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For Fr Andrew

Ecclesiasticus sub fide Christi vivens et in medio ecclesiae positus
Preface

Several years ago now I interrupted the series of books I was writing to prepare the ground for the next volume in the sequence by undertaking an edition, translation, and study of the fragments of Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia. I had thought that, having completed that task, I would be able to return to the series. However, as I continued to study the period concerned, I became convinced that, in order to understand Evagrius and the sixth-century Origenist controversy properly, I would have to go back to take a closer look at the work here edited and translated, Origen’s *On First Principles*. That, together with my increasing dissatisfaction with the standard English translation, based on Koetschau’s edition of the text—representing as it does a curious byway of earlier Origen scholarship, yet remaining the translation and layout of the text that we are forced to use in the classroom—compelled me to undertake this new edition and translation, together with the extensive study that precedes it. It might be possible, now, to continue my series on the formation of Christian theology, but I suspect that there is more work to be done on the early stages of the formation of Christian theology, especially on the Gospel of John and a new edition and translation of *Against the Heresies* by Irenaeus of Lyons.

I have come to the conclusions presented here in the introduction over the course of repeatedly teaching a seminar class on Origen, grappling almost every year for the last decade with the difficult task of trying to make sense of this text, which lies, in so many ways, at the heart of subsequent theological reflection. I am deeply grateful to my students, who were prepared to grapple with the text with me. In particular I would like to thank Ignatius Green, my teaching assistant during the semester when this work finally came together, for carefully reading through what I had prepared and making numerous helpful suggestions. I would also like to thank Fr Khaled Anatolios, Paul Blowers, Conor Cunningham, Christina Gschwandtner, Tracy Gustilo, Fr John McGuckin, and Paul Saieg, for allowing me to talk through my interpretation of this work with them, and for making valuable suggestions. I would like to thank Tom Perridge and Karen Raith for their encouragement and forbearance, and especially the copyeditor, Malcolm Todd, and proofreader, Helen Hughes, for their sharp eyes, meticulous attention to detail, and comprehensive understanding of how the different elements of the work fit together, and all those involved in the final stages of production. Finally, this work is dedicated to Fr Andrew Louth, a long-time mentor in the ways of the Fathers.
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Abbreviations

Abbreviations for classical and Patristic texts are those found in the following:


For texts not listed in this handbook, the following have been used:


Scriptural references have been given according to the LXX; this principally affects the numeration of the Psalms and the naming of 1 & 2 Samuel and 1 & 2 Kings as 1–4 Reigns.

ACO Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum
ACW Ancient Christian Writers
ANF Ante-Nicene Fathers
BLE Bulletin de litterature ecclésiastique
CCSA Corpus Christianorum Series Apocryphorum
CCSL Corpus Christianorum: Series Latina
CSEL Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum
FC Fathers of the Church
GCS Die griechische christliche Schriftsteller der ersten [drei] Jahrhunderte
GNO Gregorii Nysseni Opera
JR Journal of Religion
JTS Journal of Theological Studies
LCL Loeb Classical Library
Mansi J. D. Mansi, ed., Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio (Florence, 1759–98)
NPNF Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers
OAF Oxford Apostolic Fathers
OECS Oxford Early Christian Studies
OECT Oxford Early Christian Texts
OCP Orientalia Christiana periodica
PG Patrologia Graeca
PL Patrologia Latina
Abbreviations

PO  Patrologia Orientalis
PPS  Popular Patristic Series
PTS  Patristiche Texte und Studien
RAug  Recherches Augustiniennes et Patristiques
RB  Revue Biblique
RSR  Recherches de Science Religieuse
SBL  Society of Biblical Literature
SC  Sources chrétiennes
StP  Studia Patristica
SVF  Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta
SVTQ  Saint Vladimir’s Orthodox Theological Quarterly
TU  Texte und Untersuchungen
ZNTW  Zeitschrift für die neuestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche.
Origen of Alexandria (c.185–c.254) was the greatest theological luminary of his age. He was the most prolific Christian writer, or perhaps any writer, of the ancient world; Epiphanius (no friend of Origen) claimed that Origen's literary output amounted to six thousand works, while Jerome derides that number as impossible yet still asserts that Eusebius' list amounted to at most two thousand works, still an impressive number by any reckoning. They include his monumental Hexapla (an edition of the Scriptures in six versions: Hebrew, the Septuagint, and other Greek translations), texts on Scriptural interpretation in various genres (commentaries, homilies, and scholia), treatises on martyrdom, prayer, and the Pascha, and one of the greatest apologetic works of early Christianity. He travelled extensively, visiting Rome to hear the great Christian teachers there, made visits to the Holy Land to explore the geography of the Scriptures, and was called to various councils of bishops around the Mediterranean to expound the faith and to examine the faith of others, even bishops. A transcript of an actual dialogue that took place at just such a meeting was discovered in the middle of the last century: in it Origen is described as 'teaching' those, including bishops, gathered together. In the

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2 Epiphanius, Pan. 64.63.8; Jerome, Ruf. 2.22.

3 This is the Dialogue of Origen with Heraclides and his Fellow Bishops on the Father, the Son, and the Soul, discovered only in 1941. In Dial. 25, when Bishop Philip enters, Bishop Demetrius comments 'Our brother Origen is teaching (διδάσκει) that the soul is immortal. The practice of bringing in 'theological experts' to examine the faith of those under question continues through the third century, as is seen in the case of Paul of Samosata, who was 'unmasked' at the Council of Antioch in 268/9, by the inquisition of Malchion, the learned head of a Rhetorical School in the city. See J. Behr, Way to Nicaea, Formation of Christian Theology, 1 (Crestwood, NY;
following century he would be appealed to by Athanasius as 'the labour-loving Origen' who had defended the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father, and lauded by Gregory the Theologian as 'the whetstone of us all'.

Yet, when the Second Council of Constantinople met in 553 it condemned Origen and his 'impious writings'. At the heart of this condemnation—going right back to Origen's conflict with Demetrius of Alexandria; the polemic begun against him by the turncoat Origenist, Methodius of Olympus, in the last decade of the third century; and a few decades later in the crisis that prompted Pamphilus, with the assistance of Eusebius, to write his Apology for Origen; followed later in the fourth century when Epiphanius, in his zeal to expose all heresies, precipitated a train of events that would bring about the spectacular falling-out of the former friends Rufinus and Jerome, causing a tsunami across the Christian world from the capital city of Rome to the heartlands of Egyptian monasticism; and, finally, lurking behind the more daring speculations of the sixth-century 'Origenists' that were a significant part of his condemnation—lay the book here presented and translated, On First Principles. It was, moreover, its translation that was the reason why, Jerome says, he took it upon himself to attack Rufinus, and it was the controversy that this caused which ultimately resulted in the original Greek text being lost to the ravages of history.

St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2001), 208-12. By the middle of the following century, the situation had changed: the bishops assembled in Antioch in 341 repudiated the charge of 'Arianism' by asking indignantly how they, as bishops, could be thought to be following a presbyter, that is, Arius. Athanasius, Syn. 22.3 (ed. Opitz, 248.29-30).

4 Athanasius, Decr. 27; Gregory the Theologian as recorded in the Suidae Lexicon, ed. Adler, 3.619.

5 Origen was condemned by name in the eleventh anathema of its closing session. For the relation of this condemnation to the two lists of anti-Origenist anathemas drawn up in 543 and 553, see Richard Price, The Acts of the Council of Constantinople of 553 with Related Texts on the Three Chapters Controversy, Translated Texts for Historians, 51, vol. 2 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009), 270-99.

Origen wrote *On First Principles* in Alexandria sometime around AD 229/30, by which time he had already come into conflict with Demetrius. To set the work in proper context, it is necessary to describe both earlier events in his life and the situation of Christianity in Alexandria. Origen had been brought up as a devout Christian by his parents, with his father, Leonidas, a teacher of literature, training him in the divine Scriptures. Eusebius mentions that when Leonidas looked at his son asleep, 'he uncovered his breast as if the divine Spirit were enshrined within it, and kissed it reverently, considering himself blessed in his goodly offspring.' The young Origen was also zealously impetuous: his mother had to hide his clothes so that he couldn't follow his father to martyrdom, although the story about his self-castration should probably be rejected. After the martyrdom of Leonidas during the time of the prefect Laetus (199/200–3), leaving his family destitute, a wealthy lady gave refuge to Origen in her house and made it possible for him to continue his studies until he was able to support himself by teaching. She also treated as her 'adopted son' a certain heretic from Antioch called Paul, whose teaching had attracted 'a multitude not only of heretics but also of our people', though Eusebius underscores that Origen never joined Paul in prayer.

When persecutions began again, under the prefect Aquila (206–10/11), all the teachers of Christianity in Alexandria fled the city, leaving Origen alone to instruct those who turned to him 'to hear the Word of God.' It is, notably, only

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8 Eusebius, *Eccl. hist.* 6.2.11.  
9 Eusebius, *Eccl. hist.* 6.2.5. It is at a slightly later period, when he had begun his work of instructing Christians, that Eusebius places Origen's self-castration (*Eccl. hist.* 6.8), suggesting that he did this in order to avoid charges of misconduct from pagans regarding his dealings with women (though Eusebius also claims that he kept it a secret) and that it had resulted from an over-literal interpretation of Matt. 19. Epiphanius, on the other hand, records a tradition that attributed Origen's renowned chastity to the use of drugs (*Panarion*, 64.3.12). Henry Chadwick suggests that both stories are 'malicious gossip,' *Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987 [1966]), 68. Origen, routinely criticized for his allegorical interpretation, derides those who would take that scriptural passage literally (*Comm. Matt*. 15.1–5).

11 See also Eusebius' somewhat embarrassed report of a situation that happened later, during the time of Dionysius in *Eccl. hist.* 7.9, and the comments of Rowan Williams, 'Origen: Between Orthodoxy and Heresy,' in W. A. Bienert and U. Kühneweg, *Origeniana Septima* (Leuven: Peeters, 1999), 3–14, at p. 6.  
12 Eusebius, *Eccl. hist.* 6.3.1. On Eusebius' conflation of the two phases of the persecutions, see Nautin, *Origène*, 363–5. Eusebius states that it was 'some of the heathen' who came to Origen,
after the persecutions ceased that Demetrius begins to play any role in Eusebius' narrative. Upon his return to the city, Demetrius was clearly obliged to praise Origen's valiant work, but also seems to have wanted to appropriate Origen's activity under his own authority. According to Eusebius, 'when he saw yet more coming to him [Origen] for instruction', Demetrius 'entrusted to him alone the school of catechesis' while he himself 'presided over the church', and in turn Origen gave up the teaching of grammar by which he had supported himself, as not 'consonant with divine training', and even sold his cherished volumes of literature in exchange for a meagre fixed income to support himself in his new position. What we see here, I would suggest, is the first attempt at the establishment of monepiscopacy in the city of Alexandria, roughly contemporaneous with the establishment of monepiscopacy in Rome. It is really only from this point, when the activity of previously independent teachers (and leaders of Christian communities) was placed at the service of a newly-emerging monarchical style of episcopal leadership, that we can begin to speak of the 'Catechetical School' of Alexandria. The establishment of monepiscopacy was not an easy development, nor a quick one. We should recall that even into the fourth century, the bishop of Alexandria had more authority over the regions outside Alexandria than he did over the strong presbyters in the city, an uneasy situation that is certainly part of the background for the eruption of the controversy between the presbyter Arius and the bishop Alexander.

That Origen was not quite happy with the new configuration is shown by the letter he wrote after his final departure from Alexandria, in which he defends the propriety of studying philosophy and investigating heretical doctrines. He continues his letter by pointedly reminding his readers that Heraclas, 'who is now a member of the presbytery of Alexandria', had attended the lectures of the famous philosopher Ammonius Saccas for five years longer than he had himself though he assumes that Origen, and Pantaenus and Clement before him, were only ever involved in catechesis in the 'catechetical school'. In Hom. Jer. 4.3, Origen describes how during the times of martyrdom 'we came to the gathering, and the entire Church was present (ἐπὶ τὰς συναγωγάς, καὶ διή ἡ ἐκκλησία ... παρευόμενο). Nautin refers this to the persecution under Aquila; his conclusion, however, that some priests must have remained in the city, seems unnecessary (Origène, 416, fn. 11). See also n.25 below on the question of Origen's later 'ordination'.

13 Eusebius, Eccl. hist. 6.3.8–9.
15 Cf. Rowan Williams, Arius: History and Tradition, 2nd edn (London: SCM Press, 2001 [1987]), 42: 'The bishop of Alexandria occupied at this date what may seem a highly paradoxical position in the Egyptian church: on the one hand ... he more closely resembled an archbishop or even a patriarch than any other prelate in Christendom.... On the other hand, within Alexandria itself the bishop was surrounded by powerful and independent presbyters, supervising their own congregations.' On the development of the episcopacy in Alexandria, see Alistair C. Stewart, The Original Bishops: Office and Order in the First Christian Communities (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2014), 188–99.
16 An extract from the letter is preserved in Eusebius, Eccl. hist. 6.19.12–14.
and that, although Heraclas had previously worn common apparel, he has now laid it aside to adopt the philosopher's mantle and continues in his study of the books of the Greeks. Clearly there were other dimensions to Origen's tense relations with Demetrius. It is probably at this period that Origen visited Rome, perhaps to look for a more congenial milieu in which to pursue his studies and teaching, as had many others before him. According to Eusebius, when Origen returned from Rome, he entrusted 'his pupil' Heraclas with 'the preliminary studies of those just learning the elements,' so that he himself could have the time necessary for 'the deeper study of divine things and for the investigation and interpretation of the holy Scriptures' and teach only the more advanced. It is more likely, however, that Demetrius was more directly involved in this reconfiguration, ousting Origen from his previous position.

Supported by his wealthy patron Ambrose, whom he had converted from Valentinianism, and who in turn provided Origen with seven stenographers, and as many copyists, 'skilled in elegant writing,' Origen set to the task of literary production, beginning with his *Commentary on the Psalms* and works concerned with more speculative and philosophical issues. When the first few books of his *Commentary on Genesis* appeared, the tension between Origen and Demetrius increased, only to be exacerbated further with the work *On First Principles*. Eusebius speaks of Origen departing Alexandria for Palestine 'when no small warfare broke out in the city.' Some have attempted to date this 'warfare' to an earlier period, perhaps referring to the violence unleashed by the Emperor Caracalla when he visited the city in the autumn and winter of 215–16, in retribution for the mockery made of him by students there. But as Origen previously did not leave the city during times of persecution, even when every other Christian leader did so, and as he went to Palestine, taking refuge with Alexander in Jerusalem (no friend of Demetrius), and as he returned to Alexandria only when urged to do so by deacons sent by Demetrius, it is much more plausible to see the 'warfare' that erupted in Alexandria as the final breakdown in relations between Demetrius and Origen.

While he was taking shelter in Jerusalem, the bishops of that region invited Origen to preach and expound the Scriptures in public and before bishops. What was normal in Palestine, however, ran counter to Demetrius' developing sense of the episcopacy, and Demetrius protested vociferously that it was unheard of for a layman to preach in the presence of bishops. Alexander, nonplussed, simply

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17 Nautin, *Origène*, 365, 418, would place this trip around 215; McGuckin, 'The Life of Origen,' places it in 212.
20 For Ambrose, see Eusebius, *Eccl. hist.* 6.19 and 23.
replied: 'I know not how he [Demetrius] comes to say what is plainly untrue,' and gave precedents for this practice.23 Origen did eventually return to Alexandria, but his and Demetrius’ respective visions of the Church were too different for any lasting peace. Back in Alexandria, Origen opened his new work, his magisterial *Commentary on John*, with the assertion that the true Levites, the priests and high priests, are 'those who devote themselves to the divine Word and truly exist by the service of God alone,' words which Origen later used to describe himself and a piety which infuses the whole of Eusebius’ description of him.24

Origen left Alexandria for good probably in 231, to settle in Palestine, where, according to Eusebius, 'he received the laying-on of hands for the presbyterate at Caesarea from the bishops there.'25 Here he continued teaching, preaching, and writing, and undertook various trips, such as his visit to Arabia at the invitation of the bishops there to investigate the teachings of Beryllus. During the pogroms against Christians launched by Decius (250–1), Origen, then in his sixties, suffered extreme torture, being stretched on the rack, to no less than 'four spaces,' Eusebius recounts with horror, only to be denied the martyrdom he had sought in his youth. He spent his final days, as a broken man, writing letters 'full of comfort to those in need' until his death a few years later.26

II On First Principles

*On First Principles* was a controversial book from the beginning. And it still is, perhaps even more so, as we no longer have the original Greek text. It is routinely described as being the first attempt at a systematic theology, laying out the theological points that are universally held as certain and speculatively developing those that remain. But before we can consider the work further, we have to deal with the fact that we only have the complete work as it exists in the Latin translation of Rufinus—or rather the only extant version of the work is that of Rufinus’ translation, for he readily admits in his prefaces that he has omitted some parts of the work and developed others.

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25 Eusebius, *Eccl. hist.* 6.23.4. The plural ‘bishops’ is rather odd here, for in later times it became a firmly established practice that a single bishop lays his hands on the one he is ordaining as his presbyter, while the laying-on of hands by many bishops is reserved for elevation to the episcopacy. Here, as in other contexts and on other matters, Eusebius, as a fourth-century bishop, cannot envision any other practice than that to which he is accustomed. Eusebius’ words, I would suggest, indicate a transitional phase in the development of the ordination practices, and should probably be taken as indicating the reception of Origen as an elder of the church of Caesarea, though perhaps without any oversight (ἐμισκοπή) of a particular community but free to continue his work as a teacher and writer. On the terms ἐπίσκοπος and πρεσβύτερος see Stewart, *Original Bishops*, 11–53.  
Rufinus began his translation of *On First Principles* at the request of the Roman nobleman Macarius in the summer of 398. However, even by this stage he had already become embroiled in a bitter controversy with Jerome. A few years earlier, Epiphanius of Salamas had launched an attack against John of Jerusalem for his 'Origenism' and had uncanonically ordained Jerome's brother, Paulinian, to the priesthood, so that the monastery in which they resided at Bethlehem might be independent of John. Rufinus had sided with John and appealed to Theophilus of Alexandria, who had not yet become an opponent of Origenism. Jerome, on the other hand, supported Epiphanius and translated his letter to John. Jerome claims that he had intended it only for a private readership, but that friends of Rufinus had bribed someone for a copy of it and were now using it to inflame the controversy further, also charging Jerome with having falsified the original. Jerome then began a full-scale literary attack against John of Jerusalem, though he seems to have abandoned the project once he and Rufinus made peace, just before Rufinus departed for Rome in 397.

Once in Rome, and prevailed upon by Macarius, Rufinus set about the task of translating *On First Principles* into Latin. Jerome's friends in Rome, Pammachius and Oceanus, managed to acquire a copy of the translation and sent it to Jerome, with a letter saying that they found many things in it which appeared to be unorthodox and that it seemed to them that Rufinus had omitted many passages that would have proved the heretical character of Origen. They asked Jerome to produce his own translation and make evident the falsifications and interpolations, and they further mention that Rufinus, in his preface to the work, made a subtle allusion to Jerome, to the effect that he was doing nothing other than completing the work of translating Origen begun by Jerome himself. Now under attack in Rome, Rufinus defended his own theological orthodoxy in a written statement to Pope Anastasius and began an *Apology against Jerome*. Jerome, in turn, set about writing his own *Apology against Rufinus*, the first two books of which were written only on the basis of verbal reports about the contents of Rufinus' *Apology*, and the third after he had finally received a copy of the work.

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27 See Karl Holl, 'Die Zeitfolge des ersten origenistischen Streits' (1916), reprinted in idem, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte. II Der Osten* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1928), 310–50, at 324. For the many different, and often intensely personal, dimensions to the controversy which erupted at this stage, see Clark, *Origenist Controversy*, 11–42.

28 This letter is now counted as Jerome, *Ep*. 51.


30 Jerome, *Ruf*. 3.33. Here he recalls how 'I had joined hands with you over the slain Lamb in the Church of the Resurrection.'

31 The letter of Pammachius and Oceanus is counted as Jerome, *Ep*. 83. See also Jerome's reply in *Ep*. 84.
Introduction

Despite much bluster, aimed at Rufinus himself, Jerome's Apologies are, it has to be said, remarkably lacking in detail regarding the alleged errors in Rufinus' translations. For example, after stating that

I find among the many bad things written by Origen the following most distinctly heretical: that the Son of God is a creature, that the Holy Spirit is a servant; that there are innumerable worlds succeeding one another in eternal ages; that angels have been turned into human souls ... that our bodies themselves will grow aerial and spirit-like, and gradually vanish and disperse into thin air and into nothing; that in the restitution of all things ... [all beings, including the devil] will be of one condition and degree ... then will begin a new world from a new origin ... [in which] one who is now a virgin may chance then to be a prostitute.

Jerome then continues rather lamely: 'These are the things I point out as heresies in the books of Origen; it is for you to point out in which of his books you have found them contradicted.' Only in Jerome's letter to Avitus, written some ten years later, do we have not only paraphrases of Origen's reported teaching but substantial passages in which he claims to be quoting Origen in his own words as accurately translated by Jerome himself.

Such, briefly, is the context in which Rufinus translated On First Principles and composed his two prefaces, the first after completing the first two books, and the second a little later after completing the third and fourth. In his first preface, Rufinus mentions that Origen's books, and especially On First Principles, 'have been corrupted in many places by heretics and malevolent persons', and that his writings are often 'for other reasons most obscure and very difficult', discussing as they do subjects which philosophers spend their whole lives investigating to no avail. As such, he continues,

Wherever, therefore, we found in his writings anything contrary to that which he had himself elsewhere piously laid down regarding the Trinity, we have either omitted it, as being corrupt or interpolated, or we have rendered it according to that rule which we frequently find affirmed by him. If, however, as speaking now to persons of skill and knowledge, he has expressed himself obscurely while wanting to proceed quickly, we have, to make the passage clearer, added what we have read more fully on the same subject in his other works, seeking [to provide] explanation. We have said nothing of our own, however, but simply returned to him his own statements, though said in other places. (1 Pr.3)

In the second preface, he repeats that he has 'taken care not to translate such passages as appear to be contrary to the rest of Origen's teaching and to our faith, but to omit them as being interpolations and forgeries of others', and then further specifies that,

If he appeared to have uttered any novelties about rational beings, since the chief point of the faith does not consist in this, for the sake of knowledge and exercise

Origen and his On First Principles

(since perhaps by necessity we must reply to certain heresies in such a manner) I have neither omitted them in these nor in the preceding books, except when perhaps he wished to repeat in the subsequent books what he had already said in those previous ones and, for the sake of brevity, I thought it convenient to cut out some of these repetitions. (2 Pr.)

It is important to note Rufinus' precision: it is only with regard to matters pertaining to the Trinity that, if he found anything in the work that seemed to him contrary to what Origen says elsewhere, he omitted it as either corrupt or an interpolation; whereas if it is something unusual relating to rational beings, he has no problem in retaining the passages, apart from removing repetitions. While on the other hand, if something is particularly difficult or obscure, he has expanded the text by including passages from other works of Origen. It has, it should also be noted, proven impossible to identify such interpolated passages in Rufinus' translation of On First Principles. The most that even Jerome can claim is that Rufinus has inserted a passage of scholia composed by Didymus into Princ. 1.1.8.34

That Origen's works were subject to corruption and interpolation is certain; it even led to Pamphilus writing a short text on this very topic, On the Falsification of the Books of Origen, which also only survives in the Latin translation of Rufinus. It is also something that happened during Origen's own lifetime. In his work, Pamphilus includes a passage from a letter of Origen written to close friends in Alexandria, portions of which are also included by Jerome in his Apology against Rufinus, translated from the Greek by Jerome himself, and thus beyond suspicion. In this letter, after mentioning how the Apostle Paul also had to deal with falsified material alleging to come from himself (cf. 2 Thess. 2.1–3), Origen recounts the following incident:

I see, then, that something like this is also happening to us. For a certain author of a heresy, when a discussion was held between us in the presence of many persons and was recorded, took the document from those who had written it down. He added what he wanted to it, removed what he wanted, and changed what seemed good to him. Then he carried it around as if it were from me, pouring scorn conspicuously on the things that he himself had composed. The brethren who are in Palestine were indignant over this. They sent a man to me at Athens who was to receive from me the authentic copy. Prior to this I had not even re-read or revised the work, but it was lying there in such a neglected state that it could hardly be found. But I sent it, and I say with God as my witness that, when I met the man who had falsified the work, [and asked him] why he had done this, he answered, as if he were giving me satisfaction: 'Because I wanted to adorn and purify that discussion.' Behold with what kind of 'purification' he 'purified' my discussion: with that kind of 'purification' by which Marcion 'purified' the Gospels or the Apostle!35

34 Cf. Jerome, Ruf. 2.11. 35 Pamphilus, Fals. 7; cf. Jerome, Ruf. 2.18.
Jerome also provides evidence that works, or rather a specific work, of Origen had been corrupted. After complaining about Rufinus’ bad translation of this letter (‘turning it into Latin, or rather overturning it’), so masking its real intent of assailing Demetrius of Alexandria and inveighing against bishops worldwide, Jerome mentions a written dialogue between Origen and a Valentinian called Candidus on the topics of the Son’s relation to the Father and whether the Devil can be saved. Origen, according to Jerome, ‘rightly’ taught that the Devil is not of a substance doomed to perish, but fell by his own will, and so can be saved, which Candidus then changed into the calumny that Origen held that the diabolical nature itself can be saved. But, Jerome adds, it is only with respect to this particular dialogue that Origen claims his words have been falsified.

Although Jerome excoriates Rufinus for his translation, modern assessments are more favourable. In the case of On First Principles, we are able to compare a good portion of the work, Princ. 3.1 and 4.1–3, with the Greek text as it has been preserved for us in the Philocalia, the compilation of extracts from Origen’s writings prepared by Basil of Caesarea and Gregory the Theologian in the mid fourth century. It is indeed true that Rufinus often expands the text, bringing in further extended imagery or additional scriptural quotations, though it is also the case that the editors of the Philocalia have omitted other passages (e.g. Princ. 3.1.23) for no clear reason. But when Rufinus does so, it is never to distort the sense deliberately. As John Rist concludes from a detailed comparison of passages from Princ. 3.1:

What we have just been looking at are no obvious deformations of the text due to a desire to save Origen from accusations of heresy, but the more subtle and often unconscious changes which arise from Rufinus being a product of Latin rather than Greek culture, from his Latin desire for rhetorical embellishment and Vergilian echoes, and from his emphasis on law and the judiciary, rather than on philosophical enquiry and the quarrels of the schools. Of the world in which Origen himself moved and thought it appears from our study that Rufinus was largely ignorant.

For better or worse, the Latin translation of Rufinus, with his own forthright admission about his translation practices, remains the text of On First Principles as we have it.

36 Jerome, Ruf. 2.19.
However, the problems surrounding this seminal work of Origen were exacerbated in modern times by the edition of the text produced by Paul Koetschau in 1913, and then by the translation into English of this edition by G. W. Butterworth in 1936, which thereafter became the standard translation for English-speaking scholarship, replacing the earlier translation of Frederick Crombie for the Ante-Nicene Christian Library series (included later in the Ante-Nicene Fathers series). Every prior editor, from Jacques Merlin (1512) to Charles Delarue (1733; later incorporated into PG 11), had presented Rufinus’ translation intact, with Delarue also incorporating, for the first time, parallel passages from the Philologia, Jerome, and Justinian, alongside Rufinus’ text. Koetschau, on the other hand, taking his lead from Rufinus’ own admission of having omitted certain passages, determined that Rufinus cannot be trusted at all and, convinced that the accounts of Origen’s teaching given by his opponents, especially the letter of Jerome to Avitus, the reports of Justinian, and even the anathemas of 553, do in fact represent Origen’s authentic teaching, set about the task not only of putting passages from others in parallel, but breaking up Rufinus’ translation, wherever he thought he could discern a lacuna, and interpolating into its flow passages supplied from elsewhere.

At some points, the passages so inserted clearly twist what Origen said. For instance, at the beginning of Princ. 2.9.1, Rufinus has Origen saying: ‘In that beginning it must be supposed that God created so great a number of rational or intellectual creatures, or whatever the intellects mentioned above are to be called, as he foresaw would be sufficient.’ Koetschau inserts into the body of his text a couple of sentences from Justinian’s Epistle to Menas saying: ‘In the beginning under consideration, God, by his will, caused to subsist as large a number of intellectual beings as he was able to control; for it must be admitted that the power of God is finite and its circumscription must not be done away with under the pretext of praise.” Origen, as we will consider in more detail later on, contemplates the beginning of things by looking to their end (cf. Princ. 1.6.1); and with the certainty of the apostolic affirmation that in the end all things will be subject to God, who in turn will be ‘all in all’ (1 Cor. 15:28), describes the beginning in similar terms. Rather than an affirmation based on a definitive eschatological end, it has become, in the hands of his opponents, an affirmation of the limited power of a finite God. Alternatively,

39 The problems with Koetschau’s edition (and thereby Butterworth’s translation) have, of course, been noted before. See, most recently, Ronnie J. Rombs, ‘A Note on the Status of Origen’s De Principiis in English,’ VC 61 (2007), 21–9.
40 Justinian, Ep. ad Menas (ed. Schwartz, 190.8–14, two sentences of which are repeated at 209.3–6).
as it is put in On Faith, ascribed to Rufinus the Presbyter of Palestine, in a sentence given by Koetschau in his critical apparatus, 'Origen says, “God did not make all those whom he wished, but only those whom he could hold together and grasp.”'

Rufinus readily states, as we have seen, that he has omitted or reworked parts of the text that pertain to the Trinity, and, indeed, many of the passages supplied by Koetschau to Princ. 1 have a stronger ‘subordinationist’ flavour to them than Rufinus’ translation, as for instance, the passage from Justinian’s Epistle to Menas placed by Koetschau in the middle of Princ. 1.2.13. Here Origen is expounding how Christ is said to be ‘the image of his goodness’ (Wis. 7:26), describing the Father as the ‘primal goodness from which the Son is born’, such that the Son is ‘the image of his goodness’, for ‘there is no other second goodness existing in the Son, besides that which is in the Father’. It is for this reason, Origen says, that Christ rightly says ‘No one is good but one, the God and Father.’ In Justinian’s report, this becomes the assertion that:

Perhaps also the Son is good, but yet not good simply, and that just as he is the image of the invisible God and, in this respect, God, but not the one of whom Christ himself says that they may know you the only true God, so also he is the image of the goodness, but not, as the Father, invariably good.

The possible negative implications are drawn out of Origen’s position and attributed to him, though with the qualifier ‘perhaps’.

At other times, Jerome’s paraphrases of what Origen wrote are inserted by Koetschau into the body of the text for no apparent reason. For instance, in Princ. 1.7.4, Koetschau interpolates a passage from Jerome’s letter to Avitus beginning, ‘the sun also and the moon and the rest of the stars are animated …’. As Origen has indeed been discussing how Scripture presents the celestial bodies as living beings, there is no need for this addition, especially as it is only a paraphrase given by Jerome, who continues a few lines later in the letter by saying, ‘that no one should suppose that what I say is ours, let us quote his actual words.’ That Koetschau should prefer Jerome’s paraphrase over Rufinus’ translation clearly demonstrates the level of distrust he had for Rufinus.

However, most serious is the fact that, although Rufinus carefully specified that even when Origen ‘appeared to have uttered any novelties about rational beings’ he has not omitted these because the substance of the faith is not

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41 Rufinus of Palestine, De fide, PL 21, 1131b.
43 Matt. 19:17; Mark 10:18; Luke 18:19. Origen habitually adds the word ‘Father’ to this saying of Christ.
44 Jerome, Ep. 124.4.
45 Butterworth, who in his introduction lambasts Rufinus even more than does Jerome for the inadequacies of his translation, lamely comments here: ‘The passage is clearly meant to give a true representation of the original, though not perhaps in a strict translation’ (On First Principles, p. 62, n.8).
affected, the largest interpolations introduced by Koetschau, especially the infamous ‘Fragments’ 15 and 17a inserted into Princ. 1.8, concern precisely the ‘Origenist’ teachings about eternally existing intellects and their fall into bodies. These are, moreover, passages which Koetschau literally ‘made up’, by stitching together sentences from various anti-Origenist writers. Likewise many of the anathemas from 553 are included within the text of Rufinus, as if Origen himself could have written them. The effect of all of this—especially when these texts are presented, in Butterworth’s translation, under the capitalized heading ‘GREEK’ (and the details relegated to small print in the footnotes), to give the impression to the unwary reader that this is the authentic text of Origen himself—is to seriously distort the text that we have, beyond any hope of comprehension. It is not Rufinus who produced a ‘garbled version of Origen’s work’, as Butterworth charges him, but Koetschau and Butterworth himself.47

Fortunately scholarship has moved on. It no longer looks upon Origen as a platonizing Christian, indulging in speculative flights of fancy based upon an arbitrary allegorical reading of Scripture.48 It has also become universally accepted that the anathemas of the sixth century and the reports of Justinian were directed primarily against Evagrius and sixth-century ‘Origenism’, rather than Origen himself.49 In this changed climate, more recent editors and translators of the text have proceeded, rightly, from the assumption that we should begin, as we always must, not with the alleged teaching of a writer, by which we then reconstruct the text, but with the text itself, however we have it, on the basis of which we then try to understand his teaching. Thus the French translation of Marguerite Harl, Gilles Dorival and Alain Le Boulluec, published in 1976, consigned every reported fragment of Origen’s text to an appendix, presenting them in a chronological order, to map the developing reports of Origen’s teaching, rather than in accordance with their supposed place within the text itself.50 In the same year, a new German edition and translation, prepared by Herwig Görgemanns and Heinrich Karpp, places most (but not all) of the extracts in the space between the text and the critical apparatus, and relegates the anathemas to an appendix.51 Two years later, these were followed by the first instalment of a new edition and French translation undertaken by Henri Crouzel and Manlio Simonetti for the Sources chrétiennes series; they relegated all the fragments and parallels to separate volumes, accompanied

46 These ‘fragments’ are included in Appendix II as items 10 and 12.
47 Butterworth, On First Principles, xli.
48 See especially Mark Julian Edwards, Origen Against Plato, Ashgate Studies in Philosophy and Theology in Late Antiquity (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002).
Introduction

by extensive and detailed notes. The most recent edition, that of Samuel Fernandez, places the Greek texts that are genuine parallels to Rufinus' text alongside the Latin text and places other extracts, as did Görgemanns and Karpp, between the text and the critical apparatus. None of these recent editors and translators have considered it to be of any value to reproduce Koetschau's Fragments 15 and 17a, and understandably so.

The object of this edition and translation is to present again (especially for an English-speaking readership, which has so far been deprived of a translation of On First Principles representing the advances in scholarship on Origen made since Koetschau and Butterworth) Rufinus' Latin text and its translation, as an unbroken whole. I have followed other recent editors and translators in placing material which is genuinely in parallel with Rufinus' texts between the Latin text and the critical apparatus. I have relegated all other material, including Koetschau's Fragments 15 and 17a, to an appendix; they are a historical curiosity which should be retained, even if only as a reminder of the byways of earlier scholarship on Origen. I have also taken the step, for the sake of consistency, of placing the Greek texts from the Philocalia (i.e. Princ. 3.1 and 4.1–3) below the Latin text of Rufinus. There is no real doubt about their authenticity; but this is primarily an edition of Rufinus' Latin translation of Origen's On First Principles, and, it should always be recalled, the compilers of the Philocalia also omitted sections from what they reproduced.

2 THE STRUCTURE OF ON FIRST PRINCIPLES

Even having accepted that we must at least begin with Rufinus' text, there nevertheless remain further, and perhaps the most perplexing, problems requiring attention. As Brian Daley comments: 'Few subjects have puzzled and challenged interpreters of Origen more than the structure, the purpose, and even the title of his treatise .RESET I.jpg. Any attempt to understand Origen, in part or in whole, must address these questions, beginning with the structure.

The text as it has come down to us, in the eight manuscripts dating from the ninth to the thirteenth century used by modern editors, all present the text as divided into four books and further supply a variety of chapter headings.

54 The manuscripts are listed on p. xc; the chapter headings found in the manuscripts are reproduced in Appendix I.
The division of the work into four books seems to go back to Origen himself, for at the end of Princ. 3 he signs off: 'we here bring the third book to end.' It is possible, of course, but unlikely, that these are Rufinus' words; Pamphilus, working with the Greek text, also knew of the division of On First Principles into four books, specifying, in his Apology, from which book it was that he drew particular passages. The division of the work into four books, however, is not a thematic division. As Basilius Steidle pointed out, back in 1941, the work is in fact divided into three parts, Princ. 1.1–2.3, 2.4–4.3, 4.4, with each part dealing with a threefold series of similar subjects: the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; the nature and freedom of created intellectual beings; and the material world, with its beginning and end, in which their salvation is worked out. Once pointed out, the basic lines of this structure are indeed obvious and have been adopted in various ways in most recent editions.

The further division into chapters is, however, more problematic. As Marguerite Harl notes, despite being 'extremely audacious' in his handling of Rufinus' text, Koetschau was, ironically, very conservative with respect to the chapter headings, reproducing the chapter headings (though only some) from the same particular manuscripts as had Delarue before him. Yet the manuscripts differ greatly in regard to the chapter headings. In his introduction, Koetschau lists the complete series of headings found in the two manuscripts he used for his headings, Codex Bambergensis Ms. Part. 113 (B IV, 27 = B) and Codex Casinensis 343 (= C). Yet these manuscripts give many more headings than have been used by editors. For instance, for Princ. 1.2, on Christ, they have no less than seven separate headings. Other manuscripts, on the other hand, have no headings at all, such as Codex Abricensis 66 and Codex Sorbonicus lat.

55 Crouzel's assertion, that 'Un tome c'est la quantité de texte que contient un rouleau de papyrus,' made originally in the introduction to his edition of the work (SC 252, p. 16) and repeated in his study on the Alexandrian (Origen, 46) and by many others since, though appealing, suffers, as Charles Kannengiesser points out, from the fact that no evidence is ever given for this assertion, and, moreover, as the books are of different lengths, one would have to accept that the rolls were cut accordingly and so 'the argument becomes circular'; Origen, Systematician in De Principiis, in R. J. Daly, ed., Origeniana Quinta (Leuven: University Press–Peeters, 1992), 395–405, at 395.


57 'Recherches sur le περὶ Ἀρχόν d'Origène en vue d'une nouvelle édition: La division en chapitres, StP 3, TU 78 (Berlin 1961), 57–67, at 57–8.

58 Koetschau, De Principiis, CXLIII–CXLVIII.
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16322, which merely differentiate chapters by means of an enlarged capital letter. Besides the article of Harl, it is striking how little attention has been devoted to the question of the chapter headings; only in the most recent edition, that of Fernandez (2015), do all these variants appear in the critical apparatus for the first time. Koetschau held that it was 'very likely' that the basis for the division into chapters, and some of the chapter headings themselves, go back to Rufinus, and that their increase resulted from scribal additions over the course of time, a position now generally held, though the implications of this have not yet been fully assimilated and acted upon.

There are two other important points of reference for trying to understand the structure of On First Principles. The first is Origen's own Preface to the work, in which he gives a long list of items pertaining in various ways to the apostolic and ecclesiastical preaching; we will consider this in detail below. The other is an external point of reference, and important because it bears witness to the Greek text now no longer extant. This is the report that Photius provides of the work in his Myriobiblio or Bibliotheca. In his brief account of the work, Photius does indeed speak of four books, and provides brief summaries of the topics covered, which often match the Latin titles found in the manuscripts, though these are typically shorter, and, for some inexplicable reason, what we know as Princ. 3.6, 'On the End or Consummation', is found, according to Photius, at the beginning of Book 4.

I The Two Cycles

On the basis of various manuscript headings, Origen's Preface, and Photius' report, Crouzel and Simonetti, in their edition, further refined the division of the work into the two main 'cycles', by differentiating nine 'treatises'. It will be helpful at this stage to set in parallel Photius' account, the chapter headings used by Koetschau/Butterworth (those most familiar to the English reader) and schema adopted by Crouzel and Simonetti:

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50 Even Gustave Bardy, in his otherwise painstaking study, Recherches sur l'histoire du texte et des versions Latines du De Principiis d'Origène, Mémoires et Travaux des Facultés catholique de Lille, 25 (Paris: Edouard Champion, 1923), completely neglects the topic.
51 Koetschau, De Principiis, CXL.
52 Photius, Bibliotheca, 8.
53 The translation produced by Harl, Dorival and Le Boulluec is structured slightly differently, dividing each cycle into nine treatises; neither Gørgemanns/Karpp nor Fernandez format their editions according to a larger scheme, though both recognize that the work is divided into two 'cycles' and a summary. The variations between the most recent editions do not affect the points that I will make below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Photius</th>
<th>Koetschau/Butterworth</th>
<th>Crouzel/Simonetti</th>
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|         |                       | First Cycle of Treatises (1.1–2.3)  
|         |                       | Expounding all of the Three Archai (in a large sense)  
|         |                       | First Treatise  
|         |                       | On the Father, Son and Holy Spirit (1.1–4)  
|         |                       | (I) 1.1: On God  
|         |                       | (II) 1.2: On Christ  
|         |                       | (III) 1.3.1–4: On the Holy Spirit  
|         |                       | (IV) 1.3.5–4.2: On the particular action of each Person  
|         |                       | (Appendix) 1.4.3–5: The Father is the Creator of the whole eternity of the intelligible world contained in his Son  
|         |                       | Second Treatise  
|         |                       | On Rational Creatures (1.5–8)  
|         |                       | (I) 1.5–6: On rational creatures in general  
|         |                       | (A) 1.5.3–5: The accidental character of rational creatures  
|         |                       | (B) 1.6: The beginning and the end  
|         |                       | (II) 1.7–8. The different orders of rational creatures  
|         |                       | (A) 1.7.2–5: The Stars  
|         |                       | (B) 1.8: Angels (demons and human beings)  
|         |                       | Third Treatise  
|         |                       | On the World and the creatures found in it (2.1–3)  
| The first deals with the Father,  
| the Son,  
| and the Holy Spirit;  
| in this his statements are often blasphemous, saying that the Son was made by the Father, the Holy Spirit by the Son; and that the Father pervades all existing things, the Son only the rational being, the Holy Spirit only those being saved. He also says other irrational things full of impiety; he babbles about metempsychosis, and the stars being alive, and other similar things.  
| His first book mythologizes about the Father, and Christ (as he calls him), and the Holy Spirit,  
| and also rational beings.  
| Second book is about the world and the created things in it,  
| 1.1: God  
| 1.2: Christ  
| 1.3: The Holy Spirit  
| 1.4: Loss, or falling away  
| 1.5: Rational natures  
| 1.6: The end or consummation  
| 1.7: Things corporeal and incorporeal  
| 1.8: The angels  
| 2.1: The world  
| 2.2: The perpetuity of bodily nature  
<p>| 2.3: The beginning of the world and its causes |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Photius</th>
<th>Koetschau/Butterworth</th>
<th>Crouzel/Simonetti</th>
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<tr>
<td>and that there is one God of the Law and the prophets, and the same God is of the Old and the New Testament;</td>
<td>2.4: That the God of the Law and the Prophets, and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is one</td>
<td>Second Cycle of Treatises (2.4-4.3)</td>
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<td>and about the incarnation of the Saviour,</td>
<td>2.5: The just and the good</td>
<td>Corresponding to diverse points in the Preface</td>
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<td>and that the same Spirit is in Moses and the rest of the prophets and the holy apostles;</td>
<td>2.6: The Incarnation of Christ</td>
<td>First Treatise</td>
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<td>and also about the soul,</td>
<td>2.7: The Holy Spirit</td>
<td>That the God of the Law and the Prophets and of the Gospels is one and the same God for the Old and New Testaments (2.4-5)</td>
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<td>resurrection, the punishment,</td>
<td>2.8: The soul</td>
<td>(A) 2.4: First section</td>
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<td>and the promises.</td>
<td>2.9: The world and the movements of rational creatures, both good and evil and the causes of these movements</td>
<td>(B) 2.5: On the Just and the Good</td>
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<td>The third book is about self-determination;</td>
<td>2.10: The resurrection and the judgement</td>
<td>Second Treatise</td>
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<td>how the devil and opposing powers, according to the Scriptures, waged war against the human race;</td>
<td>2.11: The promises</td>
<td>On the Incarnation of the Saviour (2.6)</td>
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<td>Third Treatise</td>
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<td>That the same Spirit was in Moses and in the other prophets and in the apostles (2.7)</td>
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<td>Fourth Treatise</td>
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<td>On the soul (2.8–9)</td>
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<td>(I) 2.8: On the soul in general</td>
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<td>(II) 2.9: On the world, the movements of rational creatures, good or bad, and their causes</td>
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<td>Fifth Treatise</td>
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<td>On the resurrection, punishments, and promises (2.10–11)</td>
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<td>(I) 2.10: On resurrection</td>
<td>(I) 2.10: On resurrection</td>
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<td>(II) 2.10.4: On punishments</td>
<td>(II) 2.10.4: On punishments</td>
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<td>(III) 2.11: On the promises</td>
<td>(III) 2.11: On the promises</td>
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<td>Sixth Treatise</td>
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<td>On Free Will</td>
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<td>Seventh Treatise</td>
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<td>How the Devil and adverse powers fight the human race according to the Scriptures (3.2–4)</td>
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<td>3.1: On Free Will</td>
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The Structure of On First Principles

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<th>Photius</th>
<th>Koetschau/Butterworth</th>
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<td>3.2: The opposing powers</td>
<td>(I) 3.2: On the adverse powers</td>
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<td>3.3: The threefold wisdom</td>
<td>(II) 3.3: On the three forms of wisdom</td>
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<td>3.4: Whether the statement made by some is true, that each individual has two souls</td>
<td>(III) 3.4: Is it true, as some say, that everyone possesses two souls?</td>
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<td>3.5: That the world took its beginning in time</td>
<td>Eighth Treatise (3.5–6)</td>
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<td>3.6: The consummation of the world</td>
<td>(II) 3.6: On the subject of the end</td>
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<td>Ninth Treatise (4.1–3)</td>
<td>That the Scriptures are divine and how they are to be read</td>
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<td>4.1: The divine inspiration of the Scriptures</td>
<td>(I) 4.1: That the Scriptures are inspired by God</td>
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<td>4.2: Many not understanding the Scriptures spiritually and interpreting them erroneously, have fallen into heresies</td>
<td>(II) 4.2–3: That many do not understand the spiritual meaning of Scripture, and misunderstanding fall into heresy</td>
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<td>4.3: Illustrations from the Scriptures of the method in which Scripture should be understood</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4.4: Summary of the doctrine concerning the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and of the other matters discussed in the foregoing chapters</td>
<td>4.4: Recapitulation on the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and the other points treated above</td>
</tr>
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</table>

What seems a rather random progression of themes in Koetschau and Butterworth is brought into greater clarity by the division of the work into two ‘cycles’. But what is the relation between the two cycles, and the topics treated in each?

Steidle himself, building upon Hal Koch’s *Pronoia und Paideusis*, had suggested that there were parallels between Origen’s work and the contemporary ‘school philosophy’, in which the basic ‘principles’ were developed in similar, repeated patterns, building up cycles of teaching.\(^63\) Also important in developing a better understanding of the structure of *On First Principles*

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were the works of classicists in the early twentieth century, especially the study on Horace's *Ars poetica* by Eduard Norden, in which he explored how introductory handbooks (the *eisagogyai*) for fields such as poetics, rhetoric, philosophy, and physics developed in the Hellenistic period, originating in Stoic circles and extending to middle and late Platonism, and also showed how they often had a bipartite structure, in which the first part provided a summary of the important points, whereas the second part would develop these points from a different perspective.\(^{64}\)

Building upon such earlier work, Harl and Dorival argued that *On First Principles* should best be understood in the company of those handbooks that offer a systematic presentation of philosophy, such as Alcinous' *Epitome.*\(^{65}\) Here, after discussing the nature of philosophy itself and its modes of knowing and judging, Alcinous turns 'to a discussion of first principles [*περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν*] and doctrines of theology, taking our start from the primary elements [*ἀπὸ τῶν πρῶτων*] and then descending from these to examine, first, the origin of the world, and finally the origin and nature of the human being'; the three first principles for Alcinous, are, working upwards, matter, the intelligible forms, and God.\(^{66}\) The parallels to the range of topics covered by Origen are indeed striking. And there was at least one work from this period that was called *On First Principles*, written by Longinus, a student of Ammonius Saccas and a contemporary of Plotinus and Origen.\(^{67}\) Regarding the two main parts of the work, Harl suggests that the first part is more global, general, complete, and integrated, whereas the second part takes up particular questions for discussion. In her estimation, moreover, the second part is the principal focus of the work.

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\(^{64}\) Eduard Norden, 'Die Composition und Litteraturgattung der horazischen Epistula ad Pisones', *Hermes*, 40 (1905), 481–528, which remains one of the most important studies on the topic. Manfred Fuhrman, *Das systematische Lehrbuch: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Wissenschaften in der Antike* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1960), 122–31, argued that the bipartite structure has a Sophistic origin. A further important work is the extensive analysis of the *De mundo* attributed to Aristotle by A.-J. Festugiére in his *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, vol. 2 (Paris: Cabalda, 1949), 460–518. The works they identify as so structured are quite extensive, including: Horace, *Ars poetica (Ep. ad Pisones)*, before 4 BC; Quintillian, *Institutio oratoria*, before AD 96; the *De mundo* attributed to Aristotle, dated variously between 50 BC and AD 180; Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De fato*, AD 198–209; Iamblichus, *De mysteriis*, third century AD; and Sallustius' *De Diis et mundo*, fourth century AD.

\(^{65}\) Harl, 'Structure et cohérence', 21; Dorival, 'Remarques', 34–6.

\(^{66}\) Alcinous, *Epit. 8.1*; the forms are dealt with in *Epit. 9*, and God, 'the third principle', in *Epit. 10*. See also Apuleius, *Dogm. Plat.* 5, another second-century 'handbook' on Platonic philosophy, which also presents the 'three principles': God, matter, and forms.

\(^{67}\) Porphyry, *Vit. Plot.*, 14; the work of Longinus is now lost; Justin Martyr also might well be referring to another work with the same title when he writes, 2 *Apol.* 6.8: 'The Stoic philosophers themselves place a high value on these things in their discussion of [or: treatise on] ethics, so that it is shown that in their discussion of [or: treatise on] first principles and bodies (ἐν τῷ περὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ σωμάτων λόγῳ) they are not good guides.' Daley, 'Origen's *De Principiis*', 4, fn. 8, would translate λόγος here as 'treatise'; Denis Minns and Paul Parvis (ed. and trans. OECT [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009]) translate it as 'discussion'.
for it corresponds to the programme set out by Origen himself in his Preface.\(^8\) Origen has, in their telling, taken a brave new step in the development of Christian theology, by composing a Christian ‘physics’, a treatment of the origin, composition, and end, of the world and the human being, drawing upon Scripture, tradition, and human reason.

Crouzel and Simonetti, as indicated in the synoptic table above, follow Harl in their description of the two ‘cycles’: the first cycle deals with the three ‘principles’ ‘au sense large’—the Trinity, rational creatures, the world—while the second corresponds to diverse points set out in the Preface. Charles Kannengiesser, on the other hand, is a bit more sceptical, both of the analogies drawn by Dorival from works either beyond Origen’s reach or after his time, and of the way in which the bipartite structure has been used, for once it has been ‘imposed on Peri Archon as it is, it cannot help but elicit a distinctive evaluation of the “first” and “second” exposition’.\(^9\) Kannengiesser’s own suggestion is that in fact the first exposition is the work On First Principles ‘proper’, corresponding tightly to the series of items listed in the Preface, and that to this original work Origen subsequently added a series of lectures, strongly coloured by an anti-Marcionite polemic.\(^7\) Perhaps more interestingly, Kannengiesser also suggests that rather than looking to philosophical handbooks, a bipartite structure can be discerned in many writings much closer to home for Origen, not least in several letters of Paul, and ‘explicitly’ in many treatises of Philo, Justin’s First Apology as well as the Dialogue, Irenaeus’ Demonstration, as well as Clement of Alexandria’s Paedagogue, though all this without any serious or sustained analysis. But he makes a valid point in conclusion: ‘It would probably be a rewarding task to analyze Origen’s double exposition in Peri Archon proper ... with a closer look at its patristic, Alexandrian, and scriptural models, though any such analysis must surely be of the whole book, rather than only ‘Peri Archon proper’ (i.e. the first cycle).\(^7\)

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\(^6\) Kannengiesser, Origen, Systematician in De Principiis, 396.

\(^7\) Ibid. 402. For a full examination, using many of the studies mentioned above, of the bipartite structure of Irenaeus’ Demonstration, see Susan L. Graham, ‘Structure and Purpose of Irenaeus’ Epideixis’, SP 36 (Leuven: Peeters, 2001), 210–21, though this has recently been challenged by James B. Wiegel, “The Trinitarian Structure of Irenaeus’ Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching”, SVTQ 58.1 (2014), 113–39, who argues persuasively for a threefold structure. A bipartite structure is evident at the heart of Athanasius, On the Incarnation, where, between the introductory paragraphs and the concluding refutations of the Jews and Gentiles, the main part of the heart of the work is given over to examining the work of Christ in the Passion, in two different perspectives, the ‘divine dilemma regarding life and death, in an ‘existential’ perspective, and the same dilemma regarding knowledge and ignorance, an ‘epistemological’ perspective; the transition from one to the other is clearly indicated by Athanasius himself: ‘This, therefore, is the first cause of the Incarnation of the Saviour. One might also recognize that his gracious advent consistently occurred from the following’ (Inc. 10). It should also be noted that On the Incarnation itself is the second part of a diptych, the first being Against the Gentiles. See Athanasius, On the Incarnation, ed. and trans. John Behr (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2011), 38–9.
II The Division into Chapters

However, before we attempt to take any such analysis further, we must return to the question of the division into chapters, for only once we have reached as secure a conclusion about them as we can, can we then turn to the question of structure. Even a cursory look at the chapter headings provided by Koetschau and Butterworth should raise some eyebrows. For instance, where do the headings for Princ. 3.3, ‘The threefold wisdom,’ and Princ. 3.4, ‘Whether the statement made by some is true, that each individual has two souls,’ come from and how do they fit into any coherent sequence of reflection? The fact is that the heading for Princ. 3.3, and its placement at this point, is not found in any manuscript at all; it was inserted by Merlin in his edition, and has been included by all subsequent editors. The two manuscripts containing the most headings, B and C, have the heading, ‘That there is a difference between the Wisdom of God and the wisdom of this world and the wisdom of the rulers of this world, or how one might be entrapped through that wisdom which is the wisdom of the rulers of this world,’ inserted a sentence before the place where Merlin put his heading. The very length of this heading clearly indicates that it is a scribal note, not a chapter heading going back to Origen himself, as also does the brevity of this supposed ‘chapter.’ Moreover, as Origen makes clear, although turning at this point to the question of knowledge, the subject of his treatment continues to be the work of the opposing powers, as the first sentence of Princ. 3.3.2 indicates, and it remains so until the conclusion of Princ. 3.3.6, as the final statement affirms: ‘But let these points, expounded by us according to our strength, suffice regarding those powers which are opposed to the human race.’ Princ. 3.2–3 is one complete block, treating ‘the opposing powers.’

In the case of Princ. 3.4, although Origen does indeed turn, from Princ. 3.4.2 onwards, to the question of the statement made by some to the effect that there are ‘two souls’ in each human being, the opening statement of Princ. 3.4.1 makes clear the overarching topic of his intended discussion: ‘And now, I think, we must not pass over in silence the subject of human temptations, which are engendered sometimes from flesh and blood, or from the shrewdness of flesh and blood, which is said to be hostile to God.’ This simple observation makes clear the sequence of his exposition: having treated, in Princ. 3.2–3, the temptations that arise from ‘the opposing powers,’ Origen now turns to those that derive from our human nature, flesh and blood.

Similar points must be made with regard to the divisions between Princ. 1.3–4, 1.5–6, 2.1–3, and the headings given to Princ. 1.7 and 2.10. Princ. 1.4, given the heading ‘Loss or falling away’ by Koetschau and Butterworth, is in fact a continuation of the discussion about the Holy Spirit in Princ. 1.3. This is seen clearly from the opening line of Princ. 1.5: ‘After the discussion concerning the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, which we have briefly treated, as far
as we are able, it follows that we should also say a few words about the rational beings.’ Origen does indeed discuss what it means to fall away in Princ. 1.4, but this is a continuation of Princ. 1.3.8, where he had been discussing how rational beings might participate in the sanctifying power of the Holy Spirit, unless they slacken in their piety, in which case they will fall away from that participation. Princ. 1.4 is not a separate chapter, oddly positioned between a chapter on the Holy Spirit and one on rational beings, but a continuation of the discussion already begun in Princ. 1.3.8, tying together the work of the Trinity and the life of rational beings in ways which will be important for us later on.

Princ. 1.6, although turning to the question of ‘the end or consummation,’ is likewise not a separate chapter. When Origen opens Princ. 1.7, he speaks of having treated the topic of rational beings after having spoken of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The ‘end or consummation’ that he brings into his discussion at Princ. 1.6 continues the discussion in Princ. 1.5.3 about whether the variety of rational beings results from their choices and actions or from God himself, and he turns to the end in order to understand the beginning, as is made clear in Princ. 1.6.2. Origen treats the end itself in a preliminary way in Princ. 1.6.4, and more fully in Princ. 3.6. Princ. 1.5–6 is thus a complete block. Origen opens Princ. 1.5.1 by saying that after having discussed the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, ‘it follows that we should also say a few words about the rational beings, their species and orders and functions,’ for Scripture provides us with many names of different orders of rational beings: the holy angels (treated briefly in the second paragraph of Princ. 1.5.1, and more fully in Princ. 1.8), the opposite kind, who have turned aside (treated in the first paragraph of Princ. 1.5.2), and then human beings, the ‘rational animals’ (second paragraph of Princ. 1.5.2). Origen then continues by showing that God did not cause rational beings to be in these positions, as is proved by further examples from Scripture, to conclude that it lies within ourselves whether to be holy or become an opposing power (Princ. 1.5.3–5), and ends the chapter by turning to the ‘end,’ when God will be ‘all in all,’ in order to understand the beginning. The organization of the whole of this chapter, and the development of its argument, is both coherent and tight.

The final misleading division of chapters is Princ. 2.1, 2, 3. ‘The perpetuity of bodily nature’ is not arbitrarily juxtaposed between a treatment of ‘the world’ and ‘the beginning of the world and its causes. Origen specifies in the opening lines of Princ. 2.1 that he will not only treat the beginning and the end of the world, but also the arrangement of events between these two points. By the term ‘world’ Origen understands more than simply the created world in general or materiality and corporeality in particular (which are indeed treated in Princ. 2.1.4–2.2); it also includes the ‘arrangement’ (the cosmos in the sense of the Greek term; see Princ. 2.3.6) of rational creatures in all their variety and diversity, held together by providence as one harmonious body tending
towards unity in God (*Princ.* 2.1.2–3). Again, *Princ.* 2.1–3 is a complete block, treating 'the world' in all senses of that term.

Finally, we have the headings given to two other chapters. It is incorrect to title *Princ.* 1.7 'Things corporeal and things incorporeal.' This would again be an odd topic to juxtapose between a discussion about rational beings and one on the angels. Although Origen does indeed begin with a discussion about bodily and bodiless things, things visible and things invisible, he opens *Princ.* 1.7.2, with the clear statement: 'We have made these preliminary remarks wanting to come, in order, to the investigation of the sun and moon and stars.' This chapter should thus be so titled, or, as he puts it more briefly later on, 'The celestial beings.' Once again, this clarifies the sequence of topics treated by Origen: rational beings, then celestial beings (for the Scriptures do indeed speak of the sun, moon, and stars as being animated and rational), and finally the angels, before turning to a discussion about how all these rational beings fit together as one world. Similarly for *Princ.* 2.10, the resurrection is only discussed, as the opening lines make clear, in order that Origen might come in proper order to a treatment of the judgement, and then, in the following chapter, the promises.

### III Theology and Economy

Let us now return to the question of the relationship between the two cycles of exposition. It is clear that the second is longer than the first, and also is often more directed towards erroneous teaching. However, there is a much more significant difference between the two cycles that should be noted. This can be seen by the way in which Origen opens the discussion of the same topic in each, most clearly in treatments of Christ. In the first cycle, Origen begins:

> In the first place, we must know that in Christ the nature of his divinity, as he is the only-begotten Son of God, is one thing, and another is the human nature, which in the last times he took on account of the economy.

(*Princ.* 1.2.1)

He opens up the treatment of Christ in the second cycle in the following way:

> It is time, now that these points have been discussed, for us to return to the Incarnation of our Lord and Saviour, how he became human and dwelt among human beings. The divine nature having been considered, to the best of our feeble ability, ... it remains that we should seek the medium between all these created things and God, that is, the Mediator, whom the Apostle Paul calls the first-born of all creation.

(*Princ.* 2.6.1, referring to 1 Tim. 2:5 and Col. 1:15)
The correlation between the two chapters could not be clearer, and the most appropriate terms to describe the respective treatments in the two cycles are 'theology' (a term not actually used here, but certainly implied by his reference to his previous consideration of the divine nature) and 'economy'. This differentiation also seems evident in the parallel treatments of other topics. In the first cycle God is treated rather abstractly, focusing primarily on his being bodiless; in the second cycle it is specified that this one God is the God of the Law and the Prophets and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. In the first cycle the Holy Spirit is considered together with the Father and Christ, and discussed primarily in terms of the power of sanctification; in the second, he affirms that it is the same Spirit who was in both the prophets and apostles, and his treatment then discusses the pouring out of the Holy Spirit upon all flesh and his role as another paraclete, as a consoler rather than advocate, for to advocate is Christ's work. In the first cycle, rational beings are discussed in terms of their arrangement; in the second, the focus is much more on the struggles in which they find themselves.

IV The Apostolic and the Ecclesiastical Preaching

Having clarified these chapter divisions and headings, we can now turn back to Origen's Preface to his work and see, not only just how precisely he has laid out its overarching structure, but also a further differentiation that has significant implications for our understanding of On First Principles and Origen's theology as a whole. While it is routinely stated that in the Preface Origen differentiates between those theological points that are established and those that remain open for further reflection, this is not quite exact. Origen begins his Preface by quoting John 1:17, 'grace and truth came through Jesus Christ'; and further specifies that by the words of Christ he means not only 'those which he spoke when he became human and dwelt in the flesh; for even before this, Christ, the Word of God, was in Moses and the prophets', and still is in those such as Paul who have Christ speaking in them (Pr.1; 2 Cor. 13:3). However, as differences of teaching have arisen, it is necessary to 'guard the ecclesiastical preaching, handed down from the apostles through the order of succession and remaining in the churches to the present: that alone is to be believed to be the truth which differs in no way from the ecclesiastical and apostolic tradition' (Pr.2). Moreover, the apostles 'delivered with utmost clarity ... certain points that they believed to be necessary, leaving, however, the grounds of their statements to be inquired into' by those who excel in the gifts of the Spirit, language, wisdom, and knowledge; while on other points they simply asserted things to be so, 'keeping silence about how or whence they are' so that those who have proved themselves worthy of receiving wisdom might 'have an exercise on which they might display the fruit of their ability' (Pr.3).
Origen then continues (my underlined emphasis):

[Pr.4.] The particular points, which are clearly handed down by the preaching of the apostles are as follows:

First, that there is one God, who created and arranged all things, ... This just and good God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, himself gave the law and the prophets and the Gospels, who is also the God of the apostles and of the Old and New Testaments.

Then, again, that Jesus Christ himself, who came, was born of the Father before all creatures. After ministering to the Father in the foundation of all things, for *by him were all things made*, in the last times, emptying himself, he became human and was incarnate ...

Then, again, they handed down that the Holy Spirit is associated in honour and dignity with the Father and the Son. But in this case it is not yet clearly discerned whether he is born or not-born, or whether he is to be considered as himself Son of God or not: but these are points which are yet to be inquired into, to the best of our ability, from holy Scripture, and investigated with the requisite wisdom. That this Holy Spirit inspired each one of the saints, both the prophets and the apostles, and that there was not one Spirit in those of old but another in those who were inspired at the coming of Christ, is indeed most clearly taught throughout the churches.

[Pr.5] After these points, also, that the soul, having its own substance and life, shall, after it departs from this world, obtain an inheritance of eternal life and blessedness, if its actions shall have excelled, or be delivered up to eternal fire and torments, if the sin of its wicked deeds shall so direct it: and also, that there is to be a time of resurrection from the dead, when this body, which now is sown in corruption, shall rise in incorruptibility, and that which is sown in dishonour, will rise in glory.

This also is defined in the ecclesiastical preaching, that every rational soul possesses free-will and volition; that it is in conflict against the devil and his angels, and opposing powers, because they strive to burden it with sins; but if we live rightly and carefully, we should endeavour to shake off such a burden. ...

[Pr.6] Regarding the devil and his angels and the opposing powers, the ecclesiastical preaching has taught that they indeed exist, but what they are, or how they exist, it has not explained sufficiently clearly. ...

[Pr.7] This also is part of the ecclesiastical preaching, that this world was made and began at a certain time and, because it is corruptible, will be dissolved. But what existed before this world, or what will exist after it, has not yet become known openly to many, for no clear statement on this is set forth in the ecclesiastical preaching.

[Pr.8] Then, finally, that the Scriptures were written by the Spirit of God, and that they have not only the meaning which is obvious, but also another which escapes the notice of most. ...

[Pr.9] This is also in the ecclesiastical preaching, that there are certain angels of God and good powers, who minister to him in accomplishing the salvation of human beings; but when these were created, or of what kind of being, or how they exist, is not explained with sufficient clarity. Regarding the sun, moon, and stars, whether they are animated beings or inanimate is not clearly handed down.
The first point to note is that for each of the four primary items (God, Christ, the Spirit, and rational beings) Origen already makes a twofold statement relating to the two cycles of the work, theology and economy. Second, although Origen speaks, in Pr.2, of ‘the ecclesiastical and apostolic tradition’ in the singular, ‘preserved through the order of succession’ and present in the churches to his day, he does in fact make a distinction, between those things which the apostles ‘delivered with utmost clarity’ and those that they merely asserted, leaving the grounds of their statements for further reflection. This distinction is, moreover, parsed out by Origen in the list given above in terms of what belongs to the apostolic preaching and what to the ecclesiastical preaching. The tradition is indeed singular, but it is comprised of both the apostolic preaching and the ecclesiastical preaching.

This distinction between the apostolic preaching and the ecclesiastical preaching is, furthermore, maintained throughout the course of On First Principles. Thus, after discussing the apostolic preaching (that is, God, Christ, the Spirit, and rational beings) in Princ. 1.1–6, Origen begins his next chapter with these words:

The matters, then, which we have examined above, were considered by us in a more general manner, treating and discussing rational natures, more through discernment of inference than by dogmatic definition, after the place where we spoke, to the best of our ability, of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Let us now, therefore, consider those matters that it is appropriate to discuss in the following pages, according to our teaching, that is, according to the faith of the Church.

(Princ. 1.7.1)

The reference to having treated some matters ‘more through discernment of inference than by dogmatic definition’ only applies to the latter part of the preceding chapter (Princ. 1.5–6). As we have seen above, Princ. 1.5–6 begins by describing what Scripture asserts to be the case: amongst the rational beings, there are holy angels, opposing powers, and the ‘rational animals’ in between. It is when examining the causes for this variation, and understanding the beginning in terms of the end, a discussion which is now already described as ‘the ecclesiastical faith,’ that Origen changes the mode of his argumentation: ‘These things are indeed spoken about by us with great fear and caution, discussing and investigating rather than establishing as fixed and certain’ (Princ. 1.6.1). Just as in Princ. 1.3–4, the chapter on the Holy Spirit, where Origen already discusses rational beings in its latter part, before turning to the rational beings themselves in the following chapter, to sort out what Scripture says about these beings, so also, in Princ. 1.5–6, Origen cannot stop himself from also beginning to speak about matters pertaining to ‘the ecclesiastical faith’ by attempting to provide an explanation for the cause of their differences. But it is only in Princ. 1.7.1 that he definitively turns to ‘our teaching, that is,
according to the faith of the Church. Thus, although in the opening sentence he says that 'it has been pointed out by us above what are those points that must be clearly determined by dogma, which, I think, we have done to the best of our ability when we spoke about the Trinity', the scriptural affirmations regarding rational beings also belong to what is given as apostolic preaching, even though already in Princ. 1.6.1, he has begun treating 'matters of a kind needing discussion rather than definition'.

Similarly in the second cycle, after treating the apostolic preaching (Princ. 2.2–9), he opens the next chapter by saying:

But since our discourse has reminded us of the judgement to come and of the retribution and punishment of sinners, in accordance with the things threatened by holy Scripture and contained in the ecclesiastical preaching ... let us also see what ought to be thought about these points.

(Princ. 2.10.1)

As with the transition in the first cycle, Origen has already prepared the way for the further, more speculative, subjects which he is about to treat, and which he again describes as 'the ecclesiastical preaching'. There are three further references, in the appropriate sections, to 'the ecclesiastical faith' (Princ. 1.7.1; 3.1.1, preserved also in Greek; 3.5.1), but these two key transitional points, and their conformity to the Preface, are sufficient to establish this further level of division within On First Principles. The differentiation between the apostolic and the ecclesiastical preaching would seem to be that the apostolic proclamation concerns the basic elements of the Gospel preaching—God, through Christ, in the Spirit, acting to save rational creatures, bringing them into life in himself—while the ecclesiastical preaching deals with corollaries of this apostolic preaching: that, if we are able to be saved, or not, in Christ, we must have self-determination, in the exercise of which we find ourselves in conflict with opposing powers and with ourselves, and that although our end is in the eternity of God, we have nevertheless come into being in time.

The final item from the list of topics given in the Preface is Scripture and its divine character and two levels of meaning. Scripture is not treated at all in the first cycle, and so, I would suggest, Princ. 4.1–3 should not be thought of as part of the second cycle, but instead, following Daley's insightful essay, that it be seen as a distinct section and, in fact, the real purpose of the whole work. We will consider this further below, once we have concluded our analysis of the structure of the two cycles that precede it. Based on the above reflections, I would propose, and have adopted for the layout of the text and translation, the following structure for On First Principles.

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72 Daley, 'Origen's De Principiis'.

Preface

Part One: Theology

I: The Apostolic Preaching
   God (1.1)
   Christ (1.2)
   The Holy Spirit (1.3–4)
   Rational Beings (1.5–6)
II: The Church's Preaching
   The Celestial Beings (1.7)
   Angels (1.8)
   The World (2.1–3)

Part Two: Economy

I: The Apostolic Preaching
   That the God of the Law and the Prophets and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is one (2.4–5)
   The Incarnation of Christ (2.6)
   The Holy Spirit (2.7)
   The Soul (2.8)
   The World and Movements of Rational Creatures (2.9)
II: The Church's Preaching
   The Judgement (2.10)
   The Promises (2.11)
   Free Will (3.1)
      1: On Free Will (3.1.2–6)
      2: Difficult Passages in Scripture (3.1.7–24)
   The Opposing Powers (3.2–3)
   On Human Temptations (3.4)
   That the World began in Time and Expects an End (3.5)
   The Consummation (3.6)

Part Three: The Inspired Scripture

   That the Scriptures are Divinely Inspired (4.1)
   How One Must Read and Understand the Scriptures (4.2–3)

Recapitulation (4.4)

The most important implication of taking On First Principles as structured in this manner is that the basic division is not between God, on the one hand, and creation (rational and otherwise) on the other, as it would come to be in later theology when the distinction between uncreated and created reality takes
precedence, and as it is in the structuring of the opening chapters in other editions of this work. Rather, rational beings are taken together with God, Christ, the Holy Spirit as the four elements of the apostolic preaching (and how indeed could it be otherwise, given that it is preaching—there must be hearers ready to hear the good news) and reflected upon first on a theological level and then an economic level. The distinction between uncreated and created reality perhaps became the fundamental distinction in the following century, as a result of the 'Arian' controversy, in which both sides could claim precedence in Origen; but, in another sense, it only became primary as theological reflection later on (perhaps only in more recent times) became detached from the liturgical worship of the Church. It is striking, for instance, how even in the last third of the fourth century, and in his work written specifically against Eunomius, Gregory of Nyssa begins the 'exposition of our own conception of the truth' by dividing up reality in a way much more akin to Origen, both of them following the Apostle Paul's distinction between things that are seen and transient and those that are unseen and eternal (2 Cor. 4:18). Gregory's words will be important for our later discussion, and so we will quote part of them here:

Now, the ultimate division of all being is into the intellectual and the perceptible [Πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἡ ἀνωτάτω διαίρεσις εἶς τῷ νοητῷ καὶ τῷ αἰωνίῳ τῆς τομῆς ἐξει]; the perceptible nature is called by the Apostle that which is seen. For as all body has colour, and the sight apprehends this, he calls this world by the rough and ready name of that which is seen ... The common term, again for the intellectual world, is with the apostle, that which is not seen: by withdrawing all idea of comprehension by the senses he leads the mind on to the immaterial and intellectual. Reason again divides this which is not seen into the uncreated and the created, inferentially comprehending it: the uncreated being that which effects the creation, the creation that which owes its origin and its force to the uncreated. In the sensible world, then, is found everything that we comprehend by our organs of bodily sense, and in which the differences of qualities involve the idea of more or less ... But in the intelligible world—that part of it, I mean, which is created—the idea of such differences as are perceived in the perceptible cannot find a place; another method, then, is devised for discovering the degrees of greater and less.29

The distinction between the uncreated and the created finds its place within the overarching apostolic distinction between the seen and transient, on the one hand, and the unseen and eternal, on the other. Rational beings, as intellects, clearly fall within the latter, along with the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. We will return later to what all this might mean for Origen's understanding of creation, time, and eternity.

29 Gregory of Nyssa, Eun. 1.270–3; the discussion continues for several more sections before beginning his response to Eunomius on its basis (1.282).
Origen’s monotheism, then, is not that of later philosophical deism (not even a Trinitarian deism), with God considered in or by himself (or as three), prior to and independent of rational beings. It is rather a biblical monarchical monotheism, in which God is seen as presiding over the heavenly court, in the celebration of the heavenly liturgy: ‘God is in the congregation of gods’ (Ps. 82:1). This is the vision of God that pervades the Scriptures, throughout the Old Testament, and even increasing in the literature of Second Temple Judaism and apocalyptic works, to the New Testament proclamation that the crucified and risen Christ has been exalted to sit at the right hand of the Majesty on high (Heb. 1:3), in the throne room beheld by John in his Apocalypse, in which the One who sits on the throne and the slain Lamb are offered ‘blessing and honour and glory and might unto the ages of ages’ (Rev. 5:13).

It is also the vision of God experienced by Christians in their worship upon earth, where the heavenly and earthly liturgy coincide. It is captured most concisely in the preface to the anaphora of Basil the Great:

Master, the One who is, Lord, God, Father, Almighty, who are to be worshipped, it is truly right and proper and fitting the majesty of your holiness to praise you, to hymn you, to bless you, and to worship you, to thank you, to glorify you, the only God who truly exists; to offer you with a broken heart and a spirit of humility, this our reasonable worship. For it is you who have granted us the knowledge of your truth. And who is able to tell of all your acts of power? To make all your praises heard or to recounts all your wonders at every moment? Master of all things, Lord of heaven and earth and all creation, seen and unseen, who are seated on a throne

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of glory and look upon the deeps, without beginning invisible, unsearchable, uncircumscribed, unchangeable,
the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the great God and Saviour, our hope, who is the image of your goodness, perfect seal of your likeness, revealing you the Father in himself, living Word, true God, pre-eternal Wisdom, Life, Sanctification, Power, the true Light,
through whom the Holy Spirit was made manifest, the Spirit of truth, the grace of sonship, the pledge of the inheritance to come, the first-fruits of the eternal good things, the life-giving power, the source of sanctification,
through whom every rational and intelligent being is empowered, worships you and ascribes to you the everlasting άνάπλωμα hymn of glory, because all things are your servants.75

In this tapestry of Scriptural allusions, the God and Father, Christ, his Son and our great God and Saviour, the Holy Spirit, and all rational and intellectual beings are held together in the flow of one continuous sentence, expressing one movement from God, through Christ, through the Spirit, through whom all rational beings, in return, send forth praise to God. It is, moreover, an 'everlasting', or more strictly timeless, hymn that the servants of God—creatures, who have come into being in time, distinct from the uncreated God—offer to their Lord.

The distinction between the apostolic and the ecclesiastical preaching, with its placement of rational beings together with God, Christ, and the Spirit, brings us into some of the thorniest problems of interpreting Origen's theology: the idea that he taught that rational beings exist eternally, before and outside of creation, and that, through satiety or sloth, they fell into the various ranks of increasingly dense bodies—ideas that were (rightly!) anathematized in the sixth century. Before we turn to these matters, however, we must first consider what is the place of his treatment of Scripture in On First Principles, and, indeed, what might be meant by the title itself.

V Scripture, Book Four, and the Purpose of On First Principles

We will deal with the difficulties of understanding the place of Princ. 4, its treatment of Scripture and the Recapitulation, quite extensively, as doing so will also prepare the groundwork for the following sections of this Introduction. Much of the problem with the title derives from the ambiguity of the term 'principle' (άρχή), an ambiguity noted by Rufinus in his first preface: he suggests that it can be translated either by 'principle' (principium) or by 'principality' (principatus). Daley points out that the word ἀρχή, which

75 For the Greek text, see E. E. Brightman, Eastern Liturgies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896), 321–3; the translation is that of Archimandrite Ephrem Lash.
basically means 'source' or 'beginning'; was used in ancient philosophy to mean either 'the root assumption of a theoretical system, a principle in a logical sense or the ultimate underlying cause for the existence of some actual thing, a principle in a causal or ontological sense.' While nineteenth- and early twentieth-century scholars took the title of Origen's work in the first sense, as providing the fundamental axioms of a theological system, some clearly stated, others to be worked out, more recent scholars, as we have seen, took the title in the second sense, so that the work is understood, in the company of other introductory handbooks, as treating the primary realities of God and beings. Daley helpfully suggests, instead, that the title 'bears an ambiguity of reference Origen may well have intended: constructing a cohesive survey of the ontological principles of the world's beings, as Christian faith perceives them, also brings together for him, the logical principles for an understanding of the content of revelation that is both the anchor and the starting point of authentic and creative biblical interpretation.' The advantage of this approach is that it enables us to understand the place of Origen's treatment of Scripture (Princ. 4.1–3), following the two cycles of theological and economic interpretation of the content of the apostolic and the ecclesiastical preaching.

Origen ends his Preface, after enumerating the topics for consideration, by briefly discussing the (non-Scriptural) term 'incorporeal' and concludes by saying that

everyone who desires to construct a certain structure and a body of all these things, in accordance with reason, must make use of elements and foundations [probably: στοιχεῖοι καὶ ἀρχαῖ] of this sort ... that by clear and cogent arguments the truth about each particular point may be discovered, and he may form, as we have said, one body, by means of illustrations and assertions, either those which he came upon in the holy Scriptures or those which he discovered to follow by investigation and right reason. (Pr.10)

As Daley observes, Origen clearly sees himself as building, out of what he has found in Scripture and what follows on from this, 'the kind of integrated, demonstrative, logically coherent system of knowledge that in the Aristotelian tradition was called a science (ἐπιστήμη). The most important characteristic of such knowledge was that it was built upon premises or axioms that were proper to the knowledge itself. According to Aristotle, such 'hypotheses' are the starting points or first principles (ἀρχαί) of demonstration. They cannot be proved, otherwise they would be dependent upon something prior to them, and we would be led into an infinite regression. They are simply grasped by the intellect (νοῦς), through the course of its lived experience

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76 Daley, 'Origen's De Principiis', 6. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 10. 79 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. 5.1.2 (1013a17). 80 Cf. Ibid. 4.4.2 (1006a6–12).
in the world, and as such are grounded in sense-perception and held together by the memory.\textsuperscript{81}

Aristotle's account of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) was largely appropriated by later philosophy and incorporated into the handbooks of philosophy, contemporary with Origen. In the face of the Sceptics, it also became a matter of necessity to begin any systematic presentation of philosophy with an account of the 'criterion' or 'canon,' which, as we have seen above, is what Alcinous does; Origen also appeals to the canon in his Preface. Without a criterion or canon, knowledge is simply not possible, for all inquiry will be drawn helplessly into an infinite regression. Epicurus' Canon seems to have been the first work devoted to establishing 'the criteria of truth.'\textsuperscript{82} In Hellenistic philosophy, it was generally held that it is preconceptions (πρόληψεις—generic notions synthesized out of repeated sense perceptions, later held to be innate) that facilitate knowledge and act as criteria.\textsuperscript{83} The self-evidence (ἐνάργεια) of the sense perceptions, for the Epicureans, and the clarity of cognitive impressions, for the Stoics, provide the infallible criterion for examining what truly exists, though, as Clement of Alexandria points out, even Epicurus accepted that this 'preconception of the intellect' is 'faith,' and that without it, neither inquiry nor judgement is possible.\textsuperscript{84}

Returning to Aristotle, the knowledge he is speaking about is also connected to wisdom. Daley highlights a passage from the Magna Moralia attributed to Aristotle (expanding a point made briefly in the Nichomachean Ethics) explaining how wisdom combines both intellect or intuitive knowledge and knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). While the intellect deals with the first principles of things intelligible and existent, knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) deals with what can be demonstrated, as the first principles themselves are indemonstrable. Wisdom, however,

\textsuperscript{81} Cf. Aristotle, An. post. 2.19 (99b17-100b17). Jonathan Barnes, in a passage used by Daley, points out that in describing the characteristics of scientific knowledge, Aristotle is not prescribing a particular method of inquiry, but 'is concerned with the organization and presentation of results of research: its aim is to say how we may collect into an intelligible whole the scientist's various discoveries—how we may so arrange the facts that their interrelations, and in particular their explanations, may best be revealed and grasped.' *Aristotle's Posterior Analytics*, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), xii.

\textsuperscript{82} Cf. Diogenes Laertius, Vita, 10.31.


\textsuperscript{84} Cf. Aristotle, *Strom.* 2.5.16.3.
is compounded of both knowledge and intellect, for wisdom is concerned both with the first principles and with what is already demonstrated from the first principles, those things that are the concern of knowledge. So far, then, as it is concerned with first principles, [wisdom] partakes of intellect; so far as it is concerned with what can thereafter be demonstrated, it partakes of knowledge.85

This is exactly the kind of wisdom that Origen wants to present, the Wisdom that is Christ himself, whose primary title is the Wisdom of God, for Wisdom is ‘the beginning [ἀρχή] of [God’s] ways for his works’ (Prov. 8:22; Princ. 1.2.1–3). And, as Origen makes clear in the opening and concluding lines of the Preface, the Christian knowledge he intends to expound as a coherent structure is the teaching of Christ, the Word of God who spoke in Moses and the prophets and also in the apostles.

But it is only after having expounded, twice over, the first principles of this system of knowledge, and the primary elements that it contains, that Origen turns to the Scriptures themselves. He begins by noting how to this point his discussion has been based on ‘the common conceptions [τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοιάς] and the evidence [τῆς ἐναργείας] of things that are seen’ (those things that for Aristotle serve as the principles for knowledge, ἐναργεῖα) and has also used the testimonies from the Scriptures, but that it is now time to turn to the Scriptures themselves, to show that they are indeed divine by demonstrating how they speak of Christ (Princ. 4.1.1). The connection between understanding the divine character of the Scriptures and their speaking of Christ is particularly highlighted by Origen: it was not possible to show the divine inspiration of the ancient Scriptures before the sojourn of Christ; but the sojourn of Jesus led to the clear conviction that they were composed by heavenly grace. ‘The light contained in the Law of Moses, but hidden by a veil, shone forth at the sojourn of Jesus, when the veil was taken away and the good things, of which the letter had a shadow, came gradually to be known’ (Princ. 4.1.6).

However surprising this might be to a modern reader, it was a commonly acknowledged point to early Christians. Irenaeus makes exactly the same point: Christ was hidden in the Scriptures, which could not be understood until the time when the things that they had spoken of had come to fulfilment; the book had been ‘shut up’ and ‘sealed, until the consummation’ (cf. Dan. 12.4) and so is full of enigmas and ambiguities; those who read it without possessing

85 Aristotle, Mag. mor. 1.34.13–14 (1197a21–29): Ὅ δὲ νῦν ἐστι περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν νοητῶν καὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη τῶν μετ’ ἀποδείξεως ὄντων ἔστιν, ἂς δ’ ἀρχαὶ ἀναπόδεικται, ἦστε γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἰς περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἢ ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλ’ ὅ νῦν. Ἡ δὲ σοφία ἐστὶν εἰς ἐπιστήμην καὶ νῦν συγκεκριμένη, ἐστὶν γὰρ ἡ σοφία καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἡ δεικτὰμενα, περὶ α’ ἡ ἐπιστήμην ἢ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς, τοῦ νῦν αὐὴ μετέχει, ἢ δὲ περὶ τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς μετ’ ἀποδείξεως ὄντα, τῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχει: See also Aristotle, Eth. nic. 6.7.3 (1141a17–20).
the proper explanation only find a myth, for the truth that it contains is only brought to light by the cross of Christ, and only reading it in this way do we find our way into the Wisdom of God and ourselves come to shine with his light as did Moses. The same point, as J. Louis Martyn has made clear, is evident in the Gospel of John and the writings of Paul: 'the fundamental arrow in the link joining scripture and gospel points from the gospel story to the scripture and not from scripture to the gospel story. In a word, with Jesus' glorification, belief in scripture comes into being by acquiring an indelible link to belief in Jesus' words and deeds. For Christians to read Scripture as Scripture is to read it in an apocalyptic key. Even if we are not prepared to do so ourselves, it is still essential to recognize that when we read the writings of the early Christian Fathers, they, nevertheless, are reading Scripture in this way.

Despite the fact that the meaning of Scripture often eludes us, that it does indeed contain a divine sense is not disproved by our lack of comprehension, just as God's providential ordering of the world and its affairs, which also often eludes us, is not refuted by our inability to comprehend it (Princ. 4.1.7). And so, Origen urges us, using the words of Paul, to 'leave' behind the teaching of the first principles of Christ, which are but the elementary principles of knowledge, [and] press on to perfection (ibid.; Heb 6:1), so that we might receive the wisdom that Paul says he speaks to the perfect (1 Cor. 2:6). He concludes, putting together various passages from Paul: 'this wisdom will be stamped upon us distinctly, according to the revelation of the mystery [κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν μυστηρίου] which was kept secret through times eternal, but now made manifest through the prophetic Scriptures and the appearance of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, to whom be glory for all ages. Amen.'

What follows, in Princ. 4.2–3, are indications about how to read and understand Scripture, based upon 'the rule of the heavenly Church of Jesus Christ [handed down] through succession from the apostles.' It is here that he

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88 Princ. 4.1.7; Rom. 16:25–7; 2 Tim. 1:10 (cf. 1 Tim. 6:14). It is worth noting that the only other place where Origen concludes a section with a doxology and 'Amen' is Princ. 3.5.8.
89 Princ. 4.2.2 (Greek). Is he here making a contrast with the rule and succession of the church on earth, as appealed to in the Preface, perhaps now having come into greater conflict with Demetrius? This might explain the concluding doxology and 'Amen' at the end of Princ. 4.1.7, making Princ. 4.2–3 an expansion of his hermeneutic in a more strained context. Is it perhaps even possible that a previous 'edition' concluded with the doxology and 'Amen' at the end of Princ. 3.5?
suggests that there are three levels of meaning in Scripture, corresponding to
the body, soul, and spirit in a human being (Princ. 4.2.4–6), though, as this is
rarely carried out by Origen himself in his commentaries and homilies, it is far
from being intended as a methodological procedure; it is rather the simple
observation that the meaning of any given passage is not always self-evident. 90
More important are the three aims that the Spirit had in inspiring the Scriptures:
first, to instruct human beings about themselves and their situation (Princ.
4.2.7); second, to conceal these points, from those not prepared to undertake
the toil of discovering matters of such importance, within the narratives of
Scripture and yet make this ‘body’ of Scripture beneficial to the multitude
through an abundance of moral examples (Princ. 4.2.8); and third, to weave
into the narrative enough ‘stumbling blocks’ and ‘obstacles and impossibilities’
so that we become aware that there is a deeper meaning to be found rather
than remaining merely at the level of the letter (Princ. 4.2.8). The principal
aim in all of this was to make known the connection (eipudμs) amongst the
spiritual events and the sequence (ακολούθια) of intellectual realities,
harmonizing things that happened, according to the narrative, to the more
mystical meanings, but sometimes interweaving things that did not happen. 91
After giving various examples of such things—either things that could not
have happened or prescriptions that are impossible to fulfil—both in the Old
Testament and in the New, Origen reiterates, ‘our position is that with respect
to the whole of the divine Scripture all of it has a spiritual meaning, but not all
of it has a bodily meaning’ (Princ. 4.3.5).

Origen gives us his assurance that just because he asserts that some passages
do not have a ‘bodily meaning’ this does not at all mean that he holds that none
of it happened or that most precepts are not meant to be fulfilled literally.
But, as we have been directed by Christ himself to ‘search the Scriptures’, he
knows that he must also give a positive account of how to read Scripture, at
least in outline: ‘the manner of understanding of which seems to us to be such
as follows’ (end of 4.3.5, Greek). On the surface level, Scripture does indeed
give an account of how God chooses a certain nation, Israel, also called Jacob,
which was divided into twelve tribes during the times of Jeroboam, with the
ten tribes subject to him being named Israel, and the remaining two, the tribe
of Levi and the one ruled over by the seed of David, being called Judah,
the metropolis of which is Jerusalem (Princ. 4.3.6). But, when Paul speaks of

90 Cf. Karen Jo Torjesen, Hermeneutical Procedure and Theological Method in Origen’s Exegesis
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986), 35–43, and passim.

91 Origen, Princ. 4.2.9. Irenaeus also appeals to the ‘order and sequence’ of the Scriptures,
when complaining about how his opponents rearrange the tiles of the mosaic of Scripture to
produce an image of a dog or fox (Haer. 1.8.1); but, he continues a little later, those, who know the
‘canon of truth’ are able to restore the tiles to the proper place (Haer. 1.9.4) and restore the image
of the king.
'Israel according to the flesh' (1 Cor. 10:18), and says that 'not all who are descended from Israel belong to Israel' (Rom. 9:6), Origen takes him to mean that there is also an 'Israel according to the Spirit', made up of Jews who are so, not openly, with circumcision in the flesh, for 'he is a Jew who is one in secret, and circumcision is of the heart, in spirit not in letter' (Rom. 2:28–9). So, Origen concludes, while Scripture provides a narrative (the bulk of which is indeed true according to the letter) of the bodily Israelites descending from Adam, if truth be told, 'Adam is Christ', from whom all the spiritual Israelites descend, and Eve likewise is the Church, 'the Jerusalem which is above', 'our mother', 'the city of the living God', to which we are called, 'to the festal gathering and the church of the first-born who are enrolled in heaven'.

Likewise, also, for Egypt and the Egyptians, Tyre and the Tyrians, for no one, Origen points out, takes what is said in Ezekiel about Pharaoh or the ruler of Tyre as referring to a human being, nor in Isaiah about Nebuchadnezzar. In what follows, Origen uses this differentiation to seek out 'the dark and invisible and hidden treasures' (Isa. 45:3), hidden in the Scriptures, alluding back to many of the topics that he has covered in the first three books. Having opened up a world of unseen mysteries, Origen concludes by returning to the other item mentioned in the Preface, the existence of things bodiless, affirming, as he has done at several points throughout the work, that though bodiless in themselves, they never exist without a body, for the Trinity alone is, strictly speaking, bodiless.

This discussion about bodiless reality at the end of his treatment of Scripture also resurfaces in the final part of Book 4, the 'Recapitulation' (Princ. 4.4). In fact, it dominates the whole last half of this concluding chapter (Princ. 4.4.5–10), forming an inclusio with the concluding paragraphs of the Preface. After summarizing many of the points he has made during the course of the work, Origen turns to the question of matter, devoting several pages to showing just how difficult a philosophical concept it is. He claims to have found no instance in Scripture where the word 'matter' is used to refer to a substance underlying bodies; when Isaiah says, 'And he shall devour matter [δύνα] like hay' (Isa. 10:17), the word refers to 'sins'. If the bodiless God is said to be a

93 Princ. 4.3.9; cf. Ezek. 29:1–9; 28; Isa. 14:12. These figures and passages are treated at length in Princ. 1.5.
94 Princ. 4.3.11–15. See also Princ. 2.11.5, 'The Promises', which discusses what we will come to know when we depart and are with Christ (Phil. 1:23). The items mentioned by Origen have much in common with the apocalyptic texts. Cf. Michael E. Stone, 'List of Revealed Things in the Apocalyptic Literature', in Frank Moore Cross et al. eds., Magnalia Dei: The Mighty Acts of God (New York, 1976), 414–52.
95 Princ. 4.3.15; cf. 1.7.1; 2.2.2; 4.4.8; see also Cels. 6.71; 7.32.
'consuming fire'; as Origen had explained in the opening paragraphs of Princ. 1.1, it is not because he consumes bodily matter, but rather our evil thoughts, wicked actions, and desire for sin, so that he makes us capable of receiving his Word and Wisdom, as Christ himself had promised, saying 'I and the Father shall come and make our abode in him': 'he makes them, after all their vices and passions have been consumed, into a temple pure and worthy of himself' (Princ. 1.1.2; John 14:23).

For Origen, matter is certainly not itself a first principle, as some philosophers postulated (Princ. 4.4.6). But it is possible, Origen suggests, by way of a verse from First Enoch, 'My eyes have seen your imperfection,' to differentiate between matter and its properties or qualities, so that 'the mind of the prophet, examining and discussing every single visible thing, walked until it arrived at the first principle in which it beheld imperfect matter without qualities; for it is written in the same book, with Enoch himself speaking, “I beheld the whole of matter”, which Origen takes to mean the divisions of matter into everything in this world.96

God alone, Origen continues, is uncreated, and, being good by nature, he wants to benefit others, those, that is, who are able to receive him and be begotten as sons. Moreover, as God makes all things 'by number and measure' (Wis. 11:20), he alone being without end or measure, all created things are distinguished by number, in the case of intellectual beings, and by measure, in the case of matter. Intellectual beings necessarily use bodies, for God alone is bodiless, but, as we can differentiate, in thought alone, between matter itself and its properties, the properties of the body can change, by the will of the Creator, as the case demands. And just as our physical eyes are able to partake of light, and are thus of one nature, so also every intellect that partakes of the intellectual light of the divine nature is also of one nature and substance with each other. And sharing in the light of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, it is necessary that we should become incorruptible and eternal, 'so that the eternity of divine goodness may be understood in this respect as well, that those who obtain its benefits are also eternal' (Princ. 4.4.9). Even if we fall away from this, we retain within ourselves some seeds, as it were, of being restored and recalled to a better understanding, when the inner human being, who is also called the "rational" human being, is renewed according to the image and likeness of God who created him.

If, then, the human being is made 'in the image and likeness' of God, this is not seen in the form of the body, in or through matter subject to corruption, but through the acquisition of virtue, as the human being learns to be merciful

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96 Princ. 4.4.8; 1 Enoch 21:1 (GCS 5, p. 50.4), which uses the word ἀκατασκέυαστος, no doubt taken from Gen. 1:2; and 1 Enoch 19:3 (GCS 5, p. 48.18f), which speaks of Enoch seeing the 'extremities of all things' (πέρατα πάντων). The text is found in Clement of Alexandria, Ecl. proph. 2.1 (Stählin, 3.137.16–17): καὶ εἶδον τὰς Ὑλὰς πάσας. Cf. 2 Enoch 40:1.
as the Father is and so become perfect as he is (Luke 6:36; Matt. 5:48). We are therefore called to advance from bodily things, perceptible to the senses, to bodiless and intellectual realities, which are not perceptible to the senses, yet nevertheless seen through that which Solomon, the teacher of wisdom, calls 'a divine sense' (*Princ.* 4.4.10; Prov. 2:5). It is with this sense that we will perceive rational beings, and with this sense Origen asks that what he has said and written be understood. Finally Origen concludes his work by referring to the distinction between first principles and the demonstrations that they enable: 'And concerning those points about which we have spoken, or others which follow on from them, we must think in accordance with the pattern we have laid out above.'

In the acquisition of divine virtues and a divine sense we do not shed our bodies or become bodiless, as Origen was repeatedly charged with having taught. Rather, the properties and qualities of our bodies, which are distinct from matter itself, are transformed, as those of iron are when placed in fire, to use the analogy that Origen applies to Christ himself, which we will consider more fully later; iron placed in fire becomes wholly fire, so that no other property is perceived in it. Our bodies now are certainly corruptible; when we die, they will disintegrate and be dissolved back into the earth. But, as Origen expounds at length in *Princ.* 3.6, the last chapter of his second cycle of teaching, when what is sown in corruption and weakness, as an animated body, rises in the consummation, it will do so in power and glory, as a spiritual body (cf. 1 Cor. 15:42–4). In this, God 'has the service of matter in every way, so that he can transform and apply it in whatever forms and species he desires' (*Princ.* 3.6.7). It is of this transformed, spiritual body that Paul further says, 'we have a house not made by hands, eternal in the heavens' (2 Cor. 5:1; *Princ.* 3.6.4). Moreover, in this eschatological consummation, 'God will be all in all' and so we too will become 'one as the Father and Son are one.' It is with this discussion of 'the principle of bodily nature, or of the spiritual body' that Origen brings his second cycle to a close. As created beings, then, differentiated by number and always embodied in matter, we are nevertheless called to become one, eternal, and, purged of our vices and passions by the consuming fire that God is, to become the temple of God himself. In other words, we are called to embody the bodiless God, not in matter as we presently experience it, but in matter transformed by the power of God: 'God ... makes and transforms all things' (Amos 5:8; *Princ.* 3.6.7).

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97 1 Cor 15:28; John 17:24, as cited by Origen in *Princ.* 3.6.1; his exposition of God being 'all in all' is strikingly similar to that of the human soul of Christ in the Word, as iron in the fire: the rational being 'will think God, see God, hold God; God will be the mode and measure of its every movement; and thus God will be all to it.'
VI Conclusion and the Context of On First Principles

As this rather lengthy survey of Princ. 4 (which was necessary in order to prepare the ground for the following sections of this Introduction) demonstrates, Princ. 4.1–3 is not merely yet another treatise added on, with a number of others, to an already existing work, as Kannengiesser claimed, nor, as Harl maintained, a separate treatise on hermeneutics, which, while not an afterthought, as it is already mentioned in the Preface, is a change of direction nevertheless, moving from 'physics' to a theory of spiritual knowledge.* Rather, as Daley argued, it is 'its real goal: the introduction to a deeper way of reading Scripture that will be possible for him and plausible to his readers only after they have mastered the doctrinal structure he has been presenting in books one through three.'° The work as a whole is remarkably well organized and structured, from the laying out of the structure in the Preface, through the two treatments, theological and economic, of the apostolic preaching and the ecclesiastical preaching, organizing a coherent body of theological knowledge, whose first principles, or axioms, regarding the first principles of God, Christ, the Holy Spirit, and rational beings, have been established and their implications demonstrated, which then serve as a hermeneutical grounding for the studious reader to return to the Scriptures, with a divine sensibility, to be nourished by them so as to become as merciful and perfect as is God, and to realize their rightful place in the heavenly worship and as the temple of God.

If this, then, is the structure and the purpose of On First Principles, we are better able to understand the context in which it was written. As mentioned earlier, it was almost certainly written in 229/30. According to Nautin, by this time Origen had already completed his Hexapla, a Commentary on Psalms 1–25, his Stromata, a work On the Resurrection, and his Commentary on Lamentations. It was after completing the first few books of his Commentary on Genesis that Origen wrote On First Principles.°° As Nautin suggests, the most likely reason why Origen switched from completing his Commentary on Genesis to writing On First Principles was criticism directed against his exegesis of the opening verses of Genesis.°° The work was intended to demonstrate the grounding of his hermeneutic in a coherently presented account of the scientific knowledge of the ecclesial faith, which in turn would lead his readers into the deeper mysteries of theology and cosmogony. But far from reassuring his critics, 'no small warfare broke out in the city', as we saw earlier described obliquely by Eusebius, almost certainly alluding to the breakdown in relations

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°° For these works and their dates, see Nautin, Origène, 368–72.
°°° Ibid. 370, 423–5.
between Origen and Demetrius, which, again almost certainly, as we have seen, involved more than theological and exegetical differences alone.

3 THEOLOGY

Now that we have examined, in detail, the structure and purpose of On First Principles, we are in a position to reconsider some of the more difficult theological problems it presents, especially those that gave rise to the charges raised against Origen for having taught that there was an eternal realm of intellects, all of whom, apart from the one united to the Word, fell away into a diversity of ranks and bodies, but that after innumerable cycles of rising and falling, all will be restored to unity in God. As it happens, two of the key passages upon which these assertions are based lie within the two chapters on Christ, which thereby provide us with further material for exploring, respectively, his treatment of theology and then the economy.

I An Eternal Creation?

That Origen held creation to be in some sense eternal is based primarily on his argument in Princ. 1.2.10. This chapter deals with the titles of Christ expressing his divinity, especially and primarily Wisdom, who says of herself that God 'created me as the beginning of his ways' (Prov. 8:22). Origen's teaching on creation is notoriously complex and has been the subject of controversy almost from the beginning. Earlier on in Princ. 1.2, Origen had explained this verse in terms that recall both the Platonic 'ideas' and the Stoic 'reasons', suggesting that as,

within this very subsistence of Wisdom was every capacity and form of the creation that would come to be—both of those things which exist primarily and of those which occur in consequence, having been formed beforehand and arranged by the power of foreknowledge regarding these very created things, which had been as it were outlined and prefigured in Wisdom herself—Wisdom herself says through Solomon that she was created the beginning of the ways of God, that is, containing within herself the beginning and the reasons and the species of the entire creation.102

At that stage in his argument, then, if creation can be said to be eternal, it is only in a prefigurative sense.

103 Princ. 1.2.2. See also Princ. 1.4.4: 'In this Wisdom, therefore, who ever was with the Father, was creation always delineated and shaped, and there never was a moment when the prefiguration of those things, which were to be thereafter, was not in Wisdom.'
However, when Origen turns, in *Princ.* 1.2.10, to consider the verse in which Wisdom is said to be 'the emanation of the purest glory of the Almighty' (Wis. 7:25), he seems to imply a more concrete content to the eternal existence of creation. He begins by examining what might be meant by 'the glory of the Almighty' to then be able to understand what its 'emanation' is, and does so by way of an analogy to the correlation, used earlier in the chapter, between the existence of a father and that of a son, to demonstrate that the Son is eternal (*Princ.* 1.2.2). As it is impossible to be a father without a son, so also it is impossible for God to be almighty 'if there are not those over whom he can exercise his power'; and, as it is clearly better for God to be almighty than not, those things by virtue of which he is almighty must always have existed: 'if there never is a "when" when he was not almighty, by necessity those things must also subsist by which he is called the Almighty, and he must always have had those over whom he exercised power and which were governed by him as king or prince' and of these things, he adds, he will speak more fully in the proper place, when discussing the subject of his creatures (*Princ.* 1.2.10). Pared down to the bare bones of the logical structure of the analogy, as was done by Methodius of Olympus, and those who follow in his wake, this opening passage does indeed seem to suggest that creation must in some sense be eternally actualized for God to be eternally the Almighty. Stated in such a manner, as Williams suggests, it rests upon the premise that true statements about God must hold eternally, and the mistaken inference from this that anything standing in relation to God must also exist eternally.

However, as we have seen when considering the structure of the work, and as Origen himself reminds us in the last lines of the opening paragraph of this section, he is not here concerned with created beings themselves, but with the various titles of Christ and how they correlate amongst themselves and with the Father. So much is the analogy open to misunderstanding that he continues with a warning:

But even now, although briefly, I think it necessary to give a warning, since the question before us concerning Wisdom is how Wisdom is the ἀπορροια (or the emanation) of the purest glory of the Almighty, lest anyone should consider that the title of Almighty is anterior in God to the birth of Wisdom, through whom he is called Father, since it is said that [Wisdom] is the emanation of the purest glory of the Almighty. Let him who would think like this hear what the Scriptures clearly proclaim, saying, *In Wisdom have you made all things,* and the Gospel teaches, that *All things were made by him and without him nothing was made,* and

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103 See the account given by Methodius of Olympus (in a work entitled περὶ τῶν γενητῶν, 'On creatures'), as preserved by Photius Bibl. cod. 235 (Henry 5, 302a30–302b4); the passage is given in the footnotes to the text at *Princ.* 1.2.10.

let him understand from this that the title of Almighty cannot be older in God than that of Father, for it is through the Son that the Father is almighty.\textsuperscript{105}

In other words, Origen's concern is not so much the status of creation itself, but to work out the hierarchy of the scriptural titles for God and Christ. If Wisdom is said to be 'the ἀπόρροια (or the emanation) of the purest glory of the Almighty', it is nevertheless 'in Wisdom' that God has made all things and by the Word that 'all things were made', so that 'the title of Almighty cannot be older in God than that of Father, for it is through the Son that the Father is almighty'. In doing this, Origen establishes a fundamental theological point: the creative activity of God must be understood in terms of his existence already as Father.\textsuperscript{106} This is, in fact, the opening affirmation of almost every subsequent creed: I believe in One God Father Almighty. God's creative act is thus grounded in the eternal relationship between Father and Son.

Origen continues his examination of the verse in question by pointing out that, as an 'emanation,' Wisdom also shares in 'the glory of the Almighty', as is shown by the fact that Christ, the coming one, is also called 'the Almighty' in Scripture (Rev. 1:8). Moreover, since Scripture calls Christ 'God' (John 20:28), we should not hesitate to also call the Son of God 'Almighty'. And so:

in this way will that saying be true, which he himself says to the Father, \textit{All mine are yours and yours mine, and I am glorified in them}. Now, if all things which are the Father's are also Christ's, and, among all that the Father is, he is also Almighty, then without doubt the only-begotten Son ought to be Almighty, so that the Son might have all that the Father has, \textit{And I am glorified}, he says, \textit{in them}. For, \textit{at the name of Jesus every knee shall bow}, of things in heaven, and things on earth, and things under the earth, and every tongue shall confess that Jesus is Lord in the glory of God the Father. So, in this way is God's Wisdom herself the pure and clear emanation of the glory of God, in respect of his being Almighty, glorified as the emanation of omnipotence or of glory.\textsuperscript{107}

That is, not only does Scripture confer the title 'Almighty' upon both God and Christ, but the truth of their omnipotence is demonstrated by Paul's words in Philippians, that, as a result of the Passion, every knee bows at the name of Jesus. The dominion which the Father holds over all things, and by virtue of which he is called 'the Almighty', is exercised through his Son, who is thus also called 'Almighty', for 'at the name of Jesus every knee bows'. So, Origen concludes: 'if every knee bows to Jesus, then, without doubt, it is Jesus to whom all things have been subjected, and he it is who exercised power over all things, and through whom all things have been subjected to the Father'.

\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Princ.} 1.2.10; Ps. 103:24; John 1:3.


\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Princ.} 1.2.10; John 17:10; Phil. 2:10–11.
To make his point even clearer, Origen continues by explaining just what the glory of this omnipotence is:

And we add this, so that it may be more clearly understood what the glory of omnipotence is. The God and Father is Almighty because he has power over all things, that is, over heaven and earth, sun and moon, and all things in them. And he exercises power over them through his Word, for at the name of Jesus every knee bows, of things in heaven, and things on earth, and things under the earth. And, if every knee bows to Jesus, then, without doubt, it is Jesus to whom all things have been subjected, and he it is who exercised power over all things, and through whom all things have been subjected to the Father; for it is through Wisdom, that is by Word and Reason, not by force and necessity, that they have been subjected. And therefore his glory is in the very fact that he possesses all things, and this is the purest and most clear glory of omnipotence, that by Reason and Wisdom, not by force and necessity, all things have been subjected. Now the purest and most clear glory of Wisdom is a convenient designation to distinguish it from that glory which is not called pure or genuine.108

Christ's glory is 'pure or genuine', unlike that of every being that is created, for, as created and thus alterable, they can only possess righteousness or wisdom as an accidental property, and so they can also always fall away, whereas, as Origen concludes his treatment of this verse from Wisdom in Princ. 1.2.10, 'since the Wisdom of God, who is his only-begotten Son, is in all respects unalterable and unchangeable, and every good quality is in her essentially, such that it can never be changed or altered, therefore her glory is declared to be pure and genuine.'

For Origen, then, in Princ. 1.2.10, not only does the attribute of omnipotence which calls creation into being derive from the relationship between the Father and the Son, but the 'glory of omnipotence' is found nowhere else but on the cross, as the reference to the Philippians hymn makes clear. If we do not strip away from his argument the scriptural verses that he is in fact discussing, to treat it merely as a logical argument, but instead pay attention to the scriptural verses he uses to develop his argument, we see a very different picture emerge.

We will consider the relationship between Christ and the Cross more fully later, in the next section of the Introduction when we turn to the economy, but for now it is sufficient to note that Origen consistently connects Christ's lordship with his exaltation on the cross: 'the Son became king through suffering the cross'.109 In other words, the 'omnipotence' Origen is speaking about when using the analogy with the relationship between Father and Son is the power revealed through the weakness of the cross. And likewise the 'creation' that is brought into being by this omnipotence of God is not simply that of lifeless, inanimate, and irrational matter, over which a workman might

108 Princ. 1.2.10; Phil. 2:10–11; 1 Cor. 15:27–8.
exercise his power, but the creation brought into existence through his Word, 'by word and reason, not by force and necessity', that is, through persuasion upon rational, self-determining beings, who through God's long economy of creative activity come, in the end, to bow their knees in subjection to Christ, through whose own subjection to the Father God comes to be 'all in all'.

To understand what is going on here, it is important to note that the word 'creation', even in modern English, can be used in various ways. It can refer, for instance, to God's initial act of creation, creating the world ex nihilo, or it can refer to what which is thus brought into being, the creation, in which we now live and breathe. However, there is another sense in which the word can be used. Williams, in discussing how Origen spoke about the Son with reference to Proverbs 8:22, suggestively comments that for Origen 'creation, ktisis, is strictly only the unimpeded expression of God's rational will'. In this sense, following Proverbs 8:22, where Wisdom says of herself 'the Lord created me', Origen can perhaps even speak of Wisdom, the Son of God, as being a 'creature', though by this Origen clearly means something other than what was later understood as 'creation'. The 'creation' of God, everything brought into subjection to him such that he is 'all in all', is the reality brought into existence at the end, not the beginning, it is eschatological, not protological. And it is only by looking to the end that Origen, as we will see further below, tries to get some idea of the beginning.

Later tradition, with roots already in Isaiah (esp. 65:17–24), would of course speak of this as a 'new creation', or creation renewed, but that this eschatological reality can simply be called 'the creation' is also evidenced by the New Testament. It is seen most clearly in the opening self-identification that the risen Christ speaks to the church of Laodicea: 'The words of the Amen, the faithful and true witness [ὁ μαρτυρός], the beginning of God's creation [ἡ αρχὴ τῆς θεότητος τοῦ Θεοῦ] (Rev. 3:14). The Christ of the Apocalypse, the apocalyptic Christ, is the 'beginning' of God's creation. That 'the beginning of God's creation' is an 'Amen' is significant: God's 'creation' requires a response, an 'Amen'. It is, moreover, as the reference to 'faithful and true martyr' indicates,
something that comes about through death. As the verse from the Psalm puts it: "You take away their breath, they die and return to the dust, you send forth your Spirit and they will be created [κτισθήσονται]" (Ps. 103:29–30). The movement of the work of God is always, in Scripture, from death to life: 'I kill and I make alive' (Deut. 32:39). The 'Amen' which completes the creative work of God, making it his creation, is that given by the martyr.\footnote{This is perhaps also connected to the fact that whereas everything else in Gen. 1 is simply spoken into existence by a divine 'fiat', 'Let there be; the only thing said to be God's own work, that for which he takes counsel and is, as such, his own project, to make human beings in his image, is given in the subjunctive, 'Let us make' (Gen. 1:26–7). As we have seen, for Origen, the 'image' character of the human being is not seen in the body itself, but rather in the acquisition of virtue by a human being, their 'Amen.' This 'project' is only completed on the cross, as described in the Gospel of John, with Christ's final word, 'it is finished' or 'it is perfected' (John 19:30), and before which Pilate says 'Behold the human being' (John 19:5), and then by the martyrs, such as Ignatius, who on his way to martyrdom asks that the Romans be silent about him so that he can follow Christ in martyrdom and so 'become human' (Rom. 6). See further John Behr, Becoming Human: Meditations on Christian Anthropology in Word and Image (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2013).}

In an important passage in his Commentary on John, Origen differentiates between creating and fashioning or moulding:

Because, therefore, the first human being fell away from the superior things and desired a life different from the better life, he deserved to be a beginning [ἀρχή] neither of something created nor made [οὐτε κτίσματος οὐτε ποιήματος], but of something moulded [πλάσματος] by the Lord, made [πεποιημένον] to be mocked by the angels. Now, our superior being [ἡ προηγουμένη ὑπόστασις] is in our being made [κτίσματος] according to the image of the Creator, but that resulting from a cause [ἡ ἔκ αἰτίας] is in the thing moulded [ἐν τῷ ... πλάσματι], which was received from the dust of the earth.\footnote{Comm. Jo. 20.182, citing Job 40:19 and Gen. 1:26.}

Here Origen, ever keen to discern the proper ordering of scriptural terminology, is working out, as Harl suggested, a hierarchy of terms describing the different aspects of 'creatiom': a descending gradation of 'create' (κτίζειν), 'make' (ποιεῖν), and 'mould' (πλάσειν).\footnote{Marguerite Harl, 'La préexistence des âmes dans l’oeuvre d’Origène', in Lothar Lies, ed., Origeniana Quarta (Innsbruck: Tyrolia Verlag, 1987), 238–58, at 244.} He does this by noting the different verbs used in the two creation accounts in the opening chapters of Genesis, by way of a verse from Job: our 'προηγουμένη being' is not simply a 'superior' existence, as created in the image of God, an intellectual reality superior to bodily matter, but also, more immediately, our primary or primordial existence: Gen 1:26 comes, literally, before Gen 2:7, when God takes dust from the earth and 'moulds' the human being. That which comes from the earth is neither simply 'created nor made', though, because resulting 'from a cause', it has 'been made to be mocked by the angels. Though this might seem like a superior intellectual being mocking a lower earthly one, it cannot but help recall the 'mocking' of Christ, on his way to becoming 'the beginning of God's
creation. Moreover, as Adam was the father of all human beings descended from him, for those who discern the spiritual meaning of Scripture, as we have seen when discussing Princ. 4, 'Adam is Christ', from whom are descended all those who have the Church as their heavenly mother (Princ. 4.3.7). So when Origen asks, in the opening of his Homilies on Genesis, what is 'the beginning' (ἀρχή) in which God made heaven and earth? He answers, who else can it be except our Lord and Saviour of all, Jesus Christ, the first-born of every creature? Although the first account of Genesis comes first, literally, scripturally, and therefore theologically, yet for us, in our own experience of existence, the second account is first: we come into this world in Adam, until we too learn to give our 'amen' to God in Christ.\(^{117}\)

**II The ‘Foundation’ of the World**

A further important term for Origen's understanding of creation is ἱστορία, usually translated in the Scriptural translations as 'foundation', but which, as Origen makes clear in a very dense passage, signifies rather a casting downwards. Princ. 3.5.4 occurs, as we have seen, in Origen's treatment of the 'economic' dimensions of the principles of the faith, that is, in terms of the actual working out, or the arrangement, of God's plans and activity. He beings by appealing to various scriptural verses in which the term 'foundation' appears (though some of this may well be Rufinus' additions, together with explanatory comments for his Roman readers). Especially important is Ephesians 1:4, which speaks of how God 'has chosen us before the foundation of the world'. Origen attempts to explain what is implied by this term:

I am of the opinion that as the end and the consummation of the saints will be in those [worlds] that are not seen and eternal [2 Cor. 4:18] it must be supposed, from a contemplation of that very end, as we have frequently pointed out above,

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\(^{116}\) Origen, Hom. Gen. 1.1, citing 1 Tim. 4:10 and Col. 1:15. He continues: 'In this beginning, therefore, that is in his Word, God made heaven and earth, as the evangelist John also says at the beginning of his Gospel: In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was God. This same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him and without him nothing was made [John 1:1–3]. Scripture is not speaking here of any temporal beginning [Non ergo hic temporale aliquod principium dicit], but it says that the heaven and the earth and all things which were made were made in the beginning, that is, in the Saviour.'

\(^{117}\) The same idea is found in Irenaeus, Gregory of Nyssa, and Maximus the Confessor, and, indeed, all the way through the end of the Byzantine era. It is very clearly stated, for example, by Nicholas Cabasilas, Life in Christ 6.91–4 (6.12 Eng.): 'It was for the new human being that human nature was created at the beginning, and for him mind and desire were prepared. ... It was not the old Adam who was the model for the new, but the new Adam for the old. ... For those who have known him first, the old Adam is the archetype because of our fallen nature. But for him who sees all things before they exist, the first Adam is the imitation of the second. To sum it up: the Saviour first and alone showed to us the true human being, who is perfect on account of both character and life and in all other respects.'
that rational creatures have also had a similar beginning. And if they had a
beginning such as the end for which they hope, they were undoubtedly from
the beginning in those [worlds] that are not seen and eternal. And if this is so, then
there has been a descent from the higher conditions to the lower, not only on the
part of those souls who have by the variety of their own movements deserved it,
but also on that of those who, to serve the whole world, were brought down from
the higher and invisible conditions to these lower and visible ones, even against
their will. Because the creation was subjected to futility, not willingly, but by the one
who subjected it in hope [Rom. 8:20], so that both the sun and the moon and the
stars and the angels of God might fulfil an obedient service for the world; and for
those souls which, because of their excessive spiritual defects needed these denser
and more solid bodies, and because of those for whom this was necessary, this
visible world was founded. From this, therefore, a descent of everyone alike would
seem to be indicated by the meaning of the word, that is, of καταβολή. The whole
creation indeed entertains the hope of freedom, of being set free from the bondage
of corruption when the children of God [Rom. 8:21], who either fell away or were
scattered abroad, shall be gathered together into one, or when they shall have
fulfilled their other duties in this world, which are known to God alone, the
Artificer of all things.!!

There are several things in this dense passage that must be noted clearly. First,
it is by a contemplation of the end that Origen speculates about the beginning.
This is clearly an important point for him; he says he has pointed it out
repeatedly (treated most fully in Princ. 1.6.1), and we will turn to it again later
in this Introduction. As we have seen, when discussing the 'Recapitulation', he
holds that those who come to share in the immorality and incorruptibility of
God also share in his eternity—they 'are also eternal' (Princ. 4.4.9). If our end
is to enter into the eternity of God, being purged by him as a consuming fire,
and so coming to share in his properties (as does the iron in the fire), then we
too, while still embodied, material, creatures, will be in a world 'not seen'
and 'eternal', with 'a house not made by hands, eternal in the heavens' (2 Cor.
4:18–5:1; Princ. 2.3.6; 3.6.4). This being so, then our beginning in this world
and its time can only be thought of as a falling away from that eternal and
heavenly reality.

The second point to note is that Origen does not speak about the falling
away of all rational beings from their end as being caused by sinful movements,
satiety, or boredom. While some, certainly, have fallen away because of their
own movements, in all their variety, others have descended to minister to those
who have fallen. This is something Origen returns to frequently throughout
his works. 'Not everyone who is a captive', Origen begins his first homily on

118 Princ. 3.5.4. On the 'foundation' as a 'throwing-down' see also Origen, Comm. Jo.
19.149, and Jerome, Comm. Eph. 1.4 (especially when he reports what 'another says; presumably
Origen).
Ezekiel, 'endures captivity on account of his sins.'\textsuperscript{119} Or as he puts it in his *Commentary on John*, in reference to a scriptural verse we have already seen: 'it is possible that the dragon is not the beginning of the work of the Lord in general, but is the beginning of the many made with a body to be mocked by his angels, since some can exist with a body in another manner.' And likewise, he continues, Paul, 'not willing, but of hope' wishes 'to remain in the flesh,' for he preferred 'to depart and be with Christ,' yet he remained in the state he is in for the benefit of others.\textsuperscript{120}

Third, Origen does not describe this falling away in terms of taking a body or becoming embodied, but rather as resulting in those who fall away having 'denser and more solid bodies.' In his chapter treating, economically, the soul, Origen suggests, through the supposed etymology of the word 'soul' (taking \( \psi \nu \chi \tilde{\iota} \) to come from \( \psi \nu \chi \dot{o} \omega \), which, as a passive verb, can mean 'to become cold'), that the intellect becomes a soul through cooling down. As he notes, as God is 'a consuming fire,' whenever Scripture speaks of the manifestation of God in creation, it is in fiery terms (the burning bush, for instance), whereas whenever it speaks of the work of the adverse powers, and these powers themselves, it is always as 'cold' (*Princ.* 2.8.3). Christ, he continues, has come 'to cast fire upon the earth,' and so sets Simon and Cleopas' hearts aflame on the road to Emmaus.\textsuperscript{121} If our end is to be in the consuming fire that is God, transformed by incorporeal fire, and coming to share in the properties of that fire, while the matter of our bodies remains what it is, our cooling down by descending from that fire results in our bodies becoming 'denser.'

The fourth point is that it is this descent, of all, in various ways and for various purposes, that is indicated by the scriptural expression 'the foundation of the world.' But, fifth, and perhaps most important, is that, by starting with the end to speculate about the beginning, our 'election,' which happens 'before the foundation of the world,' is, in a very real sense, the call that brings us into being, prior to being 'fashioned' in 'the foundation of the world,' and prior also to our being 'created,' which only properly happens at the end.

Finally, as we have 'descended' or rather, in fact, been 'thrown down' from our high calling into this world, which results from a 'cause' that required our being 'fashioned' from the dust of this earth, then our coming into being in the time of this world, and our being 'fashioned' to become, in the end, 'created,' means that our subjection to decay, not by our own will, 'but by the one who subjected it in hope,' are the 'birth-pangs' of creation (an apocalyptic theme if there ever was one), as it labours in travail until the revelation, the *apokalypsis*, of the sons of God (Rom 8:19–22).

\textsuperscript{119} *Hom. Ezech.* 1.1; see also the first five chapters, expanding on this theme.

\textsuperscript{120} *Comm. Jo.* 1.98–100, referring to Job 40:19 and Phil. 1:23–4; see also *Comm. Jo.* 2.175–92, examining the figure of John the Baptist, 'a man sent by God' (John 1:6).

Our 'election', then, is in a real sense in God, prior to our being fashioned from the dust of the earth and the foundation of the world: we are primarily and primordially called to participate in the heavenly liturgy, and to enter into that eschatological and apocalyptic reality is to be created. But, because of certain causes, our being created (only realized in the end) is by way of our being fashioned or moulded from the dust of the earth, the earth which has itself been 'thrown down', to be mocked by the angels.

What was the cause of this falling away? In a word, as we will see in the next section, it was the scandal of 'the lamb slain from the foundation of the world' (Rev. 13:8). While happening in the time of the world at a particular moment, it is an eternal reality in God, and so is always spoken of in the past tense. As difficult as this might be for us to understand, with our modern preoccupation with history and chronology, it is the presupposition of Christians from the time that the risen Christ opened the books to show how Moses and all the prophets spoke of how it was necessary for the Son of Man to suffer to enter into his glory (cf. Luke 24:24–6). As Irenaeus had put it a few decades before Origen, when Isaiah says, 'I have seen with my eyes the King, the Lord of hosts', and the other prophets similarly in their words, visions, and mode of life, they 'see the Son of God as a human being, conversing with human beings, while prophesying what was to happen, saying that he who was not come as yet was present, proclaiming also the impassible as subject to suffering, and declaring that he who was then in heaven had descended [descendisse] into the dust of death' (Haer. 4.20.8). Or, almost a millennium later, as Anselm put it: 'When God does anything, once it is done it is impossible for it not to have been done, but it is always true that it has been done' (Cur 17). To see what it might mean that the Passion has an eternal bearing, we must turn to the treatment of Christ in the economic section of the work.

4 ECONOMY

So far we have considered, in Princ. 1.2, the 'theology' regarding Christ, examining the titles found in Scripture expressive of his divine nature, and we have followed the reflections contained therein about creation, omnipotence, and the glory of omnipotence, which, by way of Philippians 2 and the exaltation of Christ in his subjection, results in all creation bowing their knee in adoration of the one upon whom the most exalted name is bestowed. To see further how this is actually worked out on an 'economic' level, and perhaps also to give insight into the falling away of those called to participate in the eternal liturgy celebrated in the heavens, let us turn to the chapter on Christ in the second, 'economic', cycle.
Introduction

I The Incarnation

Origen opens the chapter with these words: 'It is time, now that these points have been discussed, for us to return to the Incarnation of our Lord and Saviour, how he became human and dwelt among human beings' (Princ. 2.6.1). Note that he does not say that we will now turn to the topic of the Incarnation, but rather will resume discussing it. That is, his presentation of the divine titles of Christ in Princ. 1.2, expressive of his divine nature, was not a treatment of the 'pre-incarnate' Word, who subsequently, at a certain point in the economy, becomes 'incarnate'. As Rowan Williams strikingly puts it, and as we will have cause to consider more deeply later, 'the existence of Jesus is not an episode in the biography of the Word'.

Having considered Christ's divine names, Origen now turns to how the same Christ is spoken of as 'the Mediator' (Princ. 2.6.1; 1 Tim. 2:5). He begins by praising highly the lofty pre-eminence of Christ, as being above all things. Yet this is only done to heighten even more the fact that this one has been revealed in the lowest terms possible:

But of all the marvellous and magnificent things about him, this altogether surpasses the astonishment of the human intellect, and the frailty of mortal intelligence does not discover in what way it can think or understand how that mighty Power of divine majesty, that very Word of the Father and that very Wisdom of God, in whom were created all things visible and invisible [Col. 1:16], can be believed to have been within the compass of that man who appeared in Judea; and indeed that the Wisdom of God entered into the womb of a woman, to be born an infant and to utter cries like the wailing of infants; then, afterwards, that he was also reported to be troubled in death, as even he himself acknowledges, saying, My soul is sorrowful even unto death [Matt. 26:38]; and that, at the end, he was brought to that death which is accounted by human beings the most shameful, although he rose again on the third day. When, then, we see in him some things so human that they appear to differ in no respect from the common frailty of mortals, and some things so divine, that they are appropriate to nothing else but that primal and ineffable nature of divinity, the narrowness of human understanding is bewildered and, struck with amazement at so great a wonder, it knows not which way to turn, what to hold to, or whither to take itself. If it thinks of God, it sees a mortal being; if it thinks of a human being, it perceives him returning from the dead with spoils after conquering the kingdom of death.

(Princ. 2.6.2)

122 Arius, 244. The full passage is worth quoting: 'Rather paradoxically, the denial of a “history” of transactions in God focuses attention on the history of God with us in the world: God has no story but that of Jesus of Nazareth and the covenant of which he is the seal. It is a matter of historical fact at least that the Nicene versus Deus was the stimulus to a clarification of the versus homo in the century and a half after the council: the Word of God is the condition of there being a human identity which is the ministering, crucified and risen saviour, Jesus Christ; but the existence of Jesus is not an episode in the biography of the Word. It remains obstinately—and crucially—a fact of our world and our world's limits.'
Only in this way, he continues, is 'the truth of both natures ... shown to be in one and the same being.' But he fears that 'the explanation of that mystery may perhaps even be beyond the reach of the whole creation of heavenly powers,' so he will speak 'in the fewest words possible.'

We then have one of the most intriguing and extraordinarily dense and rich passages in the whole of On First Principles, which must be quoted in full:

The only-begotten Son of God, therefore, through whom, as the previous course of discussion has shown, all things were made, visible and invisible [Col. 1:16], according to the mind of Scripture both made all things and loves what he made [cf. Wis. 11:24]. For as he is himself the invisible image of the invisible God [Col. 1:15], he invisibly bestowed upon all rational creatures a participation in himself, in such a way that each one received from him a degree of participation to the extent of the loving affection by which they adhered to him. But whereas, because of the faculty of free will, a variety and diversity had taken hold of individual souls, so that one was attached to its Creator by a more ardent, and another by a feebler and weaker, love, that soul, of which Jesus said, No one takes my soul from me [John 10:18], adhering, from the beginning of creation [Rev. 3:14] and ever after, inseparably and indissolubly, to him, as to the Wisdom and the Word of God, and the Truth and the true Light, and receiving him wholly and passing itself into his light and splendour, was made with him in a pre-eminent degree one spirit, just as the Apostle promises to those who ought to imitate him, that He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit [1 Cor. 6:17]. With this substance of the soul mediating between God and the flesh (for it was not possible for the nature of God to be mingled with a body without a mediator) there is born, as we said, the God-man, the medium being that substance for which it was certainly not contrary to nature to assume a body. Yet neither, on the other hand, was it contrary to nature for that soul, as a rational substance, to receive God, into whom, as we said above, as into the Word and the Wisdom and the Truth, it had already wholly passed. And therefore, either because it was wholly in the Son of God or because it received the Son of God wholly into itself, deservedly it is called, along with the flesh which it had assumed, the Son of God and the Power of God, the Christ and the Wisdom of God; and, on the other hand, the Son of God, through whom all things were created, is named Jesus Christ and the Son of Man. And, moreover, the Son of God is said to have died, that is, in virtue of that nature which could accept death; and he, who is proclaimed as coming in the glory of God the Father with the holy angels, is called the Son of Man. And for this reason, throughout the whole of Scripture, the divine nature is spoken of in human terms as much as human nature is adorned with marks indicative of the divine. For of this, more than anything else, can that which is written be said, that They shall both be in one flesh, and they are no longer two, but one flesh [Matt. 19:5–6; Gen. 2:24]. For the Word of God is thought to be more in one flesh with the soul than a man with his wife. And, moreover, to whom is it more fitting to be one spirit with God than to this soul,

123 The title 'Son of Man' here is not simply a statement about Christ's humanity, but an apocalyptic term (cf. Dan. 7:13), as is made clear in its use in the next sentence.
which has so joined itself to God through love that it may deservedly be said to be one spirit with him?

(Princ. 2.6.3)

This passage does indeed seem to suggest classic 'Origenist' teaching: there was a pre-existing realm of intellects, all united to the Word, but, because of their varying love for him, they subsequently fell away in various degrees. However, the Scriptural verse given—No man takes my soul from me... (I lay it down of myself)—indicates that Origen is thinking of a different, and scriptural rather than mythological, scene altogether. The most concrete passage in Scripture, where all who had, with varying degrees of love, adhered to their Creator, fell away, except one, is the crucifixion (at least in the Synoptic Gospels, we will return to John later), though, of course, seen apocalyptically in the light of the cross, the whole of Scripture is read as speaking about the continuing falling away from God, from the beginning. When Jesus lays down his soul of his own accord, Origen says—adhering, inseparably and indissolubly, from 'the beginning of creation', to the Word and Wisdom of God, the Truth and the Light—he receives him wholly and passes into his light, to be made 'one spirit' with him, as the apostle promises to those who imitate him, so that, with the soul mediating between the Word and the flesh (by laying down the soul), the *theanthropos*, the God-man, is born, so that the soul, along with the flesh, is called the Son of God, and the Son of God is called not simply Jesus, but Jesus Christ and the Son of Man.

Reading this passage this way, which is, admittedly, novel (as was our reading of Princ. 1.2.10 above), flies in the face of the standard interpretation of Origen, which itself goes back to the polemics raised against him. It also flies in the face of what we think we know about the 'Logos Christology' and 'incarnational theology' of the early Church that we expect to find in Origen. Instead it might seem to present Origen as some kind of adoptionist. But it is, nevertheless, how Origen speaks concretely and explicitly in his *Commentary on John*, which, as it survives in Greek, is undisputedly his own words. In the last section of the last book of this commentary, and appealing to the same verse from Paul, Origen writes:

Now I think God also highly exalted this man when he became obedient unto death, and the death of a cross. For the Word in the beginning with God, God the Word, was not capable of being highly exalted. But the high exaltation of the Son of Man which occurred when he glorified God in his own death consisted in the fact that he was no longer different from the Word but was the same with him [ἡ δὲ ὑπερύψωσις τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, γενομένη αὐτῷ δοξάσαντι τὸν θεόν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βασιλείῳ, αὐτὴ ἦν, τὸ μηκέτι ἐπερευνάτων αὐτὸν εἶναι τοῦ λόγου ἀλλὰ τὸν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ]. For if he who is joined to the Lord is one spirit, so that it is no longer said that they are two, even in the case of this man and the

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spirit, might we not much more say that the humanity of Jesus became one with
the Word when he who did not consider equality with God something to be
grasped was highly exalted? [Phil. 2:6] The Word, however, remained in his own
grandeur, or was even restored to it, when he was again with God, God the Word
being man.

(Comm. Jo. 32.324–6)

The unity of the God-man is again effected upon the Cross, for after it, and in
its light, we can no longer differentiate between human and divine properties:
we no longer know Christ by a set of fleshly properties, but we now only know
him as the Word of God. The abasement of the Cross is not a concealment of
his divinity, but rather its fullest revelation: 'We must dare say that the goodness
of Christ appeared greater and more divine and truly in accordance with the
image of the Father when he humbled himself and became obedient unto death,
even death on a Cross' (Comm. Jo. 1.231). It is here, on the Cross, that we finally
see the true form and divinity of the Son of God, and from this moment on we
no longer 'see' Jesus with our bodily perception, for 'even though we once knew
Christ according to the flesh, we know him thus no longer'.125

These claims might sound rather 'adoptionist' and even seem to anticipate
Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia.126 But it is, nevertheless, what
we are given to see in the Synoptic Gospel (again, we will return to John later),
and especially in the Letter to the Hebrews and Revelation. It is also something
that is found not only in earlier writers, but also in the later Orthodox tradition.
Ignatius of Antioch, for instance, speaks of 'the one physician ... Jesus Christ'
as 'first passible and then impassible' (Eph. 7.2). He also speaks of his impending
martyrdom in similar terms to Origen's description of the birth of the God-
man: 'Birth-pangs are upon me. Suffer me, my brethren; hinder me not from
living, do not wish me to die. ... Suffer me to receive the pure light; when I shall
have arrived there, I shall become a human being. Suffer me to follow the
example of the Passion of my God' (Rom. 6).

But it is with Gregory of Nyssa, to whom we already have had recourse, that
we find the most striking similarities; Gregory is often held to be the most

125 2 Cor. 5:16. It is important to recognize, especially given Paul's words in 1 Cor. 2:6–16, that
the contrast to knowing 'according to the flesh' is not, now while still in this passing age, some
kind of ecstatic spiritual experience of 'seeing' God directly, 'face to face': it is his opponents, the
spiritual enthusiasts in Corinth, who were claiming this. Paul had resorted to such an appeal in
his first letter to the Corinthians, but now realized that he could not do so again. He appeals to
the new creation, but, as Martyn points out, 'he is careful ... to imply that the opposite of the
old-age way of knowing is not that of the new age—this point must be emphasized—but rather
the way of knowing which is granted at the juncture of the ages'. He does not speak of seeing the
face of God, nor of knowing by the Spirit, for he, as everyone else, does not yet live in the new age.
As Martyn puts it, 'the implied opposite of knowing by the norm of the flesh is not knowing by
the norm of the Spirit, but rather knowing kata stauron ('by the cross'). J. Louis Martyn,
'Epistemology at the Turn of the Ages', in idem, Theological Issues, 89–110, here at 107 and 108.
126 See Behr, The Case against Diodore and Theodore, 42–7; see the passages of Theodore
preserved by Leontius (I.T 2–6, Case, 284–91).
'Origenist' of the Cappadocian Fathers, yet nevertheless was recognized, at the Seventh Ecumenical Council, as 'being called by all the father of the fathers.'\(^{127}\) As we have seen, Gregory opens his *Contra Eunomium* by saying that the most universal division is between the seen and the unseen, and that the distinction between uncreated and created falls within the latter realm. In *Contra Eunomium* 3.3, Gregory provides an account of Peter's statement in Acts, that 'God made [*ποιησα] him both Lord and Christ, this Jesus whom you crucified' (Acts 2:36), in terms of the distinction between uncreated and created.\(^{128}\) Whereas Eunomius would see the Son's suffering upon the Cross as a mark of distinction between him and the impassible Father, for Gregory it instead reveals 'the supreme exercise of his power' rather than 'an indication of weakness,' showing that 'the God made manifest through the Cross ought to be honoured just as the Father is honoured' (*Eun.* 3.3.30–4). Moreover, he continues, 'we say that the body also, in which he accepted the Passion, being combined with the divine nature, was by that commingling made into that which the assuming nature is.' With regard to Peter's words, Gregory points out that it is not as though there are two subjects here; rather, 'Scripture says that two things have been done to a single person, the Passion by the Jews, the honour by God, not as though there was one who suffered and another who was honoured by the exaltation' (*Eun.* 3.3.42). This is shown even more clearly, for Gregory, when Peter says he was 'exalted by the Right Hand of God.'\(^{129}\) So, Gregory says, 'the Apostle said that the humanity [*τὸ ἄνθρωπον*] was exalted, being exalted by becoming Lord and Christ; and this took place after the Passion' (*Eun.* 3.3.43). He then continues in even stronger terms:

He who says *exalted by the Right Hand of God* clearly reveals the unspeakable economy of the mystery, that the Right Hand of God, who made all things that are, who is the Lord by whom all things were made and without whom nothing that is subsists, himself raised to his own height the human being [*τὸν ἀνθρώπον*] united to him, making him also, by the commixture, to be what he is by nature: he is Lord and King, and the King is called Christ; these things he made him too. … And this we are plainly taught by the voice of Peter in his mystic discourse, that the lowliness of the one crucified in weakness (and weakness, as we have heard from the Lord, indicates the flesh [Mt 26:41]), that, by virtue of its mingling with the infinite and boundless [nature] of the Good, remained no longer in its own measures and properties, but by the Right Hand of God was raised up together, and became Lord instead of servant, Christ the King instead of a subject, highest instead of lowly, God instead of man.

(*Eun.* 3.3.44)

\(^{127}\) *Acta*, sixth session, vol. 5; Mansi, 13.293c.

\(^{128}\) For a full exposition of this text, see Behr, *Nicene Faith*, 436–45.

\(^{129}\) Acts 2:33, reading the dative as expressing agency, rather than 'to the right hand' as most modern translations do.
This might also sound like some kind of adoptionism, but it is not. Rather, to paraphrase Gregory’s argument here and throughout Against Eunomius 3.3: through the Passion, Christ, as human, becomes that which as God he always is. The cross is our lens and prism for understanding the revelation of God in Christ; it brings into focus ‘the God revealed through the Cross’ and allows us to see the whole of creation and the economy as refracted into its diverse aspects. We cannot begin with an understanding of God, or the Son of God in whom he is revealed, apart from the Cross. If we attempt to theologize apart from the Cross, to see God revealed in Christ apart from the Passion (after which we no longer know him in the flesh) we will end up defining divinity in human terms. This is Gregory’s chief complaint about Apollinarius: he ‘defines the divine by means of the perceptible appearance, rather than by intellectual contemplation’, for ‘the true account’, according to Gregory, is that Christ ‘is human and God, by what is seen human, by what is understood God’.\textsuperscript{130} In perhaps his most startling comment, Gregory puts it this way:

Christ [is] always, both before the economy and after it; [the] human being, however, [is] neither before it nor after it, but only during the time of the economy. Neither [is] the human being before the Virgin, nor, after the ascent into heaven, [is] the flesh still in its own properties.\textsuperscript{131}

What he seems to be pointing to is that although ‘Moses and all the prophets’ had always spoken about how the Son of Man enters his glory by suffering, and this is also the content of the apostolic preaching, yet during the time when Jesus walked the earth, seen in the flesh by fleshly eyes, the glory and divinity of the Son of Man was not in fact seen, not until the exaltation on the Cross.

For Origen, likewise, the identity of Christ, the Son of God, is shown through the Passion, hanging upon the Cross. The very last line of Philocalia 15, which discusses the apparently poor quality of scriptural language and the apparently poor aspect of Jesus, and the various forms in which both Scripture and Jesus appear, concludes:

But how can Celsus, and the enemies of the divine Word, and such as do not investigate Christianity with a love of truth, know the meaning of the different appearances of Jesus? I refer to the different periods of his life, to anything he did before the Passion and whatever happened after his Resurrection from the dead.\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{130} Antirrheticus (GNO 3.1, p. 191.24-7): οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸν ἄλληθρον λόγον καὶ ἀνθρωπὸς ἦσαν καὶ θεὸς, τῷ ὄρομένῳ ἀνθρωπῷ, τῷ νεομενῷ θεῷ, ὃ δὲ οὐ τούτῳ φησιν, ἐν τῷ συμπεράσματι τῷ φανομένῳ τὸ θεῖον, οὐ τῷ νοητῷ ὁριζόμενοι.

\textsuperscript{131} Antirrheticus (GNO 3.1, p. 222.25-9): ἀλλὰ πάντοτε μὲν ὁ Χριστὸς καὶ πρὸ τῆς οἰκουμείας καὶ μετὰ τούτῳ ἀνθρωπὸς δὲ οὔτε πρὸ τούτου οὔτε μετὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ ἐν μόνῳ τῷ τῆς οἰκουμείας καρπῷ, οὔτε γὰρ πρὸ τῆς παρθένου ἀνθρωπὸς οὔτε μετὰ τῆς εἰς οὐρανὸς ἀνοδον ἐτῆς Καρπέ ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις ἐσώμενοι.

\textsuperscript{132} Philoc. 15.20, a text coming from Cels. 6.77. The two main parts of Philoc. 15.20 are not ‘two unrelated topics’ put together by ‘an inky-fingered drudge, who knew his Origen very well, but did not know much else’ working in the library of Caesarea, as Neil McLynn, ‘What was the
The unchanging identity of Christ is fixed upon the Cross, which as lens and prism enables us to see everything as patterned upon it. If we, for instance, attempt to look behind the Cross to see the human being Jesus before the Passion, as if the Passion had never happened (rather unhistorical in its attempt to be historical), we will end up seeing Jesus as he appears in his human properties, as the son of the carpenter from Nazareth; we will not 'see', or rather intellectually contemplate the Word of God, and so will not be doing theology. If, on the other hand, we look through the Cross, we see the unchanging identity of the crucified one throughout his life, from his birth from the Virgin and throughout his ministry. And this is, of course, the same hermeneutic needed to read Scripture and encounter the Word of God: the Word of God 'eternally takes flesh in the Scriptures' (αὐτὸν ἐκ τῶν ὑμῶν ἐπισκέψη ἐν τῷ ἐνώπιός μου ἀπὸ τὴν ἀναρρήτου ἀνάλογου) so that he might tabernacle amongst us, but only if we recline on his breast, as did John, do we come to know the Word.\(^{133}\) We must ascend the mountain, to see him transfigured, speaking with Moses and Elijah, the Law and the Prophets, about his 'exodus' in Jerusalem.\(^{134}\) If we stay at the level of the flesh, the letters, we will never come to contemplate the Word.

Returning to \textit{Princ.} 2.6, Origen continues his economic account of Christ by examining further what is meant by the title 'Christ, bestowed upon this one, and does so by bringing in the verse from the Psalms, 'You loved righteousness and hated iniquity. Therefore God, your God, anointed you with the oil of gladness beyond your fellows' (Ps. 44:7–8, \textit{Princ.} 2.6.4). It is, he comments, 'by the merit of its love [that] it is anointed with the oil of gladness, that is, the soul with the Word of God is made Christ. And as the Psalm verse also speaks of being anointed 'beyond your fellows', the anointing in this case indicates that the grace of the Spirit was given to him not as it had been given to the prophets, 'but that the essential fullness of the Word of God himself was in it', for, as the Apostle says, 'in him the fullness of divinity dwelt bodily' (Col. 2:9). It is for this reason that Isaiah can say that 'he did no sin' (Isa. 53:9), and Hebrews, that 'he was tempted in all things as we are, yet without sin' (Heb. 4:15), and, even more, 'before the child know how to call father or mother, he turned himself away from iniquity' (Isa. 8:4 and 7:16). Having come to this conclusion, Origen then attempts to answer those who, accepting that Christ did not sin, ask how he can possess a rational soul, since it is in the nature of such souls to be capable of both good and evil (\textit{Princ.} 2.6.5). While it cannot be doubted that the nature of Christ's soul was the same as that of all other human beings, 'otherwise it could not be called a soul', yet, he continues:

this soul, which is Christ's, so chose to love righteousness that, in accordance with
the immensity of its love, it adhered to it unchangeably and inseparably, so that
the firmness of purpose and immensity of affection and inextinguishable warmth
of love destroyed all thought of alteration or change, such that what was dependent
upon the will is now changed into nature by the exertion of long usage; and so it
is to be believed that there is in Christ a human and rational soul, and yet not be
supposed that it had any thought or possibility of sin.

(Princ. 2.6.5)

It is here, in explaining how this might be so, that Origen brings in the analogy
of iron placed in a fire 'receiving the fire throughout all its pores and veins and
becoming wholly fire'. Could we say, Origen asks, that, while it remains in the
fire and incessantly burning, the iron is ever capable of becoming cold? So also,
he continues, bringing back in the idea of the anointing:

In this way, then, that soul which, like iron in the fire, was placed in the Word
forever, in Wisdom forever, in God forever, is God in all that it does, feels, and
understands; and therefore it can be called neither alterable or changeable, since,
being ceaselessly kindled, it came to possess immutability from its union with the
Word of God. To all the saints some warmth of the Word of God must indeed
be supposed to have passed; but in this soul it must be believed that the divine
fire itself essentially rested, from which some warmth may have passed to others.
Finally, the fact that it says, God, your God, anointed you with the oil of gladness
above your fellows, shows that that soul is anointed in one way, with the oil of
gladness, that is, with the Word of God and Wisdom, and his fellows, that is,
the holy prophets and apostles, in another way. For they are said to have run in the
france of his ointment [Song 1:4], while that soul was the vessel containing the
ointment itself, of whose glowing heat all the prophets and apostles are made
worthy partakers. Therefore, as the fragrance of the ointment is one thing, and the
substance of the ointment another, so also Christ is one thing and his fellows
another. And just as the vessel itself, which contains the substance of the ointment,
can in no way accept any foul smell, yet it is possible that those who participate in
its fragrance, if they move a little way from its glowing heat, may accept any foul
smell that comes upon them, so also, in the same way, it was impossible that
Christ, being as it were the very vessel in which was the substance of the ointment,
should accept an odour of an opposite kind, while his fellows, in proportion to
their proximity to the vessel, will be partakers and receivers of his fragrance.

(Princ. 2.6.6)

Just as a piece of iron, identified by certain properties (cold and hard), when
placed in a fire loses all those properties, while yet remaining the iron that

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135 The background for this idea is the theory of mixture developed by the Stoics. See esp. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Mixt. 3, 218.1–2 (SVF 2.473), reporting Chrysippus' teaching: 'fire as a whole passes through iron as a whole, while each of them preserves its own substance' (τον πυρ
διαν δι' ου χωρειν του σιδηρου λεγοντι, σιωλοντων αυτων οικετον την οικειαν
οισιαν).
Introduction

it is, to become identified by the properties of the fire (hot and fluid), so also,
the human nature of Jesus (identified by certain sense-perceptible human
properties), is no longer known by these properties, but rather by the properties
of God, being beyond space and time, revealed, as we have seen, in and through
the cross, known by intellectual contemplation. Through the Passion, Christ, as
human, becomes that which, as God, he always is.

Extremely important in Princ. 2.6.4–6 is that by being anointed 'beyond his
fellows' Christ enables his fellows to share in his unction, to be themselves
anointed of God; it is a ministry exercised towards them. This ministerial
character of Christ's activity, and, indeed, identity, is extended by Origen, in his
Commentary on John, to include his, and our, being God and gods. Answering
those who fear to call Christ 'God', lest it imply ditheism, Origen writes:

Their problem can be resolved in this way. We must say to them that at one time
God, with the article, is very God, wherefore also the Saviour says in his prayer to
the Father, That they may know you the only true God [John 17:3]. On the other
hand, everything besides the very God, which is made God by participation in his
divinity, would more properly not be said to be the God, but god [πᾶν δὲ τὸ παρὰ
tὸ αὐτόθεος μετοχὴ τῆς ἐκείνου θεότητος θεοποιούμενον οὐχ ὁ θεὸς ἄλλα
θεός κυριώτερον ἀν λέγοιτο]. To be sure, his firstborn of every creature [Col.
1:15], inasmuch as he was the first to be with God and has drawn divinity into
himself, is more honoured than any other gods besides him (of whom God is God
as it is said, The God of gods, the Lord has spoken, and he has called the earth [Ps.
49:1]). It was by his ministry that they became gods, for he drew from God that
they might be deified, sharing ungrudgingly also with them according to
his goodness. The God, therefore, is the true God. The others are gods formed
according to him as images of the prototype. But again, the archetypal image of
the many images is the Word with the God, who was in the beginning [John 1:1].
By being with the God he always continues to be God. But he would not have this
if he were not with God, and he would not remain God if he did not continue in
unceasing contemplation of the depth of the Father.

(Comm. Jo. 2.17–18)

It is through his entry into God, by his unceasing contemplation of the depths
of the Father, that the Lord is God and ministers this divinity to others, who
thereby also become gods. The 'firstborn of every creature', by being the first to
be with God and drawing divinity into himself, also enable us to become gods
in him, by sharing in his anointing, and also to be born of God as the martyrs
are, as we have seen, in following him in his Passion, so that Christ becomes
'the firstborn of many brethren'.136 Not only that, but for Origen, we come to be
so eternally:

[136 Rom. 8:29. Another striking passage describing the birth of the martyrs is in the 'Letter of
the Churches of Vienne and Lyon to Asia and Phrygia' (preserved in Eusebius 5.1.45–6),
describing the death of Blandina and Attalus, which recalls those who had fallen away back to life:
'Through their continued life the dead were made alive, and the martyrs showed favour to those]
The Saviour is eternally begotten by the Father, so also, if you possess the Spirit of adoption [Rom. 8:15] God eternally begets you in him according to each of your works, each of your thoughts. And being begotten you thereby become an eternally begotten son of God in Christ Jesus.  

Becoming an eternally begotten son of God in Christ Jesus, we in fact put on the identity of Jesus. We can now return to the Gospel of John, where, unlike the Synoptics, in which all the disciples fall away at the Passion, the beloved disciple, who had reclined on the breast of Jesus at the table, now remains at the foot of the Cross, along with the Virgin, to hear words only spoken in the Gospel of John:

We might dare say, then, that the Gospels are the firstfruits of all Scriptures, but that the firstfruits of the Gospels is that according to John, whose meaning no one can understand who has not leaned on Jesus' breast nor received Mary from Jesus to be his mother also. But he who would be another John must also become such as John, to be shown to be Jesus, so to speak. For if Mary had no son except Jesus, in accordance with those who hold a sound opinion of her, and Jesus says to his mother, Behold your son [John 19:26], and not, 'Behold, this man also is your son; he has said equally, 'Behold, this is Jesus whom you bore.' For indeed everyone who has been perfected no longer lives, but Christ lives in him [Gal. 2:20], and since Christ lives in him, it is said of him to Mary, Behold your son, the Christ.

Putting on the identity of Jesus, as an eternally begotten son of God, although we come into being in time, our end, through death and resurrection in Christ, is to be a participant in the eternal liturgy in the heavenly court. Yet, as the eternity of God is strictly speaking outside of time, non-temporal, entering into that reality is not entering into an eternity conceived in a temporal fashion, to enter, as it were, at a given moment in that eternity, taken as an endless chronological duration, as a continuation of our present temporal life. It is rather to enter into a non-temporal and non-spatial eternal reality, again as who had failed to witness. And there was great joy for the Virgin Mother in receiving back alive those whom she had miscarried as dead. For through them the majority of those who had denied were again brought to birth and again conceived and again brought to life and learned to confess; and now living and strengthened, they went to the judgment seat. See Behr, Irenaeus, 198–203. The identity of the Virgin Mother, whose womb is made pure by Christ so that we too can be born of it, is strikingly put by Irenaeus, commenting on Isa. 7:14, 8:3, and 9:6; these verses speak of 'the union of the Word of God with his own handiwork, that the Word would become flesh, and the Son of God the Son of Man, the pure one opening purely that pure womb which regenerates human beings unto God and which he himself made pure, having become that which we are, he is God Almighty and has a generation which cannot be declared' (Haer. 4.33.11).

\[137\] Hom. Jor. 9.4: καὶ ἀεὶ γενναίαι ὁ ὀπτήρ ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς, οὕτως καὶ σὺ ἐὰν ἔχῃς “τὸ τῆς νοῦς λαβοῦσα,” ἀεὶ γεννά σε ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ θεὸς καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ἔργον, καθ’ ἐκαστὸν διανόημα, καὶ γεννάμενος οὕτως γίνῃ ἀεὶ γεννάμενος νῦς θεῶν ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.

iron in the fire.\textsuperscript{139} And so, in a sense, we must always already be there, even though we have not yet, within the chronology of this world, arrived there. As such, our life on earth is, in a real sense, a shadow of that reality, stretched out upon the earth; our true reality is 'hidden with Christ in God' (Col. 3:3).

And so Origen completes his account of 'the Incarnation', that is, the account of Christ as unfolded in the economy, with this passage:

I think that Jeremiah the prophet also, understanding what was the nature of the Wisdom of God in him, which was also the same which he had assumed for the salvation of the world, said, \textit{The breath of our face, Christ the Lord, of whom we said that under his shadow we shall live among the nations} [Lam. 4:20]. For just as the shadow of our body is inseparable from the body, and assumes and performs the movements and gestures of our body without deviation, so I think that the prophet, wishing to indicate the work and movement of Christ's soul, which was inseparably attached to him and accomplished everything according to his movement and will, called this the shadow of Christ the Lord, under whose shadow we were to live among the nations. For in the mystery of this assumption live the nations, who, imitating that soul through faith, come to salvation. Moreover David, when saying, \textit{Remember, O Lord, my reproach, with which they have reproached me in exchange for your Christ} [Ps. 88:51–2], seems to me to indicate the same. And what else does Paul mean when he says, \textit{Your life is hidden with Christ in God} [Col. 3:3], and, again, in another place, \textit{Do you seek a proof of him who speaks in me, that is, Christ?} [2 Cor. 13:3] And now he says that Christ was hidden in God.\textsuperscript{140} The meaning of this, unless it be shown to be something like that which was signified by the prophet with the shadow of Christ, as we said above, probably exceeds the apprehension of the human mind. But we also see many other statements in the divine Scriptures regarding the significance of the word 'shadow', such as that in the Gospel according to Luke, where Gabriel says to Mary, \textit{The Spirit of the Lord will come upon you, and the power of the Most High will overshadow you} [Luke 1:35]. And the Apostle says of the law that those who have circumcision in the flesh serve a copy and shadow of the heavenly things [Heb. 8:5]. And elsewhere it is said, \textit{Is not our life upon the earth a shadow?} [Job 8:9] If then, both the Law which is upon the earth is a shadow, and our whole life which is upon the earth is a shadow, and we live among the nations under the shadow of Christ, it must be considered whether the truth of all these shadows may not come to be known in that revelation, when no longer \textit{through a mirror and in a

\textsuperscript{139} The later tradition would even assert that we become 'uncreated', thus emphasizing that the primary distinction, as we saw with Gregory of Nyssa, is between the unseen and seen realms, for the distinction in the former realm, between uncreated and created, is thus overcome. Cf. Gregory Palamas, \textit{Triad} 3.1.31: 'But as we have shown above, the saints clearly state that this adoption and deifying gift, actualized by faith, is real. ... The divine Maximus has not only taught that it is real, but also that it is unoriginiate (and not only uncreated), uncircumscribed and supra-temporal, so that those attaining it are thereby perfected as uncreated, unoriginiate, and uncircumscribed, although in their own nature they derive from nothing' (\'ως καὶ τοὺς αὐτὴς εὐμορφοτάς διὰ αὐτὴν ἀκτίστους, ἀνάρχους, καὶ ἀπειγράπτους τελέσαι, κατοι δία τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν ἐπὶ οὐκ ὄντων γεγονόται).

\textsuperscript{140} Perhaps alluding to 2 Cor. 5:16, cited at the end of the paragraph.
riddle, but face to face [1 Cor. 13:12] all the saints shall be counted worthy to behold the glory of God and the causes and truth of things. The pledge of this truth already being received through the Holy Spirit, the Apostle said, Even if we had formerly known Christ according to the flesh, we know him thus no longer [2 Cor. 5:16].

(Princ. 2.6.7)

Origen then finishes the chapter with a typical statement of humility: this is what he has in mind to say, but ‘if there is anyone who is able to discover something better and to confirm what he says by clearer statements from the holy Scriptures, let those accounts be received rather than mine. Our true identity is ‘hidden with Christ in God’ and it is under his shadow that our lives are lived out in this world, such that our whole life is but a shadow, yet a shadow that is cast, as upon the Virgin, by the power of the Most High. The truth of all these things will only be known when we no longer see through a mirror, but face to face, beholding ‘the glory of God and the causes and truth of things.’ Yet even now a pledge of the truth is given to us in Christ, whom, as we have repeatedly seen, we no longer know, or should seek to know, according to the flesh.

II The ‘Pre-existence’ and Incarnation of Christ

If this chapter, Princ. 2.6, which we have traced in detail, supplementing it with other texts from Origen himself, and the wider tradition, is what Origen understands by ‘the Incarnation of Christ, it is clearly something other than, in Rowan Williams’ arresting words, ‘an episode in the biography of the Word’, as if the task of theology were to narrate an account of a pre-existent, pre-incarnate divine person called the Word, who, at a certain point in time, becomes flesh, by being born as a human being, to return to the Father thirty-three years later. The incoherence of such an approach, which it has to be said, is rather common in theological works, was pointed out by Herbert McCabe, in his insightful essay ‘The Involvement of God’.¹⁴¹

‘It is part of my thesis’, McCabe argues, ‘that there is no such thing as the pre-existent Christ.’ It was ‘invented’, he suggests, in the nineteenth century, ‘as a way of distinguishing the eternal procession of the Son from the incarnation of the Son’, that is, to affirm that ‘Jesus did not become Son of God in virtue of the incarnation. He was already Son of God before that.’¹⁴² McCabe rejects the notion from two points of view. First, ‘to speak of the pre-existent Christ is to
imply that God has a life-story, a divine story, other than the story of the incarnation ... First the Son of God pre-existed as just the Son of God and then later he was the Son of God made man.' This is incoherent, and incompatible at least with the traditional doctrine of God, for as he points out: 'There can be no succession in the eternal God, no change. Eternity is not, of course, a very long time; it is not time at all ... Eternity is not timeless in the sense that an instant is timeless. ... No: eternity is timeless because it totally transcends time.'

Speaking of the Son of God 'becoming man' or 'coming down from heaven', McCabe writes, 'makes a perfectly good metaphor, but could not literally be true.' From the point of view of God, then, sub specie eternitatis, no sense can be given to the idea that at some point in God's life-story, the Son became incarnate.

Yet, from our point of view, in history, McCabe continues, 'there was certainly a time when Jesus had not yet been born.' And so, as McCabe puts it, 'Moses could have said with perfect truth "Jesus of Nazareth is not yet" or "Jesus does not exist" because, of course, the future does not exist; this is what makes it future.' Yet while saying 'Jesus does not exist,' Moses could also have simultaneously said truthfully 'The Son of God does exist.' This, McCabe concedes, might be called the 'pre-existence of Christ,' meaning that at an earlier time in our history (and there isn't any time except in history) these propositions would both have been true: 'Jesus does not exist,' 'The Son of God does exist,' thus apparently making a distinction between the existence of Jesus and the existence of the Son of God. But the phrase 'pre-existent Christ' seems to imply not just that in the time of Moses 'The Son of God exists' would be true, but also that the proposition 'The Son of God exists now' would be true. And this would be a mistake. Moses could certainly have said, 'It is true now that the Son of God exists' but he could not have truly said 'The Son of God exists now.' That proposition, which attributes temporal existence ('now') to the Son of God, is the one that became true when Jesus was conceived in the womb of Mary. The simple truth is that apart from incarnation the Son of God exists at no time at all, at no 'now', but in eternity, in which he acts upon all time but is not himself 'measured by it', as Aquinas would say. 'Before Abraham was, I am.'

Grappling with the intersection of time and eternity does indeed, and necessarily, stretch the limits of human thought, acting as it must do within time. It is difficult to know what to make of the phrase 'the pre-existent Christ.' It is not clear how it would have been rendered in Greek; there the typical expression, which 'pre-existent' is presumably meant to translate, is προαιώνιος.

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144 McCabe, 'Involvement', 50.

145 Ibid.

146 Ibid. His emphasis.
which simply means 'eternal', outside time, not a 'prior existence', the 'pre' prefix being added to emphasize the point. McCabe's point might have been clearer if instead of speaking about 'the pre-existent Christ', he had spoken of the 'pre-incarnate Word', a phrase I have yet to find in patristic literature, though it abounds in secondary scholarship. Indeed, although the creeds do speak of how the Son 'came down from heaven and was incarnate', which as McCabe suggests is a good metaphor, the subject of the second article of the Creeds of Nicaea and Constantinople, the one who came down from heaven to be incarnate, is not a 'pre-incarnate Word' (the term 'Word' does not even appear in the Creeds), but rather the one subject, the one Lord Jesus Christ. The intersection between time and eternity is naturally correlated to the relationship between 'theology' and 'economy', the two levels on which Origen expounds his first principles: in the first, we speak of Christ as divine, in the second we speak of the same Christ as the mediator; but this does not provide a narrative in which a divine subject later becomes human.\footnote{As Frances M. Young: 'There is no possibility of "narrative" in theologia, but narrative constitutes oikonomia; one is in time, the other beyond time.' \textit{Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 143.}

When McCabe writes that it would be true for Moses, as indeed it would be, to say 'Jesus does not exist' or 'is not yet', although it would also be true for Moses to say 'It is true now that the Son of God exists', without splitting Jesus and the Son into two different subjects (for it would not be true for Moses to say 'The Son of God exists now'), he seems to be pointing towards the same idea that we saw Origen, and Gregory of Nyssa, trying to articulate, that is, that Jesus, as a human being, through the Passion, becomes that which, as God, he always is, outside of time. Their way of expressing this point, however, focuses our attention much more strictly upon the Cross, seeing the life of Jesus always in that light, and, indeed, the whole of creation and its history, seen from the final end-point. The Incarnation, therefore, should perhaps be thought of as the enfleshing of the eternal heavenly reality in the assumption of flesh by the eternal Word, which simultaneously (as iron in the fire) transforms the earthly properties of the flesh, through the fire of the Passion, into the very properties of the Word (so that they are no longer seen), as Jesus goes to the Father, preparing the way for others to follow him and in so doing ministering divinity and the anointing to them, so that the eternal reality of the heavenly court and its liturgy is enfleshed in those who follow him. Understood in such a way, we can perhaps better understand the next great Alexandrian theologian, Athanasius, whose work \textit{On the Incarnation}, the first to be so titled, does not focus on the birth of the Word, in the sense of a biographical 'episode', conflating the infancy narratives of Matthew and Luke (who do not mention the Word of God) with John 1:14 (which doesn't speak of a birth), but shows rather how the one on the Cross is in fact the Word of God, who through the
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Passion demonstrates his resurrection in those who follow him by taking up the Cross. 148

5 'IN MY END IS MY BEGINNING'

The surprise that will no doubt be caused by the claim that the idea of a 'pre-existent' or, better, 'pre-incarnate' divine Word is incoherent, or perhaps rather, mythological, is likely to be matched by the surprise that, despite all the discussion about Origen's teaching on 'the pre-existence of souls' or 'pre-existent souls' (or, for that matter, 'pre-existent intellects'), these phrases do not, as Harl points out, actually occur in the writings of Origen. 149 In Contra Celsum, Origen emphatically maintains that he is not teaching some kind of Platonic transmigration of souls, 'but a different and more sublime view' (Cels. 4.17). That this is not some kind of later retraction is made clear by a similar statement in his Commentary on John, where he contrasts the idea of souls transmigrating from one body to another (μετενσωμάτωσις) with 'embodiment' (ἐνσωμάτωσις). 150

What gave rise to this incorrect shorthand is likely Origen's repeated references to 'antecedent causes' that result in the different position of intellectual beings within the cosmos. Before we tackle this question, however, we would do well to remind ourselves that Origen consistently begins any discussion about the beginning of things by looking towards the end. The fullest statement of this is given in Princ. 1.6.2:

Seeing, then, that such is the end, when all enemies will be subjected to Christ, and when the last enemy, death, will be destroyed and when the kingdom shall be delivered to the God and Father by Christ, to whom all things have been subjected [cf. 1 Cor 15:24–7], let us, I say, from such an end as this contemplate the beginning of things. For the end is always like the beginning, and, therefore, as there is one end of all things, so ought there to be understood one beginning of all things, and as there is one end of many things, so also from one beginning there are many differences and varieties, which, in turn, through the goodness of God and by subjection to Christ and through the unity of the Holy Spirit, are recalled to one end which is like the beginning; that is, all those who bending the knee at the name of Jesus have displayed by this the proof of their subjection to him, those who are

150 Comm. Jo. 6.86; see also 6.66–71; Cels. 1.13; 1.20; 4.40; 5.29; 7.32; 8.30; Comm. Matt. 11.17; 13.1. On the whole question of divine embodiment, see now Benjamin D. Sommer, The Bodies of God and the World of Ancient Israel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
of the heavens and of the earth and of the regions under the earth [Phil. 2:10]—the entire universe being indicated by the three terms—that is, who from that one beginning, each one variously led by his own impulse, were arranged in different orders according to their merit, for goodness does not exist in them essentially, as it does in God and his Christ and the Holy Spirit.

Although he does indeed claim that 'the end is always like the beginning', he does not start from 'the beginning', but rather looks to the end, when all things are brought into subjection to God, in order to search for some idea of the beginning. If the end is to be this unity of all in God and as God (for God will indeed be all in all), now 'enfleshed' by the assumption of flesh into this heavenly reality (as iron in fire), then the beginning of all things is also to be understood as a unity.

There is, of course, an anti-Gnostic thrust to what Origen repeatedly says throughout On First Principles: God is not an arbitrary despot who wilfully creates different beings of diverse natures. But, if God is not the cause of the variety (and much suffering and misery), then the cause must result from ourselves, while God is the one who is able to arrange all things, as vessels of honour and vessels of dishonour, in the same house, such that each is able to purge itself from dishonourable things to become 'a vessel unto honour, sanctified and useful to the master, prepared for every good work' (1 Tim. 2:20-1, Princ. 3.1.21). With this assertion from Paul, Origen continues, 'it does not seem absurd, when we are discussing antecedent causes in the same order and by the same method, to think in the same manner regarding souls, that this is the reason why Jacob was loved even before he was born into this world and Esau hated while he was still held in the womb of his mother' (Princ. 3.1.22).

P. Tzamalikos' treatment of Origen's understanding of the relationship between time and eternity, in his own re-reading of Origen, can help us greatly in understanding these 'antecedent causes'. Tzamalikos points out that, for Origen: 'The view of time as the continuum where divine and creaturely will encounter each other proves the finiteness of the world. If the world were infinite, there would be no foreknowledge.' This is not because, as we noted earlier had become the charge against Origen, he holds that 'God cannot comprehend the infinite, but because in that case “foreknowledge” would make no sense. If the world is beginningless and endless, any notion of before (hence of fore-knowledge) is meaningless. Consequently, if there is no foreknowledge, prophecy makes no sense either, since no end of the world makes sense.'

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151 Cf. esp. Princ. 2.9.6 and 3.1.22–4.
152 P. Tzamalikos, Origen: Philosophy of History and Eschatology, Supplements to VC, 85 (Leiden: Brill, 2007). It should be noted that Tzamilakos deliberately does not work from On First Principles, except as a last resort, for he regards Rufinus' translation as a 'chimerical version' (Origen, 9).
153 Ibid. 52.
If Origen begins by contemplating the end, that is because there is an end, and this end makes a beginning possible, as well as giving coherence and purpose to what happens. ‘Action is meaningful, since this is subject to judgement and has an eschatological perspective.’ But this means, as Tzamalikos points out later, ‘though odd as it may appear, the prospective fulfilment of certain prophecy is the cause, whereas the utterance of prophecy is the result, although it temporally precedes the event itself. … it is the future that determines the past.’ As Origen put it in Contra Celsum,

We say that the one who made the prediction was not the cause of the future event, because he foretold that it would happen; but we hold that the future event, which would have taken place even if it had not been prophesied, constitutes the cause of its prediction by the one with foreknowledge.

(Cels. 2.20)

It is because Christ died on the cross that the prophets spoke about this, not because they spoke about it that he then died, and, in fact, when they spoke about it, they did so, as we noted earlier, as a past event, and, given that its happening is the ‘cause’ of the prophecy, Christ himself speaks of it as an eternal ‘necessity’ (cf. Luke 24:26). How is this possible? Tzamalikos answers:

The answer to this question is that this causality, although manifest in history, is in fact a causality between time and timelessness. Prophecy is uttered by a prophet, who ‘looks to the future’ [Comm. Rom. 7.19.2], yet it is God who speaks through the prophet. What is uttered originates in God’s own foreknowledge. Prophecy as a result, although manifested in time, actually springs from timelessness.

Tzamalikos’ analysis of the function of foreknowledge and prophecy, within the framework of a definite time-frame, with a beginning and end, is readily applicable to the ‘antecedent causes’ spoken about by Origen: their anteriority is not simply chronological, but always related to the timelessness of God’s foreknowledge. Rather than imagining a host of eternally existing intellects who through some pre-cosmic fall descend into bodies, it seems more probable that the ‘antecedent causes’ invoked by Origen to reconcile the inequality of human fate with an affirmation of the justice of God refers to the anteriority of the foreknowledge of God, who knows all things for each from their womb.

Or as Origen puts it, when discussing Paul’s description of his own ‘election’ before his birth (Rom. 1:1 and Gal. 1:15), ‘any one who is predestined through the foreknowledge of God is the cause of the events known, rather than being ‘saved by nature’ as he charges his opponents with teaching (Philoc. 25).

However, as Paul speaks about being ‘called’ from before his birth, we should perhaps revisit the sophisticated understanding, and vocabulary, that Origen

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154 Ibid. 53. 155 Ibid. 119. 156 Ibid. 121.
157 As argued by Harl, ‘Préexistence des âmes’.
has for describing the different aspects of God’s creation. To summarize (and extrapolate) what we saw earlier: God has called or elected all to existence in the heavenly court from before the foundation of the world. Seeing to what they are called is a cause for scandal and falling away, with the result that we come to be in temporal existence: the world itself is ‘thrown down’, and we come into existence in time, fashioned or moulded from the dust of the earth. As this happens, the lamb is also ‘slain from the foundation of the world.’ Yet, at the same time, through the slaying of the Lamb within time at the Passion, at which all fall away (with the notable exception of the beloved disciple in the Gospel of John the Theologian), we are, in fact, brought to participate in the heavenly liturgy through, and requiring, our own taking up the cross. Thus the cause both for diversification as well as unification, in a movement that gives flesh to the heavenly reality (and transforms that flesh into an eternal state) is the self-sacrificial love that is divine life, celebrated eternally in the heavens, but taking on the character of the slaying of the Lamb as those called to the feast fall away, both eternally in the heavens and in time on earth. Yet at the same time this sacrifice is also the means by which the final unity of God’s creation is achieved, when God is indeed ‘all in all’, enfleshed, and the marriage of the Lamb is consummated. In all of this, one must bear in mind, however, that Origen is differentiating between different aspects (as with the different titles of God and Christ, and the different words for creation) of one and the same eternal reality, not narrating a mythology.

The historical and trans-historical, or eternal, significance of the single event of the crucifixion should be underscored. Origen did not teach that there was a crucifixion in the heavens before that on earth, as Jerome alleges (Ruf. 1.20): ‘Your Origen allows himself to treat of metempsychosis, to introduce an innumerable number of worlds, to clothe rational creatures in one body after another, and to say that Christ has often suffered, and will suffer again, it being always profitable to undertake what has once been profitable.’ See also the texts cited in Appendix II, item no. 23. Origen does indeed speak of the sacrifice of Christ being offered for the salvation of those on earth and those in heaven, and of the crucifixion being both invisible and visible, but it is always the single sacrifice of the cross. Cf. Origen, Princ. 2.3.5; Or. 27.15; Comm. Jo. 1.255; Hom. Lev. 1.3-4; Hom. Jes. Nav. 8.3; Hom. Luc. 10.3. It is only from the foundation of the world, not ‘before’, that the Lamb is slain (Heb. 13:8); yet, I would suggest, it is the same reality, constituting divine life, but seen from a different perspective. Seeing what divine life looks like—voluntary self-sacrificial love—those called to enter into this react in various ways, falling away or taking it upon themselves to serve those who fall away, and, in this way, the voluntary self-sacrificial love takes on the character of the Passion. These two perspectives are there in Peter’s speech (Acts 2:23): ‘this Jesus, delivered up according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God, you crucified and killed by the hands of lawless men.’ It happens, bloodily, at our hands, but is nevertheless the eternal economy of God. The same double-perspective is seen right through the Scriptures, most clearly with Joseph, who was sold into slavery, but yet was sent into Egypt by God ‘to preserve life’ (Gen. 45:5); and again in liturgy, where we celebrate the one ‘who was given up, no, rather, gave himself up for the life of the world’ (John Chrysostom, Preface to the Anaphora). We, in time, begin with the given up, but learn to think theologically in terms of ‘gave himself up’. The ‘giving himself up’, on the other hand, is primary in God, but takes on the character of ‘was given up’ because of our reaction, so that the lamb is indeed ‘slain from the foundation of the world’.
Origen's predecessor in Alexandria, Clement, had already appealed to the paradoxical intersection between time and eternity to explain what happens sacramentally in the life and being of the newly baptized and those who have grown to become mature in their faith.\footnote{Cf. John Behr, Asceticism and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement, O ECS (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 152–9, for the newly baptized, and 185–207, though I would now soften my criticism of Clement.} ‘Being baptized, we are illumined; illumined we become sons; being made sons, we are perfected; being perfected we are made immortal. “I have said”, he says, “that you are gods, sons of the Most High” (\textit{Paed.} 1.6.26.1; \textit{Ps.} 81:6). Christians are, he says, already, here and now (\textit{éi thén sched ἡ ηδη}), practising the heavenly life by which they are deified (\textit{Paed.} 1.12.98.3). Answering those who do not understand how one can speak of a neophyte as already perfect, Clement explains:

There is nothing intermediate between light and darkness. But the end is reserved till the resurrection of those who believe, and it is not the reception of some other thing, but the obtaining of the promise previously made. For we do not say that both take place at the same time—both the arrival at the end and the anticipation of that arrival. For eternity and time are not the same, neither is the attempt and the final result; but both have reference to the same thing, and one and the same person is concerned in both. Faith, so to speak, is the attempt generated in time; the final result is the attainment of the promise secured for eternity. ... having in anticipation grasped by faith that which is future, after the resurrection we receive it as present.\footnote{\textit{Paed.} 1.6.28.3–29.3: Μὴ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἁμα ἀμφω συνίστασθαι φαμεν, τὴν τε πρὸς τὸ ρέας ἀφίσεως καὶ τῆς ἀφίσεως τὴν πρόληψιν ὦν γὰρ ἐστὶ ταύτων αἰων καὶ χρόνον οὐδὲ μην ὁρμή καὶ τέλος, οὐκ ἐστὶν: πέρι ἐν δὲ ἀμφω καὶ περὶ ἀμφω δὲ εἰς κατακίνετα. “Εστι γονίν, ἡς εἰπεῖν, ὁρμή μὲν ἡ πίστις εἰν χρόνῳ γεννωμένη, τέλος δὲ τοῦ τευχεῖ τῆς ἐπαγγελίας εἰς αἰώνας βεβαιούμενον. ... ἐκείνο δὲ τῷ πιστεύσῃ ἦ δὲ προειληφότες ἐσόμενοι, μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν ἀπολαμβάνομεν γενόμενον.}

The word for this ‘anticipation’ of our eschatological reality, already real in faith, is the same term, πρόληψις, that, as we saw earlier when considering Aristotelian and Hellenistic epistemology, was used, as it is by Clement himself (especially in \textit{Strom.} 2), to refer to the generic notions, ‘presuppositions’, synthesized out of repeated sense-perceptions, which alone make knowledge possible. Its use here, in a sacramental context, gives further substance to what that might be for the baptized: ‘faith is the substance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen’ (\textit{Heb.} 11:1). Without undermining this perfection of the newly baptized, Clement insists that it must still be worked upon, to make this perfection actual already now. ‘As gnosis is not born with human beings, but is acquired, and the learning of its elements demands application, training and growth; and then from incessant practice it passes into a habit; so, when perfected in the mystic habit, it abides, being made infallible through love’ (\textit{Strom.} 6.9.78.4). Indeed for such a one, Clement says, habit ‘becomes
The mature, perfected Christian, the 'Gnostic', 'is already in the midst of that which will be, anticipating hope by gnosis, for 'through love the future is already present for him.' For such Gnostics, their whole life is one unceasing festival: 'Holding festival, then, in our whole life, persuaded that God is altogether on every side present, we cultivate our fields praising; we sail the sea, hymning; in all the rest of our conversation we conduct ourselves according to the rule' (Strom. 7.7.35.6). Finally, in the most striking terms:

This is the activity of the perfected Gnostic, to have converse with God through the great High Priest, being made like the Lord, as far as may be, by means of the whole service \[\theta\varepsilon\rho\alpha\pi\varepsilon\iota\alpha\] towards God, [a service] which tends to the salvation of human beings, through care of the goodness towards us, and on the other side, through liturgy, through teaching and through beneficence in deeds. Being assimilated to God, the Gnostic even creates and fashions himself \[\epsilon\alpha\nu\tau\omicron\upsilon \kappa\tau\iota\zeta\varepsilon\iota\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \delta\acute{\eta}m\iota\mu\iota\omicron\upsilon\gamma\eta\iota\varepsilon\iota\], and adorns those who hear him; assimilating, as far as possible, by an ascesis that tends to apatheia, to him who is by nature impassible; and this is uninterrupted converse and communion with the Lord.

With the future already present for him, when he will be deified (or rather already is, though it is always difficult to know to what extent Clement is describing an idealized portrait), the mature, perfected Christian shares in the activity of God, even to the point of 'creating himself'. The whole life of such a perfected human being is one of festival and thanksgiving.

It is, then, in the earthly liturgy that we most closely approximate, are 'images' or 'icons' of our eternal reality, 'mystically imaging \[\mu\nu\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\iota\kappa\dot{o} \epsilon\iota\kappa\omicron\nu\iota\zeta\omicron\nu\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu\epsilon\zeta\epsilon\nu\epsilon\zeta\epsilon\iota\] the Cherubim' as the 'Cherubic hymn' in the Liturgies of John Chrysostom and Basil (referred to earlier) puts it. Speaking of Christians in worship as 'icons' of the cherubim is not meant to imply that our end is to become angels (it is rather to become created human beings), but just as when iron and bronze, to extend Origen’s analogy, are placed in a fire, they become indistinguishable from the fire and from each other, so too there are no distinctions in Christ: we remain male and female (and do not become angels), but indistinguishably human in Christ, in whom 'there is neither male nor female' (Gal. 3:28). Instead, what we have is, as in the preface to Basil’s anaphora (and Origen’s preferred way of speaking), the whole assembly of rational beings, where 'rational' is defined by relation to the Word of God, praising God together eternally in the heavenly court. We do not have many details

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161 Strom. 7.7.46.9; see also 4.22.138.3.
162 Strom. 6.9.73.4: \[\delta\ \delta’\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \omega\omicron\ \acute{\epsilon}\omicron\sigma\tau\omicron\iota\ \dot{\alpha} \dot{\alpha} \acute{\alpha}\pi\tau\omicron\iota\ \eta\omicron\ \gamma\epsilon\omicron\omicron\omicron\mu\omicron\nu\epsilon\omicron\upsilon\omicron\sigma\omicron\nu\ η\omicron\ \epsilon\lambda\pi\omicron\iota\delta\alpha\ \pi\rho\sigma\epsilon\iota\iota\phi\omicron\omega\sigma\iota\ δι\iota\ τ\iota\ \gamma\nu\omega\iota\omicron\sigma\omicron\upsilon\epsilon\iota\ς\ \text{and} 6.9.77.1: \kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\ \dot{\alpha} \dot{\alpha}\acute{\alpha}\pi\tau\omicron\iota\ \epsilon\nu\epsilon\sigma\tau\omicron\oslash \ \eta\omicron\ \text{t}o\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}l\omicron\nu.
163 Cf. Origen, Comm. Jo. 2.114: 'we could also say that the saint alone is rational.'
about what liturgy was like in the time of Origen, but it does seem to be the case that the introduction of the Sanctus in the liturgy goes back to the period just after Origen, while the idea of participation in the heavenly liturgy is intimated by various writers before him, picking up on apocalyptic themes from Second Temple Judaism. As Bryan Spinks says of this dimension of Christian worship:

In Christ the space of heaven and the region of earth are united. In the eucharist the worshipper enters heaven through Christ, and is represented by the High Priest. Here time and eternity intersect and become one, and this world and the world to come elide.

I have intimated, sometimes overtly, throughout this Introduction, that there are apocalyptic dimensions to Origen’s theology and his *On First Principles*. Now that we have come to the end of the Introduction, it might be helpful to lay out more fully these apocalyptic dimensions. The best context for understanding the apocalyptic framework is the ‘correspondence’ and ‘two-level drama’ that John Ashton, in his work on the Gospel of John, describes as being one of the four key elements of apocalyptic: two of which are temporal, two ages (mystery) and two stages (dream or vision), and two are spatial, insiders/outsiders (riddle) and above/below (correspondence).

According to Ashton, the effect of Christ’s riddling discourse and the Messianic Secret, whereby the readers of the Gospel know, and therefore see, more than the disciples within the narrative, is to set up a two-level drama in a framework of correspondence. This element of correspondence is found in most apocalyptic literature, especially clearly in the ‘Similitudes’ of the Enochic material. Although there is some debate about how to translate the Hebrew, Aramaic, and Ethiopic terms, Ashton is probably right to suggest that ‘correspondence’ is the best rendering, not least because it brings out a further element of the riddling discourse of Christ: παραλογία literally means a ‘juxtaposition’, with a consequent ‘comparison’ or ‘analogy’, so entailing a ‘correspondence’. In the Enochic material, the term ‘correspondence’ is used to compare and liken things on earth and things in heaven, establishing connections between the realm above and the realm below (cf. esp. Enoch 43:4). Or, as it is put in the *Ascension of Isaiah*: ‘as it is on high, so also is it on high, so also is it on

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earth; what happens in the vault of heaven happens similarly here on earth.\textsuperscript{167}

It is important to note, as Ashton points out, that:

For Enoch, and for apocalyptic writers generally, there are not two worlds but one: or rather the whole of reality is split into matching pairs (rather like the biological theory of DNA) in which one half, the lower, is the mirror-image (albeit in this case a distorting mirror) of the higher. That is why a revelation of what is above is not just relevant or related to what happens or is about to happen on earth: rather what happens on earth is a re-enactment in earthly terms of what has happened in heaven: a correspondence!\textsuperscript{168}

There is one reality, as we emphasized when looking at different verbs Origen used for 'creation', which are but aspects of the singular work of God.

In his investigation of the context of the relationship between the community around John and others, both the Jewish community and other Christian communities, J. Louis Martyn came to a very similar insight into the dynamics of what he calls the 'stereoptic vision' of John:

John did not create the literary form of the two-level drama. It was at home in the thought-world of Jewish apocalypticism: the dicta most basic to the apocalyptic thinker are these: God created both heaven and earth. There are dramas taking place both on the heavenly stage and on the earthly stage. Yet these dramas are not really two, but rather one drama. ... One might say that events on the heavenly stage not only correspond to events on the earthly stage, but also slightly precede them in time, leading them into existence, so to speak. What transpires on the heavenly stage is often called 'things to come.' For that reason events seen on the earthly stage are entirely enigmatic to the man who sees only the earthly stage. Stereoptic vision is necessary, and it is precisely stereoptic vision which causes a man to write an apocalypse: 'After this I looked, and lo, in heaven an open door! And the first voice, which I had heard ... said, 'Come up hither and I will show you what must take place after this.'\textsuperscript{169}

In his analysis of how this stereoptic vision is enacted in the Gospel of John, Martyn points to three modifications from the correspondence found in apocalyptic literature. First, both levels of the drama are enacted on earth, between the life of Christ and the life of the Johannine community. Second, the temporal extension does not parallel the heavenly with the earthly, but, again, the two stages or times of Christ's own life and that of his body, the community. And third, 'John does not in any overt way indicate to his reader a distinction between the two stages.'\textsuperscript{170} Moreover, Martyn points out that


\textsuperscript{168} Ashton, Fourth Gospel, 327.


\textsuperscript{170} Martyn, History and Theology, 130–1.
although John obviously does not write an apocalypse but a Gospel, yet ‘the relation of his Gospel to the Apocalypse should probably be reexamined in the light of the way in which he presents his two levels.’

Martyn and Ashton are concerned with the narrativity of the Gospel of John: how a drama is unfolded over time and the correlation of the two stages of understanding with the history of the community in which the Gospel was written. However, as we attempt to understand Origen, what is important is the idea of correspondence, for Origen, between the end and the beginning, the above and the below, heaven and earth, that which is unseen and that which is seen (the fundamental distinction, according to Gregory of Nyssa, prior even to the difference between created and uncreated)—two realms which, as different as they are in our present experience, are ultimately, eschatologically, one and the same, for ‘God will be all in all’. To see this, we need ‘stereoptic vision’, or ‘a divine sense’, in the words of Solomon used by Origen. We are participants in both simultaneously, through the paradoxical intersection of (non-temporal) eternity and time. This is not, Origen insists, a realm of Platonic ‘forms’, nor a bodiless world that only exists in our imagination; and neither is it a Platonic ‘myth of transmigration, in which the soul falls from the vaults of heaven’, but ‘a different and more sublime view’. It is, I would suggest, an apocalyptic vision created by the intersection of eternity and time, with the former opened up to us in and through the Passion of Christ, while we yet remain in the latter. We are, simultaneously, in both; and we are brought into close approximation with our true being, now ‘hidden with Christ in God’, in the earthly liturgy, which is an image of the heavenly liturgy. Our end, in Christ, is to be a participant in the heavenly court, celebrating the heavenly liturgy in the eternity of God; and although this will only be a ‘present reality’, as it were, for us after our sojourn (and being fashioned) upon earth, yet as an eternal reality, we are always already there, and have always been so. For our election or calling by God precedes our formation and our eventual creation. Moreover, our ‘place’ in the heavenly court is determined by our choices in this life. Yet that is a reality that nevertheless ‘precedes’ our place in this life in this world, and so, in Origen’s terms, it determines our place in this life as an ‘antecedent cause’, enabling us, through this life governed by the economy of God, to be perfected in the end in him.

171 Ibid. 130, fn. 198.
172 Origen, Princ. 2.3.6; Cels. 1.20; 4.17.
Manuscripts and Other Sources, Abbreviations and Sigla

1 RUFINUS' LATIN TRANSLATION

1 Manuscripts

The manuscripts of Rufinus' Latin translation of Origen's *On First Principles*, utilized in this edition, are listed below, together with the letter by which they are indicated in the critical apparatus. There are altogether thirty-four manuscripts of *On First Principles* identified by Koetschau, which he described and discussed extensively (pp. xxiii-xlvi, description; pp. xlvii-xcv, discussion), selecting the seven most important codices for establishing his edition (1913). In working out the relationships between the codices, Koetschau postulated the existence of a source, which he names the *Codex Lucullanus*, as the archetype of the subsequent manuscript tradition. He was followed by Simonetti and Crouzel for their edition (1978–80). Another manuscript, the *Codex Guelferbytanus* 4141 (Weissenburger 57), unknown to Koetschau, was introduced by Görgemanns and Karpp in their edition (1976). Finally, and most recently, Fernandez identified, in a sixth- or early seventh-century codex containing sermons attributed to Basil, *Parisinus Latinus* 10593, Rufinus' Latin translation of Princ. 2.6, with the title *Sermo de incarnatione Domini*, and incorporated its readings into his own edition (2015). The value of this witness is twofold. First, it is several centuries earlier than any previous witness to Rufinus' translation, with several variations not found in the other witnesses, and thereby also provides a testimony to the translation independent of the postulated *Codex Lucullanus* and its derivatives. Second, it demonstrates that parts of Origen's work were circulating as independent texts. Fernandez also had recourse to the extract from Princ. 3.1.6–8, discovered in the late 1970s by K. A. Worp and K. Treu in a papyrus in Amsterdam, dating to the third or fourth century. Again, this contains no serious variations, but does demonstrate the stability of the Greek text. Finally, Fernandez also for the first time included in his critical apparatus all the headings contained in the
manuscripts. I have followed previous editors in adopting the schema that has been worked out and refined over the course of the century since Koetschau, and, of course, am heavily indebted to them for their work.

P  Codex Parisinus Latinus 10593. 6th cent. (Only Princ. 2.6)
A  Codex Augiensis 160. 10th cent.
W  Codex Guelferbytanus 4141 (Weissenburger 57). 10th cent.
B  Codex Bambergensis B IV 27 (953). 11th cent.
C  Codex Casinensis 343. 10th–11th cent.
G  Codex Parisinus Sangermanensis Lat. 12125. 9th cent.
M  Codex Metensis 225. 10th cent.
Ab Codex Abrincensis 66. 13th cent.
S  Codex Parisinus Sorbonicus Lat. 16322. 13th cent.

5th cent.

6th cent.

9th cent.

10th cent.

11th cent.

12th cent.

13th cent.

ω  consensus codicum A W B C G M Ab S
α  consensus codicum A W B C
γ  consensus codicum G M Ab S
δ  consensus codicum A W
β  consensus codicum B C
μ  consensus codicum G M
σ  consensus codicum Ab S
II Indirect Witnesses

In addition to the manuscripts, Rufinus' translation of *On First Principles* is also indirectly witnessed by the following sources; several of these have been newly edited, and so, along with Fernandez, I have been able to work with better editions of these texts than were previous editors.

- **Ba** Basilius Magnus (apud Leo I ACO II.4, p. 125.1–9; apud Innocent of Maronea ACO IV.2, p. 95.25–32)
- **Ha** Hieronymus, *Apologia contra Rufinum* (ed. Lardet, CCSL 79)
- **He** Hieronymus, *Epistula* 80 (ed. Hilberg, CSEL 55, pp. 102–5)
- **Ian** Ps.-Augustinus, *De Incarnatione et deitate Christi ad Ianuarius* (ed. Dorbauer, CSEL 99)
- **Pa** Pamphilus, *Apologeticus pro Origene* (ed. Amacker and Junod, SC 464)
- **Ra** Rufinus, *Apologia contra Hieronymum* (ed. Simonetti, CCSL 20)
- **Sc** Johannes Scotus Erigena, *De divisione naturae* V (PL 122, 929–30)

Of these indirect witness, the most important and extensive are Pamphilus' *Apologeticus pro Origene* and the intriguing work *On the Incarnation and the Deity of Christ to Januarius*, ascribed to Augustine. The *Apologeticus* was written during the time that Pamphilus of Caesarea was imprisoned, that is, from November 307 until his martyrdom on 16 February 310. The five books of his Apology were written with the assistance of Eusebius, who composed a sixth book after Pamphilus' death. The occasion for the *Apologeticus* was a number of charges raised against the teachings of Origen, aligning it with the teaching of Paul of Samosata, who had been condemned in the previous century, and this caused some consternation amongst the Egyptian confessors who had been imprisoned in Palestine. Only the first book of the *Apologeticus* survives, translated by Rufinus, before he turned to the larger task of translating *On First Principles*. The first book of the *Apologeticus* contains seventy extracts from a wide range of the works of Origen, twenty-seven of which come from *On First Principles*. They often vary from the translation Rufinus would subsequently give of *On First Principles* as a whole, though in no particularly significant details, thus witnessing the stability of both the Greek text, in the form that Pamphilus worked with and then that which Rufinus worked from later, and also Rufinus' own translation practice.

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2. See the Introduction of Thomas P. Sheck to his translation of the *Apologeticus* for a full discussion of the context for Rufinus' translation of the work, FC 120 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 10–15.
The work *To Januarius* is an intriguing and enigmatic work, consisting almost solely of passages from *On First Principles*. The first critical edition of this work, that of Dorbauer, is based upon twelve manuscripts, the oldest dating to the thirteenth century, though there was one from the tenth century that is now lost. It is attributed to Augustine, though from the sixteenth century doubts were cast upon this, and the attribution was decisively rejected in the following century. That the passages are extracted from Rufinus' translation means that it cannot be dated any earlier than the beginning of the fifth century. Giulia Sfameni Gasparro suggested that it was compiled in the years before the sixth-century condemnation of Origen, to defend his orthodoxy. However, as Dorbauer points out, Koetschau dated his conjectured 'Codex Lucullanus' to a period after Origen's condemnation, and so the work *To Januarius* must also be later. Noting the similarity of its readings to those of the α group of manuscripts, deriving from a common, at the latest seventh-century source, Dorbauer's conclusion is that this work must in fact be an anti-Origenist tract prepared after his condemnation. If we take the classical name of the dedicatee at face value, we should perhaps not place the composition too late, though it could equally be an attempt to gain 'Augustinian' authority. Nothing more can really be discerned from the text, other than that, as the manuscripts indicate, it originated in France, as early as the century following Origen's condemnation or as late as the Carolingian period.

For convenience, I provide here the cross-references to *On First Principles* for Pamphilus' *Apology* and the work *To Januarius*. The few occurrences in the critical apparatus of Rufinus' and Jerome's *Apologies* against each other have been supplied with a book and chapter number in the apparatus itself; the other indirect witnesses can be readily located on the basis of the above bibliographic details.

Pamphilus, *Apology for Origen*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Princ.</th>
<th>Pa</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Pr.4–8</td>
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<td>Pr.10</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1.5–6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2.2</td>
<td>54</td>
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<td>1.2.4</td>
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<td>1.2.6</td>
<td>102</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2.9</td>
<td>58</td>
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</table>

(Ps. Augustine) Ad Iuanarium

Princ.                                Ian
Pr.4 (species ... testamenti)          1.1 (1-12)
Pr.4 (tum ... sanctum)                 1.2 (1-12)
Pr.4 (sane ... praedicatur)            1.2 (12-16)
Pr.5 (post ... gloria)                 1.3 (1-8)
Pr.5 (est ... distinguitur)            1.4 (1-19)
Pr.6 (de ... nuncupantur)             1.5 (1-7)
Pr.7 (est ... profertur)               1.6 (1-6)
Pr.8 (tum ... condonatur)             1.7 (1-8)
Pr.10 (est ... distinguitur)           1.8 (1-4)
Pr.10 (oportet ... reperrerit)        1.9 (1-8)
1.2.2 (nos ... species)               1.10 (1-15)
1.2.3 (quali ... interpres)           1.11 (1-8)
1.2.3 (Iohannes ... potest)           1.11 (8-15)
1.2.4 (hic ... sapientia)             1.12 (1-6)
1.2.4 (via ... colorem)               1.12 (6-15)
1.2.4-5 (verum ... dicitur)           1.13.1-29
1.2.6 (videamus ... patrem)           1.14 (1-48)
1.2.7 (secd ... effectus)             1.15 (1-18)
1.2.8 (verum ... patre)               1.16 (1-40)
1.2.9 (videamus ... est)              1.17 (1-37)
1.2.10 (ne ... gloriae)               1.17 (37-69)
### xciv Manuscripts and Other Sources

<table>
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<tr>
<th>1.2.10 (ut ... praedicatur)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>1.2.12 (sed ... patre)</td>
<td>1.19 (1–20)</td>
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<td>1.2.12 (cum ... facere)</td>
<td>1.19 (20–1)</td>
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<td>1.2.13 (superest ... perquiramus)</td>
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<td>1.3.1–2 (consequens ... futuro)</td>
<td>1.21 (1–48)</td>
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<td>1.3.3–4 (verumtamen ... accipiens)</td>
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<td>1.3.4 (sicut ... excedunt)</td>
<td>1.22 (20–49)</td>
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<td>1.3.8 (dues ... possunt)</td>
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<td>1.3.8 (ita ... elapsum)</td>
<td>1.24 (1–16)</td>
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<td>2.6.3 (igitur ... dicatur)</td>
<td>2.8 (1–39)</td>
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<td>2.6.4 (propheta ... iniquitate)</td>
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<td>3.5.8 (verum ... amen)</td>
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<td>3.6.2–3 (ubique ... erit)</td>
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<td>4.4.2 (si ... meritorum)</td>
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<td>4.4.3 (his ... eorum)</td>
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<td>4.4.3 (post ... dei)</td>
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<td>4.4.4 (ne ... crucifixum)</td>
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<td>4.4.5 (quidam ... trinitatis)</td>
<td>2.7 (1–11)</td>
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### III Editions

The following abbreviations have been used for the editions of *Princ.*

- **Merl** Merlin (1512)
- **Del** Delarue (1733)
- **Koe** Koetschau (1913)
- **Sim** Simonetti–Crouzel (1978)
- **Goe** Görgemanns–Karpp (1992, 3rd edn)
- **Fern** Fernandez (2015)
As Koetschau was working on the manuscripts of the *Philocalia* in preparation for his edition of Origen's *Contra Celsum*, unknown to him was the fact that Joseph Armitage Robinson was also engaged in the same task in Cambridge. When they found out about each other's work, they agreed to publish their results independently: Robinson's edition of the *Philocalia* in 1893, and Koetschau's edition of *Contra Celsum* in 1899. For his edition, Robinson consulted more than fifty manuscripts, and provided a very full description of each and discussion about their relationship, identifying those listed below as the most important, and providing a schema which, with slight modifications, has served as the basis for subsequent work. The Sources chrétiennes edition of the *Philocalia* (*Philoc. 1–2, ed. Marguerite Harl, SC 302; Philoc. 21–7, ed. Éric Junod, SC 226*) did not include the texts also found in *On First Principles*. Fernandez, as noted earlier, incorporated into his edition the extract from *Princ. 3.1.6–8*, found in a third- or fourth-century papyrus, discovered in the late 1970s by K. A. Worp and K. Treu in Amsterdam. The numeration of the sections in each chapter of the *Philocalia* as presented by the various editors differs slightly from that found in editions of *On First Principles*. As this has become rather cumbersome (leading to two if not three numbers given for each section), and as the passages from the *Philocalia* found also in *On First Principles* are always cited as coming from *On First Principles*, and, finally, as it is a simple matter to locate each section, I have not reproduced the varying section numbers particular to the *Philocalia* itself.

### 1 Manuscripts

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<td>C</td>
<td>Codex Parisinus Suppl. gr. 615. 13th cent.</td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>Codex Venetus Marcianus gr. 122. AD 1343</td>
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<td>E</td>
<td>Codex Venetus Marcianus gr. 48. 14th cent.</td>
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<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Codex Parisinus gr. 456. AD 1426</td>
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Manuscripts and Other Sources

4th cent.  
9th cent.  
10th cent.  
11th cent.  
12th cent.  
13th cent.  
14th cent.  
15th cent.

β  Consensus codicum A C D E H  
δ  Consensus codicum C D E H  
ε  Consensus codicum C D  
ζ  Consensus codicum E H  

Other witnesses

Pap  Amsterdamer Papyrus Inv. no. 194. K. A. Worp and K. Treu, 'Origenes' *De Principiis* III 1, 6–8 in einem Amsterdamer Papyrus', *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*, 350 (1979), 43–47. (3rd–4th cent.)

II Editions

In addition to the editions of *On First Principles* listed above, the following abbreviations are used for editions of the *Philocalia* itself.

*Tar*  Tarin (1619)  
*Rob*  Robinson (1893)
3 ABBREVIATIONS AND SIGLA

I Abbreviations used in Critical Apparatus

ac = ante correctionem
add. = addidit, addiderunt
codd. = codices
coni. = coniecit, coniecerunt
corr. = correxit, correxerunt
dub. = dubitanter
edd. = editores
mg = in margine
om. = omisit, omiserunt
pc = post correctionem
ras = in rasura
secl. = seclusit, secluserunt
transp. = transposuit, transposuerunt

II Sigla used in Text and Translation

{} Words in text which should be elided.
<> Words added to text and translation.
[ ] Words supplied by the translator.

In preparing this volume, I quickly came to the conclusion that the primary issue at stake was not the matter of individual readings, for which there is general consensus amongst previous editors, but rather the presentation of the text. As explained in the Introduction, it cannot pretend to be a reconstruction of the lost original, based upon what we supposedly know about Origen's teaching, but must be an edition of Rufinus' Latin translation, intact. As such, I have relegated to the space between the text and the critical apparatus those passages from others which can reasonably be supposed to parallel the passage being translated by Rufinus, as supplementary witnesses, and have translated these passages, where they need translation, as differing from Rufinus' own text, in the footnotes to the translation; but I have consigned to Appendix II all the other passages introduced, or rather interpolated, into the text by Koetschau. I have also given a full rendering of the headings found in the manuscripts in Appendix I. As an edition of Rufinus' text, I have also, unlike other modern editions, placed the Latin text of Rufinus above the Greek text of Princ. 3.1 and 4.1–3, not because there is any doubt about the authenticity of the Greek text,
but for the sake of consistency. It should always be borne in mind that while Rufinus certainly extends or elaborates the text in various ways, the editors of the Philocalia have also omitted some significant sections, concerning which there is also no real doubt about their authenticity.

Regarding the translation, I have attempted to provide as literal a translation as I was able, while still respecting the rules of English grammar. This has, no doubt, resulted in longer sentences, more numerous sub-clauses, and a greater use of the passive, than will please some. This has been done in the conviction that the mode of expression, conveying as it does patterns of thought, is just as important as what is being said.
Origenes de Principiis
Origen, *On First Principles*
Praefatio Rufini

1. Scio quam plurimos fratrum, scientiae scripturarum desiderio prouocatus, poposcisse ab aliquantis eruditis uiris et graecarum litterarum peritis, ut Origenem Romanum facerent et latinis auribus eum donarent. In quod etiam frater et collega noster ab episcopo Damaso deprecatus, cum homilias duas de Cantico canticorum in latum transtulisset ex graeco, ita in illo opere ornate magnificeque praefatus est, ut cuuius legendi Origenem et auidissime perquirendi desiderium commoueret, diuens illius animae conuenire quod dictum est quia `Introductit me rex in cubiculum suum', adserens eum quod, cum in ceteris libris omnes uincat, in Canticis canticorum etiam ipse se uicerit. Pollicetur sane in ipsa praefatione se et ipsos in Cantica canticorum libros et alios quam plurimos Origenis romanis auribus largiturum. Sed ille, ut uideo, in stilo proprio placens rem maioris gloriae sequitur, ut pater uerbi sit potius quam interpres. Nos ergo rem ab illo quidem coeptam sequimur et probatam, sed non aequis eloquentiae uiribus tanti uir ornare possumus dicta. Vnde uereor ne uitio meo id accidat, ut is uir, quem ille alterum post apostolos ecclesiae doctorem scientiae ac sapientiae merito comprobauit, inopia sermonis nostri longe se inferior uideatur.

2. Quod ego saepe considerans reticebam, nec deprecantibus me frequenter in hoc opus fratribus adnuebam. Sed tua uis, fidelissime frater Macari, tanta est, cui obsistere ne imperitia quidem potest. Propert quod, ne te ultra tam grauem paterer exactorem, etiam contra propositum meum cessi, ea tamen lege atque eo ordine, ut quantum fieri potest in interpretando sequar regulam praecessorum et eius praecipue uiri, cuius superius fecimus mentionem. Qui cum ultra septuaginta libellus Origenis, quos homileticos appellatu, aliquantos etiam de tomis in apostolum scriptis transtulisset in latum, in quibus cum aliquanta offendicula inueniantur in graeco, ita eliminat omnia in interpretando atque purguit, ut nihil in illis quod a fide nostra discrepet latinus lector inueniat.
Rufinus’ Preface

1. I know that very many of the brethren, driven by a desire for knowledge of the Scriptures, have requested of some scholars, experts in Greek letters, that they should make a Roman of Origen and present him to Latin ears.¹ To this end also, when our brother and colleague, at the entreaty of Bishop Damasus, had translated two of the Homilies on the Song of Songs from Greek into Latin, he composed so elegant and splendid a preface to that work as to inspire a desire in everyone to read and avidly study Origen, saying that one could apply to his soul the saying, *The King has brought me into his chamber,*² asserting that while he ‘in other works surpassed all other writers, in the Song of Songs he had surpassed even himself.’³ He promises, indeed, in that same preface, that he himself will present the books on the Song of Songs and numerous others of Origen to Roman ears. But he, I see, finding greater pleasure in his own pen, pursues an end with greater glory, that he may be a ‘father of the word’⁴ rather than a translator. Accordingly we take up the work that was begun and approved of by him, although we are not able to provide such eloquent words as that great man. Therefore I am afraid lest, through my fault, that man, whom he has deservedly acknowledged as the other teacher of knowledge and wisdom in the Church after the apostles, should, through our own poverty of language, appear far inferior to what he is.

2. Continually thinking of this, I kept silent and did not yield to the brethren frequently entreating me to undertake this work. But your influence, most faithful brother Macarius, is so persuasive that not even lack of skill is able to withstand it. Because of this, that I might not find you too severe in your demands, I gave way, even against my resolution, yet on the agreement and arrangement, however, that in translating I would follow as far as possible the rule observed by my predecessors, and especially by that distinguished man whom I mentioned above. He, when translating into Latin more than seventy treatises, called Homilies, of Origen, and also a number of tomes on the writings of the Apostle, in which are found in the Greek a good many stumbling-blocks, so smoothed over and purified them all in his translation that a Latin reader

¹ Rufinus here, and at the end of the paragraph, is alluding to the opening sentence of Jerome’s preface to his translation (undertaken ca. 379–81) of Origen’s Hom. Ezech.: ‘It is indeed a great thing that you are asking, my friend, that I make Origen a Latin and give to Roman ears the man who in the opinion of Didymus the Seer was the second teacher of the churches after the Apostle.’
Origen: On First Principles

Hunc ergo etiam nos, licet non eloquentiae uiribus, disciplinae tamen regulis in quantum possumus sequimur, observantes scilicet ne ea, quae in libris Origenis a se ipso discrepantia inueniuntur atque contraria, proferamus.

3. Cuius diversitatis causam plenius tibi in Apologetico, quem Pamphilus pro libris ipsius Origenis scripsit, edidimus, breuissimo libello superaddito, in quo euentibus, ut arbitror, probamentis corruptos esse in quam plurimis ab haereticis et maluolis libros eius ostendimus, et praecipue istos, quos nunc exigit us interpreter, id est ΠΕΠΙ ΑΡΧΩΝ, quod uel de Principiis uel de Principatibus dici potest, qui sunt re uera alias et obscurissimi et difficillimi. De rebus enim ibi talibus disputat, in quibus philosophi omni sua aetate consumpta inuenire potuerunt nihil. Hic uero noster quantum potuit id egit, ut creatoris fidem et creaturarum rationem, quam illi ad impietatem traxerunt, ad pietatem iste conuerteret. Sicubi ergo nos in libris eius aliquid contra id inuenimus, quod ab ipso in ceteris locis pie de trinitate fuerat definitum, uelut adulteratum hoc et alienum praetermissim aut secundum aetam regulam protulumis, quam ab ipso frequenter inuenimus adfirmatam. Si quae sane uelut peritis iam et scientibus loquens, dum breuiter transire uult, obscurius protulit, nos, ut manifestior fieret locus, ea quae de ipsa re in aliis eius libris apertius protulimus, sed licet in aliis locis dicta, sua tamen sibi reddidimus.

Rufinus' Preface

would find in them nothing that differs from our faith. His example, then, we follow to the best of our ability, if not with the same power of eloquence yet at least with the same rules of method, taking care not to reproduce those passages in the books of Origen which are found to be inconsistent or contrary to himself.

3. The cause of these variations we have explained more fully in the Apology, which Pamphilus wrote in defence of the works of the same Origen, to which I added a brief tract, in which we showed, I think, by clear proofs that his books have been corrupted in many places by heretics and malevolent persons, and especially those which you now request me to translate, that is Peri Archon, which may be rendered either On First Principles or On Principalities, and which are indeed for other reasons most obscure and very difficult. For here he discusses subjects concerning which philosophers, after spending their whole lives upon them, have been able to discover nothing. But our author strives, as far as he possibly can, to turn to piety the faith in a Creator and the knowledge of creatures, which they had dragged down to impiety. Wherever, therefore, we found in his writings anything contrary to that which he had himself elsewhere piously laid down regarding the Trinity, we have either omitted it, as being corrupt and interpolated, or we have rendered it according to that rule which we frequently find affirmed by him. If, however, as speaking now to persons of skill and knowledge, he has expressed himself obscurely while wanting to proceed quickly, we have, to make the passage clearer, added what we have read more fully on the same subject in his other works, seeking [to provide] explanation.° We have said nothing of our own, however, but simply returned to him his own statements, though said in other places.®

4. I have made these remarks in the preface, therefore, by way of precaution, lest slanderers should perhaps think that they have again discovered a pretext for accusation. For you have seen what perverse and contentious men will do. In the meantime, however, we have undertaken this heavy labour, with the aid of God by your prayers, not to shut the mouths of slanderers (for this is not possible, unless perhaps God should do it), but to provide material to those who desire to advance in the knowledge of realities. I adjure and request

° It is difficult to identify these passages. Jerome (Ruf. 2.11) claims that Rufinus inserted a passage of scholia composed by Didymus into Princ. 1.1.8.
Origen: On First Principles

descripturus est uel lecturus, in conspectu dei patris et filii et spiritus sancti
contestor atque conuenio per futuri regni fidem, per resurrectionis ex mortuis
sacramentum, per illum qui praeparatus est diaboło et angelis eius aeternum
ignem: sic non illum locum aeterna hereditate possideat, ubi est fletus et stridor
dentium et ubi ignis eorum non extinguetur et uermis eorum non morietur: ne
addat aliquid huic scripturae, ne auferat, ne inserat, ne immutet, sed conferat
cum exemplaribus unde scripserit, et emendet ad litteram et distinguat, et
inemendatum uel non distinctum codicem non habeat, ne sensuum difficultas,
si distinctus codex non sit, maiores obscuritates legentibus generet.

56–7 per illum...ignem om. δ Ra(1.16) 56–8 per illum...morietur om. β 59 aliquis
W β μ  62 post generet add. in omnibus autem qui haec lecturus est, sententiam apostoli
cautissima obseruatione custodiat qui dicit omnia probantes, quae bona sunt tenete [uide 1 Thess.
5:21] β : explicit prologus ad macharium Ab
everyone who copies or reads these books, in the presence of God the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and by his belief in the kingdom to come, the mystery of the resurrection from the dead, and by that *everlasting fire which is prepared for the devil and his angels,* that, if he would not have for an eternal inheritance that place where there is *weeping and gnashing of teeth,* and where *their fire is not quenched and their worm does not die,* he neither add anything to this writing, nor take anything from it, nor insert anything, nor alter anything, but that he shall compare his copy with the exemplar from which he transcribed it and shall correct it to the letter and punctuate it, and not have an incorrect or unpunctuated manuscript, lest the difficulty of ascertaining the sense, if the manuscript is not punctuated, should cause greater difficulties to the readers.
LIBER PRIMUS

Praefatio

Pr.1. Omnes qui credunt et certi sunt quod gratia et ueritas per Iesum Christum facta sit, et Christum esse ueritatem norunt, secundum quod ipse dixit: Ego sum ueritas, scientiam quae prouocat homines ad bene beatique uiuendum non aliunde quam ab ipsis Christi uerbis doctrinaque suscipiunt. Christi autem uerbis dicimus non his solum, quae homo factus atque in carne positus docuit; et prius namque Christus dei uerbum in Moyse atque in prophetis erat. Nam sine uerbo dei quomodo poterant prophetare de Christo?

Ad cuius rei probationem non esset difficile ex diuinis scripturis ostendere, quomodo uel Moyse uel prophetae spiritu Christi repleti uel locuti sunt uel gesserunt omnia quae gesserunt, nisi studii nobis esset, praesens hoc opus omni qua possumus breuite succingere. Vnde sufficere aestimo uno hoc Pauli testimonio debere nos uti ex epistula, quam ad Hebraeos scribit, in qua ita ait: Fide magnus factus Moyses negauit se dici filium filiae Pharaonis, magis eligens afflictari cum populo dei quam temporalem habere peccati iucunditatem, maiores diuitias aestimans Aegyptiorum thesauris inproperium Christi. Sed et post adsumptionem eius in caelos quod in apostolis suis locutus sit, hoc modo indicat Paulus: Aut numquid probamentum quaeritis eius, qui in me loquitur Christus?

Pr.1, Lines 3–5

Eusebius of Caesarea, C. Marc. 1.4.26 (ed. Klostermann, 23.14–18), Koetschau Frag. 1:

Oi pepiostevoktes [η] kai pepesiamevoi, kai synafonti eγγερες την χαριν kai την αληθειαν δια Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ γεγονείναι kai Χριστόν εἶναι την αληθειαν κατὰ τὸ εἰρημένον ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἕγω εἰμι ἡ ἀληθεια.
Pr. 1. All who believe and are assured that grace and truth came through Jesus Christ, and who know Christ to be the truth, according to his saying, I am the truth, derive the knowledge which leads human beings to live a good and blessed life from no other source than from the very words and teaching of Christ. And by the words of Christ we mean not only those which he spoke when he became human and dwelt in the flesh; for even before this, Christ, the Word of God, was in Moses and the prophets. For without the Word of God how could they have been able to prophesy of Christ? In proof of this, it would not be difficult to show from the divine Scriptures how Moses or the prophets were filled with the Spirit of Christ in what they said and all that they did, were it not our purpose to confine the present work within the briefest possible limits. And therefore I think it sufficient to quote this one testimony of Paul from the epistle which he writes to the Hebrews, in which he says as follows, By faith Moses, when grown up, refused to be called the son of Pharaoh's daughter, choosing rather to be afflicted with the people of God, than to enjoy the pleasures of sin for a season, considering abuse suffered for Christ greater riches than the treasures of the Egyptians. And that he also spoke, after his ascension into heaven, in his apostles, is shown by Paul in this way, Or do you seek a proof of Christ who speaks in me?

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1 These opening lines have been preserved in Greek by Eusebius of Caesarea, C. Marc. 1.4.26, numbered by Koetschau as Fragment 1. Marcellus points to Plato, Gorgias 454e, for a parallel to the opening words.
2 John 1:17.
3 John 14:6.
4 Cf. Origen, Comm. ser. Matt. 28; Hom. Isa. 1.5; Hom. Lev. 1.1; Hom. Jer. 9.1; Cels. 6.5, 21.
5 Heb. 11:24.
6 2 Cor. 13:3.
Pr.2. Quoniam ergo multi ex his, qui Christo se credere proftentur, non solum in paruis et minimis discordant, uerum etiam in magnis et maximis, id est uel de deo uel de ipso domino Iesu Christo uel de spiritu sancto, non solum autem de his, sed et de aliis creaturis, id est uel de dominationibus uel de uirtutibus sanctis: propter hoc necessarium uidetur prius de his singulis certam lineam manifestamque regulam ponere, tum deinde etiam de ceteris quaerere. Sicut enim, multis apud Graecos et barbaros pollicentibus ueritatem, desiuimus apud omnes eam quaerere, qui eam falsis opinionibus asserebant, posteaquam credidimus filium esse dei Christum et ab ipso nobis hanc discendam esse persuasimus: ita cum multi sint, qui se putant sentire quae Christi sunt, et nonnulli eorum diuersa a prioribus sentiant, seruetur uero ecclesiastica praedicatio per successionis ordinem ab apostolis tradita et usque ad praesens in ecclesiis permanens, illa sola credenda est ueritas, quae in nullo ab ecclesiastica et apostolica tradizione discordat.

Pr.3. Illud autem scire oportet, quoniam sancti apostoli fidem Christi praedicantes de quibusdam quaecumque necessaria crediderunt, omnibus credentibus, etiam his, qui pigiores erga inquisitionem diuinae scientiae uidebantur, manifestissime tradiderunt, rationem scilicet assertionis eorum relinquentes ab his inquirendam, qui spiritus dona excellentia mererent et praecepue sermonis, sapientiae et scientiae gratiam per ipsum sanctum spiritum percepissent: de aliis uero dixerunt quidem quia sint, quomodo autem aut unde sint, siluerunt, profecto ut studiosiores quique ex posteris suis, qui amatores essent sapientiae, exercitium habere possent, in quo ingenii sui fructum ostenderent, hi uidelicet, qui dignos se et capaces ad recipiandam sapientiam praepararent.

Pr.4. Species uero eorum, quae per praedicationem apostolicam manifeste traduntur, istae sunt. Primo, quod unus est deus, qui omnia creauit atque composuit, quique, cum nihil esset, esse fecit uniueras, deus a prima creatura et
Pr.2. Since, however, many of those who profess to believe in Christ differ not only in small and trivial matters, but even on great and important matters—such as concerning God or the Lord Jesus Christ or the Holy Spirit, and not only regarding these but also regarding matters concerning created beings, that is, the dominions and the holy powers—because of this it seems necessary first of all to lay down a definite line and clear rule regarding each one of these matters, and then thereafter to investigate other matters. For just as, although many Greeks and barbarians promise the truth, we gave up seeking it from all who claimed it for false opinions after we had come to believe that Christ was the Son of God and were persuaded that we must learn it from him, so also, although there are many who think that they know what are the teachings of Christ, and not a few of them think differently from those before them, one must guard the ecclesiastical preaching, handed down from the apostles through the order of succession and remaining in the churches to the present: that alone is to be believed to be the truth which differs in no way from the ecclesiastical and apostolic tradition.

Pr.3. Now it ought to be known that the holy apostles, in preaching the faith of Christ, delivered with utmost clarity to all believers, even to those who seemed somewhat dull in the investigation of divine knowledge, certain points that they believed to be necessary, leaving, however, the grounds of their statements to be inquired into by those who should merit the excellent gifts of the Spirit and especially by those who should receive from the Holy Spirit himself the grace of language, wisdom, and knowledge; while on other points they stated that things were so, keeping silence about how or whence they are, certainly so that the more diligent of their successors, being lovers of wisdom, those, I mean, who should prepare themselves to be worthy and capable of receiving wisdom, might have an exercise on which they might display the fruit of their ability.

Pr.4. The particular points, which are clearly handed down by the preaching of the apostles are as follows: First, that 'there is one God, who created and arranged all things', and who, when nothing existed, made all things; he is God from the first creation and foundation of the world, the God of all the

7 On the 'rule' (κανόνα), see Gal. 6:16; Irenaeus, Haer. 1.9.4–10.1; Tertullian, Praescr. 13–14; Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 6.15.125.3; 7.15–17; Origen, Princ. 1.7.1; 4.2.2; 4.3.14; Comm. Jo. 13.98.
8 Cf. Origen, Comm. ser. Matt. 46. On 'tradition' more generally, see Irenaeus, Haer. 3.2–3; Tertullian, Praescr. 21–37; Clement, Strom. 7.16–17.
9 Cf. 1 Cor. 12:7–8.
10 For other lists of the articles of belief, see Origen, Comm. ser. Matt. 33; Comm. Jo. 32.187–93; Fr. Tit. (PG 14, 1303).
11 Hermas, Mand. 1.1, cited also in Origen, Princ. 1.3.3; Comm. Jo. 32.187; cf. Comm. Jo. 1.103.
conditione mundi, omnium iustorum deus, Adam Abel Seth Enos Enoch Noe
Sem Abraham Isaac Iacob duodecim patriarcharum Moysei et prophetarum; et
quod hic deus in nouissimis diebus, sicut per prophetas suos ante promiserat,
misit dominum Iesum Christum, primo quidem uocaturnu Israel, secundo
uero etiam gentes post perfidiam populi Israel. Hic deus iustus et bonus, pater
domini nostri Iesu Christi, legem et prophetas et euangelia ipse dedit, qui et
apostolorum deus est et ueteris ac noui testamenti.

Tum deinde quia Christus Iesus, ipse qui uenit, ante omnem creaturam natus
ex patre est. Qui cum in omnium conditione patri ministrasset, per ipsum
namente omnia facta sunt, nouissimis temporibus se ipsum exinaniens homo
factus est, incarnatus est, cum deus esset, et homo factus mansit quod erat,
deus. Corpus assumptus nostro corpori simile, eo solo differens, quod natum ex
uirgie et spiritu sancto est. Et quoniam hic Iesus Christus natus et passus est in
ueritate, et non per phantasiam, communem hanc mortem uere mortuus; uere
enim et a mortuis resurrexit et post resurrectionem conversatus cum discipulis
suis assumptus est.

Tum deinde honore ac dignitate patri ac filio sociatum tradiderunt spiritum
sanctum. In hoc non iam manifeste discernitur, utrum natus aut innatus, uel
filius etiam ipse dei habendus sit, necne; sed inquirenda iam ista pro uiribus
sunt de sancta scriptura et sagaci perquisitione inuestiganda. Sane quod iste
spiritus sanctus unumquemque sanctorum uel prophetarum uel apostolorum
inspirauerit, et non alius spiritus in ueteribus, alius uero in his, qui in aduentu
Christi inspirati sunt, fuerit, manifestissime in ecclesia praedicatur.
just, of Adam, Abel, Seth, Enosh, Enoch, Noah, Sem, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, the twelve patriarchs, Moses, and the prophets; and that this God in the last days, as he had announced beforehand by his prophets, sent our Lord Jesus Christ to call first Israel to himself and second the Gentiles, after the unfaithfulness of the people of Israel. This just and good God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, himself gave the law and the prophets and the Gospels, who is also the God of the apostles and of the Old and New Testaments.

Then, again, that Jesus Christ himself, who came, was born of the Father before all creatures. After ministering to the Father in the foundation of all things, for by him were all things made, in the last times, emptying himself, he became human and was incarnate; being God, when made human he remained what he was, God. He assumed a body like to our own, differing in this respect only, that it was born of a virgin and of the Holy Spirit. And that this Jesus Christ was born and did suffer in truth, and not in appearance, and truly died our common death, and did truly rise from the dead, and after the resurrection, having sojourned a while with his disciples, was taken up.

Then, again, they handed down that the Holy Spirit is associated in honour and dignity with the Father and the Son. But in this case it is not yet clearly discerned whether he is born or not-born, or whether he is to be considered as himself Son of God or not: but these are points which are yet to be inquired into, to the best of our ability, from holy Scripture, and investigated with the requisite wisdom. That this Holy Spirit inspired each one of the saints, both the prophets and the apostles, and that there was not one Spirit in those of old but another in those who were inspired at the coming of Christ, is indeed most clearly taught throughout the churches.
Pr.5. Post haec iam quod anima substantiam uitamque habens propriam, cum ex hoc mundo discesserit, pro suis meritis dispensabitur, siue uitarum aeternae ac beatitudinis hereditate potitura, si hoc ei sua gesta praestiterint, siue igni aeterno ac suppliciis mancipanda, si in hoc eam scelerum culpa detorserit; sed et quia erit tempus resurrectionis mortuorum, cum corpus hoc, quod nunc in corruptione seminatur, surget in incorruptione, et quod seminatur in ignominia, surget in gloria.

Est et illud definitum in ecclesiastica praedicatione, omnem animam esse rationabilem liberi arbitrii et voluntatis; esse quoque ei certamen adversum diabolum et angelos eius contrariasque uirtutes, ex eo quod illi peccatis eam onerare contendant, nos uero si recte consulteque vivamus, ab huiusmodi labe exuere nos conemur. Vnde et consequens est intellegere, non nos necessitati esse subjectos, ut omni modo, etiamsi nolimus, uel mala uel bona agere cogamur. Si enim nostri arbitrii sumus, inpugnare nos fortasse possint aliquae uirtutes ad peccatum et aliae iuare ad salutem, non tamen necessitate cogimur uel recte agere uel male; quod fieri abiritantur hi, qui stellarum cursum et motus causam dicunt humanorum esse gestorum, non solum eorum, quae extra arbitrii accident libertatem, sed et eorum, quae in nostra sunt posita potestate.

De anima uero utrum ex semen traduce ducatur, ita ut ratio ipsius uel substantia inserta ipsis corporalibus seminibus habeatur, an uero aliud habeat initium, et hoc ipsum initium si genitum est aut non genitum, uel certe si extrinsecus corpori inditur, necne: non satis manifesta praedicatione distinguetur.

Pr.6. De diabolo quoque et angelis eius contrariis uirtutibus ecclesiastica praedicatio docuit quoniam sint quidem haec, quae autem sint uel quomodo sint, non satis clare exposuit. Apud plurimos tamen ista habetur opinio, quod angelus fuerit iste diabolus, et apostata effectus quam plurimos angelorum secum declinare persuaserit, qui et nunc usque angeli ipsius nuncupantur.
Pr.5. After these points, also, that the soul, having its own substance and life, after it departs from this world shall, according to its merits, either obtain an inheritance of eternal life and blessedness, if its actions shall have excelled, or be delivered up to eternal fire and torments, if the sin of its wicked deeds shall so direct it: \(^{23}\) and also, that there is to be a time of resurrection of the dead, when this body, which now is sown in corruption, shall rise in incorruptibility, and what is sown in dishonour, will rise in glory. \(^{24}\)

This also is defined in the ecclesiastical preaching, that every rational soul possesses free will and volition, \(^{25}\) that it is in conflict against the devil and his angels, and opposing powers, because they strive to burden it with sins; \(^{26}\) but if we live rightly and carefully, we should endeavour to shake off such a burden. From which it follows, also, that we understand ourselves not to be subject to necessity, so as to be altogether compelled, even against our will, to do either good or evil. \(^{27}\) For if we possess free will, some powers perhaps may be able to urge us to sin, and others to help us to salvation; \(^{28}\) we are not, however, compelled by necessity to act either rightly or wrongly, as those think who say that the course and movement of the stars are the cause of human actions, not only of those which take place outside the realm of free will, but also of those which are placed within our own power.

But with respect to the soul, whether it is derived from the seed being transferred, so that the principle or substance of it may be held to be in the seminal particles of the body itself, or whether it has any other beginning, and this beginning itself, whether it is begotten or not begotten, or whether it is imparted to the body from without or not, is not explained with sufficient clarity in the preaching. \(^{29}\)

Pr.6. Regarding the devil and his angels and the opposing powers, the ecclesiastical preaching has taught that they indeed exist, but what they are, or how they exist, it has not explained sufficiently clearly. This opinion, however, is held by most, that this devil was an angel, but having become an apostate he persuaded as many angels as possible to fall away with himself, and even until now these are called his angels. \(^{30}\)

\(^{23}\) Cf. Origen, Cels. 3.31; 8.48, 52.

\(^{24}\) 1 Cor. 15:42–3.

\(^{25}\) Cf. Origen, Cels. 3.69; 4.83; Fr. Tit. (PG 14, 1305a).

\(^{26}\) Cf. Origen, Comm. Jo. 20.378.

\(^{27}\) Cf. Origen, Hom. Jer. 20.2; Comm. Jo. 32.189; Fr. Jo. 53 (GCS 4, pp. 526–7).

\(^{28}\) Cf. Origen, Or. 27.12.

\(^{29}\) Cf. Origen, Princ. 3.4.2; Comm. Jo. 2.182; Comm. Cant. 2; Cels. 3.80; 4.30; Fr. Tit. (PG 14, 1306b).

\(^{30}\) Cf. Irenaeus, Dem. 16; Athenagoras, Leg. 24; Origen, Princ. 1.5.4–5; Cels. 6.44–5.
Pr. 7. Est praeterea et illud in ecclesiastica praedicatione, quod mundus iste factus sit et a certo tempore coeperit et sit pro ipsa sui corruptione soluendus. Quid tamen ante hunc mundum fuerit, aut quid post mundum erit, iam non pro manifesto multis innotuit. Non enim euidens de his in ecclesiastica praedicatione sermo profertur.

Pr. 8. Tum deinde quod per spiritum dei scripturae conscriptae sint et sensum habeant non eum solum, qui in manifesto est, sed et alium quendam latentem quam plurimos. Formae enim sunt haec quae descripta sunt sacramentorum quorum et divinarum rerum imaginies. De quo totius ecclesiae una sententia est, esse quidem omnem legem spiritalem, non tamen ea, quae spirat lex, esse omnibus nota nisi his solis, quibus gratia spiritus sancti in uerbo sapientiae ac scientiae condonatur.

Appellatio autem ἀσωμάτου (id est incorporei) non solum apud multos alios, eterum etiam apud nostras scripturas usitata est et incognita. Si uero quis uel nobis proferre ex illo libello, qui Petri Doctrina appellatur, ubi salvator uidetur ad discipulos dicere: Non sum daemonium incorporeum, primo respondendum est ei quoniam liber ipse inter libros ecclesiasticos non habetur, et ostendendum quia neque Petri est ipsa scriptura neque alterius cuiusquam, qui spiritu dei fuerit inspiratus. Quod etiamsi ipsum concederetur, non idem sensus inibi ex isto sermone ἀσωμάτου indicatur, qui a graecis uel gentilibus auctoribus ostenditur, cum de incorporea natura a philosophis disputatur. In hoc enim libello incorporeum daemonium dixit pro eo, quod ipse ille quicumque est habitus uel circumscriptio daemonici corporis non est similis huic nostro crassiori et uisibili corpori; sed secundum sensum eius, qui composit ilam scripturam, intellegendum est quod dixit, id est non se habere tale corpus quale habent daemones (quod est naturaliter subtile quoddam et uelut aura tenue, et propter hoc uel putatur a multis uel dicitur incorporeum), sed habere se corpus solidum et palpabile. In consuetudine uero hominum omne, quod tale non fuerit, incorporeum a simplicioribus et imperitioribus nominatur; uelut si quis aerem istum quo fruimur incorporeum dicat, quoniam quidem non est tale corpus, ut comprehendi ac teneri possit urgentique resistere.

Pr.8, Line 112

Antipater of Bostra apud John of Damascus,
Sacra Parallela (PG 96, 501c), Koetschau Frag. 2:

Ὁνομα ἀσωμάτου οὐκ ἰσαίνων οὐ μονὸν οἱ πολλοὶ, ἀλλ᾽ ὁυδὲ ἡ γραφὴ.
Pr.7. This also is part of the ecclesiastical preaching, that this world was made and began at a certain time and, because it is corruptible, will be dissolved. But what existed before this world, or what will exist after it, has not yet become known openly to many, for no clear statement on this is set forth in the ecclesiastical preaching.

Pr.8. Then, finally, that the Scriptures were written by the Spirit of God, and that they have not only the meaning which is obvious, but also another which escapes the notice of most. For the things that are described therein are the forms of certain mysteries and images of divine things. There is one mind throughout the entire church about this, that the whole law is indeed spiritual, yet that which the law conveys is not known by all but only by those on whom the grace of the Holy Spirit is bestowed in the word of wisdom and knowledge.

The term ἄσωματος (that is, 'bodiless') is unused and unknown not only in many other writings, but also in our own Scriptures. If anyone should quote it to us out of that pamphlet called The Teaching of Peter, where the Saviour is seen to say to his disciples, 'I am not a bodiless daemon,' he must be answered, in the first place, that this work is not itself included among the ecclesiastical books, and it can be shown that it is not a writing of Peter nor of anyone else who was inspired by the Spirit of God. But even if the point were conceded, the sense of the word ἄσωματος there does not indicate the same as that intended by Greek and pagan authors, when philosophers discuss bodiless nature. For in that pamphlet, he used the words 'bodiless daemon' to indicate that the form or outline of the daemonical body, whatever it is, is not like this dense and visible body of ours; rather what he said must be understood according to the intention of the author of the pamphlet, that is, that he did not have such a body as the daemons have (which is naturally fine and thin like air, and because of this is considered or called 'bodiless' by many), but that he had a solid and palpable body. Now, according to human custom, everything that is not such is called bodiless by the simple or uneducated, just as one says that the air we breathe is bodiless, because it is not a body that can be grasped and held or resist pressure.

31 Cf. Origen, Cels. 1.37; 4.9, 21; Comm. Jo. 1.178. 32 Rom. 7:14.
33 These explanatory words come of course from Rufinus.
34 Perhaps The Preaching of Peter. The same quotation is given by Ignatius of Antioch (Smyrn. 3.2), without mentioning its source. Eusebius (Hist. eccl. 3.36.11) repeats these words from Ignatius, as does Jerome (Vir. Ill. 16), who elsewhere (Comm. Isa. 18.1) describes them as coming from the Gospel of the Hebrews. The closest canonical parallel would be Luke 24:39.
35 Cf. Tertullian, Apol. 22.5. In Comm. Matt. 17.30, Origen says that our present 'lowly body' (Phil. 3:21) will, in the resurrection, be transformed into one like those of the angels, ethereal and brilliant light (αιθέρια καὶ αἰγυοειδὴς φῶς). See also Princ. 3.6.4–6 on the character of the 'spiritual body' mentioned by Paul. On the other hand, Origen is emphatic that only the Trinity is bodiless: Princ. 1.6.4; 2.2.2; 4.3.15.
Pr.9. Quaeremus tamen si uel alio nomine res ipsa, quam graeci philosophi ἀσώματον (id est incorporeum) dicunt, in sanctis scripturis inuenitur. Deus quoque ipse quomodo intellegi debeat requirendum est, corporeus et secundum aliquem habitum deformatus, an alterius naturae quam corpora sunt, quod utique in praedicatione nostra manifeste non designatur. Eadem quoque etiam de Christo et de sancto spiritu requirenda sunt, sed et de omni anima atque omni rationabili natura nihilominus requirendum est.

Pr.10. Est etiam illud in ecclesiastica praedicatione, esse angelos dei quosdam et uirtutes bonas, qui ei ministrant ad salutem hominum consummandam; sed quando isti creati sint, uel quales, aut quomodo sint, non satis in manifesto distinguitur. De sole autem et luna et stellis, utrum animantia sint an sine anima manifeste non traditur.

Oportet igitur uelut elementis ac fundamentis huiusmodi uti secundum mandatum, quod dicit: Inluminate ubis lumen scientiae, omnem qui cupit seriem quandam et corpus ex horum omnium ratione perficiere, ut manifestis et necessaris assertionibus de singulis quibusque quid sit in uero rimetur, et unum, ut diximus, corpus efficiat exemplis et affirmationibus, uel his, quas in sanctis scripturis inuenerit, uel quas ex consequentiae ipsius indagine ac recti tenore reperrerit.

Pr.10, lines 138–41

Antipater of Bostra apud John of Damascus, Sacra Parallela (PG 96, 501c), Koetschau Frag. 3:

Ἐν τῷ κηρύγματι καὶ τὸ εἶναι τινας ἀγγέλους καὶ δυνάμεις κρείττονας, λειτουργικὰς τῆς σωτηρίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων, παραδείσωσι: πότε δὲ ἐκτίσθησαι καὶ τίνα τὰ περὶ αὐτούς, οὐδαμῶς τις ἐσαφήμοσεν.
Pr.9. We shall inquire, however, whether the actual thing which Greek philosophers call ἄσωματος (that is, 'bodiless') is found in the holy Scriptures under another name. For it is also to be investigated how God himself is to be understood, whether as bodily and formed according to some shape, or of a different nature than bodies, a point which is not clearly indicated in our preaching. The same is also to be investigated even regarding Christ and the Holy Spirit, and indeed it is to be investigated no less of every soul and every rational nature.

Pr.10. This is also in the ecclesiastical preaching, that there are certain angels of God and good powers, who minister to him in accomplishing the salvation of human beings; but when these were created, or of what kind of being, or how they exist, is not explained with sufficient clarity. Regarding the sun, moon, and stars, whether they are animated beings or inanimate is not clearly handed down.

Everyone, therefore, who desires to construct a certain structure and body of all these things, in accordance with reason, must make use of elements and foundations of this sort, according to the precept which says, Enlighten yourselves with the light of knowledge, that by clear and cogent arguments the truth about each particular point may be discovered, and he may form, as we have said, one body, by means of illustrations and assertions, either those which he came upon in the holy Scriptures or those which he discovered followed from investigation and right reason.

36 Cf. Origen, Cels. 6.64; 7.27, 38, 66; 8.49; Sel. Gen. 1:26 (PG 12, 93).
37 The first sentence is preserved in Greek by Antipater of Bostra as reported in John of Damascus, Sacra Parallela (PG 96, 501c); it is numbered by Koetschau as Fragment 3.
38 Cf. Plato, Tim. 38e; Origen, Princ. 1.7; Cels 5.10–11; Hom. Jer. 10.6.
39 Hos. 10:12.
PART ONE: THEOLOGY

I: The Apostolic Preaching
De deo

1.1.1. Scio quoniam conabuntur quidam etiam secundum scripturas nostras dicere deum corpus esse, quoniam inueniunt scriptum esse apud Moysen quidem: *Deus noster ignis consumens est*, in euangelio uero secundum Iohannem: *Deus spiritus est, et eos qui adorant eum, in spiritu et ureditate oportet adorare.* Iignis uero et spiritus non alius apud eos quam corpus esse putabitur. Quos interrogare uolo, quid dicant de eo quod scriptum est, quia *Deus lux est*, sicut Iohannes in epistola sua dicit: *Deus lux est, et tenebrae non sunt in eo.* Ista nempe lux est, quae inluminat omnem sensum eorum, qui possunt capere ureditatem, sicut in tricesimo quinto psalmo dicitur: *In lumine tuo uidebimus lumen.* Quid enim aliud lumen dei dicendum est, in quo quis uidet lumen, nisi uirtus dei, per quam quis inluminatus uel ureditatem rerum omnium peruidet uel ipsum deum cognoscit, qui ueritas appellatur? Tale est ergo quod dicitur: *In lumine tuo uidebimus lumen*, hoc est, in uerbo tuo et sapientia tua, qui est filius tuus, in ipso te uidebimus patrem. Numquidnam quia lumen nominatur, simile putabitur solis huius luminum? Et quomodo uel leuis alicuis dabitur intellectus, ut ex isto quis corporali lumen causam scientiae capiat et ureditatis inueniat intellectum?

1.1.2. Si ergo adquiescunt huic assertioni nostrae, quam de natura luminis ipsa ratio demonstruit, et fatentur non posse corpus intellegi deum secundum luminis intellectum, similis quoque ratio etiam de igni consumenti dabitur. Quid enim consumit deus secundum hoc quod ignis est? Numquidnam putabitur consumere materiam corporalem, ut est lignum uel faenum uel stipulam? Et quid in hoc dignum de dei laudibus dicitur, si deus ignis est huiuscemodi materias consumens? Sed si consideremus quia deus consumit quidem et exterminat, sed consumit malas mentium cogitationes, consumit gesta turpia, consumit desideria peccati, cum se credentium mentibus inserit et eas animas, quae uerbi eius ac sapientiae efficiuntur capaces, una cum filio...
1.1 God

1.1.1. I know that some will try to say that even according to our Scriptures God is a body, since they find it said in the writings of Moses, God is a consuming fire, and in the Gospel according to John, God is spirit, and those who worship him must worship him in spirit and truth. Fire and spirit, according to them, will be reckoned to be nothing other than a body. I would like to ask them what they have to say about the saying, God is light, as John says in his epistle, God is light and in him there is no darkness. He, indeed, is that light which illumines the whole understanding of those who are capable of receiving truth, as it is said in the thirty-fifth Psalm, In your light shall we see light. For what other light of God is being spoken of, in which one sees light, except the power of God by which someone, being illumined, either sees clearly the truth of all things or comes to know God himself, who is called the truth? Such, therefore, is the saying, In your light shall we see light, that is, in your Word and Wisdom, who is your Son, in him we shall see you, the Father. Can it possibly be that, because he is called light, he shall be supposed to be like the light of the sun? Or how can there be even the slightest ground for thinking that from bodily light anyone could grasp the cause of knowledge and come to the understanding of truth?

1.1.2. If, then, they accept this assertion of ours, which is proved by reason itself, regarding the nature of light, and acknowledge that God cannot be understood to be a body in the sense that light is, similar reasoning will hold for the phrase, a consuming fire. For what does God consume in respect of the fact that he is fire? Can he possibly be thought to consume bodily matter, wood or hay or stubble? And what, in this, would be worthy of the praise of God, if God is a fire consuming materials of that kind? Let us rather consider that God does indeed consume and destroy, but that he consumes evil thoughts, he consumes wicked actions, he consumes the desires for sin, when they enter the minds of believers, and that, inhabiting with his Son those souls which are rendered capable of receiving his Word and Wisdom,

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1 According to Photius, Bibl. cod. 8 (ed. Henry 1, 3b36–7), the first book of Princ. 'concerns the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.' The Latin manuscripts, however, have 'On God.' The title 'Father' is used in Princ. 2.4, which opens part two of Princ. with the heading, 'That the God of the Law and the Prophets, and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is One.'

2 Deut. 4:24.

1 John 4:24. Origen, Sel. Gen. 1:26 (PG 12, 93) mentions Melito as one who spoke of the 'body' of God.


5 Cf. Origen, Princ. 2.8.3; Comm. Jo. 13.138–9; Hom. Lev. 1.4; Hom. Ezek. 1.3.

6 1 Cor. 3:12.
suo inhabitans secundum quod dictum est: *Ego et pater ueniemos et mansionem apud eum faciemus*, omnibus eorum uitiis passionibusque consumtis purum sibi eae sequi dignum efficit templum.

Sed et his, qui per hoc quod dictum est quoniam *Deus spiritus est corpus esse arbitratur deum, hoc modo respondendum est*. Consuetudo est scripturae sanctae, cum aliquid contrarium corpori huic crassiori et solidiori designare uult, spiritum nominare, sicut dicit: *Littera occidit, spiritus autem uiviificat*. In quo sine dubio per litteram corporalia significat, per spiritum intellectualia, quae et spiritualia dicimur. Apostolus quoque ita dicit: *Vsque in hodiernum autem, cum legitur Moyses, uelamen est positum super cor eorum; cum autem conversus quis fuerit ad dominum, auferetur uelamen; ubi autem domini spiritus, ibi libertas*. Donec enim quis non se conuerterit ad intellegentiam spiritalem, *uelamen est positum super cor eius*, quo uelamine, id est intellegentia crassiore, scriptura ipsa uelari dicit uel putatur; et hoc est quod ait superpositum esse uelamen uultui Moysi, cum loqueretur ad populum, id est, cum lex uulgo recitatur. Si autem *conuertamus nos ad dominum*, ubi est et uerbum dei, et ubi spiritus sanctus reuelt scientiam spiritalem, tunc *auferetur uelamen*, et tunc *reuelata facie in scripturis sanctis gloriam domini speculamur.*

1.1.3. Sed et cum de spiritu sancto multi sancti participant, non utique corpus aliquod intellegi potest spiritus sanctus, quod diuisum in partes corporales percipiat unusquisque sanctorum; sed uiritus profecto sanctificans est, cuius participium habere dicuntur omnes, qui per eius gratiam sanctificari meruerint. Et ut facilius quod dicimus possit intellegi, ex rebus quamuis inparibus sumamus exemplum. Multi sunt qui disciplinae siue artis medicinae participant, et numquid putandum est omnes eos, qui medicinae participant, corporis alicuius, quod medicina dicitur, in medio posiit sibi auferre particulas et ita eius participium sumere? An potius intellegendum est quod quicumque promptis paratisque mentibus intellectum artis disciplinaeque perciipient, hi medicinae participare dicantur? Sed haec non omnimodis similia exempla putanda sunt de medicina sancto spiritui comparata; sed ad hoc tantummodo conprobandum, quia non continuo corpus putandum est id, cuius participatio habetur a plurimis. Spiritus enim sanctus longe differt a
1.1 God

according to the saying, I and the Father shall come and make our abode with him; he makes them, after all their vices and passions have been consumed, into a temple pure and worthy of himself.

Those, moreover, who, because of the statement that God is spirit, think that he is a body, must be answered in this way. It is the custom of holy Scripture, when it wishes to designate anything of a contrary nature to this dense and solid body, to call it 'spirit'; as when it says, The letter kills, but the spirit gives life. Here there is no doubt that by 'letter' is meant bodily things, and by 'spirit' intellectual things, which we also call 'spiritual.' The Apostle also says, moreover, that, Even to this day, when Moses is read, a veil lies over their hearts; but when someone turns to the Lord the veil is removed; and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom. For so long as someone has not turned to a spiritual understanding, a veil lies over his heart, by which veil, that is, a duller understanding, Scripture itself is said or thought to be veiled; and this is what is meant by the veil placed over the countenance of Moses when he spoke to the people, that is, when the Law was publicly read aloud. But if we turn to the Lord, where also is the Word of God, and where the Holy Spirit reveals spiritual knowledge, then the veil is removed, and thus with an unveiled face we shall behold the glory of the Lord in the holy Scriptures.

1.1.3. And although many saints participate in the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit cannot on that account be thought of as a kind of body that, divided into bodily parts, is partaken of by each one of the saints; but he is rather a sanctifying power, in which all, who have deserved to be sanctified by his grace, are said to have a share. And so that what we say may be more easily understood, let us take an illustration from things very dissimilar. There are many who take part in the sciences and art of medicine: are we to suppose that all those who participate in medicine have some body, called medicine, placed before them and remove particles [of it] for themselves and thus take a share in it? Must we not rather understand that all who with a quick and trained mind grasp the art and science itself may be said to participate in medicine? But these illustrations from medicine are not to be reckoned similar in every way when compared with the Holy Spirit; they establish only this, that that, of which a share is had by many, is not immediately to be considered a body. For the Holy Spirit differs widely from the system or science of medicine,

10 Cf. Origen, Cels. 8.18–19.
11 2 Cor. 3:6.
12 2 Cor. 3:15–17.
13 Cf. Exod. 34:33, 35.
15 Cf. Origen, Hom. Num. 6.2; Cels. 6.70.
medicinae ratione uel disciplina, pro eo quod sanctus spiritus subsistentia est intellectualis et proprie subsistit et extat; nihil autem tale est medicina.

1.1.4. Sed et ad ipsum iam sermonem euangelii transeundum est, ubi scriptum est quia deus spiritus est, et ostendendum est quam consequenter his quae diximus intellegi debat. Interrogemus namque quando ista dixerit salvator noster uel apud quem uel cum quid quaereretur. Inuenimus sine dubio quod ad Samaritanam mulierem loquens loquitur eam, quam putabat quod in monte Garizin secundum Samaritanorum opinionem adorari oporteret deum, dicens quoniam deus spiritus est. Quaerebat enim ab eo Samaritana mulier, putans eum unum esse ex ludaeis, utrum in Hierosolymis adorari oporteret deum, aut in hoc monte; et ita dicebat: Patres nostri omnes in hoc monte adorauerunt, et uos dicitis quia in Hierosolymis est locus, ubi oportet adorare. Haec ergo quae opinabant Samaritana, putans quod ex locorum corporalium praerogativia minus recte uel recte adorabatur deus aut a ludaeis in Hierosolymis aut a Samaritanis in monte Garizin, respondit salvator recedendum esse a praesumptione corporalium locorum huic qui uult deum sequi, et ita ait: Venit hora ut ueri adoratores neque in Hierosolymis neque in hoc monte adorarent patrem. Deos spiritus est, et eos qui adorant eum, in spiritu et uestate oportet adorare. Et uide quam consequenter uestatem spiritui socialuit, ut ad distinctionem quidem corporum spiritum nominaret, ad distinctionem uero umbrae uel imaginis uestatem. Qui enim adorabant in Hierosolymis, umbrae et imaginis caelestium deseruientes non uestatem neque spiritui adorabant deum; similiter autem et hi, qui adorabant in monte Garizin.

1.1.5. Omni igitur sensu, qui corporeum aliquid de deo intellegi suggerit, prout potuimus, confutato, dicimus secundum uestatem quidem deum incomprehensibilem esse atque inaestimabilem. Si quid enim illud est, quod sentire uel intellegere de deo potuerimus, multis longe modis eum meliorem esse ab eo quod sensimus necesse est credi. Sicut enim si uideamus aliquem uix posse scintillam luminis aut breuissimae lucernae lumen aspicere et eum,
in that the Holy Spirit is an intellectual being and subsists and exists distinctly, whereas medicine is nothing of the sort.

1.1.4. We must now pass on to the word of the Gospel, where it is written that God is spirit, and must show that this is to be understood in conformity with what we have said. Let us inquire when our Saviour spoke these words, to whom, and what was being sought. We find, without any doubt, that he uttered them to the Samaritan woman, saying to her, who thought according to the belief of the Samaritans that God ought to be worshipped on Mount Gerizim, that God is spirit. For the Samaritan woman, supposing him to be a Jew, was asking of him whether God ought to be worshipped in Jerusalem or on this mountain; she spoke thus: All our fathers worshipped on this mountain, and you say that in Jerusalem is the place where one ought to worship. To this belief, then, of the Samaritan woman, who thought that because of the privileges of material places, God was less rightly or rightly worshipped either by the Jews in Jerusalem or by the Samaritans on Mount Gerizim, the Saviour answered that one who would follow God must refrain from all preference for material places, and spoke thus: The hour is coming when neither in Jerusalem nor on this mountain shall true worshippers worship the Father. God is spirit, and those who worship him must worship him in spirit and truth. See also how appropriately he has associated truth with spirit: he called [God] spirit to distinguish him from bodies, and truth to distinguish him from a shadow or an image. For those who worshipped in Jerusalem, serving a shadow and image of heavenly things, worshipped God neither in truth nor spirit; similarly also those who worshipped on Mount Gerizim.

1.1.5. Having refuted, then, as best we could, every notion which suggests that God be thought of in any bodily way, we assert that, according indeed to truth, God is incomprehensible and immeasurable. For whatever it is that we are able to sense or know of God, it is necessarily to be believed that he is by many degrees far better than what we perceive him to be. Just as, if we were to see someone scarcely able to bear a spark of light, or the light of a very small lamp, and if we...
cuius acies oculorum plus luminis capere quam supra diximus non utet, si uelimus de claritate ac splendore solis edocere, nonne oportebit vos ei dicere quia omni hoc lumine quod uides ineffabiliter et inaestimabiliter melior ac praestantior solis est splendor? Ita mens nostra cum intra carnis et sanguinis claustra concluditur et pro talis materiae participatione hebetior atque obtusior redditur, licet ad comparationem naturae corporeae longe praecellens habeatur, tamen cum ad incorporea nititur atque eorum rimatur intuitum, tunc scintillae alliciuius aut lucernae uix obtinet locum. Quid autem in omnibus intellectualibus, id est incorporeis, tam praestans omnibus, tam ineffabiliter atque inaestimabiliter praecellens quam deus? Cuius utique natura acie humanae mentis intendi atque intueri, quamuis ea sit purissima mens ac limpidissima, non potest.

1.1.6. Verum non uidetur absurdum, si ad evidentiorum rei manifestationem etiam alia utamur similitudine. Interdum oculi nostri ipsum naturam lucis, id est substantiam solis, intueri non possunt; splendorem uero eius uel radios fenestris forte uel quibuslibet luminum breuibus receptaculis infusos intuentes, considerare ex his possumus, fomes ipse ac fons quantus sit corporei luminis. Ita ergo quasi radii quidam sunt dei naturae opera diuinae prouidentiae et ars uniuersitatis huius ad comparationem ipsius substantiae eius ac naturae. Quia ergo mens nostra ipsum per se ipsum deum sicut est non potest intueri, ex pulchritudine operum et decore creaturarum parentem uniuersitatis intellegit.

Non ergo corpus aliquod aut in corpore esse putandus est deus, sed intellectualis natura simplex, nihil omnino in se adiunctionis admittens; uti ne maius aliquid et inferius in se habere credatur, sed ut sit ex omni parte μονάς, et ut ita dicam ἐνός, et mens ac fons, ex quo initium totius intellectualis naturae uel mentis est. Mens uero ut moueat ur operetur, non indiget loco corporeo neque sensibili magnitudine uel corporali habitu aut colore, neque alio ullo prorsus indiget horum, quae corporis uel materiae
wish to acquaint such a one, whose eyesight is not strong enough to bear more light than what we have said, with the brightness and splendour of the sun, would it not be necessary for us to tell him that the splendour of the sun is unspeakably and immeasurably better and more glorious than all this light which he saw? So also our mind, when shut in by the fetters of flesh and blood and rendered, by its participation in such materials, duller and more obtuse, although it is regarded as far more excellent in comparison with bodily nature, yet when it strives after bodiless things and searches for a glimpse of them, it scarcely has room for some spark or small lamp. For what, among all intellectual, that is, bodiless beings, is so superior to all others, so unspeakably and immeasurably superior, as God, whose nature assuredly the vision of the human intellect is not able to grasp or see, however exceptionally pure or clear that intellect may be?

1.1.6. It will not seem absurd if we use another illustration to make the matter clearer still. Our eyes frequently cannot look at the nature of the light itself, that is, upon the substance of the sun; but when we see its brightness and rays pouring in through windows, perhaps, or any small opening for light, we can reflect about how great is the source and fountain of bodily light. So too the works of divine providence and the art of this universe are as if rays of the nature of God, in comparison with his own substance and being. Therefore because our own intellect is not able to behold God as he is, it understands the father of the universe from the beauty of his works and the comeliness of his creatures.22

God, therefore, is not to be thought to be either a body or existing in a body, but to be a simple intellectual being, accepting in himself no addition whatever; so that he cannot be believed to have in himself a more or a less, but is, in all things, μονάς [unity], or, if I may say, ἕνας [oneness],23 and the intellect24 and source from which all intellectual being and intellect takes its beginning. Now an intellect, to move and operate, needs no bodily space, nor sensible magnitude, nor bodily shape or colour, nor does it need anything else whatever

22 For seeing God through creation, and especially the beauty of creation, see Wis. 13:1–9, esp. v. 5; Rom. 1:20. For the description of God as 'father' (parentem) of the world, see: Plato, Tim. 28c; Alcinous, Epit. 10.3; Philo, Decal. 107, 134; Corp. Herm. 1.12, 1.13; Eph. 4:6; 1 Clem. 19.2; Justin, 1 Apol. 63; Tatian, Or. 4; Clement of Alexandria, Protr. 5.66; Paed. 1.5.21; 1.6.42; Strom. 1.28.178; 5.1.6; 5.11.71; Origen, Comm. Jo. 1.57; Cels. 8.53.

21 The term μονάς has a Pythagorean background and the term ἕνας a Platonic one; the former emphasizes more the unity that gave rise to multiplicity, and the latter the singularity considered in itself, unrelated to anything else. Cf. Plato, Parm. 137c; Soph. 245a; Alcinous, Epit. 10.8; Clement of Alexandria, Paed. 1.8.71; 2.8.75; Strom. 5.11.71.2; 5.12.81.4–82.3.

23 Elsewhere Origen says that God transcends 'intellect' and 'being': Cels. 7.38; see also Mart. 47 and Comm. Jo. 19.37. For the Aristotelian background of describing God as 'intellect', see esp. Metaph. 12.9 (esp. 1074b34–5); for Plotinus, Origen's contemporary, the 'intellect' is the first production of 'the one' (Enn. 5.1).
propria sunt. Propter quod natura illa simplex et tota mens ut moueatur ulter aliquid, nihil dilationis aut cunctationis habere potest, ne per huiusmodi adunctionem circum scribi uel inhiberi aliquatenus uideatur diuinae naturae simplicitas, uti ne quod est principium omnium, compositum inueniatur et diuersum, et sit multa, non unum, quod oportet totius corporeae admixtions alienum una sola, ut ita dixerim, deitis specie constare.

125 Quia autem mens non indigeat loco, ut secundum naturam suam moueatur, certum est etiam ex nostrae mentis contemplatione. Haec enim si in sua mensura consistat, nec ex qualibet causa aliquid ei obtusionis eueniat, nihil umquam ex locorum diuersitate tardabitur, quomminus suis motibus agat; neque rursus ex locorum qualitate augmentum aliquod uel incrementum mobilitatis adquiret. Quodsi obtendat aliquis, uerbi gratia, quia nauigantibus et fluctibus maris iactatis minus aliquanto mens uigeat quam uigere in terris solet, non eos ex loci diuersitate id pati, sed ex corpore commotione uel conturbatione credendum est, cui mens adiuncta est uel inserta. Videtur enim uelut contra naturam in mari degere corpus humanum, et propter hoc uelut quadam sui inaequalitate motus mentis incompotete suscipere et acuminis eius iuctus obtunesio ministerio dispensare, non minus quam si qui etiam in terra positi febris urgetur; quorunm certum est quod, si minus aliquid per uum februm mens suum seruet officium, non loci culpam, sed morbus corporis esse causandum, per quem perturbatum corpus atque confusum nequaquam notis ac naturalibus lineis solita menti dependit officia, quoniam quidem nos homines animal sumus compositum ex corporis animaeque concursu; hoc enim modo habitare nos super terras possibile fuit. Deum uero, qui omnium initium est, compositum esse non est putandum; ne forte priora ipso principio esse inueniuntur elementa, ex quibus compositum est omne quicquid illud est quod compositum dicitur.

Sed nec magnitude corporalis mens indiget, ut agat aliquid uel moueatur, sicut oculus, cum in maiora quidem corpora intuendo diffunditur, ad paru uero et exigua coartatur et adstringitur ad uidendum. Indiget sane mens magnitude intellegibili, quia non corporaliter, sed intellegibiliter crescit. Non enim corporalibus incrementis simul cum corpore mens usque ad uicesimum uel tricesimum annum aetatis augetur, sed eruditionibus atque exercitiis adhibitis acumen quidem elimatur ingenii, quaque sunt ei insita ad intellegiament prouocantur, et capax maioris efficitur intellectus non
of things proper to bodies or matter. Wherefore that simple and wholly intellectual being can have no delay or hesitation in its movements or operations, lest the simplicity of the divine nature should appear to be circumscribed or impeded somewhat by such an addition, and lest that which is the first principle of all things should be found to be composite and diverse, and to be many, not one; since the sole species of divinity, if I may speak thus, necessarily exists free from all bodily admixture.

Moreover, it is certain, even from the observation of our own intellect, that intellect does not need space to move according to its own nature. For if it abides within its own sphere, and nothing from any cause occurs to obstruct it, it will never be slowed down at all, by reason of difference in place, from performing its own movements; nor, on the other hand, does it gain any addition or increase of mobility from the quality of [particular] places. If anyone were to object, for example, that among those who sail and are tossed by the waves of the sea the intellect is somewhat less vigorous than is usual on land, it is believed that they suffer this not from the difference of place, but from the commotion or disturbance of the body to which the intellect is joined or attached. For it seems contrary to nature, as it were, for a human body to live at sea, and, because of this, as if unequal to the task, the body appears to sustain the movements of the intellect in an irregular and disordered manner and to carry out its quick movements with a slower delivery, not less than those on land when they are in the grip of a fever, of whom it is certain that if the intellect fulfils its functions less effectively because of the strength of the fever, the cause is not to be found in any fault of place, but in the illness of the body, on account of which the body, disturbed and disordered, in no way renders to the intellect services customary under well-known and natural conditions, since we human beings are animals composed from a concurrence of body and soul, and in this way [alone] did it become possible for us to live upon the earth. But God, who is the beginning of all things, is not to be regarded as a composite being, lest perchance there be found, prior to the first principle itself, elements, out of which whatever is called composite has been composed.25

Neither does the intellect require bodily magnitude to perform any act or movement, as does an eye which, for the purpose of seeing, expands when looking at large bodies, but narrows and contracts when looking at small ones. The intellect indeed requires intellectual magnitude, because it grows, not in a bodily manner, but an intellectual manner. For the intellect does not increase by bodily increments together with the body, up to the twentieth or thirtieth year of age, but, by applying instructions and exercises, a certain sharpening of its faculties is honed and the powers implanted within are roused to intelligence, and it is rendered capable of greater intellectual efforts, not

corporalibus incrementis aucta, sed eruditionis exercitiis elimata. Quae idcirco non statim a puero uel a natuuitate recipere potest, quia inualida adhuc et inbecilla membrorum compago, quibus uelut organis ad exercitium sui mens utitur, neque operandi uim sustentare ualet neque percipiendae disciplinae exhibere sufficit faculatem.

1.1.7. Si qui autem sunt qui mentem ipsam animamque corpus esse arbitrentur, uelim mihi responderent, quomodo tantarum rerum, tam difficilium tamque subtilium, rationes assertionesque recipiat. Vnde ei uirtus memoriae, unde rerum inuisibilium contemplatio, unde certe incorporeum intellectus corporis inest? Quomodo natura corporea disciplinas artium, rerum contemplationes rationesque rimatur? Vnde etiam diuina dogmata, quae manifeste incorporea sunt, sentire atque intellegere potest? Nisi si forte aliquid putet quod, sicut forma ista corporea et habitus ipse aurium uel oculorum confert aliquid ad audiendum et ad uidendum, et ut singula membra, quae a deo formata sunt, habent aliquid oportunitatis etiam ex ipsa formae qualitate ad hoc, quod agere naturaliter instituta sunt: ita etiam habitum animae uel mentis intellegere debere arbitrentur quasi apte accommodeque formatum ad hoc, ut de singulis sentiat et intellegiliter mouetur, describere quis posset aut dicere, non aduerto.

Adhuc ad confirmationem atque explanationem eorum, quae de mente uel anima diximus, eo quod praestanior sit totius naturae corporeae, etiam haec addi possunt. Vnicuique corporeo sensui substantia quaedam sensibilis subiacet proprie, in quam ipse sensus corporalis intenditur. Verbi gratia,uisui subiacent colores habitus magnitudine, auditui uoces et sonus, odoratui nidores boni uel mali, gustui sapores, tactui calida uel frigida, dura uel mollia, aspera uel leuia. Horum autem sensuum, de quibus supra diximus, quia multo melior sensus sit mentis, omnibus clarum est. Quomodo ergo non uidetur absurdum, his quidem, quae inferiora sunt, substantias esse subjectas ad intendendum, huic autem uirtuti, quae melior est, id est mentis sensui, nihil omnino subici substantiale, sed esse intellectualis naturae uirtutem corporum accidentem uel consequentem? Quod qui dicunt, sine dubio in contumeliam eius substantia, quae in ipsis melior est, haec proferunt; immo uero ex hoc etiam ad ipsum deum refertur iniuria, cum putant eum per naturam corpoream posse intellegi, quo scilicet secundum ipsos corpus sit et illud, quod per corpus

160 respondeant Koe in appar. 165 si om. δ G σ 170 arbitretur Merl Del Koe
commodique β 173 possit Koe in appar. 177 propriae C M : propria G
178-9 nidores et boni uel mali odores γ 180 leuia : lenia B G M Ab : lania M
181 sit sensus γ 183 id est : id G M*: om. σ
being increased by bodily increments but by being honed through exercises in learning. Yet it cannot receive these immediately from boyhood or from birth, because the framework of limbs, which the intellect uses as instruments for its own exercises, is as yet weak and feeble, being neither able to bear the force of the mind's working nor sufficiently developed to exhibit a capacity for receiving education.

1.1.7. But if there are any who consider the intellect itself and the soul to be a body, I wish they would tell me how it can receive reasons and arguments on matters of such great importance, of such difficulty and of such subtlety. Whence does the power of memory come to it, whence the contemplation of invisible things, and whence does the understanding of bodiless things reside in the body? How does a bodily nature investigate the disciplines of the arts and the meanings and reasons of things? Whence also is it able to perceive and understand the divine doctrines, which are manifestly bodiless? Unless, perhaps, someone should think that as the very bodily form and condition of the ears or eyes contributes something to hearing and seeing, and as the individual members of the body, formed by God, have some adaptation, even from the very quality of their form, for doing that for which they were naturally appointed, so also it is supposed that the condition of the soul or intellect must be understood as if fitly and suitably formed for the purpose of perceiving and understanding individual things and of being set in motion by vital movements. I do not know, however, who could describe or say what sort of appearance the intellect has, inasmuch as it is an intellect and moves in an intellectual manner.

Moreover, in confirmation and explanation of what we have said regarding the intellect or soul, that it is superior to all bodily nature, the following remarks may be added. Appropriately connected to each bodily sense is a sensible substance, towards which the bodily sense is directed. For example, sight is connected with colour, shape, and size; hearing with voice and sound; smell with odours, good or bad; taste with flavours; touch with heat or cold, hard or soft, rough or smooth. But it is clear to all that the sense of the intellect is far superior to the senses mentioned above. How, then, would it not appear absurd if to these inferior senses should be connected substances to which they are directed, but that to this superior power, that is, the sense of the intellect, there should be nothing substantial at all connected with it, but that the faculty of an intellectual being should be an accident or corollary to bodies? Those who assert this, without a doubt speak in disparagement of that substance which is the better part in them; even more, in doing so they even do wrong to God himself, when they suppose that he may be understood by means of bodily nature, since according to them that which may be understood

potest intellegi uel sentiri; et nolunt hoc intellegi, quod propinquitas quaedam sit menti ad deum, cuius ipsa mens intellectualis imago sit, et per hoc possit aliquid de deitatis sentire natura, maxime si expurgatior ac segregatior sit a materia corporali.

1.1.8. Verum istae assertiones minus fortasse auctoritatis habere uideantur apud eos, qui ex sanctis scripturis de rebus divinis institui volunt et inde sibi approbari quae sunt, quomodo natura dei supereminent corporum naturam. Vide ergo si non etiam apostolus hoc idem ait, cum de Christo loquitur dicens: *Qui est imago inuisibilis dei, primogenitus omnis creaturae.* Non enim, ut quidam putant, natura dei alicui usibilis est et aliis inuisibilis; non enim dixit apostolus: imago inuisibilis dei hominibus aut inuisibilis peccatoribus, sed ualde constanter pronuntiat de ipsa natura dei dicens: *Imago inuisibilis dei.*

Sed et Iohannes in euangelio dicens: *Deum nemo uidit unquam* manifeste declarat omnibus, qui intellegere possunt, quia nulla natura est, cui usibilis sit deus; non quasi qui usibilis quidem sit per naturam et uelut fragilioris creaturae euadat atque excedat aspectum, sed quoniam naturaliter uideri impossibilis est.

Quodsi requiras a me, quid etiam de ipso unigenito sentiam, si ne ipsi quidem usibilem dicam naturam dei, quae naturaliter inuisibilis est: non tibi statim uel impium uideatur esse uel absurdum; rationem quippe dabis consequenter. Aliud est uidere, aliud cognoscere: uidere et uidere corporum res est, cognoscere et cognoscere intellectualis naturae est. Quicquid ergo proprium corporum est, hoc nec de patre nec de filio sentiendum est; quod uero ad naturam pertinet deitatis, hoc inter patrem et filium constat. Denique etiam ipse in euangelio non dixit quia nemo uidit patrem nisi filius neque filium nisi pater, sed ait: *Nemo nouit filium nisi pater, neque patrem quis nouit nisi filium.*

Ex quo manifeste indicatur quod quicquid inter corporeas naturas uidere et uideri dicitur, hoc inter patrem et filium cognoscere dicitur et cognoscere, per uirtutem scientiae, non per usibilitatis fragilitatem. Quia ergo de incorporea natura et inuisibili nec uidere proprie dicitur nec uideri, idcirco neque pater a filio neque filius a patre uideri in euangelio dicitur, sed agnosci.

190 ac : et γ 191 ante uerum add. titulum: quod penitus naturae uisibilis non sit B fortassiss γ 192 et inde : etiam inde G : etiam de M*: etiamque M*: etiam de his o 193 ante uerum add. titulum: quod penitus naturae uisibilis non sit B 194 et inde : etiam inde G : etiam de M*: etiamque M*: etiam de his o 196 noscere Ra(1.17) 197 non enim : quia non Ra(1.17) 205 impossibile BS 209 noscere Ra(1.17) 210 nosci et noscere Ra(1.17) 216 noscere ... nosci Ra(1.17)
or perceived by means of a body is also itself a body; and they are unwilling for it to be understood that there is a certain affinity between the intellect and God, of whom the intellect itself is an intellectual image, and that by means of this it is able to know to some degree the nature of divinity, especially if it is purified and separated from bodily matter.

1.1.8. But perhaps these assertions may seem to have less authority with those who wish to be instructed in divine things from the holy Scriptures, and who seek to have it proved to them from that source how the nature of God surpasses the nature of bodies. See, then, if the Apostle also does not say the same thing when, speaking of Christ, he says, *Who is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature.* Not, as some suppose, that the nature of God is visible to some and invisible to others; for the Apostle does not say 'the image of God who is invisible to men' or 'invisible to sinners', but pronounces, with absolute constancy, on the very nature of God, saying *the image of the invisible God.* And John, also, saying in the Gospel, *No one has seen God at any time,* clearly declares to all who are able to understand that there is no being to which God is visible; not as if he were a being visible by nature and yet eludes and escapes the gaze of the frailer creatures, but because by nature it is impossible for him to be seen.

If you should ask of me what is my opinion regarding the only-begotten himself, whether I would say that the nature of God, which is naturally invisible, is not even visible to him, do not let this question immediately seem to you impious or absurd, for we shall of course give a reasonable answer. It is one thing to see, and another to know; to see and to be seen is a property of bodies; to know and to be known is a property of intellectual beings. Whatever, therefore, is a property of bodies cannot be predicated either of the Father or of the Son; but what pertains to the nature of divinity is common to the Father and the Son. Precisely, then, he himself, in the Gospel, did not say that no one has seen the Father except the Son, nor anyone the Son except the Father, but said, *No one knows the Son except the Father, nor anyone the Father except the Son.* From this it is clearly shown that whatever it is among bodily beings that is called 'seeing' and 'being seen', is called, between the Father and the Son, 'knowing' and 'being known', through the faculty of knowledge not by the frailness of sight. Because, then, neither 'seeing' nor 'being seen' can properly be applied to a bodiless and invisible being, neither is the Father, in the Gospel, said to be seen by the Son, nor the Son by the Father, but to be known.

27 Cf. Origen, *Princ.* 4.4.10. 28 Col. 1:15. 29 John 1:18. 30 Here Koetschau inserts a sentence from Jerome, *Jo. Hier.* 7 (PL 23, 360); it is included in Appendix II as item no. 1. 31 Matt. 11:27.
1.1.9. Quodsi proponat nobis aliquis, quare dictum est: Beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi deum uidebunt, multo magis etiam ex hoc, ut ego arbitror, assertio nostra firmabitur; nam quid aliud est corde deum uidere, nisi secundum id, quod supra exposuimus, mente eum intellegere atque cognoscere? Frequenter namque sensibilium membrorum nomina ad animam referuntur ita, ut oculis cordis uidere dicatur, id est uirtute intellegentiae aliquid intellectualem conicere. Sic et audire auribus dicitur, cum sensum intellegentiae profundioris aduerit. Sic et uti eam posse dentibus dicimus, cum mandit et comedit panem uitae, qui de caelo descendit. Similiter et ceteris uti membrorum officiis dicitur, quae ex corporali appellatione translata uirtutibus animae coaptantur, sicut et Salomon dicit: Sensum diuinum inuenies. Sciebat namque duo genera esse sensuum in nobis, unum genus sensuum mortale, corruptibile, humanum, aliud genus immortale et intellectuale, quod nunc diuinum nominavit. Hoc ergo sensu diuno non oculorum, sed cordis mundi, quae est mens, deus uidere ab his, qui digni sunt, potest. Cor sane pro mente, id est pro intellectuali uirtute nominari in omnibus scripturis nouis ac ueteribus abundanter inuenies.

Hoc igitur modo quamuis longe inferius quam dignum est, utpote pro infirmitate humanae intellegentiae naturam dei intellegentes, nunc quid sibi nomen Christi uelit uideamus.
1.1.9. But if someone lays before us the question why it was said, *Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God,* from that very passage, in my opinion, will our argument be much more firmly established; for what else is seeing God in the heart than, as we have explained above, to understand and to know him with the intellect? For the names of the organs of sense are frequently applied to the soul, so that it may be said to see with the eyes of the heart, that is, to infer some intellectual conclusion by means of the faculty of intelligence. So also it is said to hear with the ears when it perceives the deeper meaning. So also we say that it is able to use teeth, when it eats and consumes *the bread of life which comes down from heaven.* In a similar way it is said to use the services of the other members which are transferred from their bodily significance and applied to the faculties of the soul, just as Solomon says, *You will find a divine sense.* For he knew that there were within us two kinds of senses: one kind of sense being mortal, corruptible, human, the other kind being immortal and intellectual, which he here calls *divine.* By this divine sense, therefore, not of the eyes, but of a pure heart, which is the intellect, God may be seen by those who are worthy. That the intellect, that is, the intellectual faculty is indeed called *heart,* you will find abundantly in all the Scriptures, both old and new.

Having understood, therefore, the nature of God, in a manner greatly inferior to what is fitting, because of the weakness of human intelligence, let us now see what is meant by the name of Christ.

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32 Matt. 5:8.
33 For a similar treatment of this verse, see Fr. Jo. 13 (GCS 4, p. 495); Cels. 7.33, and more generally Cels. 6.69; 7.34, 44; Comm. Jo. 28.23–38; Comm. ser. Matt. 85; Or. 13.4.
34 Cf. Origen, Dial. 16–24; Hom. Luc. 16.7–8.
36 Prov. 2:5. Origen's reading of this text (which we have in Greek in Cels. 7.34) is: αἱ ὀρθὲς θείαι εὐρήσεις, whereas the usual LXX reading is: ἐπίγνωσιν θεοῦ εὐρήσεις.
1.2.1. Primo illud nos scire oportet, quod alia est in Christo deitatis eius natura, quod est unigenitus filius patris, et alia humana natura, quam in nouissimis temporibus pro dispensatione suscipit. Propter quod uidendum primo est, quid sit unigenitus filius dei, qui multis quidem et diuersis nominibus pro rebus uel opinionibus appellantium nuncupatur. Sapientia namque dicitur, sicut et Salomon dixit ex persona sapientiae: Dominus creautit me initium uiarum suarum in opera sua, priusquam aliquid faceret, ante saecula fundavit me. In initio priusquam terram faceret, priusquam prodirent fontes aquarum, antequam firmarentur montes, ante omnes autem colles generat me. Dicitur autem et primogenitus, sicut dicit apostolus Paulus: Qui est primogenitus omnis creaturae. Nec tamen alius est primogenitus per naturam quam sapientia, sed unus atque idem est. Denique et apostolus Paulus dicit: Christus dei uirtus et dei sapientia.

1.2.2. Nemo tamen putet alicuius nos insubstantium dicere, cum eum dei sapientiam nominamus; id est, ut exempli causa finixerim, quod eum non uelut animal quoddam sapiens, sed rem aliquam, quae sapientes efficiat, intellegamus, praebentem se et mentibus inserentem eorum, qui capaces uirtutum eius atque intellegentiae fiunt. Si ergo semel recte receptum est, unigenitum filium dei sapientiam eius esse substantialiter subsistentem, nescio si iam ultra euagari sensus noster debeat ad suspicandum, ne forte ipsa 
υπόστασις (id est subsistentia) eius corporeum aliquid habeat, cum omne, quod corporeum est, uel habitu uel colore uel magnitudine designetur. Et quis uel sani sensus habitum uel colorem aut mensurae magnitudinem in sapientia requisiuit per hoc, quod sapientia est? Quomodo autem extra huius sapientiae generationem fuisset aliquando deum patrem, uel ad punctum momenti alicuius, potest quis sentire uel credere, qui tamen pium aliquid de deo intellegere nouerit uel sentire? Aut enim non potuisse deum dicet generare...
1.2 Christ

1.2.1. In the first place, we must know that in Christ the nature of his divinity, as he is the only-begotten Son of God, is one thing, and another is the human nature, which in the last times he took on account of the economy. As such, we must first see what the only-begotten Son of God is, who is called by many and diverse names according to the circumstances and beliefs of those speaking. For he is called Wisdom, as Solomon said, speaking in the person of Wisdom: The Lord created me the beginning of his ways for his works; before he made anything, before the ages, he established me. In the beginning, before he made the earth, before the springs of water came forth, before the mountains were made firm, before all the hills, he begets me. He is also called the First-born, as the Apostle Paul says, Who is the First-born of all creation. The First-born is not, however, by nature another than Wisdom, but is one and the same. Finally, the Apostle Paul says, Christ the Power of God and the Wisdom of God.

1.2.2. Let no one, however, suppose that when we call him the Wisdom of God, we mean something unsubstantial; that is, to take an example, that we understand him to be not, as it were, some wise living being, but rather a certain thing which makes others wise, offering and implanting itself in the intellects of those who are made capable of receiving his virtues and intelligence. If, then, once it is rightly understood that the only-begotten Son of God is his Wisdom subsisting substantially, I do not think that our mind now ought to stray beyond this to the suspicion that his very πρωτάσις (that is, subsistence) might have something bodily, since everything that is bodily is distinguished by shape or colour or measurable size. And who in his sound mind ever sought for shape or colour or measurable size in wisdom, inasmuch as it is wisdom? And how can one, who has learnt to know and think piously about God, think or believe that the God and Father ever existed, even for a single moment, without begetting this Wisdom? For he would either say that God was unable to beget

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1 Photius, Bibl. cod. 8 (ed. Henry 1, 4a1–4), begins by saying that the first book of Princ. concerns the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, but continues by saying: 'The first book is full of fables about the Father, and (as that one says) Christ, and the Holy Spirit, and rational beings' (Ἑστι δ' ὁ μεν πρώτος αυτῷ λόγος μεμβαθυλογημένος περί πατρός και (ἤσ εκείνός φησι) περί Χριστοῦ και περί ἀγίου πνεύματος, ἤτι και περί λογικῶν φύσεων). In Princ. 1.2.6, Origen speaks of others who have fallen into 'absurd fables'.

2 For the names or aspects (ἐπώνυμαι) of Christ, see Comm. Jo. 1.90–292, esp. 119, 123, 136.

3 Prov. 8:22–5. On the present tense of 'begets' see esp. Hom. Jer. 9.4 and Comm. Jo. 1.204, and below, Princ. 1.2.2, 4. On 'Wisdom' being the 'oldest' aspect of Christ, see Comm. Jo. 1.118.

4 Col. 1:15.

5 1 Cor. 1:24.

6 Cf. Origen, Comm. Jo. 1.151–2; 10.264; Or. 15.1; Dial. 4; Fr. Tit. (PG 14, 1304d).

7 Cf. Origen, Comm. Jo. 6.188; Or. 27.12; Cels. 8.12.

8 These are clearly Rufinus' words.
sapieniam, antequam generaret, ut eam quae ante non erat postea genuerit ut esset, aut potuisse quidem et, quod dici quoque de deo nefas est, noluisse generare; quod utrumque esse et impium omnibus patet, id est, ut aut ex eo quod non potuit deus proficeret ut posset, aut cum posset dissimularet ac differret generare sapientiam.

Propter quod nos semper deum patrem nouimus unigeniti filii sui, ex ipso quidem nati et quod est ab ipso trahentis, sine ullo tamen initio, non solum eo, quod aliquibus temporum spatiiis distingui potest, sed ne illo quidem, quod sola apud semet ipsam mens intueri solet et nudo, ut ita dixerim, intellectu atque animo conspicari. Extra omne ergo quod quidem duci ul interlegi potest initium generatam esse credendum est sapientiam. In hac ipsa ergo sapientiae subsistentia quia omnis virtus ac deformatio futurae inerat creaturae, uel eorum quae principaliter existunt uel eorum quae accident consequenter, uirtute praescientiae praeformata atque disposita: pro his ipsis, quae in ipsa sapientia uelut descripta ac praefigurata fuerant, creaturis se ipsam per Salomonem dicit creatam esse sapientia initium uiarum dei, continens scilicet in semet ipsa uniuersae creaturae uel initia uel rationes uel species.

1.2.3. Quali autem modo intelleximus sapientiam initium uiarum dei esse, et quomodo creatae esse dicitur, species scilicet in se et rationes totius praeformans et continens creaturae: hoc modo etiam uerbum dei eam esse intellegendum est per hoc, quod ipsa ceteris omnibus, id est uniuersae creaturae, mysteriorum et arcanorum rationem, quae utique intra dei sapientiam continentur, aperiat; et per hoc uerbum dicitur, quia sit tamquam arcanorum mentis interpres. Vnde et recte mihi dictus uidetur sermo ille, qui in Actibus Pauli scriptus est, quia hic est uerbum animal uiuens. Iohannes uero excelsius et praeclarius in initio euangelii sui dicit, proprina definitione deum esse definiens uerbum, dicens: Et deus erat uerbum, et hoc erat in initio apud deum. Qui autem initium dat uerbo dei uel sapientiae dei, intuere ne magis in ipsum ingenitum patrem impietatem suam iactet, cum eum neget semper patrem fuisse et genuisse.
Wisdom before he begot her, so that afterwards he begot into being her who formerly did not exist, or else that he was able but, what is impious even to say about God, unwilling to beget; both alternatives, as is patent to all, are absurd and impious, that is, either that God advanced from a condition of being unable to being able, or that, while being able, he hid this and delayed the begetting of Wisdom.

Therefore we acknowledge that God is always the Father of his only-begotten Son, who was indeed born of him, and derives from him what he is, but without, however, any beginning, not only that which may be distinguished by periods of time, but even that which intellect alone is accustomed to contemplate within itself or to contemplate, if we may thus speak, with the bare intellect and reason. Wisdom is thus believed to be begotten beyond the limits of any beginning that we can speak of or understand. And since within this very subsistence of Wisdom was every capacity and form of the creation that would come to be—both of those things which exist primarily and of those which occur in consequence, having been formed beforehand and arranged by the power of foreknowledge regarding these very created things, which had been as it were outlined and prefigured in Wisdom herself—Wisdom herself says through Solomon that she was created the beginning of the ways of God, that is, containing within herself the beginning and the reasons and the species of the entire creation.°

1.2.3. Now, in the same way in which we have understood that Wisdom is the beginning of the ways of God, and is said to be created, that is, forming beforehand and containing within herself the species and reasons of the whole creation, in the same manner must she be understood to be the Word of God, as she discloses to all other beings, that is, to the entire creation, the reason of the mysteries and secrets which are contained within the Wisdom of God, and so she is called the Word, because she is, as it were, the interpreter of the secrets of the intellect. Whence the saying, written in the Acts of Paul, seems right to me, that 'he is the Word, a living being:'° John, however, speaks more sublimely and brilliantly at the beginning of his Gospel, defining the Word, by an appropriate definition, to be God, saying, And the Word was God and he was in the beginning with God." Let the one, then, who assigns a beginning to the Word of God or to the Wisdom of God consider with care lest his impiety is cast upon the unbegotten Father himself, denying that he was

° For the ideas in this paragraph, see Princ 1.4.4–5; 2.3.6; Comm. Jo. 1.111, 113–15; 19.146–50; Cels. 5.22, 39; 6.64; Comm. Cant. 3 (GCS 8, p. 208).

° The Acts of Paul are mentioned by Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 3.3.5, but are not extant; they are other than the Acts of Paul and Thecla. Origen also cites from these Acts in Comm. Jo. 20.91. The saying quoted here is echoed in Origen's Hom. Jer. 20.1, where the Word is described as being ζωαν. It is possible that this goes back to Heb. 4:12: ζωαν γάρ ὁ λόγος.

" John 1:1–2.
uerbum et habuisse sapientiam in omnibus anterioribus uel temporibus uel saeculis, uel si quid aliud est quod nominari potest.

1.2.4. Hic ergo filius etiam omnium quae sunt ueritas est et uita; et recte. Nam quomodo uiuerent quae facta sunt, nisi ex uita? uel quomodo uiuerite constaret ea quae sunt, nisi ex ueritate descendenter? uel quomodo rationabiles esse possent substantiae, nisi uerbum uel ratio praecederet? uel quomodo sapientes, nisi esset sapientia? Verum quoniam futurum erat ut etiam deciderent aliqui a uita et mortem sibi ipsi consciscerent ex eo ipso, quod a uita deciderent (non enim aliud est mors quam a uita discedere), et utique non esset consequens ut ea, quae semel ad uiuendum fuerant procreata a deo, penitens deperirent, oportuit ante mortem esse talem uirtutem, quae futuram dissolveret mortem et esset ressurrectio, quae in domino et salutatore nostro formata est, quae ressurrectio in ipsa dei sapientia et uerbo ac uita consisteret. Tum deinde quoniam futurum erat ut aliqi ex his, qui creati sunt, pro eo quod non naturaliter, id est substantialiter, inesse eis bonum sed accidens, non ualentes incontinentes et incommutabiles permanere ac semper in eisdem bonis aequa ac moderata libratione durare, sed conuersi atque mutati de statu suo deciderent, uita factus est uerbum dei ac sapientia. Quae uita idcirco dicitur, quod ad patrem ducit eos, qui incidunt per eam. Quaecumque ergo diximus de sapientia dei, haec consecuenter aptabuntur et intellegantur etiam pro eo quod filius dei uita est et pro eo quod uerbum est et pro eo quod ueritas est et pro eo quod uita est et pro eo quod ressurrectio est, quia haec omnes appellationes ex operibus eius ac uirtutibus nominatae sunt, et in nulla harum uel leui opinione intellegi corporale aliquid potest, quod uel magnitudinem designare uideatur uel habitum uel colorem.

Verum quoniam hi, qui apud nos uidentur hominum filii uel ceterorum animalium, semini eorum a quibus seminati sunt respondent uel earum in quarum utero formantur ac nutritur, habentes ex his quicquid illud est, quod in lucem hanc assumunt ac deferunt processuri: infandum est et inlicitum deum patrem in generatione unigeniti filii sui et in subsistentia eius exaequare allicui uel hominum uel aliorum animantium generanti; sed necesse est exceptum aliquid esse et deo dignum, cuius nulla prorsus comparatio non in rebus solum sed ne in cogitatione quidem uel sensu inueniri potest, ut humana...

58 in omnibus om. Pa 59 aliud Koe in appar. (uide Cels. 7.16) : illud o Goe 64 essent post quomodo add. lan sapientes : sapiens μ : saperent σ 64-75 uerum ... deciderent om. lan 73 volentes γ 75 factum lan 78 intellegendur Gβ Mβ : intelligenter σ 79 et pro eo quod uia est om. γ 82 uidetur G Mβσ 83 ante uerum add. titulum: quod non corporali progenie pater filium genuit sed ut cor uerbum ut voluntatem mens ut sapientiam sensus ut splendorem lux β uerum om. γ 84 earum : eis 85 habent γ 86 autem post infandum add. γ Pa Sim Fern 87 substantia W Pa lan 88 generati γ
always father and that he begot the Word and possessed Wisdom in all previous times or ages, or whatever else one can call them.

1.2.4. This Son, therefore, is also the truth and the life of all things which exist, and rightly so. For how could things that were created live, except by life? Or how could those things that are truly exist, unless they were derived from the truth? Or how could rational beings exist, unless the Word or Reason preceded them? Or how could they be wise, unless there was Wisdom? But since it was to come to pass that some should also fall away from life, and bring death upon themselves by this very act of falling away from life (for death is nothing else than a departure from life), and since it was not to follow that those, who had once been created by God to live, should utterly perish, it was necessary that, before death, there should be such a power that would destroy the death that was to come and be the resurrection, the figure of which is in our Lord and Saviour, which resurrection exists in the Wisdom and Word and Life of God. Then, in next place, since it was to come to pass that some of those who were created, possessing the good not by nature, that is, substantially, but by accident, would not be able to remain unchangeable and unalterable and to abide always in the same blessings with equilibrium and moderate measure, but, turning and changing, would fall away from their condition, the Word and Wisdom of God became the way. She is called the way because she leads to the Father those who walk along her. Whatever, therefore, we have said of the Wisdom of God will appropriately be applied and understood also in the case of saying that the Son of God is the life and that he is the word and that he is the way and that he is the truth, and that he is the resurrection; for all these titles are named from his works and his powers, and in none of them is there the slightest ground for understanding anything bodily, which might seem to designate size or form or colour.

But whereas the offspring of humans or of other animals, whom we see around us, correspond to the seed of those of whose seed they are or of those in whose wombs they are formed and nourished, having from these whatever it is that they have taken and bring into the light of day when they are born, it is abominable and unlawful to equate the God and Father, in the begetting of his only-begotten Son and in his giving [him] subsistence, with any generation of humans or other animals; but it must be something exceptional and worthy of God, for which can be found no comparison at all, not merely in things, but even in thought or imagination, such that a human mind could apprehend

14 Cf. Origen, Comm. Jo. 1.266–75; 2.21–33; 6.188; Or. 27.2. 15 Cf. Wis. 1:14.
95 1.2.5. Videamus tamen quomodo haec quae dicimus etiam divinae scripturae auctoritate muniantur. Ait apostolus Paulus unigenitum filium *imaginem esse dei inuisibilis*, et primogenitum eum esse *totius creaturae*; ad Hebraeos uero scribens dicit de eo quia sit *splendor gloriae et figura expressa substantiae eius*. Inuenimus nihilominus etiam in Sapientia quae dicitur Salomonis descriptionem quandam de dei sapientia hoc modo scriptam: *Vapor est enim, inquit, uirtutis dei et απόρροια (id est manatio) gloriae omnipotentis purissima; ideo ergo nihil in eam commaculatum incidere potest. Splendor est enim lucis aeternae et speculum immaculatum inoperationis dei et imago bonitatis eius.* Sapientiam uero dei dicimus, sicut superius diximus, subsistentiam habentem non alibi nisi in eo, qui est initium omnium, ex quo et nata est. Quae sapientia quia ipse est, qui est solus natura filius, idcirco et *unigenitus* dicitur.

1.2.6. Videamus sane quid intellegi debeat etiam de hoc, quod *imago inuisibilis dei* dicitur, ut et per hoc aduertamus quomodo deus recte pater dicitur filii sui; et consideremus primo ex his, quae consuetudine hominum imaginis appellari solent. Imago interdum dicitur ea, quae in materia aliqua, id est ligni uel lapidis, depingi uel exculpi solet; interdum imago dicitur eius, qui genuit, is, qui natus est, cum in nullo similitudinum liniamenta eius, qui genuit, in eo, qui natus est, mentiuntur. Puto ergo posse priori quidem exemplo aptari eum, qui *ad imaginem et similitudinem* dei factus est, hominem, de quo diligentius deo fuante, cum locum ipsum in Genesi exponere coeperimus, uidebimus.

Secundae uero comparationi imago filii dei, de quo nunc sermo est, comparari potest etiam secundum hoc, quod *inuisibilis dei imago* inuisibilis

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93 fit : sit A C : fuit M<sup>c</sup> 98 de eo dicit quod lan 101 ΑΠΟΡΡΙΑ γ : aporoea α id est manatio om. γ gloria M σ 102 ideo : idcirco γ commaculatum in eam γ 103 operationis G M<sup>c</sup> 104 dei dicimus δ : dicimus β : didicimus γ 105 et om. lan quae δ lan Koe Goe : quaeque β γ Sim Fern 108 dei om. δ γ 111 exculpi : sculpi lan 114 primus post dei add. lan hominem lan 116 secunda W
how the unbegotten God becomes Father of the only-begotten Son. For this is an eternal and everlasting begetting, just as brightness is begotten from light. For he does not become Son, in an external manner, through adoption in the Spirit, but is Son by nature.

1.2.5. Let us now see how what we have said is also supported by the authority of the divine Scripture. The Apostle Paul says that the only-begotten Son is the image of the invisible God and the first-born of all creation; and when writing to the Hebrews, he says of him that he is the splendour of the glory and the express figure of his substance. Nevertheless, we also find in the book of Wisdom, which is said to be Solomon's, a certain description of the Wisdom of God written in this way, For she is the breath of the power of God, and the andppova (that is, emanation) of the purest glory of the Almighty; for that reason, therefore nothing defiled can enter into her. For she is the radiance of eternal life and the flawless mirror of the working of God and the image of his goodness. Now we hold, as we said above, that the Wisdom of God has her subsistence nowhere else but in him who is the beginning of all things, from whom also she is born. Since this Wisdom is the one who alone is Son by nature, she is therefore called the only-begotten.

1.2.6. Let us now see what ought to be understood when he is called the image of the invisible God, so that by this we might perceive how God is rightly called the Father of his Son; and let us first of all consider things which are customarily called 'images' by human beings. That which is painted or sculpted on some material, such as wood or stone, is sometimes called an image; and sometimes a child is called the image of its parent, when the likeness of the features of the parent are in no way distorted in the child. Now I think that the first of these examples may be applied to that man who was made in the image and likeness of God, whom we will consider more precisely, God willing, when we come to expound this passage in Genesis.

However, the image [aspect] of the Son of God might be compared to the second example, even in respect of the fact that he is the invisible image of the

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18 Cf. Wis. 7:26; Heb. 1:3. See also Justin, Dial. 61, 128; Tatian, Orat. 5; Tertullian, Prax. 8.5; Origen, Comm. Jo. 32.353.
19 Cf. Rom. 8:15.
20 Col. 1:15.
21 Heb. 1:3.
22 Cf. Origen, Princ. 4.4.6, where he notes that it is 'a book not held in authority by all'.
23 Wis. 7:25–6.
24 Gen. 1:26. In Princ. 1.3.3 and 2.3.6, Origen refers to an already complete work on Gen. 1–2; Origen's Commentary on Genesis must have been written together with Princ., but it is no longer extant. His treatment of Gen. 1:26 can be found in Hom. Gen. 1.13 and Sel. Gen. 1:26 (PG 12, 93).
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est, sicut secundum historiam dicimus imaginem Adae esse filium eius Seth. Ita etiam scriptum est: Et genuit Adam Seth secundum imaginem suam et secundum speciem suam. Quae imago etiam naturae ac substantiae patris et filii continet unitatem. Si enim omnia quae facit pater, haec et filius facit similiter, in eo quod omnia ita facit filius sicut pater, imago patris deformatur in filio, qui utique natus ex eo est uelut quaedam voluntas eius ex mente procedens. Et ideo ego arbitror quod sufficere debet voluntas patris ad subsistendum hoc, quod uult pater. Volens enim non alia uia utitur nisi quae consilio voluntatis profertur. Ita ergo et filii ab eo subsistentia generatur.

Quod necesse est inprimis suscipi ab his, qui nihil ingenitum, id est innatum, praeter solum deum patrem fatentur. Obseruandum namque est, ne quis incurrat in illas absurdas fabulas eorum, qui prolationes quasdam sibi ipsi depingunt, ut diuinam naturam in partes uocent et deum patrem quantum in se est diuidant, cum hoc de incorporea natura uel leuiter suspicari non solum extremae impietatis sit, uerum etiam ultimae insipientiae, nec omnino uel ad intellegentiam consequens, ut incorporeae naturae substantialis diuisio possit intellegi. Magis ergo sicut voluntas procedit e mente et neque partem aliquam mentis secat neque ab ea separatur aut diuiditur: tali quadem specie putandus est pater filium genuisse, imaginem scilicet suam, ut sicut ipse est invisibilis per naturam, ita imaginem quoque invisibilem genuerit.

Verbum enim est filius, et ideo nihil in eo sensibile intellegendum est; sapientia est, et in sapientia nihil corporeum suspicandum est; lumen est uerum, quod inluminat omnem hominem uenientem in hunc mundum, sed nihil habet commune ad solis huius lumen. Imago ergo est invisibilis dei patris

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121 fecit Ian 122 formatur β 126 voluntatis σ Ian Pa Koe Goe: voluntas α μ. Sim
Fern et ab eo filii Pa 128 fatentur patrem Ian 130 uocent: secent Pa(102)
invisible God, just as, according to the narrative, we say the image of Adam is his son Seth. For it is written thus, And Adam begot Seth in his own image and in his own form. This image preserves the unity of nature and substance of a father and of a son. For if all that the Father does, the Son also does likewise, then by the fact that the Son does all things like the Father, the image of the Father is formed in the Son, who is assuredly born of him, as an act of his will proceeding from the intellect. And therefore I consider that the will of the Father ought to be sufficient for the subsistence of what he wills; for in willing he uses no other means than that which is produced by the counsel of his will. In this way, then, the subsistence of the Son is also begotten by him.

This point must, above all, be upheld by those who acknowledge nothing to be unbegotten, that is, unborn, except the God and Father. One must, moreover, be careful not to fall into the absurd fables of those who depict for themselves certain emanations, so as to divide the divine nature into parts and divide the God and Father as far as they can, since even to entertain the slightest suspicion of this regarding a bodiless being is not only of extreme impiety but also of ultimate folly, and neither does it in any way accord with intelligence to think that a substantial division of a bodiless nature is possible. Rather, then, as an act of the will proceeds from the intellect, and neither cuts off any part nor is separated or divided from it, so, in some similar fashion, is the Father to be supposed to have begotten the Son, that is, his own image, so that just as he is himself invisible by nature, so also he has begotten an image that is invisible.

For the Son is the Word, and therefore it is understood that nothing in him is perceptible to the senses; he is Wisdom, and in Wisdom there is no suspicion of anything bodily; he is the true light, which enlightens every human being coming into this world, but he has nothing in common with the light of this sun. Our Saviour, therefore, is the image of the invisible God and Father;

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25 Col. 1:15. For Irenaeus, the image of God in the human being is inscribed in the flesh (Haer. 5.6.1); as he argues against his opponents, an image must have form, and form can only exist in matter (Haer. 2.7, 19.6).
26 Gen. 5:3. 
27 John 5:19.
29 According to Jerome, Ep. 124.2.3 (ed. Hilberg 3.97.26), Origen asserted that the Father alone was 'uncreated' (infactum). Fernandez would place in parallel here a sentence from Justinian, Ep. ad Menam (ed. Schwartz, 210.9–10), which Koetschau would insert into Princ. 1.3.3; it is given in Appendix II as item no. 5. See above, Princ. Pr.4, n.15.
30 John 1:9.
31 For what follows, see Jerome, Ep.124.2.1 (ed. Hilberg 3.97.10–13), who reports Origen as asserting that: 'The Son, who is the image of the invisible Father, compared to the Father is not the truth, but compared with us, who cannot receive the truth of the almighty Father, he seems a simulacrum of the truth' (Filium, qui sit imago inuisibilis patris, comparatum patri non esse veritatem; apud nos autem, qui dei omnipotens non possimus recipere ueritatem, imaginariam veritatem uideri). The Synodal Letter of the Council of Alexandria in 400 (= Jerome, Ep. 92.2.1; ed. Hilberg 2.148.26–149.1), presided over by Theophilus of Alexandria, reports Origen's teaching in a more extreme form: 'For when the volume περὶ ἀρχῶν, which we call On First Principles, was read, in which it is written that the Son compared with us is truth, but compared with the Father is falsehood ...' (Nam cum legeretur volumen περὶ ἀρχῶν, quae nos 'de principiis'
saluator noster, quantum ad ipsum quidem patrem ueritas, quantum autem ad nos, quibus reuelat patrem, imago est, per quam cognoscimus patrem, quem nemo alius nouit nisi filius et cui uoluerit filius reuelare. Reuelat autem per hoc, quod ipse intellegitur. A quo enim ipse fuerit intellectus, consequenter intellegitur et pater, secundum hoc quod ipse dixit: Qui me uidit, uidit et patrem.

1.2.7. Sed quoniam sermonem Pauli inseruimus de Christo dicentis in eo quo ait quia splendor est gloriae dei et figura expressa substantiae eius, quid ex hoc sentiendum sit uideamus. Deus lux est secundum Ioannem. Splendor ergo huius lucis est unigenitus filius, ex ipso inseparabiliter uelut splendor ex luce procedens et inluminans uniuersam creaturam. Secundum haec namque, quae superius exposuimus, quomodo uia sit et ducat ad patrem, et quomodo uerbum sit arcana sapientiae ac scientiae mysteria interpretans ac proferens rationabili creaturae, quomodo etiam ueritas uel uita est uel resurrectio, consequenter intellegere debemus etiam splendoris opus; per splendorem namque quid sit lux ipsa agnoscitur et sentitur. Qui splendor fragilibus se et infirmis mortalium oculis placidius ac lenius offerens et paulatim uelut edocens et adsuescens claritatem luminis pati, cum ab eis dimouerit omne quod uisum obducit et impedit, secundum quod dixit dominus: Eice trabem de oculo tuo, capaces eos efficit ad susciwendam gloriam lucis, etiam in hoc uelut quidam mediator hominum ac lucis effectus.
in relation to the Father himself, the truth, and in relation to us, to whom he revealed the Father, the image, by which we come to the knowledge of the Father, whom no one else knows except the Son and he to whom the Son has willed to reveal him. And he reveals him by being himself understood. For to the one who has understood the Son himself, the Father is also understood, according to his own words, He that has seen me, has seen the Father also.

1.2.7. But since we quoted the saying of Paul regarding Christ, in which he says of him that he is the splendour of the glory of God and the express figure of his substance, let us see what we are to learn from this. God is light, according to John. The only-begotten Son, therefore, is the splendour of this light, proceeding from him inseparably, as does splendour from light, and enlightening the whole creation. For following what we have already explained—regarding how he is the way and leads to the Father, and how he is the word, interpreting and making known to the rational creation the secrets of wisdom and the mysteries of knowledge, and is also the truth and the life and the resurrection—in the same way ought we to understand also the action of the splendour: it is by splendour that we understand and perceive what light itself is. This splendour, presenting itself softly and gently to the frail and weak eyes of mortals, and gradually training, as it were, and accustoming them to bear the brightness of the light, when it has removed from them everything that clouds and impedes vision, according to the Lord's saying, Cast out the beam from your own eye, renders them capable of receiving the splendour of the light, even becoming in this respect a kind of mediator between human beings and the light.

possumus dicere, in quibus scriptum est, quod filius nobis comparatus est veritas et patri conlatus mendacium ...). According to a work by an anonymous defender of Origen, as reported by Photius, Bibl. cod. 117 (ed. Henry 2, 92a33–5), Origen was accused of teaching 'that the image of God, considered in relation to God, whose image he is, in so far as he is the image, is not truth (ὅτι ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ ἃς πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ὁ ἐστὶν εἰκὼν, καθο εἰκὼν, οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀλήθεια).

33 Koetschau inserts here, as Fragment 4, a sentence from Justinian, Ep. ad Menam (ed. Schwartz, 209.25–7) which is said to be from Princ. 1; the text is included in Appendix II as item no. 2.
34 Cf Origen, Comm. Jo. 13.35; 32.359; Cels. 7.43–4.
35 John 14:9. Koetschau suspects a further omission at this point, perhaps to be filled with either of the following passages: Jerome Ep. 124.2.1 (ed. Hilberg 3, 97.14–17) or Theophilus' Synodal Letter for ad 400 (= Jerome, Ep. 92.2.1; ed. Hilberg 2, 149.2–3); these texts are included in Appendix II as item no. 3.
36 Heb. 1:3. 37 1 John 1:5. 38 Cf Origen, Comm. Rom. 2.5; Comm. Jo. 13.153.
39 Matt. 7:5. 40 Cf 1 Tim. 2:5.
1.2.8. Verum quoniam non solum splendor gloriae esse dicitur ab apostolo, sed et figura expressa substantiae uel subsistentiae eius, non mihi uidetur otiosi esse intellectus aduertere, quomodo alia praeter ipsam dei substantiam uel subsistentiam, quaecumque illa substantia uel subsistentia dicitur, figura substantiae eius esse dicatur. Et uide ne forte, quoniam filius dei, qui et uerbum eius et sapientia dicitur et qui solus nouit patrem, et reuelat quibus uult, id est qui capaces uerbi ipsius et sapientiae fiunt, secundum hoc ipsum, quod intellegi atque agnosti facit deum, figuram substantiae uel subsistentiae eius dicatur exprimere: id est cum in semet ipsa primum descriptit sapientia ea, quae reuelare uult ceteris, ex quibus ab illis agnoscitur et intellegitur deus, et haec dicatur figura expressa substantiae dei.

Vt autem plenius adhuc intellegatur quomodo saluator figura est substantiae uel subsistentiae dei, utamur etiam exemplo, quod quamuis rem non plene nec propriei signifcet de qua agimus, tamen ad hoc solum uideatur assumptum, quod exinanians se filius, qui erat in forma dei, per ipsam sui exinanitionem studet nobis deitatis plenitudinem demonstrare. Verbi causa, si facta esset aliqua statua talis, quae magnitudinis immensitatem, pro eo ut qui illum immensam considerare atque intueri non possent, hanc uidentes, illum se uidisse confiderent, pro eo quod omnia uel membrorum uel uultus liniamenta uel ipsam speciem materiamque similitudine prorsus indiscreta seruaret: tali quadam similitudine exinanians se filius de aequalitate patris et uiabi nobis cognitionis eius ostendens, figura expressa substantiae eius efficitur; uti qui in magnitudine deitatis suae positam gloriam merae lucis non poteramus aspicere, per hoc quod nobis splendor efficitur, intuenda lucis diuiniae uiam per splendoris capiamus aspectum. Comparatio sane de statuis, quasi in rebus materialibus posita, ad nihil aliud recipiat quam ad hoc, quod filius dei breuissimae insertus humani corporis formae ex operum virtutisque similitudine dei patris in se immensam atque inuisiblem magnitudinem designabat per hoc, quod dicebat ad discipulos suos quia Quo me uidit, uidit et patrem et ego et
1.2.8. But since he is called by the Apostle not only the splendour of the glory but also the express figure of his substance or subsistence, it doesn’t seem to me idle to turn our intellect to the issue of how there can be said to be, besides the substance or subsistence of God himself, whatever that substance or subsistence means, another figure of his substance. Consider, then, whether the Son of God—who is also called his Word and Wisdom and alone knows the Father and reveals him to whom he will, to those, that is, who become capable of receiving his Word and Wisdom—may not, in regard to this very point of making God to be understood and known, be called the figure of his substance or subsistence; that is, when Wisdom outlines in herself, first of all, the things which she wishes to reveal to others, by which God may be known and understood by them, then she may also be called the express figure of the substance of God.

In order, however, that it may be more fully understood in what way the Saviour is the figure of the substance or subsistence of God, let us use an example, which, although it does not fully or properly represent the subject we are treating, may yet be taken, solely so that it may be seen that when the Son, who was in the form of God, emptied himself, he desires to demonstrate, by this very emptying, the fullness of divinity. For example, suppose there were a statue of such magnitude as to fill the whole world and on that account could be seen by no one; but that another statue was made similar to it in every respect, in the shape of limbs and outline of countenance, in form and matter, but not in its immensity of size, so that those who were unable to perceive and behold the immense one, on seeing the latter could be assured that they had seen the former, because it preserved every outline of limb and countenance, and even the form and matter, with an absolutely indistinguishable similarity; by some such likeness, the Son of God emptying himself of equality with the Father and showing us the way by which we may know him, becomes the express figure of his substance, so that we, who were unable to look upon the glory of the pure light while it remained in the magnitude of his divinity, may, by his becoming for us the splendour, obtain the way of beholding the divine light through looking upon the splendour. This comparison with statues, of course, although belonging to material things, is to be allowed for no other purpose than to show that the Son of God, though placed within the very small confines of a human body, yet through the likeness of his works and power demonstrated that the immense and invisible greatness of the God and Father was in him, as he said to his disciples, that He who sees me, sees the Father also.

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41 Phil. 2:6–7.
42 Col. 2:9.
43 Cf. Jerome, Ep. 124.2.2: 'He gives an illustration of two statues, a larger one and a small: the first fills the world and is somehow invisible through its size, the latter is perceptible to our eyes: the former he compares to the Father, the second to the Son.'
pater unum sumus. Quibus et illud simile intellegendum est, quod ait quia Pater in me, et ego in patre.

1.2.9. Videamus nunc etiam illud qualiter sentiendum est, quod in Sapientia Salomonis scriptum legimus, qui ita ait de sapientia quia Vaporem est quidam uirtutis dei et ἀντίφορον (id est manatio) omnipotentis gloriae purissima et splendor lucis aeternae et speculum immaculatum inoperationis siue uirtutis dei et imago bonitatis eius. Quinque igitur haec de deo definiens ex singulis quibusque certa quaedam inesse sapientiae dei designat; uirtutem namque dei nominat et gloriem et lucem aeternam et inoperationem et bonitatem. Ait autem sapientiam Vaporem esse non gloriae omnipotentis neque aeternae lucis nec inoperationis patris nec bonitatis eius, neque enim conueniens erat aliqui horum adscribi vaporem; sed cum omni proprietate ait uirtutis dei vaporem esse sapientiam. Intelleleganda est ergo uirtus dei, qua uiget, qua omnia uisibilia et inuisibilia uel instituit uel continet uel gubernat, qua ad omnia sufficiens est, quorum prouidentium gerit, quibus uelut unita omnibus adest. Huius ergo totius uirtutis tantae et tam immensae vaporem et, ut ita dixerim, uigor ipse in propria subsistentia effectus quamuis ex ipsa uirtute uelut voluntas ex mente procedat, tamen et ipsa uoluntas dei nihilominus dei uirtutis efficitur. Efficitur ergo uirtus altera in sua proprietate subsistens, ut ait sermo scripturae, vaporem quidam primae et ingenitae uirtutis dei, hoc quidem quod est inde trahens.

Non est autem quando non fuerit. Si enim quis voluerit dicere quasi prius non extiterit, sed postea ad subsistentiam uenerit, dicat causam, quare qui eam subsistere fecit pater ante hoc non fecerit. Quodsi aliquod semel initium dederit, quo initio vaporem iste ex dei uirtute procerit, iterum interrogabimus, quare non et ante illud quod dixit initium; et ita semper de anterioribus inquireretes et uerbo interrogationis ascendentem peruenietemus in illum intellectum, ut quoniam semper et poterat deus et uolebat, numquam uel decuerit uel causa aliqua existere potuerit, ut non hoc, quod bonum uolebat, semper habuerit. Ex quo ostenditur semper semper uaporem istum uirtutis dei,
and, *I and the Father are one*, with which is also to be understood the similar saying, that *The Father is in me, and I in the Father.*

1.2.9. Let us now see what is the meaning of the passage we find written in the Wisdom of Solomon, where it is said of Wisdom that, *She is a breath of the power of God, and the διπλοποια (that is, the emanation) of the purest glory of the Almighty and the splendour of eternal light and the flawless mirror of the working of God and the image of his goodness.* Determining here, then, five points regarding God, from each of them he points out a certain characteristic of the Wisdom of God: for he speaks of the power, and the glory, and the eternal light, and the working, and the goodness of God. He says, however, that Wisdom is a breath not of the glory of the Almighty, nor of the eternal light, nor of the working of the Father, nor of his goodness, for it was not appropriate that breath should be ascribed to any of these; but, with all propriety, he says that Wisdom is a breath of the power of God. Now, the power of God must be understood as that by which he is strong, that by which he establishes, preserves, and governs all things visible and invisible, and that by which he is sufficient for all things, for whom he exercises his providence and with whom he is present, as if united with them. The breath, then, or if I may speak thus, the vigour of all this great and so immense power itself comes to have its own subsistence, for although it proceeds from the power itself as will from the intellect, nevertheless even the will of God itself becomes the power of God. Another power, therefore, comes to be, subsisting in its own properties, a kind of breath, as the passage of Scripture affirms, of the first and unbegotten power of God, drawing from him whatever it is.

There is no 'when' when it did not exist. For if anyone wished to assert that it did not formerly exist, but came into subsistence afterwards, let him say why the Father who caused him to subsist did not do so before. And if he has conceded that there was a single beginning, in which beginning that breath proceeded from the power of God, we shall ask again why not even before the beginning of which he has spoken; and in this way, always seeking earlier and ascending with our questions, we shall arrive at this conclusion, that, as God was always able and willing, it was never becoming, nor could there be any other reason, such that he would not always have this good thing that he desired. From this it is demonstrated that that breath of the power of God has

45 These explanatory words are of course from Rufinus.
46 Wis. 7:25–6.
48 Cf. Origen, Cels. 8.12.
49 Cf. Origen, Princ. 4.4.1; Comm. Rom. 1.5.
50 This argument, that God is both able and willing, has already been used above (Princ. 1.2.2), regarding the begetting of Wisdom. See also Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 5.14.141.
nullum habentem initium nisi ipsum deum. Neque enim debeat aliud esse initium nisi ipsum, unde et est et nascitur, deum. Secundum apostolum uero dicentem quia Christus dei uirtus est, iam non solum uapor uirtutis dei, sed uirtus ex uirtute dicenda est.

1.2.10. Videamus etiam de eo quod dictum est, quoniam ἀπόρροια est (id est manatio) purissima gloriae omnipotentis, et prius quidem consideremus quid est gloria omnipotentis, tum deinde etiam quid sit eius ἀπόρροια sentiens. Quemadmodum pater non potest esse quis, si filius non sit, neque dominus esse quis potest sine possessione uel seruo: ita ne omnipotens quidem deus dici potest, si non sint in quos exerceat potentatum; et ideo ut omnipotens ostendatur deus, omnia subsistere necesse est. Nam si quis est qui uelit uel saecula aliqua transisse uel spatia uel quodcumque illud nominare uult, cum nondum facta essent quae facta sunt, sine dubio hoc ostendetur, quod in illis uel saeculis uel spatii omnipotens non erat deus et postmodum omnipotens factus est, ex quo habere coepit in quos ageret potentatum: et per hoc uidebitur profectum quendam accepisse et ex inferioribus ad meliora uenisse, si quidem

1.2.10, lines 231–40


"Ὅτι ὁ Ὀριγενής, ὁν Κένταυρον καλεῖ, ἐλεγε συναίδιον εἰναι τῷ μοῦν σῷρῳ καὶ ἀπροσδεῖ Θεῷ τὸ πάν. Ἐφασε γὰρ ἐὰν ἐστὶ δημιουργὸς ἀνευ δημιουργημάτων ἡ ποιητής ἀνευ ποιημάτων, οὔδε παντοκράτωρ ἀνευ τῶν κρατουμένων (τὸν γὰρ δημιουργὸν διὰ τὰ δημιουργήματα ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν ποιητήν διὰ τὰ ποιημάτα καὶ τὸν παντοκράτορα διὰ τὰ κρατουμένα λέγεσθαι), ἀνάγκη εἰς ἄρχης αὐτά ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ γεγενθεῖν, καὶ μὴ εἰναι χρόνον ὅτε οὐκ ἦν ταῦτα. Εἰ γὰρ ἦν χρόνος ὅτε οὐκ ἦν τὰ ποιημάτα, ἐπεὶ τῶν ποιημάτων μὴ ὄντων οὐδὲ ποιητῆς ἐστιν, ὅποι ὄνον ἀσέβες ἀκολουθεῖ. Μᾶλλα καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσαι καὶ μεταβάλλειν τὸν ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον συμβῆσαι Θεόν: εἰ γὰρ ὑστερον πεποίηκε τὸ πάν, δῆλον ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ποιεῖν εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν μετέβαλε. Τοῦτο δὲ ἀτοπον μετὰ τῶν προειρημένων. Οὐκ ἂρα δυνατὸν λέγειν μὴ εἰναι ἄναρχον καὶ συναίδιον τῷ Θεῷ τὸ πάν.

224 enim om. A\* γ εἰ post decebat add. C : post aliud M σ Pa 225 et\* om. Pa 228–9 uidemus ... purissima om. lan 228 aporrhoea ω 228–9 id est manatio om. γ 230 aporrhoea ω 231 si filius non sit δ B : si filius ei non sit C : si filius sit G\* M : nisi filius sit G\* σ 236 ostendit γ 236–7 uel saeculis om. γ 238 agere δ S potentatum: pote A\* W
always existed, having no beginning but God himself. Nor indeed was it fitting that there should be any other beginning, but God himself, from whom it is and is born. According to the saying of the Apostle, that Christ is the power of God, it should be called not only the breath of the power of God, but power from power.

1.2.10. Let us now examine the saying that [Wisdom] is the ἀπόρροια (that is, the emanation) of the purest glory of the Almighty, and let us first consider what the glory of the Almighty is, and then we shall understand what is its emanation. In the same way that no one can be a father if there is no son, nor can one be a lord if he owns neither possessions nor a slave, so even God cannot be called ‘Almighty’ if there are not those over whom he can exercise his power; and, therefore, that God may be shown to be almighty, it is necessary that all things exist. For if anyone would have it that some ages or periods, or whatever else he likes to call them, passed away, ages when those things that have been made had not yet been made, he would undoubtedly prove that during those ages or periods God was not almighty but became almighty afterwards, from the time when he began to have those over whom he could exercise power; and in this way he will appear to have received a certain increase and to have come from a lower to a higher state, since it is not doubted that it is better for him to be

51 What follows can be compared to the account given by Methodius of Olympus (in a work entitled ἐν τοῖς γενήσισιν, ‘On creatures’), as preserved by Photius Bibl. cod. 235 (ed. Henry 5, 302a30–302b4): ‘Origen, whom he calls the Centaur, said that the universe is co-eternal with the only wise and independent God. For he says, if there is neither a workman without products, nor maker without things made, neither is there an Almighty without those under his power (for the workman must be so called from the products, and the maker from the things made, and the Almighty from those things under his power); it is necessary, then, that it is from the beginning that these things were made by God, and that there was no time in which they did not exist. For if there was a time when the things made did not exist, then, as there were no made things, so there was no maker; you see what sort of impiety follows. Rather the unchangeable and unalterable God will undergo alteration and transition; for if he made the universe later, it is clear that he transitioned from not making to making. But this is absurd, given what has been said. It is not possible, therefore, to say that the universe is not beginningless and co-eternal with God.’ Note, however, that the argument of Princ. 1.2.10 is that the title ‘Father’ is ‘older’ than ‘Almighty’, for it is in Wisdom and by the Word that God has made all things; and that the subjection of all things to God, by virtue of which he is ‘Almighty’, is not exercised through force, but through Wisdom, for it is at the name of Jesus, the crucified and exalted Lord, that all knees bow. The implications of this for Origen’s understanding of creation, and its ‘eternity’, are explored in the Introduction, sections 3 and 5.
melius esse non dubitatur, esse eum omnipotentem quam non esse. Et quomodo non uidetur absurdum, ut cum non haberet aliquid ex his deus, quae eum habere dignum erat, postmodum per profectum quendam in hoc uenerit ut haberet. Quodsi numquam est quando non omnipotens fuerit, necessario subsistere oportet etiam ea, per quae omnipotens dicitur, et semper habuerit in quibus exercuerit potentatum et quae fuerint ab ipso uel regre uel principe moderata; de quibus plenius in locis propriis, in quibus de creaturis eius disputandum fuerit, disseremus.

Sed et nunc strictim licet, tamen admonere necessarium puto, quoniam quidem quaestio nobis de sapientia agitatur, quemadmodum ἡ ἀπόρροια (vel manatio) sit sapientia gloriae omnipotentis purissima, ne uidetur alicui anterior esse in deo omnipotenti appellatio natuitate sapientiae, per quam pater uocatur, quoniam dicta est ἡ ἀπόρροια omnipotentis gloriae purissima esse sapientia, quae est filius dei. Audiat qui haec ita uult suspicari quod manifeste scriptura pronuntiat dicens quia Omnia in sapientia fecisti, et euangelium ex hoc quia non potest antiquius esse in deo omnipotentis appellatio quam patris; per filium etenim omnipotens est pater.

Sed quoniam gloriam dixit esse omnipotentis, cuius gloriae ἡ ἀπόρροια est sapientia, hoc intellegi datur, quod etiam in omnipotentiae gloria societatem habeat sapientia, per quam deus omnipotens dicitur. Per sapientiam enim, qui est Christus, tenet deus omnium potentatum, non solum dominantis auctoritate, uerum etiam subiectorum spontaneo famulatu. Vt autem unam eademque omnipotentiam patris ac filii esse cognoscas, sicut unus atque idem est cum patre deus et dominus, audi hoc modo lohannem in Apocalypsi dicentem: Haec dicit dominus deus, qui est et qui erat et qui venturus est omnipotens. Qui enim venturus est, quis est alius nisi Christus? Et sicut nemo debet offendi, cum deus sit pater, quod etiam salvator deus est: ita et cum

1.2.10, lines 240–6

Justinian, Ep. ad Menam (ed. Schwartz, 210.21–4), Koetschau Frag. 5:

Πῶς δὲ οὖκ ἀτοπον τὸ μὴ ἐχοντά τι τῶν πρεπόντων αὐτῷ τῶν θεόν εἰς τὸ ἔχειν ἐληλυθέναι; εἰ δὲ οὖκ ἔστιν οτε παντοκράτωρ οὐκ ἦν, ἀεὶ ἐγὼ δεὶ ταῦτα δι᾿ αὐτοκράτωρ ἐστίν καὶ ἀεὶ ἦν ὑπ᾿ αὐτοῦ κρατουμένα ἄρχοντι αὐτῷ χρήμαμεν.

almighty than not to be so. And how would it not seem absurd that God, not having something of those things fitting for him to have, should afterwards, by a kind of progress, come to have it? But if there never is a 'when' when he was not almighty, by necessity those things must also subsist by which he is called the Almighty, and he must always have had those over whom he exercised power and which were governed by him as king or prince; of which we shall speak more fully in the proper place, when we come to discuss the subject of his creatures.

But even now, although briefly, I think it necessary to give a warning, since the question before us concerning Wisdom is how Wisdom is the ἀπόρροια (or the emanation) of the purest glory of the Almighty, lest anyone should consider that the title of Almighty is anterior in God to the birth of Wisdom, through whom he is called Father, since it is said that Wisdom, who is the Son of God, is the emanation of the purest glory of the Almighty. Let him who would think like this hear what the Scriptures clearly proclaim, saying, In Wisdom have you made all things, and the Gospel teaches, that All things were made by him and without him nothing was made, and let him understand from this that the title of Almighty cannot be older in God than that of Father, for it is through the Son that the Father is almighty.

But since it says that the glory is of the Almighty, of which glory Wisdom is the emanation, this is given to be understood, that Wisdom, through which God is called Almighty, has a share even in the glory of omnipotence. For through Wisdom, who is Christ, God holds power over all things, not only by the authority of having dominion, but also the voluntary obedience of his subjects. And that you may understand that the omnipotence of the Father and the Son is one and the same, just as God and the Lord are one and the same with the Father, listen to the way in which John speaks in the Apocalypse: These things says the Lord God, who is and who was and who is to come, the Almighty.

For he who is to come, who else is that than Christ? And just as no one ought to be offended that, while the Father is God, the Saviour also is God, so also,
omnipotens dicitur pater, nullus debet offendi, quod etiam filius dei omnipotens dicitur.

Hoc namque modo uerum erit illud, quod ipse dicit ad patrem quia Omnia mea tua sunt et tua mea, et glorificatus sum in eis. Si uero omnia quae patris sunt, Christi sunt, inter omnia uero quae est pater, est etiam omnipotens, sine dubio etiam unigenitus filius esse debet omnipotens, ut omnia quae habet pater etiam filius habeat. Et glorificatus sum, inquit, in eis. In nomine enim Iesu omne genu flectetur caelestium et terrestrium et infernorum, et omnis lingua confitebitur quoniam dominus lesus in gloria dei patris. Igitur ἀπόρροια gloriae dei secundum hoc, quod omnipotens est, pura ac limpida ipsa sapientia est dei, glorificata tamquam ἀπόρροια omnipotentiae uel gloriae.

Vt autem manifestius intellegatur, quae sit gloria omnipotentiae, etiam haec addimus. Deus pater omnipotens est eo quod potentatum omnium tenet, id est caeli et terrae, solis et lunae et stellarum et omnium quae in ipsis sunt. Horum autem potentatum gerit per uerbum suum, quoniam In nomine lesu omne genu flectitur caelestium et terrestrium et infernorum. Et si omne genu flectitur lesu, sine dubio Iesus est, cui subjecta sunt omnia, et ipse est qui potentatum agit in omnibus, et per quem subjecta sunt patri omnia; per sapientiam namque, id est uerbo ac ratione, non ui ac necessitate, subjecta sunt. Et ideo in eo ipso, quo obtinet omnia, gloria sua est; et haec est omnipotentiae purissima ac limpidissima gloria, cum ratione et sapientia, non ui ac necessitate, cuncta subjecta sunt. Purissima uero ac limpidissima gloria sapientiae satis conuenienter dictum est ad distinctionem eius gloriae, quae non pure nec sincere gloria dicitur.

Omnis enim natura, quae conuertibilis est et commutabilis, etiamsi glorificetur in operibus iustitiae uel sapientiae, per hoc ipsum quod accidentem habet iustitiam uel sapientiam, et quod accidit etiam decidere potest, gloria eius sincera dici ac limpida non potest. Sapientia uero dei, qui est unigenitus filius eius, quoniam in omnibus inconuertibilis est et incommutabilis, et substantiale in eo omne bonum est, quod utique mutari aut conuerti numquam potest, idcirco pura eius ac sincera gloria praedicatur.
since the Father is called *Almighty*, no one ought to be offended that the Son of God is also called *Almighty*.

For in this way will that saying be true, which he himself says to the Father, *All mine are yours and yours mine, and I am glorified in them.* Now, if all things which are the Father's are also Christ's, and, among all that the Father is, he is also *Almighty*, then without doubt the only-begotten Son ought to be *Almighty*, so that the Son might have all that the Father has. *And I am glorified, he says, in them. For, at the name of Jesus every knee shall bow, of things in heaven, and things on earth, and things under the earth, and every tongue shall confess that Jesus is Lord in the glory of God the Father.* So, in this way is God's Wisdom herself the pure and clear emanation of the glory of God, in respect of his being *Almighty*, glorified as the emanation of omnipotence or of glory.

And we add this, so that it may be more clearly understood what the glory of omnipotence is. The God and Father is *Almighty* because he has power over all things, that is, over heaven and earth, sun and moon, and all things in them. And he exercises power over them through his Word, for *at the name of Jesus every knee bows, of things in heaven, and things on earth, and things under the earth. And, if every knee bows to Jesus, then, without doubt, it is Jesus to whom all things have been subjected,* and he it is who exercised power over all things, and through whom *all things have been subjected to the Father,* for it is through Wisdom, that is by Word and Reason, not by force and necessity, that they have been subjected. And therefore his glory is in the very fact that he possesses all things, and this is the *purest and most clear glory of omnipotence,* that by Reason and Wisdom, not by force and necessity, all things have been subjected. Now the *purest and most clear glory of Wisdom is a convenient designation to distinguish it from that glory which is not called pure or genuine.*

Every being that is alterable and changeable, although it may be glorified in works of righteousness or wisdom, because it has righteousness or wisdom as accidents, and because what is accidental can also fall away, its glory cannot be called genuine and pure. But since the Wisdom of God, who is his only-begotten Son, is in all respects unalterable and unchangeable, and every good quality is in him essentially, such that it can never be changed or altered, therefore his glory is declared to be pure and genuine.

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57 John 17:10. 58 Phil. 2:10–11. 59 Cf. 1 Cor. 15:27–8.
1.2.11. Tertio dicitur sapientia esse splendor lucis aeternae; cuius rei uirtutem iam in praecedentibus exposuimus, cum solis similitudinem et radiorum eius splendorem introduximus et pro uribus nostris ostendimus, quomodo hoc debet intellegi. Addemus tamen etiam hoc unum. Sempiternum uel aeternum proprie dicitur quod neque initiun ut esset habuit, neque cessare umquam potest esse quod est. Hoc autem designatur apud Ioannahem, cum dicit quoniam *Deus lux est. Splendor* autem lucis eius sapientia sua est, non solum secundum quod lux est, sed et secundum id, quod sempiterna lux est, ita ut aeternus et aeternitatis splendor sit sapientia sua. Quod si integre intellegatur, manifeste declarat quia subsistencia filii ab ipso patre descendit, sed non temporaliter neque ab ullo alio initio nisi, ut diximus, ab ipso deo.

1.2.12. Sed et *speculum immaculatum évεpγειας* (id est *inoperationis*) dei esse sapientia nominatur. Ergo *inoperatio* uirtutis dei quae sit, prius intellegenda est; quae est uigor quidam, ut ita dixerim, per quem inoperatur pater, uel cum creat uel cum prouidet uel cum iudicat uel cum singula quaeque in tempore suo disponit atque dispensat. Sicut ergo in speculo omnibus motibus atque omnibus actibus, quibus is qui speculum intuetur mouetur uel agit, isdem ipsis etiam ea imago, quae per speculum deformatur, actibus et motibus commouetur uel agit, in nullo prorsus declinans: ita et dominus Iesus Christus, qui est sapientia dei, de semet ipso pronuntiat dicens quia *Opera quae facit pater, haec etiam filius facit similiter*. Et iterum dicit quoniam *Non potest a se filius facere quicquam, nisi quod uiderit patrem facientem.*

Quoniam ergo in nullo prorsus filius a patre uiurture operum inmutatur ac differt, nec aliud est opus filii quam patris, sed unus atque idem, ut ita dicam, etiam motus in omnibus est: idcirco *speculum eum immaculatum* nominavit, ut per hoc nulla omnino dissimilitudo filii intellegatur ad patrem. Ea sane quae secundum similitudinem uel imitationem discipuli ad magistrum a quibusdam dicta sunt, uel quod in materia corporali ea a filio fierint deformati, conuenire quomodo possunt, cum in evangeliio filius dicatur non similia facere, sed eadem *similiter* facere?
1.2.11. In the third place, Wisdom is said to be the *splendour of eternal light*; the force of this expression we have explained in the preceding pages, when we introduced the illustration of the sun and the splendour of its rays, and showed, to the best of our power, how this should be understood. We shall add, however, this one point. That which neither had a beginning of existence, nor can ever cease to be what it is, is properly called everlasting or eternal. And this is pointed out by John when he says, *God is light.* Now his Wisdom is the *splendour* of that light, not only in respect of its being light, but also in respect of its being everlasting light, so that his Wisdom is eternal and everlasting splendour. If this be fully understood, it clearly shows that the subsistence of the Son derives from the Father himself, yet not temporally nor from any other beginning except, as we have said, from God himself.

1.2.12. But Wisdom is also termed the *flawless mirror* of the ἐνέργεια (that is, the working) of God. It must first be understood, then, what the *working* of the power of God is. It is a kind of strength, if we may speak thus, by which the Father works, either when he creates or when he acts in providence, or judges, or when he arranges and orders individual things, each in its own time. For as in a mirror the image formed in the mirror moves along or acts with all the same motions and actions with which the one who looks into the mirror moves or acts, and deviates from them in absolutely nothing, even so Wisdom is to be understood concerning herself, when she names herself the *flawless mirror* of the paternal power and working; just as the Lord Jesus Christ, who is the Wisdom of God, declares about himself when he says, *The works which the Father does, these the Son does likewise.* And again he says, *the Son can do nothing of himself except what he sees the Father doing.*

As, then, the Son in no respect is separated or differs from the Father in the power of his works, nor is the work of the Son anything other than the Father's, but one and the same movement, so to speak, is in all things, he therefore called him a *flawless mirror*, that by this expression it might be understood that there is no dissimilarity whatsoever between the Son and the Father. How, indeed, are the things done by a pupil, in likeness and imitation of the teacher, as some have said, to be compared to [the idea] that those things are made by the Son in bodily matter which were first formed by the Father in a spiritual substance, when in the Gospel the Son is said to do not similar things, but the same things likewise?

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60 1 John 1:5.  
61 John 5:19.  
62 Ibid.  
63 Cf. Origen, *Princ.* 1.2.6; *Comm.* Jo. 13.228–34; *Cels.* 8.12; *Hom.* Lev. 13.4.
1.2.13. Superest quid sit imago bonitatis eius inquirere. In quo eadem, ut opinor, intellegi conuenit, quae superius de imagine ea, quae per speculum deformatur, expressimus. Principalis namque bonitas sine dubio pater est; ex qua filius natus, qui per omnia imago est patris, procul dubio etiam bonitatis eius conueniunt, imago dicetur. Non enim alia aliqua secunda bonitas existit in filio praeter eam, quae est in patre. Vnde et recte ipsa salvator in euangelio dicit quoniam Nemo bonus nisi unus deus pater, quo scilicet per hoc intellegatur filius non esse alterius bonitatis, sed illius solius, quae in patre est; cuius recte imago appellatur, quia neque aliunde est nisi ex ipsa principali bonitate, ne altera bonitas quam ea quae in patre est uideatur in filio, neque aliqua dissimilitudo aut distantia bonitatis in filio est. Propter quod non debet ulul blasphemiae aliquod genus putari in eo quod dictum est quia Nemo bonus nisi unus deus pater, ut propterea putetur uel Christus uel spiritus sanctus negari quod bonus sit; sed, ut superius diximus, principalis bonitas in deo patre sentienda est, ex quo uel filius natus uel spiritus sanctus procedens sine dubio bonitatis eius naturam in se refert, quae est in eo fonte, de quo uel natus est filius uel procedit spiritus sanctus. Iam uero si qua alia bona in scripturis dicitur, uel angelus uel homo uel seruus uel thesaurus uel cor bonum uel arbor bona, haec omnia abusiue dicuntur, accidentem, non substantialem in se continentia bonitatem.

1.2.13. It remains to inquire what the image of his goodness is. In this, I think, the same thing must be understood as we expressed above in regard to the image formed by the mirror. For the Father is, without doubt, the primal goodness, from which the Son is born, who, being in every respect the image of the Father, may doubtless be properly called the image of his goodness.\(^{64}\) For there is no other second goodness existing in the Son, besides that which is in the Father. And therefore the Saviour himself rightly says in the Gospel, No one is good but one, the God and Father,\(^{65}\) that by this it may be understood that the Son is not of some other goodness, but of that only which is in the Father, of whom he is rightly called the image, because neither is he of any other source but from that primal goodness, so that there is not seen in the Son another goodness than that which is in the Father, nor is there any dissimilarity or difference of goodness in the Son. And therefore it is not to be imagined that there is some kind of blasphemy, as it were, in the words, No one is good but one, the God and Father, as if, on that account, it be supposed to be denied that either Christ or the Holy Spirit is good; but, as we have said above, the primal goodness is recognized in the God and Father, from whom both the Son, being begotten, and the Holy Spirit, proceeding,\(^{66}\) without doubt draw into themselves the nature of that goodness, which exists in the source, from whom the Son is born and the Spirit proceeds. But if there are any other things called good in the Scriptures, whether angel, or human, or servant, or treasure, or a good heart, or a good tree, all these are called thus inexacty, having in them an accidental, not an essential, goodness.

But it would be a large undertaking, for another work and another time, to collect all the titles of the Son of God, for example, how he is the true light,\(^{67}\) or the door,\(^{68}\) or the righteousness, or the sanctification, or the redemption,\(^{69}\) and numerous others, and to explain for what reasons, either pertaining to powers or virtues, he is termed each one of these.\(^{70}\) But, content with those we have advanced above, let us now examine the remaining points in order.

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\(^{64}\) Koetschau and Fernandez insert here, as Fragment 6, a passage from Justinian, Ep. ad Menam (ed. Schwartz, 210.1–6), said to come from Princ. 1; the text is included in Appendix I as item no. 4.

\(^{65}\) Matt. 19:17; Mark 10:18; Luke 18:19. Origen adds the word '[and] Father'.

\(^{66}\) It is perhaps, as Crouzel and Simonetti suggest, Rufinus who adds the term 'proceeding', for Origen does not appeal to this word or John 15:26 in his chapters on the Holy Spirit.

\(^{67}\) John 1:9.

\(^{68}\) John 10:7, 9.

\(^{69}\) 1 Cor. 1:30.

\(^{70}\) See esp. Origen, Comm. Jo. 1.125–288; the first books of Origen's Commentary on John were written in Alexandria, probably soon after Princ.
De spiritu sancto

1.3.1. Consequens igitur est nunc, ut de spiritu sancto quam possumus breuiter requiramus. Et omnes quidem, qui quoquomodo prouidentiam esse sentiunt, deum esse ingenitum, qui uniuersa creauit atque disposuit, confitentur eumque parentem uniuersitatis agnoscant. Huic tamen esse filium non nos soli pronuntiamus, quamuis satis hoc et mirum et incredulum uideatur his, qui apud Graecos uel barbaros philosophari uidentur; tamen a nonnullis etiam ipsorum habita eius uidentur opinio, cum uerbo dei uel ratione creata esse omnia confitentur. Nos uero secundum fidem doctrinae eius, quam diuinitus adspiratam pro certo habemus, eminentiorem diuinoremque rationem de filio dei nullius alterius possibilitatis esse credimus exponere atque in hominum cognitionem proferre, nisi eius solius scripturae, quae a sancto spiritu inspirata est, id est euangelicae atque apostolicae nec non legis ac prophetarum, sicut ipse Christus asseruit. De subsistentia uero spiritus sancti ne suspicione

1.3.2. De spiritu vero sancto quia sit, multae nos scripturae docuerunt, sicut Dauid in quinquagesimo psalmo dicit: Et spiritum sanctum tuum ne auferas a me, et in Danihelio dicitur: Spiritus sanctus, qui est in te. In nouo uero
The Holy Spirit

1.3.1. Following on, then, we must now investigate as briefly as we are able the subject of the Holy Spirit. All who perceive, in whatever way, the existence of providence, confess that God, who created and arranged all things, is unbegotten and confess him as the Father of the universe. That he has a Son is not only declared by us; although this may seem sufficiently strange and incredible to those considered philosophers among the Greeks and barbarians, yet the belief in him seems to have been held by some even of them, in their acknowledging that all things were created by the word or reason of God.

We, however, by faith in that teaching which we hold for certain to be divinely inspired, believe that it is possible in no other way to explain and to bring to human knowledge a higher and more divine teaching regarding the Son than by means of those Scriptures alone which were inspired by the Holy Spirit, that is, the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures and also, according to the statement of Christ himself, those of the law and the prophets. But of the subsistence of the Holy Spirit, no one could have even a suspicion, except those who were familiar with the law and the prophets, or those who profess a belief in Christ. For although no one is able to speak worthily of God the Father, it is nevertheless possible to gain some notion of him from the fact of the visible creation and from those things which the human mind naturally perceives; and it is possible, moreover, for this to be confirmed from the holy Scriptures. But regarding the Son of God, although no one knows the Son except the Father, however it is again from the holy Scriptures that the human mind is taught how it ought to think of him too; not only from the New, but also from the Old Testament, through those things which, though done by the saints, are figuratively referred to Christ, and from which it is possible to perceive both his divine nature and also the human nature assumed by him.

1.3.2. Many passages of the Scriptures have taught us that there is the Holy Spirit, as when David, in the fiftieth Psalm, says And take not your Holy Spirit from me; and in Daniel, where it is said, The Holy Spirit which is in you. And

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1 For the description of God as 'father of the universe', see above, Princ. 1.1.6, and the material cited in n.22 there.
2 Cf. Plato, Ep. 2.312e–313a, cited in Origen, Cels. 6.18, and Plato Ep. 6.323d cited in Cels 6.8. See also Plato, Tim. 34b, alluded to by Justin Martyr, 1 Apol. 60.
4 Cf. Origen, Comm. Rom. 1.16; Comm. Cant. 3 (GCS 8, p.208); Hom. Lev. 5.1; Sel. Ex. 12:43–4 (PG 12, 285d).
5 E.g. Wis. 13:1–9, esp. v. 5; Rom. 1:20. 
6 Matt. 11:27.
7 Ps. 50:13.
8 Dan. 4:6(9) Θ.
testamento abundantibus testimonii edocemur, cum spiritus sanctus super Christum descendisse perscribitur, et cum ipse dominus insufflauit in apostolos post resurrectionem, dicens: Accipite spiritum sanctum, et ad Mariam dicitur ab angelo: Spiritus sanctus ueniet super te; Paulus uero docet quia Nemo potest dicere dominum iesen nisi in spiritu sancto; et in Actibus apostolorum per inpositionem manuum apostolicarum spiritus sanctus dabatur in baptismo. Ex quibus omnibus didicimus tantae esse et auctoritatis et dignitatis substantiam spiritus sancti, ut salutare baptismum non aliter nisi excellentissimae omnium trinitatis auctoritate, id est patris et filii et spiritus sancti cognominatione compleatur, et ingenito deo patri et unigenito eius filio nomen quoque sancti spiritus copuletur. Quis ergo non obstupescat, quanta maiestas sit spiritus sancti, cum eum qui dixerit uerbum in filium hominis audiat sperare ueniam posse, eum uero qui in spiritum sanctum blasphemauerit, ueniam non habere neque in praesenti saeculo neque in futuro?

1.3.3. Quod autem a deo uniuersa creata sint, nec sit ulla substantia, quae non ab eo hoc ipsum ut esset acceperit, ex multis totius scripturae adsertionibus conprobatur, repudiatis atque depulsis his, quae a quibusdam falsa perhibentur, uel de materia deo coaeterna uel de ingenitis animabus, quibus non tam subsistendi naturam quam uitae qualitatem atque ordinem a deo insitum volunt. Nam et in eo libello qui Pastoris dicitur, angelii paenitentiae, quem Hermas conscrispsit, ita refertur: Primo omnium crede quia unus est deus, qui omnia creauit atque componuit; qui cum nihil esset praeus, esse fecit omnia; qui est omnia capiens, ipse uero a nemine capitur. Sed et in Enoch libro his similia describuntur. Verum tamen usque ad praesens nullum sermonem in scripturis sanctis inuenire potuimus, per quem spiritus sanctus factura esse vel creatur diceretur, ne eo quidem modo quo de sapientia referre Salomonem supra edocuimus, uel quae de uita uel uerbo aliisque appellatibus filii
in the New Testament we are taught by abundant testimonies, as when the Holy Spirit is related to have descended upon Christ, and when the Lord himself breathed upon the apostles after the resurrection, saying, Receive the Holy Spirit, and to Mary it is said by the angel, The Holy Spirit shall come upon you, and Paul teaches that No one can say that Jesus is the Lord except in the Holy Spirit, and, in the Acts of the Apostles, through the laying on of the apostles' hands the Holy Spirit was given in baptism. From all of which we learn that the substance of the Holy Spirit was of such authority and dignity that saving baptism is not complete except by the authority of the most excellent of all, the Trinity, that is, by the naming of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and that the name of the Holy Spirit is also joined to the unbegotten God the Father and to his only-begotten Son. Who, then, is not amazed at the greatness of the majesty of the Holy Spirit, when he hears that he who shall speak a word against the Son of man may hope for forgiveness, but he who shall blaspheme the Holy Spirit shall have no forgiveness, neither in the present world nor in that to come?

1.3.3. That all things were created by God and that there is no being that exists which has not received its existence from him is established from many declarations throughout the whole of Scripture, while those claims falsely advanced by some regarding matter coeternal with God or unbegotten souls, in which they would have it that God implanted not so much existence but quality and order of life, are refuted and rejected. For even in that little book called The Shepherd or The Angel of Repentance, composed by Hermas, it is thus written: 'First of all, believe that there is one God who has created and arranged all things; who, when nothing existed before, caused all things to be; and who contains all things, but himself is contained by none.' And in the book of Enoch similar things are transcribed. But up to the present time we have been able to find no passage in the holy Scriptures in which the Holy Spirit is said to be made or created, not even in the way that we have shown above that Solomon speaks of Wisdom, or the way in which expressions such as Life or Word or the other titles of the Son of God, which we have treated, are

13 Acts 8:18. 14 The Greek word τριάς is found in Origen, Comm. Jo. 6.166; 10.270; Comm. Matt. 15.31; Fr. Jo. 20 and 36 (GCS 4, pp. 500, 512).
17 Hermas, Mand. 1.1, cited also in Origen, Princ. 1.Pr.4.
18 Enoch is cited by Origen in Princ. 4.4.8; Hom. Num. 28.2; Comm. Jo. 6.217; and Cels. 5.55, where he states that it is not generally held to be divine by the churches.
19 That Rufinus has faithfully rendered Origen at this point is demonstrated by Rufinus, Adult. 1 and Jerome, Ruf. 2.15; in Comm. Jo. 2.73, Origen, on the basis of John 1:3, calls the Spirit γεννητόν. See above, Princ. Pr.4, n.15.
dei intellegenda esse tractauimus. Spiritus igitur dei, qui super aquas ferebatur, sicut scriptum est, in principio facturae mundi, puto quod non sit alius quam spiritus sanctus, secundum quod ego intellegere possum, sicut et cum ipsa loca exponeremus, ostendimus, non tamen secundum historiam, sed secundum intellegentiam spiritalem.

1.3.4. Quidam sane ex praecessoribus nostris in nouo testamento obseruarunt quod, sicubi spiritus nominatur sine adiectione ea, quae designet qualis sit spiritus, de sancto spiritu deberet intellegi, ut puta: Fructus autem spiritus est caritas, gaudium, pax et cetera. Item et ibi: Cum coeperitis spiritu, nunc carne perficimini? Nos uero etiam in ueteri testamento putamus distinctionem istam posse seruari, sicut cum dicit: Qui dat spiritum populo, qui est super terram, et spiritum his, qui calculant eam. Sine dubio enim omnis qui calcul terram, id est terrena et corporalia, particeps est spiritus sancti, a deo eum accipiens. Dicebat autem et Hebraeus magister quod duo illa Seraphin, quae in Esaia senis alis describuntur clamantium adimum eam dicentia: Sanctus sanctus sanctus dominus Sabaoth, de unigenito filio dei et de spiritu sancto esset intellegendum. Nos uero putamus etiam illud, quod in cantico Ambacum dictum est: In medio duorum animalium (uel duarum uitarum) cognosceris, de Christo et de spiritu sancto sentiri debere. Omnis enim scientia de patre, reuelante filio in spiritu sancto cognoscitur, ut ambo haec, quae secundum

1.3.4, lines 68–73

Justinian, Ep. ad Menam (ed. Schwartz, 210.10–14), Koetschau Frag. 8:

60 obseruauerunt jan 62 spiritu sancto B γ jan Sim Fern debeat β Koe Sim Fern : debetur μ : debit σ 63–4 nunc carne perficimini : carne consummamini jan 68 ante dicebat add. titulum: de seraphin β 68–75 dicebat ... existant om. jan 71 essent intellegenda Merl Del Koe abbacum G* M abbacuc C G*
to be understood. The Spirit of God, therefore, who moved upon the waters, as it is written, in the beginning of the creation of the world, I think to be none other than the Holy Spirit, so far as I am able to understand; just as, indeed, we have shown in our exposition of the passages themselves, not according to the narrative, but according to the spiritual understanding.

1.3.4. Some of our predecessors have observed that in the New Testament, whenever the Spirit is named without that adjective, which designates the quality of the Spirit, the Holy Spirit is to be understood, as, for instance, Now the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, and the rest. And again here, Having begun in the Spirit, are you now concluding in the flesh? We, however, think that this distinction may also be preserved in the Old Testament, as when it says, Who gives Spirit to the people who are upon the earth and Spirit to those who walk on it. For, without doubt, everyone who walks upon the earth, that is terrestrial and bodily things, participates also in the Holy Spirit, receiving it from God. And my Hebrew master used to say that those two seraphim, which are described in Isaiah as six-winged, crying one to another, and saying, Holy, holy, holy, Lord of Sabbaoth, were to be understood of the only-begotten Son of God and of the Holy Spirit. And we think that that expression also, which is in the song of Habakkuk, In the midst of the two living creatures (or of the two lives), you will be known, ought to be understood of Christ and of the Holy Spirit. For all knowledge of the Father is acquired through the revelation of the Son in the Holy Spirit, so that both of these, who are called living beings

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20 Here Koetschau inserts, as Fragment 7, a sentence from Justinian, Ep. ad Menam (ed. Schwartz, 210.9–10); Fernandez would place this sentence in Princ. 1.2.6. It is included in Appendix II as item no. 5.
21 Gen. 1:2.
22 This work is no longer extant.
23 Gal. 5:22.
24 Gal. 3:3.
25 Isa. 42:5.
26 Given that Origen later (Princ. 1.3.5–8) holds that the Holy Spirit is given only to those who are thereby sanctified, it is probable that here Origen, following Isa. 42:5 LXX, made a distinction between breath (πνοή) and spirit (πνεῦμα), lost in Rufinus' translation of both terms by spiritus. Cf. Irenaeus, Haer. 5.12.2, commenting on the same passage of Isa.: 'thus telling us that breath is indeed given in common to all people upon earth, but that the Spirit is theirs alone who tread down earthly desires'.
27 Isa. 6:2–3.
28 This interpretation, again attributed to his Hebrew teacher, in Princ. 4.3.14, and Hom. Isa. 1.2: 4.1. According to Rufinus (Apol. Hier. 2.31, 50), Jerome inserted a statement ('Let no one think that there is a difference of nature in the Trinity when the offices of the persons are distinguished) when translating Origen's Homilies on Isaiah. This interpretation, of Jewish-Christian background (its origin is not identifiable), became a routine point of objection against Origen. See Jerome, Epp. 18A.7 (not mentioning Origen); 61.2; 84.3; the comments of Antipater of Bostra, apud John of Damascus, Sacra Parallela (PG 96, 505); and Justinian, Ep. ad Menam (ed. Schwartz, 210.7–14).
29 Hab. 3:1.
prophetam uel animantia uel uitae dicuntur, causa scientiae dei patris existant. Sicut enim de filio dicitur quia Nemo nouit patrem nisi filius et cui uoluerit filius reuelare, haec eadem etiam de spiritu sancto dicit apostolus, cum ait: Nobis autem deus per spiritum suum; spiritus enim omnia scrutatur, etiam alma dei. Sed et rursus in euangelio de diuinis ac profundioribus doctrinis commemorans salvator quae nondum caperant discipuli sui, ita ait ad apostolos: Adhuc multa habeo quae uobis dicam, sed non potestis illa modo capere; cum autem uenerit paracletus spiritus sanctus, qui ex patre procedit, ille uos docebit omnia, et commonebit uos omnia, quae dixi uobis. Et ita sentiendum est quod sicut filius, qui solus cognoscit patrem, reuelat cui uult, ita et spiritus sanctus, qui solus scrutatur etiam alma dei, reuelat deum cui uult. Spiritus enim ubi uult spirat.

Neque enim putandum est quod etiam spiritus filio reuelante cognoscit. Si enim reuelante filio cognoscit patrem spiritus sanctus, ergo ex ignorantia ad scientiam uenit; quod utique et impium pariter et stultum est, sanctum spiritum confiteri et ignorantiam ei adscribere. Non enim cum aliiq aliquid esset antea quam spiritus sanctus, per professum uenit in hoc, ut esset spiritus sanctus; ut quis adeat dicere quia tunc quidem, cum nondum esset spiritus sanctus, ignorabat patrem, postea uero quam receptit scientiam, etiam spiritus sanctus effectus est; quod si esset, numquam utique in unitatem trinitatis, id est dei inuertibilis et filii eius, etiam ipse spiritus sanctus haberetur, nisi quia et ipse semper erat spiritus sanctus. Hoc sane quod dicimus, uel semper uel erat uel si quod aliiq tale temporalis significationis nomen adsciscimus, simpliciter et cum uenia accipienda est, quoniam nominum quidem horum significatio temporaliter nominavit, et natura autem in omnem trinitatis sensus temporalis excidit.

1.3.5. Rectum tamen uidetur inquirere quid causae sit, quod qui regeneratur per deum in salutem opus habet et patre et filio et spirito sancto, non percepturus salutem, nisi sit integra trinitas; nec possibile sit participem fieri patris uel filii uel animantia uel uitae dicuntur, causa scientiae dei patris existant. Sicut enim de filio dicitur quia Nemo nouit patrem nisi filius et cui uoluerit filius reuelare, haec eadem etiam de spiritu sancto dicit apostolus, cum ait: Nobis autem deus per spiritum suum; spiritus enim omnia scrutatur, etiam alma dei. Sed et rursus in euangelio de diuinis ac profundioribus doctrinis commemorans salvator quae nondum caperant discipuli sui, ita ait ad apostolos: Adhuc multa habeo quae uobis dicam, sed non potestis illa modo capere; cum autem uenerit paracletus spiritus sanctus, qui ex patre procedit, ille uos docebit omnia, et commonebit uos omnia, quae dixi uobis. Et ita sentiendum est quod sicut filius, qui solus cognoscit patrem, reuelat cui uult, ita et spiritus sanctus, qui solus scrutatur etiam alma dei, reuelat deum cui uult. Spiritus enim ubi uult spirat.

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or lives by the prophet, exist as the cause of the knowledge of God the Father. For as it is said of the Son, that no one knows the Father except the Son, and he to whom the Son chooses to reveal him, the same again does the Apostle say of the Holy Spirit, when he states, God has revealed to us by his Spirit, for the Spirit searches out everything, even the deep things of God. And again in the Gospel, when the Saviour, mentioning the divine and profounder teachings, which his disciples were not yet able to receive, spoke thus to the apostles: I have yet many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now; when the Comforter, the Holy Spirit is come, who proceeds from the Father, he will teach you all things, and will bring to your remembrance all things that I have said to you. And one must understand, therefore, that as the Son, who alone knows the Father, reveals him to whom he will, so the Holy Spirit, who alone searches even the deep things of God, reveals God to whom he will. For the Spirit breathes where it wills.

It is not to be supposed, however, that the Spirit also knows through the Son's revelation. For if the Holy Spirit knows the Father through the Son's revelation, he passes from ignorance to knowledge; and it is both equally impious and foolish to confess the Holy Spirit and yet to ascribe ignorance to him. For even if something else existed before the Holy Spirit, it was not by progression that he came to be the Holy Spirit, as if someone should dare to say that at the time when he was not yet the Holy Spirit he was ignorant of the Father, but that after he had received knowledge, he became the Holy Spirit; for if this were the case, the Holy Spirit would never have himself been in the unity of the Trinity, that is, along with God, the unchangeable Father, and his Son, unless he had always been the Holy Spirit. To be sure, when we speak these words, such as 'always' or 'was' or adopt any similar word with temporal significance, they are to be taken simply and with due allowance, since the significations of these terms are temporal, but the things of which we speak, though spoken of by a stretch of language in a temporal mode, yet surpass in their nature every idea of a sense of time.

1.3.5. Nevertheless it seems proper to inquire what is the reason why he who is born again by God unto salvation has need of both the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and will not obtain salvation apart from the entire Trinity, and why it is impossible to become a partaker of the Father or the Son without

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33 John 3:8.
34 Cf. Origen, Princ. 1.8.3; Hom. Num. 11.8. On the word 'Trinity' see above, n.14.
35 Cf. Princ. 4.4.1; Fr. Jo. 1 (GCS 4). 36 1 Pet. 1:3.
sine spiritu sancto. De quibus discutientes sine dubio necessarium erit ut operationem specialem spiritus sancti et specialem patris ac filii describamus. Arbitror igitur operationem quidem esse patris et filii tam in sanctis quam in peccatoribus, in hominibus rationabilibus et in mutis animalibus, sed et in his, quae sine anima sunt, et in omnibus omnino quae sunt; operationem uero spiritus sancti nequaquam prorsus incidere uel in ea, quae sine anima sunt, uel in ea, quae animantia quidem sed muta sunt, sed ne in illis quidem quinquiiri, qui rationables quidem sunt sed in malitia positi nec omnino ad meliora conuersi. In illis autem solis esse arbitror opus spiritus sancti, qui iam se ad meliora convuentur et per vias Christi Iesu incedunt, id est qui sunt in bonis actibus et in deo permanent.

1.3.6. Quia autem operatio patris et filii et in sanctis et in peccatoribus sit, manifestatur ex eo quod omnes, qui rationables sunt, uerbi dei, id est rationis, particeps sunt et per hoc uelut semina quaedam insita sibi gerunt sapientiae et iustitiae, quod est Christus. Ex eo autem, qui uere est, qui dixit per Moysen: 

Ego sum qui sum, omnia quae sunt participium trahunt; quae participatio dei peruenit in omnes tam iustos quam peccatores et rationables atque irrationables et in omnia omnino quae sunt. Ostendit sane et apostolus Paulus quod omnes habeant participium Christi dicens: Ne dixeris in corde tuo: quis ascendet in caelum? id est Christum deducere. Aut quis descendet in abyssum? id est Christum a mortuis revocare. Sed quid dicit scriptura? Prope te est uerbum ualde in ore tuo et in corde tuo. Ex quo in corde omnium esse significat Christum secundum id, quod urbe uel ratio est, cuius participio rationables sunt. Sed et illud, quod in euangelio dictum est: Nisi uenissem et locutus esset eis, peccatum non haberent; nunc autem excusationem non habent pro peccato suo his, qui rationem norunt, usque ad quod tempus peccatum homo non habeat et ex qua aetate obnoxii peccato sit, manifestum est et patet quomodo ex participatione uerbi uel rationis homines peccatum habere dicon: uidelicet ex quo intellectus atque scientiae capaces effecti, cum iam eis boni uel mali discretionem ratio intrinsecus inserta suggererit; et cum scire iam...
the Holy Spirit. In discussing these things it will undoubtedly be necessary to describe the working particular to the Holy Spirit, and that which is particular to the Father and the Son. I am of the opinion, then, that the working of the Father and of the Son takes place in both saints and sinners, in rational human beings and in dumb animals, and even in things which are without life, and in absolutely everything that exists; but that the working of the Holy Spirit does not at all extend into those things which are without life, or into those which though living yet are dumb; nor is it even found in those who, though rational, still lie in wickedness, not having converted to better things. In those alone, I think, who already turn to better things and walk in the ways of Jesus Christ, that is, who are engaged in good actions and abide in God, is there the work of the Holy Spirit.

1.3.6. That the working of the Father and the Son is both in saints and sinners is clear from this, that all who are rational beings are partakers of the Word of God, that is, Reason, and in this way, as it were, bear certain seeds, implanted within them, of Wisdom and Justice, which is Christ. And in him who truly exists, who said by Moses, I am who I am, all things that are have participation, which participation in the God and Father extends to all, the righteous and sinners, rational and irrational beings, and absolutely everything that exists. The Apostle Paul also certainly shows that all have participation in Christ, saying, Do not say in your heart, 'Who will ascend into heaven?', that is, to bring Christ down, or 'Who will descend into the abyss?', that is, to bring Christ up from the dead. But what does Scripture say? The Word is near you, on your lips and in your heart. By this he indicates that Christ is in the hearts of all in respect of his being the Word or Reason, participating in which they are rational beings. That saying also, in the Gospel, If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin, is clearly about those who have reached the age of reason, up to which time a human being does not have sin and from which age he is responsible for sin, and reveals how, by participation in the Word or Reason, human beings are said to have sin; evidently from the time they become capable of understanding and knowledge, when the reason implanted within them has suggested to them the difference between good and evil, and when they have already begun

37 Koetschau inserts here, as Fragment 9, a passage from Justinian, Ep. ad Menam (ed. Schwartz, 208.26–32); it is included in Appendix II as item no. 6.
38 1 John 5:19.
39 Cf. 1 Cor. 4:17.
coeperint quid sit malum, si faciunt illud, peccato efficiuntur obnoxii. Et hoc est quod dixit quia Excusationem non habent homines pro peccato suo, ex quo eis diuinus sermo uel ratio ostendere coeperit in corde discretionem boni ac mali, ut per hanc debeant refugere et cauere quod malum est, et quia Scienti bonum et non facienti inquit peccatum est illi. Item quod omnes homines non sunt extra communionem dei, hoc modo evangelium docet, dicente salutatore: Regnum dei cum observatione non uenit, neque dicent: ecce hic aut ibi; sed regnum dei intra uos est. Sed et illud uidendum est, ne forte eadem significet quod in Genesi scriptum est, cum ait: Et insufflauit in faciem eius spiramentum uitae, et factus est homo in animam uiuam. Quod si generaliter in omnes homines datum esse intellegitur, omnes homines habent participium dei; si uero hoc de spiritu dei dictum intellegendum est, quoniam et Adam prophetasse de nonnullis inuenitur, ergo iam non generaliter sed sanctis quibusque datum accipi potest.

1.3.7. Denique etiam diluuii tempore cum omnis caro corrupisset uiam dei, tamquam de indignis et peccatoribus scriptum est dixisse deum: Non permanebit spiritus meus in hominibus istis in aeternum, propter quod caro sunt. In quo manifeste ostenditur quod ab indignis quibusque aufertur spiritus dei. In psalmis quoque scribitur: Auferes spiritum eorum, et deficiet et in terram suam reuertentur. Emittes spiritum tuum, et creabuntur, et renouabis faciem terrae. Quod manifeste de sancto spiritu designatur, qui ablatis atque extinctis peccatoribus et indignis ipse sibi nouum populum creet et renouet faciem terrae, cum per gratiam spiritus deponentes ueterem hominem cum actibus suis, in nouitate uitae coeperint ambulare. Et ideo competenter de eo dicitur quia non in omnibus neque in his, qui caro sunt, sed in his, quorum terra renouata fuerit, spiritus sanctus habitabit. Denique idcirco per inpositionem manuum apostolorum post baptismi gratiam et renouationem sanctus spiritus tradebatur. Sed et saluator noster post resurrectionem, cum uetera iam transissent et facta fuissent omnia noua, nouus ipse homo et primogentus ex mortuis, renouatis quoque per fidem suae resurrectionis apostolis ait: Accipite spiritum sanctum. Hoc est nimium quod et ipse saluator dominus in euangelio designabat, cum uinum nouum in utres mitti posse ueteres denegabat, sed iuuebat utres fieri nouos, id est homines in nouitate
to know what evil is, if they do it they render themselves responsible for sin. And this is the meaning of the saying, that human beings have no excuse for their sin, that, from the time when the divine Word or reason has begun to show within the heart the difference between good and evil, they ought to avoid and guard against that which is evil; and also when it says, Whoever knows to do good, but does not do it, it is sin. Moreover, that all human beings are not without communion with God is taught in the Gospel in this way, with the Saviour saying, The kingdom is not coming with observation; neither will they say, 'Lo, here it is!' or 'There!', but the kingdom of God is within you. But we must also see whether perhaps the same thing is meant by what is written in Genesis, when it says, And he breathed into his face the breath of life, and the human being became a living soul. For if this is to be understood as applying generally to all human beings, then all human beings have a participation in God. But if it is understood as spoken of the Spirit of God, since Adam also is found to have prophesied some things, then it may be accepted as given not generally but to whoever is holy.

1.3.7. Finally, also, at the time of the flood, when all flesh had corrupted the way of God, it is written that God said, of the unworthy and sinners, My Spirit shall not abide with those human beings for ever, for they are flesh. In this it is clearly shown that the Spirit of God is taken away from whoever is unworthy. In the Psalms, also, it is written, You will take away their spirit, and they will die and return to the earth. You will send forth your Spirit, and they will be created and you will renew the face of the earth, which is clearly intended of the Holy Spirit, who, after sinners and the unworthy have been taken away and destroyed, creates for himself a new people and renews the face of the earth, when, through the grace of the Spirit, laying aside the old human being with his actions, they begin to walk in the newness of life. And therefore what is said fitly applies to the Holy Spirit, because he will not dwell in all, nor in those who are flesh, but in those whose earth has been renewed. Finally, for this reason the Holy Spirit was handed over through the laying-on of the apostles' hands after baptism. Our Saviour, also, after the resurrection, when the old things had passed away and all things had become new, being himself the new human being, and firstborn from the dead, his apostles also being renewed by faith in his resurrection, said, Receive the Holy Spirit. This is doubtless what the saving Lord himself meant in the Gospel, when he said that new wine cannot be put into old wineskins, and commanded that new wineskins be made, that

48 For Adam as a prophet, on the basis of Gen. 2:24 and Eph. 5:31–2, see Theophilus of Antioch, Autol. 2.28; Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 1.21.135; Origen, Comm. Cant. 2 (GCS 8, pp. 157–8).
49 Gen. 6:12. 50 Gen. 6:3. 51 Ps. 103:29–30. 52 Col. 3:9; Rom. 6:4.
53 Acts 8:18. 54 2 Cor. 5:17. 55 Eph. 2:15. 56 Col. 1:18.
uitae ambulare, ut uinum nouum, id est spiritus sancti gratiae susciperent nouitatem.

Hoc ergo pacto operatio uirtutis dei patris et filii indiscrete super omnem creaturam, spiritus uero sancti participationem a sanctis tantummodo haberí inuenímus. Propter quod dicitur: Nemo potest dicere dominum Iesum nisi in spirítu sancto. Et uix aliquando ipsi apostoli digni habentur audire: Accipietis uirtutem superueniente in uos spiritu sancto. Propter quod et consequens puto quia qui peccauerit quidem in filium hominis uenia dignus est pro eo quod is, qui uerbi uel rationis est particeps, si desinat rationabiliiter uiuere, uidetur in ignorantiam uel stultitiam decidisse et propter hoc ueniam promereri; qui autem iam dignus habitus est sancti spiritus participatione et retro fuerit conuersus, hic re ipsa et opere blasphemasse dicitur in spiritum sanctum.

Ne quis sane existimet nos ex eo quod diximus spiritum sanctum solis sanctis praestari, patris uero et filii beneficia uel inoperationes peruenire ad bonos et malos et iustos et iniustos, praetulisse per hoc patri et filio spiritum sanctum uel maiorem eius per hoc asserreré dignitatem; quod utique ualde inconsequens est. Proprietatem namque gratiae eius operisque descriptimus. Porro autem nihil in trinitate maius minusue dicendum est, cum unus deitatis fons uerbo ac ratione sua teneat uniuersa, spiritu uero oris sui quae digna sunt sanctificatione sanctificet, sicut in psalmo scriptum est: Verbo domini caeli firmati sunt, et spiritu oris eius omnis uirtus eorum. Est namque etiam dei patris quaedam inoperatio praeicipua praeter illam, quam omnibus ut essent naturaliter praestata. Est et domini Iesu Christi praeipuum quoddam ministérium in eos, quibus naturaliter ut rationabiles sint confert, per quod ad hoc quod sunt praestatur eis ut bene sint. Est alia quoque etiam spiritus sancti gratia, qua dignis praestatur, ministriata quidem per Christum, inoperata autem a patre secundum meritum eorum, qui capaces eius effiiciumt. Quod manifestissime indicat apostolus Paulus, unam eandem uirtutem trinitatis exponens in eo cum dicit: Diuisiones autem sunt donorum, idem autem spiritus; et diuisiones sunt ministeriorum, idem autem dominus; et diuisiones sunt operationum, idem autem deus, qui operatur omnia in omnibus. Vnicuique autem datur manifestatio spiritus secundum id quod expedit. Ex quo manifestissime designatur quod nulla est in trinitate discretio, sed hoc, quod donum

is, that human beings should *walk in the newness of life,*\(^{59}\) that they might receive the new wine, that is, the newness of the grace of the Holy Spirit.

In this way, then, is the working of the power of God the Father and of the Son extended without distinction over every creature, but participation in the Holy Spirit is possessed, we find, only by the holy ones. Accordingly it is said, *No one can say that Jesus is Lord except in the Holy Spirit.*\(^{60}\) Even the apostles themselves are only just once deemed worthy to hear, *You shall receive power when the Holy Spirit has come upon you.*\(^{61}\) For this reason, also, I think it follows that he who has sinned against the Son of man is worthy of forgiveness,\(^{62}\) because he who is a participant in the Word or Reason, if he ceases to live reasonably, seems to have fallen into ignorance or folly and therefore to deserve forgiveness; whereas he who has once been deemed worthy of participation in the Holy Spirit, and turned back again, is, by this very fact and deed, said to have blasphemed against the Holy Spirit.\(^{63}\)

Let no one indeed suppose that we, from having said that the Holy Spirit is bestowed only upon the holy ones, but that the benefits or workings of the Father and of the Son extend to the good and to the bad, to the just and to the unjust, by so doing exalt the Holy Spirit over the Father and the Son, or assert that his dignity is greater; this would assuredly not follow at all. For it is the particularity of his grace and actions that we have been describing. Moreover, nothing in the Trinity can be called greater or less, for one fount of divinity upholds the universe by his Word or Reason and by the Spirit of his mouth sanctifies all things worthy of sanctification, as it is written in the Psalm, *By the Word of the Lord were the heavens established and by the Spirit of his mouth all their power.*\(^{64}\) There is also a certain particular working of the God and Father, besides that which he bestowed upon all things so that they should by nature exist. And there is also a certain particular ministry of the Lord Jesus Christ to those upon whom he grants that they should be, by nature, rational; by this ministry it is given that they, in addition to being, might be good. And there is again another grace of the Holy Spirit, which is bestowed upon the deserving, through the ministry of Christ and the working of the Father, in proportion to the merits of those who have become capable of receiving it.\(^{65}\) This is most clearly pointed out by the Apostle Paul, when explaining that the power of the Trinity is one and the same, in the passage where he says, *There are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit; and there are varieties of ministries, but the same Lord; and varieties of workings, but it is the same God who works all in all. But to each is given the manifestation of the Spirit as is profitable.*\(^{66}\) From which is most clearly shown that there is no separation in the Trinity, but that this, which is

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\(^{59}\) Rom. 6:4. \(^{60}\) 1 Cor. 12:3. \(^{61}\) Acts 1:8. \(^{62}\) Cf. Matt. 12:32.


\(^{64}\) On the particular workings of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, see also Origen, *Comm. Jo.* 2.77; Or. 2.6; Princ. 2.7.3.

\(^{65}\) 1 Cor. 12:4–7.
spiritus dicitur, ministratur per filium et inoperatur per deum patrem. *Omnia autem operatur unus atque idem spiritus, dividentes unicuique prout uult.*

1.3.8. *His igitur de unitate patris et filii ac spiritus sancti protestatis, redeamus nunc ad eum ordinem, quem disserere coeperamus. Deus pater omnibus praestat ut sint, participatio uero Christi secundum id, quod uerbum uel ratio est, facit ea esse rationabilia. Ex quo consequens est ea uel laude digna esse uel culpa, quia et uirtutis et malitiae sunt capacia. Propter hoc consequenter adest etiam gratia spiritus sancti, ut ea quae substantialiter sancta non sunt, participatione ipsius sancta efficiantur. Cum ergo primo ut sint habeant ex deo patre, secundo ut rationabilia sint habeant ex uerbo, tertio ut sancta sint habeant ex spiritu sancto: rursum Christi secundum hoc, quod justitia dei est, capacia efficiuntur ea, quae iam sanctificata ante fuerint per spiritum sanctum; et qui in hunc gradum proficere meruerint per sanctificationem spiritus sancti, consequuntur nihilominus donum sapientiae secundum uirtutem inoperationis spiritus dei. Et hoc puto Paulum dicere, cum ait *quibusdam sermonem dari sapientiae, alis sermonem scientiae secundum eundem spiritum.* Et designans unamquamque discretionem donorum, refert omnia ad uniuersitatis fontem et dicit: *Divisiones sunt inoperationum, sed unus deus, qui operatur omnia in omnibus.* Vnde et inoperatio patris, quae esse praestat omnibus, clarior ac magnificentior inuenitur, cum unusquisque per participacionem Christi secundum id, quod sapientia est, et secundum id, quod scientia est et sanctificatio est, proficit et in altiores profectuum gradus uenit; et per hoc quod participatione spiritus sancti sanctificatus est quis, purior ac sincerior effectus, dignius recipit sapientiae ac scientiae gratiam, ut depulsis omnibus expurgatisque pollutionis atque ignorantiae maculis, tantum profectum sinceritatis ac puritatis accipiat, ut hoc quod accipit a deo ut esset tale sit, quale deo dignum est, eo qui ut esset pure utique praestitit ac perfecte; ut tam dignum sit id quod est, quam est ille qui id esse fecit. Ita namque et uirtutem semper esse atque in aeternum manere percipiet a deo is, qui talis est, qualem eum uoluisset esse ille qui fecit. Quod ut accidat et ut indesinenter atque inseparabiliter adsint ei, qui est, ea, quae ab ipso facta sunt, sapientiae id opus est instruere atque erudire ea et ad perfectionem perducere ex spiritus sancti confirmatione atque indesinenti sanctificatione, per quam solam deum capere possunt.
called the gift of the Spirit, is ministered through the Son and worked by the God and Father. *All these are worked by one and the same Spirit, dividing to each as he wills.*

1.3.8. Having, then, made these declarations regarding the unity of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, let us return to the order in which we began the discussion. The God and Father bestows upon all that they should be; and participation in Christ, in respect of the fact that he is the Word or Reason, renders them as rational beings. From which it follows that they are deserving either of praise or blame, because they are capable of virtue and vice. For this reason, consequently, there is present the grace of the Holy Spirit, that those who are not essentially holy may be made holy by participating in it. When, then, they have, firstly, from the God and Father, that they should be; secondly, from the Word, that they should be rational beings; thirdly, from the Holy Spirit, that they should be holy—they become capable of Christ anew, in respect of his being the Righteousness of God, those, that is, who have previously been sanctified by the Holy Spirit; and those who have been deemed worthy to progress to this level by the sanctification of the Holy Spirit will attain, no less, to the gift of wisdom according to the power and working of the Spirit of God. This is what I think Paul means when he says that, *to some is given the word of wisdom, to others the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit.* And, while pointing out each distinction of gifts, he refers them all to the fount of the universe and says, *there are varieties of workings, but one God who works all in all.* Whence also the working of the Father, which confers existence upon all things, is found to be more glorious and magnificent, while each one, by participation in Christ, as wisdom and knowledge and sanctification, makes progress and comes to a higher level of perfection; and when one who is sanctified by this participation in the Holy Spirit is made purer and cleaner, he more worthily receives the grace of wisdom and knowledge so that, when all stains of pollution and ignorance are removed and cleansed, he may receive so great an advance in cleanliness and purity that what he received from God—that he should be such—is such as to be worthy of God, of him who gave it indeed to be pure and perfect; so that the one who is thus may be as worthy as he who made him be this. For in this way he, who is such as the one who made him wished him to be, will receive from God the power always to be and to abide forever. That this may come to pass and that those who were created by him may unceasingly and inseparably be present with He Who Is—this is the work of wisdom, to instruct and to train them and to lead them on to perfection by the strengthening and unceasing sanctification of the Holy Spirit, by which alone they are able to attain God.

57 1 Cor. 12:11. 58 1 Cor. 12:8. 69 1 Cor. 12:6.
Ita ergo indesinenti erga nos opere patris et filii et spiritus sancti per singulos quosque profectum gradus instaurato, ut si forte aliquando intueri possimus sanctam et beatam uitam; in qua cum post agones multos in eam perueniri potuerit, ita perdurre debemus, ut nulla umquam nos boni illius satietas capiat, sed quanto magis de illa beatitudine percipimus, tanto magis in nobis uel dilatetur eius desiderium uel augatur, dum semper ardentius et capacius patrem et filium ac spiritum sanctum uel capimus uel tenemus.

Si autem aliquando satietas cepit aliquem ex his, qui in summo perfectoque constiterunt gradu, non arbitror quod ad subitum quis euacuetur ac decidat, sed paulatim et per partes defluere eum necesse est (ita ut fieri possit interdum, si breuis aliquis lapsus acciderit, ut cito resipiscat atque in se reuertatur), non penitus ruere, sed reuocare pedem et redire ad statum suum ac rursum statuere posse id, quod per negligentiam fuerat elapsum.

1.4.1. Vt autem istam deminutionem uel lapsum eorum, qui se negligentius egerint, ostendamus, etiam similitudine alcuuis exempli uti non uidetur absurdum. Igitur si sit aliquis qui peritia uel arte, uerbi gratia geometriae aut medicinae, paulatim fuerit inbutus usquequo peruenerit ad perfectum, multo scilicet tempore institutionibus atque exercitiis semet ipsum informans, ut ad integrum supradictae artis asumeret disciplinam: huic numquam profecto accidere poterit, ut cum peritus dormierit, euigilet imperitus. Non enim ea, quae per laesionem aliquam uel debilitatem accidunt, in medium adducere aut commemorare nunc convenit; neque enim similitudini propositae exemplique conuenient. Secundum id ergo, quod proposuimus, geometres ille uel medicus donec exercet se in meditationibus artis suae et rationabilibus institutiis, permanet apud eum etiam scientia disciplinae; si uero dissimulet ab exercitiis et neglegat ab industria, paulatim per negligentiam primo pauca excidunt, tum deinde etiam plura, et ita per multum tempus abeunt omnia in oblivionem, atque uniuersa ex memoria penitus abolentur. Potest sane fieri, ut cum decidere ab initio coeperit et parua adhuc corruerit negligentia, si resuscitetur et citius in semet ipsum reuertatur, reparet ea, quae adhuc nuper amissa sunt, et recolat ea, quae ab eo fuerant tenui adhuc abolitione sublata.
In this way, then, through the ceaseless working of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit on our behalf, exercised at each stage of progress, we may just, if firm, at the last behold the holy and blessed life, in which, when after many struggles we are able to enter it, we ought so to continue that no satiety of that good should ever seize us, but the more we perceive of its blessedness, the more the desire for it in us should be expanded and extended, while with ever more zeal and capacity we attain and hold fast the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.

But if satiety should ever take hold of any one of those who stand on the highest and perfect stage, I do not think such a one would be removed and fall all at once, but he must descend gradually and by degrees (so that it may sometimes happen that if a brief lapse takes place, the person quickly recovers and returns to himself), not come crashing down utterly, but retrace his steps and return to his former state and be able to re-establish that which had been lost through negligence.

1.4.1 That we might show what is this decrease or fall of those who live negligently, it will not seem out of place to employ a comparison for illustration. Suppose, then, someone who has gradually become experienced in practical or theoretical knowledge, for example of geometry or medicine, until he had reached perfection, having trained himself for a long time in its principles and practice, so as to acquire a complete mastery of the aforesaid art—it could never happen to such a one that, having fallen asleep skilled, he should wake up unskilled. It is not to our purpose now to adduce or note those accidents occasioned by some injury or weakness, for they do not apply to the proposed comparison or illustration. According, then, to what we have proposed, so long as that geometrician or doctor exercises himself in the study and the rational principles of his art, the knowledge of his discipline will remain with him; but if he is indifferent to the exercises and neglects its practice, then gradually, by his negligence, a few details will at first drop off, then next even more, until, over a length of time, everything departs into oblivion and is utterly effaced from the memory. It is certainly possible, when he has first begun to fall away and the corrupting negligence is still small, that he might, if aroused and returned speedily to himself, recover those things which had but recently been lost and cultivate anew those things which had

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70 Cf. Origen, Or. 25.1–2; Mart. 39; Comm. Jo. 20.288–93.
71 On 'satiety' (κόπος), see Philo, Her. 240; Post. 145; Abr. 134; Origen, Princ. 3.1.13; 3.4.3.
72 The Latin manuscripts here have the heading: 'On the Loss or Fall [of Rational Beings]'. What follows, however, is not a separate chapter, as is made clear in the opening words of Princ. 1.5.1, where a new chapter begins, and also by Princ. 1.7.1, which refers back to the preceding discussion (i.e. Princ. 1.5–6) as having treated rational beings.
73 On negligence, see Origen, Princ. 1.6.2; 2.9.2; 2.9.6; 3.1.12; 4.4.9; Comm. Jo. 20.363; Hom. Ezech. 9.5; Cels. 6.45; 7.69.
Transferamus nunc haec ad eos, qui dei se scientiae ac sapientiae dediderunt, cuius erudito atque industria incomparabilibus omnes reliquas disciplinas supereminet modis, et secundum propositae similitudinis formam uel quae sit adsumptio scientiae, uel quae sit eius abolitio contemplatur; maxime cum audiamus ab apostolo quod de perfectis dicitur, quia facie ad faciem gloriam domini ex mysteriorum revelationibus speculabuntur.

1.4.2. Verum nos uolentes diuina in nos beneficia demonstrare, quae nobis per patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum praebentur, quae trinitas totius est sanctitatis fons, excessu quodam usi haec diximus et sermonem de anima quia inciderat, strictim licet, contingendum putauimus, uicinum utpote locum de natura rationabili disserentes. Opportunius tamen in loco proprio de omni rationabili natura, quae in tria genera speciesque distinguuntur, deo nobis per Iesum Christum et spiritum sanctum concedente, disputabimus.

1.4.3. Hanc ergo beatam et ἁγιότητα, id est principatum omnium gerentem <δύναμις> dicimus trinitatem. Hic est bonus deus et benignus omnium pater, simul et εὐρέγειται δύναμις et ἀρχιερεῖς, id est bene faciendi uirtus et creandi ac prouidendi. Quas uirtutes dei absurdum simul et impium est putare uel ad momentum aliquod aliando fuisse otiosas. Inlicitum namque est uel leuiter suscipari has uirtutes, quibus principaliter sicut dignum est intellegitur deus, cessasse aliquando ab operibus sibi dignis et fuisse immobiles. Neque enim extrinsecus inpeditas eas esse putandum est, quae in deo sunt, immo
1.3-4 The Holy Spirit

been to that point only slightly abolished. Let us now apply this to those who have devoted themselves to the knowledge and wisdom of God, about whom the study and practice surpasses all disciplines in incomparable ways, and let us contemplate, according to the form of the comparison proposed, what is the acquisition of knowledge or what is its disappearance, especially when we hear from the Apostle what is said of those who are perfected, that they shall behold face to face the glory of the Lord by the revelation of the mysteries.

1.4.2. But wanting to show the divine benefits bestowed upon us by the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, that Trinity which is the fount of all holiness, we have spoken of these things by way of a digression and we have considered touching the subject of the soul, which came up, although cursorily, as we were discussing the related topic concerning rational beings. However, we shall more conveniently consider the whole subject of rational beings, which is divided into three genera and species, in the proper place, with our God through Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit so allowing.

1.4.3. Therefore we call this blessed and \( \delta \rho\chi\kappa\gamma \) (that is, sovereign, sustaining all things) <power> the Trinity. This is the good God and benevolent Father of the universe, the \( \delta\upsilon\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma \) both \( \epsilon\upsilon\varepsilon\rho\gamma\eta\tau\iota\kappa\gamma \) and \( \delta\eta\mu\iota\omega\upsilon\rho\gamma\iota\kappa\gamma \), that is, the power that does good and creates and provides. It is both absurd and impious to suppose that these powers have been idle at any time even for a moment. Indeed, it is unlawful to entertain the slightest suspicion that these powers, through which primarily God is worthily known, should at any time have ceased from workings worthy of him and have become inactive. For neither can it be supposed that these powers which are in God, more, which are God,

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74 Cf. 1 Cor. 13:12; Rom. 16:25; Origen, Princ. 2.6.7; Comm. Jo. 1.93; 2.229; Hom. Num. 21.1; Comm. Cant. 3 (GCS 8, p. 183). At this point, Koetschau inserts into the text two sentences from Jerome, the first from Jo. Hier. 16 (PL 32, 368), the second from Ep. 124.3.1 (ed. Hilberg 3, 98.7–12); they are included in Appendix IJ as item no. 7. But, as Gergemanns and Karp note (p. 187, n.2), the last sentence of Princ. 1.4.1, beginning 'Let us now apply this, functions not as an introduction to a new discussion, but as the conclusion to the preceding.


76 The division of rational beings into three genera and species is taken up in Princ. 1.5.1, where he discusses the holy and the wicked powers, and those who are in between, in a position of trial and struggle. A similar threefold classification is found in Princ. 1.8.4, in terms of the angelic orders, the opposing powers, and human beings.

77 Princ. 1.4.3–5 is not found in one group of manuscripts (\( \gamma \)), and seems to have the character of a recapitulation; the other manuscripts have here the heading 'On things created and made,' which is preserved, in parentheses, by Koetschau (but was not followed in this by Butterworth) and Crouzel and Simonetti, and by Gergemanns and Karpp as a sub-heading. Princ. 1.4.3 continues the subject matter of the opening words of Princ. 1.4.2, relegating the remainder of that paragraph to be picked up in the next section.

78 The words in parenthesis, and following 'that is' in the next sentence, are clearly Rufinus' attempt to explicate the Greek terms. For the term \( \delta \rho\chi\iota\kappa\delta \) applied to the Trinity, see Origen, Comm. Matt. 15.31, and to teachings, Comm. Jo. 10.160.

79 Cf. Origen, Cels. 5.15; Fr. Jo. 1 (GCS 4).
quae deus sunt, neque rursum, cum nihil obsisteret, uel piguisse eas agere et
operari quae se digna erant uel dissimulasse credendum est. Et ideo nullum
290 prorsus momentum sentiri potest, quo non uirtus illa benefica bene fecerit.
Vnde consequens est fuisse semper quibus bene faceret, conditionibus
uidelicet uel creaturis suis, et bene faciens ordine et merito in his sua beneficia
uirtute prouidentiae dispensaret. Et per hoc consequens uidetur quod neque
conditor neque beneficus neque prouident ens deus aliquando non fuerit.

1.4.4. Sed rursum in hoc humana intellegentia hebetatur atque constringitur,
quomodo possit intellegi semper ex quo deus est fuisse etiam creaturas et sine
initio, ut ita dixerim, substitisse eas, quae utique sine dubio creatae esse atque
a deo factae credendae sunt. Cum ergo haec inter se humanarum cogitationum
atque intellectuum pugna sit, rationibus utrubique ualidissimis occurrentibus
300 ac repugnantibus et contemplantis sensum in partem suam quamque torquen-
tibus, nobis pro exiguo ac breuissimo sensus nostri captu illud occurrit, quod
sine omni pietatis periculo confitendum est: deum quidem patrem semper
fuisse, semper habentem unigenitum filium, qui simul et sapientia secundum
ea, quae supra exposuimus, appellatur. Haec ergo ipsa est sapientia, cui semper
adgaudebat deus orbe perfecto, ut per hoc etiam semper laetari intellegatur
deus. In hac igitur sapientia, quae semper erat cum patre, descripta semper
inerat ac formata conditio, et numquam erat quando eorum, quae futura erant,
praefiguration apud sapientiam non erat.

1.4.5. Et hoc modo fortass is pro nostra infirmitate pium aliquid de deo sentire
uidebimur, ut neque ingenitas et coaeternas deo creaturas dicamus, neque
rursum cum nihil boni prius egerit deus, in id ut aget esse conuersum;
cum uerus sit ille sermo, qui scriptus est quia Omnia in sapientia fecisti.
Et si utique in sapientia omnia facta sunt, cum sapientia semper fuerit,
secundum praefigurationem et praeformationem semper erant in sapientia
ea, quae protinus etiam substantialiter facta sunt. Et hoc opinor Salomonem
sentientem uel intellegentem dicere in Ecclesiaste: Quid est quod factum est?
hoc ipsum quod futurum est; et quid est quod creatum est? hoc ipsum quod

hae A$: 304 ipse B : om. W$
297 creata C 298 credenda A$ : credendi W$
300 praeformata Koe in appar.
could have been hindered from without, nor, on the other hand, with nothing obstructing them, can it be believed that they were reluctant or neglected to act and work things worthy of themselves. It is therefore not possible to imagine any moment whatsoever when that beneficent power did not work good. Whence it follows that there always were those for whom it worked good, that is, his works or creatures, and that, doing good by order and desert, God dispensed, in the power of this providence, his benefits upon them. And by this it seems to follow that at no moment was God not creator, nor benefactor, nor provident.

1.4.4. Yet, again, human intelligence is dulled and constrained regarding this point: in what way it is possible to understand that, from the fact that God is, his creatures have always existed and that they have subsisted, if we may so say, without a beginning, those things, that is, that must undoubtedly be believed by us to be created and made by God. Since, then, there is this conflict amongst human thoughts and reasonings, the strongest arguments on both sides presenting themselves and opposing each other, and each bending the intellect of the theorist in its own direction, because of the poor and small capacity of our intellects, this occurs to us, which can be confessed without any risk to piety: that God always has been Father, always having the only-begotten Son, who at the same time, as we explained above, is called Wisdom. This is that very Wisdom in whom God always delighted when the world was finished, that, by this, God might be understood to rejoice always.® In this Wisdom, therefore, who ever was with the Father, was creation always delineated and shaped, and there never was a moment when the prefiguration of those things, which were to be thereafter, was not in Wisdom.®!

1.4.5. It is probably in this way, because of our weakness, that we will seem to hold a reverent belief about God, saying neither that creatures are uncreated and coeternal with God,® nor, on the other hand, that God did no good before, changing so that he might do so; for true is that text, In Wisdom did you make all things.® And assuredly if all things were made in Wisdom, since Wisdom always was, there always were in Wisdom, according to prefiguration and pre-formation, those things which afterwards were made substantially. This is, I think, the thought and meaning of Solomon, saying in Ecclesiastes: What is that which has been made? The same as that which will be; and what is that which has been created? The same as that which will be

® Cf. Prov. 8:30–1; Origen, Comm. Jo. 1.55.
®! Cf. Origen, Princ. 1.2.2, 10; 2.3.6; Comm. Jo. 1.111, 113–15; 19.146–50; Cels. 5.22, 39; 6.66.
® Cf. Origen, Princ. 1.3.3; 2.9.2.
® Ps. 103:24.
creandum est. Et nihil recens sub sole. Si quis quid loquetur et dicet: ecce novum est hoc, iam fuit id in saeculis, quae fuerunt ante nos. Si ergo singula, quae sub sole sunt, fuerunt iam in illis saeculis, quae fuerunt ante nos, cum nihil recens sit sub sole, sine dubio omnia uel genera uel species fuerunt semper, et fortassis etiam per singula. Verum tamen omnimodo hoc est, quod ostenditur, quod non deus conditor aliquando esse coeperit, cum ante non fuerit.

1.4.5, lines 321–3

Justinian, Ep. ad Menam (ed. Schwartz, 210.25–7), Koetschau Frag. 10:

Πάντα τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἴδη ἀεὶ ἦν, ἄλλος δὲ τις ἔρει καὶ τὸ καθ’ ἐν ἀριθμῷ· πλὴν ἐκατέρως δηλοῦται ὅτι οὐκ ἤρξατο ὁ θεὸς δημιουργεῖν ἀργήσας ποτὲ.
created! There is nothing new under the sun. If anyone should speak of something and say, 'Look, this is new!', it has already been, in the ages that were before us.\textsuperscript{84} If, therefore, particular things which are under the sun were already in the ages, which were before us, for there is nothing new under the sun, then\textsuperscript{85} without doubt all genera and species always were, and perhaps even individual things. Nevertheless, either way the fact is made clear that God did not begin at a certain time to create, when he had not done so before.

\textsuperscript{84} Eccles. 1:9–10.

\textsuperscript{85} Cf. Justinian \textit{Ep. ad Menam} (ed. Schwartz, 210.25–7), an extract said to come from \textit{Princ.} 1 and numbered as Fragment 10 by Koetschau: 'All genera and species always were, but another says even that which is numerically unique; either way it is clear that God did not begin to create, having been idle before.'
De rationabilibus naturis

1.5.1. Post eam dissertationem, quam de patre et filio et spiritu sancto, quantum ualemus breuiter digessimus, consequens est etiam de naturis rationabilibus ac de speciebus earum et ordinibus uel officiis tam sanctarum quam etiam malignarum uirtutum, sed et de his, qui inter has, id est bonas et malas mediis quidam sunt et adhuc in agone atque in certamine positi, paucu disserere. Quam plurima nomina in sanctis scripturis inuenimus ordinum quorundam atque officiorum tam sanctorum quam etiam contrariorum, quae nomina prius proponentes, tum deinde quid sibi uelit eorum significatio, pro uiribus nostris discutere pertemptabimus.

Sunt quidam sancti angeli dei, quos Paulus ministeriales spiritus appellat ad ministerium destinatos propter eos, qui hereditatem capient in salutem. Apud ipsum quoque sanctum Paulum inuenimus, nescio unde sumentem, cognominantem tamen quasdam sedes et dominationes et principatus et potestates, et post enumerationem horum uel ut alia adhuc quaedam rationabilia officia atque ordines esse sentiens praeter eos, quos supra dixerat, ait de salutore: Qui est super omnem principatum et potestatem et uirtutem et dominationem et omne nomen, quod nominatur non solum in hoc saeculo sed etiam in futuro. Ex quo uidelicet ostendit esse quaedam praeter eos, quae commemorauit, quae nominentur quidem in hoc saeculo, non tamen ab ipso enumerata nunc fuerint, forte nec ab alio aliquo intellecta; esse uero alia, quae in hoc quidem saeculo non nominentur, in futuro tamen nominabantur.

1.5.2. Tum deinde sciendum est quia omne quod rationabile est et rationis terminos statutaque declinat, sine dubio per praevaricationem recti iustique efficitur in peccato. Est ergo omnis creatura rationabilis laudis et culpae capax; laudis, si secundum rationem, quam in se habet, ad meliora proficiat, culpae, si rationem recti tenoremque declinet; propter quod recte etiam poenis ac suppliciis subiacet. Quod etiam de ipso diabolo et his, qui cum ipso sunt et dicuntur eius angeli, sentiendum est. Exponendae tamen sunt...
Rational Beings

1.5.1. After the discussion concerning the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, which we have briefly treated, as far as we are able, it follows that we should also say a few words about the rational beings, their species and orders and functions, of the holy and also the wicked powers, and also about those who are between them, that is, the good and evil powers, who are, moreover, as yet placed in struggle and trial. For we find in the holy Scriptures very many names of certain orders and functions of holy beings, as well as of the opposite kind, which we shall first lay out, and then we shall attempt, to the best of our ability, to ascertain the meaning of them.

There are certain holy angels of God, whom Paul calls ministering spirits, appointed to serve those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation. Also, in the writings of the same saint Paul we find him giving the names, from whence they are I know not, of certain thrones and dominions and principalities and authorities; and after the enumeration of these, as if knowing that there are still other rational offices and orders beyond those which he named, he says of the Saviour, Who is above every principality and authority and power and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this age but also in that which is to come. From which he evidently shows that there are certain others besides those which he had mentioned, which may indeed be named in this age, but were not however named by him now, and perhaps were not known by anyone else; and that there are others, which may not be named in this age, but will be named in the age to come.

1.5.2. Then, in the next place, one should know that every rational being that turns aside from the measures and ordinances of reason is undoubtedly involved in sin by this departure from what is right and just. Every rational being, therefore, is capable of praise and censure: of praise, if, in conformity to that reason which he has in himself, he advance to better things; of censure, if he depart from the order and course of what is right, for which he is rightly subject to pains and penalties. And this is also thought to apply to the devil himself and those who are with him and are called his angels. The titles of

4 Here the manuscripts contain the heading 'On the Opposing Powers.' The opening paragraph of this chapter specifies that it will deal with 'rational beings' in terms of their species, orders, and functions, beginning with the holy powers (the second paragraph of Princ. 1.5.1), then the wicked powers (Princ. 1.5.2), and then those in between (Princ. 1.5.2, third paragraph, on human beings, 'rational animals'); Princ. 1.5 then continues by discussing whether the first two categories were already made either holy or wicked, and as such are so by nature.
5 Cf. Origen, Princ. 1.6.1; 2.10.4–5; Cels. 4.99; Hom. Jer. 20.2.
etiam appellationes eorum, ut sciamus, quae sint ista de quibus nobis sermo mouendus est.

Diaboli igitur nomen et Satanae et maligni in multis scripturae locis designatur, qui et inimicus dei esse describitur. Necnon et quidam angeli diaboli nominantur, sed et princeps mundi huius, qui utrum ipse sit diabolus an alias quis, nondum manifeste declaratum est. Principes quoque huius mundi quidam dicuntur sapientiam quandam habentes quae destruetur; sed utrum ipsi sint isti principes, qui et illi sunt principatus, aduersum quos nobis est conluctatio, an alii sint, non facile mihi ab aliquo pronuntiandum uidetur. Post principatus autem etiam potestates quaedam nominantur, aduersus quas conluctatio nobis est et agon geritur, sed et aduersus principes mundi huius et rectores tenebrarum harum; quaedam etiam spiritalia malitiae in caelestibus ab ipso Paulo nominatur. Quid autem dicendum est etiam de spiritibus malignis et de daemonibus inmundis, quae in euangeliis nominantur? Tum deinde appellantur etiam quaedam simili nomine caelestia, sed quae dicuntur genu flectere uel esse flexura in nomine Iesu, sed et terrestria et inferna, quae per ordinem Paulus enumerat.

In eo sane loco, in quo de rationabilibus naturis disserimus, reticere non conuenit ne de nobis quidem hominibus, qui utique et ipsi rationabile esse animal dicimur; sed ne illud quidem otiose praetereundum est, quod etiam de nobis ipsis hominibus diuersi quidam ordinis nominantur, cum dicitur pars domini, populus eius Iacob, funiculus hereditatis eius Israhel, pars autem angelorum dicuntur ceterae nationes, quoniam quidem cum diuideret excelsus gentes et dispergeret filios Adam, statuit fines gentium secundum numerum angelorum dei. Et ideo simul cum ceteris rationabilibus naturis etiam humanae animae ratio peruidenda est.

1.5.3. Igitur tot et tantis ordinum officiorumque nominibus cognominatis, quibus certum est subesse substantias, requirendum est, utrum conditor et creator omnium deos quodam quidem ex his ita sanctos fecerit ac beatos, ut nihil possint recipere omnino contrarium, et quosdam ita fecerit, ut possint
these beings, however, have to be explained, that we may know who they are
with whom our discussion must deal.

The name, then, of Devil, and Satan, and Wicked One, who is also described
as being the Enemy of God, is mentioned in many places of Scripture.
Moreover, certain angels of the devil are mentioned, and also a ruler of this
world, who, whether the devil himself or someone else, is not yet clearly
manifest. There are also certain rulers of this world mentioned, possessing a
kind of wisdom which is to be destroyed, but whether these are those rulers,
who are also those principalities against whom we wrestle, or others, is not
easily decided, it seems to me, by anyone. After the principalities, certain powers
are also named, against whom we wrestle and maintain a struggle, as also
against the rulers of this world and the governors of this darkness; and certain
spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places are also mentioned by Paul
himself. And what is to be said of the evil spirits and impure demons who are
mentioned in the Gospels? Then, again, there are those called by a similar name,
things heavenly, who are said to bend, or will bend, the knee at the name
of Jesus, as well as things earthly and things under the earth, which Paul
enumerates in order.

And, in this context where we have been discussing rational beings, it
would not be right to be silent regarding ourselves, human beings, for we are
certainly said to be 'rational animals'; this, indeed, is not to be idly passed
over, that even of us human beings certain different orders are named, as
when it is said, The portion of the Lord is his people Jacob; Israel is the line of his
inheritance, whereas other nations are called a portion of the angels, since
when the Most High divided the nations and scattered the sons of Adam, he fixed
the boundaries of the nations according to the number of the angels of God.
And therefore, along with the other rational beings, we must examine the
account of the human soul.

1.5.3. Since, then, so many and so important names of orders and offices have
been mentioned, behind which it is certain that there are substantial beings, it
must be inquired whether God, the Author and Creator of all things, made
some of them holy and blessed, so that they could receive nothing at all of the
contrary, and made others in such a way that they were made capable of

\[\text{Ref. 7 Matt. 13:39.} \quad \text{Ref. 8 Matt. 25:41; Rev. 12:9.} \quad \text{Ref. 9 John 12:31; 14:30; 16:11.} \]
\[\text{Ref. 10 1 Cor. 2:6.} \quad \text{Ref. 11 Eph. 6:12.} \quad \text{Ref. 12 Eph. 6:12.} \quad \text{Ref. 13 Luke 7:21; 4:33.} \]
\[\text{Ref. 14 Phil. 2:10.} \quad \text{Ref. 15 Cf. Aristotle, Eth. nic. 1.12.9–15. See also Porphyry, Exp. Cat. 60.18–19: λέγομεν γάρ ἀνθρωπόν εἶναι ἔξων λογικὸν ὑπητὸν νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεικτικὸν̆ } \quad \text{Ref. 16 Deut. 32:9, 8. On the idea of the nations being assigned angels, see Sir. 17:17; T. Naph. 8; Jub. 15:31–2; Philo, Post. 91–3; Irenaeus, Haer. 3.12.9; Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 6.17.157.5; 7.2.6.4; Origen, Princ. 1.8.1; 3.3.2–3; Hom. Jes. Nav. 23.3; Hom. Num. 11.4; Hom. Luc. 12.3; Cels. 5.30.} \]
\[\text{Ref. 17 Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Exc. 12, on the 'protoctistes'.} \]
tam uirtutis quam malitiae effici capaces; aut si putandum est quod alios ita fecerit, ut omnino incapaces sint ad uirtutem, et alios malitiam quidem nequaquam posse recipere, solummodo autem posse in beatitudine permanere, alios uero tales, qui possint utraque recipere. Vt autem etiam ex ipsis nominibus prima nobis inquisitio moueatur, consideremus si sancti angeli, ex quo sunt, semper sancti fuerunt et sancti sunt sanctique erunt, et neque receperunt umquam neque recipere poterunt peccati locum. Tum deinde etiam hi, qui sancti principatus appellantur, consideremus si statim ut creati a deo sunt, principatum a deo exercere coeperunt in aliquos, qui eis essent subjecti, et illos tales creatos et ad hoc factos, ut essent subditi et subjecti. 

Similiter autem et potestates quae appellantur utrum tales et in hoc ipsum creatae sunt, ut exercerent potestatem, an meritum aliquod istud est et praemium uirtutis, per quod ad potestatem istam dignitatemque uenerunt. Necnon et hi, qui throni (uel sedes) appellantur, an istam beatitudinis sedem stabilitatemque simul cum substantiae suae prolacione meruerint, ut ex voluntate sola hoc possideant creatoris; uel quae appellantur dominationes hoc, quod dominantur, non per profectus sui meritum eis fuerit additum, sed conditionis praerogatia donatum sit et ideo sit ab eis inseparabile quodammodo ac naturale.

Quod utique si ita recipiamus, ut putentur sancti angeli et sanctae potestates et beatae sedes gloriosaeque uirtutes et magnificae dominationes substantialiter potestates istas ac dignitates et glorias possidere: consequens sine dubio uidetur etiam ea, quae in contrariis officiis nominata sunt, ad hunc modum intellegi debere; ita ut principalis illi, aduersum quos est nobis conluctatio, illum ipsum obluctantem ac resistentem omni bono propositum non postmodum recepisse declinantes a bono per arbitrii libertatem putentur, sed eum ipsum simul substantialiter exitisse; similiter etiam potestates et uirtutes, nec esse in eis iuniorum substantia sua posteriori viz melitiam; illis quoque, quos mundi tenebrarum rectores et principes appellavit, hoc quod principitantur et obtinent tenebras, non ex peruersitate propositi, sed ex conditionis necessitate descendere. Eadem quoque etiam de spiritualibus nequitiae et de spiritibus malignis et daemonibus inmundis consequentiae ipsius ratio coget intellegi.

Quodsi haec ita de malis contrariis uirtutibus intellegi uidetur absursum, sic ute certe absursum est, ut causa malitiae ipsarum, remota ab arbitrii
virtue as much as wickedness; or whether it should be supposed that he created some in such a way as to be altogether incapable of virtue and others able to receive no wickedness whatsoever, able only to remain in blessedness, and others again who can receive either. But, in order that our first inquiry may begin with the names themselves, let us consider whether the holy angels, from the point at which they exist, have always been holy, and are holy, and will be holy, and neither have ever received nor were able to receive an occasion of sin. Then, in the next place, let us consider whether those who are called holy principalities began, from the point they were created by God, to exercise power over others who were made subject to them, and whether these latter were created such and for this purpose, that they might be subordinate and subject. Similarly, whether those who are called authorities were created such and for this purpose, that they might exercise authority, or whether this is some prize or reward for their virtue, by which they advanced to this authority and dignity. Moreover, also, whether those who are called thrones (or seats) acquired that seat and stability of blessedness simultaneously with the bringing forth of their substance, so that they possess this solely by the will of the Creator; and whether those who are called dominions did not have their dominion added to them as a reward for their progress, but given as a privilege of their creation, so that it is in some way inseparable from them and natural.

Now, if we accept the view that the holy angels and holy powers and the blessed seats and the glorious powers and the magnificent dominions possess those powers and dignities and glories by essence, it will doubtless appear to follow that those which have been mentioned with contrary functions must be regarded in the same manner; so that those principalities with whom is our struggle must themselves be supposed not to have received this determination of opposition and resistance to every good after falling from the good through the freedom of the will, but to have come into existence with it essentially in them. Similarly, also, with the authorities and powers: [it must be supposed that] the wickedness that is in them is not subsequent and posterior to their essence. Those, again, whom he called governors and rulers of the darkness of the world: [it must be supposed] that they rule and occupy the darkness not from the perversity of determination but from the necessity of their creation. Consequential reasoning itself forces the same thing to be thought regarding spirits of wickedness and evil spirits and unclean demons.

But if to think this regarding the wicked and opposing powers seems to be absurd—and it certainly is absurd that the cause of their wickedness should

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18 On the naming of angels according to their activity, see Origen, Cels. 5.4; Comm. Jo. 2.145.
sui proposito, conditori earum necessario adscribatur: quomodo non etiam de
bonis sanctisque uirtutibus cogimur similia confiteri, id est quia non substan-
tiale sit in ipsis bonum, quod utique in solo Christo et in spiritu sancto eui-
denter ostendimus, sine dubio utique et in patre? Non enim trinitatis natura
habere aliquid compositionis ostensa est, ut haec ei consequenter uideantur
accidere. Vnde superest ut in omni creatura sui operis suorumque motuum
fuerit quod uirtutes istae, quae uel principatum agere in alii uel potestatem
exercere uel dominationem uidentur, ex merito, et non per conditionis
praerogatiuam praelatae sint et superpositae his, quibus praeesse uel his, in
quos potestatem exercere dicuntur.

1.5.4. Sed ne de tantis ac tam difficilibus rebus consequentiae solius ratione
inuitati uideamur asserere atque ex coniecturis tantummodo in assensum
cogere auditores, uideamus si quas etiam de scripturis sanctis possumus
assertiones assumere, quarum auctoritate haec credibilius adstruamur. Et
primo quidem de malis uirtutibus quid sancta scriptura contineat, proferemus;
tum deinde etiam de ceteris investigabimus, secundum quod dominus nos
fuerit inluminare dignatus, et in rebus tam difficilibus quid magis ueritati sit
proximum, uel quid secundum pietatis regulam opinandum sit, consequamur.

Inuenimus namque in Hiezechiel propheta duas quasdam prophetias
scriptas esse ad principem Tyri, quarum prima forta esse uideatur aliqui, ante-
quam audiat et secundam, dici de homine aliquo, qui princeps fuerit Tyriorum.
Et ideo nunc interim nihil ex prima illa sumemus; secunda vero quoniam
evidentissime talis est, ut nihil prorsus de homine, sed de uirtute aliqua
superiore intellegi debet, quae delapsa fuerit a superioribus et in inferiora
ac deteriora deiecta, ex ipsa deferemus exemplum, ex quo manifestissime
demonstretur contrarias istas malignasque uirtutes non natura tales esse
conditas uel creatas, sed de melioribus uenisse in peius atque in deteriori
esse conversas; beatas quoque illas uirtutes non esse talis naturae, quae con-
trarium recipere non possit, si uelit ac neglegat et status sui beatitudinem non
omni cautela custodiat. Si enim is, qui dicitur princeps Tyri, refertur quia inter

95 non A\textsuperscript{cc} Koe Sim Goe Fern: om.  A\textsuperscript{cc} W B y 99 ei: et  C 105 consequentia
solius rationis A 107 quas: quid  C 108 adscriptionis G M\textsuperscript{cc}
\sigma: adersiones M\textsuperscript{cc} 108-9 ante et primo add. titulum: quid hiezechiel [quod iezachel C] de
quadam maligna uirtute et ex pristina bonitate dilabsa sub uocabulo principis tyri quid etiam de
alia similis esaias propheta commemorat  B 113 Hiezechiel Goe 116 sumamus  
120 natura tales: naturales C y 123 uelit ac: forte se  B: uelit aut Koe in appar.
be separated from the determination of their own will and ascribed of necessity to their Creator—are we not forced to acknowledge the same thing regarding the good and holy powers, that is, that it is not by essence that goodness is in them, which we have clearly shown to be the case with Christ and the Holy Spirit alone, as also, undoubtedly, with the Father? For the nature of the Trinity has been shown to have nothing that is compound, lest these properties might seem to come to apply subsequently. From which it remains that, in the case of every creature, it is by its works and its movements that those powers, who appear to hold sway over others or to exercise authority or dominion, are set above and placed over those whom they are said to rule or on whom they exercise their authority, from their merits and not by a privilege of creation.

1.5.4. But that we might not appear to be making assertions about such important and difficult matters solely on the basis of inference or to compel the assent of our hearers by conjectures alone, let us see whether we can obtain any statements from the holy Scriptures, by the authority of which these positions may be more credibly maintained. First we shall adduce what the holy Scriptures contain regarding wicked powers; then we shall next investigate the others, as the Lord shall be pleased to enlighten us, that in matters of such difficulty we may arrive at what is closest to the truth or what should be our belief according to the rule of piety.

Now, we find in the prophet Ezekiel two prophecies addressed to the prince of Tyre, the first of which might appear to anyone, before he heard the second also, to be spoken of some man who was the prince of the Tyrians. For the meantime, then, we shall take nothing from that first prophecy. But as the second is most clearly of such a kind that nothing may be understood as relating to a human being, but of some superior power who had fallen away from the superior things and been cast down into inferior and worse things, we shall take from it an illustration, by which it may be demonstrated most clearly that those opposing and wicked powers were not formed and created such by nature, but from what is better they came into what is worse, and were turned to what is worse; and that those blessed powers, also, were not of such a nature as to be unable to receive the opposite, should one so choose and be negligent and not guard with all care the blessedness of its condition. For if it is related that he, who is called the prince of Tyre, was amongst the saints and
sanctos erat et immaculatus erat et in paradiso dei constitutus, corona quoque decoris ac pulchritudinis exornatus, is, inquam, qui talis erat, quomodo inferior aliquo sanctorum fuisse putandus est? Corona enim decoris ac pulchritudinis ipse fuisse et in paradiso dei immaculatus ambulasse describitur; et quomodo ab aliquo putari potest quod iste talis non unus fuerit de illis sanctis beatisque uirtutibus, quas utique in beatitudine positas, non allo quam tali honore praeditas esse credendum est?

Sed uideamus tandem, quid etiam ipsa prophetiae uerba nos doceant. Et factus est, inquit, sermo domini ad me, dicens: Fili hominis, accipe lamentum super principem Tyri et dic ei: Haec dicit dominus deus: Tu signaculum similitudinis et corona decoris in deliciis paradisi dei fuisti; omni lapide uel gemma bona exornatus es, et indutus sardio et topazio et smaragdo et carbunculo et saphyro et iaspide, argento et auro insertis, et achate et amethysto et chrysolito et berylo et onychino; auro quoque replesti thesauros tuae et promptuaria tua in temet ipso. Ex qua die creatus es <tu> cum Cherubin, posui te in monte sancto dei. Fuisti in medio lapidum igneorum, fuisti immaculatus tu in diebus tuis, ex qua die creatus es tu, donec cum inuentae sunt iniquitates in te; ex multitudine negotiationis tuae replesti promptuaria tua iniquitate et peccasti et uulneratus es a monte dei. Et eiecit te Cherub de medio lapidum igneorum; elatum est cor tuum in decore tuo, corrupta est disciplina tua cum pulchritudine tua; propter multitudinem peccatorum tuorum in terram proieci te super te. Perditio effectus es, et non subsistes ultra in aeternum tempus.

Haec cum ita dicta sint, quis est qui audiens: Tu signaculum similitudinis et corona decoris in deliciis paradisi dei fuisti uel audiens quod ex quo creatus es tu cum Cherubin, posui te in monte sancto dei ultra sensum suum poterit relaxare, ut de aliquo hominum uel sanctorum, non dicam Tyri principes, haec dicta esse suspicetur? aut quos lapides igneos putabit, in quorum medio homo aliquis conversari potuerit? aut quis immaculatus ab ipsa die qua creatus est intellegi poterit, in quo postea aliquando iniquitates in ipso inuentae sint, et tunc in terram proieci te esse dicatur? Quod utique significat quia de eo dicitur, qui cum non esset in terra, in terram proieci est, cuius etiam sancta polluta esse dicuntur. Haec quidem de principe Tyri ex prophetia Hiezechiel,
was blameless and was placed in the paradise of God, adorned with a crown of comeliness and beauty, how, I ask, is it to be supposed that such a one was inferior in any way to any of the holy ones? For he is described as having been himself a crown of comeliness and beauty and as having walked blameless in the paradise of God; and how can anyone suppose that such a being was not one of those holy and blessed powers which, as assuredly placed in blessedness, one must believe to be endowed with no other honour than this?

But let us now see what we are taught by the words of the prophecy themselves. The Word of the Lord, he says, came to me, saying: Son of man, take up a lament over the prince of Tyre, and say to him, Thus says the Lord God: You were a signet of likeness and a crown of beauty among the delights of the paradise of God; you were adorned with every fine stone or gem, and were clothed with carnelian and topaz and emerald and carbuncle and sapphire and jasper, set in gold and silver and agate and amethyst and chrysolite and beryl and onyx; you filled your treasuries with gold and your storehouses among you. From the day you were created with the cherubim, I placed you in the holy mountain of God. You were in the midst of the fiery stones; you were blameless in your days, from the day you were created until iniquities were found in you; from the abundance of your commerce you did fill your storehouses with iniquity and you sinned and were wounded from the mountain of God. And a cherub drove you from the midst of the fiery stones; your heart was elated because of your comeliness, and your knowledge was corrupted with your beauty; on account of the multitude of your sins, I cast you down upon the earth in the presence of kings; I have given you, because of your sins and your iniquities, to be an exhibition and laughingstock; by your commerce you have polluted your holy places. And I shall bring forth fire from your midst, and it shall devour you, and I shall render you as ashes and cinders on the earth, in the sight of all who see you; and all who knew you among the nations, shall mourn over you. You shall become destruction, and shall exist no longer for ever.\(^{23}\)

These, then, being the words of the prophet, who is there who on hearing, You were a signet of likeness and a crown of beauty among the delights of the paradise of God, or on hearing that From the day you were created with the cherubim, I placed you in the holy mountain of God, could so weaken their meaning as to suppose that these things were said of some human being or saint, not to mention the prince of Tyre? Or what fiery stones will he imagine, in the midst of which any human being could have lived? Or who could be supposed to have been blameless from the very day he was created, yet when acts of wickedness were found in him some time later, it is said that he was cast down upon the earth? This certainly means that it is said of one who, not being upon earth, was cast down upon it, whose holy places are also said to be polluted. We have shown, then, that these statements from the prophet Ezekiel

\(^{23}\) Ezek. 28:11–19.
quae in adversariam uirtutem referuntur, ostendimus, per quae manifestissime demonstratur quod sancta antea uirtus haec fuerit ac beata, de qua beatitudine, ex quo in ea inuenta est iniquitas, ruerit in terramque demersa sit, et non per naturam conditionemque talis extiterit,—arbitramur ergo dici haec de angelo quodam, qui Tyriorum gentis dispensandae sit sortitus officium, cui etiam animae eorum procurandae uidentur esse commissae. Quam sane Tyrum, uel quas Tyriorum animas sentire debeamus, utrum hanc, quae in Foenices provinciae regionibus sita est, an aliam aliquam, cuius haec quam in terris nouimus forma est, et animas Tyriorum utrum horum, an eorum qui domestici sunt illius Tyri, quae spiritaliter intellegitur, in hoc loco non uidetur requirendum; ne forte uelut in transitu de tantis et tam absconditis rebus uideamur inquirere, quod utique proprium uel opus exigit uel laborem.

1.5.5. Rursum tamen etiam de alia uirtute contraria ab Esaia propheta talia quaedam docemur. Ait enim: Quomodo cecidit de caelo Lucifer, qui mane oriebatur? Confractus est et conlisus ad terram qui inmittebat ad omnes gentes. Tu vero dixisti in sensu tuo: Ascendam in caelum, supra stellas caeli ponam thronum meum, sedebo in monte excelsior supra montes excelsos, qui sunt ad aquilonem, ascendam super nubes, ero similis altissimo. Nunc autem in infernum demergeris et in fundamenta terrae. Qui te uiderint admirabuntur super te et dicent: Hic est homo, qui exacerbabat totam terram, qui mouebat reges, qui fecit uniuersum orbem terrae desertum, qui urbes destruxit nec eos qui in uinculis sunt resoluit. Omnes reges gentium dormierunt in honore, unusquisque in domo sua: tu uero proiciieris in montibus sicut mortuus exsecrabilis cum multis mortuis, qui transfossi sunt gladiis et descenderunt in infernum. Sicut uestimentum sanguine concretum et infectum non erit mundum, ita ne tu quidem eris mundus pro eo quod terram meam perdidisti et populum meum occidisti; non manebis in aeternum tempus, semen pessimum. Praepara filios tuos ad interfectionem pro peccatis patris tui, uti ne resurgant et terram hereditate possideant et repleant terram bellis. Et insurgam in eos, dicit dominus Sabaoth, et deperire faciam nomen ipsorum et reliquias et semen eorum.

Manifestissime etiam per haec ostenditur cecidisse de caelo is utique, qui prius erat Lucifer et qui mane oriebatur. Si enim, ut putant aliqui, natura tenebrarum erat, quomodo ante fuisse Lucifer dicitur? Vel quomodo poterat
regarding the prince of Tyre refer to an adverse power, by which it is most clearly demonstrated that that power was formerly holy and blessed, from which blessedness he fell, from the point when iniquity was found in him, and was cast upon the earth, and was not such by nature or creation. We think, therefore, that these words were spoken of a certain angel who had been appointed to the office of governing the Tyrian people, and to whose care their souls also seem to have been entrusted. But what Tyre, or what souls of Tyrians, we ought to understand, whether that Tyre situated within the region of the province of Phoenicia, or some other of which this one we know on earth is a figure, and whether the souls of the Tyrians are those of the former or those of the inhabitants of that Tyre which is spiritually understood, does not seem to need investigation here, lest perhaps we should appear to investigate in passing matters of such importance and so great obscurity that they demand a work and treatment of their own.

1.5.5. Again, we are taught such things by the prophet Isaiah about another opposing power. He says, How did the Day Star, who used to arise in the morning, fall from heaven? He who assailed all nations has been crushed and beaten to the earth. You said in your heart, I will ascend into heaven, above the stars of heaven shall I place my throne; I will sit upon a lofty mountain, above the lofty mountains which are towards the north; I will ascend above the clouds; I will be like the Most High. But now you will be brought down to the lower world and to the foundations of the earth. Those who see you will be amazed at you, and will say, This is the human being who used to trouble the whole earth, who shook kings, who made the whole world a desert, who destroyed cities, who did not loose those who were in chains. All the kings of the earth have slept in honour, each one in his own house; but you shall be cast out on the mountains, like an execrable corpse among the many corpses who have been pierced through with swords, and have descended to the lower world. As a garment clotted and stained with blood will not be clean, so too you shall not be clean, because you have destroyed my land and killed my people: you shall not remain for ever, most wicked seed. Prepare your sons for death because of the sins of your father, lest they rise again and possess the earth as an inheritance and fill the earth with wars. I will rise up against them, says the Lord of Sabaoth, and cause their name and their remnant and their seed to perish.

Most clearly by these words is he, who formerly was the Day Star and used to arise in the morning, shown to have fallen from heaven. For if, as some think, he was a being of darkness, how is he said to have formerly been the Day Star? Or how could he, who had nothing of the light in himself, arise in the

24 On the question of the 'Tyrians', especially in light of Matt. 11:21, see Origen, Princ. 3.1.17; 4.3.9; Comm. Jo. 10.286; Hom. Ezech. 13.1.
25 All the manuscripts of Princ. have your father; Crouzel and Simonetti translate as their father following the LXX reading as given in Codex Marchalianus.
26 Isa. 14:12–22.
27 Cf. Origen, Princ. 4.3.9; Comm. Jo. 10.286; Hom. Ezech. 13.1.
oriri mane qui nihil in se habebat ex luce? Sed et salvator docet nos de diabolo
dicens: Ecce uideo Satanan cecidisse de caelo sicut fulgur; lux enim erat
aliquando. Sed et dominus noster, qui veritas est, gloriosi aduentus sui
potientiam nihilominus fulguri comparauit diciens: Sicut enim fulgur a summo
caeli fulget usque ad summum caeli, ita erit et aduentus filii hominis. Et hunc
nihilominus fulguri comparat et dicit eum de caelo cecidisse, ut ostenderet
per hoc fuisse et ipsum aliquando in caelo, habuisse locum inter sanctos,
participasse de hac luce, de qua omnes sancti participant, ex qua et angeli lucis
efficiuntur et apostoli lux mundi dicuntur a domino. Hoc ergo modo erat
etiam iste lux aliquando, antequam praeariaretur et caderet in hunc locum
et gloria eius conuertetur in puluerem, quod est proprie impiorum, sicut et
propheta dixit, ex quo et princeps huius mundi, id est terrenae habitationis,
appellatus est; principatum namque egit in eos, qui eis malitiae obsecuti
sunt, quoniam quidem totus hic mundus (mundum autem nunc terrenum
istum appello locum) in maligno positus est, in hoc scilicet apostata. Quod
autem apostata sit iste (id est refuga), etiam dominus in Iob ita dicit: Adduces
autem in hano draconem apostatam (id est refugam). Certum est autem quia
draco ipse diabolus intellegitur.

Si ergo contrariae uirtutes refugae nominantur et immaculatae aliquando
fuisse dicuntur, immaculatum autem esse praeter patrem et filium et spiritum
sanctum nulli substantialiter inest, sed sanctitas in omni creatura accidens
res est (quod autem accidit, et decidere potest), et istae uirtutes contrariae
immaculatae aliquando fuerunt, et inter illas utique fuerunt, quae adhuc
immaculatae permanent: per hoc ostenditur neque substantialiter uel
naturaliter esse aliquem immaculatum neque substantialiter esse pollutum.
Et per hoc consequens est in nobis esse atque in nostris motibus, ut uel beati

1.5.5, lines 219–23

Jerome, Ep. 124.3.2 (ed. Hilberg 3, 98.13–18):

Quibus [inquit] moti disputationibus arbitramur sponte sua alios esse in
numero sanctorum et ministerio dei, alios ob culpam propriam de sanctimoniam
corruentes in tantam negligium corruisse, ut etiam in contrarias fortitudines
uerterentur.
morning? Moreover, the Saviour himself also teaches us, saying of the devil, *Behold, I see Satan fallen like lightning from heaven,*\(^{28}\) for he once was light. Furthermore, our Lord, who is the truth, compared even the power of his own glorious advent to lightning, saying, *For as the lightning shines from one end of heaven to the other, so will be the coming of the Son of Man.*\(^{29}\) Yet he nevertheless compares Satan to lightning and says that he fell from heaven in order that, by this, he might show him to have been in heaven, to have had a place among the holy ones, and to have participated in that light in which all the holy ones participate, by which they are made *angels of light*\(^{30}\) and the apostles are said, by the Lord, to be the *light of the world.*\(^{31}\) In this manner, then, even this one was once light, before he went astray and fell to this place and had his glory turned into dust, which is the particular mark of the wicked, as the prophet also says, from which too he was called the *ruler of this world,*\(^{32}\) that is, of an earthly habitation, for he ruled over those who were obedient to his wickedness, since *the whole of this world* (I now call 'world' this earthly place\(^{33}\)) *lies in the evil one,*\(^{34}\) that is, in this apostate. That he is an apostate (that is, fugitive\(^{35}\)), the Lord also, in Job, says, *You will catch, with a fish hook, the apostate* (that is, a fugitive) *dragon.*\(^{36}\) It is certain that by the dragon is understood the devil himself.\(^{37}\)

If, therefore, the opposing powers are called apostates, and are said to have once been *blameless,* while to be *blameless* exists essentially in none except the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, but holiness is an accidental quality in every created being (for what is accidental is able also to fall away\(^{38}\)), and those opposing powers were once *blameless* and were once amongst those who still remain *blameless,\(^{39}\) from this it is evident that no one is either essentially or naturally *blameless,* nor essentially polluted. And\(^{40}\) it follows from this that it lies within ourselves and in our own actions whether we be blessed and holy,


\(^{32}\) John 12:31; 16:11.  

\(^{33}\) Cf. Origen, *Comm. Gen.* 3 (= Philoc. 14); *Comm. Jo.* 19.129; *Comm. Rom.* 3.1; Cels. 6.59; *Hom. Ps.* 36, 2.4; *Princ.* 4.3.10–12.  

\(^{34}\) 1 John 5:19.  

\(^{35}\) These are of course Rufinus' explanatory words.  


\(^{38}\) Cf. Origen, *Princ.* 1.3.8; 1.5.3; 1.8.3.  

\(^{39}\) Note that there are some rational beings who have remained 'blameless,' those, that is, who presumably exercise their given ministry for the benefit of others who have fallen away from their calling. Cf. Origen, *Princ.* 1.6.2; 1.8.4; 2.9; 4.2.7; 4.3.12; *Hom. Ezech.* 1.1–5; *Hom. Luc.* 34.4. In *Comm. Jo.* 2.175–92, Origen describes how John the Baptist and Isaiah were 'sent' for such ministry, and refers to the Hebrew document called 'The Prayer of Joseph,' where this teaching is 'stated outright,' namely that those better than other souls have descended to human nature from being angels' (*Comm. Jo.* 2.188).  

\(^{40}\) Cf. Jerome *Ep.* 124.3.2 (ed. Hilberg 3, 98.13–18): 'And, in a subsequent passage: moved, he said, by these reasonings we suppose that by their own free act some are numbered with the saints and servants of God, and others, through their own faults, departing from holiness fell into such negligence that they were changed into opposing powers.'
et sancti simus, uel per desidiam et negligentiam ex beatitudine in malitiam perditionemque uergamus in tantum, ut nimius profectus ut ita dixerim malitiae, si qui eo usque sui neglexerit, usque in eum deueniat statum, ut ea quae dicitur contraria uirtus efficiatur.

1.6.1. Finis uel consummatio rerum perfectarum consummatarumque esse uidetur indicium. Quae res etiam nos in hoc loco commonet quod ad haec tam ardua et difficilia intellegenda, si quis ille est qui legendi horum et talia cognoscendi desiderium cepit, perfectum et eruditum sensum debet adhibere; ne forte si aut nullum usum in huiuscemodi quaestionibus habuit, uana quaedam haec illi et superfluauideantur, aut si iam praediudicatum et praeuentum in alius animum gerit, haeretica haec et contra fidem ecclesiasticam putet, non tam ratione convincens quam animi sui praediudicio definiens. Quae quidem etiam a nobis cum magno metu et cautela dicuntur, discutientibus et pertractantibus quam pro certo ac definito statuentibus. Indicatum namque a nobis in superioribus est, quae sint de quibus manifesto dogmate terminandum sit; quod et pro uiribus fecisse nos puto, cum de trinitate loqueremur; de his uero disputandi specie magis quam definiendi, prout possumus, exercemur.

Finis ergo mundi et consummatio dabitur, cum unusquisque pro merito peccatorum etiam poenis subicietur; quod tempus deus solus agnoscit, quando unusquisque quod meretur expendet. In unum sane finem putamus quod bonitas dei per Christum suum uniuersam reuocet creaturam, subactis ac subditis etiam inimicos. Sic enim dicit sancta scriptura: Dixit dominus domino meo: sede a dextris meis, donec ponam inimicos tuos scabelum pedum tuorum. Quodsi minus nobis manifestum est, quid in hoc indicet propheticus sermo, a Paulo apostolo discamus apertius dicente quia Oportet Christum regnare, donec ponat omnes inimicos suos sub pedibus suis.

221 uergamus : mergamur C 222 eo usque : in tantum γ 224 ante finis add. titulum: de fine uel [ut C] consummatione nec non et de principio rerum sed et diuersitate ordinum ac restitutione in unum ® : de fine uel consummatione γ Koe Goe; secl. Sim Fern : om. δ uel : ut C 230-8 animum ... illis om. M (duobus foliis deperditis) 236 de his uero om. γ : nunc autem Merl Del 245 a om. γ 246 suos om. γ
or, through sloth and negligence, we fall from blessedness into wickedness and ruin to such a degree that, through too great an advance, so to speak, in wickedness, one may descend even to that state (if one shall have neglected himself to such an extent) that he may become what is called an opposing power.

1.6.1. An end or consummation would seem to be an indication that things are perfected and consummated. Which now reminds us that, regarding these things which are so hard and difficult to understand, if anyone cherishes a desire to read them and to understand such things he ought to apply a perfect and instructed understanding, lest, perchance, if he has no experience in investigations of this kind, they may appear to him as vain and superfluous, or if, by other investigations, his mind is already prejudiced and closed, he may reckon these to be heretical and opposed to the ecclesiastical faith, not so much convincing by reason but determining by the prejudice of his own mind. These things are indeed spoken about by us with great fear and caution, discussing and investigating rather than establishing as fixed and certain. For it has been pointed out by us above what are those points that must be clearly determined by dogma, which, I think, we have done to the best of our ability when we spoke about the Trinity; but now, however, we are occupied, as best we can, in matters of a kind needing discussion rather than definition.

There will be, then, an end and consummation of the world, when every one shall be subjected to punishments on account of sins; this time, when he will render to each one what is deserved, is known to God alone. We think, indeed, that the goodness of God through Christ may recall his whole creation to one end, with even his enemies being overcome and subdued. For thus says holy Scripture, The Lord said to my Lord: Sit at my right hand, until I make your enemies a footstool for your feet. And if what the prophetic language means here is less than clear to us, we may learn from the Apostle Paul, saying more openly that, For Christ must reign until he has put all his enemies under
Quodsi ne ista quidem apostoli tam aperta sententia satis nos edocuit, quid sit inimicos poni sub pedibus, audi adhuc eum in consequentibus: Oportet enim ei subiecta esse omnia. Quae ergo est subjectio, qua Christo omnia debent esse subjecta? Ego arbitror quia haec ipsa, qua nos quoque optamus ei esse subjecti, qua subjecti ei sunt et apostoli et omnes sancti, qui secuti sunt Christum. Subiectionis enim nomen, qua Christo subicimur, salutem quae a Christo est indicat subjectorum; sicut et Daudiv dicebat: Nonne deo subdita erit anima mea? ab ipso enim salutare meum.

1.6.2. Talem igitur finem uidentes, cum omnes inimici subjecti erunt Christo, et cum nouissimus inimicus destructur mors, et cum tradetur a Christo, cui omnia subjecta sunt, regnum deo et patri: ab isto, inquam, tali fine rerum contemplemur initia. Semper enim similis est finis initii; et ideo sicut unus omnium finis, ita unum omnium intellegi debet initium; et sicut multorum unus finis, ita ab uno initio multae differentiae ac uarietates, quae rursum per bonitatem dei, per subiectionem Christi atque unitatem spiritus sancti in unum finem, qui sit initio similis, reuocantur, omnes scilicet hi, qui in nomine Iesu genu flectentes per hoc ipsum subiectionis suae insignia declarantur, qui sunt caelestium et terrae et infernorum; in quibus tribus significacionibus omnis uniuersitas indicatur, hi uidelicet, qui ab illo uno initio pro suis unusquisque motibus uarie acti per diversos ordines pro merito dispensati sunt; non enim in his bonitas substantialiter inerat, sicut in deo et Christo eius et in spiritu sancto. In hac enim sola trinitate, quae est auctor omnium, bonitas substantialiter inest; ceteri uero accidentem eam ac decidentem habent, et tunc sunt in beatitudine, cum de sanctitate et sapientia ac de ipsa deitate participant.
his feet. But if even that plain statement of the Apostle has not sufficiently informed us what is meant by *enemies being placed under [his] feet*, listen to him in what follows, *For all things must be subjected to him*. What then is this *subjection* by which all things must be made subject to Christ? I am of the opinion that it is the same subjection by which we also wish to be subject to him, by which the apostles, and all the saints who have followed Christ, were also subject to him. For the word *‘subjection’*, as to how we are subject to Christ, indicates the salvation, which is of Christ, of those who are subject; as David said, *Shall not my soul be subject to God? For from him comes my salvation.*

1.6.2. Seeing, then, that such is the end, when all enemies will be subjected to Christ, and when the last enemy, death, will be destroyed and when the kingdom shall be delivered to the God and Father by Christ, to whom all things have been subjected, let us, I say, from such an end as this contemplate the beginning of things. For the end is always like the beginning, and, therefore, as there is one end of all things, so ought there to be understood one beginning of all things, and as there is one end of many things, so also from one beginning there are many differences and varieties, which, in turn, through the goodness of God and by subjection to Christ and through the unity of the Holy Spirit, are recalled to one end which is like the beginning; that is, all those who *bending the knee at the name of Jesus* have displayed by this the proof of their subjection to him, those who are of the heavens and of the earth and of the regions under the earth—the entire universe being indicated by the three terms—those, that is, who from that one beginning, each one variously led by his own impulse, were arranged in different orders according to their merit, for goodness did not exist in them essentially, as it does in God and his Christ and the Holy Spirit. For in this Trinity alone, which is the author of all things, does goodness exist essentially; others possess it as an accident and something that can be lost; and only then are they in blessedness, when they participate in holiness and wisdom and in divinity itself.

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47 1 Cor. 15:25. 48 1 Cor. 15:27, 28. 49 Ps. 61:1. 50 Cf. 1 Cor. 15:24–7. 51 On the relation between the beginning and the end, see Barn. 6.13; Origen, Princ. 2.1.1; 2.1.3; 3.6.3; Comm. Jo. 13.244; Cels. 8.72. See also the comments in the Introduction, sections 3 and 5, regarding creation and its completion. 52 Phil. 2:10. 53 Cf. Origen, Princ. 1.4.3; 1.5.5; 1.8.3. 54 Cf. Origen, Princ. 1.3.8; 3.6.1; Mart. 47; Cels. 3.47.
Si uero ab huiuscemodi participatione neglegant atque dissimulent, tunc uito propriae desidiae alius sitius alius tardius, plus alius uel minus, ipse sibi causa sui lapsus uel casus efficitur. Et quoniam, ut diximus, casus iste uel lapsus, quo de statu suo unusquisque declinit, quam pluriram in se habet diuersitatem pro mentis ac propositi motibus, quod alius leuïus, alius uero grauius ad inferiorem declinit: in hoc iam iustum judicium dei prouidentiae est, ut unicuique secundum diuersitatem motuum pro merito sui decessus et commotionis occurrat. Ex his sane, qui in illo initio permanserunt, quod futuro fini simile esse descripsimus, quidam ex ipsis in ordinatione ac dispensatione mundi ordinem angelicum sortiuntur, alii uirtutum, alii principatum, alii potestatum (quo in eos uidelicit exerceat poestatem, qui habere super caput indigent potestatem), alii thronorum ordinem, id est iudicandi uel regendi eos, qui hoc indigent, habentes officium, alii dominationem, sine dubio super seruos; quae omnia eis pro merito et profectibus suis, quibus in dei participationem imitationemque profecerant, aequo

1.6.2, lines 272–94

Justinian, Ep. ad Menam (ed. Schwartz, 210.29–211.7), Koetschau Frag. 11:

'Ex idias aitias twn μη προσεχοντων έαυτωις αγρύπνως γύνονται τάχιον ἡ βράδων μεταπιπτώσεις [Koe, G-K μεταππώσεις], καὶ ἐπὶ πλείον ἤ ἐπ’ ἐλαττων, ὡς ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας κρίσει θεία συμπαραμετρούσῃ τοίς εκάστον βελτίωσιν ἡ χείρος κινήμασι καὶ τὸ κατ’ ἄξιον, ο μὲν τις ἔχει ἐν τῇ ἐσομένῃ διακοσμήσει τάξιν ἀγγελικήν ἢ δύναμιν ἀρχικήν ἢ ἔξοψιαν τῇ ἐπὶ τινῶν ἢ θρόνων τὸν ἐπί βασιλευμένων ἢ κυρείαν τῇ κατὰ δουλῶν: οἱ δὲ οὐ πάνω τι ἐκπεσόντες τὴν ὑπὸ τοῖς εἰρημένοις οἰκονομίαι καὶ βοηθείαιν ἔξοψαν. Καὶ οὕτως κατὰ μὲν τὸ πλεῖστον ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπὸ τὰς ἀρχαίς καὶ τὰς ἔξοψιας καὶ τοὺς θρόνους καὶ τὰς κυριότητας, τάχα δὲ ἐσθ’ ὅτε καὶ ἀν’ αὐτῶν [as Koe, G-K; Schwartz ἀντ’ αὐτῶν] συστήσεται τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ἐν τῷ καθ’ ἔνα κόσμῳ.
But, if they are negligent and careless about such participation, then each one, by fault of his own slothfulness, becomes—one more quickly, another more slowly, one to a greater extent, another to a lesser—the cause of his own lapse or fall. And since, as we have said, this fall or lapse, by which each one departs from his original state, has in itself the greatest diversity, according to the impulse of the intellect or intention, one falls slightly, another more seriously, to the lower things: in this is the just judgement of the providence of God, that it should happen to everyone according to the diversity of his conduct, in proportion to the merit of his declension and revolt. Certain of those, indeed, who have remained in that beginning, which we have described as being similar to the end which is to come, are allocated, in the ordering and arranging of the world, the rank of angels, others that of powers, others of principalities, others of authorities (clearly that they may exercise authority over those who need to have authority over their head), others the rank of thrones (that is, having the office of judging or ruling those who need this), others dominion (doubtless over slaves); all of which divine providence bestows upon them, in fair and just judgement, according to their merit and the progress by which they advanced in the participation and imitation.

55 Cf. Justinian Ep. ad Menam (ed. Schwartz, 210.29–211.7), an extract identified as coming from Princ. 1 and numbered by Koetschau as Fragment 11: 'For those who do not pay vigilant attention to themselves, changes of condition take place, from their own fault, either quicker or slower, greater or lesser, so that from this fault, by a divine judgement corresponding to the better or worse movements of each and according to merit, one will have an angelic rank in the future arrangement, or ruling power, or authority over certain beings, or a throne over subjects, or lordship over slaves; while those not completely falling away will have the oversight and aid of those mentioned. And thus for the most part it is from those set under the rulers and the authorities and thrones and dominions, and perhaps sometimes even from these, that the race of human beings will be constituted in the world in unity.'

56 Cf. Origen, Princ. 3.3.6; Frag. Lam. 23 (GCS 3, p. 245).

57 Cf. 1 Cor. 11:10.
Justoque iudicio divina contulit prudentia. Hi uero qui de statu primae beatitudinis moti quidem sunt, non tamen inremediabiler moti, illis quos supra descripsimus sanctis beatisque ordinibus dispensandi subjici sunt ac regendi; quorum adiutorio usi et institutionibus ac disciplinis salutaribus reformati, redire ac restitui ad statum suae beatitudinis possint. Ex quibus aestimo, prout ego sentire possum, hunc ordinem humani generis institutum, qui utique in futuro saeculo uel in superuenientibus saeculis, cum caelum nouum et terra noua secundum Esaiam erit, restituetur in illam unitatem, quam promittit dominus Iesus dicens ad deum patrem de discipulis suis: *Non pro istis rogo solis, sed et pro omnibus qui crediti sunt per uerbum eorum in me, ut omnes unum sint, sicut ego in te, pater, et tu in me, ita etisti in nobis unum sint*; et iterum ubi ait: *Vt sint unum, sicut nos sumus unum, ego in ipsis, et tu in me, ut sint et ipsi consummati in uno*; et sicut confirmat nihilominus etiam Paulus apostolus dicens: *Donec occurramus omnes in unitatem fidei in virum perfectum, in mensuram aetatis plenitudinis Christi*; et sicut idem apostolus iam nos etiam in praesenti uita in ecclesia positos, in qua utique futuri regni est forma, ad hanc eandem unitatis similitudinem cohortatur dicens: *Vt eadem dicatis omnes, et non sint in uobis schismata, sitis autem perfecti in uno eodemque sensu atque in una eademque sententia.*

1.6.2, lines 287–94

*Jerome, Ep. 124.3.3 (ed. Hilberg 3, 98.23–99.4):*

Qui uero fluctuauerint et motis pedibus nequaquam omnino corrurerint, subicientur dispensandi et regendi adque [Koe atque ad] meliora gubernandi principatibus, potestatibus, thronis, dominationibus; et forsitan ex his hominum constabit genus in uno aliquo ex mundis, quando iuxta Esaiam caelum et terra noua fient.
of God. Those, however, who have been removed from their state of primal blessedness, yet not removed irremediably, have been made subject to the governance and rule of those holy and blessed orders, which we have described above; availing themselves of their help, and being reformed by their instruction and salutary discipline, they may be able to return and be restored to their former state of blessedness. It is from these, I suggest, as far as I am able to understand, that this order of the human race has been established, which, in the future age or in the coming ages, when there shall be a new heaven and new earth, according to Isaiah, will certainly be restored to that unity promised by the Lord Jesus, praying to the God and Father on behalf of his disciples, I do not pray for these alone, but for all who shall believe in me through their word, that all may be one, as I, Father, am in you, and you in me, that they also may be one in us; and again, where he says, That they may be one, even as we are one, I in them and you in me, that they may be perfected in one; and just as the Apostle Paul also confirms, saying, Until we all attain to the unity of the faith in the perfect man, to the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ; and just as the same Apostle now exhorts us, who even in the present life are placed in the Church, in which is the figure of the kingdom to come, to this same image of unity, saying, That you all say the same thing, and that there be no divisions among you, but that you be perfected in one and the same mind and in one and the same judgement.
1.6.3. Sciendum tamen est quosdam eorum, qui ex illo uno principio, quod supra diximus, dilapsi sunt, in tantam indignatem ac malitiam se dedisse, ut indigni habiti sint institutione hac uel eruditione, qua per carmen humanum genus adiutorio caelestium uirtutum instituitur atque eruditur, sed e contrario etiam aduersarii et repugnantes his, qui erudiuntur atque imbuuntur, existunt. Vnde et agones quosdam atque certamina omnis haec habet uita mortalium, reluctantibus scilicet et repugnantibus aduersum nos his, qui sineullo respectu de statu meliorem dilapsi sunt, qui appellantur diabolus et angeli eius ceterique ordines malitiae, quos apostolus de contrariis uirtutibus nominavit.

Vnde et agones quosdam atque certamina omnis haec habet uita mortalium, reluctantibus scilicet et repugnantibus aduersum nos his, qui sineullo respectu de statu meliorem dilapsi sunt, qui appellantur diabolus et angeli eius ceterique ordines malitiae, quos apostolus de contrariis uirtutibus nominavit.

Iam vero si aliqui ex his ordinibus, qui sub principatu diaboli agunt ac malitiae eius obtemperant, poterint aliquando in futuris saeculis converti ad

1.6.3, lines 306–14

Jerome, Ep. 124.3.4 (ed. Hilberg 3, 99.4–9):

Qui uero non fuerint meriti, ut per genus hominum reuertantur ad pristinum statum, fient diabolus et angeli eius et pessimi daemones ac pro uarietate meritorum in singulis mundis diuersa officia sortientur.

1.6.3, lines 315–30

Justinian, Ep. ad Menam (ed. Schwartz, 211.10–12):

Oμαι δὲ δύνασθαι ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποτεθημένων τοῖς χείροις ἀρχαῖς καὶ ἑξουσίαις καὶ κοσμικράτορις καθ᾽ ἐκαστὸν κόσμου ἦ τινὰς κόσμους ἐνίον τάχιν εὐφρενισμένους καὶ βουλησομένους ἐξ αὐτῶν μεταβαλεῖν συμπληρώσειν ποτὲ ἀνθρωπότητα.


Ipsosque daemones ac rectores tenebrarum in alio mundo uel mundis, si uoluerint ad meliora converti, fieri homines et sic ad antiquum redire principium, ita dumtaxat, ut per supplicia atque tormenta, quae uel multo uel breui tempore sustinuerint, in hominum eruditi corporibus rursum ueniant ad angelorum fastigia.

Cf. Jerome, Jo. Hier. 16 (PL 23, 368).
1.6.3. It should be known, however, that some of those who fell away from that one beginning, which we have spoken about above, have given themselves to such unworthiness and wickedness that they have become undeserving of that instruction and training by which the human race, through the flesh, with the aid of the heavenly powers, is being instructed and trained, but, on the contrary, they are adversaries and opponents of those who are being trained and formed. And thus it is that this whole life of mortals is full of conflicts and struggles, for opposing and attacking us are those who have fallen from a better condition without any looking back, who are called the devil and his angels and the other orders of wickedness, which the Apostle names amongst the opposing powers.

But whether any of these orders, which live under the rule of the devil and obey his malice, will be able in some future age to be converted to goodness,

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64 Cf. Jerome, Ep. 124.3.4 (ed. Hilberg 3, 99.4–9), continuing to recount Origen's teaching: 'Those, however, who have not become worthy, that they should return through the human race to their former state, shall become the devil and his angels and the worst kind of demons, and will be allocated, according to their varying merits, diverse offices in one of the worlds.'


66 Cf. Origen, Princ. 3.2.

67 Cf. Justinian, Ep. ad Menam (ed. Schwartz, 211.10–12), an extract said to be from Princ. 1: 'But I think that of those subjected to the worst rulers and authorities and world-powers, in each world or certain worlds, some are perhaps able, through doing good deeds and wanting to transfer from these powers, to attain sometime to humanity.' Jerome's account (Ep. 124.3.5; ed. Hilberg 3, 99.9–14), continuing from the passages given in previous footnotes, runs as follows: 'The demons themselves and the rulers of darkness in any world or worlds, if they desire to turn to better things, become human beings and thus revert to their original beginning, in order that, being disciplined in human bodies through punishments and torments, whether they bear them for a long or short time, they may reach again the exalted heights of the angels.' See also Jerome, Jo. Hier. 16 (PL 23, 368).
bonitatem, pro eo quod inest inipsis liberi facultas arbitrii, an uero permanens et inueterata malitia uelut in naturam quandum ex consuetudine convurtatur: etiam tu qui legis probato, si omnimodis neque in his quae **uidentur temporalibus** saeculis neque in his quae **non uidentur et aeterna** sunt penitus pars ista ab illa etiam finali unitate ac conuenientia discrepabit. Interim tamen tam in his quae **uidentur et temporalibus** saeculis quam in illis quae **non uidentur et aeterna** sunt omnes isti pro ordine, pro ratione, pro modo et meritorum dignitatis dispensantur: ut in primis alii, alii in secundis, nonnulli etiam in ultimis temporibus et per maiora ac graviora supplicia nec non et diuturna ac multis, ut ita dicam, saeculis tolerata asperioribus emendationibus reparationi et restitutis eruditionibus primo angelicus tum deinde etiam superiorum graduum uirtutibus, ut sic per singula ad superiorm proiecti usque ad ea quae sunt **invisibilia et aeterna** perueniant, singulis uidelicet quibusque caelestium uirtutum officiis quadam eruditionum specie peragratis. Ex quo, ut opinor, hoc consequentia ipsa uidentur ostendere, unamquamque rationabilem naturam posse ab uno in alterum ordinem transeuntem per singulos in omnes, et ab omnibus in singulos peruenire, dum accessus prefectuum defectuumque varios pro motibus uel conatibus propriis unusquisque pro liberi arbitrii facultate perpetitur.

1.6.3, lines 330–34

*Jerome, Ep. 124.3.6 (ed. Hilberg 3, 99.14–18):*

Ex quo consequenti ratione monstrari omnes rationabiles creaturas ex omnibus posse fieri, non semel et subito sed frequentius, nosque et angelos futuros et daemones, si egerimus neglegentius, et rursum daemones, si voluerint capere uirtutes, peruenire ad angelicam dignitatem.

Scholia on Dionysius the Areopagite's Ecclesiastical Hierarchy (PG 4, 173a):

ως φησιν Ὁριγένης μὲν ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἀρχῶν πρώτῳ λόγῳ οὕτως· ὁ τοίνυν λόγος, οἷμαι, δεῖκνυσι πᾶς, πάν ὅ τι ποτὲ λογικὸν ἀπὸ παντὸς οὕτως οὐτισοσοῦν λογικοῦ δύνασθαι γενέσθαι.

To which Görgemanns and Karpp add, from the Scholia on Dionysius the Areopagite's Ecclesiastical Hierarchy (PG 4, 173a):

καὶ μετὰ βραχέα ἐπάγει λέγων· μετὰ τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέλος πάλιν ἀπόρρευσι καὶ κατάπτωσις γίνεται.
through the faculty of free will which is in them, or whether persistent and
inveterate wickedness might be changed, by habit, into a kind of nature, you, reader, must judge, that is, if in any way, both in these seen and temporal ages and in those unseen and eternal ages, that portion will be wholly discordant from that final unity and harmony. In the meantime, however, both in these seen and temporal ages and in those that are unseen and eternal, all those beings are arranged in order, by reason, according to the measure and dignity of their merits, so that some at first, others second, some even in the last times and through heavier and severer punishments endured for long duration and, so to speak, for many ages, are renewed by these harsh correctives and restored, at first by the instruction of the angels, and then by the powers of a higher rank, that, advancing thus through each stage to better things, they arrive even at those things which are unseen and eternal, having traversed, by some form of instruction, every single office of the heavenly powers. From which, so I think, this consequence appears to be demonstrated, that every rational being is able, passing from one order to another, to go from each order to all and from all to each, while it continues, through its faculty of free will, susceptible of promotions and demotions according to its own actions and efforts.

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68 On the idea of action being changed by habit into nature, see Origen, Comm. Jo. 20.174, and, in the case of the human soul of Christ, Princ. 2.6.5–6; see also Hom. Jer. 18.1, a propos of Jer. 18:1–16. For Aristotle, Eth. nic. 7.10.4 (1152a30–3), habit 'is like nature.' Clement of Alexandria also speaks of habit 'becoming nature,' see Strom. 7.7.46.9; see also 4.22.138.3.

69 Origen addresses his readers also in Princ. 2.3.7; 2.8.4, 5; 3.6.9.

70 Cf. 2 Cor. 4:18.

71 Cf. Origen, Princ. 1.6.2; 2.5.3; 2.10.6; 3.1.23; 3.6.6; Cels. 4.99; 5.31; Hom. Exod. 3.3.

72 Cf. Jerome Ep. 124.3.6 (ed. Hilberg 3, 99.14–18), continuing his account of Origen's teaching: 'From which, by rational inference, it is shown that any rational creature can come to be out of any other, not once or suddenly but repeatedly; we may become angels and, if we live negligently, demons, and, in turn, demons, if they desire to possess virtues, may attain to the angelic dignity.' The following is also preserved in the Scholia on Dionysius the Areopagite's Ecclesiastical Hierarchy (PG 4, 173a): 'as Origen says in the first book of On First Principles: every argument shows, then, I think, that every rational being is able to come to be out of any other rational being whatsoever.'

73 Görßemanns and Karpp add the following sentence from the Scholia on Dionysius the Areopagite's Ecclesiastical Hierarchy (PG 4, 173a), which follows immediately from the sentence quoted in the previous footnote: 'And after a little he adds, saying: after the end comes upon all, an emission and a fall take place again.'
1.6.4. Quoniam sane *uisibilia* quaedam dicit esse Paulus *et temporalia*, alia vero praeter haec *invisibilia et aeterna*, quiserimus quomodo haec quae uidentur temporalia sint: utrumne pro eo quod nihil omnino post hoc erunt in omnibus illis futuris spatii ac saeculis, quibus dispersio illa unius principii atque diuisio ad unum et eundem finem ac similitudinem reparatur, an pro eo quod habitus quidem eorum quae uidentur transeat, non tamen etiam substantia eorum omnimodis corrumpatur. Et Paulus quidem uidetur id quod posterius diximus confirmare, cum dicit: *Transiet enim habitus huius mundi*. Sed et Daudum cum dicit: *Caeli peribunt, tu autem permanebis, et omnes sicut uestimentum ueterescent, et sicut amictum mutabitis eos, sicut uestimentum mutabuntur*, eadem uidetur ostendere. Si enim mutabuntur caeli, utique non perit quod mutatur; et si habitus huius mundi transit, non omnimodis exterminatio uel perditio substantiae materialis ostenditur, sed inmutatio quaedam fit qualitatis atque habitus transformatio. Esaias quoque cum per prophetiam dicit quia *Erit caelum nouum et terra noua*, similem sine dubio suggerit intellectum. Innouatio namque caeli et terrae et transmutatio *habitum huius mundi* et inmutatio caelorum his sine dubio praeparabitur, qui per illam uiam, quam supra ostendimus, iter agentes ad illum finem beatitudinis tendunt, cui etiam ipsi inimici subiciendi dicuntur, in quo fine *omnia et in omnibus* esse dicitur deus. In hoc fine si qui materialem naturam, id est corpoream, penitus interitam putet, nullo omnino genere intellectui meo occurrere potest, quomodo tot et tantae substantiae uitam agere ac subsistere sine corpore possint, cum solius dei, id est patris et filii ac spiritus sancti naturae id proprium sit, ut sine materiali substantia et absque ulla corporeae adictionis societate intellegatur existere. Alius fortasse dicet quoniam in illo fine omnis substantia corporalis ita pura erit atque purgata, ut aetheris in modum et caelestis cuiusdam puritatis ac sinceritatis possit intellegi. Certius tamen qualiter se habitura sit res, scit solus deus, et si qui eis per Christum et spiritum sanctum amici sunt.
1.6.4. Now, since Paul says that some things are *seen and temporal*, and others, besides these, *unseen and eternal,* we ask how those things which are seen are transient—whether because there will be nothing at all after this [world], in all those periods or ages to come in which the dispersion and division from the one beginning is restored to one and the same end and likeness, or because while the form of the things that are seen passes away, their substance, however, is in no way corrupted. And Paul seems to confirm the latter view, when he says, *The form of this world passes away.* David, also, seems to indicate the same thing, when he says, *The heavens will perish, but you will endure; and they will all become old like a garment, and you will change them like clothing, like a garment they will be changed.* For if the heavens are to be changed, assuredly that which is changed does not perish; and if the form of the world passes away, it is not, by any means, an annihilation or destruction of the material substance that is indicated, but a kind of change of quality and transformation of form takes place. Isaiah, also, when he says prophetically that *there will be a new heaven and a new earth,* undoubtedly suggests something similar. For this renewal of heaven and earth, and the transmutation of the *form of this world,* and the changing of the heavens will undoubtedly be prepared for those who, travelling along the way which we have indicated above, are stretching out towards that end of blessedness, to which even the enemies themselves are said to be subjected, in which end God is said to be *all and in all.* And if anyone thinks that in that end material, that is, bodily, nature will perish utterly, he cannot in any respect meet my argument, how beings so numerous and powerful are able to live and exist without bodies, since it is thought to be a property of God alone, that is, of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, to exist without any material substance and apart from any association of a bodily addition. Another, perhaps, might say that in that end every bodily substance will be so pure and refined that it must be thought of as the *aether,* in a way, and of a heavenly purity and clearness. Just how it will be, however, God alone knows with certainty, and those who are his friends through Christ and the Holy Spirit.

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74 Cf. 2 Cor. 4:18.
75 On the issue of the transience, and permanence, of matter and corporeality, see Princ. 2.1–3; 3.6; 4.4.8.
76 1 Cor. 7:31. 77 Ps. 101:27. 78 Isa. 65:17.
79 1 Cor. 15:28. Cf. Origen, Princ. 3.6, for a full treatment of this verse.
80 A point repeated at Princ. 2.2.2; 4.3.15.
81 Origen rejects the idea of 'aether' as a fifth element, as was probably advocated in Aristotle's lost work *On Philosophy*; see Cicero, Acad. 1.7.26; Origen, Princ. 3.6.6; Comm. Jo. 13.126; Cels. 4.60.
82 Cf. John 15:15; Jas. 2:23.
II: The Church’s Preaching
1.7.1. Haec quidem, quae superius disseruimus, generali nobis sermone digesta sint, per consequentiae magis intellectum quam definito dogmate pertractata atque discussa de rationabilibus naturis, post eum locum quem de patre et filio et spiritu sancto pro nostris uiribus exposuimus. Nunc ergo uideamus quae sint, de quibus disserere in consequentibus conuenit secundum dogma nostrum, id est secundum ecclesiae fidem.

Omnes animae atque omnes rationabiles naturae factae sunt uel creatae, siue sanctae illae sint, siue nequam; quae omnes secundum propria naturam incorporeae sunt, sed et per hoc ipsum, quod incorporeae sunt, nihilominus factae sunt; quoniam quidem omnia a deo per Christum facta sunt, sicut generaliter Iohannes docet in euangelio dicens: In principio erat uerbum, et uerbum erat apud deum, et deus erat uerbum. Hoc erat in principio apud deum. Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil. Per species autem ac numeros ordinemque describens ea, quae facta sunt, Paulus apostolus hoc modo disserit, quo ostendat omnia facta esse per Christum, dicens: Et omnia in ipso creata sunt, quae in caelis sunt et quae in terra, siue visibilia siue invisibilia, siue sedes siue dominationes siue principatus siue potestates, omnia per ipsum et in ipso creata sunt, et ipse est ante omnes, et ipse est caput. Manifeste ergo in Christo et per Christum facta esse omnia et creata pronuntiat, siue visibilia, quae sunt corporalia, siue invisibilia, quae non alia esse arbitror quam incoporeas substantiasque uirtutes. Horum autem quae uel corporea uel incorporea generaliter dixerat, ut mihi uidetur, in consequentibus enumerat species, id est sedes dominationes principatus potestates uirtutes.

1.7.2. Haec autem nobis praedicta sint uolentibus per ordinem ad inquisitionem solis ac lunae uel stellarum per consequentiae indaginem peruenire:
The Celestial Beings

1.7.1. The matters, then, which we have examined above, were considered by us in a more general manner, treating and discussing rational beings, more through discernment of inference than by dogmatic definition, after the place where we spoke, to the best of our ability, of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Let us now, therefore, in the following pages consider those matters that it is proper to discuss according to our teaching, that is, according to the faith of the Church.²

All souls and all rational beings, whether they are holy or wicked, were made or created. They are all, according to their proper nature, bodiless;³ even despite this fact, that they are bodiless, they are nonetheless created, because all things were made by God through Christ, as John teaches, in a comprehensive way, in the Gospel, saying: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him and without him was nothing made.⁴ Moreover, when describing created things by species, and numbers, and orders, the Apostle Paul, who shows that all things were made through Christ, speaks in this way, saying: And in him were all things created, things in heaven and things on earth, whether visible or invisible, whether thrones or dominions, or principalities, or authorities: all things were created by him and in him, and he is before all things, and he is the head.⁵ Clearly therefore he declares that in Christ and through Christ were all things made and created, whether bodily, or invisible, which I judge to be none other than the bodiless and spiritual powers. But then, it seems to me, he enumerates, in what follows, the species of those things that he had called, in a comprehensive manner, bodily or bodiless: thrones, dominions, principalities, authorities.

1.7.2. We have made these preliminary remarks wanting to come, in order, to the investigation of the sun and moon and stars, through the method of ...

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¹ Here the manuscripts have the heading 'On Things Bodiless and Bodily'. However, as Princ. 1.7.2 makes clear, the discussion of things bodiless and bodily in Princ. 1.7.1 is meant as a preliminary discussion to the subject matter of this chapter, that is, the sun, moon, and stars (which Koetschau, in his apparatus, suggests as a title), referred to collectively in this chapter as 'celestial beings'.

² Görgemanns and Karpp (p. 233, n.2), following Franz Heinrich Kettler (Der ursprüngliche Sinn der Dogmatik des Origenes, Beiheft 31 zur ZNW (Berlin: Toplemann, 1966), 31–2), would have the words 'according to our teaching, that is, according to the faith of the Church' begin the next paragraph; Crouzel and Simonetti, and Fernandez, keep this phrase with the preceding sentence. Cf. Manlio Simonetti, 'Osservazioni sulla struttura del De Principiis di Origene', Rivista di filologia e d'istruzione classica, N.S. 40 (1962), 273–90, 372–93, at 388–9.

³ Although souls and rational beings are 'bodiless' in themselves, Origen is emphatic that they never exist without a body. Cf. Princ. 1.6.4; 2.2.2; 4.3.15; 4.4.8.

⁴ John 1:1–3.

⁵ Col. 1:16–18.
utrum etiam ipsa inter principatus haberi conueniat pro eo quod dicuntur \textit{in áρχα̂ς} (id est \textit{in principatum}) \textit{dies facta uel noctis}, an putanda sint istum solum habere principatum diei ac noctis, quas inluminandi officium gerunt, non tamen sint de illo ordine atque officio principatum principes. Verum tamen cum dicitur quia \textit{Omnia per ipsum facta sunt}, et \textit{In ipso creata sunt omnia, siue quae in caelis sunt siue quae in terra}, non potest dubitari quod etiam ea, quae in firmamento sunt, quod caelum utique appellatur, in quo \textit{luminaria ista posita esse} dicuntur, inter caelestia numerentur. Tum deinde cum omnia facta esse uel creata, et in quae facta sunt nihil esse, quod non bonum malumque recipiat atque utriusque capax sit, euidenter sermo disputationis inuenerit: quomodo putabitur consequens quod etiam nostrorum quidam de sole et luna uel sideribus opinantur, ut inconuertibiles sint et contrarii incapaces? Idque nonnulli etiam de angelis sanctis, haeretici uero etiam de animabus, quae apud illos spiritualis naturae appellantur, aestimaurent.

Primo ergo uideamus, quid ipsa ratio de sole et luna ac stellis inueniat, si rectum est quod quidam putant, conuertibilitatis eos esse alienos; et quantum fieri potest de sanctis scripturis primo adhibeatur assertio. Iob namque ita uidetur ostendere, quod non solum stellae possint subdita esse peccatis, uerum etiam quod mundae non sint a contagione peccati. Ita namque scriptum est: \textit{Stellae quoque non sunt mundae in conspectu eius}. Quod non utique de corporis earum splendore sentitur, uerbi causa, ut si diceremus: \textit{Vestimentum non est mundum}; quod si ita intellegatur, ad conditoris sine dubio reuocatur inuiri, si quid inmundum in splendore earum corporis accusetur. Si enim per industriam suam neque lucidius sibi corpus assumere neque minus purum per desidiam potuerunt, cur quasi \textit{non mundae stellae} culpentur, si neque quia mundae sunt laudabuntur?

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1.7 The Celestial Beings

inference: [to ask] whether they also ought to be reckoned among the
principalities, on account of their being said to be made in ἀρχάς (that is,
for rulership) of the day and of the night, or whether they are to be supposed
to have only that rulership of the day and of the night which they accomplish
in the office of illuminating them, but are not however of the order and office
of principalities? Now, when it is said that all things were made through him
and in him were created all things, whether things in heaven or things on earth,
there can be no doubt that also those things which are in the firmament,
which is called heaven and in which the lights are said to have been placed, are
to be numbered among the celestial beings. And, then, since the course of the
discussion has clearly found that all things were made or created, and that
among those things which were made there is nothing which may not accept
good or evil, and be capable of either, how shall we reckon as consistent the
opinion held even by some of our own people about the sun and moon and
stars, that they are unchangeable and incapable of becoming the opposite
of what they are? Not a few have thought such even about the holy angels,
and certain heretics [have thought the same] even of souls, which they call
spiritual beings.

First, then, let us see what reason itself can discover about the sun and
moon and stars, whether what some suppose is right, that they are foreign to
changeability; and, as far as possible, let the statement of the holy Scriptures be
first adduced. For Job appears to show that not only may the stars be subject
to sins, but even that they are not clean from the contagion of sin. For it is
written thus: The stars also are not clean in his sight. This is certainly not to be
understood of the splendour of their body, as if one were to say, for example,
that a garment is not clean; if it were thus understood, then the injustice would
without doubt rebound to the Creator, as if accused of the uncleanness in the
splendour of their body. For if they are not able, by their own diligence, to
assume for themselves a brighter body, or, through sloth, one less pure, why are
the stars reproached for being not clean, since they would not be praised even
if they were clean?

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6 Gen. 1:16. Rufinus' Latin text has kept the Greek word ἀρχάς, and explained it
parenthetically; the word connection between Gen. 1:16 and Col. 1:16 is impossible to render in
English: what is translated as 'rulership' is the same noun, in Latin and Greek, as what had
previously been rendered as 'principalities', one of the heavenly ranks.
7 In Princ. 2.9.1, Origen differentiates between the 'heaven' and the 'firmament'.
8 That the celestial bodies are animated and rational beings was a common place in antiquity
(e.g. Plato, Tim. 40b; Leg. 10.898a and 899a; Alcinous, Epit. 14.7), and provided many occasions
for criticism of astrology, fatalism, or worship of heavenly bodies (e.g. Origen, Cels. 5.8–11). As
the following paragraphs make clear, however, Origen develops his cosmology by taking the
language of Scripture at its word, literally.
9 Job 25:5. In Comm. Jo. 1.257, Origen accepts that this might have been said 'hyperbolically.'
1.7.3. Sed ut manifestius hoc intellegi possit, etiam illud primo debemus inquirere, si animantia haec esse et rationabilia intellegi fas est; tum deinde utrum animae ipsarum pariter cum ipsis corporibus extiterint, an anteriores corporibus uideantur; sed et post consummationem saeculi si intellegendum est eas relaxandas esse corporibus, et sicut nos cessamus ab hac uita, ita etiam ipsae a mundi inluminatione cessabunt. Quamuis haec inquirere audaciae cuiusdam uideatur, tamen quoniam captandae ueritatis studio prouocamur, quae possibilia nobis sunt secundum gratiam spiritus sancti scrutari et perpertmare non uidentur absursum.


1.7.4. Iam uero ea, quae animantia esse et rationabilia consequentia disputationis inuenit, utrum cum corporibus pariter animata uideantur eo in tempore, cum dicit scriptura quia Fecit deus duo luminaria magna, luminare maius in principatum diei et luminare minus in principatum noctis, et stellas, an non cum ipsis corporibus, sed extrinsecus factis iam corporibus inseruerit
1.7.3. But to make this point more clearly understood, we ought to inquire, first, whether it is right to think that they are living and rational beings; then, next, whether their souls came into existence along with their bodies or whether they are discerned to be before the bodies; and, also, whether it is to be understood that, after the consummation of the age, they are to be released from their bodies and, just as we cease from this life, so they too will cease from illuminating the world. Although to inquire into these things may seem somewhat audacious, yet, roused as we are by the desire to ascertain the truth, it does not seem absurd to examine and to test, by the grace of the Holy Spirit, all that is possible for us.

We think, therefore, that they may be designated as living beings, because they are said to receive commandments from God, for that does not normally happen except to rational living beings. He speaks, thus, a commandment:° I have commanded all the stars. What are these commandments? Clearly that each star, in its order and course, should supply the world with splendour to the extent entrusted to it. Those called ‘planets’ move in one kind of course, and those called ἀνάμεικται [that is, ‘fixed’] in another. It is most clearly shown from this, that no movement can take place in any body without a soul nor can living beings be at any time without movement. With stars, then, moving with such order and regularity, such that their courses do not appear at any time ever to be derailed, how would it not be the height of obtuseness to say that such order and such observance of rule and plan is carried out or accomplished by irrational beings? In Jeremiah, indeed, the moon is even called the queen of heaven. But if the stars are living and rational beings, without doubt there will appear among them both some progress and regress. For that which Job said, And the stars are not clean in his sight, seems to me to indicate some such idea.

1.7.4. It is now to be ascertained whether those beings, which the course of the discussion has found to be living and rational, appear to have received their soul together with their bodies, at the time when Scripture says that God made two great lights, the greater light to rule the day and the lesser light to rule the night and the stars also, or whether the spirit was implanted not with [the creation of] their bodies but from without, once the bodies were made.°

° Koetschau supposes that there is an omission here, which would have included a citation of Ps. 103:19; however, see note by Crouzel and Simonetti, SC 253, p. 107, n.17.

° Isa. 45:12.

° If Origen, Princ. 2.8.1; 2.9.2; 3.1.2; Cels. 6.48.

° Jer. 44:17–25.

° Gen. 1:16. On the stars being commanded by God, see also Origen, Cels. 5.11; Hom. Jer. 10.6.

° Crouzel and Simonetti, SC 253, p. 108, n.23, suggest that the term translated by Rufinus as spiritus in this sentence and the next was νοῦς, ‘intellect’. On the terminology of ‘spirit’ and ‘soul’, see esp. Princ. 2.8.3–4.
spiritum, peruidendum est. Ego quidem suspicor extrinsecus insertum esse spiritum, sed operae pretium uidebitur de scripturis hoc ostendere. Nam per coniecturam facilis assertio esse uidebitur, scripturarum autem testimoniis utique difficilius adfirmatur. Nam per coniecturas ita possibile est ostendi. Si hominis anima, quae utique inferior est, dum hominis est anima, non cum corporibus ficta, sed proprie et extrinsecus probatur inserta, multo magis eorum animantium, quae caelestia designantur. Nam quantum ad homines expectat, quomodo cum corpore simul ficta anima uidebitur eius, qui in uentre fratrem suum subplantauit, id est Iacob? Aut quomodo simul cum corpore ficta est anima uel plasmata eius, qui adhuc in uentre matris suae positus, repletus est spiritu sancto? Iohannem dico tripidiantem in matris utero, et magna se exultatione iactantem pro eo quod salutationis uox Mariae ad aures Elisabeth suae matris aduenerat. Quomodo simul cum corpore ficta est et plasmata etiam illius anima, qui antequam in utero formaretur, notus esse dicitur deo, et antequam de uulua procederet, sanctificatus ab eo est? Ne forte non iudicio neque pro meritis replere aliquos uideatur deus spiritu sancto et sanctificare non merito. Et quomodo effugiemus illam uocem, qua ait: Numquid iniustitia est apud deum? Absit! uel illud: Numquid personarum acceptio est apud deum? Hoc enim consequitur eam defensionem, quae animas subsistere simul cum corporibus adseuerat. Quantum ergo ex comparatione humani status concipi potest, consequens puto multo magis haec de caelestibus sentienda, quae etiam in hominibus ratio ipsa et scripturae auctoritas uidetur ostendere.

1.7.5. Sed uideamus si quam proprie etiam de ipsis caelestibus significantiam apud scripturam sanctam possimus inuenire. Paulus apostolus ita ait:
I suspect, in fact, that the spirit was implanted from without, but it seems to be a valuable task to demonstrate this from the Scriptures. To make the assertion through inference will be seen to be easy, but assuredly more difficult for it to be established by the testimonies of the Scriptures. Now it may be shown to be possible by inference thus: if the soul of a human being, which, while it remains the soul of a human being, is certainly inferior, is proved to have not been made with the body but separately and implanted from without, much more is this the case with those living beings which are called celestial. Now, with regard to the human being, how will the soul of him who supplanted his brother in the womb, that is, Jacob, appear to be formed together with the body? Or how could the soul of him who, while lying in his mother’s womb, was filled with the Holy Spirit, be formed or fashioned together with the body? I mean John, leaping in his mother’s womb and jumping with great joy because the sound of the salutation of Mary had come to the ears of his mother Elizabeth. How could that soul who, before he was fashioned in the womb, is said to be known by God, and, before he came from the womb, was sanctified by him, be formed or fashioned together with the body? Otherwise it would seem that God fills some with the Holy Spirit neither by judgement nor according to merits, and sanctifies [them] undeservedly. And how shall we avoid that word which says, Is there unrighteousness with God? By no means! Or this, Is there no respect of persons with God? For this is the consequence of that defence which holds that souls come to exist together with bodies. Therefore, so far as it is possible to adduce from a comparison with the condition of the human being, I think it follows that whatever reason itself and the authority of Scripture appear to show in the case of human beings, such ought much more to be held regarding celestial beings.

1.7.5. But let us see whether we can find in holy Scripture any indications properly applicable to the celestial beings themselves. The Apostle Paul speaks

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16 The idea that the soul pre-exists its entrance, 'from without', into the body, is found in Platonism (e.g. Plato, *Phaed.* 76–7; Alcinous, *Ept.* 16.2; Philo, *Gig.* 12); however, as is clear, Origen develops his position by trying to take account of the particularity of the language of Scripture. See also Origen, *Princ.* 2.8.3–4; 2.9.6–7; 3.3.5; *Comm. Jo.* 13.327; 20.162; 20.182–3; *Cels.* 4.40; 5.29; 7.32; and the comments in the Introduction, sections 3 and 5, about creation.


19 Cf. Jer. 1:5. These examples recur frequently in Origen in an anti-Gnostic and anti-determinist context; see esp. *Comm. Jo.* 2.174–92; *Princ.* 2.9.7; 3.3.5.

20 Rom. 9:14.

21 Rom. 2:11.

22 In place of this sentence, Koetschau substitutes a passage from Jerome, *Ep.* 124.4.1 (ed. Hilberg 3, 99.22–7), followed by a sentence from Justinian, *Ep. ad Menam* (ed. Schwartz, 212.20–3), said to come from *Princ.* 1, and numbered by Koetschau as Fragment 13; both texts are included in Appendix II as item no. 8.

23 This passage echoed in Jerome, *Jo. Hier.* 17.
Quoniam, inquit, uanitati creatura subiecta est non uolens, sed propter eum qui subiecit in spe, quia et ipsa creatura liberabitur a seruitute corruptionis in libertatem gloriae filiorum dei. Cui, obsecre, uanitati creatura subiecta est, uel quae creatura, uel quomodo non uolens, uel sub qua spe? quo autem modo ipsa creatura liberabitur a seruitute corruptionis? Sed et alibi ipse apostolus dicit: Nam exspectatio creaturae revelationem filiorum dei expectat. Et iterum alibi ait: Non solum autem, sed et ipsa creatura congemescit et condolet usque nunc.

Vnde inquirendus est qui sit gemitus eius uel qui sint dolores eius.

Et primo ergo uideamus quae est uanitas, cui creatura subiecta est. Ego quidem arbitror non aliam esse uanitatem quam corpora; nam licet aetherium sit corpus astrorum, tamen materiale est. Vnde et Salomon mihi uidetur uniuersam corpoream naturam uelut onerosam quodammodo et uigorem spirituum retardantem hoc modo compellare: Vanitas uanitatum, omnia uanitas, dixit Ecclesiastes, omnia uanitas, Respexi enim, inquit, et uidi uniuerua quae sub sole sunt, et ecce omnia uanitas. Huic ergo uanitati creatura subiecta est, illa praecipue creatura, quae utique maximum in hoc mundo et egregium operis sui obtinet principatum; id est, sol et luna et stellae uanitati subjecta dicuntur, corporibus indita atque ad inluminandi officium humano generi deputata.

Et non, inquit, uolens creatura haec uanitati subiecta est. Non enim uoluntate exhibendum suscepit ministerium uanitati, sed quoniam uolebat ille, qui subiciebat, propter eum, qui subiecit, promittentem his, qui non uoluntate uanitati subdebatur, quod expleto magnifici operis ministerio liberabuntur ab hac seruitute corruptionis et uanitatis, cum redemptionis gloriae filiorum dei tempus aduenerit. Qua spe accepta, et quam promissionem conplendam sperans uniuerua creatura congemescit nunc interim utpote etiam affectum habens erga eos, quibus ministrat et condolet per patientiam, quae promissa sunt sperans.

110 libertate B μ 114 nos post autem add. γ 115 inquirendum Koe
120 uanitatum : uanitatum Gκ Mκ : uanitantium β Mκ
thus: For, he says, the creation was subjected to vanity, not willingly but by reason of him who subjected it in hope, because creation itself shall be set free from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the sons of God. To what vanity, pray, was the creation subject, or what creation, or how is it not willingly, or in what hope? And how is the creation itself to be set free from the bondage of corruption? Moreover, the same Apostle also says in another place, For the expectation of the creation waits for the revelation of the sons of God. And again elsewhere he says, And not only we, but also creation itself groans and is in travail until now. Hence it must be asked what are its groans and what are the pains?

Let us first see, then, what is the vanity to which the creation is subject. I reckon that the vanity is nothing other than the body; for although the body of the stars is ethereal, it is nevertheless material. Whence also Solomon, it seems to me, arraigns the whole of bodily nature as somehow burdensome and impeding the vigour of spirits this way: Vanity of vanities, all is vanity, says the Preacher; all is vanity. I have looked, he says, and have seen all things that are under the sun, and, behold, all is vanity. To this, then, was creation subjected, especially that creation which assuredly possesses, by virtue of its function, the greatest and most eminent authority in this world; that is, the sun and the moon and the stars are said to be subject to vanity because they were clothed with bodies and allotted the task of giving light to the human race.

And this creation, he says, was subjected to vanity not willingly. For it did not by will undertake rendering service to vanity, but because he who subjected it willed it, on account of the one who subjects it, promising those who were being subjected to vanity unwillingly that when the service of their distinguished work should be complete they would be set free from this bondage of corruption and vanity, when the time of the glorious redemption of the sons of God should have arrived. Having received this hope and hoping for the fulfilment of this promise, the whole creation now, in the meantime, groans together, as even suffering for those whom it serves, and patiently labours in pain, hoping for what has been promised.

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24 Rom. 8:20–1. 25 Rom. 8:19. 26 Rom. 8:23, 22.
27 Cf. Origen, Princ. 2.8.3; 2.9.7; 3.5.4; Comm. Jo. 1.95–102; 1.173; Cels. 7.65; Comm. Rom. 7.4.
28 By this, Origen means that the matter of stars is very refined, not that they (along with the intellect) are composed out of a fifth element, as was probably advocated in Aristotle's lost work On Philosophy. See Cicero, Acad. 1.7.26, and Origen, Princ. 3.6.6; Comm. Jo. 13.126; Cels. 4.60.
29 Probably again translating the term νοῦς, 'mind' or 'intellect'; see above, n.15.
30 Eccl. 1:2, 14.
31 Rom. 8:20. It is important to note that in all this discussion about being subjected to vanity, despite many allegations from the time of Jerome to the present day, there is no mention of a prior sin nor of this as being punitive: it is a subjection to vanity, taken as embodiment, with a view to the revelation of the sons of God. For further discussion, see the Introduction, section 5.
Intuere illud quoque, si forte aptari potest etiam illa uox Pauli his, qui licet non uolentes, pro uoluntate tamen eius qui subiecit et pro reipromissionum spe uanitati subjecti sunt, qua ait: Optarem enim resolui (uel redire) et esse cum Christo; multo enim melius. Puto enim quia similiter possit etiam sol dicere quia Optarem resolui (uel redire) et esse cum Christo; multo enim melius. Et Paulus quidem addit: Sed permanere in carne magis necessarium propter uos; sol uero potest dicere: Permanere autem in hoc caelesti et lucido corpore magis necessarium propter reuelationem filiorum dei. Eadem sane etiam de luna et stellis sentienda sunt ac dicenda.

Videamus nunc quae sit etiam libertas creaturae, uel quae absolutio seruitutis. Cum tradiderit Christus regnum deo et patri, tunc etiam ista animantia cum prius regni Christi fuerint effecta, simul cum omni regno etiam patri regnanda tradentur; ut cum deus erit omnia in omnibus, etiam ista cum sint ex omnibus, sit et in istis deus sicut in omnibus.

1.7.5, lines 138–44

Justinian, Ep. ad Menam (ed. Schwartz, 212.25–30), Koetschau
Frag. 14:

Κάλλιον ἀναλύσαι καὶ σὺν Χριστῷ εἶναι, πολλῷ γὰρ μᾶλλον κρείσσον. Νομίζω γὰρ ὅτι λέγοι ἃν ὁ ἥλιος ὅτι κάλλιον ἀναλύσαι καὶ σὺν Χριστῷ εἶναι· πολλῷ γὰρ μᾶλλον κρείσσον. Καὶ ὁ μὲν Παῦλος ἄλλα τὸ ἐπιμένειν τῇ σαρκί ἀναγκαίοτερον δἰ ὑμᾶς, ὃ δὲ ἥλιος· τὸ ἐπιμένειν τῷ οὐρανῷ τοῦτῳ σύματι ἀναγκαίοτερον διὰ τὴν ἀποκάλυψιν τῶν τέκνων τοῦ θεοῦ. Τὰ δὲ αὕτα καὶ περὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν [Koe add. ἀστέρων] λεκτέον.

138 qua : quam C G M*:cum σ resolui uel om. α 146 regnum : regni β μ Koe Goe
Consider also that passage—whether perhaps this saying of Paul can also be applied to those who, although not willingly, yet by the will of him who subjected them and in hope of the promises, are made subject to vanity—where he says: *I would wish to be dissolved (or return) and be with Christ; for it is far better.* For I think that the sun too might say likewise, *I would wish to be dissolved (or return) and be with Christ; for it is far better.* And whereas Paul adds, *But to remain in the flesh is more necessary on your account,* the sun might say, *To abide in this celestial and shining body is more necessary on account of the revelation of the sons of God.* One might well think and say the same regarding the moon and the stars.

Let us now consider what is the freedom of the creation and its deliverance from bondage. When *Christ shall have delivered up the kingdom to the God and Father,* then those living things, when they shall have first been made the kingdom of Christ, shall also be delivered up, together with the whole of that kingdom, to the rule of the Father; so that when *God shall be all in all,* they also, since they are a part of the all, may have God in themselves, as he is in all things.

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[34] Cf. Rom. 8:21. Koetschau here inserts a passage from Jerome Ep. 124.4.1–3 (ed. Hilberg 3, 100.2–17); it is included in Appendix II as item no. 9. Something is perhaps missing at this point, for Origen does not in fact go on to a lengthy discussion about the freedom of the creation and its deliverance from bondage; although, as he understands this to be the Christ's delivery of all to God, so that God might finally be *all in all,* which has already been treated in Princ. 1.6, there is not much more that needs to be said at this point.

[35] 1 Cor. 15:24.

[36] 1 Cor. 15:28.
De angelis

1.8.1. Simili quoque ratione etiam de angelis utendum puto nec aëstimandum quoniam fortuito accidat, ut illi angelo illud iniangatur officium, uerbi gratia, ut Rafaelo curandi et medendi opus, Gabrielo bellorum prudentia, Michaelo mortalium preces supplicationesque curare. Haec enim officia promeruisse eos non aliter putandum est, quam ex suis quemque meritis et pro studiis ac uirtutibus, quae ante mundi istius conpagem gesserint, suscipisse; tum deinde in archangelico ordine illud uel illud officii genus unicuique deputatum; alios uero in angelorum ordine meruisset describi et agere sub illo uel illo archangelo uel illo duce uel principe ordinis sui. Quae omnia, ut diximus, non fortuito neque indiscrete, sed aptissimo et iustissimo dei iudicio ordinata sunt et pro meritis disposita ipso iudicante et probante; ut illi quidem angelo Ephesiorum committi ecclesia debat, illi uero aliis Smyrnensium, et ille quidem angelus ut sit Petri, alius uero ut sit Pauli; tum deinde per singulos minimorum, qui sunt in ecclesia, qui uel qui adscribi singulis debeant angeli, qui etiam cotidie uideant faciem dei, sed et quis debeat esse angelus, qui circumdet in circuitu timentium deum.

Quae utique omnia non casu neque fortuito geri, neque quia naturaliter tales facti sint, aëstimandum est, ne etiam in hoc factoris inaequalitas accuse- tur; sed pro meritis et uirtutibus ac pro uniuscuiusque uigore et ingenio deferri a iustissimo et aequissimo moderatore omnium credendum est deo, [1.8.2.] ne forte incurramus in illas ineptas atque impias fabulas eorum, qui naturas spiritales diuersas et ob hoc a diuersis conditoribus institutas tam in caelestibus quam etiam inter animas hominum fingunt, dum et uni eidemque
1.8 Angels

1.8.1. A similar method or reasoning must be used in regard to the angels, it seems to me, not supposing that it happens accidentally that a particular office is assigned to a particular angel, curing and healing, for example, to Rafael, supervising wars to Gabriel, attending to the prayers and supplications of mortals to Michael. It should be supposed that they deserve these offices in no other way than by their own merits and receive them on account of the zeal and virtue which they displayed before the construction of this world; then, afterwards, this or that kind of office was assigned to each in the order of archangels, while others deserved to be enrolled in the order of angels and to act under this or that archangel, or under that leader or ruler of his order. All these things, as we have said, were arranged not accidentally nor indiscriminately, but by the most appropriate and righteous judgement of God and were disposed by merit, with God himself judging and approving: so that to one angel the Church of the Ephesians would be entrusted, to another the Church of the Smyrneans; one angel was to be Peter's, another Paul's; and then such and such angels, who daily behold the face of God, would be entrusted to each of the little ones, who are in the Church; and there would also be some angel who encamps round about them that fear God.

All of these [functions], assuredly, it is to be supposed, are not performed by accident or chance, nor because they [the angels] were made such by nature, lest in doing this God be charged with partiality; but it is to be believed that they were conferred by God, the most just and impartial ruler of all things, according to the merits and virtues and according to the activity and ability of each, lest we fall into the silly and impious myths of those who imagine a diversity of spiritual natures, both among the heavenly beings and also between human souls, and on this basis [imagine] that they were established by different creators, for while it seems absurd, and really is absurd,
conditori diversas naturas rationabilium creaturarum adscribi uidetur absur-
dum, sicut uere absursum est, et causam tamen in eis diversitatis ignorant. 
Aiunt enim consequens non uideri ut unus atque idem conditor, nulla extante 
causa meritorum, aliis potestatem dominationis iniungat, alios subiciat 
dominantibus, alios tribuat principatum, alios subjectos esse principibus faciat. 
Quae utique omnia, ut ego aestimo, consequentia rationis huius, quam supra 
exposuimus, redarguit atque confutat, per quam causa diversitatis ac uarietatis 
in singulis quibusque creaturis ostenditur ex ipsarum motibus uel ardentiori-
bus uel pigrioribus, secundum uirtutem uel secundum malitiam, non ex 
dispensantis inaequalitate descendere. 

Sed quo facilius haec ita esse in caelestibus agnoscatur, de his quae inter 
hominum gesta sunt uel geruntur, proferamus exempla, ut consequenter ex 
visibilibus etiam inuisibilibus contemplemur. Paulum uel Petrum sine dubio 
spiritalis naturae fuisse confirmant. Cum ergo multa contra pietatem egisse 
Paulus inueniatur in eo quod persecutus est ecclesiam dei, cumque Petrus 
peccatum magra commiserit, ut ancilla ostiaria interrogante se cum iura-
mento adfirmauerit nescire se qui sit Christus: quomodo isti, qui secundum 
illos spiritales sunt, in peccata huissencemodi corruerunt, maxime cum soleant 
 frequerent asserrere et dicere quoniam Non potest arbor bona malos fructus 
facere? Et si utique arbor bona non potest malos fructus facere, secundum 
ipsos uero de radice bonaarboris erant Paulus et Petrus: quomodo istos 
fructus tam malos attulisse putandi sunt? Quodsi responderint ea quae com-
minisci solent, quoniam non Paulus persecutus est, sed alius nescio quis, qui 
erat in Paulo, neque Petrus negauit, sed alius negauit in Petro: quare Paulus, si 
nihil peccauerat, dixit quia Non sum dignus uocari apostolus, quoniam persecu-
tus sum ecclesiam dei? cur autem et Petrus alio peccante ipse flet amarissime? 
Ex quo omnes quidem illorum ineptiae arguentur.

1.8.3. Secundum nos uero nihil est in omni rationabili creatura, quod non tam 
boni quam mali sit capax. Sed non continuo, quia dicimus nullam esse naturam, 
quae non posit recipere malum, idcirco confirmamus omnem naturam 
recepisse malum, id est malam effectam; sed sicut est dicere quia omnis
that to one and the same creator should be ascribed diverse natures of rational
beings, they are nevertheless ignorant of the cause of that diversity.® They say
that it does not seem logical that one and the same creator, with there being no
grounds for merits, should confer upon some the power of domination and
subject others to domination, that he should bestow principalities on some
and make others subject to principalities. All such opinions, indeed, as I would
reckon, are refuted and confuted by thinking through that reasoning which we
developed above, by which the cause of the diversity and variety between each
creature was shown to derive from their own conduct—whether more zealous
or more sluggish, according to virtue or malice—and not to an unfairness on
the part of the Arranger.

But, that this may be more easily understood to be the case with heavenly
beings, let us borrow an example from what has been done or is done among
human beings, in order that from visible things we may, by inference, behold
things invisible too. They [our opponents] will affirm that Paul and Peter were
without doubt of a spiritual nature.? When, therefore, Paul is found to have
done much that is contrary to religion, in having persecuted the Church of
God,¹⁰ and Peter to have committed so grave a sin as, when questioned by the
maid who kept the door, to have asserted with an oath that he did not know
who Christ was,¹¹ how is it possible that these—who, according to them, were
spiritual—should have fallen into sins like this, especially as they are in the
habit of frequently asserting and saying that it is not possible for a good tree to
produce evil fruit?!² And if a good tree cannot produce evil fruit, yet according
to them Paul and Peter were from the root of a good tree, how should they be
considered to have brought forth fruits so wicked? And if they should give the
answer which they generally fabricate—that it was not Paul who persecuted
but some other, I know not whom, who was in Paul, and that it was not Peter
who denied, but some other who denied in Peter—why did Paul say, if he had
not sinned, that I am not worthy to be called an apostle, because I persecuted the
Church of God?!³ And why did Peter weep most bitterly, if another sinned?
From this, all their fooleries are shown.

1.8.3. According to us, however, there is nothing amongst all rational creation
that is not capable of both good and evil. But it does not follow that, because
we say there is no nature which is not able to allow evil in, we therefore affirm
that every being has allowed evil in, that is, has become evil; but just as one
may say that the nature of every human being has the possibility of sailing,
hominis natura recipit ut possit nauigare, non tamen ex eo etiam omnis homo nauigabit, et iterum omni homini possibile est discere artem grammaticam uel medicinam, non tamen idcirco ostenditur omnis homo uel medicus esse uel grammaticus: ita si dicimus nullam esse naturam, quae non possit recipere malum, non tamen continuo etiam recepisse malum designatur. Secundum nos namque ne diabolus quidem ipse incapax fuit boni, non tamen idcirco quia potuit recipere bonum, etiam uoluit uel uirtuti operam dedit. Sicut enim per haec, quae de prophetis exempla protulimus, edocetur, fuit aliquando bonus, cum in paradiso dei in medio Cherubin uersaretur. Sicut ergo iste habuit quidem in se uel uirtutis recipiendae uel malitiae facultatem et a uirtute declinans tota se mente conuertit ad malum: ita etiam ceterae creaturae cum utriusque habeant facultatem, pro arbitrii libertate refugientes malum adhaerent bono.

Nulla ergo natura est, quae non recipiat bonum uel malum, excepta dei natura, quae bonorum omnium fons est, et Christi: sapientia enim est, et sapientia stultitia utique recipere non potest; et iustitia est, iustitia autem numquam profecto iniustitiam capiet; et uerbum est uel ratio, quae utique inrationabilis effici non potest; sed et lux est, et lucem certum est quod tenebrae non conpraehendant. Similiter quoque et natura spiritus sancti, quae sancta est, non recipit pollutionem; naturaliter enim uel substantialiter sancta est. Si qua autem alia natura sancta est, ex assumptione hoc uel inspiratione spiritus sancti habet, ut sanctificetur, non ex sua natura hoc possidens, sed accidens sibi, propter quod et decidere potest quod accidit. Ita et iustitiam accidentem quis habere potest, unde et decidere eam possibile est. Sed et sapientiam quis accidentem nihilominus habet, quamuis in nostra sit positum potestate, studio nostro et uitate merito, si sapientiae operam demus, effici sapientes, et si
but from that, however, it does not follow that every human being will sail; or, again, it is possible for every human being to learn the art of grammar or medicine, but it is not therefore proved that every human being is either a doctor or a grammarian; so, if we say that there is no nature which is not able to allow evil in, it has not necessarily been shown, however, [that every being] has allowed evil in. For, in our view, not even the devil himself was incapable of good; but although able to allow the good in, he does not, however, also desire it or make any effort towards virtue. For as we are taught by those quotations we cited from the prophets, he was at one time good, when he dwelt in the paradise of God, among the cherubim. Just as he had in himself the capacity of allowing in either virtue or evil, and falling away from virtue he turned with his whole mind towards evil, so also other creatures, having the capacity for either, by avoiding evil by their will, they cleave to the good.

There is no nature, therefore, which does not allow in good or evil except the nature of God, which is the fountain of all good things, and of Christ: for he is wisdom, and wisdom assuredly is not able to allow folly in; and he is righteousness, and righteousness will certainly never allow unrighteousness in; and he is word and reason, which indeed cannot be made irrational; moreover, he is also light, and it is certain that darkness does not overcome the light. Similarly, also, the nature of the Holy Spirit, being holy, does not admit of pollution, for it is naturally or substantially holy. If any other nature is holy, it is so as sanctified by the reception or the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, not having this by nature, but as an accidental addition to it, for which reason, as an accidental addition, it may also be lost. So too it is possible for a person to possess an accidental righteousness, whence also it is possible for the same one to fall away. And even the wisdom which a person has is still accidental, yet it is within our power, through our endeavour and worthiness of life, if we devote ourselves to the work of wisdom, to become wise; and if we

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14 The text as preserved in Pamphilus' Apology (68) contains this extra sentence, which does not appear in any of the manuscripts of Princ.; and, on the other hand, there is no nature which may not allow good in, but neither, however, will it be proved thereby that every being has allowed in what is good.

15 A teaching of Origen also reported by Jerome, Ep. 124.4.4 (ed. Hilberg 3, 100.17–19), 'maintaining that while not incapable of virtue the devil has not chosen to be virtuous' (adserens diabolum non incapacem esse uirtutis et tamen necdum uelle capere uirtutem). Of Origen's dialogue with Candidus, Jerome (Ruf. 2.19) reports: 'Candidus asserted that the devil is of a nature wholly evil that can never be saved. Against this Origen rightly replied (recte Origenes respondit) that he is not of a substance destined for destruction, but that it is by his own will that he fell and can be saved. This Candidus falsely turned into a reproach against Origen, as if he has said that the diabolical nature could be saved.'

16 Cf. Ezek. 28:13–14; Origen, Princ. 1.5.4–5.

17 In place of this sentence, Koetschau substitutes, as Fragment 16, a sentence taken from Antipater of Bostra as quoted by John of Damascus, Sacra Parallela (PG 96, 505); it is included in Appendix I as item no. 11.

18 John 1:5.

19 Cf. Origen, Princ. 1.3.5–8.
semper id studii geramus, semper sapientiae participemus, et id nobis uel plus uel minus accidat siue pro uitae merito siue pro studii quantitate. Benignitas enim dei secundum quod se dignum est, prouocat omnia et adtrahit ad beatum finem illum, ubi decidit et aufugit omnis dolor et tristitia et gemitus.

1.8.4. Puto ergo, secundum quod mihi uidetur, quod praecedens disputatio sufficierent ostenderit quod non indiscreto uel fortuito aliquo casu isti principatus teneant principatum uel ceteri ordines suum quisque sortiantur officium, sed pro meritis suis gradum dignitatis huius adepti sunt, licet non sit nostrum uel scire uel quaerere, qui illi actus fuerint, per quos in istum ordinem uenire meruerint. Sed hoc tantum scire sufficit ad dei aequitatem et iustitiam demonstrandum, quia secundum sententiam apostoli Pauli personarum acceptio non est apud deum, quin potius omnia pro meritis singulorum profectibusque dispensat. Neque ergo angelorum officium nisi ex merito constat, neque potestates nisi ex profectu suo agunt potestatem, neque quae nominantur sedes, id est iudicandi uel regendi potestates, id nisi ex meritis administrant, neque dominationes contra meritum dominantur, et est unus iste summus et excellentissimus ordo in caelestibus rationabilis creaturae gloriae officiorum uariatet dispositus.

Similiter sane etiam de aduersariis uirtutibus sentiendum est, quae se in id loci atque officii praebuerunt, ut hoc quod uel principatus uel potestates uel mundi rectores tenebrarum uel spiritualia nequitiae uel spiritus maligni uel daemonia immunda sunt, non substantialiter id habeant, neque quia tales creati sint, sed pro motibus suis et profectibus, quibus in scelere profecerunt, hos in malitia sortiti sunt gradus. Et est alter iste ordo rationabilis creaturae, qui se ita praeceps nequitiae dedit, ut reuocari nolit magis quam non possit, dum scelerum rabies iam libido est et delectat.

Tertius vero creaturae rationabilis ordo est eorum spirituum, qui ad humanum genus replendum apti iudicantur a deo, id est animae hominum, ex quibus per profectum etiam in illum angelorum ordinem quosdam

82 id om. γ sapientiae : de sapientia α
83 siue ... siue : uel ... uel Pa
85 illum om. α Sim Fern
86 ante puto add. titulum: quod per arbitrii libertatem tripertio modo ex rationabilis creatura caelestes ac terrestris atque inferni qui sunt contrariaeum potestatum ordines fact sunt β
87 isti : uel γ Sim Fern
88 uel ceteri ... officium om. α μ.
96 potestates Merl Del Koe Sim Fern : potestas α Goe
98 et post creaturae add. δ
105 in malitia : malitiae γ
108 eorum spirituum qui ad : earum quae γ
109 apte γ a deo om. γ
110 ex quibus post ordinem trans. γ
always demonstrate zeal for it, we shall always participate in wisdom, and that
will happen to us to a greater or lesser extent, depending upon the worthiness
of our life and the degree of our zeal. For the goodness of God, as is befitting
to him, incites and attracts all to that blessed end, where all pain and sorrow
and sighing have fled away\textsuperscript{20} and disappear.

1.8.4. As far as it seems to me, I think that the preceding discussion has
sufficiently proved that it is not from any random or chance occurrence that
the principalities hold their princldoms or the other orders are assigned
their respective offices, but they have obtained the degree of their dignity in
proportion to their merits, although it is not for us to know or inquire what
those acts were through which they deserved to come into a particular
order. It is sufficient to know this much, to demonstrate the impartiality and
righteousness of God, that, according to the statement of the Apostle Paul,
there is no respect of persons with God,\textsuperscript{21} who rather dispenses everything
in accordance with the merit and progress of each. No angelic office, therefore,
exists except by merit, neither do powers exercise their power except as a
result of their progress, nor do those called thrones, that is, the judging and
ruling powers, administer except by merits, nor do dominions exercise
dominion otherwise than by merit, and this is the first order, supreme and
most eminent, of rational creatures in the heavenly places, arranged in a
glorious variety of offices.\textsuperscript{22}

One should think in the same way of the opposing powers, who have given
themselves over to such places and offices so as to be principalities or powers or
world rulers of darkness or spiritual hosts of wickedness\textsuperscript{23} or malignant spirits
or unclean demons,\textsuperscript{24} not holding this substantially, nor because they were
created such, but having been assigned these degrees in malice in proportion
to their conduct and the progress which they made in wickedness. And
this is the other order of rational creatures, who have devoted themselves
to wickedness so precipitously that they are unwilling rather than unable to
recall themselves, as the frenzy for wicked deeds is now a passion and gives
delight.

The third order of rational creatures is that of those spirits who are judged
fit by God to replenish the human race, that is, the souls of human beings,
some of whom, because of their progress, we see assumed into the order

\textsuperscript{20} Isa. 35:10. \textsuperscript{21} Rom. 2:11.
\textsuperscript{22} Note again (as in Princ. 1.5.5, at n.39) that the angelic ranks, and their glorious arrangement,
is not the result of a fall, but rather of their merit and progress, in service of others. Cf. Origen,
Princ. 1.6.2; 2.9; 4.2.7; Hom. Ezech. 1.1–5.
\textsuperscript{23} Eph. 6:12.
\textsuperscript{24} Luke 7:21, 4:33. Cf. Origen, Princ. 1.5.2.
uidemus assumi, illos uidelicet, qui filii dei facti fuerint uel filii resurrectionis, uel hi, qui derelinquentes tenebras dilexerint lucem et facti fuerint filii lucis, uel qui omnem pugnam superantes et pacifici effecti, filii pacis ac filii dei fiunt, uel hi, qui mortificantes membra sua quae sunt super terram et transcendentes non solum corpoream naturam, uerum etiam animae ipsius ambiguos fragilesque motus adiunxerunt se domino, facti ex integro spiritus; ut sint cum illo unus spiritus semper, cum ipso singula quaque discernentes, usquequo perueniant in hoc, ut perfecti effecti spiritales omnia discernant per hoc, quod in omni sanctitate inluminati sensum per uerbum et sapientiam dei a nullo possibilit penitus discerni.

Illa sane nos nequaquam recipienda censemus, quae a quibusdam superfluo uel perquiri uel adstrui solent, id est quod animae in tantum sui decessum ueniant, ut naturae rationabilis ac dignitatis oblitae etiam in ordinem irrationabilium animantium uel bestiarum uel devoluantur; pro quibus etiam quasdam ex scripturis commentitias afferre adstructiones solent, id est quod uel pecus, cui se mulier contra naturam subiecerit, in reatum pariter cum muliere deuocetur ac lapidari pariter iubeatur, uel quod taurus cornipeta lapidari nihilominus praecipitur; sed et quod Balaam asina, os eius deo aperiente, locuta est, et subiugale mutum in hominum uoce respondens arguit prophetae dementiam. Quas nos non solum non suscipimus, sed et...
1.8 Angels

of angels,25 those, that is, who have been made sons of God or sons of the resurrection,26 or who, forsaking the darkness, have loved the light and been made sons of the light,27 or who, after winning every battle and being made peaceable, become sons of peace28 or sons of God, or those who, mortifying their members on earth and rising above not only their bodily nature but even the ambiguous and fragile movements of the soul itself, have united themselves to the Lord, being made altogether spiritual that they may always be one spirit with him,29 discerning every single thing with him, until they arrive at the point that they become perfected spiritual beings who judge all things by a mind illuminated in all sanctity by the Word and Wisdom of God, while they are utterly incapable of being judged by anyone.30

We31 think that those views are by no means to be admitted which some are unnecessarily accustomed to inquire into or to advance, that is, that souls come to such a degree of abasement that, forgetting their rational nature and dignity, they descend even into the condition of irrational beings, either animals or beasts; in support of these claims they are accustomed to quote certain alleged proofs from Scripture: the fact, for instance, that a beast to which a woman has unnaturally given herself shall be deemed equally guilty with the woman and it shall be ordered to be stoned with her;32 or that it is commanded to stone a bull that gores;33 or even that Balaam's ass spoke, when God opened its mouth, and the dumb beast of burden, answering with a human voice, reproved the madness of the prophet.34 All35 these assertions, we not only do not accept, but,
omnes has assertiones eorum contra fidem nostram uenientes refutamus atque respuimus. Verumtamen suo in loco et tempore confutato hoc peruerso dogmate atque depulso, ea quae de scripturis sanctis ab illis prolata sunt, qualiter intellegi debeant exponemus.
running contrary to our faith, we refute and reject. After refuting and rejecting this perverse teaching, however, at the proper time and place, we shall show how those passages which they quote from the holy Scriptures ought to be understood.

reader, he says, "These, in our mind, are not dogmas, but as inquiries and conjectures, so that they might not seem to be completely untouched" (Haec inquit iuxta nostram sententiam non sint dogmata sed quaesita tantum atque proiecta, ne penitus intractata uiderentur). This version of the conclusion of this chapter is similar to Rufinus' other rendering, in his translation of Pamphilus' Apology (175): 'But these things, insofar as they concern us, are not dogmas, but have been said for the sake of discussion and are rejected. They have only been said lest it seem that a question that had been raised has gone unanswered' (Sed haec quantum ad nos pertinet non sint dogmata sed discussionis gratia dicta sint et abiciantur. Pro eo autem solo dicta sunt ne uideatur quaestio mota non esse discussa). The similarity between these passages of Jerome and Pamphilus/Rufinus is enough to establish that Origen did indeed conclude Princ. 1.8.4 this way, despite Jerome's attempt to suggest otherwise. For further discussion see Crouzel and Simonetti (SC 253, pp. 119–25). Origen consistently rejects the idea of metempsychosis or rather metensomatosis: see Comm. Jo. 6.66–71, 86 (which contrasts μετενσωμάτωσις with ἐνσωμάτωσις); Cels. 1.13; 5.29; 7.32; Comm. Matt. 11.17; 13.1.
LIBER SECUNDUS

De mundo

2.1.1. Consequens nunc uidetur, licet omnia, quae superiore libello disserta sunt, de mundo atque eius ordinatione disserta sint, proprie tamen paucæ de ipso mundo repetere, id est de initio eius ac fine ut his, quæ inter initium ac finem eius per diuinam prouidentiam dispensantur, seu de his, quæ ante mundum uel post mundum putantur.

In quo hoc primum euidenter apparat, quod omnis status eius, qui est uarius ac diuersus, ex rationabilibus et diuinioribus naturis et ex diuersis corporibus constet, sed et ex mutis animantibus, id est feris bestiis et pecudibus et aubibus atque omnibus, quæ in aquis uiiuent, tum deinde ex locis, id est caeli caelorum et terræ uel aquæ, sed et ex eo qui medius est aere, uel quem aetherem dicunt, atque ex omnibus, quæ procedunt uel nascentur ex terra. Cum ergo tanta sit mundi uarietas, atque in ipsis rationabilibus animantibus sit tanta diuersitas, propter quam etiam omnis reliqua uarietas ac diuersitas putanda est extitisse: quam causam aliam dici oportebit qua mundus extiterit, praecipue si intueamur illum finem, per quem omnia restituenda in statum initii sui libro superiore dissertum est; quod utique si consequenter dictum uidetur, quam aliam, ut diximus, causam putabimus tantaæ huius mundi diuersitatis, nisi diuersitatem ac uarietatem motuum atque prolapsuum

2.1.1, lines 14–16

Justinian, Ep. ad Menam (ed. Schwartz, 211.14–16), Koetschau Frag. 18:

Οὐτὸς δὴ ποικιλωτάτον κόσμου τυγχάνοντος καὶ τοσαῦτα διάφορα λογικὰ περιέχοντος τι ἀλλο χρῆ λέγειν αὕτων γεγονέναι τοῦ ὑποστήναι αὐτὸν ἢ τὸ ποικιλὸν τῆς ἀποτύπωσεως τῶν οὐχ ὀμοίως τῆς ἑνάδος ἀπορρέοντων;

1 titulus: liber secundus edd. : incipit liber II A μ : incipit liber secundus W : incipit idem liber secundus B : incipit II σ 2 titulus de initio mundo et fine Ab : de rationibus causisque mundi et his quae ante ipsum uel post ipsum opinanda sint β : capitularis littera indicat divisionem δ μ S : de mundo Koe Sim Goe Fern 6–7 quae ... putantur : quae ante mundum facta uel post mundum facienda putantur σ Del 10 et om. γ 12 et post quem add. G S 19 diximus : dixi α
The World

2.1.1. Although everything that has been discussed in the preceding book has had reference to the world and its arrangement, it now seems reasonable, however, to revisit a few particular points concerning the world, that is, about its beginning and end, and those events between its beginning and the end, which were arranged by divine providence, and about those which are supposed to have occurred before the world or after the world.

In this investigation, the first point which clearly appears is that its entire constitution, which is various and diverse, consists of rational and more divine natures and of a diversity of bodies, and also of dumb animals, that is, wild beasts and farm animals and birds, and of all things which live in the waters; then, secondly, of places, that is of the heaven or heavens and earth and water, and also of the air, which is in the middle, which they call 'aether,' and of everything which proceeds from, or is born of, the earth. There being, then, so great a variety in the world, and so great a diversity even among rational beings themselves, on account of which every other variety and diversity is thought to have come about, what other cause ought to be given for the existence of the world, especially if we consider that end, discussed in the preceding book, by which all things are to be restored to their original state? And if what was said there seems to be sound, what other cause, as we have said, can we imagine for the great diversity of this world, except the diversity

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1 Most manuscripts simply have here a capital letter demarcating the beginning of a chapter; one (Ab) has 'On the beginning and end of the world'; and two others (B C) speak more broadly of the reasons and causes of the world and what is thought to be before and after the world. According to Photius, Bibliothek 8 (ed. Henry 1, 4a5–6), the second book begins by treating 'the cosmos and created things in it' (πέρι κόσμου καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ κτισμάτων). As Origen specifies in the opening lines that he will not only treat of the beginning and the end of the world, but the arrangement of events between these two points, I have followed previous editors in entitling this chapter simply 'The World'; it must be borne in mind, however, that the subject of the 'world' is broader than the created world in general or materiality and embodiment in particular (though this is treated in Princ. 2.1.4–2.2); it includes also the arrangement (the kosmos in the sense of the Greek term. cf. Princ. 2.3.6) of rational creatures in all their variety and diversity, held together by providence as one harmonious body tending towards unity in God (Princ. 2.1.2–3).

2 Although Origen says that 'everything that has been discussed in the preceding book' was concerned with 'the world and its arrangement,' he clearly has in mind only Princ. 1.7–8, thus indicating more firmly that Princ. 1.7–8 is a continuous discussion distinct from Princ. 1.1–6.

3 Cf. Origen, Princ. 2.9.2, 5.

4 On the earth, see Origen, Comm. Jo. 19.130–42; Cels. 6.59; on the heavens, Comm. Jo. 19.143–50.

5 Cf. Justinian, Ep. ad Menam (ed. Schwartz, 211.14–16), an extract numbered as Fragment 18 by Koetschau: 'Since the cosmos is so greatly varied and comprises so great a diversity of rational beings, what else can be said to be the cause of its existence, except the variety of the falling away of those declining dissimilarly from unity?"
eorum, qui ab illa unitate atque concordia, in qua a deo primitus procreati sunt, deciderunt et ab illo bonitatis statu commoti atque distracti, diuersis dehinc animorum motibus ac desideriis agitati, unum illud et indisceretum naturae suae bonum pro intentionis suae diuersitate in varias deduxerunt mentium qualitates?

2.1.2. Deus vero per ineffabilem sapientiae suae artem omnia, quae quoquomodo fiunt, ad utile aliquid et ad communem omnium transformans ac reparans prefectum, has ipsas creaturas, quae a semet ipsis in tantum animorum uarietate distabant, in unum quendam reuocat operis studiique consensum, ut diuersis licet motibus animorum, unius tamen mundi plenitudinem perfectionemque consuumment, atque ad unum perfectionis finem uarietas ipsa mentium tendat. Vna namque uirtus est, quae omnem mundi diuersitatem constringit et continet atque in unum opus varios agit motus, ne scilicet tam inmensum mundi opus discidiis solueretur animorum. Et propter hoc opinamur parentem omnium deum pro salute uniuersarum creaturarum suarum per ineffabilem uerbi sui ac sapientiae rationem ita haec singula dispensasse, ut et singuli quique spiritus uel animi, uel quoquomodo appellantia sunt rationabiles subsistentia, non contra arbitrii libertatem ui in aliud quam motus mentis suae ageret cogerentur, et per hoc adimi ab his uideretur liberi facultas arbitrii (quod utique qualitatem iam naturae ipsius inmutabat), et diuersi motus propositi earum ad unius mundi consonantiam competenter atque utiliter aptarentur, dum aliae iuuari indigent, aliae iuare possunt, aliae uero proficientibus certamina atque agones mouent, in quibus eorum probabilior haberetur industria et certior post victoriam reparati gradus statio teneretur, quae per difficultates laborantium constitisset.

2.1.3. Quamuis ergo in diuersis sit officiis ordinatus, non tamen dissonans atque a se discreps mans totius intellegendus est status; sed sicut corpus nostrum unum ex multis membris aptatum est et ab una anima continetur, ita et uniuersum mundum uelut animal quoddam inmensum atque inmane
and variety of the movements and declensions of those who fell away from that original unity and harmony in which they were at first created by God, and who, being disturbed and torn away from that state of goodness, and then being driven about by the diverse motions and desires of their souls, have drawn aside the single and undivided goodness of their nature, by the diversity of their inclinations, into the various qualities of minds?

2.1.2. But God, by the ineffable art of his wisdom, transforming and restoring all things, in whatever state they are, to some useful purpose and to the common advantage of all, recalls those very creatures, which differed from each other in the variety of so many souls, into one unanimity of work and endeavour, so that, although the motions of the souls may be diverse, they nevertheless bring to completion the fullness and perfection of one world, and the very variety of intellects tends towards the one end of perfection. For it is one power which grasps and holds together all the diversity of the world, and leads the various movements towards one work, lest such an immense work as that of the world should be dissolved by the dissensions of souls.° And for this reason we think that God, the father of all,⁷ for the salvation of all his creatures through the ineffable plan of his Word and Wisdom, so arranged each thing, that every spirit⁸ or soul, or whatever else the rational beings ought to be called, should not be compelled by force, against the freedom of its will, to anything other than that which the movements of its mind directs—for in that case the faculty of free will would seem to be taken away, which would certainly change the quality of the nature itself—and that the diverse movements of their wills would be suitably and usefully adapted to the harmony of one world, with some of them needing assistance and others being able to assist, some again providing struggles and conflicts for those who are making progress, whose diligence would be esteemed as more worthy of approval and the place of rank obtained after victory would be held more surely, as it has been established through the difficulties of the endeavours.

2.1.3. Therefore, although arranged into diverse functions, the condition of the whole world is nevertheless not to be thought of as being dissonant or discordant; but just as our one body is fitted with many members, and is held together by one soul, so also, I think, the whole world ought to be regarded as

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° Origen has a very strong conception of the providence of God. E.g. Hom. Gen. 3.2; Cels. 3.38; 4.74; 6.71; 7.68; 8.70. The apparently discordant and unequal variety and diversity of rational beings in the world, resulting from their differing movements in their freedom and self-determination, is simultaneously harmoniously arranged by God in such a way that what has been subjected to corruption is brought, through that corruption, into subjection to God so that God might be all in all. See Princ. 1.5–6; 1.7.5; 2.9.6–8; 3.1.21–4; 3.6.

⁷ Cf. Origen, Princ. 1.1.6, and n.22 there.

⁸ Perhaps 'intellect'; see above Princ. 1.7.4, n.15.
opinandum puto, quod quasi ab una anima uiuente dei ac ratione teneatur. Quod etiam a sancta scriptura indicari arbitror per illud, quod dictum est per prophetam: Nonne caelum et terram ego repleo? dicit dominus, et iterum: Caelum mihi sedes, terra autem scabellum pedum meorum, et quod saluator dixit, cum ait: Non iurandum neque per caelum, quia sedes est dei, neque per terram, quia scabellum est pedum eius, sed et illud, quod ait Paulus, cum apud Athenienses contionaretur, dicens quoniam In ipso uiuimus et mouemur et sumus. Quomodo enim in deo uiuimus et mouemur et sumus, nisi quod uiuente sua uniuersum constringit et continet mundum? Quomodo autem caelum sedes dei est et terra scabellum pedum eius, sicut saluator ipse pronuntiat, nisi quia et in caelo et in terra uiuente eius replet uniuersa, sicut et dicit: Nonne caelum et terram ego repleo? dicit dominus. Quod ergo pares omnium dei uniuersum mundum uiuente sui plenitudine repleat atque continat, ex his quae ostendimus non puto quemquam difficulter annuere. 

Iam sane quoniam diuersos motus rationabilium creaturarum variasque sententias causam dedisse diuersitatis mundo huic sermo superioris disputations ostendit, uidendum est ne forte similis initio exitus quoque huic mundo conueniat. Dubium enim non est quin finis ipsius in multa adhuc diuersitate ac uarietate reperiendus sit, quae utique uarietas in huius mundi fine depraehensa causas rursum diuersitatum alterius mundi post hunc futuri occasionesque praestabit, quo scilicet huius mundi finis initium sit futuri.

2.1.4. Quodsi haec ita esse ordo disputationis inuenit, consequens nunc uidetur, quoniam mundi diuersitas sine corporibus subsistere non potest, naturae corporeae discutere rationem. Ex rebus ipsis apparebat quod diversam uariamque permutacionem recipiat natura corporea, ita ut possit ex omnibus in omnia transformari; sicut, uerbi gratia dixerim, lignum in ignem uertitur et ignis in fumum et fumus in aerem; sed et olei liquor in ignem mutatur. Escae quoque ipsae uel hominum uel animalium nonne eandem permutacionis

60-1 nonne ... dicit om. γ 61 quod ergo : quomodo γ 70 quo ... futuri om. γ 74 posset δ C
some immense and enormous animal, which is held together by the Power and Reason of God, as by one soul. This, I reckon, is also indicated by holy Scripture by that passage, spoken through the prophet, Do I not fill the heaven and the earth? says the Lord; and again, Heaven is my throne, and the earth my footstool; and by what the Saviour said, when he tells us, Do not swear, neither by heaven, for it is the throne of God, nor by earth, for it is his footstool; and further in what Paul affirms, when he addressed the assembly of Athenians, saying, In him we live and move and have our being. For how do we live and move and have our being in God, except by the fact that he binds and holds together the whole world by his power? And how is the heaven the throne of God and the earth his footstool, as the Saviour himself declares, except by the fact that his power fills all things in heaven and in earth, as he says, Do I not fill the heaven and the earth? says the Lord? I do not think, therefore, from the passages which we have pointed out, that anyone will find it difficult to grant that God, the father of all, fills and holds together the world with the fullness of his power.

And now, since the argument of the preceding discussion has shown the diverse movements and varying opinions of rational creatures to have been the cause of the diversity that is in this world, it must be seen whether it is appropriate for this world to have an end similar to the beginning. For there is no doubt that its end must be sought amidst much diversity and variety; and this variety, when found at the end of this world, will in turn provide causes and occasions for the diversities of the other world which is to come after this one; for clearly the end of this world is the beginning of the one to come.

2.1.4. If the course of the discussion has found this to be so, it now seems reasonable, since the diversity of the world cannot exist without bodies, to discuss the subject of bodily nature. It is evident from things themselves that bodily nature accepts diverse and various changes, such that it is able to be transformed from everything to everything, as, for example, the conversion of wood into fire, and of fire into smoke, and of smoke into air; and even oil, a liquid, is changed into fire. Does not food itself, whether of humans or of...
causam declarant? Nam quodcumque illud est, quod per cibum sumpserimus, in corporis nostri substantiam uertitur. Sed et qualiter aqua mutetur in terram uel in aerem et aer rursus in ignem uel ignis in aerem, quamuis non sit difficultas exponere, tamen in praesenti loco sufficit ea tantummodo commemorasse uolenti corporalis materiae discutere rationem. Materiam ergo intellegimus quae subjecta est corporeibis, id est ex qua inditis atque insertis qualitatibus corpora subsistunt. Qualitates autem quattuor dicimus: calidam, frigidam, aridam, humidam. Quae quattuor qualitates \( \delta \lambda \eta \), id est materiae, insertae (quae materia propria ratione extra has esse inuenitur quas supra diximus qualitates) diuersas corporum species efficient. Haec tamen materia quamuis, ut supra diximus, secundum suam propriam rationem sine qualitatibus sit, numquam tamen subsistere extra qualitates inuenitur.

Hanc ergo materiam, quae tanta ac talis est, ut et sufficere ad omnia mundi corpora, quae esse deus uoluit, queat et conditori ad quascumque formas uelit ac species famularetur in omnibus et seruiret, recipiens in se qualitates, quas ipse uoluisset imponere, nescio quomodo tanti et tales uiri ingenitam, id est non ab ipso deo factam conditore omnium putauerunt, sed fortuitam quandam eius naturam uirtutemque duxerunt. Et miror quomodo isti culpent eos, qui uel opificem deum uel prouidentiam huius uniuersitatis negant, et impie eos sentire arguent, quod tantum mundi opus arbitrentur sine officio uel prouideret, sed fortuitum sunt quod quas suae uirtutis esse occiderunt, et quod uirtutis esse occidit, et quod uirtutem esse occiderunt; et quod quod uirtutem esse occiderunt, et quod quod uirtutem esse occiderunt. Et miror quomodo isti culpent eos, qui uel opificem deum uel prouidentiam huius uniuersitatis negant, et impie eos sentire arguent, quod tantum mundi opus arbitrentur sine officio uel prouideret, sed fortuitum sunt quod quas suae uirtutis esse occiderunt, et quod uirtutem esse occidit, et quod uirtutem esse occiderunt.
animals, show the same fact of change? For whatever it is that we take as food is converted into the substance of our body. But, although the way water is changed into earth or into air and air in turn into fire or fire into air, or air into water, is not difficult to explain, yet on the present occasion it is enough merely to call them to mind, as it is the subject of bodily matter that we want to discuss. By matter, then, we understand that which underlies bodies, that is, that from which, with the inclusion and insertion of qualities, bodies exist. We speak of four qualities: heat, cold, dryness, and wetness. These four qualities, being implanted in ἅλη, that is, matter (for matter is found to exist on its own definition, apart from those qualities we have mentioned above), produce the different kinds of bodies. Yet, although this matter, as we have said above, exists according to its own proper definition without qualities, it is however never found without qualities.¹⁵

This matter, then, which is so great, and such that it is able to suffice for all bodies in the world that God willed to exist and to attend upon and serve the Creator for whatever forms and species he wished in all things, receiving into itself whatever qualities he wished to bestow upon it—I do not understand how so many and such distinguished men have held it to be uncreated, that is, not made by God himself, the creator of all things, but that its nature and power were the result of chance. And I am astonished that they should find fault with those who deny that God is the maker of the universe or his providential administration of it, and accuse of impiety those who think that such a great work as the world could exist without a maker or overseer, while they themselves incur a similar charge for saying that matter is uncreated and coeternal with the uncreated God. According to their account, then, if we suppose, for example, that matter did not exist, as they maintain, saying that God could not create anything when nothing existed, without doubt he was idle, not having matter on which to work, matter which, they think, was available to him not by his own provision but by chance; and it seems to them that this, which was discovered by chance, was able to suffice for him for the immensity of such a work and for the exercise of the might of his power, that, receiving the plan of all his Wisdom, it might be separated and formed into a world. This seems to me to be very absurd and proper to human beings who are altogether ignorant of the power and intelligence of uncreated nature. But in order that we may look into the plan of things more carefully, let it be granted for a little while that matter did not exist and that God, when nothing existed before, caused to exist those things which he wished to exist: what are we to suppose? That God would have created matter either better or greater or of another kind than that which he produced from his own Power and

¹⁵ For the background of this account of matter and qualities, resulting in bodies, see: Plato, Tim. 50b–51c; Alcmaeon, Epit. 8; Plutarch, Comm. not. 34, 48; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math. 10.312. For Origen, see also: Princ. 3.6.6–7; 4.4.6–8; Comm. Jo. 13.127, 262–7, 429; Cels. 3.41; 4.54–7; 6.77.
ac sapientia proferebat, ut esset quae ante non fuerat, an inferiorem et
deteriorem, an similem atque eandem ut esset illa, quam isti ingenitam dicunt?
Et puto cuius facilimente patat intellectus, quod neque melior neque inferior
potuisset mundi formas speciesque suscipere, nisi talis fuisset, quales ista est
quae suscepit. Et quomodo ergo non uiidebitur impium id ingenitum dicere,
quod si factum a deo credatur, tale sine dubio inuenitur, quale et illud est, quod
ingenitum dicitur.

2.1.5. Vt autem etiam ex scripturarum auctoritate haec ita se habere credamus,
audi quomodo in Machabaeorum libris, ubi mater septem martyrum unum ex
filiis suis cohortatur ad toleranda tormenta, de hoc dogmate confirmatur; ait
enim: Rogo te, fili, respice ad caelum et terram et omnia, quae in eis sunt, et
uidens haec scito quia deus haec, cum non essent, fecit. Sed et in libro Pastoris
in primo mandato ita ait: Primo omnium crede quia unus est deus, qui omnia
creavit atque composuit et fecit ex eo quod nihil erat ut esset uniuersa.
Fortassìs ad hoc respicit etiam illud, quod in psalmis dictum est quia Ipse dixit,
et facta sunt; ipse mandauit, et creata sunt. Nam quod ait quia ipse dixit, et facta
sunt uidetur ostendere substantiam dici eorum, quae sunt; quod uero ait:
Mandauit, et creata sunt de qualitatis dicitum uidetur, quibus substantia ipsa
formata est.

2.2.1. Hoc in loco quaerere solent quidam, utrum sicut unigenitum filium
generat pater et sanctum spiritum profert, non quasi qui ante non erat, sed
quia origo et fons filii uel spiritus sancti pater est, et nihil in his anterius
posterius intellegi potest, ita etiam inter rationabiles naturas et materiam
 corporalem similis quaedam societas vel propinquitas possit intellegi. Quam
rem ut pleniuss atque intentius investigent, illuc solent iniquum disputationis
reflectere, ut inquirant, si haec ipsa natura corporea, quae spiritualitatem
et rationabilia mentium uitas fert et continet motus, pari cum ipsis aeternitate
perduet, an uero absoluta interibit et exolescet. Quod ut possit scrupulosius
depraehendi, requirendum primo uidetur, si possibile est penitus incorporeas
remanere rationabiles naturas, cum ad summum sanctitatis ac beatitudinis

122 ad ante omnia transp. γ 125 erant μ. Ab 131 ante hoc add. titulum: de
perpetuitate corporea naturae α. μ. Ab Koe Goe; secl. Sim Fern: capitularis littera indicat
divisionem S unigenitum: ingenitum μ. Ab Sc 135-6 quam rem om. γ
139 exolescet: peribit γ 140 depraehendere quaerendum γ
Wisdom, in order that that might exist which formerly did not, or would he have created it inferior and worse, or similar to and the same as that which they call uncreated? Now, I think it will very easily be understood by anyone that neither a better nor inferior matter could have assumed the forms and species of the world, if it had not been such as that which did assume them. And, therefore, how will it not seem impious to call 'uncreated' that which, if believed to have been made by God, is found without doubt to be such as that which is called 'uncreated'?

2.1.5. But that we may believe on the authority of the Scriptures that this is so, hear how, in the book of Maccabees, where the mother of seven martyrs exhorts one of her sons to endure torture, this dogma is confirmed: *I implore you, my son, to look at the heaven and the earth and at all things which are in them, and, beholding these, to know that God made them when they did not exist.* In the book of *The Shepherd* also, in the first Mandate, it says as follows: 'First of all believe that there is one God who created and arranged all things, and from that which was not made all things to exist.' Perhaps also that passage in the Psalms refers to this, which says, *He spoke and they were made; he commanded and they were created.* For when it says *he spoke and they were made*, it seems to be said to indicate the substance of things that exist; while when it says *he commanded and they were created*, it seems to be said of the qualities by which the substance itself has been formed.

2.2.1. At this point, some are accustomed to inquire whether, just as the Father begets an uncreated Son, and brings forth the Holy Spirit, not as if not previously being, but because the Father is the origin and source of the Son or the Holy Spirit, and no before or after can be understood in respect of them, so also a similar kind of association or relationship can be understood between rational beings and bodily matter. That they may examine this question more fully and attentively, they are accustomed to divert the beginning of the discussion elsewhere, in order to ask whether this very bodily nature, which bears the lives, and contains the movements, of spiritual and rational intellects, will, like them, endure eternally, or will absolutely perish and pass away. That this may be determined more precisely, it seems it must first be asked if it is possible for rational beings to continue, completely bodiless, when they have

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16 2 Macc. 7:28.
17 Hermas, Mand. 1.1. The appeal to 2 Macc. and Hermas recurs in Origen, Comm. Jo. 1.103 in defence of the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*.
18 Ps. 32:9 and 148:5; this verse is also quoted in Cels. 2.9 and 6.60, though without a similar interpretation.
19 The manuscripts have a separate heading at this point, 'On the Perpetuity of Bodily Nature', which is included as a separate chapter by Koetschau (and followed by Butterworth) and Görtemanns and Karpp; however, it is clear that Origen is continuing the discussion begun in Princ. 2.1, and which continues until the end of Princ. 2.3.
uenerint, quod mihi quidem difficillimum et paene impossibile uidetur; an necesse est eas semper coniunctas esse corporibus. Si ergo posset quis ostendere rationem, qua possibile esset eas omnimodis carere corporibus, consequens uidebatur quod natura corporea ex nihilo per interualla temporum procreata sicut, cum non esset, effecta est, ita et esse desineret, cum usus eius ministerii praeterisset.

2.2.2. Si uero inpossibile est hoc ullo modo adfirmari, id est quod uiuere praeter corpus possit ulla alia natura praeter patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum, necessitas consequentiae ac rationis coartat intellegi principaliter quidem creatas esse rationables naturas, materialem uero substantiam opinione quidem et intellectu solo separari ab eis et pro ipsis uel post ipsas effectam uideri, sed numquam sine ipsa eas uel uixisse uel uiuere: solius namque trinitatis incorporea uita existere recte putabitur. Vs ergo superior diximus, materialis ista substantia huius modi habens naturam, quae ex omnibus ad omnia transformatur, cum ad inferiores quoque trahitur, in crassiorem corporis statum solidioremque formatur, ita ut uisibiles istas mundi species uariasque distinguat; cum uero perfectioribus ministrat et beatioribus, in fulgore caelestium corporum micat et spiritualis corporis indumentis uel angelos dei uel filios resurrectionis exornat, ex quibus omnibus diuersus ac uarius unius mundi conplebitur status.

Verum haec si plenius discutere libet, oportebit adtentius et diligentius cum omni metu dei et reuerentia perscrutari scripturas diuinas, si qui forte in his de talibus arcanus et reconditus sensus, si quid in absconsis et reconditis (sancto
reached the summit of holiness and blessedness (something which seems to me to be most difficult and almost impossible), or whether they must necessarily always be united to bodies. If, then, anyone is able to show a reason whereby it would be possible for them to be wholly without bodies, it would appear logical that as a bodily nature, created out of nothing after intervals of time, was thus produced when it did not exist, so also it would cease to exist when the need of its services had passed away.

2.2.2. If it is impossible for this point in any way to be maintained, that is, that any other being, apart from the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, can live without a body, then the necessity of logic and reason compels one to understand that principally, indeed, rational beings were created, yet that material substance is to be separated from them only in thought and understanding and that it seems to have been formed either for them or after them, but that they never have lived nor live without it; for a bodiless life will rightly be considered only of the Trinity. Now, that material substance of this world, as we have said above, having such a nature that accepts every kind of transformation, when it is dragged down to lower beings is moulded into the denser and more solid condition of body, so as to distinguish those visible and various forms of the world; but when it serves the more perfect and blessed beings, it shines in the splendour of celestial bodies and adorns either the angels of God or the sons of the resurrection with the garment of a spiritual body, from all of which is composed the diverse and various conditions of the one world.

But if one should desire to discuss these things more fully, it will be necessary to examine the holy Scriptures with greater attention and diligence, with all fear of God and reverence, to see if perhaps there can be found in them a secret and hidden meaning about these things, if there is anything in things

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20 Cf. Origen, Princ. 1.6.4; 1.7.1; 2.9.1; 4.3.15; 4.4.8. That rational beings are 'principally' created as such, yet united to material bodies that can only be separated 'in thought', see esp. Comm. Jo. 20.182: 'Because, therefore, the first human being fell away from the superior things and desired a life different from the better life, he deserved to be a beginning neither of something created nor made, but of something moulded by the Lord, made to be mocked by the angels [Job 40:19]. Now, our superior being is our being made according to the image of the Creator, but that resulting from a cause is in the thing moulded, which was received from the dust of the earth (και ἡμῶν δὲ ἡ προηγουμένη ὑπόστασις ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ κτισταντος: ἡ δὲ ἐξ αἰτίας ἐν τῷ ληφθεὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ χοῦ τῆς γῆς πλάσματι.) For the different words used to describe these different aspects of creation, and how they correlate, see the Introduction, section 3.

21 1 Cor. 15:40; cf. Origen, Comm. Matt. 17.30.


23 1 Cor. 15:44.

24 The life of the resurrection, in which there will still be differences (as Origen asserts, following 1 Cor. 15:41–2; e.g. Princ. 2.3.7), forming the diversity of that age and world, is thus not yet the final consummation, when, according to 1 Cor. 15:28, God will be 'all in all' (treated in Princ. 3.6).
spiritu demonstrante his, qui digni sunt) poterit inueniri, cum plura testimonia de hac ipsa specie fuerint congregata.

2.3.1. Superest ut post haec requiramus, utrum ante hunc mundum, qui nunc est, mundus alius fuerit, et si fuit, utrum talis fuerit, qualis iste, qui nunc est, an paulo differentior uel inferior; aut omnino non fuerit mundus, sed tale aliquid fuerit, qualem intelligimus illum post omnia finem futurum, cum tradetur regnum deo et patri: qui nihilominus alterius mundi fuerit finis, illius scilicet, post quem hic mundus coepit, lapsus autem uarius intellectualium naturarum prouocauerit deum ad istam uarium diuersamque mundi conditionem. Sed et illud similiter requirendum puto, utrum post hunc mundum curatio aliqua et emendatio futura sit, asperior quidem et doloris plena erga eos, qui uerbo dei oboedire noluerunt, per eruditionem uero rationabilemque institutionem, per quam possent ad locupletiorem proficere ueritatis intellectum hi, qui in praesenti iam uita in haec se studia dediderunt et mentibus purgationes effecti, capaces iam hinc diuiniae sapientiae perrexerunt, et si post haec statim finis omnium consequetur; an pro correctione et emendatione eorum, qui talibus indigent, alius rursum mundus erit, uel similis huic, qui nunc est, uel hoc melior aut etiam modo deterior; et qualiscumque ille erit post hunc mundus, quamdui erit, aut si omnino erit; et si erit aliquando cum nullus usquam sit mundus, aut si fuit aliquando cum mundus omnino non fuerit; aut si fuerunt plures uel erunt, aut si accidat aliquando, ut alter alteri aequalis et similis per omnia atque indiscretus eueniat.

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167 ante superest add. titulum: de initio mundi et causis eius a μ Koe Goe; secl. Sim Fern : capitularis littera indicat diuisionem σ 175 futura sit : erit γ 179 si om. γ
180 an : ac C γ 181 mundus rursum γ 183 aut si omnino erit om. γ W ub
185 accidit dub. Koe in appar.
abstruse and concealed (the Holy Spirit explaining the meaning to those who are worthy) about such matters, after many testimonies have been collected on this very idea.

2.3.1. It remains, after these matters, to inquire whether there was any other world before this world which is now, and if so whether it was such as this one which is now, or slightly different or inferior; or whether there was no world at all, but something like that which we understand will be after the end of all things, when the kingdom shall be delivered up to the God and Father, which, nonetheless, may have been the end of another world, of that, namely, after which this world began; and whether the various lapses of intellectual beings provoked God to this varied and diverse condition of the world. This point also, I think, must similarly be investigated, that is, whether after this world there will be any healing or improvement—severe indeed and full of pain for those who were unwilling to obey the Word of God—through instruction and rational training, by which those may arrive at a fuller understanding of the truth who have devoted themselves in this present world to these pursuits and, being made more purified in intellect, they have advanced to be, here and now, capable of divine Wisdom; and whether after this the end of all things follows immediately, or whether, for the correction and improvement of those who need it, there will be again another world, either similar to this which now is, or better than it, or greatly inferior; and how long that world, whatever kind it is after this one, shall exist or whether it will exist at all; and whether there will be a time when there is no world anywhere, or whether there has been a time when there was no world at all; or whether there have been, or will be, many, or whether it shall ever happen that there will be one equivalent to another and like it in every respect and indistinguishable from it.

25 Most manuscripts have a separate heading at this point, 'The Beginning of the World and its Causes', included by Koetschau (followed by Butterworth) and Görgemanns and Karpp; however, again, as with Princ. 2.2, it is clear that there is no real break here, but that Origen is continuing the discussion begun in Princ. 2.1, which continues until the end of Princ. 2.3. Jerome, Ep. 124.5.1 (ed. Hilberg 3, 101.5~12), paraphrases Origen's discussion here in this manner: 'In his second book he asserts that there are innumerable worlds, not, as Epicurus, with many and similar ones existing at once, but that after the end of one world comes the beginning of another, and there was a world before this world of ours, and another will exist in turn after it, and another after that, another after another. He is in doubt whether there will ever be one world similar in every respect to another, so that they would appear to differ in no respect, or whether it is certain that there will never be one world totally indistinguishable and similar to another.'

26 1 Cor. 15:24.

27 Cf. Origen, Princ. 1.6.3; 2.10.4–8. For an eschatological 'baptism of fire' or purification see Origen, Hom. Jer. 2.3; Hom. Lev. 8.4; 14.3; Comm. Matt. 15.23; Comm. Jo. 2.57.

28 This last possibility is refuted by Origen below in Princ. 2.3.4, and more fully in Cels. 5.20–3, where it is attributed to the Stoics.
2.3.2. Vt ergo manifestius appareat, utrum materia corporalis per interualla subsistat et, sicut non fuit antequam fieret, iterum resoluatur ut non sit, uideamus primo si fieri potest, ut uiuat aliquis sine corpore. Si enim potest aliquis uiuere sine corpore, possunt et omnia esse sine corpore; omnia enim ad unum finem tendere superior tractatus edocuit. Si autem omnia possunt carere corporibus, sine dubio non erit substantia corporalis, cuius usus nullus existet. Et quomodo sentiemus illud, quod apostolus dixit in his locis, in quibus de resurrectione disputat mortuorum, cum ait: Necesse est autem corruptibile hoc induere incorruptionem, et mortale hoc induere inmortalitatem. Cum autem corruptibile hoc induerit incorruptionem, et mortale hoc induerit inmortalitatem, tunc fiet sermo, qui scriptus est: Absorpta est mors in victoria; ubi est, mors, victoria tua? ubi est, mors, aculeus tuus? aculeus autem mortis peccatum, uirtus uero peccati lex. Talem ergo quendam suggestere uidetur apostolus intellectum. Quod enim ait: Corruptibile hoc et mortale hoc, uelut tangentis et ostendentis affectu, cui alii conuenit nisi materiae corporali? Haec ergo materia corporis, quae nunc corruptibilis est, induet incorruptionem, cum perfecta anima et dogmatibus incorruptionis instructa uti eo coeperit.

Et nolo mireris si uelut indumentum corporis perfectam animam dicimus, quae propter uerbum dei et sapientiam eius nunc incorruptio nominatur; cum ipse utique qui est dominus et creator animae Christus Iesus indumentum sanctis esse dicavit, sicut apostolus dicit: Induite vos dominum Iesum Christum. Sicut ergo Christus indumentum est animae, ita intellegibili quadam ratione etiam anima indumentum esse dicitur corporis. Ornamentum enim eius est celans et contegens eius mortalem naturam. Tale est ergo quod dicitur: Necesse est corruptibile hoc induere incorruptionem, ut si diceret: necesse est naturam hanc corruptibilem corporis indumentum accipere incorruptionis, animam habentem in se incorruptionem, pro eo uidelicet quod induta est Christum, qui est sapientia et uerbum dei. Cum autem uitae participauerit corpus hoc,

2.3.2, lines 189–93


Si omnia [inquit] ut ipse disputationis ordo compellit, sine corpore uixerint, consumetur corporalis universa natura et redigetur in nihilum, quae aliquando est facta de nihilò, eritque tempus, quo usus eius iterum necessarius sit.
2.1–3 The World

2.3.2. That it may appear more clearly, then, whether the matter of bodies can subsist for periods of time and, just as it did not exist before it was made, so it may again be reduced such that it is not, let us first see whether it can possibly happen that someone lives without a body. For if it is possible for someone to live without a body, then all things are able to be without a body, for all things, as our former treatise has shown, tend towards one end. Now, if all things are able to dispense with bodies, there will undoubtedly be no bodily substance, for which there is no purpose. But how shall we understand that statement made by the Apostle in the places where he discusses the resurrection of the dead, when he says, This corruptible [body] must put on incorruptibility and this mortal [body] must put on immortality. When this corruptible [body] shall put on incorruptibility and this mortal [body] shall put on immortality, then shall come to pass what is written: 'Death is swallowed up in victory'. 'O death, where is your victory? O death, where is your sting?' For the sting of death is sin, and the power of sin is the law. The Apostle, then, seems to suggest some such meaning: when he says, this corruptible [body] and this mortal [body], with the gesture, as it were, of touching or pointing out, to what else does it apply except bodily matter? Therefore, this matter of the body, which is now corruptible, shall put on incorruptibility, when a perfected soul, instructed with the teachings of incorruptibility, shall have begun to use it.

And I would not have you surprised if we call a perfected soul the clothing of a body, for it, on account of the Word of God and his Wisdom, is now named incorruptibility; for, indeed, Jesus Christ himself, who is the Lord and the Creator of the soul, is said to be the clothing of the saints, as the Apostle says, Put you on the Lord Jesus Christ. As Christ, then is the clothing of the soul, so by an intelligible kind of reason is the soul said to be the clothing of the body. For it is its ornament, covering and concealing its mortal nature. The saying, The corruptible must put on incorruptibility, is, then, such as if he had said: 'this corruptible nature of the body must receive the clothing of incorruptibility, a soul possessing in itself incorruptibility, because, clearly, it has put on Christ who is the Wisdom and Word of God. But when this body, which someday we shall have in a more glorious state, shall have become a

29 Cf. Jerome, Ep. 124.5.2 (ed. Hilberg 3, 101.13–18): 'And again a little further on he writes: If, he says, as the course of the discussion itself makes necessary, all things have lived without bodies, then all bodily nature will be swallowed up and what was once made out of nothing will be reduced into nothing, and there will be a time when its use is again necessary.'

30 Cf. Princ. 2.1.2, and further back at Princ. 1.6.2.


32 Cf. Origen, Comm. Jo. 13.430; Cels. 5.19; 7.32; Or. 25.3.
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quod aliquando gloriosius habebimus, tunc ad id quod inmorta Ie est accedit, ut etiam incorruptibile fiat. Si quid namque mortale est, hoc continuo et corruptibile est; non tamen si quid corruptibile est, hoc etiam mortale dici potest. Denique lapidem uel lignum corruptibile quidem dicimus, non tamen etiam mortale consequenter dicemus. Corpus uero quoniam uitae participat, ex eo quod separari ab eo uti potest et separatur, consequenter mortale nominamus et secundum alium quoque intellectum etiam corruptibile dicimus.

Mira ergo ratione sanctus apostolus generalem primo causam respiciens materiae corporalis, cuius materiae anima usum semper habet in qualibet qualitate positae, nunc quidem carnali postmodum uero subtìliori et puriori, quae spiritalis appellatur, ait: Necesse est corruptibile hoc induere incorruptionem; secundo uero ad specialem corporis respiciens causam ait: Necesse est mortale hoc induere inmortalitatem. Incorruptio autem et inmortalitas quid aliud erit nisi sapientia et uerbum et iustitia dei, quae formant animam et induunt et exornant? Et ita fit ut dicatur quia corruptibile incorruptionem induit, et mortale induit inmortalitatem. Nunc enim etiamsi valde proficiamus, tamen quoniam Ex parte cognoscimus et ex parte prophetamus et per speculum in aenigmate uidemus ea ipsa, quae uidemur intellegere, nondum corruptum hoc induit incorruptionem, neque mortale ab inmortalitate circumdatur; et quoniam sine dubio in longius protrahitur nostra haec in corpore eruditio; uidelicet usque quo ipsa corpora nostra, quibus circumdati sumus, propter uerbum dei et sapientiam ac perfectam iustitiam incorruptionem inmortalitatemque mereantur, propteraea dicitur: Necesse est corruptibile hoc induere incorruptionem, et mortale hoc induere inmortalitatem.

2.3.3. Verumtamen hi, qui putant posse umquam extra corpora uitam ducere rationabiles creaturas, possunt in hoc loco talia quaedam mouere.

219 numquam enim uixit post dicemus add. B Koe Sim Fern
220 ad post apostolus add. Merl Del Koe
223 ante uerumtamen add. titulum: quae asserant hi qui putant animas quandoque corporibus carituras [sed uideamus add. B] B
2.1-3 The World

partaker in life, it then accedes to what is immortal, such that it also becomes incorruptible. For whatever is mortal is, by consequence, also corruptible; but we cannot say, however, that what is corruptible is also mortal. Thus we call a stone or piece of wood corruptible, but we do not, however, consequently call them mortal. But since the body participates in life, as life can be separated and is separated from it, we consequently call it mortal and, according to another sense, we also speak of it as corruptible.

With remarkable insight, therefore, the holy Apostle, first referring to the general cause of bodily matter—of which matter the soul always makes use, whatever the qualities are with which it is endowed, now, indeed, fleshly, but after a while more refined and pure, which are called spiritual—says, *This corruptible [body] must put on incorruptibility;* and second, referring to the special cause of the body, says, *This mortal [body] must put on immortality.* Now what else can this *incorruptibility* and *immortality* be except the Wisdom and the Word and the Righteousness of God, which mould and clothe and adorn the soul? And thus it comes about that it is said that the corruptible puts on incorruptibility and the mortal immortality. For, although we now may make great progress, as yet we know in part and prophesy in part, and see through a glass darkly* those very things which we seem to understand, this corruptible [body] does not yet put on incorruptibility nor is this mortal [body] encompassed with *immortality;* and since without a doubt this training of ours in the body is drawn out to a very long period,** that is, up to the time when our very bodies, with which we are encompassed, may, on account of the Word and Wisdom and perfect Righteousness of God, be worthy of *incorruptibility* and *immortality,* therefore it is said, *This corruptible [body] must put on incorruptibility and this mortal [body] must put on immortality.*

2.3.3. Nevertheless, those who think that rational creatures are able at any time to lead a life outside the body, may here raise such questions as the following.

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* Cf. 1 Cor. 13:9, 12.  
** Cf. Origen, Princ. 2.11.4–7.
Si uerum est quod corruptibile hoc induet incorruptionem, et mortale hoc induet inmortalitatem, et quod absorbeatur mors in finem, non aliud quam materi-alem naturam exterminandam declarat, in qua operari mors aliquid poterat, dum hi, qui in corpore sunt, per naturam materiae corporalis mentis acumen uidentur obtundi. Si uero extra corpus sint, tunc omnem molestiam huiuscemodi perturbationis effugient. Sed quoniam non ad subitum omne indumentum corporeum effugere poterant, prius in subtilioribus ac purioribus inmorari corporibus aessimandis sunt, quae ultra a morte uinci nec aculeo mortis compungii praeualeant, ut ita demum paulatim cessante natura materiali et absorbeatur mors et exterminetur in finem, atque omnis eius aculeus penitus retundatur per divinam gratiam, cuius capax effecta est anima et incorruptionem atque inmortalitatem meruit adipisci. Et tunc merito dicetur ab omnibus: Vbi est, mors, victoria tua? ubi est, mors, aculeus tuus? Aculeus autem mortis peccatum est. Si ergo haec habere consequentiam uidentur, reliquum est ut status nobis aliquando incorporeus futurus esse credatur; quod si recipitur et omnes subiciendi Christo esse dicuntur, necesse est ut omnibus et hoc deferatur, in quos peruenit Christi subiectio;

2.3.3, lines 242–4

Jerome Ep. 124.5.3 (ed. Hilberg 3, 101.18–25):

Sin autem, ut ratione et scripturarum auctoritate monstratum est, corruptuum hoc induerit incorruptionem et mortale hoc induerit inmortalitatem, absorbetur mors in victoriam et fortisan omnis natura corporea toletur e medio, in qua sola potest mors operari.

2.3.3, lines 255–8


Si haec non sunt contraria fidei, forsitan sine corporibus aliquando uiuemus. Sin autem, qui perfecte subiectus est Christo, absque corpore intellegitur, omnes autem subiciendi sunt Christo, et nos erimus sine corporibus, quando ei ad perfectum subiecti fuerimus.
If it is true that *this corruptible [body] shall put on incorruptibility and this mortal [body] shall put on immortality*, and that *death shall be swallowed up* at the end, this demonstrates nothing other than that material nature, upon which death could work, is to be destroyed, while those who are in the body seem to have the acumen of intellect dulled by the nature of bodily matter. If, however, they are outside the body, then they will escape all the vexation of this kind of disturbance. But since they would not be able to escape immediately all bodily clothing, they are first to be considered as lingering in more refined and purer bodies, which are stronger, beyond being conquered by death or pierced by the sting of death, so that, by the gradual cessation of material nature, death may be swallowed up and, in the end, be destroyed, and all its sting completely blunted by divine grace, of which the soul has become capable and has thus deserved to attain incorruptibility and immortality. And then it will worthily be said by all, *Where, O death, is your victory? Where, O death, is your sting? The sting of death is sin.* If, therefore, these conclusions seem to be logical, it follows that it must be believed that our condition will at some future point be bodiless; and if this is admitted, and all are said to be subjected to Christ, it is necessary that this [bodiless condition] be conferred on all to whom subjection

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*6 Jerome continues his account of Origen's words in *Ep. 124.5.3* (ed. Hilberg 3, 101.18–25) in this way: 'And in the following: If, as has been demonstrated by reason and the authority of Scripture, *this corruptible [body] shall put on incorruptibility and this mortal [body] shall put on immortality, and death shall be swallowed up* in victory, then, perhaps, all bodily nature will be removed from the midst, for it is only in this that death can operate.'

*7 Cf. Jerome, *Ep. 124.5.4* (ed. Hilberg 3, 101.25–102.4) continues his account of Origen's words thus: 'And a little further on: If these things are not contrary to the faith, perhaps one day we shall live without bodies. And if he who is perfectly subject to Christ is understood to be without body, and all are to be subjected to Christ, we also shall be without body when we have become perfectly subjected to him.'
quia omnes, qui subiecti sunt Christo, in fine quoque subiecti erunt deo patri,
cui regnum traditurus dicitur Christus, et ita uidetur, ut tunc etiam usus
corporum cesset. Si autem cessat, in nihilum redit sicut et antea non erat.

Sed uideamus quid eis occurrat, qui haec ita asserunt. Videbitur enim
esse necessarium ut, si exterminata fuerit natura corporea, secundo iterum
reparanda sit et creanda; possibile enim uidetur ut rationabiles naturae, a
quibus nunquam aufertur liberi facultas arbitrii, possint iterum aliquibus
motibus subiacere, indulgente hoc ipsum deo, ne forte, si inmobilem semper
teneant statum, ignorent se dei gratia et non sua uirtute in illo fine beatitudinis
constitisse; quos motus sine dubio rursus uarietas corporum et diuersitas
prosequetur, ex qua mundus semper adornatur, nec umquam poterit mundus
nisi ex uarietate ac diuersitate constare; quod effici nullo genere potest extra
materiam corporalem.

2.3.4. Iam uero qui indissimiles sibi mundos ac per omnia pares aliquando
euenire confirmant, nescio quibus id possint adserere documentis. Si enim

2.3.3, lines 259–61

Justinian, Ep. ad Menam (ed. Schwartz, 211.25–7), Koetschau Frag. 19:

_Ei δὲ τὰ ὑποταγέντα τῷ Χριστῷ ὑποταγῆσεται ἐπὶ τέλει καὶ τῷ θεῷ, πάντες ἀποθήσονται τὰ σώματα καὶ οἷμαι ὅτι τότε εἰς τὸ μὴ ὃν ἔσται ἀνάλυσις τῆς τῶν σωμάτων φύσεως, ὑποστηρισμένης δεύτερον, ἕαν πάλιν λογικὰ ὑποκαταβῆ_.

Jerome, Ep. 124.5.5 (Hilberg 3, 102.4–16):

Cum subiecti fuerint omnes deo, omnes deposituri sunt corpora et tunc
corporalium rerum uniuersa natura soluetur in nihilum, quae, si secundo
necessitas postularit, ob lapsum rationabilium creaturarum rursus existent.
Deus enim in certamen et luctamen animas dereliquit, ut intellegend plenam
consummatamque uictoriam non ex propria se fortitudine sed ex dei gratia
consecutas. Et idcirco arbitrōr pro uarietate causarum diuersos mundos fieri et
elidi errores eorum, qui similes sui mundos esse contendunt.

262 _ante sed uideamus add. titulum; quid responderi debet his qui naturam corpoream negant
esse mansuram_ β  
272 _ante iam uero add. titulum; quod multa sint saecula et diuersa[indiuersa C] ex quibus alia iam fuisset alia futura dicantur_ β
to Christ extends, since all who are subject to Christ will in the end be subject to the God and Father, to whom Christ is said to deliver up the kingdom; and thus it appears that the use of bodies will then cease. And if it ceases, it returns to nothing just as it also did not exist before.

But let us see what happens to those who thus assert these things. For it will be seen to be a necessity that, if bodily nature be destroyed, it must be restored again and created, since it seems possible that rational natures, from whom the faculty of free will is never taken away, may again be subjected to certain movements, granted this by God, lest, if they should always hold an unchangeable condition, they would be ignorant that it is by the grace of God and not by their own virtue that they have been placed in that final state of blessedness; and these movements undoubtedly will again be accompanied by a variety and diversity of bodies, by which the world is always adorned, nor will the world ever be able to exist except from variety and diversity, which can in no way be effected without bodily matter.

2.3.4. Now, as for those who assert that worlds similar to each other and in all respects alike sometimes come into existence, I do not understand by what proofs they can defend this. For if there is said to be a world similar in all

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38 Cf. Justinian, Ep. ad Menam (ed. Schwartz, 211.25-7), an extract said to come from Princ. 2 and numbered by Koetschau as Fragment 19: 'But if those subject to Christ shall in the end be subject to God, then all will lay aside their bodies, and I think that then there will be a dissolution of bodily natures into non-being, to be restored a second time, if rational beings should fall again.' See also Jerome, Ep. 124.5.5 (ed. Hilberg 3, 102.4-16), continuing the above quotations: 'And in the same passage: When all things will be subjected to God, all bodies will have been laid aside; and then the entire nature of bodily things will be dissolved into nothing; but which, if necessity should demand it a second time, on account of a fall of rational creatures, it would come to exist again. For God has given souls over to struggle and conflict, in order that they may understand that the complete and final victory has been attained not by their own strength but by the grace of God. And, therefore, I think that on account of a variety of causes worlds become diverse and that the errors of those who contend that worlds are alike are shattered.'

39 Cf. Origen, Princ. 3.6.3; 4.4.8.

40 On the necessity of grace, see Origen, Princ. 3.1.15, 17, 24; Com. Ps. 4.6 (= Philoc, 26.7); Cels. 7.33; Hom. Ps. 36, 4.1.

41 A Stoic position countered most fully by Origen in Cels. 4.67-8 and 5.20-1, where it is also attributed to the Platonists and Pythagoreans; in this passage of Princ. Origen takes scriptural figures for examples, in Cels. he takes figures from Greek history, especially Socrates.
per omnia similis mundo mundus dicitur, erit ut iterum Adam uel Euá eadem
faciant quae fecerunt, idem iterum diluuium, atque idem Moyse rursum
populum sexcenta milia numero deducat ex Aegypto; Judas quoque bis
dominum tradet, Paulus secundo lapidantium Stephanum uestimenta seruabit,
et omnia, quae in hac uita sunt, iterum gerenda dicentur: quod non puto
ratione aliqua posse firmari, si arbitrii libertate aguntur animae et uel profectus
suos uel decessus pro voluntatis suae sustinent potestate. Non enim cursu
aliquo in eosdem se circulos post multa saecula reuoluentu aguntur animae,
ut hoc aut illud uel agant uel cupiant, sed quocumque proprie ingenii libertas
intenderit, illo gestorum suorum dirigunt cursum.

Tale autem est quod ab istis dicitur, ut si qui uelit adserere quod frumenti
medimnum si profundatur in terram, potest fieri ut idem et penitus indiscreti
secundo accidant casus granorum, ita ut unumquodque granum iuxta id
profusum iaceat secundo, quo primo aliquando deiectum est, et eodem ordine
eisdemque dispersum sit signis, quibus fuerat primo diffusum; quod utique in
innumerabilibus mediimni granis inpossibile est prorsus accidere, etiamsi per
inmensa saecula indesinenter ac iugiter effundantur. Ita ergo mihi inpossibile
uidetur eodem ordine eisdemque modis nascentium ac morientium atque
agentium quid secundo mundum posse reparari; sed inmutationibus non
minimis diversos posse mundos existere, ita ut pro manifestis quibusque
causis melior status sit alterius mundi et pro aliis inferior et pro aliis mediis
quidam status. Qui autem uel numerus uel modus hic sit, ego me nescire fateor.
Si qui autem possit ostendere, libertius discerem.

2.3.5. Verumtamen multorum saeculorum finis esse dicitur hic mundus, qui
et ipse saeculum dicitur. Docet autem sanctus apostolus quod Christus in
eo saeculo, quod ante hoc fuit, non est passus, sed ne in illo quidem, quod
ante ipsum fuit; et nescio si enumerare sufficiam, quanta fuerint anteriora
saecula, in quibus passus non est. Ex quibus autem sermonibus Pauli ad
occasionem huius intellegentiae uenerim, proferam; ait enim: Nunc uero
semel in consummatione saeculorum ad refellendum peccatum per hostiam
respects to this world, then it will come to pass that Adam and Eve will do the same things as they did before, again the same flood, and the same Moses would again lead a people numbering six hundred thousand out of Egypt, Judas will also betray the Lord twice, Paul will a second time keep the clothes of those who stoned Stephen, and everything which has been done in this life will be said to be repeated: I do not think that this can be established by any reasoning, if souls are driven by freedom of will and maintain their progression or regression by the power of their will. For souls are not driven on in some cycle which revolves again to the same cycle after many ages, so as either to do or desire this or that, but at whatever the freedom of their own disposition aims, to that they direct the course of their actions.

For what is said by these persons is much the same as if one were to assert that if a bushel of corn were poured out on the ground it could happen that the way the grain fell would be identical and utterly indistinguishable the second time [as the first], such that every individual grain would lie, on the second time, close to that grain where it had been thrown before, and scattered in the same order and with the same marks as happened in the first pouring; which, with the innumerable grains in the bushel, is certainly an impossible thing to happen, even if they were to be poured out incessantly and continually for countless ages. Thus, it therefore seems to me impossible that the world could be restored for a second time, with the same order and with the same amount of births and deaths and actions; but that diverse worlds, with non-negligible variations, are able to exist, so that for certain clear causes the condition of one world may be better, while for other causes another worse, and for other causes another an intermediate condition. But what may be the number or the measure of this, I confess myself ignorant. If anyone is able to demonstrate it, I would gladly learn.

2.3.5. This world, however, which is itself called an age, is said to be the end of many ages. Now the holy Apostle teaches that in that age which was before this Christ did not suffer, nor even in the age which was before that; and I know that I am not able to enumerate the number of anterior ages in which he did not suffer. I will quote, however, from what statements of Paul I have come to this understanding. He says, But now he has appeared, once for all, at the consummation of the ages to take away sin by the sacrifice of himself.

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42 Perhaps Wis. 13:9. Cf. Origen, Sol. Ps. 5 (PG 12, 1172d): 'Aeon is a natural system containing different principles from various bodies on account of the knowledge of God (Αἰών ἐστι σύστημα φυσικὸν, ἐκ σωμάτων ποικίλων λογικὰς διαφορὰς περιέχων τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ γνώσεως ἔρεικεν). P. Tzamalikos, Origen: Philosophy of History and Eschatology (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 190, suggests thinking of 'aeon' as 'space-time': The "world" is a reality which is made of two agents interwoven with each other: "the structure of the world" (the spatial element of space-time) and "time" (the temporal element of space-time).'

43 Heb. 9:26.
sui manifestatus est. Semel enim ait eum hostiam effectum et in consummatione saeculorum ad refellendum peccatum esse manifestatum. Quod autem post hoc saeculum, quod ad consummationem aliorum saeculorum dicitur factum, erunt alia saecula superuenientia, manifeste ab ipso Paulo didicimus dicente: Vt ostenderet in saeculis superuenientibus superabundantes divitiias gratiae suae in bonitate super nos. Non dixit: in saeculo superueniente neque: in duobus saeculis, sed in saeculis superuenientibus; unde arbitror multa saecula indicio sermonis istius declarari.

Si uero est aliquid saeculis maius, ita ut in creaturis quidem saecula intellegantur, in alis uero, quae excedunt et supergrediuntur usibiles creaturas, quod erit forte in restitutione omnium, cum ad perfectum finem uniuersa peruenient: id fortasse plus aliquid esse quam saeculum intellegendum est, in quo erit omnium consummatio. Mouet me autem in hoc scripturae sanctae auctoritas, quae dicit: In saeculum, et adhuc; adhuc enim quod dicit, plus aliquid sine dubio quam saeculum uult intellegi; et uide ne illud quod dicit salvator quia Volo ubi ego sum ut et isti ibi sint mecum et Sicut ego et tu unum sumus, ut et isti in nobis unum sint ostendere uideatur plus aliquid quam est saeculum uel saecula, forte etiam plus quam est saecula saeculorum, id uidelicet cum iam non in saeculo sunt omnia, sed omnia et in omnibus deus.

2.3.6. His pro nostris uiribus de mundi ratione dissertis, non uidetur incongruum etiam ipsius mundi appellatio quid sibi uelit inquirere; quae appellatio in scripturis sanctis diuersa significans frequenter ostenditur. Quod latine mundum dicimus, graece κόσμος appellatur; κόσμος autem non solum mundus, sed et ornamentum significat. Denique in Esaia ubi ad principes filias Sion incrépationis sermo dirigitur, et dicit: Pro ornamento...
For he says that he was once for all made a sacrifice and he has appeared at the consummation of the ages to take away sin.\(^{44}\) Now, that after this age, which is said to have been made for the consummation of other ages, there will be yet other coming ages, we have clearly learnt from Paul himself, who says, That in the coming ages he might show the immeasurable riches of his grace in kindness towards us.\(^{45}\) He did not say, 'in the coming age', nor 'in two ages', but in the coming ages, whence I infer, by his language, that many ages are indicated.

If, however, there is something greater than the ages—so that, among created beings certain ages may be understood, but among those which exceed and surpass visible created beings [something greater than the ages], which perhaps will take place in the restitution of all things,\(^{46}\) when the universe will come to a perfect end—then possibly that period in which the consummation of all things will take place is to be understood as something more than an age. In regard to this the authority of holy Scripture prompts me, which says, For an age and further;\(^{47}\) for when it says further, it undoubtedly wishes that something greater than an age be understood. And see if that which the Saviour says, I desire that where I am these also may be with me, and, as I and you are one, so also these may be one in us,\(^{48}\) does not seem to point to something more than an age or ages, perhaps even more than the ages of ages,\(^{49}\) that is to say, that period when all things are no longer in an age, but when God is all in all.\(^{50}\)

2.3.6. Having discussed, according to our ability, these points regarding the subject of the world, it does not seem inappropriate to inquire what the very term 'world' means, which term in holy Scripture is shown frequently to have different significations. For what we call in Latin 'world', is termed in Greek κόσμος; and κόσμος signifies not only 'world' but also 'ornament'.\(^{51}\) Consequently, in Isaiah, where a reproving speech is directed to the ruling daughters of Sion, and he says, instead of a head ornament of gold, you will have

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\(^{44}\) The same affirmation is found in Origen, Or. 27.15 and Comm. Jo. 1.255. Jerome (Ruf. 1.20), on the other hand, asserts: 'Your Origen allows himself to treat of metempsychosis, to introduce an innumerable number of worlds, to clothe rational creatures in one body after another, and to say that Christ has often suffered, and will suffer again, it being always profitable to undertake what has once been profitable.' See also the texts cited in Appendix II, item no. 23. Origen does indeed speak of the sacrifice of Christ being offered for the salvation of those on earth and those in heaven, and of the crucifixion being both invisible and visible, but it is always the single sacrifice of the cross. Cf. Origen, Hom. Lev. 1.3–4; Hom. Jes. Nav. 8.3; Hom. Luc. 10.3.


\(^{46}\) Acts. 3:21.

\(^{47}\) Cf. Ps. 113:26, 120:8, 124:2.

\(^{48}\) John 17:24, 21.

\(^{49}\) Cf. Gal. 1:5; 1 Tim. 1:17.

\(^{50}\) 1 Cor. 15:28. Cf. Origen, Princ. 3.6.

\(^{51}\) The following explanatory words are clearly written by Rufinus. Origen expounds the various meanings of the word 'cosmos' similarly in Comm. Jo. 6.301–5 and Comm. Matt. 13.20.
capitis aurei caluitium habebis propter opera tua, ornamentum ibi eo nomine quo mundum appellauit, id est κόσμον. Dicitur etiam in indumento pontificis mundi ratio contineri, sicut in Sapientia Salomonis inuenimus, cum dicit quia In uestimento poderis erat universus mundus. Mundus dicitur etiam noster cum habitatoribus suis orbis iste terrarum, sicut cum scriptura dicit quia Omnis mundus in maligno positus est. Meminit sane Clemens, apostolorum discipulus, etiam eorum, quos ἀντίχθωνας Graeci nominarunt, atque alias partes orbis terrae, ad quas neque nostrorum quisquam accedere potest, neque ex illis, qui ibi sunt, quisquam transire ad nos, quos et ipsos mundos appellauit, cum ait: Oceanus intransmeabilis est hominibus et hi, qui trans ipsum sunt mundi, qui his eisdem dominatoris dei dispositionibus gubernantur.

Dicitur mundus etiam ista universitas, quae ex caelo constat et terra, sicut Paulus ait: Transiet enim habitus huius mundi. Designat sane et alium quem mundum praeter hunc usibilem etiam dominus et saluator noster, quem re uera describere ac designare difficulte est; ait namque: Ego non sum ex hoc mundo. Tamquam enim qui ex alicubi quodam esset mundus, ida dixit quia Non sum ex hoc mundo. Cuius mundi difficilem nobis esse expositionem idcirco praediximus, ne forte aliquus praebatur occasio illius intelligentiae, qua putent nos imaginem quasdam, quas Graeci ιδέας nominant, adfirmare: quod utique a nostris rationibus alienum est, mundum incorporeum dicere, in sola mentis fantasia uel cogitationum lubrico consistente; et quomodo uel salvatorem inde esse uel sanctos quoque illius nactus poterunt adfirmare, non uideo. Verumtamen praeclarius aliquid et splendidius, quam iste praesens mundus est, mundus, indicari a salvatore non dubium est, in quem etiam credentes in se tendere prouocat ethortatur. Sed utrum mundus iste, quem sentiri uult, separatus ab hoc sit aliquis longeque diuisus uel loco uel qualitate uel gloria, an gloria quidem et qualitate praecellat, intra huius tamen mundi circumscriptionem cohibeat, quod et mihi magis uersisimile uidetur, incertum tamen et, ut ego arbitror, humanis adhuc cogitationibus et mentibus insitatum. Ex his tamen, quae Clemens uisus est indicare cum dicit: Oceanus intransmeabilis hominibus et hi mundi, <qui> post ipsum sunt, mundos, post ipsum, pluraliter nominans, quos et eadem dei summi prouidentia agi regique significat, semina quaedam nobis huiuscemodi intelligentiae uidetur adspergere, quo putetur omnis quidem universitas.
baldness because of your works,"52 he uses for ornament there the same word as for world, that is, κόσμος. It is even said that the clothing of the high priest contained a plan of the world, as we find in the Wisdom of Solomon, when it says that Upon the long robe was the whole world.53 This earthly sphere of ours, with its inhabitants, is also called world, as when Scripture says, The whole world lies in wickedness.54 Indeed, Clement, a disciple of the apostles, mentions those whom the Greeks call ἄντιχθονες;55 and other parts of the earthly sphere, to which no one of our people is able to approach, nor can any of those who are there cross over to us, which he also termed 'worlds', when he says, 'The ocean is impassable to human beings and the worlds which are beyond it, which are governed by these same ordinances of the ruler God.'56

That universe, which consists of heaven and earth, is also called a world, as Paul says, For the form of this world will pass away.57 Our Lord and Saviour indeed points out a certain other world besides this visible one, which it is difficult to describe and point out, for he says, I am not of this world.58 For he thus says, I am not of this world, as if he were of a certain other world. As we have already said, an exposition of this world is difficult for us, lest we afford to any an occasion for the supposition by which they think that we affirm the existence of certain 'images' which the Greeks call ἰδέας; for it is certainly foreign to our ways of thinking, to speak of a bodiless world that exists only in the imagination or in the unsteady realm of thoughts; and how they can affirm either that the Saviour is from thence, or that the saints will go thence, I do not see. There is no doubt, however, that something more glorious and splendid than this present world is pointed out by the Saviour, to which he invites and exhorts believers in him to aim. But whether that world, which he desires to be known, is far separated and divided from this either by space and nature and glory, or whether it is superior in glory and quality but confined within the limits of this world, which seems to me more probable, is nevertheless uncertain and, I think, an unsuitable subject for the thoughts and minds of human beings. But from what Clement seems to indicate when he says, 'The ocean is impassable to human beings and the worlds <which> are beyond it,' naming in the plural the worlds beyond it, which he also indicates are directed and governed by the same providence of the most high God, he would seem to throw out to us some seeds of that understanding by which it might be supposed that the entire universe of things that

52 Isa. 3:17, 24. 53 Wis. 18:24. 54 1 John 5:19.
55 Lit. people 'of the opposite earth' i.e. of the southern hemisphere. The idea of a 'counter-earth' (ἄντιχθον) was invented by the Pythagoreans, according to Aristotle (Cael. 293a20–4); Stobaeus, 1.15.7, reports the teachings of Philolaus about this idea. The Latin geographer Pomponius Mela adopted the concept in the first century AD.
56 1 Clem. 20.8. 57 1 Cor. 7:31. 58 John 17:14, 16.
365 eorum, quae sunt atque subsistunt, caelestium et supercaelestium, terrenorum infernorumque, unus et perfectus mundus generaliter dici, intra quem uel a quo ceteri, si qui illi sunt, putandi sunt contineri.

Vnde quidam uolunt globum lunae uel solis ceterorumque astrorum, quae πλανήται uocant, per singula mundos nominari; sed et ipsum supereminentem quem dicunt ἀπλανή globum, proprie nihilominus mundum appellari uolunt. Denique etiam Baruch prophetae librum in adsertionis huius testimonii uocant, quod ibi de septem mundis uel caelis uidentiis indicetur.

Esse tamen super illum σφαίραν, quam ἀπλάνη dicunt, uolunt aliam, quam, sicut apud nos caelum continet omnia, quae sub caelo sunt, ita illum dicunt immensa quadam sui magnitudine et ineffabili complexu spatio uniuersarum spherarum ambitu magnificentiore constringere; ita ut omnia intra ipsam ita sint, sicut est haec nostra terra sub caelo: quae etiam in scripturis sanctis terra bona et terra uiuentium creditur nominari, habens suum caelum illud, quod superius diximus, in quo caelo sanctorum nomina scribi uel scripta esse a salvatore dicuntur; quo caelo cohbetur illa terra atque concluditur, quam salvator in euangelio mansuetis et mitibus repromittit. Ex illius namque terrae nomine etiam hanc nostram, cui arida prius nomen fuerat, cognominatam uolunt, sicut et firmamentum hoc caelum illius caeli uocabulo nuncupatum est. Verum de huiuscemi opinionibus plenius in illo loco tractauimus, cum requireremus, quid esset quod In principio fecit deus caelum et terram. Aliud enim caelum atque alia terra indicatur esse quam illud firmamentum, quod post biduum factum dicitur, uel arida, quae postmodum terra nominatur.

Sane hoc quod dicunt quidam de hoc mundo, quoniam corruptibilis quidem est ex eo quod factus est, nec tamen corrumpit quia corruptione

exist, celestial and super-celestial, earthly and infernal, is called, generally, a single and perfect world; within which, or by which, other worlds, if there are any, must be supposed to be contained.

Accordingly, some wish the sphere of the sun or moon, and of the other celestial bodies, which they call πλανήτας [literally 'wanderers', that is, planets], to each be called 'world'; and also that the uppermost [sphere], which they call ἀπλανή ['non-wandering'], they nevertheless wish to be properly called 'world'. Finally they appeal to the book of Baruch the prophet as a witness to this assertion, because in it the seven worlds or heavens are more clearly indicated. Nevertheless, above that ἄπατον ['sphere'], which they call δαπάν Ṛ [non-wandering'], they would have another, which, just as our heaven contains all things under the heaven, so that one, they say, by its immense size and ineffable span encloses all the spheres within its more magnificent circumference, so that all things are within it, just as this earth of ours is under the heaven. This is also believed to be called in Scripture the good land and the land of the living, having its own heaven, which we have spoken of before, in which heaven the names of the saints are said to be written or to have been written by the Saviour; by which heaven that earth is embraced and enclosed which the Saviour in the Gospel promises to the meek and gentle. Furthermore they would have it that this earth of ours, which was formerly called the dry land, has been called by the name of that earth, just as the firmament was called heaven from the name of that heaven. But we have treated such opinions more fully in the place where we had to inquire into what the meaning is of In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. For another heaven and another earth are shown to exist besides that firmament which is said to have been made after the second day, or that dry land which was afterwards called earth.

Certainly what some say of this world—that it is corruptible because of the fact that it was made, and yet it is not corrupted, because the will of God, who

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59 This must be Third Baruch (the Greek Apocalypse of Baruch), though in the text as we now have it, which is probably incomplete, Baruch travels through only five heavens. Irenaeus (Dem. 9), commenting on the seven spirits named by Isa. 11:2–3, had also spoken of seven heavens; as does Ascen. Isa. 7–9, which describes a journey through the firmament and the seven heavens though only six heavens and the firmament are mentioned in Ascen. Isa. 10. Aristo of Pella is also reported to have taught seven heavens (cf. PG 4, 421bc).

60 Cf. Exod. 3:8; Jer. 11:19; Ps. 26:13, 141:6.


62 Cf. Gen. 1:10, 8. See Origen, Sel. Ps. 36,2 (PG 12, 1332–3):"There is also that other earth, of which the Scripture speaks, flowing with milk and honey, which the Saviour in the Gospels promises to the meek, when he says, Blessed are the meek, for they shall possess the earth. This earth of ours, which we inhabit, is in its proper designation called the dry land, just as the heaven which we behold is properly called the firmament. But the firmament takes the name of heaven from the name of that other heaven, as the Scripture teaches in Genesis. See also Hom. Ps. 36,2, 4, 5:4; Cels. 7:28–9, 31.

63 Gen. 1:1. This is not, however, treated in Origen's Homilies on Genesis.
fortior ac ualidior est uoluntas dei, qui fecit eum et continet illum, ne ei

corruptionem dominetur, rectius ista sentiri possunt de eo mundo, quam \( \tilde{\alpha} \pi \lambda \nu \tilde{\eta} \) sphaeram supra diximus, quia ex uoluntate dei nequaquam corruptioni
subiecta, pro eo quod nec causas corruptionis accepit. Sanctorum quippe
est et ad liquidum purificatorum mundus ille, non etiam impiorum, sicut
iste noster. Videndum autem est ne forte in hoc respiciens apostolus dixit:

*Prospicientibus nobis non ea quae uidentur, sed quae non uidentur. Quae enim*

*uidentur temporalia sunt, quae autem non uidentur aeterna sunt.* Scimus
*autem quoniam, si terrestris domus nostrae huius habitationis dissolutur,*

eaedificationem a deo habemus, domum non manu factam, aeternam in caelis.

Cum enim alibi dicat: *Quia videbo caelos opera digitorum tuorum,* et de

*omnibus uisibilibus per prophetam deus dixit quia Manus mea fecit haec*

*omnia,* istam aeternam *domum,* quam sanctis repromittit in caelis, manu
*factam non esse* pronuntiat, differentiam sine dubio creaturae in his quae
uidentur et in his quae non uidentur ostendens. Non enim idem intellegitur
*quod dicit ea quae non uidentur et ea quae uisibilia sunt.* Ea namque quae

*sunt uisibilia, non solum non uidentur, sed ne naturam quidem habent, ut*
uiideri possint, quae Graeci \( \alpha \sigma \omega \mu \alpha \tau \alpha, \) id est incorporea, appellarunt; haec
*autem, de quibus Paulus dixit: Quae non uidentur, naturam quidem habent, ut*
uiideri possint, nonandum tamen uiideri ab his, quibus promittuntur, exponit.

2.3.7. His igitur tribus opinionibus de fine omnium et de summa beatitudine
*prout sentire potuimus adumbratis, unusquisque legentium apud semet ipsum*

2.3.7, lines 409–25

*Jerome, Ep. 124.5.6 (ed. Hilberg 3, 102.16–103.6):*

Triplex ergo suspicio nobis de fine sugeritur, et quibus quae uera et melior sit,
lector inquirat. Aut enim sine corpore uiuemus, cum subiecti Christo subiciemur
deo et deus fuerit *omnia in omnibus;* aut, quomodo Christo subiecta cum ipso
Christo subiciemtur deo et in unum foedus artabantur, ita omnis substantia
redigetur in optimam qualitatem et dissolutur in aetherem, quod purioris
simpliciorisque naturae est; aut certe sphaera illa, quam supra appellauimus
\( \tilde{\alpha} \pi \lambda \nu \tilde{\eta}, \) et quidquid illius circulo continetur, dissolutur in nihilum, illa uero,
qua \( \alpha \nu \tau \iota \zeta \omega \nu \eta \) ipsa tenetur et cingitur, uocabitur *terra bona* nec non et altera
sphaera, qua hanc ipsam terram circumambit uertigine et dicitur *caelum,* in
sanctorum habitaculum seruabitur.

390 quam : quem Aes Koe  \( \tilde{\alpha} \pi \lambda \nu \tilde{\eta} \) sphaeram corr. Koe Goe Fern : aplanes feram Aes W :
aplane speram Aes : *\( A \tilde{\Pi} \Lambda \tilde{N} \) speram B : aplane speram C : APLANE speram G M σ : 
\( \tilde{\alpha} \pi \lambda \nu \tilde{\eta} \) speram Sim 394 dixerit β Koe Goe 397 nostra γ  habitatio A C
406 asomata A C Abes : *AΩMATA* B M : *AΩNATA* G : acowaceta S
made it and holds it together lest it should be mastered by corruption, is stronger and more powerful than corruption—may more correctly be supposed of that world, which we have above called ἀπλανή ['non-wandering'], since, by the will of God, it is not at all subject to corruption, because it has not admitted any causes of corruption. For it is obviously the world of saints and of those purified to resplendence, and not of the wicked like that world of ours. We must see if it is not perhaps in reference to that world that the Apostle said, We look not to the things that are seen, but to the things that are unseen; for the things that are seen are temporal, but the things that are unseen are eternal. For we know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were destroyed, we have a building from God, a house not made by hands, eternal in the heavens. And when it says elsewhere, Because I have seen the heavens, the work of your fingers, and when God said, through the prophet, about all things visible, that My hand has made all things, he declares that that eternal house which he promises to the saints in heaven was not made with hands, undoubtedly demonstrating the difference of creation between those things that are seen and those that are not seen. When it says those things that are not seen it does not mean the same as 'those things that are invisible.' For those things which are invisible are not only not seen, but do not even possess a nature that is able to be seen, which the Greeks have called ἀσώματα, that is bodiless; whereas the things of which Paul says, they are not seen, possess a nature that is able to be seen, but, he explains, they have however not yet been seen by those to whom they are promised.

2.3.7. Having sketched, then so far as we have been able to understand, these three opinions about the end of all things and the supreme blessedness, let each one of our readers judge for himself, with all care and diligence,
diligentius et scrupulosius iudicet, si potest aliqua harum probari uel eligi. Dictum est enim quod uel incorporea uita agi posse putanda sit, posteaquam Christo fuerint subiecta omnia et per Christum deo patri, cum erit omnia et in omnibus deus; uel cum nihilominus Christo fuerint uniuersa subiecta et per Christum deo, cum quo et unus spiritus secundum hoc, quod spiritus sunt naturae rationabiles, fiunt, tunc ipsa quoque substantia corporalis optimis ac purissimis spiritibus sociata pro assumptium uel qualitate uel meritis in aetherium statum permutata, secundum quod apostolus dicit: Et nos inmutabimus, refulgebit; aut certe quod eorum quae uidentur habitu praeterente et omni corruptibilitate decussa atque purgata omniue hoc muni statu, in quo πλανήτων dicuntur sphaerae, supergresso atque superato, supra illam, quae ἄπλανήτης dicitur, sphaeram piorum ac beatorum statio collocatur, quasi in terra bona et terra uiuorum, quam mansueti et mites hereditate perципient; cuius est caelum illud, quod ambitu magnificentiore ipsam illam circumdat et continet terram, quod uere caelum et principaliter appellatur, in quo caelo uel tera finis omnium atque perfectio tuta ac fìdissima possit statione consistere, quod scilicet uel hi qui post correctionem castigationum, quas pro delictis pertulerant purgationis obtentu, expletis omnibus atque depensis, terrae illius habitaculum mereantur, hi uero, qui uerbo dei oboedientes fuerunt ac sapientiae eius iam hinc capaces se obtemperantesque praebuerunt, caeli illius uel caelorum promereni regna dicantur, et ita dignius conpleatur illud, quod dictum est: Beati mansueti, quia ipsi hereditate possidebunt terram et: Beati pauperes spiritu, quoniam ipsi hereditatem capient regni caelorum et quod dixit in psalmo: Et exaltabit te, ut heredites terram. Ad hanc etenim terram descendit dicitur, ad illam autem, quae in alto est, exaltari. Hoc ergo modo uidetur quasi iter quoddam sanctorum professorum aperi ab illa terra ad illos caelos, ut non tam permanere in illa terra quam habitare uideantur, transi tur scilicet, cum in id quoque profecerint, ad hereditatem regni caelorum.
whether one of them can be approved and adopted.\textsuperscript{70} It has been said that it must be supposed either that it is possible to lead a bodiless life, after all things have become subject to Christ and through Christ to the God and Father, when \textit{God will be all in all}.\textsuperscript{71} Or that when all things have been made subject to Christ, and through Christ to God, with whom they become \textit{one spirit},\textsuperscript{72} by virtue of the fact that rational beings are spirits, then the bodily substance itself, being united to the best and most pure spirits and being changed, according to the quality or merits of those who assume it, into an ethereal character—as the Apostle says, \textit{and we shall be changed}\textsuperscript{73}—and will shine with light. Or else that when the \textit{form} of those things which are seen \textit{passes away},\textsuperscript{74} and all corruptibility has been shaken off and cleansed away, and the entire condition of this world, in which the spheres of the planets are said to be, has been superseded or transcended, there is established the abode, above that sphere which is called ‘non-wandering’, of the pious and the blessed, as it were, in a \textit{good land} and \textit{the land of the living},\textsuperscript{75} which will be inherited by the meek and the gentle, to which belongs that heaven (which, with its more magnificent circumference, surrounds and contains that land itself) which is truly and principally called heaven; in this heaven and earth, the end and perfection of all things can safely and most surely take place, where, that is to say, those who, after the rebuke of punishments which they have endured, by way of purgation, for their offences, fulfilling and discharging every obligation, may deserve a habitation in that land; while those who have been obedient to the Word of God and, being compliant, have proved themselves already capable of receiving his Wisdom, are said to be deserving of the kingdom of that heaven or heavens, and thus the saying is more worthily fulfilled, \textit{Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth, and Blessed are the poor in spirit, for they shall inherit the kingdom of heaven}, and what is said in the Psalm, \textit{He shall exalt you and you shall inherit the land}.\textsuperscript{76} For it is called a descent to this earth, but an exaltation to that which is on high. In this way, therefore, a sort of road seems to be opened up for the progress of the saints, from that earth to those heavens, so that they would appear not so much to remain in that land but to dwell there, that is, to pass on, when they will have made progress in it, to the inheritance of the \textit{kingdom of heaven}.

\textsuperscript{70} Origen addresses his readers also in \textit{Princ.} 1.6.3; 2.8.4, 5; 3.6.9.\textsuperscript{71} 1 Cor. 15:28.\textsuperscript{72} 1 Cor. 6:17.\textsuperscript{73} 1 Cor. 15:51.\textsuperscript{74} Cf. 1 Cor. 7:31; 2 Cor. 4:18.\textsuperscript{75} Cf. Exod. 3:8; Jer. 11:19; Ps. 26:13, 141:6.\textsuperscript{76} Matt. 5:5, 3; Ps. 36:34.