dare not suspend judgment on whether they love their spouse!

A Response to Intentionalism

Perhaps the easiest way to state the fundamental objection to intentionalism is to point out that the road to hell is paved with good intentions." Furthermore, even Hitler had what he considered good intentions for the Holocaust: he wanted to weed out Inferior" strains of the human species. In addition, intentionalism wrongly assumes that because bad intentions are always bad, good intentions are always good. Bad intentions are always bad, even if they do not result in bad ac- tions. Trying to kill an innocent person is surely bad, even if the attempt does not succeed. However, killing handicapped people to alleviate the financial burden on society is not good no matter how noble the intention may be.

A Response to Voluntarism

Contrary to voluntarism, an act is not good simply because God wills it. First, this would make God arbitrary and not essentially good. Second, it exalts God's will above his nature and allows it to operate independent of his nature. This is questionable theology at best. Third, voluntarism provides no security that God will remain constant in his ethical concerns, since he could change his mind at any time and will (decide) that hate is right rather than love. Fourth, an act is not good simply because it flows from the choice of some sovereign being. As we all know, sovereigns can be capricious about their will. Something is not good simply because someone else has the power to perform it. For something to be a good act, it must come from a good power. A will alone is not a sufficient basis for good; it must be a good will.

A Response to Nominalism

First, if nominalists are correct in saying there is no universal form or essence of meaning, then meaning could not be translated from one language to another. But translation of meaning from language to language occurs daily around the world. Thus there must be some universal basis for meaning that transcends any given language. Second, when applied to ethics, this means that all good acts must participate in some universal goodness by which they are designated good acts. So there must be some universal good that is common to all good acts. Third, for the Christian this universal good is the moral character of God. To deny that God has such a transcendently good nature that it is the basis of all creaturely good is contrary to the Christian view of God.

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A Response to Utilitarianism

The first problem with utilitarianism is that it implies that the end justifies any means necessary to attain it. If this were so, then Stalin's slaughter of some eighteen million or more could be justified in view of the communist utopia he hoped would eventually be achieved. Second, results alone do not justify an action. When the results come, we must still ask whether they are good results or bad ones. The end does not justify the means; the means must justify themselves. Infanticide of children thought to be carriers of genetic Impurities" is not justified by the goal of a purified genetic stock. Third, even utilitarians take the end as a universal good, showing that they cannot avoid a universal good. Otherwise from whence do they derive the concept of a good that should be desired for its own sake? Finally, desired results alone do not make something good. Often we desire what is wrong. Even desires for ends thought to be good are subject to the question Are they good desires? So even here there must be some standard outside the desires by which they are measured.

A Response to Existentialism

Many criticisms can be leveled at an existential ethic. First, if everyone literally "did their own thing; there would be chaos, which would hinder anyone from doing their own "thing." Second, even free choices need a context or structure. Absolute freedom for two or more persons is impossible, for if one person chooses to do to others what they choose not to have done to them, then an unavoidable conflict emerges. This is why law is necessary to structure free choice, thus maximizing the freedom of all without negating the freedom of any. Third, no free act is without justification; otherwise one is unjustified in performing it. No action escapes the first principle of justice any more than a thought can escape the first principle of noncontradiction. Both thought and action are justified by first principles, and whoever breaks first principles will in the end be broken by first principles.

A Response to Evolutionism

The response to an evolutionaryethic is similar to the response to a process ethic. First, on what basis do we decide what the goal is? What is meant by "development"? Is this to be understood biologically, politically, culturally, or morally? Second, how do we know that the desired development is really good development? One can also develop in an evil direction. Third, who decides what will hinder or help the evolutionary process? Some standard outside the evolutionary process must be assumed in order to measure it. Otherwise, we could not know whether the change is for better or for worse. Since no stage in the process is final or perfect, there must be some standard beyond it by which we can measure the progress. Otherwise we do not know the difference between mere change and real progress.

Antinomianism 31

A Response to Emotivism

The first difficulty with emotivism is that it tries to prescribe that ethical state- ments are not prescriptive. It dictates that "ought" statements do not mean one ought to do such and such, but simply, "I feel it is wrong:' This is legislating meaning rather than listening to meaning. It prescribes what an ethical statement should mean, rather than listening to what it does mean. Second, even emotivists do not really believe that everything is a matter of subjective feeling. Like everyone else, emotivists believe some things really are wrong, such as robbing humans of their freedom of thought and expression. Third, the way emotivists react to being cheated, robbed, assaulted, or tortured reveals that they really believe these are wrong.

A Response to Nihilism

Nihilism is hard-core antinomianism. It negates all objective value. Such a view is subject to severe criticism. First, it is self-destructive, for nihilists value their right to negate all value. They value their freedom to hold their view and not to be forced to hold another position. Second, even Nietzsche could not help making value judgments, both negative and positive. For example, he considered Chris- tianity to be "the highest of all conceivable corruptions,"* but by what standard did he make this judgment?

A Response to Situationism

A situational ethic that denies all absolute norms is vulnerable to the same criticisms that all total relativisms are. First, situationists have no place to stand to make value judgments. They cannot relativize everything else unless they have some nonrelative place to stand. It is clearly self-destructive to make an absolute claim that there are no absolutes. Second, even situationists cannot avoid making such universal ethical statements as "No unwanted baby should ever be born" or "Love only is always good.:" Third, situationism is really a form of utilitarianism and as such is subject to the same criticisms.

Criticisms of Antinomianism in General

In addition to the criticisms that can be leveled at the particular views that have contributed to antinomianism, several general criticisms can be made of antinomianism as a whole. Let us examine them in turn.

3. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, in Portable Nietzsche, 655. 4. Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966), 39, 57.

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It Is Self-Defeating

The denial of all moral value is self-destructive. One cannot deny all value with- out presupposing some value. There is no way to be consistently total relativists, for they cannot move the world unless they have some place to put their fulcrum. Relativists really stand upon their own absolutes in their attempts to relativize everything else. This becomes more obvious when one reduces to its common denominator their basic claim, which amounts to saying, We should never use the word never," or ““* should always avoid the word always!" But if they are absolutely sure there are no absolutes, then there must be some. Moral absolutes cannot be denied unless they are implied. Everyone who denies all value believes there is value in the denial, or they would not take the trouble to make the denial.

It Is Too Subjective

There may be a subjective element in much of ethics, but this does not mean that all ethical statements are subjective. There no doubt is a subjective element in the application, but the principle itself is objective. For example, the understanding of love varies from person to person, but love itself does not change. There may be progress in a society's application of justice to its members, but justice is not purely subjective. A purely subjective ethic is like a game without rules. In fact, it is not a game at all; it is a free-for-all.

It Is Too Individualistic

Not only is an antinomian ethic like a ball game without rules; it is also like a game without umpires. Everyone is really their own umpire, since there are no objective moral laws that bind everyone. Each individual is really their own authority, because there is no binding external moral authority. Each person can literally do what is right in their own eyes, and there is nothing that everyone ought to do.

It is one thing to stress the value of each individual's responsibility but quite another to say there is no real responsibility for any individual. In such an ato- mistic ethic, each situation is distinct. There is no real community of value that transcends the individual, no meaningful moral milieu for interpersonal relations. Each individual lives in a hermetically sealed moral vacuum jar perched on their own isolated shelf.

It Is Ineffective

As long as there are two or more persons in the world, there will be conflicts. But if there are no objective moral laws, there are no ways to adjudicate these clashes. Moral laws regulate the ways in which persons relate to each other. Even antinomians want to be treated with respect. But why ought anyone else treat them with this respect, unless there is a moral law that says they ought to do so?

Antinomianism 33

Unless there is a moral standard outside of two individuals in conflict, there is no way to resolve their moral conflict. It is simply insufficient to appeal to a different standard within each individual in order to judge between them. Voluntarily as- sumed moral standards are no moral standards at all. Amoral duty is an obligation, not an option. People cannot simply choose whether they will be just and loving; they are obligated to be just and loving.

It Is Irrational

Antinomianism does not make peace with such laws of rationality as, for ex- ample, the laws of noncontradiction. It makes no sense to say everything is right for people to do, even opposites. If love is right for one person, hate cannot be right for another person. If kindness to children is right in one culture, then cruelty to them cannot be right in another. These are contradictory actions, and contradic- tories cannot both be true. It is irrational to contend that opposite moral duties can both be equally binding.

Summary and Condusion

Antinomianism is a radical form of ethical relativism. It denies not only that there are any valid ethical absolutes, but also that there are any binding moral laws whatsoever. It is literally "without law." This does not mean that it is without any value. Antinomians do stress the value of the individual in making ethical decisions, as well as the value of personal relations. Furthermore, they often point out an obviously emotive dimension in much of our ethical exhortation.

However, as an adequate ethical system, antinomianism falls far short of the mark for many reasons. First, it is self-defeating to deny all binding moral values. The one denying all values certainly values their right to deny them. Second, it is also purely subjective, providing no objective rules for the game of life. For antinomians life actually turns out not to be a serious game at all; it is a free-for-all. Third, it is too individualistic. Everyone does what is right in their own eyes. Fourth, it is ineffective, since two or more people cannot function in a society without objectively binding rules. Finally, it is irrational, since it entails the belief that opposing views are both right.

Select Readings

Beauvior, Simone de. The Ethics of Ambiguity. New York: Citadel, 1962.

Bloom, Allan. The Closing of the American Mind. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988. Budziszewski, Jay. The Revenge of Conscience. Dallas: Spence, 2004.

Fletcher, Joseph. Situation Ethics: The New Morality. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966.

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Heraclitus. Cosmic Fragments. Edited by G. S. Kirk. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1954.

Huxley, Julian S. Essays of a Biologist. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1939.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals. Translated by Francis Golffing. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956.

Sartre, JeanePaul. Being and Nothingness. Translated by Hazel E. Barnes. New York: Philos sophical Library, 1956.

Sextus Empiricus. Against the Dogmatists. In Sextus Empiricus, translated by R. G. Bury. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935-49.

3

SITUATIONISM

Contrary to what the word situationism might seem to imply, it is not a completely normless ethic. According to one of its most vigorous proponents, Joseph Fletcher, author of Situation Ethics, situationism is located between the extremes of legal- ism and antinomianism. The antinomians have no laws, the legalists have laws for everything, and Fletcher's situationism has only one law.

There are a number of situationists whose works might have been examined here, among them Emil Brunner (The Divine hnperative), Reinhold Niebuhr (Moral Man and Immoral Society), and John A. T. Robinson (Honest to God). But Fletcher's position has been more influential than these.

Situationism Explained

Since Fletcher's situationism claims allegiance to one unbreakable norm, it will be treated here as a one-norm absolutism. According to Fletcher, his position is neither a lawless relativism, which says there is no law for anything, nor a legalistic absolutism, which has laws for everything. Rather, he contends that there is one law for everything, the law of love.

Avoiding the Extremes of Legalism and Antinomianism

Fletcher fears both the radical right and the radical left in ethics. However, his position yields more readily to the criticism that it, too, is not distinguishable from

35

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antinomianism. Between these two poles, he tries to firmly establish one absolute norm that can be applied to every ethical situation.

The legalist is one who enters every decision-making situation encumbered with a bundle of predetermined rules and regulations. For such, the letter and not the spirit of the law prevails. The post-Maccabean Pharisees can be singled out as classic examples of legalists. With their 613 (or 621) laws, they were pre-armed for any moral predicament. They had a preset and prescribed manual for morality. Fletcher considers Judaism, along with both classical Catholicism and Protestantism, to be legalistic, though Judaism is less so than the latter two. The Jews stoned homosexuals and the church burned them, says Fletcher. Both put law over love. The legalist believes in the love of duty; the situationist holds to the duty of love.

At the other end of the ethical spectrum, Fletcher locates the antinomians, who are complete libertines, with no norms whatsoever. Each of their moral decisions is spontaneous and unprincipled, based only on the situation of the moment. Some antinomians claim to have a clairvoyant conscience, a kind of direct moral insight into right and wrong. As examples of the antinomian view, Fletcher cites the New Testament libertines, with their lawlessness; the early gnostics, with their 'special knowledge"; the modern Moral Rearmament movement, with its "spiritual power"; and Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialism (discussed here in chap. 2). Common to all these views, says Fletcher, is the rejection of all moral rules, even any generallyvalid ones. No norm is accepted, not even a norm of love. From Fletcher's point of view, the antinomians throw out the ethical baby (love) with the legalistic bathwater.

Between the polar opposites of legalism, with laws for everything, and antino- mianism, with its lack of laws for anything, Fletcher posits his situational abso- lutism, with its one law for everything. The situationist comes into every ethical battle armed with but one moral weapon—love: "Only the command to love is categorically good."" Every other decision is hypothetical: do this if it is loving. "We are ‘obliged’ to tell the truth, for example, only if the situation calls for it; if a would-be murderer asks his victim's whereabouts, our duty might be to lieflAs far as other moral rules are concerned, they are helpful but not unbreakable. The only ethical imperative one has is "'Act responsibly in love:" Literally "everything else without exception, all laws and rules and principles and ideals and norms, are only contingent, only valid if they happen to serve love in any situation" (emphasis original)?

The situationist has the one law of love (agape); many general rules of wisdom (sophia), which are more or less reliable; and the particular moment of decision (kairos), "in which the responsible self in the situation decides whether the sophia

1. Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966), 26. 2.1bid., 27. 3.1bid., 28, 30, emphasis original.

Situationism 37

can serve love there or not." The "legalists make an idol of the sophia, antinomians repudiate it, situationists use it," writes Fletcher.’ The solidification of these generally valid rules into absolute norms is legalism, and the rejection of all value in them is antinomianism.

There are at least two basic reasons for accepting only one universal norm. First, universals cannot be derived by deduction from other universals like "middle axioms"—one cannot derive an underived norm. Second, each situation is so different from every other situation that it is questionable whether a rule that ap- plies to one situation can be applied to all situations like it, since the others may not really be like it. Only the single axiom or norm of love is broad enough to be applied to all circumstances and contexts.

Setting Forth the Presuppositions

According to Fletcher, there are four working principles of situationism: prag- matism, relativism, positivism, and personalism. He does not, however, intend that we should conclude that situationism is totally relativistic and nonnormative. He means, rather, that within the framework of this absolute norm of love, everything else is pragmatic, relativistic, positivistic, and personalistic.

1. Pragmatism. By a pragmatic approach Fletcher means that "the right is only the expedient in our way of our behaving." It is what "works" or "satisfies" for love's sake. He wants to put love to work in order to make it successful and to realize its "cash value."° The pragmatic approach disdains abstract, verbal solutions to ethical problems; it seeks, rather, concrete and practical answers.

2. Relativism. There is only one absolute; everything else is relative to it. As the strategy is pragmatic, the tactics are relativistic."' The divine command of love is changeless in its why, but contingent in its specific what and how. "The situationist," writes Fletcher, "avoids words like 'never' and ‘perfect’ and ‘always’ and ‘complete’ as he avoids the plague, as he avoids ‘absolutely's Yet it is impossible to be "absolutely relative "There must be an absolute or norm of some kind if there is to be any true relativity." "In Christian situationism the ultimate criterion is ... 'agapic love:"” But Christians should constantly remind themselves that everything else is relative to this one norm.

3. Positivism. A positivistic position, as opposed to a naturalistic view, holds that values are derived voluntaristically, not rationally. A person decides

Ibid., 33, emphasis original. Ibid

Ibid, 41, 42.

Ibid. 43.

Ibid, 43,44.

Tbid., 45.

CORPNANDMNF

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on their values; one does not deduce them from nature. This is also called "emotivism" because moral values are thought to be expressions of one's feelings rather than prescriptions for one's life. Apositivistic or emotive ethic places art and morals in the same camp: both call for a decision or leap of faith. Ethical statements do not seek verification; they look forjustification. And only in the one norm of Christian love do all other moral expressions find their ultimate justification.

4. Personalism. Moral values are not only what persons express; persons are the ultimate moral values. There are no inherently good things; only persons are inherentlyvaluable. Value only "happens" to things. Things are of value only to persons. "Things are to be used; people are to be loved:"° The reverse of this—loving things and using people—is the perversion of morality. According to Fletcher, considering only persons to have intrinsic value is what Kant meant by treating persons always as ends and never as means. So this is the meaning of love: relating everything to the good of persons, who alone are good as such.

In brief, situationism is an ethic with a pragmatic strategy, a relativistic tactic, a positivistic attitude, and a personalistic value center. It is an ethic with one absolute, to which everything else is relative and which is directed toward the pragmatic end of doing good to persons.

Explaining the Propositions

The situational position in ethics can be explained by six basic propositions. Each proposition is an elaboration of what it means to live situationally with only the one absolute norm of love. Let us examine them in the order in which they are presented by Fletcher.

"Only one thing is intrinsically good; namely, love: nothing else at all." The realist argues that God wills something because it is good. Fletcher follows the voluntarists like Duns Scotus and Ockham, who saythat something is good because God wills it so. Nothing is good in and for itself. It is good only if it helps persons and bad if it hurts persons. The person "finding" the value maybe divine or human, but only persons—God, self, neighbor—determine something to be valuable. No act has intrinsic value. It gains its value only as it relates to persons. Apart from helping or hurting persons, all ethical acts are meaningless. All value, worth, goodness, and rightness are predicates, not properties. They may be predicated about persons, but they are not real things in themselves. God is goodness and love; all other persons merely have or do good.

Love is an attitude, not an attribute. Love is something that persons give and something that persons should receive, because onlypersons have intrinsic value.

10. Ibid., 51.

Situationism 39

According to Fletcher, the image of God in the human being is not reason but love. Love and personhood constitute humankind's characteristic similarity to God. This is why the only human thing with intrinsic value is love—it makes the human like God.

The other side of the proposition that only benevolence (love) is inherently good is that only malevolence is intrinsically evil. However, for Fletcher the opposite of love is not hate, which is really a perverted form of love, but rather indifference. ference. Hate at least treats the other as a thou, or person. Indifference treats others as inanimate objects. To totally ignore others and their needs is to depersonalize them. It is worse than attacking them, for an attack presupposes at least that the attacker considers the other person worth attacking.

Fletcher is opposed to calling some acts lesser and, therefore, excusable evils. A spy's lie, for example, is not wrong at all. "If it [a lie] is told in love it is good, right?’ "It is not an excusable evil; it is a positive good." "If love vetoes the truth, so be it."" Whatever one must do for love's sake is good, for only love is intrinsically good; nothing else whatsoever is good. Whatever is the loving thing to do in a given situation is the right thing to do, even if it involves sacrificial suicide while suffering torture, to avoid betraying one's comrades to the enemy.

"The ruling norm or Christian decision is love; nothing else." Love replaces the law. The spirit replaces the letter. "We follow law, if at all, for love's sake.:"” One does not follow love for the law's sake; one follows the law only for love's sake. Traditionally, people believed that they kept love by obeying the law because the two were identical. But love and law sometimes conflict, and when they do, it is the Christian's obligation to put love over the law. It is not the love of the law but the law of love that one ought to follow.

According to Fletcher, Jesus summed up the Mosaic law and the Ten Command- ments in one word: Jove. Indeed, there is no one of the commandments that may not be broken in some situation for love's sake. "There are no ‘universal laws' held by all men everywhere at all times, no consensus of all men."" For 'any precepts all men can agree to are platitudes such as ‘do the good and avoid the evil' or 'to each according to his due?" There are no universal laws except love. Every other law is breakable by love. As Augustine put it, "Love with care and then what you will, do." He did not say, adds Fletcher, ‘Love with desire and do what you please?"

Christian love is a giving love. Christian love is neither romantic (erotic) love nor friendship (philic) love. Christian love is a sacrificial (agapic) love. And it is also a responsible love, which is no more subject to exploitation than to the evasive motives of legalism. A legalistic refuge in the safety of universal laws can even be a retreat from individual responsibility. One may wish for the security

11.Ibid., 65.

12.Ibid., 70, emphasis original. 13.Ibid., 76.

14. Ibid.

15.Ibid., 70.

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of absolutes rather than the responsibility of relatives. The classical pacifist is, for Fletcher, escaping the responsibility of deciding which wars are just. It is an easier ethic if someone else decides what is right or wrong and simply tells us what to do.

"Love and justice are the same, for justice is love distributed; nothing else.""Love and justice are identical. Love does more than take justice into account; love becomes justice. Justice means to give others their due, and love is their due. Fletcher quotes the apostle Paul's injunction, "Owe no man anything except to love" (Rom. 13:8). Even if love and justice differed (and they do not), the least love could do would be to give justice to every person. In loving, in being just, one must be multidirectional, not just one-directional. The command is to love one's neighbors.

Love is not merely a present activity toward one's immediate neighbor. Love must have foresight. It must borrow the utilitarian principle and try to bring the greatest good (love) to the greatest number of people, for if love does not calculate the remote consequences, it becomes selfish. In short, justice is love using its head. Christian ethics welcomes law and order for love's sake and even foresees the need at times for a loving use of force to protect the innocent. It makes "rights" practical. Sometimes one may have the moral (loving) responsibility to disobey unjust civil law. And on occasion love may demand a revolution against the state—if the state has gone beyond love's pale.

"Love wills the neighbor's good whether we like him or not."' Fletcher's fourth proposition stresses that love is an attitude and not a feeling, and in so doing it stresses the distinctive characteristics of Christian love. In eras desire is the cause of love, while in agape love is the cause of desire. Agapic love is not reciprocal. A comparison of the three kinds of love reveals what Fletcher has in mind here. Erotic love is egoistic. It says, "My first and last consideration is myself." Philic love is mutual. It says, "I will give as long as I receive? Agapic love, on the other hand, is altruistic, saying, 31 will give, requiring nothing in return? This kind of love is the ruling norm in situational ethics. Agapic love holds that one ought to love one's neighbor as oneself.

Fletcher sketches four interpretations of the command to love one's neighbor as oneself. First, some say it means to love your neighbor just as much as you love yourself. Second, it may mean to love others in addition to loving yourself. Third, thinkers such as Soren Kierkegaard hold that it means to love your neighbor in the way you ought to love yourself—rightly and honestly. Fourth, it is said that the command is to love your neighbor instead of loving yourself (as you have been doing but must now stop doing). Which is the true meaning of self-love?

Following the ladder of self-love suggested by Bernard of Clairvaux—which ascends from love of self for self's sake, to love of God for self's sake, to love of God for God's sake, to love of self for God's sake—Fletcher outlines his own un- derstanding of loving one's neighbor as oneself. We move, he says, from love of ourselves for our own sake, to love of our neighbor for our own sake, to love of our

Situationism 41

neighbor for the neighbor's sake, to love of ourselves for the neighbor's sake. The last is the highest and the best. It is the right kind of self-love: the love of oneself for the sake of loving others.

When self-love and neighbor-love conflict, "the logic of love is that self-concern is obligated to cancel neighbor-good whenever more neighbor-good will be served through serving the self."" Ship captains and airplane pilots, for example, are to keep themselves alive, even at the expense of some passengers, if need be, for the sake of the safety of the rest of the passengers. In actuality, there is no real conflict between self-love and neighbor-love. One is to love oneself only to the degree that it maximizes neighbor-love.

All love is self-love, but it is the self loved for the sake of loving the most people possible. Love is one, but there are three objects: God, neighbor, and self. Self-love maybe either right or wrong. 'If we love ourselves for our own sakes, that is wrong. If we love ourselves for God's sake and the neighbor's, then it is right. For to love God and the neighbor is to love one's self in the right way ... ; to love one's self in the right way is to love God and one's neighbors!"" And in no case does loving one's neighbors imply that we must like them.

Love does not even necessarily involve pleasing our neighbor. Love demands that we will our neighbor's good, whether or not the neighbor pleases us, and whether or not our love pleases the neighbor. Calculating the neighbor's good, even if it displeases them, is not cruel. A military nurse, for example, may lovingly treat patients roughly so as to hasten their recovery and return them to battle.

"Only the end justifies the means; nothing else." Tf this were not true, no act would be justified. There are no intrinsically good acts except the act of love. Hence, the only thing that can justify an act is if it is done for loving ends or purposes. This is not to say that any end justifies any means, but only that a /oving end justifies any means. For example, it might be the loving thing to steal a murderer's gun or to lie to a schizophrenic patient to keep him calm for treatment. What, asks Fletcher, justifies slicing into a human body with a knife? Surely not hatred of him as one's enemy. But would not the act of mutilating his body be justified if the end in view is to save his life from a disease or a cancerous organ? Does not the end justify the means in this situation?

In fact, what other than the end could possiblyjustifythe means, asks Fletcher? The means cannot justify themselves. Only ends justify means. Indeed, "no act apart from its foreseeable consequences has any ethical meaning whatsoever." is The meaning of the act comes from its purpose or end. And the only justifiable purpose for performing ethical acts is agapic love. Any means that is sought for its own sake is wrong. All ends are actually only means to higher ends, until one arrives at last at the ultimate end of love itself.

16.1bid., 113. 17.1bid., 114. 18.1bid., 120.

42 Ethical Options

In response to those who challenge, on the basis of the "wedge" principle (i.e., that it is dangerous to have exceptions to moral norms like telling the truth and sav- ing lives), Fletcher argues that "abuse does not bar use." The fact that some people will abuse the situationist position of responsible love by irresponsible actions does not disprove the value of the love norm itself. And the so-called generalization argument—"What if everyone did it?"—is no more than obscurantism, a delaying tactic of static morality.

"Love's decisions are made situationally, not prescriptively.' The final expository postulate of situation ethics strongly marks the difference between the basic ethical principle of the love norm and the application of that principle in a given circum- stance. The love principle is a universal but formal norm. It does not prescribe in advance what specific courses of action will be loving. For the precise prescription of love, a person will have to wait until they are in the situation. Love is free from specific predefinition. One cannot know in advance the "existential particularity" that love will take in a given situation. Love operates apart from a system of pretailored, prefabricated moral rules. Love functions circumstantially and neocasuistically. Love does not make up its mind before it has seen the facts, and the jacts come from the situation.

What the situationist does have in advance is a general (though not specific) knowledge of what one should do (love), why one should do it (for God's sake), and to whom it should be done (one's neighbors). The situationist surely knows that love is altruistic and not egoistic. And one knows that love should be exercised toward as many neighbors as possible. The situationist knows in advance how this love will probably operate in a general way by means ofsophia, or wisdom. But one cannot say for sure what the loving thing to do will be in a particular case until all the particulars are known. For example, if Fletcher is asked, "Is adulterywrong?" he answers, "I don't know. Maybe. Give me a case:' (In fact, Fletcher himself provides a case where adultery can be right if it is done in love; see below.)

In brief, the situationist holds that the general what and why are absolute, but the how is relative. There is an absolute prescription, but it is only worked out in the relative situation. Love is ultimate, but just how one is to love is dependent on the immediate circumstances. By a closer examination of some difficult moral situations, we will be able to understand even betterjust how Fletcher's one-norm absolutism functions in different contexts.

Applying the Love Norm

By the use of provocative illustrations throughout his book, Fletcher is able to explain more fully just why he holds to only one absolute norm and how it would probably be applied under differing conditions. Some of these marginal moral cases merit further examination.

Altruistic adultery. A German mother of two was captured by the Russians near the end of World War II. The rules of her Ukrainian prison camp allowed her release

Situationism 43

to Germany only in the event of pregnancy, in which case she would be returned as a liability. So the woman asked a friendly camp guard to impregnate her. She was sent back to Germany, was welcomed by her family, gave birth to the baby, and made him a part of their reunited family. Was her adultery justified? Fletcher does not say explicitly that it was, but he implies the same by calling it "sacrificial adultery." Elsewhere, however, Fletcher speaks approvingly of mate-swapping for consenting adults, of a woman seducing a man pathologically attracted to a little girl, and of a young couple forcing parental approval of their marriage by engaging in intercourse. The direct implication is that all of these things can be done lovingly and can, therefore, be morally right.

Patriotic prostitution. A young woman working for a United States intelligence agency was asked to lure an enemy spy into blackmail by using her sexuality. In the guise of a secretary, she was to become involved with a married man working for a rival power. When she protested that she could not put her personal integrity on the block by offering sex for hire, she was told, "It's like your brother risking his life or limb in Korea. We are sure this job can't be done any other way." She was patriotic and wanted to serve her country. What was the loving thing to do? Here again Fletcher does not give his answer, but in view of the fact that he elsewhere approves of spies lying and men dying for their country out of love, for him there seems to be no reason why one might not be able to justify committing fornication for the fatherland, too.

Sacrificial suicide. Is taking one's own life always morally wrong? According to situation ethics, it is not; suicide can be done in love. For example, if a man has only the two choices of taking an expensive medicine—a course of action that will deplete his family's finances and cause his insurance to lapse—in order to live three more years, or else refusing the medicine and dying in six months, thereby leaving ample financial provisions for his family, which is the loving thing to do? It is not difficult to see how a situationist could approve of this rather indirect kind of sacrificial suicide. In fact, Fletcher speaks with approval both of Mother Maria's substitutionary death in the Nazi gas chambers for a young Jewess, and of a captured soldier's taking his own life to avoid betraying his comrades to the enemy. Suicide can be done for love's sake, in which case it is morally right according to a situationist ethic.

Acceptable abortion. Even though Fletcher favors birth control over abortion as a means of controlling the population, nonetheless there are circumstances when he comes out clearly in favor of abortion. He gives the example of an unmarried schizophrenic patient who became pregnant after being raped. Her father requested abortion but was refused by the hospital staff on the grounds that it was not a therapeutic abortion and was, therefore, illegal. Fletcher castigates this refusal as legalistic. "The situationist ... would almost certainly, in this case, favor abortion and support the girl's father's request?”

19. Ibid., 38.

44 Ethical Options

In another case, Fletcher gives tacit approval to a Romanian Jewish doctor who aborted three thousand babies ofJewish mothers in concentration camps because, if pregnant, the mothers were to be incinerated. That means that the doctor saved three thousand lives. And from the standpoint that the embryos were human lives (which Fletcher rejects), the doctor, by "killing" three thousand, saved three thousand and prevented the murder of six thousand. Surely this was the loving thing to do, according to situationism.

Merciful murder. Should we actually turn our back on someone who is hope- lessly caught in a burning airplane and begs to be shot? Would it not have been right to assassinate Hitler? Fletcher offers both illustrations and seems to indi- cate that either one could be a merciful, and therefore justifiable, murder. He seems to favor the act of a mother smothering her crying baby in order to save her group from being detected and killed by hostile Indians. The direct impli- cation is that such an act might be performed in sacrificial love for the good of the whole group.

Fletcher clearly approves of throwing some men out of an overloaded rescue boat to save them all from sinking. In 1841, the first mate of the ship William Brown of Liverpool was in charge of an overcrowded lifeboat and ordered most of the males thrown into the sea to save the rest. Later, the seaman who threw them into the sea was convicted of murder, with mercy recommended. "Situation ethics says it was bravely sinful, it was a good thing."" According to Fletcher, the first mate actually acted in love for the greater number of lives.

There are many other marginal cases that Fletcher offers, including refusing to respirate a monstrously deformed child and carrying the inventor of a cancer cure out of a burning building rather than one's own father. He also recommends sterilizing someone marrying a syphilitic and providing motherhood for single women by artificial insemination. I will not take space here to discuss more cases. One point, however, arises from all of these situations and needs emphasis here: in each situation there is a conflict of moral norms that the situationist feels can best be resolved by appeal to a single higher norm.

Often the norms that conflict are held by some people to be unbreakable and universal. But how can two or more norms be universal and unbreakable if they conflict? One cannot follow two opposing paths; one must choose. Surely persons cannot be held responsible for obeying two conflicting norms when they can obey only one, can they? At this point the situationist's solution shines. There is really only one universal and unbreakable norm: love. All the other norms are at best general and can be broken for love's sake. The simplicity and logic of the solution has strong appeal, but there are also some grave difficulties. Let us turn our attention now to an evaluation of the one-norm absolutism of situation ethics.

20. 1bicl., 136.

Situationism 45

Situationism Evaluated

The goal in what follows is not to evaluate the whole of situational ethics compre- hensively, but only insofar as it bears on the question of moral laws. In this respect the evaluation will be both positive and negative. First, there are some clear merits to holding only one absolute norm such as love.

Some Advantages of the Situational Position

Critics from more traditional and absolutistic viewpoints tend to overreact to Fletcher's relativism, pragmatism, emotivism, and radical examples. But what is sometimes forgotten is that all of this is in the context of a clear claim that his ethic is an absolutism, a one-norm absolutism. In this latter regard, many of the merits of the situational position emerge.

It is a normative position. First to be commended is Fletcher's attempt to lay down a normative approach to ethics. His second proposition states, "The ruling norm of Christian decision is love; nothing else:' In view of the fact that he spends a whole chapter elaborating this, as well as repeatedly referring to this one absolute throughout the book, it seems quite unfair to summarily dismiss Fletcher as totally normless and antinomian. Indeed, Fletcher spends much of his first chapter explaining that his view is not antinomian but rather a one-norm absolutism. (In "What Is a Rule?" Fletcher later denies that his approach has any universal norms)"

Fletcher distinguishes between formal principles, such as "Act as lovingly as possible"; substantial principles, such as "The good which should be sought or done is utility"; and normative principles, such as "Loving concern for our neighbors calls for telling them the truth:' Only formal principles, he says, are universal." Possibly Fletcher means that there are no universals with substantive content, and that the love principle, which he calls "the ruling norm of Christian ethics," is only formally universal."

The reasons for commending a normative approach to ethics have alreadybeen given and need not be repeated here. It is sufficient to note in passing that norms are both inescapable and essential to a meaningful ethic. Without them, one has no objective basis or guide for ethical decisions.

It is an absolutism. Fletcher's view is not only normative; it is also absolute. There is one unbreakable law, the law of love. And even though Fletcher deliberately avoids such words as "never" and "always" with regard to every other norm, he does not hesitate to emphasize that there are no exceptions to the love norm. Only love and nothing else justifies what one does, he argues. Furthermore, there

21. Joseph Fletcher, " What Is a Rule? A Situationist's View; in Norm and Context in Christian Ethics, ed. Gene H. Outka and Paul Ramsey (New York: Scribner's, 1960,325. 22x Fletcher, Situation Ethics, 337-38.

23. Ibid., 69.

46 Ethical Options

is no such thing as total relativity. Relative norms must be relative to a norm that is not relative. What, why, and who are the Christian's three universals, Fletcher says. That is, the Christian knows that the neighbor should be loved for God's sake. These three universals are absolute; only the circumstances are relative. He clearly holds that one ought always to love and should never hate or be indifferent to one's neighbors. "Christian situation ethics has only one norm ... that is binding and unexceptional, always good and right regardless of the circumstances": agapic love."

It resolves the issue of conflicting norms. Whatever one maythink of the situationist's solution to the marginal cases where conflicting norms are involved, at least it presents a logical possibility. All other ethical norms are subordinate to the one absolute norm, in view of which it is ethically right to break any of them for the sake of this love norm. This solution is both logical and simple. It is simple because it does not involve a complicated series of exceptions to norms, nor does it present a pyramid of moral values. It posits a single norm that takes precedence over all others. It is logical in the sense that it is not internally contradictory. It never leaves any ethical dilemmas in conflict or tension; they are always resolvable (at least in theory) by appeal to the single law of love. In other words, situationism is never faced with the dilemma of having two absolute or universal norms in conflict, since it does not have two absolute norms. There is one absolute norm, no more and no less.

It gives due value to differing circumstances. Another merit of situationism not to be undervalued is its emphasis on the fact that the circumstances or context of an ethical decision have a bearing on the rightness or wrongness of the act. However morally wrong falsifying may or may not be, surely it differs from context to context. Falsifying in fun to a friend is probably amoral, whereas serious falsifying before a judge and a jury is not. The circumstances do make a difference in the moral rightness or wrongness of the act. Likewise, taking another life accidentally, or in self-defense, or letting one die as an act of mercy are all markedly different situations from an intentional and malicious murder of another human being. The situation does condition the way one's norm (or norms) should be applied. Without due stress on the conditioning influence of the moral situation, one's ethics become legalistic and even inhuman.

Indeed, as will be seen later, it is very difficult (if not impossible) to contend for a many-norm absolutism of any kind, unless contextual qualificationsbecome part of the definition of the norm. Truthfulness and the duty to avoid or prevent taking life (or at least letting someone die) invariably come into conflict unless one has the prerogative to say that lying and taking life in certain contexts are wrong. This will be discussed more fully later. For now it is sufficient to note that giving attention to the circumstances or context o f ethical decisions is both unavoidable and desirable in elaborating a good ethical position.

24. Ibid., 38.

Situationism 47

It stresses love and the value of persons. From a Christian point ofview (and even from many non-Christian perspectives), the stress on agapic love as the ruling norm is certainly commendable. Bertrand Russell wrote Why I Am Not a Christian, but he also said elsewhere, "What the world needs is Christian love or compassion."'s Seldom do strong voices arise in defense of selfish love, that is, self-love, or self-centered love. And from the Christian point of view, love is the absolute moral character of God. "God is love" and love is of God," the New Testament says (1 John 4:7-8).And when all else fades, love will abide forever. Jesus summarized the whole of the Old Testament in the one word love. Indeed, according to Jesus, love was to be the earmark of his disciples. By this all men will know that you are my disciples, if you love one another" (John 13:35).

In view of this and from a Christian point of view, it is quite difficult to criticize the preeminence Fletcher gives to Christian agapic love. Implied in this stress on loving others is the fact that they are to be treated as persons in the image of God and not as mere things. The neighbor is a thou, not an it. The other is a person to be loved, not a thing to be used. Others are ends in themselves and not merely means for our own ends. Fletcher's emphasis that humans are persons (like God) who have God-given value is commendable from a Christian perspective.

Some Inadequacies of One-Norm Situationism

From both a moralistic viewpoint in general and a Christian perspective in particular, not everything in Fletcher's situationism is praiseworthy. We will not take time here to elaborate on his critical and inconsistent view of the Gospel records of the New Testament,”° nor the implications of holding that God can be loved only through one's neighbor. We will rather center our attention on the inadequacy of having only one norm for an ethic.

One norm is too general. A one-norm ethic, especially when the norm is as broad and general as Fletcher's love norm, is in most (though not all) cases little better than having no norm at all. By its very nature, a single universal norm must be broad and adaptable, or else it could not apply to all circumstances. But its versatility is also a liability, for it necessitates an ambiguity about what the norm means as far as concrete relationships are concerned. And if the absolute love norm is without concrete content apart from the relative situation, then the specific meaning of love is relative and not absolute.

Indeed, Fletcher admits that the content of love varies from situation to situ- ation. Therefore, the command "Love in all cases" means little more than to X in all cases:' For unless there is advanced cognitive content to the term Jove, then one does not really know what one is being commanded to do. Fletcher clearly

25. Bertrand Russell, The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russel:, ed. Robert E. Egner and Lester E. Denonn (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961), 579. 26. See Norman L. Geisler, A Popular Survey of the New Testament (Grand

Rapids: Baker Books, 2007), chap. 2.

48 Ethical Options

confesses that the love principle is empty of factual content: "This is why I say it is a ‘formal’ principle, which rules us and yet does so without content.""

In actual practice, Fletcher does seem to implythat there is some understanding of what love means in advance of the situation. But the question is How much understanding? Is there enough content in the universal love norm to raise it above a mere platitude? "Do the /oving thing" is scarcely more specific than "Do thegood thing." In both instances the question is What kinds of acts are good or loving? So his one moral law is too general to be helpful.

Fletcher's one-norm ethic of love is not more helpful than a view that says "Follow nature" or "Live according to reason:' Instead of'"What does ‘love’ mean?" the question becomes "What does ‘nature’ mean?" The result is the same, and one is left without any specific ethical direction. An appeal to the situation to provide content or meaning for love will not suffice. Fletcher admits that situations are relative and even radically different. If the meaning of love is dependent on the circumstances, then the significance of love is really relative to the situation and therefore not absolute. This leads to a second criticism.

The situation does not determine the meaning of love. The meaning of the love norm is not completely determined by the particulars of the situation but is merely conditioned by them. Circumstances do not effect (determine) norms; they only affect (influence) them. The context in which a norm is applicable does not dictate how the norm will be applied but only influences its application. If the complete determination of meaning came from the situation, then the alleged ethical norm would not really be normative at all. The situation would be determining the norm rather than the norm being determinative for the situation. Actually, the situation does not determine what is right; God does. The situation simply helps us discover which of God's laws is the one applicable there.

Fletcher does not claim that the situation completely determines what the norm means. He says only that what love will mean in advance of the situation cannot be known with any "existential particularity"; it can be known only in general. However, what is known in advance, "in general: may turn out to be the wrong meaning of love in a particular circumstance. No general wisdom (sophia) or norms are universal and unbreakable. There is no rule apart from the general (and ambiguous) rule of love, which ought never be broken. But this is precisely the problem. The meaningful norms are breakable, and the only unbreakable norm is not meaningful in any specific or practical sense of the word. Perhaps Fletcher should not have so summarily dismissed the possibility that there are many universal and unbreakable norms.

The possibility of many universal norms. There seem to be several reasons why situationism dismisses the possibility of having many universal norms, though none of these reasons is definitive. First, Fletcher argues that the many-norm position would be legalistic. This does not follow. A many-norm ethic may be legalistic, but

27. Fletcher, "What Is a Rule; 337.

Situationism 49

there is no reason why it must be legalistic. Whether or not the view is legalistic all depends on what the norms are, how they are related to each other, and how they are applied to life. One could actually be legalistic with one absolute norm such as Keep the Sabbath?

Second, it is implied that there is no other way to resolve the conflict of norms unless there is one absolute norm to which all other norms are only relative. But this is not so. There are at least three others ways to relate many universal norms: show how they really do not conflict, show why it is wrong to break either when they do conflict, or show how one of the norms is of a higher order and takes priority over those of a lower order.

Third, Fletcher sees no way to derive universal norms from a universal norm. He thinks that the concept of "middle axioms" is a contradiction in terms; they are "derived underiveds."But there is no reason why a deduction cannot be as uni- versal as its premises. Apart from whether there really are many universal norms, Fletcher certainly does not eliminate the possibility that there are such. He does not disprove that they can be arrived at by deduction the way postulates are de- rived from axioms in geometry. He does not disprove that they could come from revelation such as many Christians find inscripturated in the Bible. Nor does Fletcher definitely dismiss the possibility that many universal norms could be known intuitively to have a separate status of their own.

In brief, the possibility of there being many universal norms should not be given up until either it is shown to be logically impossible, or no universal norm other than love is ever found. In view of the fact that candidates for universal norms will be introduced and evaluated in subsequent chapters, we will withhold judgment until then whether or not there really are many universal norms. At this point, it is enough to observe that Fletcher does not prove that "there is only one universal norm," since he does not prove that it is impossible that there may be many universal norms.

A different universal norm is possible. Not only is it possible that there are many universal norms in contrast to Fletcher's single norm, but it is also possible to opt for a different single norm than the love norm Fletcher uses. Why not a one-norm ethic built on hate instead of love? Why not Buddhist compassion instead of Christian love? Why not a Confucian "negative Golden Rule" that mandates, "Do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you," rather than the positive one? Or a New Age principle of harmony with nature? Surely Fletcher has not demonstrated that all ethical principles mean exactly the same thing (at any rate, not those as different as love and hate). Then on what basis is one to choose the single norm on which to build a whole ethic? There m ust be some way to justify one's basic ethical presupposition if it is not to be entirely arbitrary.

In brief, the problem of a one-norm ethic arises: Which norm? Prima facie, there are many ethical norms that claim obedience. Which one should be given the special position ofbeing absolute and unbreakable? Could not a case be made forusing truth- fulness at any cost as the single absolute? Could not such a position be worked out

50 Ethical Options

with intemal consistency in the same way as Fletcher's love norm can be developed? And if one absolute norm can be just as internally consistent as another, then on what basis is one norm to be preferred over another? By evaluating the consequences of each? If the one absolute norm is chosen on the ground that it brings the best consequences for most people in the long run, then there are several problems.

First, we do not know the long run, and some things that are not reallybest in the long run work well for many people in the short run (e.g., dishonesty and dictator- ships). Manythings distinctly wrong on almost any ethical basis obviouslywork too well for too many people for too long a time (e.g., cheating, lying, and stealing).

Second, to choose the norm on the basis of its consequences (if this were pos- sible) would be to depart from a normative basis for ethics in favor of a utilitarian basis, with all the problems that view entails. Yet utilitarianism actually depends on norms for its own operation, which brings the argument full circle. This would thus be saying that ends are needed to justify norms, and these ends in turn depend on norms to establish them. But this really demonstrates that norms are the basis of ethics in either event. Norms are necessary. The questions remain: Which norms? How many are there? Next we turn to an examination of the many-norm view to seek an answer to these questions.

A many-norm ethic is defensible. A number of contemporary writers have shown how one may defend the validity of many ethical norms. On a popular level this has been done by C. S. Lewis in Mere Christianity and in a philosophical way by William K. Frankena in Ethics. In this latter category one may also place the works of Paul Ramsey (see Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics). Indeed, there do seem to be many universally binding moral laws. Rape, cruelty, hatred, and genocide are universally frowned upon. And even if all do not practice them toward others, nevertheless all do seem to believe that others should treat them in accordance with these norms. (For an answer to this problem from a Christian point of view, see chap. 7.) And in view of the fact that Fletcher frankly but reluctantly admits that his view is utilitarian, perhaps this criticism should be stressed more.

Fletcher is really a utilitarian. Fletcher admits that his view is utilitarian. As such, then, it is not really a one-norm absolutism but a form of generalism. This being the case, it is subject to the criticisms of utilitarianism (see chap. 4). As he says, the end justifies the means. He believes in the greatest love (good) for the greatest number of people in the long run. Not only do we not know the long run, but what is good for many may rob the minority of rights. Furthermore, just because an end is good does not make an act good. There are evil acts, such as rape, cruelty, child abuse, and murder. No amount of good intentions can make an evil act good.

Summary and Condusion

Situationism claims to be a one-norm absolutism. It believes that everything should be judged by one absolute moral law: love. However, it turns out that this one moral

Situationism 51

principle is really only formal and empty. It has no content that can be known in advance of or apart from the situation. Different situations really determine what it means. So in the final analysis the one moral law turns out to be no moral law. Situationism reduces to antinomianism, for in practice one empty absolute moral law is no better than no absolute moral law. And the denial of all value is self-defeating. It values the right to say that there are no values.

Select Readings

Bloom,Allan. The Closingof theAmerican Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988.

Brunner, Emil. The Divine Imperative. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1947. Eletcher, Joseph. Moral Responsibility. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974.

— Situation Ethics: The New Morality. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966. he Forbidden Fruit: The Ethics of Humanism. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books,

— — ed. Humanist Manifestos I and IL Buffalo: Prometheus, 1973.

MacKinnon, Barbara. Ethics: Theory and Contemporary Issues. 6th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2009.

Robinson, ohn A. T. Honest to God. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963. Singer, Peter. Practical Ethics. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

4

GENERALISM

Ethical positions can be divided into two broad classes: those that believe in binding ethical rules and those (such as antinomianism) that do not. The first group can be subdivided into those who believe that there are universally binding ethical laws, and those who believe they are only generally binding. This latter position is called generalism, and traditional adherents of this view include utilitarians.

Generalism Explained

Utilitarians are not antinomians, since they believe in the value of ethical laws in helping individuals determine which action will probably bring the greatest good for the greatest number of people. On the other hand, utilitarians are not absolutists, since they usually deny that there are universally binding ethical norms that represent intrinsic values.

It is true that some utilitarians (e.g., Rule Utilitarians) say that rules should not be broken, but this is only because of the extrinsic value of the good results from keeping rules. The rule is kept, not because it is really intrinsically wrong to perform the forbidden act, but only because making exceptions to any ethical law is a practice that leads to greater evil than good. In other words, the act is judged not by its intrinsic and universal value, but by its results. Even the utilitarians who value rules, then, have no universal norms in the deontological and normative senses discussed in chapter 1.

52

Generalism 53

Yet this does not mean that utilitarians have no absolutes. They may have ab- solute ends, but they claim to have no absolute norms. They may have an absolute or ultimate result by which they judge all actions, but they confess no absolute rules enabling one to realize this ultimate end of the greatest good for the greatest number of people.

Jeremy Bentham: Quantitative Utilitarianism

Modern generalists is heir to ancient hedonism, which believed that pleasure is the greatest good (summum bonurn) for humans. Although the popular "Eat, drink, and be merry" is a perversion of what Epicurus himself taught, his ancient followers set forth the classic doctrine that seeking physical pleasure and avoiding physical pain is the chief aim in life.

The pleasure calculus. eremyBentham (d. 1832) developed this ancient hedonistic pleasure calculus into a utilitarian position in his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789). According to Bentham, "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure," and "it is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as what we shall do:" These are summed up in the principle of utility, which affirms that "the greatest happiness of all those whose interest is in question ... is the right and proper, and only right and proper and universally desirable, end of human action:*

In view of this, "an action then may be said to be conformable to the principle of utility... when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish it."" Furthermore, "when thus interpreted, the words ought, and right and wrong, and others of that stamp, have a meaning: when otherwise, they have none." That is, no acts or words have any ethical meaning apart from their consequences. Everything is to be justified by its end, by whether it brings more pleasure than pain. But how is the principle of utility itself to be justified? Bentham answers that it is not susceptible to any direct proof, "for that which is used to prove everything else, cannot itself be proved." People everywhere naturally tend to embrace the principle of utility, although some have inconsistently rejected it. However, "when a man attempts to combat the principle of utility, it is with reasons drawn, without his being aware of it, from that very principle itselr

Further, if a person rejects the utilitarian principle in favor of his own feeling, "in the first case, let him ask himself whether his principle is not despotical, and

1. Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (reprint, New York: 1-lafner, 1965),1. 2. Ibid., 5, note added by Bentham, July 1822. 3. Ibid., 3. 4. Ibid., 4. 5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., 4-5.

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hostile to all the rest of the human race," and "in the second case, whether it is not anarchical, and whether at this rate there are not as many different standards of right and wrong as there are men?"

Calculating pleasure. If pleasure and the avoidance of pain are the ends of ethically good acts, then it is reasonable to ask how one is to measure relative amounts of these two elements. Bentham divides his answer into two parts, one for individuals and one for groups.

To an individual person, the value of pleasure or pain in itself will be determined by six factors: intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty, propinquity or remoteness, fecundity (the chances of producing others of its kind), and purity (the chances of not producing the opposite kind of sensation). When applying the pleasure calculus to a group of people, a seventh factor of extent (the number of persons to whom it extends) must be considered in determining the value of pleasure or pain. So, to make a final calculation of the good of an act for a group, one must first determine how much more pleasure than pain it will give to each individual and then add all these together. The total balance of pleasure over pain will give the general good tendency of the act. If there is more evil than good, then the general evil tendency will be revealed.

Bentham admits that "it is not to be expected that this process should be strictly pursued previously to every moral judgment, or to every legislative or judicial operationfsPresumably this is because it is too psychologically and mathematically complex to be practical. At this point the need for some kind of general norms is most obvious in Bentham's position. For if one cannot always calculate the balance of pleasure, then how is one to determine a course of action? The answer becomes more explicit in the utilitarian position of Bentham's successor.

John Stuart Mill: Qualitative Utilitarianism

John Stuart Mill (d. 1873) made at least one modification to Bentham's position conceming how pleasure (the end) is conceived and developed a fuller statement regarding how general moral laws could function in a utilitarian context.

Pleasure is defined qualitatively. Bentham's hedonistic calculus (or pleasure prin- ciple) lends itself easily to a materialist interpretation. He seems to be speaking of physical pleasure and pain, since they are measured by intensity and duration. Although in later years Bentham tried to soften the hedonistic implications o f this by noting that "happiness" or "felicity" may be better words for describing what he meant by "pleasure," he did not deny the materialist way this "happiness" was to be measured nor the mathematical way it was to be calculated.

Mill, on the other hand, argued that pleasures differ in kind, and higher plea- sures are to be preferred over lower ones (Utilitarianism [1863]). Pleasures do not differ merely in their amount or intensity. One is higher and more valuable

7. Ibid., 6. 8. Ibid., 31.

Generalism 55

than another simply because most people who experience both decidedly prefer one over the other.

The reason humans give marked preference to some pleasures is that they have higher faculties than animals. "No intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs.” Indeed, says Mill, "it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied, better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.’ And if the fool and the pig are of a different opinion, says Mill, it is because the pig knows only one side of the question; the fool knows both sides.

Cultured pleasures are higher than uncultured pleasures. Intellectual pleasures are higher than sensual pleasures, and so on. There is a qualitative difference between them, and one is obligated to seek the highest kind of pleasure for the greatest number of people. But again it maybe asked How can one know what will bring about the highest good for the greatest number unless there are some guides or norms for the decisions? Surely the individual is seldom if ever in a position of being able to foresee the long-range results of his actions. Mill's answer to this question leads to the need for norms.

Pleasure is determined normatively. The utilitarian position is not without norms. Mill refers to the great usefulness of the veracity norm. "Yet that even this tule, sacred as it is, admits of possible exceptions is acknowledged by all moralists" Truthfulness is a general rule, with some exceptions (lying is right to save a life), that can guide one in doing what will bring the greatest good to the greatest number of people.

Mill admits that one cannot always calculate the consequences of one's actions. This is preciselywhy rules and norms are needed. Humankind has had ample time to formulate a fund of human experience on which one may draw to help calculate the consequences of actions. "During all that time, mankind have been learning by experience the tendency of actions," Mill writes.” And unless we assume humans to be complete idiots, they "must by this time have acquired positive beliefs as to the effects of some actions on their happiness." And "the beliefs which have thus come down are the rules of morality for the multitude, and for the philosopher until he has succeeded in finding better."

In short, there are valid moral rules, beliefs, and codes to guide human decisions toward maximizing the good in society, but none of these are universal rules. None of these is exceptionless; all of them can and should be broken for the principle of

9. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in The Utilitarians (Garden City, NY: Dolphin Books, Doubleday, 1960,409.

10.1bid., 410.

11.1bid., 424.

12.1bid., 42$.

13.1bid,425-26.

14.1bid,425.

56 Ethical Options

utility when the greater good is in jeopardy. For "the received code of ethics is by no means of divine right.."'s It admits of indefinite improvement. ‘But to consider the rules of morality as improvable is one thing; to pass over the intermediate generalization [i.e., rules and codes] entirely and endeavor to test each individual action directly by the first principle [of utility] is another."' Just because there is only the one ultimate goal of happiness, toward which all morality is directed, does not mean there cannot be many moral norms directing us toward that one goal. It means only that these many norms are not absolute, and when they conflict, the conflict must be resolved by the utilitarian principle. There is only one fundamental principle of morality, and all others are subordinate to it.

The problem with exceptions. Mill admits that his position is open to the criti- cism that exceptions to moral rules will present a temptation to break moral rules indiscriminately fo r the supposed utility of it. His reply is twofold. First, this same criticism may be made of all moral systems. "It is not the fault of any creed, but of the complicated nature of human affairs, that the rules of conduct cannot be so framed as to require no exceptions."" And "there is no ethical creed which does not temper the rigidity of its laws by giving a certain latitude ... for accommodation to peculiarities of circumstances; and under every creed, at the opening thus made, self-deception and dishonest casuistry get in."" The utilitarian no more than other moralists must overcome the misuse of exceptions by intellect and virtue. To be utilitarian has a standard of morality, and though the application of it may be difficult, it is better than none at all. "While in other systems the moral laws all claim independent authority, there is no common umpire entitled to interfere between them."

Second,Mill acknowledges that exceptions ought to be recognized as exceptions and have their limits defined. The reasons for this, he says, are so that exceptions will not be multiplied beyond their need and so that they may not weaken one's confidence in the general rule. Mill merely mentions but does not elaborate on these points. Other utilitarians have adopted an alternate approach to that of Mill, arguing for exceptionless moral rules, or at least rules, though not exceptionless in themselves, that should never be broken for utilitarian reasons.

G. E. Moore: General Rules and Universal Obedience

Utilitarians handle the problem of exceptions in two basic ways. One school, sometimes called act-utilitarians, holds that each particular ethical act must be judged by its consequences. Hence, there maybe exceptions to any ethical rule or norm that in a particular case would justify breaking it. Another group, known as

15. Ibid. 16. Ibid., 426. 17. Ibid., 427. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid.

Generalism 57

rule-utilitarians, argues that rules should never be broken (unless there is a conflict between them), since the consequences of rule breaking are bad. In some respects, the position of G. E. Moore (d. 1958) seems to combine a bit of each view.

Rules are only generally valid. According to Moore the assertion "I am morally bound to perform this act" means that the action will produce the greatest possible amount of good in the universe. The results of acts thus determine their morality. Furthermore, "with regard then to ethical judgments which assert that a certain kind of action is good as a means to a certain kind of effect, none will be universally true; and many, though generally true at one period, will be generally false at others... . Hence we can never be entitled to more than a generalization—to a proposition of the form 'This result generally follows this kind of action: And even this generalization will only be true, if the circumstances under which the action occurs are generally the same."" Rules and norms are generally useful but are not really universal.

In fact, ethical rules are not really categorical but prove to be only hypothetical. They say that if we act this way under these circumstances, then the greatest good will probably result. But since other circumstances may interfere, it is not possible to know this with any more than probability. So then "an ethical law has the nature not of a scientific law but of a scientific prediction: and the latter is always merely probable, although the probability may be very great7”!

Murder, for example, cannot be known to be universally wrong, since awe do, as a matter of fact, only observe its good effects under certain circumstances; and it maybe easily seen that a sufficient change in these would render doubtful what seem the most universally certain of general rules:" Thus, the general disutility of murder could be proved only if the majority of the human race persists in believing that life is worthwhile. "In order to prove that murder ... would not be good as a means, we should have to disprove the main contention of pessimism—namely that the existence of human life is on the whole an evil."r° So "when... we say that murder is in general to be avoided, we only mean that it is so, so long as the majority of mankind will certainly not agree to it, but will persist in living:' * However, as long as most people continue to value life, the ethical consideration that "it is generallywrong for any single person to commit murder seems capable of proof."*s The same holds true for other rules such as temperance and keeping promises.

Chastity, likewise, is only a general rule whose universal utility depends upon certain conditions that are considered necessary for the conservation of society. For instance, it is usually presupposed that chastity is necessary to avoid conjugal jealousy and to preserve paternal affection, and that both of these are necessary

20. G. E. Moore, Principia Aka (reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 22. 21.1bid., 155.

22.1bid., 156.

23.1bid.

24,1bid.

25. Ibid.

58 Ethical Options

conditions to preserve society. "But it is not difficult to imagine a civilized society existing without them "26 Hence, the rule of chastity is only a general and condi- tional rule, which could be relinquished if society could survive without it.

Some general rules should never be broken. Notwithstanding the fad that moral norms are only general rules that have individual exceptions, Moore argues that the individual ought never disobey a rule that is held by most people to be true in general. He gives the following reasons. First, "if it is certain that in a large majority of cases the observance of a certain rule is useful, it follows that there is a large probability that it would be wrong to break the rule in any particular case?" Further, "the uncertainty of our knowledge both of effects and of their value, in particular cases, is so great, that it seems doubtful whether the individual's judgment that the effect will probably be good in his case can ever be set against the general probability that that kind of action is wronrAlso, "added to this general ignorance is the fact that, if the question arises at all, our judgment will generally be biased by the fact that we strongly desire one of the results which we hope to obtain by breaking the rule."!9 In view of these factors, "it seems, then, that with regard to any rule which is generally useful, we may assert that it ought always to be observed: wrote Moore. This observance is "not on the ground that in every particular case it will be useful, but on the ground that in any particular case the probability of its being so is greater than that of our being likely to decide rightly that we have before us an instance of its disutility... In short, though we may be sure that there are cases where the rule should be broken, we can never know which those cases are, and ought, therefore, never to break it "3°

Even if one were to perceive clearly that in one's own case breaking the rule would be advantageous, yet insofar as such a rule-breaking action tends to encour- age other unadvantageous breaches of the rule, it has a bad effect. For "in cases ... where example has any influence at all, the effect of an exceptional right action will generallybe to encourage wrong ones."J! According to Moore, the logic of this should be carried even one step further. For "it is undoubtedlywell to punish a man, who has done an action, right in his case but generally wrong, even if his example would not be likely to have a dangerous effect. For sanctions [punishments] have, in general, much more influence upon conduct than example; so that the effect of relaxing them in an exceptional case will almost certainly be an encouragement of similar action in cases which are not exceptional?”

The position that one ought always obey rules that are admittedly only gener- ally applicable is limited only to the rules or norms known "certainly" to be of

26. Ibid., 158. 27. Ibid. 162. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid, 163. 32. Ibid, 164.

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general usefulness. In cases where there is doubt of the general utility of a rule, Moore appears to agree with the approach of the act-utilitarians. He says, it seems that, in cases of doubt, instead of following rules, of which he is unable to see the good effects in his particular case, the individual should rather guide his choice by a direct consideration of the intrinsic value of vileness of the effect which his action may produce."

In either event, there are no actions or kinds of action that really are universally wrong; there are only some things generally wrong, which one ought (for utilitarian reasons) to avoid universally. So there are at least two ways in which Moore's position does not provide any truly universal norms. First, the norms that one should always follow do not represent acts really universally right or wrong, but only acts that are generally wrong. In specific cases an exception may be justified. But since it brings more evil than good to claim that any given case qualifies as a legitimate exception, it follows that the rule should never be broken.

Second, Moore's general rules that should always be obeyed are not really nor- mative universals in a categorical sense, since they are norms justified onlyby their results. They are not deontological. They do not represent kinds of actions with intrinsic value. Moore is very clear in holding that no acts have intrinsic value; all acts are to be judged by their results?’

John Austin: No General Rules Should Be Broken

In the rule-utilitarianism of John Austin, the question of unbreakable rules is carried one step further than in the thinking of G. E. Moore. Moore argued only that some rules ought never to be broken, because of their general utility and because one could not be sure a certain case was a legitimate exception, and even if it were, other offsetting bad consequences and influences would result from making an exception of it. Austin, on the other hand, argues that certain rules involve a class of actions that if generally done would bring bad results; such rules should never be broken.

Rules are justified by general results. Austin's position is decidedly utilitarian because the only justification for keeping the rules is the good result that keeping rules brings. In The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832), he says, "Our rules would be fashioned on utility; our conduct on our rules!" According to Austin's view, "our conduct would conform to rules inferred from the tendency of actions, but would not be determined by a direct resort to the principle of general utility.""" Hence, “utilitywould be the test of our conduct, ultimately, but not immediately!"

33. Ibid., 166.

34. See ibid, 92-93, 104-5.

35. John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832; reprint, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1954), 47.

36.1bid.

37. Ibid.

60 Ethical Options

Rules are justified if keeping them brings greater good, or if breaking them brings greater evil, on society. However, rules are not about specific or individual acts but about classes or kinds of acts.

Universal rule-keeping is justified by general results. Each individual act is not to be justified by its specific results as in act-utilitarianism. But the whole class of acts of that kind is judged by the results that those kinds of acts bring. As Austin states it, "If we would try the tendency of a specific or individual act, we must not contemplate the act as if it were single and insulated, but must look at the class of acts to which it belongs."’ Further, "we must suppose that acts of the class were generally done or omitted, and consider the probable effect upon the general hap- piness or good?" For "the particular conclusion which we draw, with regard to the single ad, implies a general conclusion embracing all similar acts.""

The only exception to this is when rules conflict or when a particular act falls under no rule. Furthermore, these general rules are always to be obeyed only if they are generally observed and generally useful. If either (or both) ceases to be a fact, then they lose their force and need not always be obeyed. Austin gives a number of examples of his position. A poor person should not steal from the rich neighbor on the grounds o sthe utility of this particular act (as an act-utilitarian would say), for if stealing were general, the effect on society would be disastrous. Nor should one evade the payment of a tax to devote the money to some good purpose, for "regular payment of taxes is necessary to the existence of the government. And I, and the rest of the community, enjoy the security which it gives, because the payment of taxes is rarely evaded."

In a similar way, the punishment of an individual as a solitary event may do more harm than good. "But, considered as part of a system, a punishment is useful or beneficent. By a dozen or score of punishments, thousands of crimes are prevented:" The individual punishment is justified by the good results of the general practice. Exceptions should not be made because the general results of disobeying general rules is generally bad.

Traditionally, utilitarians argued that an action should be judged on whether it would bring the greatest good to the greatest number of people. Professor Joseph Barnhart offers a modification to this utilitarian calculus. He believes we should act so as to bring the greatest good (happiness) to every individual, including one- self:" From a libertarian perspective, he believes this will better safeguard each individual's rights.

38. Ibid., 47-48.

39. Tbid,48. 40.1 bid.

41. Ibid, 39.

42. Ibid, 40.

43. Joseph E. Barnhart, "Egoism and Altruism; Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 7, no.I (Winter 1976): 101-10.

Generalism 61

Generalism Evaluated

There are some positive values as well as serious drawbacks to generalism. Let us first consider some of the positive features of the generalist approach to ethical norms.

Some Values of Generalism

The values of generalism vary with its representations. But taken as a whole, there are at least three that relate to a normative approach to ethics such as that taken by Christians. First, generalism reflects a need for norms. Second, it offers a possible solution to conflicting norms. Finally, some generalists even argue for "unbreakable" norms.

The need for norms. Generalists are not antinomian. They recognize the need for norms, for even utilitarian ends need normative means for attaining them. There must be a road map to one's ultimate goal. Moral ends are not self-attaining, and there is an evident need for criteria to guide one's conduct. To the credit of the utilitarians, they have recognized that without norms or other normative bases taken from the fund of human experience, there is no way of determining the long-range results of one's actions. They thus are aware of the fact that in the absence of predictive powers, people must draw upon principles that are known to produce good results when followed.

Moore argued that in view of the fact that a person does not know the long-range future, one must gauge one's actions on the basis of the known short-range future, assuming they will be the same. But he frankly acknowledges that this is an unproved assumption. He adds, alt will be apparent that it has never yet been justified—that no sufficient reason has ever yet been found for considering one action more right or more wrong than another [via results]:"" In view of this, it is understandable that utilitarians resort to norms to save their position from collapsing.

A solution to conflicting norms. Generalism offers a solution to the problem of what to do when there is a conflict of duty, such as that between truthfulness and saving lives. For apart from rule-utilitarians, generalists believe that there are no universal rules that are really exceptionless. At best they are only general norms that maybe broken if the occasion calls for it. In this way, lying to save a life can be right, even though lying is generally wrong. There is only one absolute end ("the greatest good"), and all the means (rules, norms) are relative to that end. In any given instance, when there is a conflict of means or norms, it maybe resolved by a direct appeal to the utilitarian end. If lying in a situation would be more useful or helpful to most people, then one ought to lie.

As has been mentioned, the generalistic solution is neither antinomian nor situational. Antinomians admit of the value of no laws at all, not even general ones.

44, Moore, Principia ethica, 153.

62 Ethical Options

Situationists such as Joseph Fletcher claim to have one absolute norm, whereas generalists claim no absolute norms at all. Yet generalism has one absolute end that functions like a norm in helping to determine a given course of action when there is a conflict of general norms. Technically, the greatest good for the greatest number is not considered by generalists to be a norm by which the best end can be attained, but it is the end itself in view of which the best norm should be chosen. So generalism evades the no-norm position and offers a reconciliation when there is a conflict among accepted norms. Its answer is simple: when moral principles conflict, the conflict is not absolute; there is always a possible excep- tion. Moral duties are only general, not universal. And general principles admit of exceptions.

Some generalists have a "universal" norm. Some generalists offer a case for rules or norms that should never be broken. Even though they admit to exceptional cases that might in isolation justify breaking a general rule, they offer practical arguments for never breaking a rule such as saving lives or keeping promises (unless there is a conflict of norms). The very desire to have meaningful and unbreakable norms for conduct is a commendable aspect of their ethic. It is a recognition of the many difficulties of an exceptive approach on the practical level.

Furthermore, generalists are not complete relativists. They have an absolute, even though it is not always considered to be an absolute norm. It is an absolute end, and it is used by them to discern among their relative means. Without an ab- solute end, it certainly is difficult to see how generalists could justify their choice among means or how they could argue that some rules should never be broken. For if there is no ultimate criterion for deciding on these issues, then how could one relative means be chosen over another? Ranking separate actions by intrinsic value is not something that generalists of the utilitarian stripe are prone to do, for it is contrary to their premise of judging things by their extrinsic value (namely, their usefulness).

Some Inadequacies of Generalism

Despite some positive things that maybe said of generalism, there are some seri- ous problems with the position. Several of these will be briefly considered here.

The end does not justify the means. Utilitarianism believes that the end justifies the means. But this is clearly wrong. Hitler's goal to have a more perfect race was good, but his means of attaining it were evil. President Nixon's goal of national security was a noble one, but the criminal and unethical activity of Watergate was not justified to reach it. The end never justifies the means; the means must justify themselves. Thus, an act is not automatically good simply because it has a good goal. The means to achieve it must be judged good by some objective standard of good. The road to destruction is paved with good intentions (Prov. 14:12). Something is not good because the intentions underlying it are good; it is good only if the actions are also good. From a Christian perspective, we must agree

Generalism 63

with Paul when he writes, "Shall we go on sinning so that grace may increase? By no means!" (Rom. 6:1-2).

Generalism has no universal norms. There is a distinct difference between a general norm, which for practical reasons one ought always to obey, and a truly universal norm, which is always intrinsically right to follow. The latter represents an intrinsically good act. But the generalist offers only norms that have less than universal extension. There are always unspecifiable exceptions or else cases that are not covered by the rules. And even though generalists sometimes opt not to break these rules because of general utility, nevertheless the rule itself is not es- sentially unbreakable.

If a person is in search of meaningful norms for conduct that one ought always to follow because they will be a guide toward performing acts that are always the right thing to do, then this person will be disappointed in generalism. The best a generalist can offer is a set of general norms that neither cover all cases nor are nonconflicting; in order for these norms to be effective, one must have some other means of applying them in specific and often crucial cases.

Utilitarian acts have no intrinsic value. Another criticism maybe directed toward the utilitarian generalists: the norms that they do have do not represent any acts with intrinsic value. For example, the attempt to save a life is not an intrinsically valuable act. It has value only if the person is actually saved or if some other good comes from the futile attempt. According to the utilitarian premise, a gift of charity that never reaches the poor or an act of kindness to which there is no favorable response is not a good act. Indeed, no act is good in and of itself unless good results from it. And no act is morally right unless it brings the greatest good to the greatest number of people. No benevolence, no sacrifice, no love has any value unless it happens to have good results. And conversely, if an act brings about good, it is a good act, whether it was intended that way or not.

Thus the utilitarian position reduces the ethical value of acts to the fates and fortunes of life. All is well that ends well. And what ends well is good. This would mean that the intentions of one's actions have no essential connection with the good of those actions. Presumably, one could will and perform an evil act that by chance turns out for good and hence be credited with performing a good act. Surely fortuity and morality do not belong in such proximity.

The need for an absolute norm. It is not possible to consistently maintain a group of general norms that may and do conflict without having an absolute norm by which the conflict can be resolved. This point seems to be evidenced by the need among utilitarian generalists to appeal to the end to resolve the conflict between norms. But when the end is so used, it serves a normative function. The end (the greatest good) becomes the norm for determining which means will be best for attaining the end. Not only is there a manifest circularity in appealing to the end; there is also an obvious need for an ultimate principle to resolve the tension among the less-than-ultimate principles or norms. To state the point another way, relative norms do not stand alone. They must be relative to something that is not relative.

64 Ethical Options

So unless there is an assumed nonrelative standard, the relative standards cannot function properly. General rules presuppose a universal norm or norms.

Whether the number of absolute or universal norms is one or many will be discussed more fully in the next three chapters. For now it is sufficient to note that there must be at /east one norm that is true under all conditions if the other norms are to be true under any conditions.

The"end'is an ambiguous term. The generalists ethic is based on what willbring the best results in the long run. But how long is "long"? A few years? A lifetime? Eternity? Anything beyond the immediate present is outside the human purview. Only God knows the future. Hence, only God could be a utilitarian, and he is not.

Certainly God knows that his moral principles will bring the best results in the long run. But he does not will them for this reason. Rather, God wills what is right because it is right. And it is right because it is in accord with his own un- changeable moral character. So appealing to long-range consequence as the basis for determining what rules we follow is out of the range of humans and out of the question for a morally perfect God.

The debate about whether the "greatest good" should in the end be understood quantitatively or qualitatively brings an ambiguity in the phrase into focus. How do we determine what is meant by "good"? As we saw in chapter 1, unless good has a divinely determined meaning, there is no real basis for holding that anything is objectively good. And if moral good is not objective, then we are left with antinomianism.

The further ambiguity in the word end is brought to light by the disagreement about whether it means "for the greatest number" or "for all individuals," as some have suggested. Which view is taken will make a significant difference, particularly with respect to minority rights. For in many cases, more good could be achieved for the most people if basic rights were denied to some people.

The need for absolute ethical norms. Even generalism does not avoid the need for some absolute norm or norms. First, without some basic value standard, there is no means by which to measure the consequences to determine whether ethical norms are really good or bad. How can we know whether the results are better or worse unless we have some standard for what is best?

Second, the fund of human experience cannot serve as the ultimate measure. We cannot know what to put in this fund unless we have some moral standard outside of the fund by which to measure it.

Third, in utilitarianism the end serves as a norm by which actions are measured. It is the ultimate by which all else is measured, and hence its role is normative.

Summary and Conclusion

Generalism, in contrast to antinomianism, argues that there are some binding moral principles. But in contrast to absolutism, generalism insists that none of these

Generalism 65

moral laws is really absolute. Since every moral principle admits of exceptions, the generalist has an easy solution to moral conflicts. However, since generalists have no absolute moral principles, their view tends to be reducible to antinomianism. Unless there are some objective moral prescriptions of substantive content that are binding on all persons at all times, then at any given time any action could be justified.

Select Readings

Austinjohn. The Province offun sprudence Determined. 1832. Reprint, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1954.

Bentham, Jeremy. Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Reprint, New York: Hafner, 1965.

Kurtz, Paul. Forbidden Fruit: The Ethics of Humanism. Buffalo: Prometheus, 1988.

Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism. In The Utilitarians. Garden City, NY: Dolphin Books, Doubleday, 1961.

Moore, G. E. Principia ethica. 1903. Reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962.

Mulgan, Tim. Understanding Utilitarianism. Stocksfield: Acumen, 2007.

Singer, Marcus G. Generalization in Ethics. New York: Knopf, 1961.

West, Henry R. Mill's Utilitarianism: A Reader's Guide. London: Continuum, 2007.

5

UNQUALIFIED ABSOLUTISM

There are two basic kinds of ethical views: absolutism and relativism. The preceding three chapters (2-4) have examined ethical relativism. The next three chapters (5-7) will look at three forms of ethical absolutism.

Perhaps the most influential and widely held view among Christians is unquali- fied absolutism. The position was given its classic presentation by Augustine of Hippo and has been defended by the notable philosopher Immanuel Kant and the noted theologians John Murray and Charles Hodge.

An Exposition of Unqualified Absolutism

The basic premise of unqualified absolutism is that all moral conflicts are only apparent; they are not real. Sin is always avoidable. There are moral absolutes that admit of no exceptions, and these never actually come into conflict with one another. On the classic question as to whether or not one should ever lie to save a life, the unqualified absolutist answers with an emphatic "No!" The importance of this issue to Augustine can be measured by the fact that he dedicated two works to it, Against Lying and On Lying, and made numerous other references to it throughout his writings.

Augustine's Unqualified Absolutism

The bishop Augustine of Hippo (d. 430) has sometimes been misunderstood to be a situationist because of his statement "Love [God], and do what you will"

66

Unqualified Absolutism 67

(Tractates on 1 John 7.8). While it is true that Augustine cast his whole ethical system in terms of love, it is not true that he based that system only on the one command of love. Augustine believed that love consummates the virtues, but it does not consume them. Rather, charity implies the other virtues.

Augustine's arguments against lying. There are many arguments offered byAugustine against ever telling a lie. For him, telling the truth is an absolute, and absolutes cannot be broken. Augustine is quick to point out that not all falsifications are lies. Onlythose falsifications with intention to deceive qualify as lies. A person is to be judged as lying or not lying according to his intention, not by the truth or falsity of his expressions. Thus something said in jest or even something false, spoken by one who intends the hearer to understand something true by it, is not a lie. For example, if a man wants to reach a certain city and asks directions of a friend he knows is a perpetual liar, the liar would give him directions that take him along the bandit-infested route. Hence the friend will take the opposite route and avoid the robbers and possible death. This is not a lie.

Lying to ward off rape, or even to save a life, is strictly forbidden byAugustine's unqualified absolutism, for one's choice is really between the permission of an-other's sin or the commission of one's own sin. Of a certain heretical group, the Priscillianists, who were lying to keep themselves from being discovered, Augus- tine insisted that Christians ought to condemn the impiety of lying as well as the heresy. Further, Christians ought not to lie to expose liars. In short, committing one sin to avoid another sin is still a sin.

Some had suggested that lying would be permissible as a means of getting another to heaven. But Augustine maintained that no eternal good could be ac- complished by a temporal evil. He insisted that no one for any reason whatsoever ought to be deceived into the kingdom of Truth. Christian teaching is truth, and no falsehood should be part of Christian teaching.

Augustine insists that lying breaks down regard for the truth because lying destroys all certainty. When regard for the truth has been broken down or even slightly weakened, all things will remain doubtful. In brief, without truthfulness there is no integrity, and without integrity there can be no certainty. Once falsity is admitted into communication, then one can never again be certain that the speaker is telling the truth.

Lying is a web that entangles more and more because lying necessitates more lying to explain and cover up for itself. Eventually, argued Augustine, this will lead to perjury or even blasphemy. One who becomes a habitual liar might lie even to God.

Lying would weaken the Christian faith, for if we are untruthful in one area, then how can people believe us when we teach them Christian doctrine? When we are teaching the faith to them, they will say, "How do I know whether you are not lying to me now?"

Augustine borrowed a Platonic premise as a basis for his argument that one should never lie, even to avoid rape. He contended that one should endeavor to

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preserve chastity in both soul and body, but when both cannot be protected, he insisted that the latter must give way to the former because everyone knows intuitively that the soul is to be preferred to the body, and sins of the soul are worse than sins of the body.

Augustine cites numerous passages from the Bible and Apocrypha to support his unqualified absolutism. Psalm 5:5-6 is rendered, "Thou dost hate, 0 Loan, all who work iniquity; thou shalt destroy all who speak a lie:' Wisdom 1:11 is also quoted byAugustine: "The mouth that lies slays the soul" (On Lying 6) Thus Augustine concludes that since eternal life is lost by lying, a lie should not be told for the preservation of the temporal life of another. In short, why lose eternal life in order to save a temporal life?

Augustine admitted that some acts are not good or bad in themselves. For ex- ample, giving to the poor is good at some times and bad at other times, depending on the motive for giving. But when the works themselves are already sin, such as theft, impurity, blasphemy, and the like, who would say that these evil acts should be done for good reasons? Some moral acts are intrinsically good, and hence their violation can never be for a good purpose.

In his Retractions, Augustine confessed that some of his arguments were "obscure," but he never revised or corrected them. He apparently went to his reward firmly believing in an unqualified moral absolutism.

Augustine's treatment ofdifficult passages. On the face of it, the Bible seems to record many cases ofjustified lying. Augustine was aware of these passages and tried to explain them in terms of his unqualified absolutism. Let us examine his interpretations of the stories about Rahab, the Hebrew midwives, Lot, David's oath to kill Nabal, and the alleged falsehoods and deceptions of Abraham, Jacob, and Jesus.

The Hebrew midwives lied to Pharaoh, and yet God apparentlyblessed them for it (Exod. 1). Rahab's lie saved the Jewish spies (Josh. 2), and she is commended for her faith in the hall of fame found in the Letter to the Hebrews (11:31). Augustine's answer was that God blessed these women for their mercy but did not condone their impiety. God did not praise them because they lied but because they were merciful to the people of God. So it was not their deception that was rewarded, but their kindness. God blessed in spite of their lie, not because of it.

Lot faced a moral conflict when the Sodomites demanded his guests for im- moral purposes (Gen. 19:1-11). To some, Lot's action of giving his daughters to appease the Sodomites seemed like an avoidance of a greater sin (homosexuality) by allowing a lesser one (rape). But Augustine emphatically rejects this position. His answer to this dilemma is to observe two things. First, a person must never commit a great crime of one's own in order to avoid someone else's greater crime. Second, and more directly to the point of the dilemma, Augustine insisted that Lot himself did not sin; he was merely allowing the Sodomites the opportunity to sin by raping his daughters.

The Bible seems to say that an oath before God is inviolable (see Eccles. 5:1-6), and yet the Bible (and common sense) suggests that one should not keep a foolish

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or sinful oath.Augustine's response is that not everything done by righteous people of the past should be taken as normative. In short, the Bible records but does not approve of David's making such a sinful oath (1 Sam. 25:21-22; To Consentius, Against Lying 22).

The Scriptures say that Abraham claimed Sarah to be his "sister" (she was his half sister) in order to protect himself from being killed if the king discovered she was his wife (Gen. 20). Augustine insisted that Abraham was not lying here since he only concealed something of the truth but did not really say anything that was false. As to Jacob's alleged deception of his father, Isaac, in order to obtain God's blessing, Augustine argues that what Jacob did at his mother's bidding in seemingly deceiving his father was not a lie but only a "mystery" (Gen. 27:1-29; To Consentius, Against Lying 24)

The Gospel account tells us that Jesus asked, "Who touched me?" as though he didn't know (Luke 8:45). Later he indicated to the two disciples on the Emmaus road that he would go farther when he had not mentioned doing so (Luke 24:28). Augustine's answer here is that this was not really deception but instruction. Jesus pretended not to know who touched his garment in order that he might teach his disciples something they did not know. Since this teaching was true, no lie was involved. This answer seems to imply that as long as a person conveys what is true in the light of one's intentions, even if some deception is necessarily involved in doing so, then the person has not lied.

Kant's Unqualified Absolutism

Immanuel Kant (d. 1804) was one of the most influential thinkers of modern times. He was agnostic about knowing reality in itself, but he was a devout believer in God and was a moral absolutist.

A universal moral duty. Kant called the universal moral obligation a categorical imperative. By that he meant that the duty was unconditional, not conditional. He eschewed any hypothetical ethics such as if one does this, then this or that will result. He favored a categorical (deontological) ethic where "one ought to do thus and thus." Duties are duties regardless of the consequences. Kant stated the categorical imperative several ways. First, we should always treat others as an end and never as a means to an end. And second, we should act so that we could will our action a rule for all people.

Kant gave both proclaiming truth and protecting life as examples of the categorical imperative. That is, both lying and murder are universally wrong. His justification for this position is as follows. If one were to will lying as a universal rule, then there would be no more truth to lie about. Hence, it would be self-destructive to lie. But whatever we cannot will as a universal rule, we should never do, for this is what the categorical imperative demands. Likewise, we should never kill, for if we do so, then we must will that all can kill. But if all kill, then there will be no one left to kill. Therefore, murder should never be permitted in even one instance.

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The defense of universal moral duties. There are at least three reasons stated or implied by Kant for his unqualified absolutism. All of them reveal his strong commitment to a deontological (duty-centered) ethic.

Moral duties by their nature admit no exceptions, since any exception to a moral law would indicate that it was not truly a rule. Kant believed that moral laws, like Newton's law of gravitation, have no exceptions. God does not tolerate the breaking of any of his laws, whether ethical or natural. The universe runs ac- cording to universal law.

Moral duties are intrinsic, not extrinsic, and whatever is intrinsically good can- not be evil. It is as absurd to call an intrinsically good act evil as it is to call light darkness. Only what is neither good nor bad in itself but dependent on something else for its goodness or evil can be called evil at one time and good at another. In- trinsically good actions are not like this; they are always good in and of themselves. Since telling the truth is an intrinsic good and a lie is an intrinsic evil, it follows that there can never be a good lie.

Kant's defense of universal moral laws is a kind of transcendental argument. He argues that it is absolutely necessary to posit moral duties as categorical and universal in order to live moral lives. Society cannot function without law, and law must be universal in order to be law. If it does not apply to everyone, then it is not a law. Hence, universal moral law, not what is simply socially or personally desirable, is rationally necessary to posit for /ife.

Lying to save a life is always wrong. The fact that one should neither lie nor murder leads to the dilemma that Kant addressed in his tractate "On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives" (1787). His response to that supposition, like Augustine's response, was a categorical no. He wrote, "Whoever then tells a lie, however good his intentions may be, must answer for the consequences of it ... however unforeseen they may have been?’ For "to be truthful (honest) in all declarations is therefore a sacred unconditional command of reason, and not to be limited by any expediency."! Kant makes several points in elaborating his view.

All social duties are moral contracts, and truth is the basis of all contracts. Unless there is mutual trust in each other's word, there can be no contract. Therefore, truth is the very foundation of all social duties. Without it, all law is rendered useless and uncertain.

Kant is strongly opposed to the view that it is a duty to tell the truth only to those who have a right to it. First, he insists that truth is not a possession the right of which can be granted to one person and refused to another. Second, the duty to tell the truth makes no distinction between persons but is an uncondi- tional duty that holds in all circumstances. Therefore, it is a duty to be truthful to everyone.

1.1mmanuel Kant, 'On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives, in The Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Thomas Kinsman Abbot, 6th ed. (London: Longman Green, 1963), 363. 2. Ibid.

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By lying to one person, we do injury to all persons, for falsehoods violate the principle of justice, which protects all from harm. Veracity constitutes the condition ofjustice in utterances, and by lying one offends all persons through violating the principle necessary for justice in general.

Kant argues, it is possible that while you have honestly answered Yes to the murderer's question, whether his intended victim is in the house, the latter may have gone out unobserved, and so not have come in the way of the murderer." Or, if you had spoken the truth as well as you knew it, perhaps the murderer while seeking for his enemy in the house might have been caught by neighbours coming up and the deed been prevented."" Consequently, lying may not be necessary to protect the innocent.

John Murray's Unqualified Absolutism

One of the best modern examples of unqualified absolutism in the evangelical tradition is that ofJohn Murray (d. 1975) of Westminster Seminary. In Principles of Conduct (1957), Murray elaborates how he would maintain "the sanctity of truth" even in situations that would seem to call for a justifiable lie. There are two basic reasons for this: God is absolute, and truth is of the essence of God.

God's law is absolute. Like Augustine, Murraybelieves that God's law is absolutely binding. The will of God is a sovereign reflection of his unchanging character. Since God is truth and cannot ever lie (Heb. 6:18), then neither should we. The moral standard in Scripture is "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect." (Matt. 5:48 KJV).

Lying is always wrong. Because the command to tell the truth flows from the absolute law of God, no exceptions can be made to it. Murray writes,"The necessity of truthfulness in us rests upon God's truthfulness. As we are to be holy because God is holy, so we are to be truthful because God is truthful."”

The explanation of alleged biblical lies. Murray offers an explanation for some of the difficult biblical passages, along the same lines as Augustine. With regard to Rahab's lie, he says, "Although our purpose be to assist our brethren, to consult for their safety and to relieve them, it never can be lawful to lie, because that cannot be right which is contrary to the nature of God."°After reviewing several biblical examples of lying, Murray concludes, "We see, therefore, that neither Scripture itself nor the theological inferences derived from Scripture provide us with any warrant for the vindication of Rahab's untruth and this instance, consequently, does not support the position that under certain circumstances we may justifiably utter an untruth..""

3. Ibid., 362-63.

4. Ibid., 363.

S. John Murray, Principles of Conduct (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971), 127. 6.1bid., 139.

7. Ibid.

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One significant qualification. Murray believes all lying is wrong, but he does not hold that every intentional deception is a lie. For example, a general's troop maneuver may lead his enemy to an erroneous conclusion without lying. For ac- cording to Murray, it is a "fallacious assumption [to hold) that to be truthful we must under all circumstances speak and act in terms of the data which come within the purview of others who may be concerned with or affected by our speaking or acting."® In brief, we may without lying intentionally act or speak in a way that we know will be misunderstood by others.

The Providence of God

Implied in unqualified absolutism is another premise: the providence of God. Deontologists believe that the result does not determine the rule; unqualified absolutists stress that in God's providence he always makes "a third alternative" in every apparent moral dilemma.

Several examples supplied from Scripture and elsewhere are used to show that God delivers his faithful from these dilemmas. The implication (seldom, if ever, stated) is that there are no real, unavoidable moral dilemmas. Daniel is often used as a prime example. The pagan king commanded Daniel to violate the law of God by partaking of forbidden meat and wine. But Daniel proposed "a third alternative" of vegetables and water, which God blessed and which thus brought him into the king's favor (Dan. 1).

It is also said that Sarah followed God's law and obeyed her husband's command, trusting that God would intervene and save her from having to commit adultery. This God did (Gen. 20). Of the many biblical examples where God did not intervene, it is implied that he would have intervened if the believer had asked in faith for the deliverance, since "God is faithful; he will not let you be tempted beyond what you can bear" (1 Con 10:13). Those who admit there are some cases in which God does not intervene claim that this is because there was antecedent sin in the person's life. For example, someone driving too fast might have to choose between hitting a school bus or hitting a pedestrian when there is no waybetween or around them. But the dilemma arises from the driver's own evil choice of fast driving.

In short, sometimes we make our own moral bed and then have to lie in it. But many of God's people do (and all could) manifest the kind of faithfulness that says, "I will tell the truth and leave the consequences to God:' A case in point can be found in the story of Corrie ten Boom's life ( The Hiding Place). When the ten Boom family told the truth to the Nazis, they said the Jews were hiding "under the table," but the Nazis did not see the fugitives because they were under the floor under the table. This, say some unqualified absolutists, is the sort of protection God will give if we trust him and never lie. Hence, there is never a need to lie or break any moral law in order to save a life or do any other moral good.

8.1bid., 145, emphasis original.

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Summary of Unqualified Absolutism

There are several major premises that make up the unqualified absolutist's posi- tion, at least as it is held by Christians. Briefly stated, they include the following:

1. God's unchanging character is the basis of moral absolutes. 2. God has expressed his unchanging moral character in his law. 3. God cannot contradict himself.

4. Hence, no two absolute moral laws can really conflict.

5. All moral conflicts are only apparent, not real.

Positive Aspects of Unqualified Absolutism

Unqualified absolutism has much to commend it as a Christian ethic. It is based in God's unchanging character, its nature is deontological, it has trust in God's providence, and it holds the belief that there is always a way to avoid sinning. Let us examine these in a little more detail.

It Is Based in God's Unchanging Nature

Most unqualified absolutists realize the need to anchor their universal moral duties in the unchanging character of God. Indeed, it is difficult to see how there can be any absolute moral prescriptions unless there is an absolute moral Prescriber. Absolutely binding moral laws come only from an absolute moral Lawegiver. This most commendable emphasis of unqualified absolutism points up the inconsistency of any form of moral relativism, such as antinomianism (chap. 2), situationism (chap. 3), or generalism (chap. 4).

It Stresses Rule over Result

Unqualified absolutism is a deontological ethic (see chap. 1). As such it rightly holds that the rule determines the result, and not the reverse. Here again, this is a necessaryingredient in an adequate Christian ethic. Something is not good simply because it brings about desired results. An act is good because it is good, regardless of the results. Surely G od designed good acts so that they would bring about good results. Moses told Israel "to observe the LoRD's commands and decrees that I am giving you today for your own good" (Deut. 10:13). However, even though doing good is intended to bring good, nonetheless good is good no matter what evil may come from it. And evil is evil no matter what good may result from it.

It Shows Trust in God's Providence

Another positive dimension of unqualified absolutism is its manifest confidence in the providence of God. This is revealed clearly in the attitude of believers who,

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in the face of death, can say with Esther, "If I perish, 1 perish" (Esther 4:16), or with the three Hebrew young men, "The God we serve is able to save us from it [the fiery furnace].... But even if he does not, we want you to know, 0 king, that we will not serve your gods or worship the image of gold you have set up" (Dan. 3:17-18). Since an absolute ethic is based in a God who is in absolute control, the believer can trust him absolutely. God's providence makes it unnecessary to take things into our own hands. The Christian can confidently believe that since God made the rules, it is simply our duty to keep them and leave the results in his hands.

There Is Always a Way to Avoid Sinning

Another commendable feature of unqualified absolutism is its belief that it is not necessary to sin. God has so designed our moral laws and our duty that it is never necessary to sin. Ultimately, there is no moral conflict in the self-consistent God, nor are there any unresolvable conflicts in this moral world. There is always "a way to escape" (1 Cor. 10:13 KJV). It is never necessary to literally do the lesser evil. There is always "a third alternative." That is to say, the believer is never duty-bound to sin in order to avoid sin. God has set it up that way.

Negative Aspects of Unqualified Absolutism

Critics have pointed out a number of difficulties with unqualified absolutism. Since not all unqualified absolutists hold identical views, not all of these criticisms are applicable to all proponents. However, many of them will apply to all forms of the position.

Some Disputable or False Premises

Let us begin by examining presuppositions that are either unnecessarily or unjustifiably held by some proponents of unqualified absolutism.

Are sins of the soul greater? This Platonic premise held by Augustine has by no means experienced a universal acceptance. To be sure, many Christians still adhere to a dualistic hierarchy of this variety. This has led, not without justification, to the charge that such Christians neglect social concern because they are more interested in saving souls than helping bodies. The biblical teaching on the unity of the human being is the best corrective to this false dichotomy.

If Augustine were correct in this ethical dualism, then a "white lie" or minor "evil thought" would be worse than rape or murder, for any spiritual offense would be worse than a physical one. Furthermore, Augustine was not consis- tent in applying this principle. Otherwise he would not have rejected the view that David should have killed Nabal (the body) in order to keep his oath (the soul).

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Can the lie to save lives be separated from mercy? Augustine says that God blessed the mercy but not the lie. However, it was by means of the lie that Rahab's mercy was expressed and the spies were saved. The same is true of the Hebrew midwives' lie (Exod. 1:15-16). There was no actual separation between the lie and the act of mercy. And a mere formal distinction will not suffice as an explanation, since in actuality there was only one act (which included the lie) under consideration, and this act was praised by God.

Are acts intrinsically good? Augustine argued that some acts are intrinsically good, apart from one's intentions or motives. If this is so, then theft or lying would indeed always be wrong. However, there are several objections to this view. First, if some acts were intrinsically good or evil, then an act of killing committed by an animal or an imbecile would have to be considered morally wrong. It will not suffice to add that only human acts of killing could be morally wrong, or else we would have to deny that imbeciles are human, since they are not morally culpable for their acts. Furthermore, this would mean that they were wrong only because they were so intended by someone, which is tantamount to saying that the act as such is not evil, but only the act as intended is evil. But this is contrary to their view that the act as such is evil.

Can a lie be defined without intention? Augustine defined a lie as an intentional falsehood. But if intention needs to be added to the act of falsifying in order to make it a lie, then it follows that the act of falsifying as such is not a lie. Further, if acts are intrinsically evil apart from intentions or motives, then any falsification or action contrary to a moral prescription in Scripture would be an evil. This would include unintentional falsehoods as well as accidental injury or death inflicted on persons. But this is not so. Finally, Augustine admitted that not all acts are intrinsically good or evil, as, for example, giving to the poor. If so, then he has already qualified his absolutism; perhaps the other acts, such as lying, are not intrinsically evil either.

Does lying destroy all certainty? Augustine argued that lying would destroy all certainty. At best, this argument only proves that lying undermines some certainty, undermining information based on the testimony of one known to have lied. Furthermore, the same argument could be made against anyone known to have made unintentional mistakes, which we all do. So Augustine's argument would prove to be too much. It would prove that one cannot be certain of anything that depends on any person. But his own Christian beliefs depended on the testimony of the apostles, which Augustine did not consider uncertain.

Is the choice between permission and commission? Unqualified absolutists believe there is no real moral dilemma in the case of lying or permitting a murder. They believe there is really only one moral obligation in this situation: to tell the truth. The only other duty, they say, belongs to the person threatening to do the killing. Such threatening persons are responsible for what they do with the truth we give them. But is this overlooking the fact that there is also a duty to save innocent

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lives, to show mercy? In short, is there a real conflict between truthfulness and mercifulness? In other words, the choice is really between an act of commission and one of omission. And a sin of omission can be just as much a sin as a sin of commission (James 4:17).

Does lying condemn a person to hell? Few Christians really believe, as Augustine suggests, that a single lie (even a few lies scattered through one's life) will send a believer to hell. Indeed, anyone who believes in salvation by grace alone, as Scripture teaches (Eph. 2:8-9), will not trouble themselves long with this point. It is only those lives characterized by untruthfulness that eventuate in the lake of fire (Rev. 21:8). And these unsaved find themselves right alongside those who are "fearful." Yet who would say that everyone who has ever (or even occasionally) been fearful will be in hell?

Will God always save us from moral dilemmas? There are several reasons to suppose that divine intervention is not the solution to all moral dilemmas. First, nowhere does Scripture promise this to every faithful believer all the time. First Corinthians 10:13 is only a promise for victory in temptation—not a guarantee of divine intervention to avoid moral conflicts. Second, neither Scripture nor the history of the martyrs supports the position that God always delivers the faithful from moral conflicts. God did deliver Daniel and Sarah, but he did not deliver Abraham (Gen. 22), the midwives (Exod. 1), Rahab Josh. 2), the three Hebrew youths (Dan. 3), or the apostles (Acts 4). And yet the conflicts were just as real and the believers were just as faithful in these cases.

Further, not all real moral conflicts are brought on by a person's prior sin(s). Jesus seemed to face real conflicts between obeying his heavenly Father and obeying his earthly parents (Luke 2), between showing mercy and keeping the Sabbath (Mark 2:27), and even between justice and mercy on the cross; yet he was without sin (Heb. 4:15). In fact, moral conflicts are often brought on by one's faithfulness to God. This was so of the midwives, of Daniel, of Abraham, of the apostles, and even of Corrie ten Boom. If she had not cared so much about those innocent Jews, she would never have found herself in the dilemma of needing to lie to save their lives.

WasAbraham's concealment a lie? Augustine insisted that Abraham's concealment of Sarah's identity as his wife was not a lie, since she was really his half sister. But what about Isaac, who also claimed Rebekah was his sister, though she was not (Gen. 26:7)? Surely this was not even half true. Augustine does not address this problem, nor would his explanation for Abraham suffice for Isaac.

While one can agree that there is not always an obligation to tell the whole truth, as we have in the divinely approved case of Samuel's half truth (1 Sam. 16), nonetheless concealment sometimes is a lie. If one knows exactly what the questioner wants and yet conceals the information by intentionally misleading him (though without direct falsification), is this not intentional deception? And an intentional deception is a lie.

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Fatal Qualifications

Unqualified absolutism does not need a thousand qualifications to kill it; it can die "a death by one qualification?’ As Kant acknowledged, even one exception to a rule proves that the rule is not genuinely universal. By the absolutists' own definition, an absolute rule has no exceptions, and yet there are many ways the proponents of unqualified absolutism have qualified their view or made exceptions to it.

Augustine's exceptions. Augustine admitted many exceptions to divine com- mands. He excused Abraham from the charge of intending to murder Isaac because Abraham was going to sacrifice his son "in obedience to God." Likewise, sacrifice of his daughter and Samson's sacrifice of his own life are "justified only on this ground, that the Spirit, who wrought wonders by him, had given him secret instructions to do this."” But even one exception kills a universal rule as unquali- fied absolutists understand it; it is shown not to be genuinely universally binding, without exception. Likewise, Augustine argues that there were exceptions to the divine command to obey human government. It should be noted in this connection that the Bible not only enjoins submission to the consequences of a law (for example, going to prison for disobedience, as in Dan. 6) but also demands obedi- ence to the rules of government (1 Pet. 2:13-14). Paul enjoins both submission and obedience, saying, "Remind the people to be subject to rulers and authorities, to be obedient" (Titus 3:1).

John Murray's qualification. Murray contended that an intentional deception is not a lie. He claimed that it is a "fallacious assumption [to hold] that to be truthful we must under all circumstances speak and act in terms of the data which come within the purview of others who maybe concerned with or affected by our speaking or acting."'y But once this qualification is made, there are two momentous problems. First, how do we keep from allowing a thousand similar qualifications? At least Augustine limited the allowable instances of intentional deceptions to special cases involving supernatural intervention; Murray leaves the door wide open to all kinds!

Second, if a lie by definition is an intentional falsification, as Augustine said, then Murray is playing ball in another park, since he no longer defines a lie in the same way. But if one allows Murray this new definition of a lie, then Murray is no longer an unqualified absolutist in the original Augustinian sense. What is more, Murray, by virtue of his tactic of redefinition, is subject to the criticism that he salvages "unqualified absolutism" by stipulative redefinition. But is this move really justified? Would it not be more honest to admit that there are actually times when one believes that a lie (an intentional deception) is justified, rather than redefining a lie to avoid admitting that lies are sometimes justified?

9. Augustine of Hippo, City of God, in A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, ed. Philip Schaff (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956), 2:15. 10. Murray, Principles of Conduct, 145, emphasis original.

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Hodge's limitation. Charles Hodge makes a distinction that would rescue Au- gustinian unqualified absolutism from collapse. He suggests limitations on what counts as a lie. These limits are contextual. That is, an intentional deception counts as a lie if and only if it is told in a context in which the truth is expected." Since one does not expect a spy to tell the truth, it would follow that lying" in spying is not really lying.

However, this solution presents unqualified absolutism with several serious problems. First, once this qualification is made, the view is no longer an unquali- fied absolutism. It is an admission that there are exemptions from the moral rule "Thou shalt not intentionally falsify," which is what Augustine originally meant by a lie. Second, the only way one can know which moral law should be qualified is if one has knowledge of which is higher and which is lower. But this is a form of graded absolutism (see chap. 7), not unqualified absolutism.

Unsuccessful Qualifications

"Unqualified" absolutism is not really unqualified. It always seems to find some way to qualify divine commands. So-called absolutists reduce certain divine com- mands to less than an absolute level either by insisting that they flow only from God's will, not from his nature, or by saying that some are purely civil or ceremo- nial in nature and not moral, or by claiming that the command applies only ceteris paribus, other things being equal.

There are, however, several problems with these solutions. First, not all moral commands fit into these categories. Some are between two moral principles re- flective of God's nature, such as truth and mercy. Second, even civil commands (such as "Obey government") are a moral duty. Third, such a move to subordinate some commands to others is not an unqualified absolutism but is a form of graded absolutism (see chap. 7). Finally, subordination or qualification of any kind is a capitulation of unqualified absolutism, since it admits there are occasions when moral commands must be qualified.

Punting to Providence

An appeal to the providence of God to avoid moral conflict is ill-advised for several reasons. First, God does not always intervene and spare all the faithful from moral dilemmas. There is no evidence for this premise of unqualified absolutism either inside or outside the Bible. Indeed, the premise of supernatural intervention is in conflict with other premises held by these absolutists. To begin with, what need is there for divine intervention if all conflicts are only apparent and not real? The need for divine intervention is a concession to the position that there are real conflicts, which is contrary to the tenets of unqualified absolutism. For once one admits that there are real moral conflicts and that they can be resolved by divine

11. Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (reprint, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952), 3:439-44.

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intervention, then one is no longer an unqualified absolutist but is some kind of graded absolutist.

Further, why the need for intervention if all moral dilemmas are caused by antecedent sin? Sometimes in his mercy, God may desire to intervene, but there is no reason to believe that he must (or will) always do so. We should not always expect miracles to help us out of real moral conflicts.

Many unqualified absolutists "solve" the ethical dilemma with recourse to the belief that God will always spare the faithful. This, however, meets with several serious objections.

1. God nowhere promises that he will always intervene to save us from moral conflicts.

2. The three Hebrew youths did not expect God to bail them out of their moral dilemma (Dan. 3).

3. Jesus spoke against expecting a miracle to get one out of difficult situations (Man. 4:7).

4. Expecting a miracle shifts the responsibility from us to God. It is an ethic of "If in trouble, punt to God."

S. We should not base the reality of a present decision on the possibility that

God may perform a miracle in the future. 6. Believing that God will intervene if we do right begs the question. It assumes that there is always a way to do right without real moral conflict. 7. Such a view would demand frequent miraculous intervention. But frequent miraculous intervention would make both life and miracles impossible, since both depend on regular patterns of activity for their operation.

. Finally, there are some pertinent questions to answer if one always expects God to intervene. In the case of the Christian called upon to reveal the whereabouts of an innocent victim to a would-be assassin, why not trust God to intervene before speaking the truth (by making us temporarily mute)? That way the hiding place of the innocent is not disclosed. Or why not trust God to intervene and cause deafness in the would-be assassin?

oo

Third Alternatives Are Not Always Available

It is both unrealistic and unbiblical to assume that moral obligations never conflict. Real life reveals this kind of conflict daily in hospitals, courtrooms, and battlefields. Sometimes one must kill or be killed. Other times the baby must die, or both the mother and baby will die (as in tubal pregnancies). Likewise, the Bible tells of no third alternative for Abraham in killing Isaac (Gen. 2.2), or for the Hebrew midwives (Exod. 1), or the three Hebrew youths (Dan. 3). It is naive to assume that these kinds of situations never happen. And if the Christian ethic is adequate for all situations, it must have an answer for these real moral conflicts.

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Not All Moral Conflicts Are Self-Made

Further, prior personal sin does not cause all moral dilemmas. Even if Adam's sin (Rom. 5:12) is the ultimate cause of original sin and imputed sin, it cannot be blamed for each personal sin since then. And it is certainly not the cause of every individual moral dilemma since then; otherwise there would be no need for confession of personal sins (1 John 1:9). To argue to the contrary would be to confuse total depravity and ethical responsibility. At best, prior personal sins cause only some of one's personal moral conflicts, not all of them. Some are caused by others who force the conflict on the innocent. Indeed, sometimes just the opposite is true: personal moral dilemmas are precipitated by one's faithfulness or righteousness.

A Basic Inconsistency

Most unqualified absolutists are inconsistent. For while they condemn lying to save a person, they engage in intentional deception to save their property. Most people, for example, leave their lights on while away from home in order to deceive potential thieves. But if one will lie to save his property from a potential thief, then why not lie to save an actual life from a murderer? While condemning Corrie ten Boom for lying to protect Jews from being killed, they lie to save their jewels from being stolen. But persons have more value than things.

Falling into Sins of Omission

Another problem is that the unqualified absolutist often ends up committing unmerciful acts. Absolutists perform greater sins of omission to avoid what they believe to be sins of commission. Plato's example is instructive." Who would return a weapon one had borrowed from a man if he requested it back in order to kill someone with it? The law of mercy is higher than the law of property. Likewise, Scripture indicates that saving the lives of the innocent (mercy) is a greater duty than telling the truth to the guilty (Exod. 1:15-16). So, in failing to show mercy to the innocent by withholding truth from the guilty, the unqualified absolutist falls into a sin of omission while trying to avoid a sin of commission.

The Tendency to Legalism

Another difficulty with unqualified absolutism is that it often tends toward legalism by neglecting the spirit of the law in order to avoid breaking the letter of the law. This attitude is precisely what Jesus condemned when he said, "The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath" (Mark 2:27; man = hu- mankind). After Corrie ten Boom's torturous internment experience, is it not a

12. Plato, The Republic, trans. Francis Macdonald Comford (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 1.330.

Unqualified Absolutism SI

cold indifference to demand that she not sign the prison release stating that she had been "treated humanely"? When lying and lives are weighed, are not lives more important?

Silence Is Not Always Possible

It is not always possible, as some unqualified absolutists suggest, to avoid fal- sification by partial truths or silence. Samuel was able to avoid Saul's wrath by the partial truth that he had come to offer a sacrifice, when he had really come to anoint David as king. But what if Saul had asked him what other mission he had in mind? At that point he would have had to either lie, be silent (which would have implied that he had another purpose for coming), or else risk the death of the innocent and be unmerciful. Even silence before an interrogator who says, will kill these people unless you speak," can be an unmerciful sin of omission.

Summary and Condusion

Despite the positive aspects of unqualified absolutism, and its noble efforts to preserve unmodified absolutes, there are some serious deficiencies in the position. It is unrealistic, unmerciful (even legalistic at times), and unsuccessful in avoiding the inevitable modification of its absolutes in order to give an adequate answer to numerous biblical and real-life conflicts of divine commands.

Though it is no doubt true that moral conflicts are not God's ideal, it is also a fact that this is not an ideal world. It is a real and fallen world. And if the Christian ethic is adequate for this real world in which we live, then it must not retreat into unqualified absolutes. It must find a morally acceptable way to preserve absolutes while honestly and adequately providing an answer for every moral situation.

Select Readings

Augustine. On Lying and To Consentius: Against Lying. In vol. 2 of A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, edited by Philip Schaff. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956.

Griffiths, Paul J. Lying: An Augustinian Theology of Duplicity. Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2004.

Hodge, Charles. Systematic Theology. 3 vols. Reprint, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952.

Kant, Immanuel. "On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives: In The Critique of Practical Reason. Translated by Thomas Kinsmill Abbot. 6th ed. London: Longmans Green, 1963.

Lutzer, Erwin W. The Necessity of Ethical Absolutes. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1981.

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Murray, John. Principles of Conduct. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971.

Plato. The Republic Translated by Francis Macdonald Cornford. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Rae, Scott B. Moral Choices: Au Introduction to Ethics. 3rd ed. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2009.

6

CONFLICTING ABSOLUTISM

Evangelicals have generally held to some form of ethical absolutism. In contrast to situationism, they have claimed that there are many moral absolutes. Within the camp of those holding to two or more absolutes, a special problem arises: What about moral conflicts? What should one do when two or more of one's absolute obligations come into unavoidable conflict?

Basically, there are three answers to this question. First, unqualified absolutism affirms that all such conflicts are only apparent, not real. In short, no two absolute obligations ever come into unavoidable conflict. Second, conflicting absolutism admits to real moral conflicts but claims that a person is guilty no matter which way one goes. Third, graded absolutism (or the greater-good position) agrees with the view that real moral conflicts do sometimes occur, but maintains that one is personally guiltless for doing the greatest good and choosing the lesser evil in that situation. This chapter will consider the second view.

An Explanation of Conflicting Absolutism

The central assumption of the ethical position of conflicting absolutism is that we live in a fallen world, and in such a world real moral conflicts do occur. The accompanying premise, however, is that when two duties conflict, we are morally responsible to both duties. God's law can never be broken without guilt. In such cases, therefore, one must simply do the lesser evil, confess that sin, and ask for God's forgiveness.

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The Historical Background of Conflicting Absolutism

Conflicting absolutism has roots in the Greek world, was incorporated into Reformation thinking, and finds expression in both modern existential and popular thought. The colloquial "I did the lesser of two evils" is an expression of it. It can even be called the lesser-evil view.

Although there are Christian roots for conflicting absolutism, they grow in Greek soil. The ancient Greek tragedies often portrayed lesser-evil situations. In the fifth century BC, Sophocles and Euripides wrote dramas about heroes who contended against forces of fate they could not avoid. These dramatized dilemmas reflected the nature of the real world of moral conflicts, with which conflicting absolutism struggles.

The concept of lesser evils was given a new dimension with the Reformation doctrine of depravity, particularly as that was developed by Martin Luther (d. 1546). Two things embedded in Lutheran thought give rise to a form of conflicting abso- lutism, the first being Luther's theory of two kingdoms. He believed that Christians live simultaneously in two kingdoms, the kingdom of G od and the kingdom of this world. Since they are opposed and since Christians have responsibility in both, it is inevitable that there will be conflicts.

Second, Luther's famous statement to Melanchthon that we must "sin boldly" is amenable to a lesser-evil interpretation. Luther wrote: "Be a sinner and sin boldly, but believe even more boldly and rejoice in Christ, who is victor over sin, death and the world:" The Lutheran scholar Helmut Thielicke (d. 1986) comments on this quote: "It is not a case of compromise being justified.... The truth is rather that Christ conquers and overcomes the schema [form] of the world, the structure within which such compromise is necessarca In short, even though sin is sometimes unavoidable, it is conquerable through the cross. In a fallen world sin is inevitable, but in a redeemed world it is also forgivable.

Helmut Thielicke

Perhaps the most comprehensive contemporary exposition of the conflicting absolutist view is found in Thielicke's works. There are several elements in Thielicke's form of conflicting absolutism. Fundamental to his view is the belief in real, unavoidable moral conflicts, for "to deny the conflict situation is to deny decision.’ In conflict situations, says Thielicke, "I may have to face the possibility that what is involved here is a borderline situation which does not allow of any easy solutionf And "I can reach such a decision only by going

1. Letter to Melanchthon, August 1, 1521, in Letters 1, vol. 48 of Luther's Works, ed. and trans. Gottfried G. Krodel (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1963), 282. 2-5 Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics, ed. William H. Lazareth (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966), 1:504. 3.lhid., 610.

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through the conflict and enduring it, not by evading it in the name of some kind of perfectionism."’

In the conflict situation sin is unavoidable, for we "constantly fall into sin in the borderline situation."" In view of human depravity, these kinds of conflicts should be expected, since "the form of this world is no more able to produce absolute righteousness than our human heart" The consequence is that in this fallen world "conduct is de facto a compromise between the divine requirement and what is permitted by the form of this world, ... by the manifold conflicts of duty'" Even the so-called just war unavoidably involves injustices. For "there is no such thing as a wholly just war, and my decision to endorse a given war and participate in it can be made only from the standpoint that I see, or think I see, greater wrong on the one side than the other.""

Moral depravity is the cause of moral dilemmas. A moral conflict is "not due to the character imparted to the world by creation, as though ‘from the beginning’ (Matt. 19:8)7 No, "it is due rather to the complex of wrong decisions which lie behind us, which have their ultimate root in that primal decision recorded in the story of the fall's In brief, moral conflicts arise out of the fact that this is a fallen world. In a sinless world there would be no moral dilemmas. There will be none in heaven. God did not design, nor does he desire, moral dilemmas. They are not his ideal. But on the other hand, this is not an ideal world; it is a real and fallen world. In such a world, there will be times when we cannot avoid evil.

When decisions are made in conflict situations, we must choose the lesser evil, for "there are heavier sins and lighter sins:' They both are sins, but "they do not have the same weight." Thielicke makes it clear that there is no justification for doing the lesser evil.'; Neither is there any pragmatic justification. For "the slogan 'to prevent something worse’ is always ethically destructive because it subjugates our action to a non-Christian pragmatismf " In fact, "readiness to do wrong in order to ‘prevent something worse' is a very dubious principle, because it implies that the end justifies the meansf "We must simply recognize that in conflict situations both commands are our moral duty and that sin is inevitable." Nonetheless, since there are lesser and greater sins, the Christian should do the lesser sin, knowing that forgiveness is available. "He knows that here in this world there is no perfect righteousness, but he does not therefore draw the conclusion

4. Ibid., 612.

5. Ibid., 653.

6. Ibid., 499.

7. Ibid., 414-15.

8. Ibid., 596.

9. Ibid., 620.

10.1bid., 602.

11.1bid, 625. 12. Ibid., 590. 13. Ibid., 488.

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that everything is under the same condemnation and that everything is equally permissible? On the contrary, a Christian realizes that there is a "quantitative distinction between reprehensible and less reprehensible, between good and less good possibilities?"

According to Thielicke, "we can undergo and endure borderline situations and ... inescapable conflicts only under forgiveness?" The Christian knows "that even in a war which—given things as they are—is ‘just,’ [one] must always stand in need of forgiveness."'s Thus our "certainty that acts done under the guidance of the Spirit are, despite their ‘crooked’ form, done in God's name as his affair, and that at the same time they nonetheless stand in need of forgiveness."" In the conflict situation, the Christian "acts in the knowledge that even those actions which conform to the ultimate norms perceptible in this aeon must stand under forgiveness.:"° In short, even our best effort in obeying God's commands is an evil that needs to be forgiven.

The Basic Tenets of Conflicting Absolutism

There are four basic premises in conflicting absolutism. First, God's law is absolute and unbreakable. Second, in a fallen world unavoidable conflicts between God's commands occur. Third, when moral conflicts happen, we should do the lesser evil. Fourth, forgiveness is available if we confess our sins.

God's Moral Law Is Absolute

"The law of the LORD is perfect" (Ps. 19:7). The psalmist confessed to God, "Every one of thy righteous ordinances endures for ever" (119:160 RSV). God has not made his law to be broken. The psalmist exclaims, "Thou [God] hast commanded thy precepts to be kept diligently” (119:4 RSV). "The ordinances of the Lox") are true, and righteous altogether"; and "in keeping them there is great reward" (19:9, 11 RSV). Further, "the LORD will not hold him guiltless" who breaks his commands (Exod. 20:7 RSV).

In short, God is absolutely perfect, and his law is a reflection of his character. "You, therefore, must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matt. 5:48 RSV). Anything that does not measure up to the absolute perfection of the law of God is sin. Whenever God's law is broken, the lawbreaker sins, for "sin is lawless- ness" (1 John 3:4). God does not change (Mal. 3:6), nor does the moral law that

14. Ibid., 501.

IS. Ibid., 654. 16. Ibid., 655. 17. Ibid., 659. 18. bid, 431.

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reflects his character. "It is impossible for God to lie" (Heb. 6:18). Therefore, it is inexcusable for us to lie, even if it is necessary to save a life.

Moral Conflicts Are Unavoidable

The second premise of conflicting absolutism springs from the depravity of humanity. Humans have broken God's law and find themselves inextricably bound in a web of sinful relationships, in which sin is unavoidable. Before the fall of hu- mankind, Adam was able not to sin, but since the fall, humans are unable to avoid sin. Not only can humankind not avoid sinning in general; there also are tragic moral dilemmas in this fallen world in which all alternatives are wrong. Sometimes no matter what we do, we cannot avoid breaking one of God's laws. That is the reality of a fallen world. Sometimes one must sin. Certainly one must choose the lesser evil, but one must sin, regardless.

Conflicting absolutism runs contrary to the Kantian dictum: "Ought implies can:' Humans are always called upon to obey a standard of perfection they cannot reach: "You, therefore, must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matt. 5:48 RSV). Further, in moral dilemmas a person is morally obligated to keep both laws, even though one of them must be broken. Such it is in this sinful world, says the conflicting absolutist. Ideally, God did not design it this way. But then again, this wicked world is far from ideal.

The Duty to Do the Lesser Evil

Not all sins are created equal. Jesus said to Pilate, "The one who handed me over to you is guilty of a greater sin" ( John 19:11). One sin is so bad that it is unpardonable: the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit (Matt. 12:32). This being the case, there is an obligation to do the lesser evil. Whenever our moral duties conflict, we should obey the greater one, realizing that breaking the other is a sin. Nonetheless, it is the lesser sin in the situation. It is always our responsibility to do our best, even when it is not good. We must maximize the good even when it is minimal.

Forgiveness Is Available

The fourth premise associated with conflicting absolutism is that even though sin is sometimes unavoidable, God's forgiveness is always available through the cross of Christ. One of the happy by-products of this sad world is that the unavoidability of sin drives people to the cross for forgiveness. There is a way out of the dilemma. It is not a way to avoid sin; by the nature of the case, sin is unavoidable. Rather, it is a way to avoid bearing the guilt of the sin for long. In brief, the way out is, on our part, confession, and on God's part, the sacrifice of Christ on the cross. All we need to do in lesser-evil situations is to do the lesser evil, confess

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that we have broken God's law, and receive forgiveness through Jesus Christ. Sin is unavoidable, but salvation is available.

Some Positive Contributions of Conflicting Abso lut ism

Conflicting absolutism has many merits as a form of moral absolutism, but it is subject to some serious objections as well. First, let us consider four of the positive contributions it makes to Christian ethics.

It Preserves Moral Absolutes

Whatever its weaknesses, conflicting absolutism preserves moral absolutes intact. God's law is absolute, and there are absolutely no occasions when it is morally justifiable to break it. God is absolutely good, and his law is a reflection of his nature. This being so, the breaking of a moral law is an attack upon his character. Hence, God can no more allow a moral law to be broken than he can allow his character to be violated. Conflicting absolutism is to be commended for this strong stand upon the unchangeable and unbreakable nature of moral absolutes.

It Has a Moral Realism

In spite of their tenacious grip on transcendent moral values, conflicting ab- solutists are in touch with the real world of moral conflicts and borderline cases. Not every decision is neat and clean. Everything is not black or white. There are real moral conflicts. This realistic recognition of moral dilemmas is commendable. There is no effort to explain away all conflicts as apparent, not real. Conflicting absolutists may have their heads in a heavenly cloud of moral perfection, but their feet are planted solidly in the clay of earthly imperfection.

It Sees Moral Conflicts as Rooted in Humanity's Fallenness

Another important dimension ofconflicting absolutism is its attempt to explain the nature of moral conflicts. It sees moral dilemmas as rooted in moral depravity. In an unfallen world there would be no unavoidable moral conflicts. It is only because of sin that such conflicts occur. There are no moral conflicts in God, and there will be none in heaven. So conflicting absolutism claims that moral dilem- mas are of humankind's own making. This does not mean that each individual makes his or her own moral bed and has to lie in it. Some moral dilemmas result from Adam's sin (Rom. 5:12), some from the sins of others, and some from our own sins. However, sin lies at the root of moral conflicts. God did not design the world this way.

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It Is a Solution without Exception

There is an unadulterated simplicity about conflicting absolutism. It is a solution without exceptions. It cannot be accused of casuistry. It is simply always wrong to break an absolute moral law of God. There are no exceptions, exemptions, or divine immunity. Absolute moral laws are absolute, and that is that. In a complex world of confused circumstances, there is an admirable simplicity about conflicting absolutism. In this respect it has an uncluttered and unadorned appeal.

Some Criticisms of Conflicting Absolutism

In spite of its many appealing features, a number of objections have been leveled against the lesser-evil view. We will consider four of them here. The first two may be called moral and the latter two christological.

A Moral Duty to Sin Is Morally Absurd

According to conflicting absolutism, in real moral conflicts we have a moral duty to do the lesser of the two evils. That is, one is morally obligated to do evil. But how can there ever be a moral obligation to do what is immoral? It seems to be a morally absurd claim.

There are three basic alternatives for the proponent of the lesser-evil position in view of this criticism. First, a Christian might claim that there is no moral ob- ligation or divine command to do the lesser evil. It is simply what one "ought" to do, on some kind of pragmatic or utilitarian grounds, for personal or social reasons. This alternative would seem to be particularly embarrassing for biblical Christians, since they would be faced with some of life's most difficult situations without any direction or command from God. Christianity would have an incomplete ethic. It would be able to handle the ordinary situations, but for the really difficult ones—the ones involving tragic moral choices—it would give absolutely no divine direction.

There is another way out of the dilemma for the lesser-evil proponents. They may admit that there is a moral obligation—an obligation not to do evil, but simply to maximize good or minimize evil in an evil situation. But if they take this route, then their position really collapses into the greater-good view. For if they are actually obligated to do a maximal good, then why call it evil? For example, the doctor who amputates a leg to save the patient's life is not guilty of the sin of mutilation, but is to be commended for doing the maximal good. As tragic as amputation is, surely there is no basis in Christian ethics to consider amputation done to save a life as a culpable act. Likewise, why call the act evil, as the lesser-evil view would seem to do, when it is the greatest good under the circumstances?

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Finally, surely the proponent of the lesser-evil view could simply admit the absurdity and unavoidability of sin and claim that one is morally obligated to do what is morally wrong, absurd as this is.

The Unavoidable Is Not Morally Culpable

This leads to a second criticism, that conflicting absolutism holds that one is personally responsible for what is personally unavoidable. Those who espouse this view challenge the underlying premise of their opponents that responsibility implies ability, that "ought implies can." They may point to biblical instances where God commands the impossible, such as "Be perfect, ... as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matt. 5:48). They may point to the doctrine of depravity, which declares it to be impossible for a human not to sin even though God commands humankind not to sin.

But in these cases one need simply note that "ought implies can" only in the sense that one can, by the enabling grace of God, do what is utterly impossible by human standards. In this sense, the ought-implies-can thesis is not a violation of these biblical truths. Furthermore, to focus on the ought-implies-can principle misses the real issue. The moral absurdity of the lesser-evil position is not based on the truth or falsity of "ought implies can?' From a Christian standpoint it is morally absurd to say, "One ought to do an evil," since "ought" means "God has commanded it"; and God does not (I would say, cannot) command one to do what is morally evil. God is good, absolute good, and as such he can neither perform nor promote anything evil. For God to command one to do evil would contradict his very will, his very nature.

Yet one might respond here by claiming that whatever God commands is ipso facto good and not evil, since one could define good as that which God commands. However, this response would be fatal to the lesser-evil view, for if what God commands in so-called lesser-evil situations is really good simply because he has commanded it, then it is not an evil. Actually, if the act is good in this conflict situation because God has commanded it, then the lesser-evil view has really col- lapsed into the greater-good view. The good act one performs at the command of God is not sinful but commendable because it is done in obedience to God.

Before we leave this point, we notice making a distinction between good and right does not help the lesser-evil position. One cannot simply claim that the lesser evil is the "right" thing to do in a given situation, for one can always ask Was the "right" act morally good or evil? Was the act culpable or not? If it is a morally evil or guilt-inducing act, then we are back where we started, and the preceding criti- cisms apply. If, on the other hand, the "right" act was good or guiltless, then the view has collapsed into the greater-good view.

The essential difference between these two positions is that according to con- flicting absolutism, the tragic moral act is guilt-inducing and calls for confession and forgiveness, whereas according to the greater-good view the tragic moral act

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is guiltiness. A person may regret having to make the decision, but one need not repent of it. Indeed, according to the greater-good view, doing the greatest good leads to reward, not to punishment. At any rate, the lesser-evil view is not redeemed from its difficulties by calling the lesser evil the "right" act in contrast to a "good" act. The question still remains: Is one personally guilty or not guilty for performing this act? If one is guilty, then God is commanding an act that is unavoidably sinful. If one is not guilty, then the act is morally acceptable, and we are driven to the greater-good position.

Another distinction is sometimes made in an attempt to rescue the lesser-evil position. It is occasionally claimed that people are not blamed for doing their best in conflicting situations, but rather they are blamed in doing their best, for even the most faithful servant is unworthy (Luke 7:6-10). In this sense some might claim that it would be morally absurd to blame people for doing their best, but it is not necessarily absurd to blame them for doing evil in the process of doing their best. Might it not be that the act of lying is evil but that the whole process of showing mercy to the innocent is the greater good? Hence, a person should confess the lie in particular even though the act as a whole was the greater good. Perhaps God blames a human for whatever sinful acts are part of an overall good performance.

In response to this distinction, we simply observe that the ethical complex must be thought of as a whole. Certain things done in one context are morally good and in another are morally evil. For example, cutting off a person's leg is good if done by a doctor as a necessary means to save a life, but evil if done as an act of sadism. It is the moral context as a whole that gives meaning to the act. Hence, one cannot separate specific evil parts from an overall ethical performance and call the whole act good. As an intention-act complex, amputation is either good or evil. One cannot claim that the overall amputation process was good but actually cutting off a human leg was evil.

This discussion brings up a more principled issue beneath the whole discussion: the relation of intention to action in judging the morality of an act. The difficulty with much of the discussion on these issues seems to hinge on the question of whether an act is intrinsicallygood or evil, or whether it is the intention-act complex that must be considered. An adequate discussion of this is beyond the scope of this volume. Suffice it to say here that it seems reasonable to assume that we must consider the intention-act complex. Good intentions alone are not sufficient to make an act morally right. Hitler may have intended to produce a better world by enacting genocide, but the murder of millions of Jews and others was not made morally good by admirable motives. Likewise, an act as such apart from its motive or intention is not necessarily good. For instance, those who give to the poor in order to receive the praise of others are not to be morally commended. If this is the case, then the lesser-evil position is wrong in separating an act from its total intention-act complex, pronouncing that act evil, and then declaring the overall process good.

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Jesus Must Have Sinned

According to conflicting absolutism, sin is unavoidable in real moral conflicts. However, according to the Bible, Jesus was "tempted in every way, just as we are—yet without sin" (Heb. 4: Is). So if there are real moral dilemmas; then either Jesus faced them or else he did not. If he did face them, then according to the lesser-evil view, which states that evil is indeed unavoidable, Jesus must have sinned. But the Bible says that Jesus did not sin (2 Cor. 5:21; Heb. 4:15). Hence, the only alternative here is that Jesus never faced real moral conflicts. If we assume that there are real moral conflicts, several explanations for this dilemma can be offered. First, perhaps the lesser-evil view is incorrect, and Jesus never sinned when he faced real moral conflicts because one is not held to be sinful when doing the greatest good in a moral conflict. Perhaps "stealing" bread from the temple (taking it without permission from the proper authority) is not morally wrong when starvation of God's servant is the other alternative. Is this not what Jesus implied in Matthew 12:3-8?

But let us not so readily assume that conflicting absolutism is defenseless in the face of this charge. Perhaps Jesus never sinned in the area of moral conflicts simply because he never faced any moral conflicts. There are two explanations for this position. First, it maybe that God providentially spared Jesus from facing moral conflicts in order to preserve his sinlessness. But if this is the case, then Christians may ask why they, too, are not spared from moral conflicts if they are faithful to God. In fact, this is precisely what many nonconflicting absolutists hold: there is always a third alternative for the faithful. Daniel did not have to either eat the pagan meat and drink the pagan wine or suffer the consequence of his disobedience (Dan. 1). There was a prayerful third way out. Is this not what 1 Corinthians 10:13 seems to imply, that there is always a "way of escape” (RSV)? If the conflicting absolutists wish to take this alternative of arguing that God will always provide a way out for those who are faithful to God's will, as Jesus was, then their view really collapses into nonconflicting absolutism. For in the final analysis, the lesser-evil view is saying that there never is an unavoidable moral conflict for those who do God's will. It would be special pleading to declare that the providential way out applies only to Christ but not to other servants of God who are faithful to his will.

Another suggestion is that Jesus never faced any moral dilemmas simply be- cause he never committed any antecedent sin to get himself into these tight spots. Only those who make their moral beds have to lie in them. Jesus never sinned, and hence he never found himself in unavoidable moral conflicts. On the face of it, this view has merit. Often our previous sins seem to get us into a moral pickle. We do reap what we sow. However, in order for this obvious truth to rescue the lesser-evil position from collapse, it must be universally true: it must always be true that moral dilemmas we face are created by our own antecedent sins. This seems patently false by counterexample. Sometimes even the innocent are faced with moral difficulties. What sin did innocent German Christian families com-

Conflicting Absolutism 93

mit that placed them in the dilemma of either lying or watching Jews go to the gas chamber? Were these believers more sinful than others in the world? One is reminded here ofJesus's statement about those on whom the tower fell: to you think that they were worse offenders than all the others who dwelt in Jerusalem?' (Luke 13:4 RSV).

Indeed, not only is it not true that moral dilemmas are always brought about by antecedent sin: sometimes it also is antecedent righteousness that precipitates the dilemma. Daniel and the three Hebrew youths were not confronted with their dilemma because theywere backslidden (Dan. 1, 3, 6). Nor were the apostles doing evil when religious authorities commanded them not to preach, thus forcing a choice between the command to obey government and the command to preach the gospel (Acts 4). The same is true ofAbraham's dilemma over whether to kill his son or to disobey God (Gen. 22). Indeed, many times in life it is one's dedication to God that precipitates moral conflicts. It may be a person's righteousness, not antecedent sin, that occasions the moral conflict. If this is the case, then the lesser-evil position has not redeemed itself against the criticisms. It has not explained away the christological dilemma. It has not shown that Jesus never faced moral dilemmas simply because he never committed any previous sins.

Before the opponents of the lesser-evil view rejoice too quickly, there is another point to consider. Perhaps there is always antecedent sin in our case, but never in Christ's case—because we are fallen and he is not. Adam's sin is antecedent in the case of all humankind except Christ. Hence, because we are part of a fallen world, previous sin (that is, Adam's; see Rom. 5:12) is responsible for subsequent moral dilemmas that we will face but that Christ did not.

There is a certain plausibility about this suggestion that cannot be denied. It seems to point to a clear difference in Christ's case, as well as to recognize ante- cedent sin in our case. There are, however, at least two problems here. First, moral conflicts due to the antecedent sin of Adam are not unique to fallen humanity; Christ also lived in this fallen world. And even though he never personally sinned, Christ was nevertheless immersed in a world of moral conflicts due to Adam's and others' sins. Anyhow, not all moral conflicts are due to one's own antecedent sin. The sins of others can force a dilemma on those who did not personally create the tragic situation. Thus a key question appears: Why did Christ not face any moral conflicts forced on him by the sins of others?

Second, the attempt to explain why Christ did not face moral conflicts by way of Adam's fall confuses collective and personal guilt. There is a corporate sense in which everything done by fallen humanity is sinful. In this sense, sin is inevitable for all fallen people. This, however, is quite different from saying that a person is personally guilty for creating the situation or that any particular sin is unavoidable. The immediate moral choice may not induce guilt because it is unavoidable. However, if it were not for Adam's fall, that kind of situation would never have occurred. For example, one would never have to kill in self-defense if it were not for Adam's fall. In a paradise, presumably there would be no need to kill for any

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reason. Nonetheless, killing in self-defense is not a personally culpable act according to the law of God (Exod. 22:2).

We may still ask: Did Jesus really face moral dilemmas in which two or more commands of God came into unavoidable conflict? An examination of the Gospels yields several illustrations. At age twelve Jesus faced a conflict between his earthly parents and his heavenly Father. Although he later submitted to his earthly parents, initially he left them in order to fulfill God's will (Luke 2). Also, Jesus justified his disciples’ action of taking grain by approving David's "stealing" of the consecrated bread in the tabernacle (Matt. 12:3-4). In this regard Jesus said to others, "[Whoever] loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me" (Matt. 10:37). On many occasions, Jesus faced conflict between obeying the religious authorities, which he taught his disciples and others to do (Matt. 23:3), and following the law of mercy by helping those in need (Luke 14:1-6). For example, he chose to heal a man on the Sabbath. When challenged, he said that the law of the Sabbath should be subordinated to humankind, not vice versa. On another occasion Jesus approved of the disciples’ plucking grain on the Sabbath (Luke 6:1-5).

The greatest moral conflict that Jesus faced, however, was his trial and cross, where mercy and justice came into direct and unavoidable conflict. Should he speak in defense of the innocent (himself), as the law demands (Lev. 5:1), or should he show mercy to the many (humankind) by refusing to defend himself? Further, should he take his own life in a self-sacrifice for others (cf. John 10:10), or should he refuse to die innocently for others? In both cases, esus chose mercy over justice. But did he sin in so doing? God forbid! The cross was not the lesser of two evils; it was the greater good ("Greater love has no one .. 7 [ John 15:13]). It appears that the lesser-evil view, then, literally stands at the crossroads. If it is a sin to do the greatest good in a morally conflicting situation, then Jesus would have been perhaps the greatest sinner who ever lived. Perish the thought! Indeed, God himself faced a moral conflict in the cross: Should he sacrifice his Son, or should he allow the world to perish? Thank God, mercy triumphed over justice. Surely the sacrifice of Christ was not a lesser evil; it was indeed the greatest good that God could do (cf. John 15:13; Rom. 5:8-9).

Christ Must Have Faced Moral Contlicts

The fourth objection is another christological problem with the lesser-evil view. If Christ is our complete moral example, then he must have faced morally conflicting situations in which both alternatives were sinful. But if Christ never sinned, then Christ never faced them. Hence, we have no example from Christ to follow in some of life's most difficult moral decisions. But does not Hebrews say Jesus was "tempted in every way, just as we are" (4:15)? Does not Paul exhort us to be followers of Christ (1 Cor. 11:1-2)? How can we follow Christ in ethical dilemmas if he never faced ethical dilemmas?

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Some proponents of conflicting absolutism frankly admit that Christ is not our complete moral example. But it is unacceptable to grant this point. It concedes that the ethic of following Christ is incomplete for the followers of Christ. Indeed, a proper understanding of the New Testament would dictate that we give up claims of the lesser-evil view rather than sacrifice the completeness of Christ's moral example.

The proof that one can face real moral dilemmas without sinning is that Jesus faced them but never sinned. If this is so, then it follows that moral dilemmas do not necessitate personal guilt. There is always a "way of escape" through doing the greater good. In conflicting situations, keeping the higher law (for example, obedience to God over government) is the guiltless way out.

Summary and Condusion

Conflicting absolutism believes that there are many moral absolutes that some- times conflict. This view is rooted in the premise that God's laws are absolute and hence can never be violated. On the other hand, it recognizes that this is a fallen world. And in such a world there are real moral dilemmas. When such a real, unavoidable conflict occurs, it is our obligation to do the lesser evil. However, we must recognize such an act for what it is, confess our sin of breaking God's law, and accept his forgiveness.

Conflicting absolutism has the merit of retaining absolutes and yet being realistic about the fallen world in which we live. However, it does not appear to have successfully defended itself against either the moral or the christological charges leveled against it. It seems morally absurd to say that there is a moral duty to sin or to blame someone for what was unavoidable. Furthermore, if Christ was tempted in all ways as we are, then he must have faced moral dilemmas. But if he did face moral dilemmas, then he must have sinned, because either alternative was sinful according to this view. If he did not face moral dilemmas, then he is not our perfect moral example. In short, when pushed to the wall, this position seems to collapse into either nonconflicting absolutism by claiming special providential intervention for Christ to save him from moral dilemmas, or into graded absolutism by claiming that one is morally obligated to maximize good. In short, in spite of its helpful insights, it seems to have no firm ground of its own on which to stand.

Select Readings

Fletcher, Joseph F., and John Warwick Montgomery. Situation Ethics: True or False? A Dialogue between Joseph Fletcher and John Warwick Montgomery. Minneapolis: Dimension Books, Bethany Fellowship, 1972.

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Luther, Martin. "Letter to Melanchthon." In Letters I, vol. 48 of Luther's Works, edited and translated by Gottfried G. Krodel. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1963. Lutzer, Erwin W. The Morality Gap. Chicago: Moody, 1972.

Thielicke, Helmut. Theological Ethics. Edited by William H. Lazareth. Vol. 1. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966.

7

GRADED ABSOLUTISM

Total ethical relativism is not an option for an evangelical. God's character is un- changing, and his law reflects his character (see chap. 1). Of the options within ethical absolutism, evangelicals must choose between unqualified absolutism (see chap.5), conflicting absolutism (see chap. 6), or graded absolutism (see chap. 7). Our previous analysis, however, has indicated serious problems with the first two of these views. There remains one alternative to discuss: graded absolutism.

The Historical Roots of Graded Absolutism

Of the three forms of absolutism held by evangelicals, unqualified absolutism is associated with the Anabaptist tradition, conflicting absolutism with the Lu- theran tradition, and graded absolutism with the Reformed tradition. Before we examine the basic premises of graded absolutism, a brief look at some of its roots is in order.

Augustine of Hippo

Like most Reformed traditions, the roots of graded absolutism can be traced to Augustine