OF OUR FATHER AMONG THE SAINTS

MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR

Translated from the Greek

by

JOSEPH P. FARRELL
In preparing this translation of The Disputation with Pyrrhus of Saint Maximus the Confessor, I have relied solely on the Greek text as found in the Migne Patrologiae Graec-Latina, Volume 91: 288-353. Where it was necessary to add words to the text I have enclosed them in brackets, [ ]. In some cases, I have added words which, while not strictly necessary, hopefully clarify the meaning of a given sentence. Inasmuch as the Disputation constitutes one of the premier christological texts in Patristic literature, I have numbered each paragraph for teachers and students who might wish to use this translation as a basis for their own research.

While I have provided some annotations to the text, I have tried to limit both the number and complexity of these. Almost every phrase of the Disputation could be commented upon at length, and I therefore thought it best not to clutter the page with overly technical explanations and references. These, chiefly Marcel Doucet’s Notes sur la Dispute from his unpublished dissertation, are already well-known to scholars of the Confessor. In my own annotations I have tried to place the text in a more general dogmatic context.

This translation, minus introduction and notes, first appeared in 1988 in a series of monthly installments in The Dawn, diocesan publication of the Diocese of the South of the Orthodox Church in America, at the encouragement of His Grace Bishop DMITRI. There were some regrettable lacunae in the text which need correcting here. To those familiar with that translation, or with my earlier work Free Choice in St. Maximus the Confessor, will notice that I have chosen to adopt a slightly modified form of King James English for this translation. In the process of revising the translation for publication by the St. Tikhon’s Seminary Press, and of revising an earlier and as yet unpublished translation of the complete text of The Theological and Polemical Works (Opuscula Theologica et Polemica), I concluded that this form of the English was best suited to convey the subtle nuances of St. Maximus’ Greek. In his other works, the Confessor, perhaps more than any other Father and master of the spiritual life, also writes to elevate the soul to contemplation of divine mysteries;
The Disputation with Pyrrhus, like all other works of St. Maximus the Confessor, is centered around the mystery of the Incarnation and enfeminization of the only-begotten Son and Word of the Father. Thus, when approaching the writings of St. Maximus, there is always the possibility to see whatever particular composition which occupies one's attention at the moment as standing at the center of his theological synthesis, and interpreting his other writings from that basis. St. Maximus is consequently often characterized as a systematic thinker, but not a systematic writer. Indeed, no less a man than St. Photius the Great, whose Greek is not without its own subtleties and complexities, complained of the Confessor's labyrinthine style. Had St. Photius known of the word, he would perhaps have characterized the Confessor's style as 'baroque', for behind the complexity and length of his sentences lies the idea of synthesizing several seemingly independent strands of thought into an overarching whole whose center and keystone is Christ Himself, in the hypostatic and personal fulness of the union of His divine and human natures. The Disputation must consequently be read from a broad dogmatic context which takes into account not only his other works, but its significance within the Patristic and dogmatic Tradition of the Church.

At the center of St. Maximus' theological and christological universe is the doctrine of Recapitulation. It is this doctrine which forms the basis of all that the New Testament and the Fathers have to say in connection with the Incarnation. While the term "recapitulation" itself appears only twice in the New Testament, the concept itself occurs repeatedly; one has only to recognize its principles of operation in order to know when it is being applied. These may be categorized as follows: 1) preeminence 2) repetition and recontextualization, 3) reversal, and 4) fulfillment.

The Confessor elegantly summarizes this doctrine and its principles of operation in a compact sentence: "The One Logos is
his conceptions and sentences are to be lingered over and "inwardly digested," and not merely "read" as if reading a novel. This, too, the King James form of the English is more capable of conveying. By employing it here in the context of an obviously polemical debate I hope to convey the sense that the chief disputants, Patriarch Pyrrhus and St. Maximus, are first and foremost churchmen, hierarchy and monk, and that the tone of their dispute, while often heated, does not degenerate to the level of non-technical colloquialisms, but rather preserves its dignity throughout.

To His Grace Bishop KALLISTOS (Ware) once again goes my deepest gratitude for vetting the translation when it was first made. Translation is often a wearying process, and that of checking translations even more so. The result here presented has been through at least five different revisions, and thus if there is any error or infelicity of style, these are wholly my own and not His Grace KALLISTOS', whose suggestions for alternative readings were invariably helpful.

I am grateful also to His Grace Bishop HERMAN of Eastern Pennsylvania and Rector of St. Tikhon's Seminary not only for encouraging me to revise and publish the translations of the Disputation and the Theological and Polemical Works, but also for allowing me the full measure of editorial freedom and time necessary to do so. It is not often that one has the opportunity to write such works without having to worry about preset editorial limits or deadlines which, more often than not, restrict the benefit that such works might have for the Church.

Finally, to His Grace Bishop DMITRI, Bishop of Dallas and the South, my gratitude for his long friendship and support to me over the years, and for his constant encouragement of this project in particular.

To all of them, may God grant many years!

Joseph P. Farrell, D.Phil.(Oxon.),
Associate Professor of Dogmatics and Patristics,
St. Tikhon's Seminary

INTRODUCTION

The Disputation with Pyrrhus, like all other works of St. Maximus the Confessor, is centered around the mystery of the Incarnation and ontologization of the only- and eternally begotten Son and Word of the Father. Thus, when approaching the writings of St. Maximus, there is always the possibility to see whatever particular composition which occupies one's attention at the moment as standing at the center of his theological synthesis, and interpreting his other writings from that basis. St. Maximus is consequently often characterized as a systematic thinker, but not a systematic writer. Indeed, no less a man than St. Photius the Great, whose Greek is not without its own subtleties and complexities, complained of the Confessor's labyrinthine style. Had St. Photius known of the word, he would perhaps have characterized the Confessor's style as "baroque", for behind the complexity and length of his sentences lies the idea of synthesizing several seemingly independent strands of thought into an overarching whole whose center and keystone is Christ Himself, in the hypostatic and personal fullness of the union of His divine and human natures. The Disputation must consequently be read from a broad dogmatic context which takes into account not only his other works, but its significance within the Patristic and dogmatic Tradition of the Church.

At the center of St. Maximus' theological and christological universe is the doctrine of Recapitulation. It is this doctrine which forms the basis of all that the New Testament and the Fathers have to say in connection with the Incarnation. While the term "recapitulation" itself appears only twice in the New Testament, the concept itself occurs repeatedly; one has only to recognize its principles of operation in order to know when it is being applied. These may be categorized as follows: 1) preeminence 2) repetition and recontextualization, 3) reversal, and 4) fulfillment.

The Confessor elegantly summarizes this doctrine and its principles of operation in a compact sentence: "The One Logos is
the many logoi, and the many logoi are the One Logos." In other words, in His Incarnation and eahominization, Jesus Christ possesses and is all the fulness of the universals common both to deity and humanity. In terms of the four principles enumerated above, then, this works itself out in a multitude of ways. In terms of preeminence, it means that Christ is both the presupposition, the method, the paradigm, and the summit of whatever might be said either about God or about man. God is truly, uniquely, ultimately and finally revealed in The Word Incarnate. And man, perfect humanity, is also only understood properly in its union with the Word. In scriptural terms, Jesus Christ is the Alpha and Omega of all that can be said of God and man, and thus has the preeminence "in all things". Being thus preeminent in all things, Christ becomes the final context, the ultimate and perfect "recontextualization" and repetition, of the logoi, understood here as both the words of the Old Testament Scriptures and the principles of nature: of creation as a whole and of man in particular. That is, not only are the typological themes of Scripture repeated in His Incarnate Economy from His conception to His Second Advent, but He also repeats all of the natural stages of humanity itself; Christ recapitulates and summarizes not only sacred history but the history of all of humanity as a whole, and the stages of life of each individual human being in particular. In doing so, He reverses the effects of the Fall. As the Second Adam, the entire drama of the Fall is replayed, this time to an opposite conclusion. Instead of a Fall into passions and corruption, mankind in Christ is raised and exalted. Deification and the spiritual life, in other words, are integral components and implications of the doctrine of Recapitulation. By thus repeating, and in some cases reversing, the typological themes of Holy Scripture and the natural laws and stages of humanity, Christ is not only preeminent in all things, but fulfills all Old Testament prophecy and expectation concerning His Coming, there being nothing more that can be said about them outside of and without reference to Christ.

Consequently, the doctrine of the Recapitulation in Christ bears implications not only for the exegesis and interpretation of

\[1\text{Ambigua 7, PG 91: 1081C.}\]

\[2\text{Colossians 1: 18.}\]

Scripture and the understanding of the Incarnation, but implies also a general basis on which to interpret human history and the whole created order and their principles of activity.

At this point, it would be helpful to survey how this doctrine is employed by other Fathers prior to St. Maximus before proceeding to his own use of it. The word "recapitulation" means "to collect several different things together under one head", or simply "to summarize". It occurs only twice in the New Testament, in Ephesians 1:10 -- "That in the dispensation of the fulness of times he might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven, and which are on earth, even in him" -- and in Romans 13:9 -- "if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." It is significant that St. Paul uses this word so sparingly, and then only in contexts having to do either with christological affirmation or with counsels on living a Christian life. In other words, the doctrinal affirmations of Christology and the principles of the spiritual life go hand in hand, they cannot be divorced from each other. The doctrinal principles of Christology are not mere intellectual constructions which have no force or bearing on the conduct of life, nor are the counsels of a virtuous life in love ever fully apprehended apart from Christ. Love, the union of God and man in Christ and the love of man for God and his neighbor, are the essence of the doctrine. This union was to play an important role in St. Maximus' own theology, as we shall see.

St. Irenaeus of Lyons is the name most often associated with recapitulation. For him, the two natures of Christ along with their

\[3\text{St. Matthew 22: 37-40: "Jesus said unto him, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets." cf. St. John 3:16, 1 St. John 14-16, 23.}\]

\[4\text{This characterization is true as far as it goes, but must not be pressed. As will be shown from a cursory comparison of his writings with those of other Fathers, the four principles of the doctrine are well known to other Fathers, even though they may not use the term 'recapitulation' itself in conjunction with them.}\]
various properties, establish His preeminence in both heavenly and earthly things and thus Christ fulfills them in Himself, i.e., fills them with Himself:

He was invisible and became visible; incomprehensible and made comprehensible; impassible and made passible; the Word, and made man; consummating all things in himself. That, as in things above the heavens and in the spiritual and invisible world the Word of God is supreme, so in the visible and physical realm he may have pre-eminence, taking to himself the primacy and appointing himself the head of the Church, that he may "draw all things to himself" (St. John 12:32) in due time.

Here not only is Christ's recapitulation taken to refer to His preeminence in deity and humanity, but, since His divine nature is spiritual and invisible, it also includes "the spiritual and invisible world", the world of the angels and also of man's soul and mind. And by the same token, for St. Irenaeus the fact that Christ's humanity is physical and part of the physical creation, all of "the physical realm" is also effected by His Incarnation. Thus, the "one Christ Jesus our Lord" came "in fulfillment of God's comprehensive design and consummates all things in himself." In other terms, as the Word Himself in conjunction with His everlasting Father created "all things visible and invisible", so His Incarnation effects all things visible and invisible.

The double entendre of the word 'effects' is intentional, for Christ's Incarnate Economy affects all invisible and visible things both in the sense of accomplishing and even causing them to be, as well as in the sense of influencing them. The Recapitulation consequently effects the very design of time and history itself, since it pertains to "the mystery which hath been hid from the generations" of the "Lamb slain from the foundation of the world." Recapitulation is the christological basis, then, of a proper understanding of the history of creation and of humanity from its inception to its consummation:

He was incarnate and made Man; and then He summed up in Himself the long line of the human race, procuring for us as a comprehensive salvation, that we might recover in Christ what in Adam we lost, namely, the state of being in the image and likeness of God.

This constitutes the allegorical or typological basis on which Irenaeus and other Fathers read the Old Testament. On the basis of the Pauline precedent of the parallelism between Adam and Christ, Irenaeus draws further explicit parallels between them: Adam is fashioned of virgin untitled earth, Christ is born of the Virgin Mary. As the Fall occurred through a (fallen) angel, and the disobedience of Eve and Adam, so the restoration is effected not only by a repetition of these elements in the Annunciation by an

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5 Against Heresies, V: 20: 2, citing Ephesians 1:10
7 Ibid., V: 20: 2: "The things in heaven are spiritual, while those on earth constitute the dispensation in human nature. These things, therefore, He recapitulated in Himself: by uniting man to the Spirit, and causing the Spirit to dwell in man..."
8 Ibid.
9 Colossians 1:26.
11 Ibid., III: 18: 1.
12 There is a measure of disagreement among exegetes whether allegory and typology are the same thing or not. For purposes of this survey, 'typology' is to be understood as a special kind of allegory, with particular roles and paradigms of its own which are discussed briefly above.
angel, but by a reversal of disobedience by the obedience of Christ the Second Adam and Mary the Second Eve.\textsuperscript{14}

(This is) the back-reference from Mary to Eve, because what is joined together could not otherwise be put asunder than by inversion of the process by which those bonds of union had arisen; so that the former ties be cancelled by the latter, that the latter may set the former again at liberty.\textsuperscript{15}

That is, in order for there to be a fulfillment of the Old Testament, their must be a repetition and recontextualization of its themes in the Life of Christ, and where necessary, a reversal of them. This presupposes certain principles in order for typological exegesis to take place. Types are like leitmotifs in music; they are repeated, and with each repetition, recontextualized, reaching their fulfillment in Christ.\textsuperscript{16}

Not only does this repetitional fulfillment of types occur in reference to the events of the Old Testament, but also in reference to the principle stages of human life itself, i.e., in reference to the observed phenomena of nature:

\textsuperscript{14}cf. III: 21:10.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., III: 22: 4.

\textsuperscript{16}This highlights another principle vital to Recapitulation, that of the unity between the Old and New Testaments. For St. Irenaeus, this principle, and therefore the whole doctrine of Recapitulation, underpins his polemic against the Gnostics and Marcionites, both of which separated the God and Author of the Old Testament, the Creator of matter and hence of evil, from the God of the New Who, being spiritual and therefore good, could not have authored the Old. This dialectical opposition is of course not found in Scripture, since God created all things good, including the material creation. The opposition of the two Testaments shows more the influence of Hellenistic philosophical concepts. St. Irenaeus' recapitulatory response which presupposes their unity in Christ would thus seem to weaken the oft-repeated axiom that the Fathers 'Hellenized' Christianity.

Therefore he passed through every stage of life, restoring to each age fellowship with God\textsuperscript{17}. He sanctified each stage of life by making possible a likeness to himself. He came to save all through his own person: all, that is, who through him are re-born to God: infants, children, boys, young men and old. Therefore he passed through every stage of life. He was made an infant for infants, sanctifying infancy; a child among children, sanctifying childhood, and setting an example of filial affection, of righteousness and of obedience; a young man among young men, becoming an example to them, and sanctifying them to the Lord.... And thus he came even to death, that he might be 'the first-born from the dead, having the pre-eminence among all [or in all things].'\textsuperscript{18}

But this recapitulation of humanity is not merely by repetition of its laws and stages, as the reference to Holy Baptism suggests. There is an ecclesiological and sacramental dimension in which it takes place.\textsuperscript{19}

With these principles of the doctrine in mind -- the preeminence of Christ in all things pertaining to deity and to humanity, and to the invisible and visible worlds, the repetition and fulfillment in His Incarnate Economy of the laws of human history, collective and individual, as well as of the repeated typology of the Old Testament -- we may now see how they operate in two other Fathers writing in entirely different times and for different purposes: St. Athanasius the Great of Alexandria, and St. Ambrose of Milan.

For St. Athanasius as for St. Irenaeus the Incarnation recapitulates all of humanity:

\textsuperscript{17}Against Heresies, III: 18: 6.

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., III: 22: 4.

\textsuperscript{19}cf. V: 20: 2: "The Church has been planted as a garden in this world."

\textsuperscript{14}Against Heresies, III: 18: 6.
Through this union of the immortal Son of God with our human nature, all men were clothed with incorruption in the promise of the resurrection. For the solidarity of mankind is such that, by virtue of the Word's indwelling in a single human body, the corruption which goes with death has lost its power over all.

That is, in His human nature which is consubstantial with all men, the Son and Word effectively bestows incorruption, with a certain irresistible determination, on all of humanity.

In the rest of the created order, St. Athanasius like St. Irenaeus sees that the salient events of the Incarnate life of Christ have the result of effecting and filling all of Creation, being above by virtue of His coming down from heaven and His bodily Ascension and return there, being present in this world in virtue of His Incarnation in it, and below it in virtue of His Descent into Hades prior to the Resurrection: “The self-revealing of the Word is in every dimension --, above, in creation; below, in the Incarnation; in the depth, in Hades; in the breath, throughout the world. All things have been filled with the knowledge of God.”

Thus the sensible world itself, in virtue of the Word becoming man, has been made the vehicle of the knowledge of the Word, because “He, as Man,” centers “their senses on Himself.”

Consequently, there is a preeminence of the Word over and in all things of creation, inasmuch as He during His Incarnation as man never ceases His proper divine activity of providentially ordering all of creation:

The Word was not hedged in by His body, nor did His presence in the body prevent His being present elsewhere as well. When He moved His body He did not cease also to direct the universe by His Mind and might. No. The marvelous truth is, that being the Word, so far from being Himself contained by anything, He actually contained all things Himself... As with the whole, so also is it with the part. Existing in a human body, in which He Himself gives life, He is still Source of life to all the universe, present in every part of it, yet outside the whole; and He is revealed both through the works of His body and through His activity in the world. It is, indeed, the function of soul to behold things that are outside the body, but it cannot energize or move them... With the Word of God in His human nature... His body was not for Him a limitation, but an instrument, so that He was both in it and in all things, and outside all things, resting in the Father alone. At one and the same time - this is the wonder - as Man He was living a human life, and as Word He was sustaining the life of the universe, and as Son He was in constant union with the Father.

This recalls once again the statement of St. Maximus, the Word in His Incarnation is the Logos of all logos, the Principle of all principles of deity and of humanity, of all spiritual and sensible worlds.

The miracles consequently reflect in miniature this principle of Christ's preeminence over creation, since each miracle reflects creation.

"Consider the miracle at Cana. Would not anyone who saw the substance of water transmuted into wine understand that He Who did it was the Lord and Maker of the water that He changed? It was for the same reason that He walked on the sea as on dry land -- to prove to the onlookers that He had mastery over all. And the feeding of the multitude, when He made little into much, so that from five loaves five thousand mouths were filled -- did not that prove Him none other than the very Lord Whose Mind is over all?"
Thus "every miracle exhibits the character of the Incarnation."24 The miracles then reflect and recapitulate the created order. They express "not simply a god, but God: that which mis outside Nature, not as a foreigner, but as her sovereign."25 The Word, being in the bosom of the Father before the foundation of the world,26 makes a little bread "into much bread. The Son will do nothing but what he sees the Father do. There is, so to speak, a family style."27 Fulfillment of the created order thus provides the basis from which to understand Christ's miracles properly; they, too, are repetitions of the typologies to be found in the created sensible world.

In St. Ambrose of Milan, this typological recapitulation is also made the basis for a correct understanding of the sacraments. Working through the connection in Scripture between water and the Spirit, he begins, like St. Athanasius, with the general principle that the Incarnation recapitulates invisible and sensible things:

This is made the basis of his exegesis of the whole typology of water and the Spirit, beginning with the Creation of the world itself. "How ancient is the mystery pre-figured even in the origin of the world itself. In the very beginning, when God made the heaven and the earth, 'the Spirit,' it is said, 'moved upon the waters,'"31 With this principle in hand, he follows the typology through the Old Testament, beginning with the Flood:

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28 1 Corinthians 5: 18.
29 Romans 1: 20. Notably, St. Ambrose's use of this verse contrasts rather dramatically with that of the Latin Schoolmen for whom it is taken to refer to the program of natural theology, that is, of philosophical explanations designed to prove the existence of God apart from, and prior to, Christology. For St. Ambrose, the verse is understood recapitulationally, as being indicative of the whole typological principle which is to be employed in scriptural exegesis.
30 St. John 10: 38.
Ambrose then provides the answer to his question.

The water, then, is that in which the flesh is dipped, that all carnal sin may be washed away. All wickedness is there buried. The wood is that on which the Lord Jesus was fastened when He suffered for us. The dove is that in the form of which the Holy Spirit descended, as you have read in the New Testament.  

Following St. Paul, he discovers the repetition of the themes of water and the presence of God again at the Exodus:

There is also a third testimony, as the apostle teaches us: 'For all our fathers were under the cloud, and all passed through the sea, and were all baptized to Moses in the cloud and in the sea.' And further, Moses himself says in his song: 'Thou sentest Thy Spirit, and the sea covered them.' You observe that even then holy baptism was prefigured in that passage of the Hebrews, wherein the Egyptian perished, the Hebrew escaped.  

Interpreting the cloud, St. Ambrose comes finally to root Baptism in the virginal Conception and Nativity of Christ.

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32 Ibid., III: 10, p. 318. St. Ambrose' rhetorical question is reminiscent of Christ's words to Nicodemus at the end of St. John 3: 1-10. After a prolonged reiteration of the typological connection of water and the Spirit, Christ asks: 'Art thou a master of Israel, and knowest not these things?'(v. 10)

33 Ibid., III: 11, p. 318.

34 Ibid., III: 12, p. 318.


36 Ibid., IV: 20, p. 319.
Spirit into two separate baptisms or events, as this would be a kind of sacramental Nestorianism.\(^7\)

To summarize, the doctrine of recapitulation combines several different principles. By maintaining that the Incarnate Economy unites in an indivisible and unconfused union all that can be said about deity and humanity and about the invisible and sensible world, it confesses the preeminence of Christ in all things. By maintaining that Christ, in the events and miracles of His Incarnate life, repeats and fulfills the laws not only of creation but also the sacred history of the Old Testament, it implies a Christocentric view of history. It thus has the most profound implications not only of the exegesis of the words and events of Holy Scripture but also of the doctrine of Providence, that is, of predestination and free choice of will, in order to remain uniquely Christian must be understood at the outset as being grounded in the Mystery of Christ. Finally, the doctrine of recapitulation also implies a certain vision of ecclesiology, the sacraments, and the spiritual life, in turn, form the background to a proper understanding of The Disputation with Pyrrhus, and it is to them that our attention must now be given.

\(^{37}\) This point cannot be lingered over too long, since many Evangelical Christians take such a separation. For the Fathers, such a separation always indicates a distorted and incorrect understanding of the Incarnation as the Christological basis of recapitulation that infants are baptized after the sin of Adam. Thus there are five basic distinctions in St. Maximus' cosmology, each of which in turn forms the basis for his understanding of Christ's work of recapitulation. These are: 1) the distinction between Uncreate and created beings; 2) the distinction between intelligible and sensible beings being mentioned above; 3) the distinction between the sensible creation between heaven and earth; 4) the distinction on earth between paradise and the world of men; and finally 5) the distinction in humanity between man and woman, the masculine and the feminine. These distinctions are in and of themselves good, but become diametrically opposed by man's Fall.
2. The Fall of Man into the Dialectic of Oppositions

Since he is created in the image and likeness of God, a proper understanding of man requires two terms of reference: nature and person. Man by nature has soul, reason, activity or energy, and the faculty of will and free choice. But the individual hypostasees particularizes or enthypostasizes each of these things in an irreducible unique personal manner. This unique mode of existence becomes primarily opposed to the principle of nature at the Fall and the five distinctions mentioned above are rendered by man as oppositions which begin to tear apart from each other and to introduce death, beginning with the first and most crucial distinction between the Uncreate and the created. Maximus expresses this Fall into dialectical opposition and death by a lengthy consideration on the meaning of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil in Genesis 2:17.

The tree of life is altogether productive of life, but the other is not the tree of life, being clearly productive of death. And that which is not productive of life is [for that reason] not called the tree of life, but since it is clearly productive of death, it is logically distinguished by opposition to [the tree] of life.

But as wisdom, the tree of life also has a great difference from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, since it is neither wisdom nor respecting of the law. For of [the tree of life] comes that wisdom proper to intellect and reason, but of [the tree of the knowledge of good and evil] comes that knowledge of opposition which is a habit of opposing things, which is proper to the irrational and sensible... The tree of life is, according to one interpretation, the intellect of the soul, in which wisdom exists: but the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is the sensory perception of the body, in which an irrational motion exists.

Great indeed, therefore, is the difference between the two trees, both as regarding their natural powers of discernment as well as of the name attached to each. Since [the tree of the knowledge of good and evil] is so designated without any designation of distinct good and evil, one who is not wisely and accurately conversant with the logos of the Spirit will be liable to commit great error, for they that are being made wise through grace know that what is called the simple evil is not evil at all, but evil in relation to some end but the relation to some end is not evil in a similar way as well that which is called the simple good is not always good, but good in relation to some end but the relation to some end is not necessarily good.

In other words, there is no such thing as an evil which has substantial and independent existence; there is no basic cosmological and metaphysical opposition between good and evil. Rather by making the sensible form of knowledge the sole basis of his reasoning faculty at the Fall, man is doomed to make choices on his own, never knowing with certitude that any given choice is...
Maximus' "good in relation to some particular end" will have a good issue. Thus, the Fall is not only a Fall into dialectic, but it also introduces a kind of knowledge based on habit and therefore upon experience. Whereas before the Fall, man's intellect was still finite, and thus there was a kind of "ignorance" due to the limitations of his natural reason, after the Fall there is a new "habitual" and personal mode of the existence of this limitation. There is now an ignorance of whether or not individual acts will end in a good or an evil result.

So then gnomic is nothing else than an act of willing in a particular way, in relation to some real or assumed good.

We deliberate about things within our own power and which may be brought to pass by our abilities, and which have an unknown end.

It is to this latter kind of ignorance that St. Maximus refers in The Disputation:...

Thus, those who say that there is a gnomic in Christ, as this inquiry is demonstrating, are maintaining that He is a mere man, deliberating in a manner like unto us, having ignorance, doubt and opposition, since one only deliberates about something which is doubtful, not concerning what is free of doubt. By nature we have an appetite simply for what by nature is good, but we gain experience of what we gain in a particular way, through inquiry and counsel. Because of this, then the gnomic act must be of the employment of the will, and a principle of nature, otherwise nature itself would change innumerable times. But the humanity of Christ doth not simply subsist in a manner similar to us, but divinely, for He Who appeared in the flesh for our sake was made. It is thus not possible to say that He is a mere man.

What the Confessor means to exclude in this passage is that fallen man, being which was, had been by chance accordly corruption given to the human created by God. If the humanity of Christ in the Garden of Gethsemane indicated that kind of hesitation then this would mean His mode of willing was gnomic and created, which would deny the Incarnation and make Him a mere man.

That this is the meaning of St. Maximus, however, can only be made clear by examining what he says in connection to the natural powers and activities of the human soul when willing.

40 Disputation with Pyrrhus, 83

41 Opusculum Theologicum et Polemicum 1, PG 91: 16D of the whole discussion on pp. 102-103 of my Free Choice in St. Maximus the Confessor
The things that exist came to be out of nothing, and have
therefore a power that impels them towards existence
and not non-existence, which power is simultaneously an
inclination towards that which naturally maintains them in
existence and a drawing back from things destructive to their
existence. Consequently, the super-essential Word, by virtue
of His humanity, had of His humanity this self-preserving
power which clings to existence. And (in fact), He exhibited
both aspects of this power, willing the inclination and the
drawing back on account of His human energy. He exhibited
the inclination to cling to existence in the natural and innocent
use (He made) of a great many things, and the drawing back at
the time of the Passion, when He drew back from the voluntary
death. How both the Church of God do anything absurd, if we
confess that, along with His human and created nature, there
existed in Him those principles inserted creatively in that
nature by Him, without which that nature could not exist.44

Thus the hesitation of Christ in Gethsemane in accepting the
cup of the Passion is not a manifestation of the opposition
between divine and human wills, but a manifestation of their proper and natural
functioning, a functioning which was distorted at the Fall into a
dialectical opposition between pleasure and pain.

As a consequence, even Christ's fear of the Passion is to be
interpreted in a manner consonant with the anthropic human nature with
the Word. The fear is real and really human, but its subsumation in the Word of God makes it something far more
than that fear which particularizes itself only in a created
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Thus Christ's hesitation is to be strictly distinguished from that
ignorance which results from the Fall into dialectic, for the goal of
the Incarnation is precisely to save and restore the human nature to
its proper relationship with God.

3 The Three Dialectical Principles
of Monotheletism

Before proceeding with an examination of the Three
Dialectical Principles of Monotheletism and the Confessor's

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44 Disputation with Pyrrhus, 33

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45 Ibid., 35
response to them, it would perhaps be beneficial to survey the manner in which the two christological heresies of Monophysitism and Nestorianism relate to the question of the will and how they answer certain questions. These questions may be summarized as follows: 1) In what is the will rooted? 2) What is the number of wills? 3) What is the principle emphasis or aspect of the will which is view in each system when considering the Incarnation, the unity or the distinction? 4) How does each system construe the principle of opposition? and finally 5) what are the implications of this opposition?

Monophysitism and Nestorianism both answer that the will is rooted in personal agency, but for Monophysitism there is only one will since there is only one person. For Nestorianism on the other hand, there are two wills because there are two persons in the union. After the union, however, Nestorianism maintains that there is one will.

These points allow one to see what a peculiarity of each system is emphasized. For the Monophysites, this emphasis would be placed on the will as a faculty, for after the union, the will has two different "manifestations" (apatheia, apathia) in one person. In other words, the will is divided into two wills, which suggests that the manifestation of two wills are more real than the union itself. For the Nestorians, however, the one will or aspect (prosopa) which results from the union would suggest that what is principally in view is the will understood as an object of will. In this case, man's salvation there being two underlying faculties of will which 'contract' with each other with that object of will in view. Consequently the emphasis of the two systems are radically different. For Monophysitism the union itself is paramount. For Nestorianism, the things which are united are paramount. In each system therefore, there would appear to be a subtle but nevertheless real implication of a fundamental opposition between the divine and human natures. Since Monophysitism naturally develops the further doctrine of Aphthartodoketism, which would appear to deny any real role for human free choice, and Nestorianism asserts that the voluntary and contractual basis of the union is the soul means by which it is be distinguished from the essential union of the Trinity on the on hand and the natural union of the body and soul in man on the other

Monotheletism reduces these principles into three rather compact statements, each implying a more fundamental dialectical problem which the Confessor is always quick to drive to an heretical reductio ad absurdum. The first of these is that The Will is Hypostatic, that is, that it is rooted in hypostasis, and not in nature. If Christ be one person, then He will ed as one person. And if He willed as one person then doubtless He hath one will, and not two. 46 St Maximus reduces this principle to two alternative Trinitarian heresies.

If one suggests that a "willer" is implied in the notion of the will then by the exact inversion of this principle of reasoning, a will is implied in the notion of a "will". Thus, will thou say the because of the one will the superessential Godhead there is only one hypostasis, as did Sabellius, or that because there are three hypostases there are also three wills, and because of this, three natures as well, since the canons and definitions of the Fathers say that the distinction of wills imply a distinction of natures? So said Arius. 47

To maintain three wills because of the distinction of hypostases in other words implied a polytheism on the one hand, and also Arrianism, since similar as Christ had only one will and did manifest any of the characteristics of the human will, He was therefore less than fully God.

The second principle of Monotheletism is the dialectical counterpart of the first, and that is that What is Natural is implanted. If thou sayest that the will is natural and if what is natural be compelled, and if thou sayest that the wills in Christ are natural, thou dost in fact take away all His voluntary motion. 48 For Maximus, this implies a return to The Origenist Problematic, for it would make any natural property of God a limiting definition of His essence.

46 Ibid. 10
47 Ibid. 15
48 Ibid. 24
[If one were to continue in this line of reasoning, then] God, Who is by nature good, and by nature Creator, must of necessity be [not only] God and good, but also Creator. To think, much less to speak, in this manner is blasphemous. Where then attributes necessity to God?49

There is another element to this aspect of St. Maximus’ argument. Origen could only have formulated his problematic on the basis of a definition of the simplicity of the divine essence where the being, activity, and will of God were at, wholly identical. Thus, for Origen,

We can therefore imagine no moment whatever when the power was not engaged in acts of well-doing. Whence it follows that there always existed objects of this well-doing, namely, God’s works or creatures, and that God, in the power of his providence, was always disposing his blessings among them by doing good in accordance with their condition and deserts. It follows plainly from this, that at no time whatever was God not Creator, nor Benefactor, nor Providence.50

Thus, there is no distinction between God’s faculty of will, in other words, that natural property of His essence which allows Him to be the Creator, and the objects of that will, the creatures themselves. The faculty of will and the object of will are the same agent acting in God on account of the simplicity. This leads Origen to his most famous statement of his problematic: “Let the man who dares to say ‘There was a time when the Son was not understand that this is what he will be saying’ once what this did not exist and word did not exist, and life did not exist.”51 Here, to speak in St. Maximus’ terms, there is a clear confusion on the basis of the simplicity between the Logos of God and the logos of His attributes. Since there is thus no clear and real distinction between the attributes or

\[ \text{logos of the divine nature, its will, and the activity of that will, then the Logos Himself can be viewed as the product and object of that will.} \]

The final principle of Monothelitism concerns that of the dialectical opposition of distinct wills. For Monothelitism, two wills means two opposing wills. “It is impossible for two wills to exist in one person without opposition.”52 For Pyrrhus, this was meant to be the formulation of a general metaphysical principle. For St. Maximus, however, as has already been seen, this opposition is acceptable only as a formulation of the results of the Fall and the resulting dialectical oppositions in which the created human hypostasis finds itself enslaved as it is to a knowledge that is based merely upon sensory perception and not on the Logos of God. Thus

49b. d. 25

50Origen, \textit{On First Principles}, 1: 4: 3, p. 42 of the Koetschau-Butterfield text

51b. d. 1: 4: 1, p. 3: 5
If it be not possible for two wills to exist in one and the same person without opposition, then by thine own reasoning, it is possible with opposition. And if this be possible, then thou hast confessed the existence of two wills. So thou dost not differ over the number of wills, but with the principle of their opposition. So, it remains for us to discover the real cause of this conflict of wills. What dost thou say this is? The natural will, or sin? If thou sayest it be the natural will, and since we already know that there is an other cause of this than God, then thou maketh God the Author of the conflict of wills. But if the cause be sin, and if Christ be free from sin, then the Incarnate God hath no opposition of any kind in those wills proper to His natures, since no effect can result from a cause which does not exist. 55

Pyrhus then asks "Therefore the willing appertaineth to nature?" a question which elicits a response from the Confessor, which recalls the distinction he made between the same kind when discussing the Tree of the knowledge of good and evil. He says that "the simple willing" pertaineth to nature. 56 What or necessity can be said of the will, do not apply to so as to such that the fourth distinction which the Confessor makes, namely a willing of a given hypostasis. 57

4 The Apokatastasis as Recapitulation

Ever since the time of Origen, the doctrine of recapitulation of all things in Christ and out of the new and universal restoration and salvation in God have always been intimately connected. Indeed the very fact of Christ's human nature which is consubstantial with all men implies an apokatastasis, for if in Adam all have died, in Christ there is a certain predetermination that all shall be made alive. 58 This interrelationship between the apokatastasis and the recapitulation highlights once again the fact that the latter doctrine is a christological way of understanding or of approaching the question of predestination.

The doctrine of recapitulation strikes at the heart of any doctrine of Limited Atonement, i.e., at any doctrine which would put the efficacy of Christ's redemptive work to a point of elected and predestined individuals who are predestined prior to apart from consideration of that work. If Christ's redemptive work is limited in this fashion, then His humanity was also be consubstantial only with that predetermined number of elected individuals. But since Christ is the Second Adam, this implies that there are some individuals who, not being in the Second will neither be found in the First Adam. Not being in the First Adam they will not be subject to ancestral sin, and will therefore have no need of Christ. 59

There is a christological aspect to the problem as well which is only highlighted by the Confessor's polemic against Monotheletism. On the one hand, if the Monothelete doctrine were true, and there was only one will in Christ that of His divine Hypostasis, then the human nature would be denuded not only a will but it would also follow that the human will neither effects salvation, or contributes anything to it. The human nature would be determined externally as it were since Christ Himself, in His humanity would have no will. Thus, not only would there be a denial of a full Incarnation on these grounds, but the apokatastasis of all men sharing that consubstantial nature would be an inevitable result. Yet on the other hand, if Christ's human nature was endowed with all its natural properties including a human natural will this too would appear to compel an apokatastasis whose effects, from the standpoint of those effected, would still be the same in that they to the degree that they are individual hypostases who in virtue of their

56St. Tikhon's ' Seminary Press, p. 225, and St. John Cassian's Third Conference of the Abbot Chaeremon, 7
Consubstantiality with Christ’s human nature are irresistibly determined.

This was the state of affairs prior to St. Maximus, who applies four basic correctives: 1) the Triadological, 2) the Christological, 3) the Ecclesiological, Sacramental, and 4) the Spiritual, or the Ascetic.

The Triadological corrective depends upon three elements: First there is the distinction between Nature and Principle of Existence on the one hand, and Hypostasis and Mode of Existence on the other. The second component of this distinction is the division within the Trinity of Three Unique Hypostatic Modes of Wiling of the one divine natural will, according to good pleasure, according to Economy, and according to consent of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit respectively. The third component is the Triadological scheme of history implied by such triads as "Genesis, Kinesis, Stasis" and more especially by "Being, Well-being, or Ill-Being, and Ever-Well-being" or "eternal being that each will enjoy or suffer that resurrection depends upon the hypostasis, mode of existence in this life.

The Christological component then grounds the remaining two, the Ecclesiological and Sacramental and the Spiritual. This is based upon the distinction between the Principle of Human Existence which is consubstantial with all men, and the Mode of its Generation of the Virgin Mary in His capacity as the Second Adam, which is unique to Him alone.

Therefore, that humanity which is proper to Him alone that which is ours, not by nature, but by nature free from all sin, neither by generation, but by nature, by the new mode of generation, was not the same by reason of (ins) seedless generation. Thus, He was not a mere [man] ... For clearly, having been generated without seed or with seed do not serve the [human] nature, neither do [generation] of [generation] apart from [divine] nature.

The Ecclesiological and Sacramental corrective is grounded in the fact that, in order to participate in Christ Who recapitulates all of creation and collective, sacred, and individual human history, one must personally recapitulate in His recapitulation, e.g., one must partake of the sacramental life of the Church, recapitulating the heavenly manner of His seedless generation in His Virgin Birth by partaking in its sacramental counterpart. In order to share in the baptism of His Cross and Resurrection, one must partake of His Virgin Birth of water and The Spirit.

61 Opusculum Theologicum et Polemicum 4 PG 91 60BD

62 Romans 6:1-3
Finally, as the One Logos is the many Uncreate logos of God and they are the One Uncreate Logos of God, one can only partake of Him be practicing, that is, by recapitulating, those very virtues which are the logos of the Logos.

The Church knoweth three apokatastases. One is the apokatastasis of everything according to the principle (logos) of virtue, in this apokatastasis one is restored who fulfills the principle of virtue in himself. The second is that of the whole (human) nature in the Resurrection. This is the apokatastasis to incorruption and immortality. The third, in the oft-quoted words of Gregory of Nyssa, is the apokatastasis of the powers of the soul which, having lapsed into error, are again restored to that condition in which they were created. For it is necessary that just as the nature of the flesh hoped in time to be taken up again into incorruption in the apokatastasis, so also the powers of the soul, having become distorted during the course of the ages had instilled in it a memory of evil, so that at the end of the ages, not finding any rest, will come once God Who hath no limit. And thus the distorted powers of the soul will be taken up into the primary apokatastasis, or a mere discursive knowledge of, but not into the participation in the good things of God, where the Creator is known but not being the cause of [those] sin.

There is an apokatastasis of all, but the state of hypostasis in that apokatastasis, whether in error or ever-ill-being, depends upon their own mode of existence and will and its participation or non-participation, in His hypostasis.

Sacramental recapitulation and the life in virtue, in other words, cannot be divorced for the simple fact that the logos and the virtues are the very same things, i.e., the eternal powers and operations of His Godhead. The virtues must be constantly recapitulated within each individual human hypostasis by an unceasing effort to bring their own created hypostatic modes of willing, their gnomic, back into conformity with the natural principles of human nature as revealed in Christ be our wise One.

PYRROHUS, Virtues, then, are natural things?

MAXIMUS: Yes, natural things.

PYRROHUS: If they be natural things, why do they not exist in all men equally, since all men have an identical nature?

MAXIMUS: But they do exist equally in all men because of the identical nature!

PYRROHUS: Then why is there such a great disparity of virtues in us?

MAXIMUS: Because we do not all practice what is natural to us to an equal degree, indeed, if we [all] practiced equally [these virtues] natural so as we were created to do, then one would be able to perceive one virtue in us all, just as there is one nature [in us all], and that one virtue would not admit of a more or less.

PYRROHUS: If virtue be something natural [to us], and if what is natural to us are not through asceticism but by reason of our creation, then why is it that we acquire the virtues which are natural, with asceticism and labours?

MAXIMUS: Ascent, and the toils that go with it, was devised simply in order to ward off deception, which established itself through sensory perception. It is not [as if] the virtues have been newly introduced from outside, for they were in us from creation, as hath already been said. Therefore, when deception is completely expelled, the soul immediately exhibits the splendour of its natural virtue.
The spiritual life, in other words, is that aspect of salvation which lies within the power of the individual man, not as a result of disciplined self-renunciation in the human hypostasis and human nature, but brought into their proper harmony and fellowship. The ignorance occasioned by the dialectic of the passions, which make man dependent upon sensory knowledge only, is dispelled by constant recollection and spiritual knowledge of the Incarnate Logos in all the fulness of His logos through the Scriptures. Dispassion, the true freedom in the cosmos of eternal, distinct but undivided and equally good virtues and goods, personal recapitulation of His Passionless Passion, is the ultimate goal, the Vision of God in Christ.

Viewed against the background of these correctives Origen's understanding of the apokatastasis is far too narrow and truncated. His mistake was to consider human and the apokatastasis as identical, apart from the Mysteries in the Church and the sacraments. For this reason he overlooks the notion of the free choice to maintain and to which sink between dialectically opposed ones at the root in the mind of creatures in his system never in this led dispassion to any motion is ipso facto passionate and a Fall away from God.

For St. Maximus then Christ in the whole Economy of His Incarnation and reversion of this has a necessary and essential aspect of His work, as well as His operations which introduced not only between man and Nature but also in the human Distributions of His beings. By His endless generation from His Mother if the He overcomes the opposition not only of Nature and created natures but of male and female as well. When He says, "As man he was the pen of the thief: 'Tis day shall thou with me in Paradise," He overcomes the opposition between earth and Paradise. By His bodily Ascension into heaven He overcomes the opposition between earth and heaven, "thence manifesting the essential unity of sensible nature beyond any separation." By His continued bodily Ascension beyond the angelic orders of the intelligible world, He overcomes the opposition between the intelligible and the sensible, and reconstitutes human nature in Himself to be the microcosm once again. Finally by virtue of the Incarnation itself He effects the complete interpenetration of divine and human natures being the Logos of all logos proper to deity and to humanity.

It is there, in heaven, that the final unity of man's nature. Free choice will experience the boundless fulness of objects of choice, each limitless, each equally good and without any opposition to each other. In heaven there will be no hesitation not ignorance of the outcomes of activity of the will.

So then, since counsel, and judgement, and free choice are [all directed towards] uncertain things that are within our power, then when there are no uncertain things, as when the Self-Subsistent Truth has been made clearly manifest to all, then [it is the case] that free choice will not be moved by any of the things in this middle and which are within our power, for there will be no evaluation or deciding between opposite [courses of action], whereby we prefer the better to the worse [course of action]. But then in this case if free choice does not exist according to the law of nature that prevails at present — since all uncertainty has been removed from things — then it will only be an active and intellectual appetite. Thus it will only be directed toward the mystical enjoyment in an ineffable manner, of that which is natural the object of the active appetite, towards which it is drawn by the things already enumerated. And the satiety of this appetite is the infinite extension of the object itself towards the things which are enjoyed, each one supernaturally partaking to the extent that the desire desires.
The God who transcends all in infinite measure will be seen only by those who are pure in understanding when the mind in contemplative recollection of the principles (logoi) of beings will end up with God as cause, principle, and end of all, the creation and beginning of all, things and eternal ground of the circuit of things.

For numerous and of almost infinite number are the men, women, and children who are distinct from one another and vastly different by birth and appearance, by nationality and language, by customs and age, by opinions and skills, by manners and habits, by pursuits and studies, and still again by reputation, fortune, characteristics, and connections. All are born into the Church and through it are reborn and recreated in the Spirit. To all in equal measure it gives and bestows one divine form and designation, to be Christ's and to carry his name. For as the center of straight lines that radiate from him, he does not allow by his unique space, and a single source and power that the principles (logoi) of beings become designated at the periphery but rather he circumscribes their extension in a circle and brings back to himself the distinctive elements of beings which he himself brought into existence.

For St. Maximus the Confessor, denial of the two natural wills of Christ is a denial of the very principles of the deity, and the very principles according to which creation and humanity were created and which exist in it. Such a denial is in fact the denial of salvation, deification, and of the ultimate and limitless joy of heaven and the Vision of Christ.

68 The Church's Mystagogy, trans. George C. Berthold, The Classics of Western Spirituality, pp 186-187
THE DISPUTATION WITH PYRRHUS

1. A brief statement on the recent inquiry into the agitations concerning ecclesiastical dogmas which was held by Pyrrhus, formerly Patriarch at Constantinople, and Maximus the most devout monk in the presence of the most pious Gregory Patriarch the most holy bishops, and the other men, beloved of God found with him Pyrrhus and those with him contended in the Byzantium namely that there is one will in Christ. Conversely, the doctrine of that supernatural man Maximus advocated the patristic and apostolic teaching that came down us from above so that the most estimable Patriarch Gregory said about the afore mentioned men who contended each other that is, Pyrrhus and Maximus Pyrrhus began the conversation with Maximus as follows:

2. PYRRHUS: What did I or my predecessor ever do to thee, father Maximus, that thou dost everywhere disparage us, and not only me, but my predecessor also, and who esteemed and honored thee more than I, even though I never met thee personally?

3. MAXIMUS: Since God hears us, no one so honored nor so revered me as thou didst. But since thou dost spurn my dogma, I considered it a terrible thing to prefer thine honor towards me more than the truth itself.

4. PYRRHUS: In which of our conceptions have we abandoned the doctrine of Christians?

5. MAXIMUS: I conceive one will of the deity and humanity of Christ. And not only thinking it, but also by harming the entire body of the Holy Church by propagating it through thy novel Ekthesis.

6. PYRRHUS: What? Dost thou really think that whosoever thinks that there is one will of Christ moves away from Christian doctrine?

7. MAXIMUS: Yes, I truly do. For what is a more irreverent conception than that which maintains that the very same will which before the incarnation created everything from nothing and which maintains, provides, and orders everything for salvation, after the incarnation, desireth food and drink, changeth from one position to another and performeth a manner of similar things that are free from blame and reproach, but which

2 Ekthesis (638). This was the central text of Monothelitism and was Sergius' own composition. Its main declaration stated:

Because the expression one energy, although some of the Fathers use it yet sounds strange to the ears of some and disquieted them and since in the same way many take offense at the expression, two energies, since it is not used by any of the holy Fathers (on account of the fact that) we should then be obliged as a consequence to teach two, mutually contradictory wills as if God the Logos, having at our salvation, was willing to endure suffering, but His manhood had opposed itself to His will, which is impious and foreign to the Christian dogmas when even the wicked Nestorius, although he, dividing the Incarnation and introducing two persons, did not venture to maintain two wills of the same but the contrary taught the similar will of the two persons assumed by Him, how can then the orthodox who worship only one Son and Lord admit in Him two and those mutually opposed wills? (Mansi X:994A-C)

3 St. Maximus here being careful to avoid any suggestion that natural human desires are inherently sinful since his position would ultimately reduce to a Manichean dualism between a good God and an evil materia creatura. Later in the Dispute he St. Maximus replies to a question put by Pyrrhus that the properties of the divine and of the human natures do not define each other by dialectical opposition, since, if they did, human possibility and peculiarity would be the very condition of the divine impassability and goodness. cf. paragraphs 25, 210

1 Sergius I, 638, Patriarch of Constantinople and the author of the Ekthesis.
would by this means prove that the whole Economy of the Incarnation was not illusory?

8. PYRRHUS: But is Christ one or not?

9. MAXIMUS: Yes, obviously He is one.

10. PYRRHUS: If Christ be one person, then He willed as one person. And if He willed as one person, then doubtless He hath one will, and not two.

11. MAXIMUS: To state something and not first to distinguish the different meanings of what is being said invites confusion, and ensures that what is under investigation remains obscure, which is foreign to a man of learning. Therefore, explain this to me: If Christ be one, is He God only, or man only, or both together God and man?

12. PYRRHUS: Obviously, God and man.

13. MAXIMUS: Therefore, Christ existeth as God and as man by nature. Then did He will as God and as man, as a will.

If it were Christ who willed and operated according to His divinity and humanity, then it is clear that, being one and the same Christ, He willed dually and not singly. For if Christ be nothing else apart from the natures from which and in which He existeth, then we may consider the wills and operations in a manner corresponding to His natures, in other words, as each nature is capable of operation. And if He hath two natures, then He surely must have two natural wills, the wills and essential operations being equal, a number to the natures. For just as the number of natures of the one and the same Christ, correctly understood and explained, doth not divide Christ but rather preserves the distinction of natures in the union, so likewise the number of essential attributes, wills, and operations.

4 St. Maximus seems to suggest here that his remarks have a certain rhetorical character, since the end result of Monotheletism, the denial of the human will of Christ, is a species of Dofetism, since those passages in Holy Scriptures which suggest human choice would be reduced to being mere illusions.

5 This, along with Pyrrhus' statements in paragraphs 16 and 24, is one of the theological principles of Monotheletism, the other two being 1) the opposition of wills if there are two wills, and 2) that what is natural is compelled. At this point in the debate, Pyrrhus has not yet, expressly indicated whether his "I will," etc., refers to the hypostatic will of the nature, but it is clear that he means that the agency of willing is the hypostasis.

6 Heraclius, i.e., Heraclius the Great (ca. 575-641), Emperor from ca. 610-641. It was Heraclius' reconquest of the provinces of Egypt, Palestine, and Syria which provided the political incentive behind the formulation of Monotheletism, for these provinces contained significant Nestorian and Monophysite populations who each had their own kind of Monotheletism.
did Sabellius?, or that because there are three hypostases there are also three wills, and because of this, three natures as well. Since the canons and definitions of the Fathers say that the distinction of natures implies a distinction of wills, some confusion exists concerning the identity of the man who authored the heresy which bears his name. Some maintain that he was an early third-century Roman. Others maintain that he was a heretic who was being either from Egypt or from Palestine. In any case, since each of Sabellian or Modal Monarchism is some kind of dualism, one must safeguard the unity and monarchical nature of the Father Sabellianism had the will distinction in the Godhead and simply successive begetted or produced by the Father from himself. The term 'Son' in Sabellianism is not used to mean that Jesus Christ is the same Person who simply a creature different in nature from the Father. It is a term appearing in the Old Testament to mean the One who was 'sent' or the Son, and after Pentecost simply as the Revealer of himself. The term 'Son' here was even more to mean the Son of God, the Godhead, the Father, the term 'Son' was simply the same. The heresy is thus sometimes referred to as Sabellianism, and the confusion of this doctrine is that, in his role as the Son, the Father suffered.

Because our Lord exhibited a will distinct from the Father at the Transfiguration, He was by the mystery of redemption doing so. Arius accepted the point that the two natures are rooted in nature, but he denied that there were two natures in the Son. He thus professes his own type of Monotheletism.

St. Augustine, conversely, does not deny two wills, divine and human, in Christ but only his wills. He does not claim that the Will of the Father is not personal. Pelagian doctrine he is in fact and not to establish their opposition in order to demonstrate the over-dog of the human will by the divine thereby showing by Christ as the perfect example of predestination. St. Augustine is thus unequivocally a dyothetic, but with the significant difference of accepting the opposition of wills. Again one is forced to consider the question of whether or not St. Maximus, in his struggle to contest the two natures yet deny their dialectical opposition, was in fact so responding to the position of St. Augustine. If so, he

10 PYRRHUS: But is it possible for two wills to exist in one person without opposition?

17 MAXIMUS: If it is not possible for two wills to exist in one and the same person without opposition, then by that same reason, it is possible with opposition. And if this be possible then there has been no opposition of two wills. So they do not differ over the number of wills, but with the principle of their opposition. So, it remains for us to discover the real cause of this conflict of wills. What cause do you think this is? The natural will or not? If thou sayest it be the natural will, and since we are always guided by the authority of this, that is not God in whose name Christ is God. And if Christ be free from sin, then the incarnate God has no opposition of any kind in those wills which are proper to His nature, since no effect is an essential cause which did not exist.

18. PYRRHUS: Therefore the "willing" appertains to nature.

19. MAXIMUS: Yes, the simple "willing" as least appertains to nature.
20. PYRRHUS  But if the willing appertains to nature and if the more distinguished of the Fathers say that there is one will of God and His saints, then there will be one nature of God and the saints. 11

21. MAXIMUS: Earlier we said that it is necessary for one who wishes to speak about the truth to distinguish precisely the meanings of what is being said because error arises out of ambiguity. I will therefore ask thee this: thou must say who he the saints, when saying that there is one will of God and the saints, mean the creative and essential will of God [itself], or whether they mean the object of that will. 12

11 As has been noted, St. Gregory the Theologian amongst others moves in the milieu of the immediate aftermath of the Council of Nicæa, when the Origenistic paradigm that two wills mean two principles was still influencing theological formulation. Consequently, the underlying implication of Pyrrhus remarks in a broader context of Monothelitism, Origen's first Principles suggests Gregory's grappling with the problem of free choice from the perspective of Heaven.

"It is certain that no living creature can be altogether inactive and immovable, but that it is eager for every kind of movement and it is in a state of action and volition, and it is clear that, if it is true, this nature resides in all beings. Much more then must a rational being such as man or a sure engaged in some movement or activity. So we seek to know whether in the life when I am with Christ in God, that is, in the eternal life, there will be for us any such order or condition of existence?" (III.1)

Unfortunately Origen's understanding of free choice is couched in terms of the dialectic of oppositions, and thus, in order for there to be free choice in heaven.

"It is possible that in the many and endless periods throughout diverse and unmeasurable ages it may either descend from the Highest good to the lowest evil or be restored from the lowest evil to the Highest good." (III.123)

See also the discussion on pp. 61-65 of my Free Choice in St. Maximus the Confessor, St. Tikhon's Seminary Press.

12 St. Maximus here introduces one of the distinctions crucial to the understanding of his dyothelete teaching, that of "will" as a "faculty of will" inherent in rational nature as one of its essential operations, and the "will" as an external "object" or even "purpose".

13 Pyrrhus' argument depends upon a "substantial" connection of, or confusion between 1) the faculty of will, 2) the nature in which it inheres, and 3) the object of the will. Thus if the object of the will is unchangeable and substantial, it is connected with the nature of the faculty of will which is not changeable in what is willed (the object of will) must imply a change in the nature itself. The "object of will" is thus viewed by Pyrrhus in an almost Neoplatonic way as a kind of emanation from the nature.
23 MAXIMUS The will and the mode of willing\textsuperscript{14} are not the same, just as the power of sight and the mode of perception are not the same. Will, like sight, is of nature. All things which have an identical nature have identical abilities. But the mode of willing, like the mode of perception, in other words, to will to walk or to will not to walk and the perception of the right hand or of the left, or of up or down, or the contemplation of concurrence or of the discrepancy of principles in beings is only a mode of the use of a power of the employment of will and of perception. And the same distinction may be applied to other things as well. These things demonstrate that have, by nature, the will to eat or not to eat to walk or not to walk. But these negatives are not applicable to the will as such, but only to the particular mode of willing.\textsuperscript{15} In other words, things come to pass by choices. If we assume that the things created by God and willed by Him pass out of existence, it does not follow that His essential and creative will, which is presupposed in those things, also passeth out of existence.

24 PYRRHUS: If thou sayest that the will is natural, and if what is natural be compelled, and if thou sayest that the will in Christ are natural, thou dost in fact take away all His voluntary motion\textsuperscript{16}.

25 MAXIMUS Not only doth His divine and uncreated nature have no natural compulsion, neither doth His rational and created\textsuperscript{17} For the rational nature hath the nature, activity and rational appetite [proper to it]. This is called the "faculty of will" of the rational soul. It is according to this [faculty] that we consider when willing, and in considering, we choose the things which we.

\textsuperscript{14} Ultimately, Pyrrhus' previous argument depends on the underlying presupposition of the "substantialized hypostasis" of Monophysitism, i.e., on the confusion between hypostasis and essence in favour of hypostasis which seems to underwrite all Monophysite systems. St. Maximus is quick to respond to this underlying presupposition in Pyrrhus' previous remarks by employing his own christological purposes in Coppard's arguments, i.e., between "proper nature" and "mode of its existence," i.e., essence and hypostasis. The will as a faculty is natural, but the mode of its usage by a particular hypostasis is always unique.

\textsuperscript{15} The Confessor's language is strongly reminiscent of that of St. Augustine in On the Forgiveness of Sins and Baptism\textsuperscript{10}. (Writings Against Pelagius, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Volume V, pp 56,106,130,141) where he says.
would. And when willing we also inquire, examine, deliberate, judge, are inclined toward, elect, impel ourselves toward, and make use of a thing. As hath already been stated, if the rational appetite, in other words, willing and consideration, be proper to our nature then so are deliberation, inquiry, examination, choice, judgement, inclination towards, election, and the impelling of ourselves toward, the natural actions of rational things, and these are not subject to compulsion 18. Once this is admitted, thy proposition is shown to be most absurd for according to it, what is natural is also entirely compelled. If one were to continue in this line of reasoning, then God, Who is by nature God by nature good and by nature Creator, must of necessity be [not only] God and good but also Creator 19. To think, much less to speak, in this manner is blasphemy. Who then attributes necessity to God 20. Consider my friend, if thou wilt the blasphemy of such a proposition! For if one saith that the wills in Christ are natural, and if according to thee he who has a natural will doth not have voluntary motion then it necessarily follows that thins which will in a natural way have a movement that is involuntary. But then God Who is beyond beings and all beings with a rational and intellectual nature and which possess the faculty of will have involuntary motion and only that which is without a soul and without a will have voluntary motion. But the blessed Cyril, in the criticisms of his Third Chapter against Theodoret, released us from any further argument by saying quite explicitly, that "Nothing which is natural is involuntary in the rational nature." 21 It is possible for anyone that

And thus it follows plainly from this, that at no time whatever was God not Creator, nor Benefactor, nor Providence (14.3)

20 By asking this question, St. Maximus is perhaps being rhetorical, trying perhaps to force Pyrrhus to acknowledge or to recall Origen by name and thereby unmask the root of the Monothelite difficulty.

21 cf. also The Incarnation of the Only Begotten: "He made the human soul his own, thus making it victorious over sin, colouring it, as it were, with the dye of the steadfastness and immutability of his own nature." (Henry Bettensen, The Later Christian Fathers, p. 263.)
26 PYRRHUS: One should gladly accept what has been proven by this matter. And the argument was stated in a way that there are two natures in Christ. However, just as we say that it is impossible for there to be a nature without a body, so also here the body has no nature without a nature. Thus, in order for there to be two natures in Christ and that say these are two natures, because of the Immanence of natures in Christ and the Immanence of natures in the Father and the Immanence of natures in the Son, the Father must be the Immanence of natures in Christ.

27 MAXIMUS: If the Son were to be born, one would not say that the Father be born as well, but one would say that the Son is born. This is also the command of Plato and Aristotle. There is no nature in reference to some other third thing.

28 PYRRHUS: There is nothing, then, which the natures and natural properties have in common?

29 MAXIMUS: Nothing save only the hypostasis of the same natures. For just as He was with a human body in the hypostasis of His two natures so He was with a human body in the hypostasis of His two natures.

30 PYRRHUS: What? Do the Fathers, whose doctrines constitute the law, the rule, the glory, and the pride of the Church, say that there is no common glory and no common humiliation? If anyone uses the expression 'of two natures,' confessing that a man was made of the Godhead and of the humanity of the hypostasis, he has made false of the Godhead and the humanity of the hypostasis, and the one who uses this expression is anathema. (Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Volume XIV, p. 313)

St. Maximus is quite clear on this point for if there were two natures, then he would have the hypostasis of the divine and human natures as a common between the deity and humanity, the 'something else' would also be a mediator between God and man and Christ would not be the unique Way of salvation. (Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol XIV, p. 257)

"One of these truths accepted without the other would not profit into salvation and it was equally dangerous to believe the Lord Jesus Christ to be merely God and not man, or merely man and not God."

That holy Father said this in reference to the mode of the exchange of attributes. As is clear from the previous statement, the exchange doth not concern one, but two, things, and different kinds of things. According to the exchange, the natural attributes of the two parts of Christ are exchanged according to the ineffable union, without a change or mixture of the natural principles. Thus, if thou sayest that there is a common will by the mode of exchange, then thou art really saying that there is not one will but two wills. So, once again, thin ingenious argument brings thee back to the position that thou tried to avoid.

How? Was not the flesh moved by the decision of the Word Who is united with it?

Thou dividest Christ by talking like this. For Moses and David, and as many as were susceptible to the influence of the divine energies, were moved by His command and guidance to human and fleshly propertics. But, following all, he it was Father in this as in all things, we say since the God of All hath reigned without change, it followeth that the same Person not only willed appropriately as God in His Godhead, but also willed appropriately as man in His humanity. For the good man exist came to be out of nothing, and have her power inferi, which power is simultaneously an inclination towards the good.

St. Cyril of Alexandria states that certain statements in the Holy Scriptures must be attributed to Christ's deity since they refer to His glory, and others, referring to His lowliness must be referred to His humanity (Epistle 39 to John of Antioch).

The idea of "flesh" being moved by the Word is Apollinarian both in language and content. For Apollinaris the Incarnation results in one composite being and nature moved solely by one will (see Jonas, Apollinaris von Laodicea und seiner Schule, texte, und Untersuchungen, p. 277).

If fear be attributed to us by nature and if this be a thing worthy of reproof, then according to thine opinion, things that are worthy of reproof such as sin, exist in us by nature.

Again thou dost reason erroneously from an equivocation. Fear can be both proper to nature and contrary to nature. Fear is proper to nature when it is a force that tends to existence by drawing back from what is harmful to existence. But it is contrary to nature when it is an irrational dread of something, which exists through thoughts stemming from betrayal. Rather, He assumed as good, that which is proper to nature and which expresses that power inherent in our nature, which holdeth fast to being, willing it for our behalf.

The argument here is that human nature has as one of its principles that it seeks those things which will sustain its existence, amongst which are the virtues. The argument that men by nature seek the good in Cyrillic, and ultimately, Platonic.
37. MAXIMUS: If it be an act of reverence on our part to say that the natures are without the characteristic attributes of each other that Christ is perfect God and perfect man without the properties that go with each perfection, then the Councils mathematicize thee, and before them, the Fathers, [because they] decreed that we should not only confess the natures but the properties of each nature as well. The same Person is not only Perfect God and perfect man, but also hath the properties concomitant with each perfection. That is to say, the same one Person is both visible and invisible, mortal and immortal, corruptible and incorruptible, touchable and untouchable, created and Uncreated. And according to the same reverent way of understanding, they also correctly taught that there are two wills of one and the same Person, not only defining it by the number two, but also by means of the expression "one to another," that is, by the contrast of each will one to another, the human to the divine. For the nature of the number two is not restricted in any particular way.

38. PYRRHUS: If it be not possible to say that which the Fathers themselves say on account of the heretics' misusing these expressions, then let us be satisfied with the conciliar definitions alone, and speak neither of one nor of two wills.

28 The a human to the divine in Christ has been vacated and super-essential Word, and therefore the mode of willing of the human will is not that of a created human being, but precisely a divine and eternal mode of willing. To this end he also employs the language of the Fathers, saying: "The implications of this statement are really particular for the question of Christ's temptations, for it suggests, not that Christ could have sinned, but precisely that by not sinning, He is the only one Who was ever truly tempted, for the moment sin begins temptation ends.

29 That is, if Christ was afraid of death in His fear being a human fear which is experienced by a divine Person must not be supposed as a superhuman fear of death which we experience. The implications of this statement are really particular for the question of Christ's temptations, for it suggests, not that Christ could have sinned, but precisely that by not sinning, He is the only one Who was ever truly tempted, for the moment sin begins temptation ends.

30 Pyrrhus, defeated by Maximus' arguments, now returns to the position originally promulgated by Sergius in the Exæthesis, that simply of prohibiting any discussion on the subject.
39. MAXIMUS: If we should confess merely the conciliar definitions, then we should not speak of "one incarnate nature of God the Word." If an expression which embraces the whole mystery of godliness, since it was not defined by any council. Nevertheless, even if one were only to confess what the Councils say, one would still be compelled to confess the attributes of each nature, and hence the wills, along with the natures. For if one saith that the natural attributes, with their natural properties, exist in the natures of Christ and if a will be rooted in each nature, then thou art compelled to confess, together with the natures, the will as well as all the other natural properties. Or again, if Arius and Apollinarius, who both used the expression "one will", were anathematized by the Councils, for both of them misused this expression to establish their own heresy, the latter trying to prove thereby that the flesh is consubstantial with the Word, the former trying to introduce the notion that the Son is different in essence from the Father, then how is it possible for us to exercise devotion without confessing those doctrines which are truly opposite to these heresies? The Fifth Council so that I may not

33. The famous statement of St. Cyril of Alexandria. St. Cyril is quite clear that this expression does not imply any form of Monophysitism. "We do not mean that the nature of the Word was changed and made flesh or, on the other hand, that He was transformed into a complete man consisting of soul and body, but instead we affirm this, that the Word substantially united to Himself flesh, endowed with life and reason in a manner mysterious and incomprehensible, and became man, and was called Son of Man uniting it substantially, not merely by way of divine favor or good will and that though the natures joined together to form a real unity, it is one Christ and Son coming from them— not implying that the difference between the natures was abolished through their union." (Second Letter to Nestorius, trans. Lionel R. Wickham, Oxford, p. 5, paragraph 3.)

34. For Arius and Apollinarius, the will was hypostatic, but both drew differing and opposed conclusions. For Arius, Christ's will was opposed to the will of the flesh; for Apollinarius, the will, like the soul, of the flesh was replaced in Christ by the Logos in a substantial union.

40. PYRRHUS: Dost thou not think that thou art confusing the many different senses of the term "natural will"?

41. MAXIMUS: Excluding the deity, how many forms of life wouldst thou say there are?

42. PYRRHUS: Thou sayest.

43. MAXIMUS: There are three forms of life.

44. PYRRHUS: Which are they?

45. MAXIMUS: The vegetable, the sentient, and the rational.

46. PYRRHUS: Correct.

47. MAXIMUS: Since each of them is distinguished from the others by a specific creative principal, then what is that distinctive and particular principle of each?

35. cf. Fifth Ecumenical Council, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Volume XIV, p. 303. "We further declare that we hold fast to the decrees of the four Councils, and in every way follow the holy Fathers, Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Gregory the Theologian, Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose Theophrastus John Chrysostom of Constantinople, Cyril, Augustine, Proclus, Leo and their writings on the true faith."
48. PYRRHUS: I request that thou clarify this as well.

49. MAXIMUS: Plants are distinguished by the property of a productive and growing motion in the sense, by motion caused by impulse, but not by self-determination.

50. PYRRHUS: Thou hast fully demonstrated that the properties of each form of life are distinct and unconfused.

51. MAXIMUS: If the property of both forms of life has been proven to be distinct and unconfused, then I ask again: Is not the nourishing, productive, and growing motion, in the case of the plant, and the motion of impulse in the case of the sentient, proper to them by nature?

52. PYRRHUS: Without a doubt, they are proper to them by nature.

53. MAXIMUS: Then by the same reasoning, the self-determinative motion is one of the principles in the case of [nature].

54. PYRRHUS: This teaching on the principles thou must supply as well.

55. MAXIMUS: If self-determination be proper by nature to rational natures, then every rational creature is by nature a creature that will. For blessed Diadochus of Photike\(^{36}\) defined the will as self-determination. So, if all rational natures possess the faculty of will by nature, and if God the Word truly became flesh which was rationally and intellectually animated, then He also became man, possessing the human faculty of will by virtue of His human essence. And if this be so, then should the natural will never be mentioned it will be offensive to the ears, not of the devout, but of heretics\(^{37}\).

56. PYRRHUS: That the wills of Christ are natural I am already persuaded from what hath been said previously. I do demand any further proof regarding this matter, the doctrine hath been demonstrated, not only with the testimonies of those who speak of divine things, but also because the nature of things themselves testifieth that the same [Person] willed in a manner appropriate to each of His natures: on the one hand, determining as God and on the other, obeying as man, and that because the natural wills correspond in every way to the natures, the uncreated will to the uncreated nature, and the created will to the created nature. And I am persuaded that one will not be divided into another even though they belong to the same [Person], because they, like the natures, are without beginning in the one case and a work in the other, one is uncreated, the other, created, one male, the other female, one is unconfined, the other limited, one devoted, and the other is desired. But there are still some in Byzantium who place the natural wills in opposition to each other and who thus...

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36 Diadochus of Photike (d. ca. 470): Little comparatively is known of Diadochus. He was bishop of Photike, and one of the opponents of Monophysism at Chalcedon. Few of his works survive.

37 St. Maximus is referring to the position adopted by Pyrrhus in his Typos.
maintain that the Fathers said that the Lord had a human will by appropriation itself.

57. MAXIMUS: Since thou wast thyself the author of this wondrous and resplendent doctrine, then what kind of "appropriation" didst thou mean? The essence by which each of the two natures hath the natural attributes which be the will of the relative, by which we appropriate in a human manner something otherwise foreign to us, neither suffering nor doing any of these things of ourselves?

58. PYRRHUS: It is plain that the relative appropriation is meant.

59. MAXIMUS: So then, this hath already been proved to be absurd. But it would be more reasonable to examine whether man is by nature a being by whom things be moved by nature, and whether things be moved by virtue of his own will. For if it hath been stated a ready fact that men made after the image of the blessed and superessential God, and that the divine nature be self-determined, then man be made endowed with free will. For it hath been stated already, and hath been said in the lecterns, and that the will is self-determined. And it is not the case that it exists in some, and existeth in others. For what it observed in all men, and in the nature of beings, is characteristic of the nature of all the members of a being rational. Consequently man by nature possesseth the faculty of will.

60. PYRRHUS: I have been fully demonstrated that man by nature hath the faculty of will.

61. MAXIMUS: Having proven this, then let us examine what we propose to determine the absurdity of their proposition.

62. PYRRHUS: Very well.

63. MAXIMUS: If man hath the faculty of will by nature, as hath been demonstrated, and if we maintain that he hath the human will only by mere appropriation of it, then it is necessary for those people to be consistent and say that those other natural properties are also in him by mere appropriation of them. I know that he who makes the Economy must be assumed...
THE DISPUTATION WITH PYRRHUS

Furthermore, if the teaching of those who explained the doctrine of the two persons be accepted, namely, that there is a more appropriate manner by which the two persons be appeased, togne with things which they maintain, albeit erroneously, then those who say, albeit erroneously, that there are two wills must, by the same token, say that there are two persons. And who was it that could tolerate the division of the one Person (of Christ) into two persons?

PYRRHUS: Why, did not the Fathers say that Christ formed our will in Himself?

MAXIMUS: Yes, they did.

PYRRHUS: So, when they said that He formed our will in Himself, they were referring to what appertained to Him by nature.

MAXIMUS: Yes, they were.

PYRRHUS: How canst thou say this?

MAXIMUS: Because the same Person was wholly God with the humanity and wholly man with the Godhead. Thus, when we subject human nature to the mind and through reason to the nature, we make a new order by which our own human nature can exist without the rational principles. Thus, if Christ has no human will, He did not truly become man.
nigh unto God, the Author and Finisher of our salvation, no longer willing anything apart from that which He willeth.

76. PYRRHUS: They say that this is a gnomic [will].

77. MAXIMUS: So, if it be a gnomic will, it is derived from a prior gnomic and if it be so received, then the gnomic in the original from which it is derived, is an essence.

It is worth recalling that St. Cyril initially does not use the term *physi* with the precision of the Antiochenes, but that he does subsequently move in this direction by accepting the formula of union. It might be argued in favor of the WCC study that St. John of Damascus does not refer to the Monophysites as heterodox but only as schismatic. However, St. Maximus 

44 Hebrews 12:2

45 For St. Maximus, Our Lord manifests Himself to the Author, Finisher and Pattern of our salvation at Gethsemane precisely because He voluntarily submits the human will, by a human act of will, to the Father.

46 The "Severans" is the Confessor's standard term of reference for the Monophysites.

47 The attitude of St. Maximus is in clear contradiction to that found in the recent study Does Chalcedon Divide or Unite? Towards Convergence in Orthodox Christology. There in the "Agreed Statements" held between Orthodox and the so-called "oriental" (i.e., Nestorian and Monophysite) churches at the Third Unofficial Consultation in Geneva, Switzerland 16-21 August, 1970, a distinction is drawn between the 'dogmatic' definition of a Council, and the particular terminology in which it is expressed, with the latter has less authority than the intention ("Does Chalcedon Divide or Unite?, World Council of Churches, 1981 p. 10).

48 1 Kings (I Kings) 17

49 "they", i.e., the Monophysites. St. Maximus has thus perceived that the root of the heresy of Monotheletism is that of Monophysitism.
78 PYRRHUS: The gnome is not an essence.

79. MAXIMUS: It is not an essence, then it must be a quality. So, a quality is discovered that has its existence from another quality, which is impossible. What then do they now say the gnome is?

80. PYRRHUS: The gnome is nothing else than the very thing which the blessed Cyril defined as "the mode of Trees Yugr..."

81. MAXIMUS: Dost thou maintain that a good or evil mode of life is by choice or not? "Ex eis logi..."

82. PYRRHUS: By choice, obviously.

83. MAXIMUS: Do we choose for ourselves, voluntarily and deliberately? Or involuntarily and without deliberation?

84. PYRRHUS: Obviously, voluntarily and deliberately.

85. MAXIMUS: So then, the gnome is nothing else than an act of the gnomic will, for how is it possible for a will to proceed from a will? Thus, those who say that there is a gnome in Christ, as this inquiry is demonstrating are maintaining that he is a mere man, deliberating in a manner like unto us, having ignorance and doubt and opposition, since one only deliberates about something which is doubtful, not concerning what is free of doubt. By nature, we have an appetite for the good, we gain experience of the good in a particular way through inquiry and counsel. Because of this, then the gnome will is set in motion by a mode of the employment of the will, and not as a principle of nature, otherwise nature itself would receive its logos quidem

51 That is, if the will is hypostatic, how can a particular mode of willing (the human and the divine) come from another mode of willing (the divine)?

52 The dialectic of good and evil, or of "more" or "less" good introduced hesitatio into the process of willing, and thus, deliberation and hesitation over choices to be made is only made over things of uncertain outcome.

53 This is the most precise definition that St Maximus gives to the gnomic will: it is that mode of willing which is not simply proper to the category of hypostasis as such, but to that category of hypostasis whose mode of willing must always involve natural processes of doubt and hesitation, and which therefore must fully be ascribed "to us". It is a mode of the mode of willing proper only to the human hypostasis, and connecting to some extent the habitual manner in which the human hypostasis employs its natural will.
would change innumerable times. But the humanity of Christ does not simply subsist [in a manner] similar to us, but divinely, for He Who appeared in the flesh for our sakes was God. It is thus not possible to say that Christ had a gnomic will. For the Same had being itself, subsisting divinely, and thus naturally hath an inclination to the good and a drawing away from evil just as Bas., the great eye of the Church, said when explaining the interpretation of the forty-fourth Psalm. By the same line of interpretation Isaiah said the same thing: ‘Before the child knew or advanced in evil, He chose the good’, because he also said before the child knows good and to refuse evil, He chose the good.’ For the word ‘before’ indicates that He had by nature what is good, as acquiring and deliberating as we do, but because He subsisted divinely by virtue of His very being.

88 PYRRHUS. Virtues, then are natural things?

89 MAXIMUS: Yes, natural things.

90 PYRRHUS: But they do exist equally in all men equally, since all men have an identical nature.

91 MAXIMUS: But they do exist equally in all men because of the identical nature.

92 PYRRHUS: Then why is there such a great disparity of virtues in us?

93 MAXIMUS: Because we do not all practice what is nature to us to an equal degree. Indeed, if we [all practiced equally] the virtues natural to us as we were created to do, then one would be able to perceive one virtue in us all. Just as there is one nature in us all, and that one virtue would not admit of a more or less.

94 PYRRHUS: If virtue be something natural to us and if what is natural to us existeth not through asceticism but by reason of our creation, then why is it that we acquire the virtues which are natural, with asceticism and labours?

95 MAXIMUS: Asceticism, and the toils that go with it, was devised simply in order to ward off deception which established itself through sensory perception. It is not as if the virtues have been newly introduced from outside, for they were from creation as had already been said. Therefore, when deception is completely expelled, the soul immediately exhibits the splendor of...

This is a key to the spiritual teaching of the Confessor. In the Gnostic Chapters, 58, he speaks of the “well-ordered cosmos of virtues” These in their distinct plenitude are nevertheless all equally virtuous. One virtue is neither “more” nor “less” virtuous than another.

This, along with Pyrrhus’ remarks in paragraph 34, is yet another example of the resonances of Augustine which seem constantly to hover in the background of the Disputation. The implications of St. Maximus’ remarks would be clearly to deny any notion of a “sin nature” or of a “character” or grace which is introduced into man from outside his nature, both of which are positions that arose later in the Christian West as implications of its received Augustinianism. It would be difficult to believe that St. Maximus, living as he did for a long period in North Africa, could have remained ignorant of the character and writings of North Africa’s most illustrious Latin father much less have failed to respond in some degree to them.
its natural virtue. For example, he that is not fruitful is intemperate, he that is not cowardly is bold, he that is not unrighteousness is a righteous man. Reason, in a natural state, is prudence, the faculty of judgement, in a natural state, is justice, anger is courage, desire, temperance. Consequently, with the removal of things that are contrary to nature only the things proper to nature are manifest, just as when rust is removed the natural clarity and lustre of iron are manifest.

96 PYRRHUS: Hence, those Fathers who say that there was a gnomic will in Christ greatly blaspheme.

97 MAXIMUS: But let us not overlook the fact that the term 'gnomic' hath many different meanings in the Holy Scriptures and in the Holy Fathers, as is clear to any who read them with care. Sometimes this same term meaneth advice and counsel, as when the Apostle [St. Paul] saith now concerning the Gospel I have a commandment of the Lord, yet I give my own opinion. And sometimes it meaneth counsel, as when the blessed David saith: 'They have taken crafty counsel against thy people.' And sometimes it is used to mean decree, as when Daniel, amongst the prophets, saith that the shameless decree issued from the King's person. And sometimes it meaneth faith, or viewpoint, as when Gregory the Theologian (Nazianzus), in his first oration On the Son, saith: 'Since to refute others is a matter of difficulty, whatsoever but a very easy thing, which anyone who wishes may do, and whereas to substitute one's own belief for theirs is the part of a pious and intelligent man.' And briefly so as not to have to go through all the meanings proper to that term one by one putting them into a heap, I have discovered twenty-eight meanings of the word 'gnomic' in the Holy Scriptures and in the Holy Fathers. [Gnomic] do not have an unvarying general or specific meaning. Its sense is rather determined by the context. Because of this, it is impossible to determine only one meaning for the term.

98 PYRRHUS: Then how is it possible for an indefinite term with so many meanings to be indicative of some one thing?

99 MAXIMUS: In order to make more explicit the shameful nature of this heresy, let us examine another similar proposition.

100. PYRRHUS: If thou wilt, then let us examine it.

101. MAXIMUS: Those who say that there is one will, whether it be freely-choosing, or gnomic, or self-determining, or whatever else they wish to call it (for we will not argue about that) must say whether it be divine, angelic, or human. And in the final analysis, regardless of which one they choose, they will still say that it is natural, since each of these names signifies an existing nature, and what they sought to avoid by making such distinctions, they will be shown to uphold by the use of analysis. At any rate, to continue in this line of thought, if they say that this will is divine, then they regard Christ as God alone by nature. If, on the other hand, they say that, as will is angelic. Then they regard Him neither as divine nor human, but as an angelic nature. And if they say that it is human, then they proffer us a mere man subject to compulsion.
103. **MAXIMUS**: Doth this aptitude exist in us by nature, or not by nature?

104. **PYRRHUS**: By nature.

105. **MAXIMUS**: Then once again, according to the principles of rational analysis, they shall be forced to say that the will is natural and they shall have gained nothing by speaking in this roundabout manner. And since aptitude proceeds through experience, a disposition and an execution of intention in accordance with that disposition, then Christ also had according to them, a habit of will and an execution of intention acquired through experience, and He therefore advanced through ignorance before learning whatever He learnt. Why then, do they reject Nestorius, yet firmly embrace his words and ideas? It is rather the case that those who say “one will” vindicate his teachings, for their Ekthesis testifies, advocates, and decrees “one will”, which is exactly what Nestorius advocated. The doctrine of a habit of will is suggestive, once again, of St Augustine.

106. Furthermore, those who have rejected the proposition that the will is natural must say either that it is hypostatic or contrary to nature. But if they say it is natural then the Son shall have a different will than the Father. A characteristic of any given hypostasis characterized by that particular hypostasis. But if they say the will is contrary to nature, then they make Him destroy His own essence, since things contrary to nature destroy what is natural.

107. But I will gladly question them on this as well: doth the God and Father of all will as Father, or as God? But if He willeth as Father then His will is different from the will of the Son. For the Father is not the Son. But if He willeth as God, and the Son and the Holy Ghost, are God as well, then they must affirm that the will is a property of nature, in other words, natural.

108. Further, if the will be one then according to the teachings of the Fathers, the essence is one. So, if there be one will of the Godhead and humanity of Christ, then they are compelled to say that there is one and the same essence. How then, being so impious, can they follow the Fathers?

109. And again, if wherever there be one will there be no evident distinction of natures, then those who say that there is one will do not make a distinction of natures in Christ. Conversely, they that affirm a distinction of natures do not affirm one will; provided that they observe the norms of the Fathers.

110. And again, if according to the same teachers, the two natures cannot both have the same will, then they must either admit that the two natures cannot have the same will, in common, or else if they say this, then they must oppose the rules and decisions of the Fathers.

111. **PYRRHUS**: Thou hast demonstrated with clarity and concision that your opinion entangles them in every manner of contradiction. But what are we to say when they attempt to prove their propositions from the Fathers?

112. **MAXIMUS**: Certainly if they wish to call “Fathers” those who introduce division or confusion into the supernatural Economy, they are welcome to do so. For both groups affirm one will even though their respective positions are diametrically.

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63 i.e., Nestorians and Monophysites.
Opposed. But if they are referring to the Fathers of the Church we shall not allow them to say such a thing because, [the Fathers] proved many notable things, so that we may discern those who bring accusations against Christ. God. So, by means of what expression canst thou clearly demonstrate this complete destruction of the mystery of the Incarnation? We [for our part], have a defense in that we revere the Fathers in all things.

113. PYRRHUS: Why then doth Gregory the Theologian say "The will of that Man no one regards as supposed to God, since it was wholly deified.66 Is this not opposed to the notion that He had two wills?

114. MAXIMUS: By no means, on the contrary, it is more clear evidence of the duality of wills and of all the other natural properties.

115. PYRRHUS: How canst thou say this?

65 cf. Opuscule 2, PG 40-45 and note 47 above. Basically, the Confessor's point is that the Nestorians maintain that there are two persons, the divine 'Word' and the man 'Jesus' united in presenting one 'aspect' or 'person' of union 'Christ.' This union is effected by the will of each underlying person cooperating in one object of will, i.e., man's salvation. Thus, Nestorianism might be characterized as a kind of split personality: the 'nurse' union being simply an object of will. In this, Nestorianism is Montanist in that it is 'proselytistic.' Nestorians who agree in it Convex e.g., monotheism and Monotheism unite the will in hypostasis, but maintain that there is only one nature or hypostasis respectively, and thus only one will. The two positions thus bear superficial resemblance to each other, but in reality, they are diametrically opposed.


116. MAXIMUS: When one saith 'the one presumes with that which burns and that which is burned, when one saith 'cool' one presumes that which is made cool and that which is cool, when one speaketh of walking one presumes a walker and the space, in which one walketh, when one saith 'sight' one presumes that which is seen and a seer when one saith 'conception' one presumes one that is thought and a thinker, for it is not possible to know or to talk about a relationship without distinguishing the things that are related. So it is appropriate to distinguish that which is desiderated and that which desiderates. Otherwise, even if the deification of the will be opposed to the notion that there are two wills, then the deification of the nature eliminates the existence of the two natures. But in both cases this Father used the same word 'deification.'

117. PYRRHUS: This expression of the Fathers hath been shown to be altogether compatible with the doctrine of two wills, but it is also necessary to prove that Gregory of Nyssa agreat with him. For they argue that he regarded the will as one from the fact that he saith 'The soul of Christ' wills, the body of the sick man is touched, and on account of both the sickness effects. They maintain that this Father said that the soul of the Lord willed with the divine will of the Godhead which was united with it by hypostasis.

118. MAXIMUS: Then by the same kind of argument, the body might be said to have been touched with a divine touch, and so the Godhead will be subject to touch. For what they say of
the soul of the Lord applieth equally to the body, leading them into an error of the worst possible kind.

119. PYRRHUS  Thou hast completely and concisely demonstrated the blasphemy of such an interpretation [of Gregory of Nyssa]. But what shall we say concerning the quotations from the great Athanasius to which they refer? For example, "the mind of the Lord is not actually the Lord, but it is will, choice or operation directed to a particular object." 68

120. MAXIMUS  This too they adduce against themselves, for the true doctrine everywhere utilizes their own arguments to refute what they themselves say. For truth is never impoverished as to need to employ its own weapons against its opponent. If according to this father the "mind of the Lord is not actually the Lord" then doubtless His mind is something else than the Lord altogether, that is to say, the mind of the Lord is not nature Lord, nor God. It is believed that it was made by Him as regards the hypostasis, and this is evident from what St. Irenaeus says. The will, choice, or operation directed to a particular or general reference to this point [Athanasius] is utilizing the words of the philosopher of philosophers, in the sixth of the Stromateis, that defined the will as a mind desiring something, and purpose as reasonable desire, or a will directed to some particular object. The phrase "operation with reference to some thing" however, is used by the divine doctor employed because in all His divine actions, the God of all, having become man, used of the rational and intellectual soul hypostatically united to Him.

121. PYRRHUS  Indeed, in the very arguments whereby they imagine they can refute the true faith, they themselves are refuted without knowing it. But it is necessary to examine another expression which they adduce from this father, so as not to leave them any pretext for denying the truth.

122. MAXIMUS  Which one is that? I am not familiar with it.

123./pyrrhus  The one in which that wonderful man saith: "he was born from a woman, having raised up in Himself the form of man from the first creation without carnal wills and human thoughts, in an image of newness. For the will is of the Godhead only." 69

124. MAXIMUS  This is self-explanatory. It is not necessary to seek the aid of the principles of interpretation.

125. PYRRHUS  How, then, can they interpret it in such a questionable manner?

126. MAXIMUS  Out of much ignorance. For it is obvious to everyone, unless the eye of one's soul is completely blind, that it was not said in reference to the natural principle, but concerning the mode of existence proper to His flesh. The Father went over this point thoroughly wishing to show that the incarnation was the work of the divine will alone, of the good pleasure of the Father, the Son accomplishing it in Himself and the Holy Spirit cooperating, 70 and that it is not the work of the carnal motion and of human thoughts, in other words, the work of the sexual union of marriage. For the God of all having become man.

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68 St. Athanasius, On the Incarnation of the Word.

69 There is no record of this in the Stromateis of Clement.

70 These are the three modes of willing of the divine will of the Trinity. The formulation is that of St. Sophronius of Jerusalem.
do not alter the principle of human nature since if He had, He could not; it has been a man in the perfection and not a mere potential [being] of human nature. Rather, He added the making of His essence that was, to say, conception by means of seed and the corruption that cometh through birth. Thus the godly minded doctors of the Church by no means denied the natural principles of its natures that had been united in Him, but in concordance with the Evangelists, apostles, and Prophets, said that our Lord Jesus Christ, for our salvation possessed that will and activity proper to each of His natures.

127. PYRRHUS: Is it possible to prove this from the Old and New Testaments?

128. MAXIMUS: Of course it is, for the Fathers were not moved by their own opinions. Rather, they learned from them, they taught this also as well. For we know that Jesus was not they who were speaking, but the grace of the Son which completely interpenetrated them.

129. PYRRHUS: Since then in imitation of the divine goodness, hast made it thine intention to benefit us, and hast given thyself to the labor of this inquiry, do not draw back, but instruct us about this point as well.

130. MAXIMUS: In the Holy Gospels it is said of the Lord that "the day following Jesus went forth into Galilee." So, as it is apparent that He willed to come thither, as much as He was not already there, then it is obvious that He was "not there" according to His humanity for His Godhead was absent from no place. Consequently He willed to come into that place as man, and not as God. And therefore He possessed the will which is proper to man. And elsewhere again, 'I will that where I am, these may be also.' If Christ, as God, be beyond place, but as God He is not in any place and it is impossible that the created nature should be beyond place, then He willed according to that nature which He is as man, in order that where He is "these may be also." Therefore, He possessed the will which is proper to man.

131. And elsewhere again, "And coming into a place He said, "I thirst." And they gave Him wine mixed with gall; and He would not drink." Of which part of Him is it said that He thirsted? If the Godhead, then His Godhead is subject to passio in every place contrary to its own nature. If the humanity, then according to that nature with which He thirsted He also willed not to drink that which was not fit for that nature to drink.

132. And elsewhere again it saith, "And Jesus walked in Galilee, for He would not walk in Jewry, because the Jews sought to kill Him." If the act of walking is in the nature of the flesh and not in that of the Godhead which is united hypostatically to it, then the same Person willed by that which He was as man, and as man He willed to walk in Galilee and willed not to walk in Judaea and therefore He possessed the faculty of will proper to that humanity.

133. And elsewhere again, "And they departed thence and passed through Galilee, and He would not that any man should know it." It is generally agreed that journeying is proper to Christ's humanity, not to His deity if journeying be confessed to

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71 cf. Theological and Polemical Works, Opuscule 4, PG 41-45

72 St John 1 47
be proper to that which He was as man, but not proper to that which He was as God, then it was as man that He would "that no man should know." Therefore He possessed the faculty of will proper to that which He was as man.

134. And yet elsewhere: "And from them He arose, and went into the borders of Tyre and Sidon, and entered into an house, and would have no man know it, but He could not be hid." If Christ as God was self-existing power and as man was weakness -- for "He was crucified," saith the divine apostles, "from weakness but He lives by the power of God" then the "coming into a house" and His willing "that no man should know it" and furthermore, His inability to escape detection were proper to that which He was as man, and not to His godhead. Hence the same Person possessed that faculty of will proper to that which He was as man. And elsewhere again it saith "about the fourth watch of the night, He cometh to them, walking upon the sea, and would have passed by them." If one understands this to be said in reference to His deity, then one is obliged to say that the Godhead is circumscribed by bodily limits, by "above" and "below," "before" and "after," "right" and "left." Conversely if these things be said of Him as man, then the same Person possessed the faculty of will proper to His humanity.

135. And yet elsewhere it saith: "and the disciples said unto Him saying, Where wilt thou have us go and prepare for you to eat the passover?" If the food of the Passover be one of the things commanded by the law, and the Lord was subject to the law as man and not as God, then He willed to eat the Passover in His humanity and therefore possessed that faculty of will proper to that which He was as man.

136. And the divine apostle, in the epistle to the Hebrews, saith of Him that "He became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross." So, did He obey willingly or unwillingly? If "unwillingly" then it is reasonable to say that [He was] not really obedient [at all, but subject to compulsion], which is tyranny. If "willingly" then He became obedient not in His deity, but in His humanity, for "neither obedience nor disobedience are proper to the deity, according to the Fathers. For these things are appropriate to those in an inferior position, and under subjection," as the divine Gregory saith. Thus He possessed that faculty of will proper to humanity.

137. And the blessed David saith in the thirty-ninth Psalm: "Sacrifice and offering thou didst not desire, but a body hast thou prepared for me. Burnt offering and sin offering thou hast not required. Then said I, lo, I come. In the volume of the book it is written for me, I delight to do thy will, O my God." On the one hand, the Father was Christ's God according to the humanity and not according to His deity, just as He is Christ's Father according to His deity and not according to that which He is as man. He thus delights to do the will of the Father, not according to His deity, but according to His humanity, for the Father's will is also His will, since He is also God by essence. And if this be so, then as God He not only possessed a will consubstantial with the Father but as man He also possessed a will consubstantial with us.

138. We should also observe that the divine apostle applies the words just cited from the Psalm to the Lord in the Epistle to the Hebrews. The great Moses, in the account of the creation of man, introduced God as saying "Let us make man in our image, and form him after our likeness." For these things are appropriate to those in an inferior position, and under subjection, as the divine Gregory saith. Thus He possessed that faculty of will proper to humanity.

77 St. Mark 7:24
78 1 Corinthians 13:4
79 St. Mark 6:48
80 St. Mark 14:12
81 Philippians 2:8. St. Maximus has misquoted the reference.
82 St. Gregory of Nazianzus: Fourth Theological Oration (second Oration on the Son), 6: "In His character of the Word He was neither obedient nor disobedient. For such expressions belong to servants, and inferiors." (Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Volume VII, p. 311.)
83 Psalm 40:6-7
image, and after that likeness. If man be the image of the Divine nature, and the Divine nature be self-determining, then so is the image, since he image preserveth its likeness to the archetype; it too must be self-determining by nature. And if Christ is become both the archetype and the image by nature, then the same Person, subsisting in both His natures possesses in the will proper to both natures. For it hath been demonstrated previously that the Father that the will is the self-determination proper to a rational nature.

139. And it is necessary to realize that the term "self-determination" as well as the term "nature" is used in different senses when referring to God when referring to man and when referring to angels. It is used of God superessentially and of angels, to denote the convergence between creatio et habitation without any intervening interval of time, but in men there is such an interval of time. If Adam when we were born, had been united will to us, it would have been all that was lacking, and after we were born to die. For it is the first thing in us that becomes a part of our passion and leading to us the Word when He became incarnate and I have this faculty of willing with the nature then I have never lost thee from me. And if I cannot be lived from us then, we cannot be saved, since what is not assumed is not healed.

140. And thus, if the self-determinative power of nature as well as His work and creation and if as they say the Word when becoming incarnate did not assume this nature with the nature in the inefable union, then He rather condemns that the creation as something which is not good, and He destroyeth the beginning of our will depriving us of complete renovation and work in Him as being subject to passion because He is a rational being, unable to save completely.
are the dogmas of the Evangelists, Apostles, and Prophets. So what greater proof that He hath the faculty of will proper both to His deity and to His humanity could there be than this?

143. PYRRHUS: Nothing could be clearer than this proof that the wills are natural. How then could Vigilius, the bishop at that time presiding over the Roman Church, accept that Libellus issued by Menas at the imperial capital and shown to him at the imperial council chamber, and which said that Christ had one will?

144. MAXIMUS: I am shocked at how, though thou art a Patriarch, thou darest to tell lies! Thy predecessor writing to Honorius, said that "he [Vigilius] had received a copy, intact, of that Libellus, but that it was not delivered or early shown to him." But thou thyself hast said, in the epistle to Pope John, now among the saints, that it was delivered and shown to him, but having been read by Constantine the Quaestor. Whom are we to believe, thee, or thy predecessor? You cannot both be correct?

145. PYRRHUS: Did my predecessor really write in such a manner?

146. MAXIMUS: He did.

147. PYRRHUS: Let us leave the question of Vigilius. What dost thou say of Honorius, who clearly taught one will of Our Lord Jesus Christ in his letter to me predecessor?

148. MAXIMUS: Who is a more trustworthy interpreter of such an epistle? The one that actually wrote it for Honorius, the one who at that time was still alive and who, in addition to all his other virtues, illumined the whole West with godly dogmas? Or is it those in Constantinople who interpret it in accordance with their whims of their own hearts?

149. PYRRHUS: The one who actually composed the letter.

150. MAXIMUS: This same person afterwards wrote for Pope John (who is among the saints) to Constantine just after he had become Emperor regarding the very same letter of Honorius. He explained that "we say one will of the Lord, not of the Godhead and humanity, but only of the humanity." For Sergius had written: As some say that the two wills of Christ are opposed we in response write that Christ did not have two opposing wills as of flesh and of spirit, as we ourselves have since the Fall, but only one that which characterized His humanity by virtue of nature. And the clear proof of this is the fact that he writeth of limbs and flesh which means that we cannot apply what he saith unto the Godhead. Straight away, in anticipation of objections, he saith: "And if someone saith 'Why, when speaking of the humanity of Christ, did you not refer to the Godhead as well?' we reply for the first part, that our answer was made to a specific question, and for the second part, that there, as ever we have followed the practice of Scripture. For sometimes it speaketh concerning His Godhead..."
only as when the Apostle saith Christ the power of God and wisdom of God, and sometimes concerning only His humanity, as when the Apostle saith 'the foolishness of God is stronger than men' and what is weak in God is stronger than men."

152. PYRRHUS: My predecessor, misled by the puerile manner of writing, understood it in a somewhat naive fashion.

MAXIMUS: I speak truly when I say that nothing so appalled me about thy predecessor as his consistency. He was wont to change his mind from time to time, and not to persist in one line of thought. At one time he proposed the Iacarpate, but was withal a mere man for he who is subject to deliberation differs from those who are not. At another time he proposed that the Incarnation was effectual, but in no way from Pyrrhus and Maximus! And yet another time he saith it is 'hypothesis', that is, by introducing the distinction of hypostases distinct wills within identical natures, and another time he accepteth the opinion of those who make the Lord simply a mere man, but mutable and sinful man also. Why? Because the gnomes is a judgement concerning opposing things, an attempt to things still unknown, and a choice between uncertain things. Why? Because the gnome is a judgement concerning opposing things, and an attempt to things still unknown, and a choice between uncertain things.

91 [Corinthians 1:24,25]

92 Having established already that the gnomes will is the mode of willing proper to the created human hypostasis, St. Maximus then demonstrates that the attribution of a gnomes will to Christ would imply the existence of a human hypostasis in Him, thus making Him a 'mere man'.

153. PYRRHUS: But Sophronius, who a short while before he became the Patriarch of Jerusalem made us do this very thing, is not only saying what we should think about the energies, although it was not a suitable occasion to do so.

93 The Incarnation of the Word was a result of the fiat omnis, and not an act of will, as is shown by the fact that St. Sophronius had implored Cyrus of Alexandria not to sign the monenergistic document of union with the Monophysites. It was apparently St. Sophronius' elevation to the Patriarchate of Jerusalem in 634 that prompted Sergius to write Pope Honorius concerning the doctrine of one will. St. Sophronius convened a synod in Jerusalem and condemned those who spoke of 'only one energy'. This is perhaps what Pyrrhus is referring to when he says that he was urged 'to speak about the energies, although it was not a suitable occasion to do so.'
154. **MAXIMUS:** I am altogether vexed! What kind of defense dost thou imagine thou art making by attacking this blameless man so bitterly? Tell me, in the name of the Truth, when Sergius wrote to Theodore of Pharan and sent him the Libellus of Menas through Sergius of Makarona, the bishop of Arsinoe, asking him to state what he thought of one energy and one will; and he wrote back accepting this teaching, where then is Sophronius? Where is Sophronius when Sergius wrote, quoting Severus to Paul the one-eyed in Theodosiopolis, sending him the Libellus of Menas as well as his own consent to it and that of the Pharanites as well? Or where is Sophronius when he wrote to Chosce the Arsan, a follower of Paul of Samosata, stating the same thing concerning the one operation, being self-assured to have in the epistle that the union of all with the Church could not be effected without this doctrine? But blessed Pseudo-Alexandria took it from the Arsan's hand, choosing to effect its overthrow by this means. I was prevented from doing so at this time by the attack of the Persians in Egypt. When Sophronius] when [Sergius] himself wrote to Cyrus in Egypt, asking him whether he thought there were one or two wills, and sending him the Libellus of Menas? What men so rashly pursued this insanity in various ways and at such a destruction of the Church, the blessed Sophronius accused to him, with humility and posturing himself before Cyrus, not to consider the quickening sufferings of Christ God so that in the heretical expression, having been extinguished by the holy Fathers, could again be renewed? Is Sophronius then made the cause of such great scandal?

155. **PYRRHUS:** What thou hast said adequately refutes all the points advanced. Our discussion of the two wills is now complete.

95 The Persian attack occurred in 634 and was the immediate cause of the Emperor Heraclius' subsequent and successful campaigns against Persia.

96 Cyrus, i.e., Cyrus the Patriarch of Alexandria.
Thesdinios said, “What does it mean to speak of predestination?”

“The Saint replied, “His foreknowledge pertains to our thoughts, words, and deeds which are within our power. His providence, on the other hand, is that which befalls us and is not in our power.”

“Bishop Theodostus asked, “What is in our power, and what is not?”

“Saint Maximus replied, “You know all these things, my lord, and only ask me in order to try me, your servant.”

“The Bishop said, “In truth I do not know, and I wish to understand what is the difference between that which is in our power and that which is not, and how one pertains to the divine foreknowledge and the other to the divine predestination.”

“Saint Maximus replied, “All our good and bad deeds depend on us, but they are beyond our power. We love or hate what we have or see. We do not cause sickness or preserve health. So also, keeping God’s commandments is cause for our attaining the heavenly Kingdom, but not for our entering into the Gehenna of fire.”

(From The Life of Our Holy Father Maximus the Confessor, trans. Fr. Christopher Birchall, Holy Transfiguration Monastery, pp. 18-19.)
163. PYRRHUS: If thou sayest there are two energies on account of the distinction of the two natures in Christ, and not one [energy] on account of the singularity of the Person, then thou must also discover two energies of humanity because of that distinction between the soul and the body, which is an essential distinction. And if this be so, then there will be three energies of Christ, and not two.

164. MAXIMUS: The very point which thou dost allege as a negation of the natural properties also stretches out to engage the natures in the same negation. For this doctrine of thine also impliceth those things with it. Whereas, we shall also introduce thee to proofs from the Fathers, seeing that thou hast such an excessive fondness for what they say. Wherefore, if thou saiest as we do that there be two natures of Christ in the one hypostasis by mean of the distinction between soul and body which are also two natures, then there shall be three natures of Christ and not two. And if thou sayest as we do that there are two and three natures of Christ, how canst thou maintain that there are two energies in account of the distinction of natures, for that there are but one or three energies united in one hypostasis? For what saist thou about the natures of Christ against us also and such as stand with us in the matter concerning the energies. This principle, as we say, proves to be equally uncertain and ambiguous. But we say that the unity is not proper to the form of man but is the unity proper to essence of body and soul. If the unity be proper to the form of man on the one hand, then the indistinguishability of that nature is proven, in spite of the particular energies of body and soul. But for this reason that we said of man [that he hath one energy, and we did so not without support, rather, we adduced support for it. Contrariwise, thou wouldst mishandle the unity of body and soul.

165. PYRRHUS: But according to the Nestorius, persons are introduced with energies so of necessity those who say that there are two energies vindicate his polluted dogmas.

166. MAXIMUS: Did not Nestorius, who indeed maintained that there were two persons, rather say that there was but one energy? But according to what thou saest of persons being introduced along with the energies, and vice versa, energies with persons, then are art compelled, following the same principles, either to say that because of the one operation of the Holy Ghost there is one Person as well, or because of its three Hypostases that there are three operations.

167. Or thou mightest maintain that their union is relational as Nestorius said of Christ, for the one energy was the union as Nestorius and his party maintained in their writings. For all these reasons thou must say that since operation is proper to the form that there are as many human hypostases [as energies] or that since there is one energy of the genus "man" that there is likewise one person for all men. Or that since there are many persons there are also many energies. In this the principles of being of the same

98 The question of the nature of the union between man's soul and body was one of the centers of the christological debate between St. Cyril of Alexandria and Nestorius. Nestorius held that there were only three kinds of union: 1) the essential union between the Three Hypostases of the Holy Trinity, 2) the union between body and soul, and 3) the relational and volitional conjunction of the Word and the man Jesus into one "aspect.

99 Again, the Confessor insists that if energy and will are hypostatic features and not natural properties then the whole panistic ortho thesis of God is overthrown and the doctrine of God itself will reduce to one or another dialectically opposed alternative to a Sabellian mono-Personal God or to a Trinitism.
THE DISPUTATION WITH PYRRHUS

essence have the same energy asserted by the Fathers is nullified.

168 Moreover, if as thou sayest, a person be introduced with an operation, and thou yet supportest [the fact that] many energies proceed from the same Person of God the Word Incarnate, then thou must also support as many persons [in Christ] as there are energies. So His Persons and His energies are found to be infinite.

169 Furthermore, if, according to their proposition, a person be introduced with an operation then surely with the destruction of the one cometh the destruction of the other. If this in turn be true, then with the destruction of the one of the one or of the two energies cometh also the destruction both of the one and of the two persons in Christ. And so Christ is sundered on their own principle, from existence and person existence and pushed into non-existence. How could anything be more impious?

170 And if were to examine from the many superabundances of what each one of us doth one by one discover that we can both think and work at once and the same moreeth that we can think one thing and say something else. In those as now, as when Moses simultaneously made intercessions with Christ in behalf of the people, and reasoned with the people by urging them with

171 PYRRHUS: But the agent, it is not one?

172 MAXIMUS: Certainly it is.

173 PYRRHUS: If the agent be one, then the operation must also be one, as of one [hypostasis].

174 MAXIMUS: Christ Himself is one, but thou hast returned again to what hath already been said, so again I will ask, is He one by hypostasis, or nature?

100 This section is not to be misunderstood as being merely a rhetorical reductio ad absurdum, for St Maximus the principle that natures must have their own proper energies in order to exist is one of the cardinal principles he is defending.

101 This argument was to be repeated upon in the ninth century by St Photius in response to the Latin exegesis of passages which refer to the Holy Spirit being the Spirit "of Wisdom," or "of Truth" and so on as indicating an eternal procession of the Spirit from the Son, since the Son is Wisdom and Truth. Again, energies have been confused with Personas (cf St Photius, Mystagogy 58-59).

102 That is, reason as the faculty, and conception as its activity, are not identical things, and yet imply the other.

103 That is, reason as the faculty, and conception as its activity, are not identical things, and yet imply the other.
175. **PYRRHUS.** By hypostasis, for by nature He is dual.

176. **MAXIMUS:** Then doth the same Person operate dually by means of the duality of natures, or singly, by reason of the singularity of the hypostasis? If the same one Person operateth dually, then the fact that there is more than one energy doth not imply that there is likewise more than one Person. But if thou sayest that He acteth singly by reason of the singularity of the Person, (then I remind thee) that this doctrine hath [already] been shown to be absurd, the same absurdities still hold for the same reasons, for if energy be hypostatic, then with a multitude of hypostases a multitude of distinct energies will have to be asserted.

177. **PYRRHUS:** It doth not necessarily follow that since He operateth dually, He hath two energies; but since the agent is one, the energy is also one.

178. **MAXIMUS:** Someone else could say to thee that [it was not because] His nature is dual that He was said to have two natures, but rather because His hypostasis was one that it was so that His nature was one. Nevertheless, to pass over everything that might also be said here, I will ask: Thou sayest that there is one energy, what sort of energy dost thou judge this to be, divine, or human, or neither of the two? If divine, then thou sayest: that Christ is God only, but if human and not God at all, then thou sayest: He is a mere man only, but if neither of the two, neither God nor man then thou dost teach a non-existent Christ.

179. **PYRRHUS:** We who say there is one energy of the Godhead and humanity of Christ say that this belongeth to him not by virtue of the principle of nature, but because of the mode of union.

180. **MAXIMUS.** According to the doctrine, if the energy came into existence at the time of the union, then before the union He was without energy. So according to thee, when He created He acted from compulsion. Furthermore, if the operation came into existence at the time of the union then the Father and the Holy Ghost were not active because they were not hypostatically united to the flesh. And if they were not active then neither are they Creators. So it is not I who say that they are incomplete.

181. And again, since the union is relational, and not a real object then this energy of Christ is a relationship, not a real object.

182. Thou art also forced to state whether this energy be created or Uncreate, since in general nothing existeth between the created and the Uncreate [natures]. If thou sayest it is created then it is perfectly clear that His nature is created only conversely, if thou sayest it Uncreate then it characterizeth only the Uncreate nature. It is surely necessary for natural things to correspond with their appropriate natures, for how is it possible for the energy of a created nature to be Uncreate, without beginning, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable? And the reverse, how is it possible for the Uncreate and eternal nature to be created, a thing made, tried and compelled by other things?

183. **PYRRHUS:** Dost thou not accept and agree with those who say that the effect of Christ's actions is one energy?

184. **MAXIMUS:** Different actions have different effects, not one effect, as was demonstrated by the example of the sword being hardened by fire. If the operation of the sword and
that of the fire are both mutually united and yet we observe that the fire's effect is burning and the iron's effect is cutting; even though they are not distinguished in the burning but or the cutting burn, just as the effect of heaven, earth and the sun are different from one another — then it is not possible to say that there is one work unless there is only one action. Thus if thou dost maintain that the effect of one energy is several distinct works by Christ, thou must also maintain one action. Or if thou dost teach an innumerable number of actions, then thou must also teach that the energies are innumerable. But our inquiry is not about the works, for we are not discussing things external to Christ, but about things within Christ Himself, and we must, therefore, be about the natural principles of the essences of Christ whether He remained defective from the union or not. If He was defective, then it is possible for a nature that is defective [in a natural energy] to be genuinely existent. If He is not defective, then the energy is either understood to be a component of the essence, or it is acquired from those things external to Him. If the energy proper to a nature be not acquired from external sources, then, in the other case, a nature to exist without actions, or of the converse will be true: a nature can neither be conceived nor can it exist without the energies proper to it. To believe this is to believe that He operateth in each nature naturally and that they are not altered thereby.

185. When thou didst teach the one energy, thou saidst nothing about the action, but spoke only of the natural principles of the united essences, and from this infallible faith thou didst produce a goat-stag! This was also taught by the chapters of Cyrus whom thou hast kindly and readily received. In which he stated that He operateth divine things and human things by one energy; contradicting not only the Holy Scriptures and the holy Fathers, but also the very nature of things that come to pass. For nothing which abideth in the things proper to its nature begets or fashions its opposite: fire doth not warm and cool, nor doth ice cool and warm, nor is the earth dried up and watered at the same time. If this did not happen in the case of anything that exists, then how darest thou say that the Incarnate Word could perform and undergo both the miracles and the sufferings though these differ from each other in the principles of their nature, with only one energy?

186. PYRRHUS: Then what about the clear opposition of the godly conceptions of Cyril to the current inquiry? This great

107. The Confessor means by this that the doctrine of one energy or operation being produced from two distinct natures will result in a hybrid combination of the operations of both natures, i.e., whenever two distinct things are made one in their effect or production, the inevitable result is a mixture of both. This argument is in fact repeated by St. Photios in his Mystagogy where it is argued that the Spirit, if consubstantial as a production of, or as caused by, the Father and Son would be analogous to a centaur, originating at the Father's Uncaused Causality and the Son's caused causality. (St. Photios, Mystagogy 43) The same principle holds true with regard to the two natures of Christ. Divine energies, such as ubiquity, would become merged with the spatiotemporal limitations of the human energies, resulting in a kind of "semi-ubiquity." Regardless of whether this principle of synthesis of distinct things into a tertium quid is applied chronologically or theologically, the results are as mythical as goat-stags and centaurs, since they are speculative creations of the human mind which go beyond the bounds of Revelation.
THE DISPUTATION WITH PYRRHUS

luminary of the Church clearly taught that Christ "exhibited one energy of the same type in both natures."

IR7 MAXIMUS The present expression doth not completely contradict the two operations, rather, it affirms them. For he did not say one natural energy of the Godhead and humanity of Christ, because he elsewhere said that "those of sound mind do not support one energy of the Creator and creatures." He wanted to show that there is one energy of the Godhead both with and without the flesh, just as it is clear that there is one operation of fire both with and without matter. Thus, this father did not say that there is one operation of the two natures, but spoke of one energy in reference to the divine and Fatherly nature which really subsisted in God the Word Incarnate. He effected the miracles not only with an almighty command, incorporeally: but also with the same operation as the Father, even after the miracle, where he also effected them with the sense of touch, which is form of the flesh, corporeally. For this [is what he meant when he said] "through each of the two." Similarly the recovery of the sight, the restoration of sight to the blind man, of the hundred loaves of bread, or the cleansing of the leper, were effected by means of an omnipotent word and decree and also corporeally by the sense of touch, as was proper to each nature so as to demonstrate that the flesh was life-giving flesh in that it was truly His own, and not that of any other, in its union with Him. The divine energy was made known in His deeds in both of these, I mean the command and the touch — and did not in any way impair the natural, passable, human energy of the flesh proper to us. Quite the contrary, it preserved its own proper manifestations, just as a soul, even though working through the instrument of the body and its own proper energy nevertheless preserved its own natural energy. For the stretching out of the hand, the touch, the grasping, the mingling of spit and clay, the breaking of bread, and simply anything which is brought to pass by the hand or any other part of limb of the body, proveth the existence of the natural energy of Christ's humanity. Accordingly, He Who is by nature God Himself was active also as man, naturally working divine things, so that through both He might be believed to be both perfect God and perfect man — only excepted both being subject to true demonstration.

Hence, this father was not ignorant of what is included in the distinctive properties and attributes of each nature. I mean that proof is offered of His quickening and creative operation of the soul in His body — which god the Word Incarnate preserveth without confusion, as hath been shown. The creative energy createth both quantity and quality in an essence, and the existence of things is contemplated from and in these categories. If the Greek philosophers enumerate ten rational principles or beings, then everything is maintained and comprehended in these categories. So Christ showed that displayed that energy proper to human nature in as many categories as are proper to that nature. He fulfilled essence by making the deficient eyes of the blind man [to see], quality by turning water into wine, and quantity by increasing the loaves of bread. He displayeth the life giving operation of His humanity in breathing, in speaking, in seeing, in hearing, coughing, smelling, eating, drinking, moving His hands, and working and sleeping and in on and so forth.

108 The ten rational principles to which St. Maximus refers are those of Aristotle: state, action, opposition, substance, quality, relations, quantity, place, time, and position.

109 This is one aspect for St. Maximus of the doctrine of Recapitulation. As the Logos of all logos, Christ not only undergoes all stages of humanity, but fulfills all the metaphysical categories of Creation as well. In this connection, it is worth noting that for Aristotle, whose metaphysical categories these are, there is an intimate connection between the categories of metaphysics and those of language. This is echoed in St. Maximus, who affirms that Christ as the Logos of God the Father illumines the true sense not only of the events recorded in Holy Scripture, but the very words or logos with which it is written.
189. PYRRHUS: Thou hast shown, reverently, and without doing any violence to the truth, that the conception of this Father doth not contradict but rather agreeeth with the two energies. But what about that expression of St. Dionysius in the epistle to Gaius the worshipper which saith some new theandric energy of Christ active with us?  

190. MAXIMUS: This newness, is it a quantity or a quality?  

191. PYRRHUS: A quantity  

192. MAXIMUS: If so, then it is a质量, or a quantity, which is according to every definition of nature. The rational principle of the energy must have the same kind of nature. Moreover, when the divine apostle saith “Behold all things have become new” no one will assert that he meant that things have become something else. But doth anyone say that he means that all things are become one? This must be well determined in regardless of whether thou wishest to call it energy or nature. But if this newness be a qualitative one, then it doth not remain something in the middle but doth indicate one energy.  

193. PYRRHUS: Doth not the term “theandric” indicate one energy?  

194. MAXIMUS: By no means. Quite the contrary, this expression teacheth the two energies in a round about way by enumerating the natures, since if two existences be negatived, there doth not remain some “christic” thing in the middle. But if it doth indicate one energy, then Christ must have one energy, as God which is different from the Father. If the Son be of a different nature than the Father because the Father’s energy is not theandric, then by the same token the nature must be characterized as theandric. For the energy being natural existeth as an innate property and component of nature. Those who comprehend the order of things must say whether this be of the genus “quality” or “quantity”.  

195. PYRRHUS: Then this newness is neither quantity nor quality, but essence  

196. MAXIMUS: I am astounded that thou canst say this with confidence! What is the opposite of essence?  

110 St. Dionysius, Epistle 4, PG 3:1072  
111 1 Corinthians 5:17  
112 “christic thing in the middle”, i.e., A Eutychian hybrid nature which blends the two natures to form a third, new nature composed of elements mixed together from both. Cf. note 107
197. **PYRRHUS**: Non-being.

198. **MAXIMUS**: And what is the opposite of newness?

199. **PYRRHUS**: Ancicntness.

200. **MAXIMUS**: Then newness is not an essence but a quality. If we do not interpret this expression of his which referreth to one operation in this way, do we not show this God-revealing teacher to be in opposition to the rest of the Fathers? For all of them distinctly stated and taught that beings of the same energy had the same essence. Likewise, they stated that those which differ in essence differ also in energy, and that those which differ in energy differ in essence as well.

201. **PYRRHUS**: But the Fathers said this on the level of Theology and not on the level of Economy. Hence, no one who loveth the truth should change the appointed meaning of their statements which refer to Theology into statements that refer to the Economy, and thereby introduce an absurdity.

202. **MAXIMUS**: If the Fathers say it of the Theology alone, then after the Incarnation it is not possible -- so thou wouldst have us say -- to regard the Son as equally divine as the Father.

113 This would seem to explain why Pyrrhus persists in the literary spirit of St. Cyril of Alexandria, using *physis* in Theology and Economy differently, whereas St. Maximus, firmly within the Cyrillic Chalcedonian tradition, uses a consistent terminology, where the meanings of hypostasis and nature remain the same, whether referring to Triadology (i.e., Theology) or Christology (i.e., Economy).

114 Pyrrhus seems to object to the whole enterprise of Cyrillic Chalcedonianism itself, and to its (eventually successful) effort to use technical terms such as hypostasis and nature univocally in both Theology and Economy.

203. **MAXIMUS**: And again, if it be not possible to regard the Son as equally divine with the Father after the Incarnation, then [how will these statements be explained]? "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work." Or "Whatever the Son seeth the Father doing, the Son doeth likewise." Or "If ye believe not me, believe my works." Or "The works which I do bear witness of me." Or "For as the Father raiseth up the dead and quickeneth them, even so the Son quickeneth whom He will." For all these prove that He was not only of the same essence as the Father after the Incarnation, but of the same energy as well.

204. **MAXIMUS**: And again, if the foreknowledge of beings be a divine energy, and if it be not only proper to the Father and the Spirit, but further, be also proper to the Son even after the Incarnation, then the Son is of the same energy after the Incarnation as the Father.

205. **MAXIMUS**: And again, if the miracles be a divine operation, and if we know from the miracles that He is of the same essence as the Father, then from the same energy He is shown to be of the same essence as the Father, and is to be regarded as equally divine [with Him] after the Incarnation [as He was before it].

115 St. John 5:17

116 St. John 5:19

117 St. John 10:38

118 St. John 5:36

119 St. John 5:21
206. And again, if the creative energy be an attribute proper to the essence of God, then the attributes of the essence are by necessity inseparable. So those who say that after the Incarnation He is not of the same energy as the Father also say that He is not of the same essence, for where the energy proper to a given nature is not found neither shall that nature be found. Conversely, those who say that He is of the same essence say that He is of the same energy as well, and regard Him to be equally divine [with the Father] after the Incarnation [as He was before it]. For wherever the nature is, there also is the energy proper to it, without diminution.

207. PYRRHUS: But we do not say one energy as a denial of human operation. It is said to be passable by opposition to the divine nature. It is said to be passable by opposition to the divine nature.

208. MAXIMUS: Then by the same principle those who say one nature do not say this as a denial of the humanity, but by this means oppose its passable character to the divine nature.

209. PYRRHUS: So? Did not the Fathers define passibility by means of its difference from the divine operation [of impassibility]? 208

210. MAXIMUS: God forbid! For no father ever defined an existence by comparison to its opposite or found the one to be the cause of the other. For if human passion is caused in such a manner by the divine energy, then doubtless human imperfection existeth because of the goodness of the divine nature. And the exact opposite may also then be stated: that through the passable human motion the divine energy existeth, and that because the human nature is evil, the divine nature is good. But enough of this! For such conceptions are quite perverse. 121

211. PYRRHUS: Why? Did the Fathers not designate passion as the human motion?

212. MAXIMUS: Yes, but the spoke in various ways about these same propositions and conceptions.

213. PYRRHUS: How canst thou say this?

214. MAXIMUS: They referred to the same thing as power, energy, distinction, motion, property, quality, and passion, but not by opposition to the divine energy. Power they defined as that which maintaineth immutability, energy as that which characterizeth the same forms by indistinguishable productions, distinction as that which defineth a thing, motion as that which manifesteth, property as a component attributed only to one thing and not to another, quality as that which imparteth form, and passion as that which is moved. For all things that are from God and after God change by motion, for they are not self-moved beings.

120 Pyrrhus' argument is dependent upon the Neoplatonic and Plotinian paradigm, which would define all distinctions by means of a dialectical opposition. cf. Enneads III.2.16, 17.

"The All is in accordance with its rational formative pattern, and it is necessary that this one formative pattern should be one pattern made out of opposites, since it is opposition of this kind which gives it its structure, and, we might say, its existence... distinction is opposition... the more it is differentiated the more opposed will it make the things it makes." (trans. A.H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, No. 442, p. 99)

121 Once again, St. Maximus' response is upon the implications of Pyrrhus' Neoplatonic dialectic which underwrites Monothelitism.
of omnipotent power. Therefore, they cannot be defined by opposition, but only by means of the rational principle created and placed into them, which are the established causes in each thing. So [the human] energy is designated at the same time as the divine, for what else can one make of the expression "He operateth in the form of each of the two by the communion of each of the two"? Or "after He continued also for forty days fasting, He hungered, for He granted energy to nature when He so willed to enact those things proper to it"? Or of those who say either that there is a distinction of energy, or of those who say there are two energies, one, and another one?

PYRRHUS: Of a truth, the inquiry into operations hath shown that the one energy of Christ is absurd, however one may speak of it. I ask pardon for myself and my predecessor. We proposed and introduced these absurdities out of much ignorance. But I also implore thee to find a way that the absurd notion may be destroyed and yet the memory of my predecessor secured.

MAXIMUS: There is no way to anathematize the heresy and to pass over the person who promulgated it in silence.

PYRRHUS: But if this should be so, then both Sergius and the Council held under my presidency would both be rejected.

MAXIMUS: I am amazed at how thou hast called it a "council", for it was not held in accordance with conciliar laws and canons, nor as becometh ecclesiastical custom, for no encyclical letter was ever issued with the consent of the Patriarchs, nor a place and time of meeting ever established, nor any accuser introduced, nor epistles or delegates sent to any of the other Patriarchs. Those who were introduced were not the proper members for a council, neither bishops, nor metropolitans, nor Patriarchs. So how canst thou call this which distributed scandals and discord throughout the whole world a "council"?

PYRRHUS: If there be no other way than this for my salvation [to be accomplished], then I am ready to make every compliance. I ask only one thing, that thou deem me worthy to visit the apostolic graves [in Rome] and to venerate them, and then to see the pope face to face and give him a letter recanting these errors.

After these things had been said by Pyrrhus, Maximus and Gregory the Patriarch said, "Since thy proposal seemeth good to us, and uniteth the Church, so shall it be." Thus, in this most brilliant city of the Romans, his promise to them hath been fulfilled: one the one hand he hath condemned the impious doctrines of the Ekthesis, and on the other hand hath united himself to the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church through the

Pyrrhus and St. Maximus subsequently travelled to Rome, though not necessarily together, where Pyrrhus did retract his monothelete opinions before the Pope (St. Martin I). However, he subsequently lapsed back into Monotheletism. St. Maximus remained in Rome where he was instrumental in the formal condemnation of Monotheletism by the Roman Church in the Lateran Council of 649, held under Pope St. Martin I.
grace and cooperation of our great God and Saviour Jesus Christ, to Whom be glory, for ever and ever. Amen.