G O D, H I S T O R Y, A N D D I A L E C T I C

THE THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE TWO EUROPEAN CULTURES AND THEIR CULTURAL CONSEQUENCES

Volume II - Dialectic: The Hellenized Foundation of the Second Europe
PART TWO: DIALECTIC
The Hellenized Foundation of the Second Europe
The Legal Stuff

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VII. THE DIALECTICAL GOD OF AUGUSTINISM AND THE INVERSION OF THE PATRISTIC ORDO THEOLOGIAE

1. The Augustinian Formulation of the Doctrine of the Trinity: Prologue

Beginning with Adolf von Harnack and Reinhold Seeberg in the nineteenth century, two of the first historians of doctrine in the modern, comprehensive and systematic sense, there is a growing awareness of a sea-change in the fourth century, a change all readily associate with the name and theological system of St. Augustine of Hippo Regius. The Byzantinist Joan M. Hussey remarks, in her book Church and Learning in the Byzantine Empire, that “insofar as it is possible to assign a watershed, that comes in the fourth century, between those who follow Augustine on the one hand, and those who follow the Cappadocians on the other.”

This comment, coming as it does from a scholar of general culture and by no means of theologian, is a significant one, for it means that underlying all other expressions of the problem, be they cultural, canonical, legal, philosophical or even liturgical, the underlying difference of outlook between the Two Europes is dogmatic and specifically Trinitarian in its ultimate roots.

But the most succinct statements of the problem may be found in the early twentieth century Calvinist historian James Orr’s Progress of Dogma, for “with Augustine, theology passes from East to West, and from the region of theology proper to anthropology. Not that this great Father was not a theologian in the stricter sense as well. No man plunged deeper into the mysteries of the divine nature in his discussions of the Trinity.”

On this point, the perception of the First Europe and Second Europe regarding Augustine’s significance is the same. Only the assessments of
that significance differ. For Orr and the Second Europe, Augustine is the “father of the fathers” and his trinitarian theology the clearest statement of Church doctrine. For the First Europe, however, Augustine is the “most error-prone” of the fathers, and his trinitarian theology the clearest evidence of that fact.

Nor is the ambiguity of this legacy a phenomenon that results only when juxtaposing First and Second European assessments of it. It exists within the Second Europe taken alone. To the relatively conservative Orr one might, for example, append the liberal Protestant theologian Paul Tillich for whom (being himself something of a Neoplatonist) Augustine is “the foundation of everything the West has to say.” And this ambiguity is intensified if one juxtaposes conservative and liberal Protestant remarks with the Roman Catholic reception of the same father. Agostino Trape, the author of the section on Augustine in Johannes Quasten’s celebrated Patrology, is even less restrained in his description of the continued influence of Augustine; he is “undoubtedly the greatest of the Fathers and one of the great geniuses of humanity, whose influence of posterity has been continuous and profound.” Here, in these remarks, we already encounter one of the themes that will linger throughout the remaining pages of these essays, that of Augustine as the “greatest of the Fathers.” Why he should be so evaluated by so many historians of doctrine in the Second Europe will become evident as we pursue the deep and lasting – and deleterious – influences of his dialectical formulation of trinitarian theology throughout the history of the Second Europe. Indeed, without that dialectical formulation, there would be no Second Europe.

The essence of this formulation and its influence on the Second Europe lies precisely in the deliberate synthesis of theology and philosophy, combined in Augustine with the new element of an explicit starting point in his own personal experience. It was he who “created in the Christian milieu the first great philosophical synthesis, which remains an essential component of Western thought. Departing from the evidence
of his knowledge of himself, he expounded on the themes of being, of truth, and of love, and contributed much to the understanding of the problems of the search for God..." Inevitable, this invites comparison with Origen, a comparison that, as the examination proceeds, will become ever more apparent. But notably, the ultimate difference between the two is that Augustine’s synthesis endures: “That which Origen was for theological science in the third and fourth centuries, Augustine has been in a more lasting and affective manner for the entire life of the church in the succeeding centuries down to the present time." Ignoring for the moment the implication that “the church” is here defined as the “Church of the Second Europe” – for the First Europe deliberately came to reject the Augustinian Hellenization just as she had the Origenistic – these almost ecstatic passages are not to be dismissed lightly, for they serve to highlight the measure of Augustine’s effect on the historiography and general cultural perceptions and assumptions of the Second Europe.

Nor should the purpled prose divert our attention from certain commonly accepted evaluations of Augustine’s legacy that function almost as unexamined axioms of the Second Europe’s establishments of itself as the canon of Christmas civilization:

1. Augustine is the “greatest of the fathers”;
2. His legacy to the Second Europe was a synthesis of philosophy and theology that was more permanent that Origen’s; and
3. that synthesis effected all aspects of doctrine of ecclesiastical, and of cultural life in the Second Europe.

And these observations entail even more implications:

1. Augustine effects the exposition of theology and theological method to such an extent that he becomes almost synonymous with the subsequent Latin theology;
2. This development is reflected in the historiographical
phenomenon that subsequent Second European authors perceive a “change in direction”, from the continuity of Christianity in the East to the continuity of Christianity in the West. In other words, the theological “horizon”, for a reason inherent in Augustine’s theology itself, has been foreshortened and now excludes, rather than includes, Eastern developments; this too is perhaps also a function of his being the “greatest of the Fathers”;

(3) Something in Augustine is nevertheless very “new”, that newness lying in part, as we shall see, with his peculiar and very tight blending of Neoplatonic and Christian elements;

(4) This blending is, however, likewise the more ambiguous for that fact, to such an extent that it is difficult to distinguish between the philosophical and the strictly Christian elements of his system;

(5) By dint of the identification of his peculiar theological formulations with the theology of the Church as a whole, Augustine is not only the “greatest of the Fathers” but the measure of the Orthodoxy of other fathers, with all the massive historiographical consequences that this entails;

(6) The “newness” of Augustine’s theological exposition also constitutes a genuine novelty. With this, one senses the emergence of an unwritten, but nevertheless real, historiographical assumption: one progresses from Christ, to the Apostles, to Augustine, with a confusing and barely comprehensive “Greek interlude” in between. With this foreshortening of the theological horizon, which this ninety degree change of direction and turn to the left, Augustine is erected into the canon of patristic orthodoxy. And as such, his name is therefore inevitably linked to that concept of doctrinal
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development, or real novelty not only in formulation of doctrine, but in the formulation of new doctrines. With him, in other words, the notion of “theological progress” changes profoundly.

Thus, in our exposition of Augustine’s theology in general, and of his Trinitarian and predestinarian theology in particular, the assessments of these Second European historians shall be the signposts along the way. We shall seek to say nothing the Second Europe has not already said of itself. It is only in the juxtaposition of those statements within the already emergent context of the First Europe, however, that the true, and tragic, implications of those assessments will emerge.

2. A Note of the Term “Augustinism”

In the next chapter, we shall come to certain conclusions regarding the intrusion of the Carolingian Frankish theologians into the process of the formulation of Church dogma. But these must be anticipated here, since they govern the presentation of material in this chapter. These are:

(1) It is difficult to distinguish between the Carolingians’ imperialism and their genuine theological convictions; indeed, the former is often a function of the latter and vice versa;

(2) The acceptance of the filioque doctrine – the doctrine that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son in eternity – was the acceptance of an entirely different method of doing theology:

(a) it was the acceptance of a different, and inverted, ordo theologiae;

(b) it was the acceptance of the validity of dialectical methods and expositions of theological doctrines;
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(c) as such, it was the acceptance of a particular way of relating the pivotal concepts of faith and reason, of theology and philosophy or of revelation and reason;

(d) it was, accordingly, the acceptance of a different method of the exegesis and interpretation of crucial passages of Scripture, a method which made full use of the Gnostic tactics and techniques of textual revision;

(e) but since this method of exegesis was at odds with the received doctrine of the Church, it inevitable meant that Augustinism was the acceptance of a different understanding of the “consequences of the fathers” or consensus patrum. Or, to put it in perhaps a better fashion, it was the reception of that consensus, but a reception increasingly filtered through the prism of the previous considerations. This is to say that it is the acceptance of the distorted, mediated, and mitigated consensus.

In this and the next chapter, it will be demonstrated that one result of this mediated, distorted, mitigated consensus – a consensus read now through Augustinian and Hellenizing spectacles – is the opening of the chasm between the Faith of the Church, and its doctrinal expression. This may be illustrated by pointing out an obvious pastoral consideration those who use the filioque in their creeds are not un-trinitarian in their faith and devotion, but the doctrinal expression itself is un-trinitarian. Theology with Augustine began to divorce itself from liturgical life and faith of the Church, and to seek its roots elsewhere: in “science”, i.e., in philosophical constructions and not liturgical confessions of theological doctrine.

From these considerations, a further questions arises: if one local church, in this case the Carolingian, can accept as a dogma of the Faith of the Whole Church the systematic speculations of one father which, as the case is, are dogmatically erroneous, and then justify this position on the
basis of “clarifying a previously obscure point”, then what is to prevent one from seeking to rehabilitate individuals not received as fathers of the Church? If one can accept Augustine, why not Origen?

In short, to accept the filioque is to accept the thesis of the correctness of the dogmatic development in general, and of the Second Europe’s development in particular. To accept it is to canonize the “change in direction” and correctness of dogmatic development in particular. To accept it is to canonize the “change in direction” and foreshortening theological horizons spoken of previously. To accept it is to accept the canonization of the Second Europe as the measure of Christian civilization. This is the ultimate, and central, doctrinal issue in the history of Christian doctrine.

Thus, the term “Augustinian” here indicated that whole complex of problems and issues associated with and deriving from the filioque and its implications as they played themselves out with dialectical inevitability in the history of the Second Europe. To say that the Second Europe is “Augustinian” in this sense is to say that it is neither completely pagan nor completely Christian, but it is to say, once the filioque was accepted by it, that it is neither Orthodox nor Catholic in any sense. To say that the Second Europe is Augustinian is also to assign an explanation for the increasing paganism of its culture, and the inability of that culture to determine the ultimate roots of its crisis; it cannot see the problem unless it steps outside of itself to see that the problem is itself. Likewise, to call the Second Europe “Augustinian” is to acknowledge that the system is bigger than the man in a certain sense, and therefore that the man is not to be blamed for the fact that others worked out implications of his system that he most certainly would never have approved.
3. The Neoplatonic Basis of Augustinian Triadology

In criticizing his theology, we are in fact providing the critique he himself called for, in the beginning of his *De Trinitate*:

I will not be ashamed to learn if I find myself in error. Therefore... let him continue along with me, whoever with me is certain; let him search with me, whoever shares my doubts; let him turn to me, whoever acknowledges his own error; let him rebuke me; whoever perceives my own.  

Like the Apologists before him, St. Augustine sought the common ground between philosophy and Christianity, and like them, he believed that he found it in Platonism, and more particularly, specifically in the Neoplatonic definition of the simplicity of the One.  It is this definition which he appropriates, unreconstructed, as an adequate definition of the divine essence of the Christian Trinity. Thus, Augustine’s synthesis is rooted in his doctrine of God and consequently his entire theological synthesis must be approached from that vantage point and not, as Orr and others in the Second Europe maintain, from the standpoint of his doctrine of sin, grace, and his theological anthropology.

In taking this step, however, Augustine had done something of which he was probably no less aware of the drastic consequences than were the Apologists or Origen. It is an inadvertent and innocent step, done for the commendably pious reasons. Nonetheless, as the Roman Catholic philosopher and mediaevalist Etienne Gilson observed, Augustine had in fact made his “philosophical first principle one... with his religious first principle to such an extent that even his notion of “divine being remained Greek”, which is to say it remained ultimately pagan.

Let us recall for a moment exactly what simplicity meant for Plotinus and Origen. Since the Greek Fathers as well used the term “simplicity”, it is important to recall that they did not use it in its Neoplatonic
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sense. They therefore did not draw the same set of deductions from it as did Origen and the Neoplatonists. But for Plotinus, simplicity meant the absolute metaphysical identity of the categories of essence, will, and activity, such that the One willed what the One does what the One is what It wills. Thus, there could be no real operation of the One outside (ad extra) of Itself. For Origen, this set of implications reproduced itself in his famous Problematic: As God cannot be Father apart from having a Son (Essence), so God could not be Almighty without having Creatures over whom to exercise His power (operation) Thus, Origen could speak of the Son being the product of the Father’s will, and ultimately could speak of God the Father as “first God”, or God the Son as “second god” or of God the Holy Spirit as “third god”, since He derived from the first two. In this, Origen merely took the simplicity to a new conclusion, for in this the Father’s personal characteristic (υποστατικη ιδιοτης) – ingenerate cause – is not distinct from the divine essence because it defines the define essence. And from this, Arius could and did argue that the Son was therefore not the same identical essence with the Father since He was not ingenerate cause.

Consequently, if Augustine is operating with the specifically Neoplatonic conception of the simplicity of the divine essence, then one should expect to discover similar metaphysical identifications of the categories of Persons, Operations, and Essence, with the duplication of heretical structures similar in form to those of the East, to occur.
This is indeed, and tragically, what happens.

4. The Dialectical Imperatives of the Augustinian Formulation of Triadology

a. The Divine Essence as Simple and Intelligible.
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The effect of the simplicity in Plotinus’ system was such to compel unity to transcend multiplicity, for simplicity to transcend distinction. A parallel structure occurs in Augustine’s exposition of Trinitarian doctrine, as the divine essence – as unity and simplicity – begins to transcend the “divine multiplicity” – the attributes and persons – in the order of the exposition of the doctrine. There are three implications of this step.

(1) The unity of God begins to be seen in increasingly abstract and philosophical terms, which, by focusing on the essence as something prior in exposition to the attributes and persons, is an increasingly impersonal unity. The essential unity of the godhead begins, in other words, to be conceived apart from the Monarchy of the Father precisely because this new inverted ordo theologiae allows it to be conceived this way, and this inspite of St. Augustine’s own firm affirmation of the Monarchy of the Father: “The Father is the beginning (principium) of the whole divinity.”

(2) The attributes and persons, as multiplicities, are accorded the same logical status vis-à-vis the simplicity, and thus, they are vis-à-vis the simplicity accorded the same logical status as each other. Augustine puts in this way:

He is called in respect to Himself both God, and great, and good, and just, and anything else of the kind; and just as to Him to be is the same as to be God, or as to be great, or as to be good, so it is the same thing to Him to be as to be a person.”

He carries this logic much further, however, when he says: “Since the three together are one God, why not also one person…” And as if this were not enough, he uses the phrase “the person of that Trinity” in a context where no question is involved.
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(3) Once simplicity has been adopted as the definition of the divine essence, the dialectic of oppositions which accompanied it in the Neoplatonic system also appears in the new order of exposition of categories: essence, attributes, persons, for the opposition is between unity (essence) and multiplicity (attributes and persons). This order is adopted in order to demonstrate what for Augustine is an inevitable consequence of the simplicity: the essence of God is the same thing as His existence, or as any other attribute, including that special kind of attribute called Person.

These points prompt a further observation, for with them one stands chin to chin with the first long term implication of the Augustinian ordo theologiae: since the essence of God has been defined by an essentially dialectical definition, the essence of God has now been rendered intelligible. Moreover, this intelligibility is of a certain character. Since the simplicity means “the abyss of everything specific”, or rather, the absolute identification of categories, then God’s essence, existence, attributes, and persons are all ultimately identical. Thus, if one “proves the existence of God”, one proves everything else that can be said about Him as well. The whole scholastic enterprise of natural theology is thus one implication of the original definition.\[468a\]

b. The Attributes as Mutually Identical

But does St. Augustine in fact mean that these categories are absolutely and metaphysically identical? If indeed he does, then certain metaphysical affirmations will have to be made: i.e., that each attribute is the same as any other attribute absolutely, and that this identification can only be exhibited by a syllogistic treatment of them.

This is in fact what occurs. “The Godhead,” writes Augustine, “is
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absolutely simple essence, and therefore to be is then the same as to be wise.469 The Jesuit Eugene Portalie takes the statement to mean that “our ideas of the divine attributes are not formally distinct, but mutually compenertate each other.”470 In the very apt words of liberal Protestant Paul Tillich, the simplicity is “the abyss of everything specific.”471 But Augustine himself is even more forceful and direct than this: “In regard to the essence of truth, to be true is the same as to be and to be is the same as to be great… therefore, to be great is the same as to be true.”472 “A” equals “B” and “B” equals “C”, ergo “A” equals “C”. With this, Augustine’s Neoplatonic understanding and use of the term “simplicity” is finally manifest. And with it is manifest another disturbing implication that will have its own long term effects, for the attributes of God have been reduced to conventions of human language; each distinct attribute’s “name” no longer stands for a distinct reality or operation in God, but now all names stand the same underlying reality. This is the womb which will spawn the subsequent Mediæval disputes between nominalism and realism, not to mention the Second Europe’s strong reaction against the teaching of the First Europe’s St. Gregory Palamas, for whom the energies were distinct and uncreated. Language, in short, has undergone the same “leveling” of meaning that was associated with Gnosticism, which is the surest indicator that more Gnostic transformations of meaning will be in that more Gnostic transformations of meaning to apply the full store for the Second Europe as it learns to apply the full battery of Gnostic techniques on various traditional writings in order to justify its new basis and order of theology.

But there is yet another long term implication of this identification of the attributes among themselves, that of the identification of Theology and Economy in a manner similar to what happened in the thought of the Apologists and Origen, for just as it became impossible in Origen to separate the eternal characteristic of the Father in begetting the Son from the eternal creation of the World by His will, so in Augustine this
identification means that Will and Essence cannot, ultimately, be distinguished. This paradigm is reproduced almost exactly by Thomas Aquinas centuries, later, who entitles two articles in his *Summa Contra Gentiles* by the propositions “God’s will is not other than His essence” and “the principal object of the divine will is the divine essence”\(^4\) And this identification of attributes with essence and with each other also produces the most famous Augustinian example of the blurring of Theology and economy; predestination.\(^4\) Since the attributes, by dint of their simplicity and identity with the essence are absolutely the same thing, then, to quote him once more, “to predestine is the same as to foreknow.”\(^5\) What God foreknows, He predestines, and what He predestines, He foreknows. From this it is a simple matter to deduce the consequence of double predestinations (as did Gottschalk in the ninth, and the extreme Calvinists in the seventeenth centuries), for if God foreknows sin, He must also predestine it, *if* He is to remain simple essentially. Thus, the Medæval natural theology, and the entire Second European preoccupation with the problem of predestination stem from one and the same basis: *Augustine’s doctrine of God’s essence as simple and intelligible.*

Now the question inevitably changes. Once the fact of the essential simplicity with all these massive implications has been established, then what exactly is the status of the attributes and persons *vis-à-vis* each other? This question may seem obvious in the light of the foregoing, and its conclusion inevitable: there is no logical or real metaphysical distinction. But Augustine the Orthodox Christian cannot come to this conclusion without formally abandoning his faith. Therefore, he seeks a solution which preserves, in his mind, the real distinction of Persons, but one which, ultimately, only serves to disguise the logical implication of his system, but not to alter it. Accordingly, in order to understand his solution, and how it could disguise its hidden but still ultimately Sabellian basis, we need to proceed more slowly.

Augustine states that “to God is is not one thing to be, another to
be a person, but it is absolutely the same thing... It is the same thing to Him to be as to be a person.\textsuperscript{476} As Portalie puts it, “God” for St. Augustine “did not mean directly (the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit), but the more general notion of the godhead, conceived concretely and personally, no doubt, (but) not as any one person in particular.\textsuperscript{477} He goes on to observe that there is a real tension here that is not resolved by Augustine, because it can be argued that, at this point, one could conceive of, and know, God in all the fullness of His (or Its?) attributes “independently of the three persons.\textsuperscript{478} Thus, the origin of the Trinity is really no longer the Monarchy of the Father, but the simplicity and its accompanying dialectics of oppositions.\textsuperscript{479}

The effect of the simplicity on Augustine’s doctrine has thus effected a revolutionary – in every sense of the word – inversion of that patristic \textit{ordo theologiae}. This Portalie states very succinctly:

All the ancient creed, even those in vogue at the time of Augustine and in use by him at Milan and in Africa, are drawn up according to the old idea beginning with faith in One God who is the Father. But the (Quicumque Vult) based on Augustinian inspiration, opens by professing faith in the godhead common to the Three Persons.\textsuperscript{480}

In other words, the divine essence, by standing behind and ontologically prior to the persons, is that which binds the attributes, including the persons, together. Augustine states it this way: “The divinity (or to express it more precisely) the Godhead itself... is the unity of the Trinity,\textsuperscript{481} a formula which Hincmar of Rheims in the ninth century would make even more explicit: “the unity of the Trinity is the “incorporeal deity.\textsuperscript{482} Taken in and of themselves, divorced from their context in the Neoplatonic structure of Augustine’s exposition of the doctrine, these are not altogether different from expressions one might encounter in the Cappadocians. But cast within that new inverted \textit{ordo theologiae} of essence, attributes, and persons, these statements cast a very ominous shadow. Indeed, we would
do well here to recall the solemn warning of St. Basil of Caesaria that such an order of theology subordinates the divine revelation of the Trinity to Something Else.

In his fifty-second epistle, Basil indicated that the original difficulty with the “consubstantial” or *homoousios* formula of Nicæa was precisely the understanding of some that it set forth a “crypto-Augustinian” order of theology which began at an abstracted divine essence:

so that the essence, when divided, confers the title of co-essential on the parts into which it is divided. This explanation has some reason in the case of bronze and coins made there from, but in the case of God the Father and God the Son there is no question of substance anterior or even underlying both; the mere thought and utterance of such a thing is the last extravagance of impiety. What can conceived of as prior to the Unbegotten. 483

As was seen in Part One, the *homoousios* was the result of the Monarchy of the Father in causing the Son; it was not the starting point for the exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity. By the same token, the term “godhead” itself (θεοιηζ) therefore connoted, in the patristic *ordo theologiae*, a Personal locus and origin. But in the citations from Augustine and Hincmar above, it will be observed that the term has been shorn of all personal references and reduced to that abstract and impersonal hydra that so many moderns find objectionable. 484 From St. Basil’s remarks, and indeed, from the patristic *ordo theologiae* itself is a crucial component to true doctrine since it abandonment in every case produced heresy.

1. **The Persons as Relations of Dialectical Opposition**

The question for Augustine thus became more acute and urgent: How to maintain the real distinction of Persons in the face of a simplicity which has already effectively nullified the real distinctions of attributes?

Augustine’s solution to this question is brilliant, novel, and
unfortunately, problematical.

We have seen that for the other attributes, there is an absolute essential identity between them. But for the three Persons, their status as such means that they are attributes of a special kind, since they are not absolutely identical (that, of course, would be heretical), nor can they absolutely distinct (that, of course, would nullify the simplicity). Thus the names “Father, Son, and Holy Spirit” are relative terms, “used reciprocally and in relation to each other.” Augustine thus “saves” the absolute character of the distinction of Persons by making it relative.

2. The Category of Attributes and the Procession of the Spirit from the Son in Eternity

Now we must digress for a moment.

A glance as Western, Second European systematic theologies – by they Roman Catholic, Anglican, or even “Dallas Dispensationalist” – will show a great deal of overall similarity in the methodological exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity. That ordo theologiae is, as has been seen, (1) essence, (2) attributes, and (3) persons. The persons come not, first, as they did for the traditional patristic ordo, but last. This is a revolution in the most classic sense, and it is intimately related to, indeed cannot be separated from, Augustine’s derivation of the procession of the Holy Spirit “from the Father and the Son” (a Patre Filioque) by dialectical considerations of the attributes.

When St. Augustine wrote his De Trinitate, he may have done so in part in an effort to combat Arianism. Certainly the Council of Toledo later took him in that fashion, advancing Augustinian arguments for the filioque as being anti-Arian in nature. But is filioque in fact an adequate safeguard against Arianism? We have already seen that the Arians defined “deity” by confusing the hypostatic characteristic of the Father – ingenerate causation – with the divine essence itself. They thus defined the indefinable divine essence by identifying it with the Father’s Monarchy; the
two were one and the same. Thus, they could deny that Christ was fully God because He did not cause but was caused. To this Athanasius responded, we saw, by going to the root of the heresy: the definition of the divine essence by its confusion with the Father’s Monarchy. If that were so, he indicated, then, yes, if the Son were to be God in such a system, he would have to cause yet a third equally divine Person (the Spirit), and in turn, the Spirit to be equally God would have to cause a fourth, and so on until the whole system ended in polytheism and an infinitude of caused and causing persons.

But it is exactly this course which Augustine pursues: “As the Father had life Himself, so hath He given to the Son to have life in Himself, so hath He given to the Son to have life himself.”486 Because of this, one should, he says,

Understand that as the Father has in Himself that the Holy Spirit should proceed from Him, so He has given to the Son that the same Spirit should proceed from Him (the Son), and both apart from time. For if the Son has of the Father whatever He (the Father) has, then certainly He has of the Father that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from Him.487

The phrase “and both apart from time” indicates very clearly that Augustine is not referring to a mere sending of the Spirit from or through the Son in respect of economy or time. This is a clear confession of a procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son in eternity, in Theology.

But what is unique in this structure is the new turn in the ordo theologiae: the subordination of the category of Persons to that of attributes, for the Son has received His causation of the Spirit from the Father not on the basis of a direct deduction from the simplicity of their essence, but mediately, on the basis of their common interchangeable attribute of “life in itself”. The reason for this step is, I believe, rather obvious, for had Augustine argued immediately from the simple essence
to the double procession, he would have ended with no persons at all. It is therefore this "middle" step, unnecessary from the logical point of view, but quite necessary to faith, which obscures the problem and disguises its problematical nature.

Consequently, there are two subordinationalist structures present in the Augustinian theology. The first, at the purely formal and structural level, is that of the Augustinian *ordo theologiae* itself: essence, attributes, and persons. But at the lowest level of categorical discourse, the Persons themselves, there is a recast of the structure found in Eunomianism, for at this level, the Holy Spirit is seen to proceed from an Uncaused Cause, The Father, and a Cause Cause, the Son, not only in a manner identical to the Plotinian One, Nous, and World Soul, but also because the son derived His Causation of the Spirit from the Father through an attribute which both shared, "life in itself."

But is Augustine, the "greatest of the fathers" and the "clearest thinker on the doctrine of the Trinity" really this confused? Indeed, and unfortunately, yes:

> For we cannot say that the Holy Spirit is not life, while the Father is life, and the Son is life: and hence as the Father... has life in Himself; so He has given to Him (the Son) that life should proceed from Him, as it also proceeds from Himself. 488

Hence, not only has the unique personal distinction of the Father been exchanged with the Son on the basis of the common attribute of life, but that attribute which proceeds from the Father and the Son turns out to be the Holy Spirit! So it is precisely the Holy Spirit who turns out to be the attribute common both to the Father and to the Son. Consequently, a Person has been identified with an attribute of all three Persons. What is natural is now personal, and what is personal is now natural, and the distinction of person, operation, and nature has entirely broken down. This, of course, is classical Sabellianism.
This whole process of sublime, if not confusing, dialectics seems to defeat itself at every turn. Having made the Spirit proceed from the Father and the Son, because the Father and the Son share common attributes since the essence is simple, the Spirit then becomes an attribute, He defines the essence, and indeed, is the essence, the new locus of unity in the Trinity. But does Augustine trace out the logic of his system to this drastic extent? Indeed he does:

Because both the Father is a spirit and the Son is a spirit, and because the Father is holy and the Son is holy, therefore... since the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God, and certainly God is Holy, and God is a spirit, the Trinity can be called also the Holy Spirit.  

Thus, since the Spirit defines attributes suitable to the father and the Son, He replaces the Father as the new personal locus of unity in the Trinity, and is thus the Hegelian “synthesis” to the Father’s “thesis” and the Son’s “antithesis”, or, in Augustine’s own words, because He is the “substantial and consubstantial love of both.”  And this, of course, the in penultimate statement of a dialectical vision of God, for now the Persons are not distinguished by relations of origin, but of opposition, according to the celebrated diagram:
5. The Analogies of the Trinity in the Faculties of the Soul

St. Augustine has the most extensive exposition of the analogies of the Trinity, which is reproduced in the Jesuit Eugene Portalie’s classic study, *A Guide to the Thought of St. Augustine*. The three Persons, now understood as dialectical processes of creation and of the individual soul (only the more clear examples of the dialectical structure are reproduced here):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FATHER</th>
<th>SON</th>
<th>HOLY SPIRIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**A. Creatures in General**

- Cause of Being
- Cause of Kind of Being
- Cause of Goodness
- Source of Things
- Distinction
- Harmony
- Beings
- Knowing
- Willing

**B. In the Sensitive part of Man**

- Object Seen: Faculty of Vision
- Attention of Mind
- Memory: Internal Vision
- Will

**C. In the Spiritual Soul**

- Mind: Knowledge
- Love
- Memory: Understanding
- Will

From this table, certain observations are in order in the context of the
foregoing discussion. First, it will be noted that, in terms of the analogies, each Person is defined as a type of causation, which is what one would expect given the internal dialectical mechanisms of the derivation of the *filioque* itself. Secondly, this dialectic receives almost classical Hegelian expression in the analogy of “Source of Things (the Father)" “distinction" (the Son), and “Harmony" (the Holy Spirit). Thirdly, note that each person is also analogous to certain attributes of nature: being, understanding, and willing (or the analogy of the sensitive and spiritual soul), which indicates that the confusion of person and nature operates at a profoundly deep level in Augustinian theology.

A further point must be made. For Augustine, while there are indeed analogies of the Trinity that one may find within creation or the individual soul, he nevertheless does not start his speculation from that point, but rather presupposes Trinitarian faith as the basis for discovering analogies. However, the clear implication of the inversion of the *ordo theologiae* and its initial identification of The One and The Being of Neoplatonism (τὸ εὖ, τὸ οὖ) with He Who Is (ο ἐις, ο ὦν) of revelation makes the natural theology of later Second European scholasticism inevitable. Thus, with Bonventura’s *The Mind’s Road to God*, one finds the order reversed as the full implications of the system are explored: beginning with the simple analogies, one rises to the Simple God.492

A comparison to the non-Augustinian fathers is also in order. In Cappadocian thought, for example, the Trinitarian analogies are “social" analogies, not “psychological" analogies, i.e., there is no possibility of exhibiting an analogy to the Trinity within the soul of one individual person, but only and ultimately in the fact that man himself is an analogy or “image" of God precisely because mankind is many persons in one nature. Augustinism, in the classical Platonic turn (περιαγωγη) bids one go within oneself, in a flight of the alone to the Alone.493 But the Cappadocians bid one go outward, outside oneself, to the multitude of persons in one nature.

Of course, there are hazards in any system of analogies if used as
The Dialectical God of Augustinism

starting points for theology, and both Augustine and the rest of the fathers are the first to admit this. One could argue, as did the Gnostics for example, that because mankind is both male and female, that God has maleness and femaleness. But there is an important dogmatic connection between the Augustinian filioque, its beginning with the definition of a simple, abstract and impersonal essence, and modern “feminist” calls for a “reconstruction” of the “patriarchal God” of Christianity. Indeed, such calls occur only on the fertile soil already tilled and sown by Augustinism, for the system itself has already accomplished that destruction, for by destroying the Monarchy of the Father, the “Patri-archy” or Father-source of the Unity of the Trinity, the essence itself, as we have seen, becomes the seat of that unity, a unity which is now abstract and impersonal.493a

6. Augustinism at a Glance: An Outline of Its Theology and Implications

The following outline sets forth the Augustinian system of triadology and its implications, many of which would only be explored centuries later. But it is necessary to include it here, in order that the relationship between it and subsequent expositions will be clear, and in order to summarize as succinctly as possible the full and sweeping nature of the implications of the filioque doctrine and its devastating effects in the Christian West.

I. Essence

A. The Divine Essence is Simple (απλως) by Definition. If it is simple by definition, it is also:

1. defineable, and therefore, intelligible.

2. defined in terms of an unreconstructed pagan philosophical
God, History, and Dialectic

category; philosophy becomes the "handmaiden", or actually, the mistess, of theology.

a. In this, Augustine has, life Origen or St. Gregory of Nyssa, made use of the "gold of the Egyptians," but unlike them, he does not indicate the idolatrous use to which the ancient Hebrews put it, and himself ends up with a doctrine of God at root ultimately pagan.

b. Since God's intelligibility has been construed in terms of an unreconstructed worldly philosophical principle, there is:

(1) one philosophical way of knowing both God and the world, i.e., dialectic, which leads to

(2) a reduction of words to one level of meaning, and

(3) the misinterpretation of the occurrence of philosophical words in theology as intended to convey the philosophical concepts of the systems from which they are borrowed;

(a) St. Dionysius the Areopagite will be misinterpreted by the Christian West as Neoplatonist in Christian guise;

(b) the phenomenon of "Hellenization", which is peculiar to the Second Europe, will be universalized, and the First Europe will be misinterpreted by the Second, but the First Europe, which has gone through and rejected the process, will be able to interpret the Second Europe correctly;

(4) the reduction of the Holy Scriptures to "propositional revelation about God" and the necessary Gnostic reinterpretation of them;

(5) the necessity to change theological formulations every time the prevailing philosophical fashion of "the world" of Aristotle in the twelfth century, or the collapse of the possibility of
The Dialectical God of Augustinism

such formulation on account of the alleged “plurality” of philosophical systems current in the worlds, as in the twentieth century.496

3. defined in terms of the identity of the impersonal, neuter “The One” and “That Which is” (τὸ ἐν, τὸ οὖν) with the masculine and personal “The One Who” and “The One Who Is” (ὁ ἐκζ., ὁ ὦν)

4. the essence will be equivalent to the attributes both severally and individually;
   a. the simplicity and impersonality of ultimate reality implies the “nominalist” construction of all language of multiplicity used of God, which establishes in a new guise the leveling of meaning and the univocal correspondence of such terms;

5. the essence will be equivalent to the attributes both severally and individually;

6. the simplicity of the divine essence transcends the multiplicity of the divine pluralities as unity transcends multiplicity, from which several things follow:

II. Attributes:

A. Structurally, the attributes are subordinate to the essence in the exposition of the doctrine, but

B. The attributes have the same ontological status and identity with the essence, and therefore

C. The divine attributes are identical to each other and wholly indistinguishable. From this, certain results inevitably follow:
   1. The will of God is the same as the essence of God, which in turns means;
      a. The will of God is the same as the Object of the Will of God,496a which duplicates the Origenist Problematic in the mediaeval disputes over the operations of God outside Himself (ad extra);
b. There is no distinction between Theology and Economy, which means;

2. to predestine is to foreknow, and to foreknow is to predestine, which means;

a. God predestines some to sin because He foreknows their sins;\textsuperscript{497}

III. Persons: At this lowest level of discourse, the Persons are subordinated to the attributes because:

A. Christ is subordinate to an overarching theory of predestination which considers the attribute operative prior to, and apart from, the Persons, or, in Augustine’s words, Christ is the most “illustrious example” or our predestination, i.e., of a general phenomenon;\textsuperscript{498} which leads to:

1. The “supra-“ and “infra-lapsarian” debates as to whether the abstract “God” predestines on the basis of foreknowledge or prior to it, which is a debate over the ordo theologiae, establishing a new problem;\textsuperscript{499}

a. which attributes are primary (prior), and which are secondary (posterior)?\textsuperscript{500}

b. The subordination of the Church and Her sacramental mysteries to the theory of predestinations; which leads to

(1) The disputes with Donatism which compromises the note of the Church’s holiness on account of the confusion of personal holiness with the Church’s nature, which is Christ’s body;\textsuperscript{500a}

(2) The disputes with Pelagianism, in which Augustine came to the same position via the theory of predestination;\textsuperscript{500b}

2. The Limited Atonement, i.e., the doctrine that Christ’s death is efficacious only for those who have received prior predestination,\textsuperscript{501} which in turn is:
The Dialectical God of Augustinism

a. a confusion of person and nature since Christ’s humanity, consubstantial with all men, has been redefined as the sum total of all the elect,\textsuperscript{502} which leads to:

(1) massive application of Gnostic tactics of pseudomorphosis in key scriptural texts;\textsuperscript{503}

(2) confusion of person and nature, since in order to redefine the efficacy of His humanity as limited to the elect, one defines it by the sum total of those elect;\textsuperscript{503a}

3. Spanish adoptionism, which maintains that since Christ is “the most illustrious example of our predestination in that it is by grace”\textsuperscript{504} that His humanity is \textit{adopted} to be the Son of God by grace, whereas His deity is Son of God by nature,\textsuperscript{505} which in turn is Nestorianism, which is based upon:

4. Original guilt, which confuses person and nature by maintaining that Adam’s evil personal misuse of the natural human will transmits his culpability to the human nature;\textsuperscript{506} and thus maintains that Christ’s humanity is post-lapsarian because its will “lusts in opposition to the spirit;”\textsuperscript{507}

B. The attributes \textit{of} God are causes of the Persons which derive \textit{from} God, or, to put it differently, a new Gnostic tactic of supplying new meanings for old terms is discovered in the “of=from” argument for the \textit{filioque}.

1. The Spirit “of Life” proceeds “from” the Father and the Son because they share the common attribute “of” Life, and because the Father’s personal property of causation has been given to the Son on that basis, a structure of a category of attribute between one of the three Persons. And within this new level of discourse, yet a final form of subordinationalist structure, occurs, because:

   a. The Father has no distinctions, and it the Uncaused Cause;
b. the Son has one distinction, being the Cause Cause;

   (1) In this, one may discern the “middle step of two” explicitly prohibited by the Cappadocians;

c. and the Holy Spirit has Two distinctions, being caused by two different types of causes.

2. The Holy Spirit becomes the new personal Locus of Unity – the consubstantial love of both Father and Son – in the Trinity, replacing the Father, because

   a. The name “Holy Spirit” defines the divine essence by two of its attributes, holiness, and spirit, and therefore because

   b. His name is capable therefore of signifying the entire Trinity. With this step, to cite Aquinas, the whole “cycle concludes” because it has returned “to the very substance from which the proceeding began.”\textsuperscript{508}

C. Since the Trinity is conceived in dialectical terms, the Persons then become less important than the relations of oppositions between them,\textsuperscript{509} and thus, all apparent contradictions in texts, including those of Augustine, must be resolved dialectically.\textsuperscript{509a}

\textbf{7. The Gnostic Historiographic Imperative: The Reinterpretation of Texts and the Canonization of Augustine as the Canonization of the Second Europe.}

This outline is illuminating, for it serves to indicate that the gradual adoption of Augustinism in general by the Western Church is a function of its gradual adoption of the \textit{filioque} in particular. One set of implications cannot be gotten rid of without getting rid of the other. The problems of predestination and free-will or of nature and grace or of “symbolic” versus “realistic” views of the Eucharist cannot be resolved by the Second Europe
The Dialectical God of Augustinism

so long as it retains the source from which they spring: the erroneous casting of the doctrine of God. Thus, from its first canonical section in the local synods of the Spanish Church to its final adoption by the Papacy in the year 1014 – the year of the first real irrevocable break with the First Europe – this new doctrine carried with it sweeping implications for the culture of the Second Europe, not the least of which was the surrender of its cultural autonomy from the world by the adoption of the Neoplatonic definition of simplicity as the definition of the essence of Christian Trinity. These implications became cultural imperatives or enormous and costly consequences.

The most notable of these, we shall discover, was at least the tacit admission that the doctrine was at least a novelty; it has, as the West knew, never been explicitly taught by any earlier source of unimpeachable orthodoxy. The best, then, that could be hoped for, was to demonstrate the earlier fathers’ “anticipations” of the doctrine, an attempt first enunciated by Paulinus of Aquilea, as we shall discover in the next chapter. Furthermore, if only Augustine was the first to formulate this “development” explicitly, then he had perforce to become the measure of the orthodoxy of other fathers. This breathtaking implication carried with it an extraordinary and almost limitless series of logical entailments which, like Augustine’s own “pure futuribles”, worked themselves out in the subsequent history of the Second Europe.

The first of these is one of the pillars of its cultural assumptions: doctrine develops. There is a genuine progress in theological doctrine. Thus the filioque, once adopted by the Second Europe as its doctrine of God, transforms the use of patristic texts for ever after, for they now had to be massively reinterpreted according to the new ordo theologiae which ran directly counter to that manifest in the fathers, and which maintained the loss of the cultural autonomy from Hellenization that each of them had defended. Eventually, of course, this new paradigm of “development of doctrine” would be extended to other theological doctrines, as theology
itself was transformed into a “science” based upon deductive and dialectical principles. And from there, it was a short distance to the notion of the history of all thought, whether theological or not, as one smooth and inevitably progressive march forward. But it is the Augustinian paradigm and ordo which remains central of the effort, for it became the heuristic method and mechanism to discover and explore those "anticipations", and thus, it became the central component of the Second Europe’s mechanism of continuous theological, historiographical, and cultural revisionism. The Second Europe indeed managed, on that basis, to declare and effect its cultural autonomy from the First, but only at the cost of a far more compromising surrender of her own cultural autonomy to “the world” at large.

Even Augustine himself became a victim of this process, as we shall see, for let is ever be remembered that Augustine the man belonged, for all his problematical elements, heart and soul to the First Europe, or rather, to the Church which was and is its foundation. Once the “either-or” dialectic of reduction was applied to his own ambiguous statements, Augustine came to be read in and increasingly “Augustinian manner”, and it became difficult, if not impossible, as the Second Europe worked out the implications of his system in its own history and culture, even for the First Europe to read him in a balanced fashion. Lest this misunderstood, it is best to state clearly what will happen: Augustinism distorts and misunderstands Augustine, for the very nature of the theological derivation of the filioque compels to theological distortion and to the Gnostic and dialectical reinterpretation of all texts. The system Augustine erected in his triadology thus functions in a self-defeating manner at every possible turn, here functioning both to canonize his system as the system of the Church, and yet, simultaneously to demote the person, Augustine himself, and subordinate him in his more Orthodox moments to the implications of his essentialist and dialectical system, yet another implication of the inversion of the ordo theologiae which he himself perfected.
In Augustine’s triadology and its implications, all the tactics and techniques of the Gnostic deconstruction combine, for by defining the divine essence in terms of the unreconstructed conception of Neoplatonic simplicity, the relationship of Faith and Reason takes the deconstructive form of the subordination of Faith to Reason. And this bears with it the inevitable consequence that the received text, and the received interpretation it bore in the “community of faith”, was subordinated to the private and purely dialectical speculations of the individual. Once in place, this principle can be extended across the range of doctrine, such that one can “do Christology”, as we shall see with Anselm, without reference to Christ! Moreover, this dynamic also insured that at some point (and in fact in the twelfth century) that dialectic would emerge as the basic measure of reality (God), and the means of attaining It (the dialectical reconciliation of texts, as with Peter Lombard’s Sentence or Abelard’s Sic et Non). And once this produced confusion, as it inevitably was bound to do, then the only means of maintaining cultural and doctrinal cohesion was externally, by pleading the necessity of the great, and blasphemous, power structure of the papacy.

And of course, once the cultural autonomy of the Church was utterly surrendered in that identification of the One of Plotinus with the one God and Father of the Christians, the lines between what was Christian and what was not became increasingly vague and non-existent. With that, the God-in-general was re-enthroned, and with Him – or better, It – came the imperative to revision on a massive scale. It became possible to speak of a partial knowledge of God based upon a “natural theology” apart from the context-specific revelation of salvation history, its natural home being in the first two steps of the Augustinian ordo theologiae: essence and attributes. One need only talk of the Trinity at the end of the process, or if one be an Augustinized Jew or Muslim such as Moses Maimonides or an Avicenna, dispense with it altogether. The new genus of “philosophical monotheism” will permit, nay, compel a common methodology and...
conceptual content in the first two steps of the *ordo*; after all, “God” is “simple”, and all names used of Him are equivalent to all other names; they mean the same *Thing*. Not for nothing does the modern ecumenical movement take root and grow on the syncretistic ground of the Second Europe.

Eventually, of course, Neoplatonism would be dethroned, and Aristotle put in its place, albeit in modified fashion, by the Second Europe.\(^5\) With this deification of a new philosophical school came yet another enormous consequence which it would take the magnifying power of a telescope to see. But Galileo’s case is still misunderstood by the Second Europe’s scientists, and probably Galileo himself did not fully understand how much a part of the Second Europe he was. For that crisis represented not what happens when “the Church” tried to legislate “science” on the basis of “revelation”, but rather represented what happens when theological and philosophical first principles were wedded in the first place, for no such crisis would have arise had the Second Europe not already surrendered her cultural autonomy to the world. The deification of Aristotle and the problem of Galileo would not have happened with the *filioque*.

But before we can attend to all that, we must first attend a coronation
VIII. THE INCEPTION OF THE TWO EUROPES

A. The Ninth Century Crisis and the Emergency of the Two Europes

1. The First Phase and Its Central Ikon: The Coronation of Charlemagne

A. The Second Europe’s Historiography and Charlemagne’s Geopolitical Ambitions

The scholarly mediævalist Norman Cantor made the following suggestive observation in a book on mediaeval historiography that is replete with intriguing observations.

We have not dealt with the making of the other Middle Ages – primarily Arab, Byzantine, and Jewish. That is the subject of another inquiry. It is my personal prejudice that while these other Mediæval civilizations are of enormous importance not only intrinsically but in respect to their impact on the West, for a variety of reasons, including sheer chance, the magisterial intellectual structures that were created to privilege the European Middle Ages in the twentieth century were largely lacking with respect to the conceptualization of these other Mediæval societies. 513

These remarks are intriguing because they allude to the elevation of the historiographical tradition of the Second Europe to “canonical status”, yet hint that something is amiss that cannot be explained solely by reference to the Second Europe. It is obvious by now that that “something” is theological and ecclesiological in nature, with it roots deep within the theological formulations and perceptions of the First Europe. One may appreciate this fact by the paradox that the Second Europe, when it is
being cognizant of what Professor Cantor calls “the other middle ages”, is far more comfortable with the Jewish and Muslim Middle Ages, and far more prone to discuss them, than it is with the other specifically Christian “Middle Ages” of the First Europe.

And yet, it is the Byzantine Empire and Church which hold the key to the decryption of the central moment in the emergence of the Two Europes, that moment in the ninth century when Augustinism became the basis of the general Frankish culture, and had begun to be drive by, and to drive, the imperial and ecclesiastical pretensions of the Franks, and coming into open conflict with the First Europe’s representative in the West: the Papacy. Without this perspective – which at first glance seems almost ludicrous – all remains obscure at best or unintelligible at worst.

And so we come to the central moment in the history of the Two Europes, that moment at which they begin to diverge and take on definite shape, and to define themselves to some extent by exclusion of each other. We come to that Great Act that lies almost at the exact mid-point between the inception of Christianity on the one hand, and the final collapse of the Christian unity of the Second Europe during the debacle of the Protestant and Roman Catholic Reformations on the other: the coronation of Charlemagne by Pope Leo III on December twenty-fifth in the year 800 A.D. It is an event with an almost typological significance, therefore, because it was so interpreted – or misinterpreted – by the Franks themselves. It is typological in a certain sense that cannot be denied, for it looks back to the Conversion of Constantine I, and forward to Otto III, Friederich II, Henry VIII. Even the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 is foreshadowed in it, for Charlemagne’s ecclesiastico-imperial geopolitics became the first embodiment of the principle that came to dominate the Post-Reformation period: cuius region eius religio, “whose the region, his the religion.”

One may imagine the powerful typological significance that the event held for the Franks, and how it arose: the congregation in the vast
basilica fell silent, anxious to hear the words. The faithful stood on their tip toes to catch a glimpse of The Moment. A man with flowing white hair, vested in Greek Emperor’s coronation dalmatic, bowed his head reverently before the Pope, who stood before him, anointing him and placing a diadem on his head. And then there would have been some Latin spoke: Carolus magnus, rex Francorum et Langobardum tu coronatus et constitutus Imperator Romanorum es, 514 or words to that effect.

But here, at the Act itself, unanimity of interpretation suddenly stops, and two historiographical traditions diverge; and the historiography of the Second Europe, even now, hesitates, uncertain of how to proceed from the apparent contradictions in the historical record that then ensue. For that record informs us that the man who was crowned was shocked and surprised, one might go so far as to say that he was perhaps even angry. And the man who crowned him is apparently neither shocked nor surprised by this reaction. 515 Indeed, we know nothing of the latter’s reaction to the event, except that his subsequent actions seem curiously inconsistent toward his new-found Frankish ally.

The man who was crowned was, of course, Karl der Große, Charlemagne; and the man who crowned him was of course, Leo the third, that most enigmatic and subtle of the enigmatic and subtle mediæval Roman Popes. And in the events that spun forth from that day to the final schism between Rome and Constantinople in 1014-1054, it is Leo III, and not just Charlemagne, whose acts and motivations require the most explanation and interpretation. Clearly the primary source evidence, the testimony of Charlemagne’s contemporary and sympathetic biographer, Einhard the Monk, indicates that something clearly had happened which upset the Frankish King-cum-Emperor. But the daunting question remains: did Leo III know this would be the reaction?

The standard historiographical tradition of the Second Europe looks at all of this and offers an explanation which runs more or less as follows:
both Leo and Charlemagne previously agreed, when Leo III had fled Rome to seek refuge with the king at Paderborn,\textsuperscript{516} that Charlemagne would be made Emperor, in exchange for his assistance in helping Leo reassert his authority over the Roman church. And, so the explanation runs, Leo had ample precedent in the papacy's previous and long involvement with the Merovingian, and later the Carolingian kings, for from the time of the Greek pope Zacharias and King Clovis (Clodovech), the relationship between papacy and Franks had been one of cordiality to outright alliance. Clovis, after all, had his dynasty largely by the sanction of the papacy.\textsuperscript{517}

Another tradition of this standard historiography is that Charlemagne had other reasons to seek the imperial purple, and Leo to confer it upon him. The title would give a kind of political and cultural completeness to the Frank's far-flung dominions that they otherwise lacked; the title plus the Orthodox Catholic religion would be powerful forces promoting greater cohesiveness. And so (the tradition continues), Charlemagne, that consummate practitioner of ninth century Realpolitik was “waiting” (perhaps deliberately) for Leo III, that geopolitically perspicacious Pope, who, seeing far into the European future, anticipated the necessity of a break by Byzantium and a reorientation westward, and who, stepping boldly onto the stage of History like a Hegelian man of destiny, altered its course with a crown. For this variation of the tradition, both men became – and to a great degree remain – the heroes of this historiographic tradition. This tradition, as shall be discovered in a moment, gets at least some of the story right, for by focusing not on Charlemagne but on Leo III, it casts him as the Pope who begins the process of breaking the papacy free from the Byzantine Roman cultural orbit and making the papacy the central figure in the drama. The question, however, remains, was that Leo III’s \textit{intention}, or merely the unforeseen consequence of his acts?
The Inception of the Two Europes

The details (or at least some of them), seem quite convenient to this interpretation. Charlemagne had held his own council on ikons in Frankfurt in 794. This council accepted ikons as religious art, as decoration, and even as instructional “audio-visual” aids, but it did not accept their liturgical function nor their veneration. Leo III’s predecessor, however, Hadrian, remained loyal to the Roman, which is to say Byzantine view of things, confirming the Seventh Oecumenical Council in Constantinople which has been summoned by the “Emperor” Irene, and in very firm and explicit terms rejected Charlemagne’s council.518

And then, thankfully (at least from the Frankish point of view), the troublesome pope died, and Leo III was elected over the opposition of Hadrian’s old Roman senatorial family. Accosted by Hadrian’s relatives, who attempted to blind the new pope and thus render him canonically impeded from exercising his office, Leo was eventually thrown into prison. From here he escaped,519 and made his way to Paderborn. With their secret bargain struck,520 Leo had opened the door of the papacy to growing Franko-Germanic influence, and laid the foundations for the German Reform movement which would eventually capture the papacy.521 This bargain may be deduced, so the argument runs, from the outline of subsequent events: Charlemagne would return with Leo III to Rome, and Frankish bishops would “try” him before his opposition,522 restore him to this throne, and Leo, in return, would crown Charlemagne emperor and make him a grateful son of the papacy.523

And of course, in those version of the Second Europe’s historiography which are more aware of the First Europe hovering uncomfortably on the fringes of its peripheral vision, both Leo and Charlemagne proposed the action because the woman Irene ruled “unconstitutionally” in New Rome as “emperor”.524 Moreover, she had proposed marriage to the Frank, probably more in order to secure her own position within Constantinople rather than to unit the two empires. In any case, the proposal would certainly have been welcomed by Charlemagne,
who would see in it an opportunity to increase his dominions and power with a minimum expenditure of effort. All it would take would be to crowned emperor by Byzantium’s representative in the West, Leo III.

It is in this “legal” and “liturgical” context that Charlemagne’s geopolitical ambitions are born. All could be accomplished at a single stroke: with the imperial title, he could marry Irene, save her regime by restoring its liturgical and therefore constitutional legitimacy, the two Empires could be married, creating a reunited and Christina Rome stretching from the English channel to Asia Minor; Charlemagne could stay at home in Aachen: Irene could rule as before in Constantinople without having to fuss with the Frankish barbarian she had married; and Leo III would be the first, most influential, and powerful bishop in the Christian world; and, in general, everything would be “fine”.

But this bold and audacious Plan – true as far as it goes – fell apart for two reasons. First, Irene was overthrown by a palace and senatorial coup led by the Logothete of the treasury, Nikephoros; and second, the new emperor, Nikephoros would not, and did not, accept Charlemagne’s claim to the title “emperor of the Romans.” Indeed, it was precisely because Irene had proposed the marriage that the smoldering resentments against her sole rule broke into open revolt and a palace coup against her.

B. The Perspective of the First Europe

The “marriage” explanation, which reflects the growing sophistication of the Second Europe’s historiography and while true as far as it goes, is not without its own difficulties. Indeed, this explanation more than any other serves to focus the historiographical difficulty much more accurately. Charlemagne’s biographer, Einhard, stated, in an oft-cited quotation, that “the king would not have entered the basilica that day at all if he had any idea of what Leo intended to do.” So the basic and acute
difficulty comes sharply into focus, and the difficulty, let it be noted, remains whether or not Irene had secretly made the proposal before the coronation or not, for how does one account for the elaborate preparation for the event, and the foreknowledge on Charlemagne’s part that these preparations imply (such as being measured for the imperial vestments, or a private bargain struck beforehand in Paderborn), and yet account for his very real surprise?

From the foreshortened historiographical perspective of the Second Europe, one cannot, for the very reason that that perspective is a consequence of the events, since those events helped to create it. Or to put it differently, the Byzantine perspective must be totally reintegrated into the explanations of the events of the ninth century to gain a broader basis from which to account for the historiographical difficulty. The effects of such reintegration lead to a much different historiographical interpretation than ultimately obtains in the “canonical” tradition of the Second Europe. These may be summarized as follows:

(1) Charlemagne is not the “hero” of the events, but the “villain” driving them and seeking to orchestrate them to his own benefit.

(2) Leo is not the perspicacious pope who breaks with the East and casts the papacy’s lot geopolitically and ecclesiastically with the West, but is in every respect motivated by considerations which are the exact opposite of the way the Second Europe’s historiography, both secular and ecclesiastical, portrays him, for he is the consistent spoiler of Charlemagne’s religio-geopolitical ambitions. Leo III, far from desiring or orchestrating a break with the East Romans, did everything in his power to prevent that break from occurring, even to the point of a direct, explicit, and final censure of the whole Augustinian foundation and paradigm driving the Frankish church, of which, as patriarch of the West, he was the acknowledged canonical head.

(3) These religio-geopolitical ambitions of Charlemagne were first
disclosed in the Council of Frankfurt in 794;\textsuperscript{525a}

(4) His actions \textit{subsequent} to his coronation display the \textit{same} ambitions, particularly in the strong evidence of orchestration in the Palestinian crisis of 810 and the subsequent calling of the Council of Aachen in 813 which made the \textit{filioque} a dogma \textit{de fidei}, presumably designed to force Leo once and for all into subjection to and support of those ambitions;

(5) Leo III’s actions, by the same token, \textit{subsequent} to the coronation are not those of a pro-Frankish Pope, but consistently that of and ardently pro-\textit{Byzantine} Pope, and the consistency of these actions in turn form a basis from which to speculate on his possible motivations for the coronation itself;

(6) Thus, it is probable that Leo’s actions in the coronation were those of a pro-\textit{Byzantine} Pope, and that somehow, this became immediately apparent to Charlemagne, and is the \textit{real} reason for his surprise and consternation, not the coronation itself;

(7) The subsequent contest is therefore between Leo III and Charlemagne, between Northern Frankish Second Europe, and Southern Roman First Europe, with the two men as their leading contenders. This contest forms in turn the ultimate backdrop for the later controversy between the Second European Pope Nicholas I, and the First European Patriarch Photius, ca. 858-867.

\section*{C. The Disclosure of Charlemagne’s Religio-Geopolitical Ambitions at the Council of Frankfurt (794)}

When the Council of Frankfurt was held in 794 under Charlemagne’s inspiration and imperial summons, it was by no means clear which party, Iconodules or Iconoclasts, would win out in the East
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Roman Empire. It will be recalled that the Iconodules insisted not only on the value of ikons as religious art and decoration, but on their Christological and liturgical use and veneration as implications and silent testimonies of the Incarnation. Conversely, the Iconoclasts prohibited the ikons altogether, both as focuses of veneration and as decorations and instructional aids.

The religio-geopolitics of Charlemagne's agenda are thus evident: by insisting on the acceptability of the ikons as decorations and instructional aids on the one hand, but by prohibiting their use or veneration on the other, Charlemagne attempts to steer a political via media which, on the basis of the patina of theological and cultural "canonicity" that his council conferred, gave him the ability to contest the orthodoxy of whichever faction ultimately emerged victorious in Byzantium.

And the obstacle to these ambitions was, of course, the papacy of Hadrian, who had already confirmed the Constantinopolitan Church's definition of Faith with regards to the use and veneration of the ikons. The scope of the Frankish king's ambitions is now evident, as are the lengths which he will go to pursue them. His is, if one may so put it, an even more cæsaro-papist ambition and policy than anything a Byzantine emperor ever contemplated: his vision is that of a restored and reunited Christian Roman Empire under Frankish hegemony. There is nothing new in this assertion. What is new is the use he made of Church dogma to achieve his ends, a policy which was deliberately aimed at exploiting those aspects of Western ecclesiastical tradition which Charlemagne knew were foreign, or antithetical, to the practice and belief of the Byzantine-Roman Church. In short, Charlemagne is willing to play fast and loose with the dogmas of the whole Church, the Church of the still unified ecclesiastical Europe, in order to effect a similar union in the political sphere.

But if this indeed be his driving motivation, we should expect to see
similar policies being pursued with even greater vigour after his coronation. Were they?

The answer is yes, and lies in the Palestinian Crisis in the years 807-810, and the Council of Aachen in 813.

\[ \textit{D. Charlemagne’s Ambitions as Disclosed Subsequent to the Coronation: The Palestinian Crisis of 807 and the Council of Aachen in 813} \]

The theological crisis that exists at the center of the stormy ninth century occurs in two distinct phases. The first comprises the period to 813, and consists of the conflict between Rome and New Rome on the one hand, and the Frankish imperial church on the other, and its chief contenders are Leo III and Charlemagne respectively. The second phase consists of the conflict between Rome and the Frankish imperial theology on the one hand, and New Rome on the other, and its chief contenders are Nicholas I and St. Photius respectively.\textsuperscript{528}

The first, Frankish versus Rome and New Rome phase exhibits the same outlines of a consuming passion on Charlemagne’s part for a unified imperial-ecclesiastical realm. At the outset, however, it is vitally important to understand that the immediate target of the events of 807-813 is not, as it was with the Council of Frankfurt, the papacy and Byzantium. Here the target is clear: it is the papacy. One senses even that the contest had become \textit{personal}, it was a contest against Leo III himself. Byzantium entered Charlemagne’s calculations only as a foil to the goal of bending the papacy to his policy. Why this is so will become evident as the examination of the evidence proceeds, for it is in this phase that the spectre of a tearing asunder of “Europe” into Two Europes becomes visible, such brinksman ship being, indeed, Charlemagne’s \textit{terribilus modus operandi}, forcing Leo to use every stratagem possible to avoid that consequence.

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The principal piece of evidence in this regard is the *Epistle of the Pilgrim Monks Living on Mount Olivet to the Roman Pontiff (807)*.\(^529\) This letter contains statements by the pilgrim Frankish monks in Palestine which deserve careful scrutiny, statements which are examined seriatim here:

(1) “John, who was from the Monastery of St. Sabbas... (said) that the Franks who are on Mount Olivet are heretics. He also said to us that ‘all you Franks are heretics,’ and he reproved our faith by saying that it is no better than heresy.”

John is an East Roman monk, as is proven by his association with the well-known St. Sabbas monastery. But the real significance of the Frankish monks’ remarks lies in the fact that John has accused them of a sort of *national* heresy. This is significant, and is not to be explained solely as a case of xenophobia, for in the case of all previous struggles with various heresies, the name of the heresy itself was derived from the heresiarch who invented or promoted it.\(^530\) Even iconoclasm, which might seem a possible exception, is, in the literature and anathemata of the day, described by association with the names of the various iconoclastic Emperors who promoted it.\(^531\) Monophysitism, which became a nationalistic cause and movement after Chalcedon is no exception, for its tenets can be traced unequivocally to Severus of Antioch and Philoxenus of Mabbug, and its adherents are referred to in the patristic literature of the period as “Severans.”\(^532\)

With John’s remarks as recorded by the Frankish monks – and there is no reason to suppose they were unfaithful or inaccurate in their record – we have a first in the literature of theological controversy and the historiographical traditions which will emerge from it: a heresy whose *personal* origin the Graeco-Roman Christians of the East are, at this point,
unable to identify by the name of its founder. Indeed, from their perspective, the Frankish doctrine seems so entrenched that it constitutes for them a kind of tribal, or national, heresy, as opposed to the internationalism and Catholic Orthodoxy of the Byzantine oikoumene. Nor can we assume that the Frankish monks exaggerated John’s response, given the confused and almost pleading tone of the rest of the epistle.

(2) “And we said to him, ‘Brother, be silent. Because if you call us heretics, you are calling the holy Apostolic See heretical.’”

Here nothing seems new. The Greeks had encountered such representations of papal claims before, and rejected them. But these claims are now articulated by the monks, not in terms of supremacy but of incipient infallibility. It is the strength of the Greek opposition in the face of this Frankish assertion which also lies at the source of the confused and pleading tone of the letter, for far from silencing the Greeks, the opposition to the Frankish doctrine remained. The Franks, naturally, viewed this with alarm, since it seemed to imply that Rome itself might be in heresy.

(3) He sent laymen who wanted to throw us out saying, ‘You are heretics and the books which you have are heretical.’”

At some point in the developing difficulties in Palestine, the “Greek” monk John, at least as far as it appeared to the Franks, had incited the predominantly Graeco-Roman population of Jerusalem against them. But one must remain somewhat skeptical toward what the Franks have assumed in this regard. To them, the crisis must have seemed to have developed so quickly that they simply assumed that the first one to have noticed a peculiarity in their doctrinal and liturgical practice, namely John,
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was also the one who incited the local Christian population against them. John may or may have not been an agent provocateur, but in any case, a reaction was inevitable, and probably inevitably swift, for to the local Graeco-Romans, the “Roman Faith” was the faith of the Great Church in the capital of the Roman Empire: Constantinople. Roman Faith meant not the faith of the pope but of the entire Empire, and the Franks would thus have been perceived as innovators. In any case, the unfortunate Frankish monks were in a serious situation, and realized it:

(4) “(We responded): ‘fathers and brothers, look at this man who says such things against us and against the holy Roman Faith, because such things we have never heard about our people.’”

This statement reveals the measure of their consternation, as well as, perhaps, a growing subtlety of diplomacy. They have admitted to the local Greeks that they have never had their, or their entire people’s, faith so seriously challenged by those whom they had by then discovered viewed themselves as both Roman and Catholic Christians. Their use of “Roman Faith” here is perhaps illustrative of an intentional craftiness on their part, for in order to get their letter through the Caliph’s censors the Byzantium’s spies, guarded language capable of two interpretations would have had to have been employed. This little statement is the first indication that the monks are genuinely confused, and are appealing to Rome to sort out a situation that they are simply in no position to do, and perhaps to warn Rome of a serious development. This concern to warn Rome of a looming crisis becomes clearer as the letter proceeds.

(5) “In the Creed we say more than you, ‘Who proceedeth from the Father and the son,’ because of which words, that John, an enemy of his own soul, says that we are all heretics.”
Here at last is the focal point of the controversy, the filioque. As the doctrine was never part of the original creed, the local Roman Christian population would have required little or no instigation by John of St. Sabbas to become hostile toward the Frankish monks. It is more likely that John emerged as the spokesman for the Greeks. The Franks are simply trying to explain to Leo the consistency of the opposition they encountered. At this point in the epistle, one senses that the Frankish pilgrims have at last understood – because they would have been stubbornly told and shown abundant and persuasive documentation – that the local population was in fact correct, and that they themselves might very possibly be wrong, that they had in fact inherited something which had been added, without any detectable or apparently proper oecumenical authority. That this is not reading too much into their statements is evident by considering the main focus of their letter in the next two statements:

(6) “We begged the men of Jerusalem saying: ‘If you say that we are heretics, you impute heresy to the throne of Blessed Peter, and if you say that, you lead yourselves into sin.”

(7) “Most benign father, while I thy servant... was in thy holy presence, and in the devout presence of thy son, the most pious emperor Lord Charles, we heard it said in his chapel in the Creed of Faith ‘Who proceedeth from the Father and the Son.”

These two statements, taken together, indicate the true and genuine depth of the monks’ perplexion, for the one statement, the public defense of the claims of the papacy and its incipient “infallibility” to the Greeks is denied in the next nervous private statement to Pope Leo. That private statement indicates that the connection between the pilgrim monks and Charlemagne is direct and intimate, and indicates that, as far as they
know, the doctrine originates with him. Their remark also contains another interesting feature, for they make no clear comment to Leo on what they think is the doctrine’s orthodoxy or heterodoxy.

The next statements are the bombshells:

(8) “…Whence, holy father, again and again, we ask and beseech thee, prostrate upon the ground with tears, that thou deign to search out both in the Greek as well as in the Latin the holy fathers who composed the Creed concerning that phrase where it is said ‘Who proceedeth from the Father and the Son.’ For in the Greek they do not say as we do, but rather they say: ‘Who proceedeth from the Father,’ and they view that phrase which we say in the Latin as a serious matter. Deign to give an order to thy son the Emperor Lord Charles, because we heard the words ‘Who proceedeth from the Father and the Son’ in his chapel…”

This is the bombshell, because after Leo is asked to research the matter, the Frankish monks again refer the whole matter back to Charlemagne, and give a final, curious twist to the whole episode by implying that they expect that the order will be to suppress the addition (which, as events turned out, it was). After all, if they were confident of a positive vindication of the doctrine, no order from Leo to Charlemagne would be needed at all, since he was already, as their letter indicates, using the filioque.

From these last statements, another possibility of interpretation emerges, and that is that the pilgrim monks are writing to warn Leo that a crisis of enormous proportions is about to break open around him, a crisis which, as the constant, though cautious, references to Charlemagne suggest, may have been deliberately orchestrated by the Frankish Emperor to bring Leo to heel.

But whether or not the Frankish king did orchestrate it, Leo is nevertheless in a most untenable and cruel position vis-à-vis the Frankish
emperor, for he is in a cruel threefold dilemma: (1) since the *filioque* is already in use throughout most of the western Church, the local papal dioceses of Italy excepted, *Leo is threatened with the schism of the whole western Church should he challenge the addition and order Charlemagne to suppress it*; and (2) *should he challenge it, then as the Frankish monks had indicated, he is in effect challenging his own claims to supremacy, and throwing doubt over the whole incipient infallibility precisely because the papacy had tolerated it for so long*; moreover (3) *should Leo accept the doctrine and side with Charlemagne, then by the same token a similar schism would loom with the Greeks, who, as the Frankish monks are cautiously but clearly implying, maintain the original and uncorrupted creed of Faith, which again would compromise the incipient infallibility and supremacy which the Frankish monks ascribe to the papacy (a point which will assume importance when we come to Leo III’s response to the crisis).

We have thus far argued that Charlemagne had a consistent ambition which he pursued subsequently, and vigorously, to the coronation. We are persuaded that the evidence thus far, while not conclusive, at least strongly supports the thesis that Charlemagne may have orchestrated the whole affair to place the papacy precisely in this no-win situation. But whether or not he did deliberately orchestrate the crisis, he certainly *exploited it as if he had*. The extent of his dominions would have given him sure and certain intelligence on that fact that the *filioque* was in use throughout Western Europe with the *exception* of Rome. And his contacts with the East, through the “Emperor” Irene and the Caliph of Bagdad, Harun al-Raschid would have told him that it was *not* a part of the liturgical or dogmatic tradition of the East Romans. Finally, Charlemagne would have had comparatively easy access to the records of the Council of Gentilly in Gaul in the eighth century, during which the *filioque* became a point of contention for a local Greek taking part in the council. So even if he did not orchestrate the crisis, he can employ the same tactics he employed at Frankfurt to *exploit* it, only this time, he has,
so he thinks a much more potent weapon, one which he thinks assures him of Rome’s cooperation, *for if Rome did not accept the *filioque*, it would be threatened with the schism of the entire Western Church except Italy itself. The papacy would thus be relegated to a Byzantine backwater, and tear its claims to supremacy from beneath itself. It is, in a word (!), full scale ecclesiastical and geopolitical warfare.

Thus, if the controversy in Palestine was not orchestrated by Charlemagne, it was at the very least a godsend for him, whose bishops, at the council of Aachen in 813, made the *filioque* a dogma *de fidei* and sent the decisions to Leo for his confirmation. The cultural and historiographical significance of this consistent policy, as culminating in the Council of Aachen, is that the Frankish Church has elevated itself to universal and canonical status, for a *dogma de fidei* must perforce be applicable to the whole universal Church. In short, the council of Aachen’s decrees are a direct challenge to the papacy and to the “Byzantine hegemony” in the formulation of church doctrine. And thus the reason for the target of the policy, the papacy, is now clear: *in order to give those decrees the needed patina of universality* (*οἰκουμενικής*), *some symbol of that Byzantine oikoumene had to be wrested from “Rome” – understood here are both the Empire, the Church of the Empire, and the Cities of Rome and New Rome – and made to serve the new imperial theology.*

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**E. Paulinus of Aquileia and the “Theology of Interpolation” as the First Formal Second European Statement of the Historiographical Presupposition of Dogmatic Development**

The Carolingian theologians in and around Charlemagne’s court were not oblivious to the fact that the *filioque* was not explicitly taught by any father prior to Augustine. Indeed, they were not oblivious to the fact that it was not part of the original creed, for their justification for insisting on the doctrine at Aachen as a *dogma de fidei* was based precisely upon
the theory that doctrine develops, and that their actions at the council were therefore justified, since they were rendering explicit what had earlier been only implicit.

The task of working out this concept fell to bishop Paulinus, who was made Patriarch of Aquileia in northern Italy by Charlemagne. The council of Fruili which Paulinus convoked in 797 explicitly taught the *filioque* on the basis of a carefully worked out theory of how additions may be made to the Creed.

We must, however, once again go back to the time of Pope Hadrian to understand the urgency which one senses in the documents of Fruili. It will be recalled that Charlemagne convoked the council of Frankfurt in order to establish a theological basis on which to contest whichever party won out in Byzantine, whether Iconodules or iconoclasts. And it will be recalled that Hadrian and explicitly upheld the Byzantine Seventh Oecumenical Council, and not that of Frankfurt. In response to the Frankish contentions for their council, Hadrian wrote, “We have already shown that the divine dogmas of (the seventh oecumenical Council of Nicea in 787) are irreprehensible… For should anyone say he differs from the Creed of the above-mentioned Council, he risks differing with the Creed of the Six Holy Councils.”

In other words, the issue of the *filioque* had already been raised by the Frankish theologians in connection with the imperial ecclesiastical policy. Hadrian is therefore responding to an assertion in the *Carolingian Books (Libri Carolini)*, which were the “official” statement of Charlemagne’s ecclesiastical policy. These accused the then patriarch of Constantinople, Tarasius (uncle of Photius), as being “not correct in professing that the Holy Spirit proceeds not from the Father and the Son, according to the faith of the Nicene Creed, but that he proceeds from the Father through the Son.”

This is significant, for it *clearly indicates that the Franks themselves understand the difference of a double procession from the Father and the Son in eternity, and a procession from the Father*
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in eternity and through the Son in economy.

For his part, Hadrian is also aware of the distinction. Citing passages of Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, Hilary of Poitiers, and various other fathers, the pope indicates that he accepts the standard “Greek” understanding of the phrase “through the Son” as meaning simply that the Spirit is sent into the world by the Son. But Hadrian also explicitly rejects the use of that phrase to teach that the Spirit has an eternal relation of origin from the Son. Thus, Leo III’s predecessor had already excluded what the Franks were trying to do.

Paulinus’ council at Fruili thus relies upon a different approach, the “theology of interpolation.” This was based upon two basic assumptions. First, citing the fact that the Second Oecumenical Council of Constantinople (381) itself had added the final paragraph concerning the Spirit to the Creed, Paulinus maintained that the Creed could be legitimately added to if the addition were in accord with the original intention of the fathers. Secondly, it could be added to if the addition were not contradictory to the original meaning of the Creed.

This cannot be pondered too long, for it is the first formal statement of the historiographical presupposition of dogmatic development. With the theology of interpolation, the unique historiographical commitments of the Augustinized and Hellenized Second Europe begin to take on definite shape. The two principles, furthermore, are interlinked, for by introducing the notion of intention into the mixture, Paulinus must then prove, from Scripture and patristic citations, that the filioque was not contradictory. This means that phrases such as “through the Son” (διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ) had to be catalogued and proven to mean the same thing as the phrase “from the Son” (παρὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ). One begins the search – like the Apologists searching the Greek philosophers for conceptions similar to Christian doctrines – for a kind of “filioquist” protoevanegel, for
“anticipations” of the fully developed Augustinian novelty, and a massive attempt is begun to reinterpret the non-Augustinian fathers through the newly confected spectacles of the Augustinian \textit{ordo theologiae} and its “theology of interpolation.”\textsuperscript{541}

Paulinus’ theology of interpolation lays the basis for the overwhelming pressure that Charlemagne attempts to bring to bear upon Leo through his council at Aachen in 813. In this context, Leo III’s response to the crisis assumes extreme importance, for he maintained a consistently pro-Byzantine (i.e., pro-Roman) view which influenced and guided his own policies. It is a breathtaking refutation of the whole ecclesiastical world view of the Frankish Church and the imperial policy on which it was based, even to the point of being a refutation of the exalted ideas of papal authority and “inerrancy” entertained by the Franks; Leo III

(1) ordered the \textit{filioque} suppressed throughout Charlemagne’s realms (i.e., most of western Europe); and

(2) erected two silver shields, in St. Peter’s Lateran basilica, of the Creed both in the Latin and in the Greek without the interpolation. Between these shields, Leo has inscribed a small plaque, stating that he had done so “out of love” for, and as a safeguard of, the \textit{orthodox} faith.\textsuperscript{542}

(3) Finally, and most importantly, he informs the Frankish delegation which had been sent from the Council of Aachen to acquire his approval of their decisions that he had no authority to alter the creed as the fathers had formulated it.\textsuperscript{543}

(4) In yet another strange move – strange if seen only from the perspective of the Second Europe – Leo transferred the diocese of Illyricum back to the jurisdiction of Constantinople.\textsuperscript{543a}
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2. The Second Phase and its Central Ikon: The Schism Between Pope Nicholas I and Patriarch Photius

It is the second phase of the crisis that signals the real emergency of the Two Europes has begun. The renowned scholar of the Papal Church, Francis Dvornik, in his magisterial study *The Photian Schism* not only did much to rehabilitate Photius in the Papal Church, and to challenge the assumptions of its historiographic “memory” of the period, but also minced no words regarding the significance of the period as a founding event in the formation of the Two Europes. “The Photian case,” he wrote, “is not merely a matter of Byzantine interest. It concerns the history of Christianity and the world, as the appraisement of Photius and his work lies at the core of the controversies that separate Eastern and Western Churches.” It lies, therefore, at the heart of the issues that created the Second Europe by means of its schism from the First.

Photius’ critique of the *filioque* heresy is often perceived, however, only in a narrowly theological sense, as a critique of the doctrine itself and nothing more. But it must be seen for what it really is: a dialectical deduction of the sweeping ecclesiastical, historiographical, and cultural implications that flow from the theology of the *filioque*. It would not be going too far to say that Photius perceives that the *filioque* refounds the basis of the Christian civilization of the Second Europe on a dialectical basis. Two historiographical traditions begin to take definite shape during this crisis, even to the extent that some documents are accepted as authentic by one Europe while being rejected by the other, and in both cases, this acceptance or rejection is a function of theological commitments. So our examination must perforce proceed slowly.

First, the theological critique of the *filioque* which Photius undertook will be examined with a view to making clear the basis of the historical revisionism that begins to take hold in the Second Europe. Secondly, we shall explore the way this new historiographic tradition operates, with a
view to exhibiting the reemergence of the Gnostic strategies of changing the meaning of the texts of the primary founding documents of Christina civilization. Finally, we shall examine the actual historical sequence of events that embroiled the Pope and the Patriarch in the controversy in order to highlight the way the two historiographical traditions diverge in their understanding of what happened.

A. The Critique of the Filioque’s Implications for Authority and the History of Doctrine:

Photius’ final word in refutation of the filioque is to be found in his last written work, a work dedicated wholly to that subject, the Mystagogy, written toward the end of his life in the period of his second exile (ca. 882-886). At the beginning of the work, there is an important paragraph outlining the cultural consequences of the doctrine if it should be adopted by the entire western Church. Photius begins by questioning its canonicity, or licitness:

Which of our common and holy fathers said that the spirit proceeds from the Son? Did any oecumenical confession [of faith] establish it? And which of the great priests and bishops, inspired of God, affirmed this understanding of the Holy Spirit? …For the Second of the Seven Holy and Oecumenical Councils declared that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. The Third received that tradition, the Fourth confirmed it, the Fifth supported the same doctrine, the Sixth sealed it, and the Seventh contended for and proclaimed it. 545

While Photius does not develop the implications of this statement immediately in the work, a word should be said about them.

While it may be an obvious thing, Photius is very quietly pointing out that every oecumenical definition of the Orthodox Catholic Faith was in fact formulated by the Church in the East, and all the seven
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Oecumenical Councils were, from one point of view, Eastern Councils.\^45a Given the tacit “nationalism” that was exhibited by the Frankish Pilgrim monks in the Palestinian crisis, these remarks are a gentle reminder of what is at stake. In essence, Photius is maintaining that the *filioque* subverts the proper nature of ecclesiastical authority that must, perforce, reinterpret the entire history of Christian doctrine.

As Photius elaborates it, this Gnostic program of the reinterpretation of texts takes five forms.

First, he maintains that the *filioque* compels the West to search for “anticipations” of the doctrine in fathers prior to Augustine, since the speculative “theologoumenon” or the opinion of one man has been raised to dogmatic status:

If Gregory and Zacharias, so many years distant from each other, did not have the knowledge about the procession of the Most Holy Spirit that you do, and if the ones who came between them on the succession list of Roman bishops enjoined the same doctrines without novelty, being warmed by faith, but rather, advocated the same dogmas, then not only these two poles, but those men between them, kept, established, and proclaimed the same faith. If those who follow these men *anticipate and discover an alien doctrine not readily apparent in their writings*, he is indeed torn from the Faith, because the chorus of the bishops of the Episcopal throne of Rome hold fast to this Faith.\^46

It should be noted that, in Photius’ understanding, to accept the *doctrine* of the *filioque* is to accept the *program* of textual revision and dogmatic development, and that it is *all three things* which “tears one from the Faith.”

Secondly, the *meaning* of biblical and patristic statements which appear close to the *filioque* must themselves be reinterpreted according to the new program:

Either pervert that which is already written by the fathers,\^47 or subscribe
to a single saying of theirs which is already perverse... and thus it goes for those currently acknowledged as fathers. But that means it may go the same way for those who will be called fathers in the future. 548

Note that Photius is explicit about the ongoing consequences of the filioque; it required not only a massive revision of the traditional interpretation of the texts of the past, but would require constant and continuous adjustment in the future as well.

Thirdly, this reinterpretation of biblical and patristic texts must itself in turn be elevated to the status of a dogma, since it naturally tends to support the new dogma:

Admittedly, those things (i.e., in support of the filioque) were said. But, if such a man, whether in some crisis or Greek “rage”, or while fighting heresy, or through some weakness of discipline, falls into some unseemliness, then why do you still dismiss their testimony, and take as a lawful dogma that which they did not intend as a dogma? 549

In other words, the effect of the filioque results in a kind of leveling of doctrines in terms of their authority or status, since to make of opinion a dogma means that the basis for distinguishing between the two is lost: either all opinions will have to be made dogmas, or all dogmas will be reduced to the status of opinions.

Fourthly, such reinterpretation, however, opens within the consensus patrum a division between Augustine, who clearly teaches the doctrine, and all other fathers, about whom the best that can be said is that they “anticipated” it. Moreover, on this view, between Augustine and the “proto-Augustinian” fathers on the one hand and the Roman Popes who confirmed the Creed without the doctrine on the other, the patristic basis of authority and the unity of the Church was split at a very fundamental level: that of the way in which her historic monuments were received and its dogmatic tradition defended. His point is that “authority”
itself will change; whereas before it existed to attest to tradition and received doctrine, it now exists to confirm the licitness or illicitness of these “developments”. As such, it will be an inevitability that it will have to claim a juridical infallibility as a necessity of the program. This is a great paradox, for the Photius who will subsequently be reviled by the Second Europe’s historiographic tradition after the schism is the same Photius who defends the papacy which will become the core of the unity of the Second Europe:

If there are, among the chorus of the fathers, those who reject your subtle contrivance against godly doctrine, then they are the fathers of the fathers. And they are indeed some of those very same men whom you acknowledge to be your fathers. So, if you acknowledge Ambrose, Augustine, and Jerome, then why do you not acknowledge those others, but indeed, deny them?  

And to insure that his point is not lost, he then goes on to enumerate the Roman Popes who did not teach the doctrine: Vigilius, Agathos, Gregory, Zacharias, Benedict the Fourth, his contemporary John the Eighth, and most especially, Leo the Third:

Leo, another renowned man with wonders of his own to glory in, cut off each and every opportunity for the heresy to take root. Because the Latin language, frequently, used by our holy fathers, has inadequate meanings, which do not translate the Greek tongue purely and exactly and thus often render false notions of the doctrines of the Faith, and because it is not supplied with as many words that can render the meaning of a Greek word in its exact sense, that God-inspired man fixed the concepts by decreeing the doctrines of the Faith in the Greek.  

Photius is obviously referring to the fact that Leo had erected the celebrated silver shields of the Creed in St. Peter’s Lateran basilica in Greek and Latin, and without the filioque. The importance of this
quotation cannot be overstated, for it is evidence that the Byzantine Romans knew of Leo the third’s motives and actions intimately, and gives the lie to the oft-asserted notion in some quarters that the schism was the result of “growing estrangement” and the “difficulty of communications” between Rome and Constantinople.  

Finally, having thus injected the element of development and dialectic into the *consensus patrum* by elevating Augustine’s opinion to dogmatic status, “Augustinism” must inevitably become the *sine qua non* of theological orthodoxy, and a localized paradigm would inevitably become the universal canonical and cultural norm, thus splitting the *consensus patrum*:

You put forward Ambrose, Augustine, and Jerome as well as certain other men as witnesses *against* the dogma of the Church, because they hold the *opinion* that the Spirit proceeds from the Son. But this necessarily brings the holy fathers under the charge of ungodliness…

But which of us rightly serves the fathers? The one who received them with no contradictions against the Master, or the one who is compelled to wrestle against the established testimony of the Master’s voice…?

I will admit that the words “the Spirit proceeds from the Son” are to be found in the writings of these men. What of it? If those fathers, who taught such opinions, did *not* alter not change the correct statements [of the Creed], then you who teach your word [i.e., the “*filioque*”] as a dogma… *bring you own stubbornness of opinion into the teachings of those men…* Having discovered this unruly thing, which they never *imposed as a dogma*, why do you men declare it to be your dogma, and *judge them guilty of blasphemy in an impious pretence of benevolence and affection*?  

This “stubbornness of opinion” is the erection of the opinions and system of Augustine into a school. But one should also observe something else about this passage. Clearly, Photius is working not from primary texts, but
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only from the quotations of fathers encountered in the Frankish polemical works he has received, for had he been working with primary texts, he could easily have pointed out that the *filioque* was not clearly taught by Ambrose.\(^{560}\)

**B. The Reemergence of the Gnostic Strategy of Interpreting Texts:**

*A Partial Basis of the Historiographic Tradition of the Second Europe:*

But once the implications of this vast program of revisionism and reinterpretation are admitted as consequences of the *filioque*, exactly how will the program be carried out? The commitment of the Augustinian triadology to the process of Hellenization means inevitably that the same strategies and tactics that were in existence in Gnostic systems will reemerge as the techniques of revision for Augustinism as well. Photius, while he does not explicitly state this, nevertheless *does* point out that the search for justifications of the *filioque* cannot stop with the fathers, but must be extended into the Scripture themselves. Once he has observed how this operates, he then goes on to point out the merely humanistic basis of the doctrine.

1. The Interpretation of Scripture: The “Of” Equals “From” Argument

For Photius, the *filioque* compels the Augustinian “scriptural defense” to equate expressions that are not in fact equivalent, that is, following the now familiar Gnostic tactic, *it must assign old terms new meanings*. Thus, expressions such as “the Spirit of God” or “of Christ” are taken to mean “the Spirit from God” or “from Christ.”

The divine Paul, in the compass of the evangelical proclamation around which the whole world was gathered, stated “God sent forth the Spirit of His Son.” By this, he did not, however, mean anything like what you are justly accused of having said… You, just as if you were caught up to the
third heaven of transcendent and ineffable utterances, a law unto yourselves, proclaim that Paul was imperfect\textsuperscript{561} in his writings. Thus you exclude him from your faith, perfecting what was imperfect, instead of saying, “the Spirit of His Son,” you teach... that the Spirit proceeds “from the Son.” \textsuperscript{562}

But this exegetical program proves too much, because, just like the Eunomian insistence that different prepositions indicated different eternal relations of origin and different essences, it collapses in the face of other scriptural statements:

Did he intend for you all those sacred statements, by which he described the mischievous plottings of your rebellious insanity? He says many sacred things in reference to the Most Holy Spirit, such as “Spirit of Wisdom,” “Spirit of understanding,” “Spirit of knowledge,” “Spirit of Love,” “Spirit of a sound mind,” “Spirit of adoption unto sonship,”... Why do you frown at these statements? Is it because you would fight against a procession of the Most holy Spirit from each of these as well? \textsuperscript{563}

The other favorite texts employed by the Carolingian divines – texts still employed by the Second Europe down to our own day as if no response or answer had ever been made – to defend the “scriptural basis” of the doctrine were St. John 14:12 and 16:13-14, and particularly the phrase “He will take from that which is mine.”\textsuperscript{564} But as Photius points out, this leads to even more absurd grammatical acrobatics:

The Savior did not say, “He will receive from Me,” but “He will receive from that which is Mine.”... Thus you do not follow His word, because you say that the Spirit will take “from me,” just as if that means the same thing as “He will receive from that which is Mine.” This does injury to the expression “from that which is Mine” because it changes its meaning into what is meant by the phrase “from me”. Therefore, on account of this new expression, which is only your opinion, you have charged the Saviour [Himself] with three calumnies: you have said what he did not
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say, made Him say what He did not say, and taught an idea that does not even follow from His words, but which, on the contrary, His teaching denies; and fourthly, you introduce dogmas in rivalry with Him.\textsuperscript{565}

Here not only is the Gnostic tactic of changing the meanings of old phrases in evidence yet again, but Photius’ last comment cannot be lingered over too long, for it is more than just hyperbole; \textit{the inevitable consequence of the filioque is that it must claim for its dogmatic “developments” that infallible power of Christ Himself precisely because it is a development, otherwise, without it, it is merely a false development.}

It is obvious that for Photius the \textit{filioque} is hardly just a dispute about words, an opinion one often encounters in the more recent examples of the Second Europe’s historiographic tradition.\textsuperscript{565a} It is a dispute about doctrine, but equally importantly, it is a dispute about the meaning of words and the method of exegesis, about the unity and cultural autonomy of the Church, and about the true nature of authority. The new doctrine of God is thus not only compelling a new historiographic assumption, but with that assumption comes a whole program, for the foundational texts must be reinterpreted along the same broadly Neoplatonic parameters that underwrote Gnosticism, Arianism, Eunomianism and Origenism.

2. The Humanistic Basis of the \textit{Filioque}:

On the basis of a purely logical analysis of the dialectical implications of the \textit{filioque} and following so closely the arguments of Sts. Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa and Basil the Great that he oftentimes almost quotes their exact words, Photius is able to drive the doctrine to absurd conclusions. The \textit{Mystagogy} is liberally sprinkled with such arguments and patristic allusions, and to reproduce them all here would be impossible. Instead, we cite those places where Photius explicitly indicates that his method is that of the dialectical \textit{reduction ad absurdum}. 

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This insane doctrine, *not being able to escape absurd conclusion about the Son*, goes on to engulf the specific hypostatic characteristic of the Father as well. 566

And again: if two causes are promoted in the monarchical Trinity, why then, *on the basis of the same reasoning*, could not a third appear? 567

And like the Cappadocians and Athanasius long before him, Photius ascribes the basis of the doctrine explicitly to the mythological and Hellenistic presuppositions and structure from which it starts:

If two causes be discerned in the divine and transcendent Trinity, and if the Spirit thus flows from Two Persons, then where is the celebrated and divine Majesty of the Monarchy? Is this not but a restatement of the superstitious ideas of the Greeks, and therefore are they not Christian in outward semblance only? 568

The end result of this reorientation of Trinitarian doctrine thus inverts the order between Faith and Reason, for its ultimate basis is revealed to be man-centered and humanistic:

In general, according to these new sophists, who appropriate the possession of truth to themselves, each Person is Lord over each of the Hypostatic characteristics. 569 Thus, to them it seems as if the converse proposition, namely, that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, is contrary to the dignity of each Person. *In a word, however, it is ultimately we men who determine the processions of the essence, and therefore, it is we men who determine which Persons will not submit themselves to share in the characteristics* 570 of the other Persons. 571

This brings us to Photius’ critique of the theology of the *filioque* itself.
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C. The Theological Critique of the Filioque

1. Of the Augustinian Ordo Theologiae of Essence, Attributes, and Persons:

The core of Photius' theological refutation of the filioque lies in his pursuit of the doctrine to its various and mutually contradictory heretical implications. As was seen earlier with the Gnostics, Apologists, Origen and Arius, the dialectical structure of Greek philosophical thought in general, and Neoplatonic philosophy in particular, could be driven in two directions: (1) on the one hand, all basis for ultimate unity could be lost as the system multiplied the number of constituent elements of its metaphysical hierarchy, as with Iamblichus producing "Ones above the One", or as with Arius' logic implying an infinite regression of "Sons" of God; (2) on the other hand, all basis for ultimate distinctions could be lost, and all discreet entities could be reduced to an indistinguishable and indissoluble mass, as with Porphyry's version of Neoplatonism or Sabellius' doctrine of the Trinity, where the Three Persons are only appearances on the stage of history, there being only one Person acting out different roles at different times. Photius relies quite deliberately on the patristic tradition of argumentation against these two tendencies, and simply turns this dialectical structure back upon itself to demonstrate its inadequacy to comprehend the Christian Trinity. The Mystagogy is liberally sprinkled with passages of this sort as well, each of which is of extraordinary dialectical subtlety. We reproduce a few of them under the points they address.

a. Of Its Heretical Implications of Arianism and Macedonianism:
Preserving Personal Distinction by Arguing for Essential Subordination:

If the Father and the Son have everything in common, then with all temerity you have excluded the Spirit from what is common to these other Two Persons. If the Father is Father to the Son, not according to
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essence, but by reason of a hypostatic characteristic, and if this characteristic has in turn been joined to the Son because of their essential affinity, then the Holy Spirit cannot be excluded either. 572

Therefore, He is inferior to each of the other Two Persons and therefore inferior to the Son, Who in turn is of the same nature as the Father. Thus, the Spirit’s equal dignity is blasphemed, once again giving rise to the Macedonian insanity against the Spirit. 573

b. Of Its Heretical Implication of Sabellianism: Preserving Unity by Arguing for Personal Identity: The Porphyrean Dialectic of Pantheism Revisited:

The filioque tends first to confuse the Persons both with the divine essence, and then on that basis, to identify them with each other, thus implying that they are not really distinct Persons at all, which is the heresy of Sabellius:

You should consider this: If the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son (what deceiving drunkenness of impiety!), why do not the Father and the Spirit beget the Son for the very same reason... and make common to all three Persons what uniquely characterizes the Son as well, combining the other two Persons into one, in the same manner? Our Sabellius thus sprouts up form all of you, but this time with an even greater portent, in a sort of monstrous “Semi-Sabellianism.” 574

The phrase “semi-Sabellianism” suggests that Photius is also aware of another difficulty, and that is that the filioque does not, in fact, reduce the Three Persons to just One Person, but rather, to Two. It is neither really Trinitarian, nor merely Sabellian, but rather, “semi-Sabellian” or perhaps “binitarian”, a point which recalls Gregory the Theologian’s cautions against involving the Trinity with any element of dialectical “twoness”.

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c. Of Its Heretical Implications of Polytheism: The Iamblichian Dialectic of the Multiplication of Constituent Elements Revisited: Polyarchy and Anarchy versus Monarchy:

There is a devastating series of quotations in the Mystagogy which implicate not only the theological, but the political, consequences of the doctrine by spelling out its collapse into polyarchy and anarchy in terms that would have been very familiar to a Gregory the Theologian:

Furthermore, if the Son is begotten from the Father, and the Spirit (according to this innovation) proceeds from the Father and the Son, then by the same token another Person should proceed from the Spirit, and so we should have not three but four persons! And if the fourth procession be possible, then another procession is possible from that, and so on to an infinite number of processions and persons, until last this doctrine is transformed into a Greek polytheism! 575

In other words, the doctrine collapses into polyarchy. But, as Gregory the Theologian indicated in his struggle against Arianism and Eunomianism, polyarchy is itself a form of anarchy:

Again, if the Father be a cause and the Son also be a cause, which of these bold thinkers will at least clarify their doctrine and tell us which one of these Persons has more of the property of being a cause? 576

Thus the doctrine, for all its defenders say in support of the Monarchy, nevertheless reduces to anarchy, or literally, to “no-sourceness”:

for if, according to this principle of anarchy, the paternal principle and cause is established as consubstantial to all (Three Persons), and the Son is therefore a cause, how can you escape the conclusion that there are two interchangeable causes in the Trinity? For on the one hand, you firmly establish the idea that there is no source – anarchy – in Him, but at the very same time you reintroduce a source and a cause, and then go on simultaneously to transfer the distinctions of each Person! 577
2. Of the Christological Implications:

a. Nestorianism:

There are Christological implications of the doctrine since, as we
seen, the “scriptural defense” of it is based on expressions such as “Spirit
of God” and “Spirit of the Son” and “Spirit of Christ” being equivalent to
“Spirit from God”, “from the Son”, and “from Christ”. Photius, utilizing the
“of equals from” formula on which this defense is based, drove the *filioque*
to two more dangerous heretical implications:

You have said that “the Spirit of the Son” and “of Christ” are nearly equal
expressions. But this by no means indicates that the Spirit proceeds from
the Son… it says “Spirit of Christ: because the Spirit anoints Him… The
Spirit anoints Christ, but in what manner? According to the humanity of
the Word, Who took its flesh and blood and became man, or according to
his preexistent deity? If you say the second, then I suppose you have
said every rash insolence that there is to say! For the Son was not
anointed as God! Therefore, Christ was anointed according to His
humanity… But you go on to say that, since Scripture says that He is the
“Spirit of Christ” He therefore proceeds from Him. But this in turn means
that the Spirit of Christ proceeds from him, not according to His deity, but
according to His humanity.\(^{578}\)

That is, the meaning of the word “Christ” is precisely “the Anointed one.”
But, as Photius points out, in his divine Person and Nature, Christ had no
need to be anointed by the Spirit, since He was already God. Therefore
He is “Christ” because in His human nature, as man, He is the Anointed
One. But if the Spirit proceeds *from* “Christ” because He is the “Spirit of
Christ”, then the Spirit must proceed *from* Christ’s human nature. Thus,
his argument is that the *filioque* here collapses into a kind of Nestorianism,
since the One Son is treated as two separate or juxtaposed natures,
because the Spirit ends up proceeding form only one of these, rather than
from the One *Person* of the Son incarnate. But if this is so, then another
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set of implications rears its head.

b. Apollinarianism:

If the Spirit thus proceeds from Christ’s humanity because He is the Spirit of Christ, then:

He does not proceed before the beginning of time... but rather begins to proceed at the time when the Son took humanity to Himself. 579

Accordingly, the Holy Spirit is a creature – Macedonianism again! – but this time, the conclusion is reached not through trinitarian, but through Christological, dialectics based upon the “exegetical of equals from” rule common to all attempts to ground the doctrine scripturally.

But if the contrary position be maintain, that the Spirit is eternal and therefore God, at the same time as one insists that the Spirit proceeds from Christ because He is the Spirit of Christ, then a wholly different set of implications follows:

And so He must proceed from Christ... not from Christ’s deity, but from that which He took from us and comingled with himself. If therefore the Spirit, as God, proceedeth from the Son, from Christ, according to the humanity which Christ comingled with us, then the human nature must be concluded as being consubstantial with the Son and indeed may be spoken of as “of Christ”. For you would make Him proceed both before, and during, His Incarnation, and not cast off His consubstantiality with either. 580

Consequently, at the end of the whole enterprise, the mask finally comes off the Hellenistic basis of the filioque, for at the end it reproduces the Origenist Problematic: either the Spirit is a creature since He is the Spirit “of Christ” and therefore proceeds “from Christ”, i.e., His humanity which is not eternal, and thus the One Son and Christ is split into two in quasi-Nestorian fashion; or, since the Spirit is God and proceeds “from Christ”
as from His humanity, then the human nature “of Christ” must be concluded to be consubstantial and co-eternal with God. It was just this “pre-existence” of the human nature which was implicated in the heresy of Apollinarius and Monophysitism, just like the eternity of the world was necessary in Origen’s Problematic in order to maintain the eternity of the Son. 581

And in either case, asks St. Photius, “which of these two alternatives is the more wretched and detestable impiety and error?” 582 In the end, the Second and Augustinian Hellenization has reproduced the full range of implications and Christological heresy that obtained in the Origenistic and First Hellenization. And therefore, in refuting the *filioque* St. Photius, by utilizing the entire tradition which rejected the first Hellenization, is the clearest testimony that the metaphysical assumptions of both Hellenizations are one and the same. He is defending the Catholic Orthodoxy from which he, like the earlier Roman Popes whom he cites in the *Mystagogy*, perceives the Frankish Church is in danger of departing.

And lest the implications be forgotten, this dialectical theology – since it becomes the official theology of the western Carolingian, and later of the German Holy Roman, Emperors – also becomes the eventual basis of the Second Europe’s understanding of the “emperor” or “king” as the “anointed” hieratic head of its own imperial and royal hierarchies, and thus the Augustinian Hellenization will *radically alter* the Second Europe’s appropriation and development of Byzantine Roman law, constitution, and political theory. As such, crisis to form the legal foundations of the Second Europe. But before we examine this, we must first ascertain the historical course and consequences of the split between Photius and Nicholas.

c. The Historical Sequence of events and the Divergence of the Two Europes’ Historiography of the Ninth Century:

Any approach to the schism between Nicholas and Photius in the ninth century must pay close attention to a whole constellation of complex
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imperial and ecclesiastical politics. And though both men act within the strict limits of the canons of their respective churches, very clearly it is Nicholas who initiates the schism by tying the papal claims to the filioque and by attempting to force the submission of Photius and the Eastern Church to those claims, claims which, as we have seen, it never accepted or acknowledged and always rebuffed. Here too, in the schism of the ninth century, one encounters the first visible and explicit divergences between historiographic traditions in the Two Europes.

In the pathology of the filioque and its metastasis throughout the entire cultural mind of the Second Europe, one often encounters the argument that it could not have been a significant issue prior to the ninth century since it was never an issue of contention before that. This argument, however, only serves to demonstrate the type of historiographical “memory” that becomes a paradigm for the Second Europe, for as we have already seen, the filioque became an issue prior to the ninth century crisis with Photius: each time the Greeks were made aware of the doctrine, they rejected it.\(^{582a}\) It is the Second Europe, in fact, and not the First Europe, which chose to make it a point of contention.

For the Second Europe, the period and its schism is known by the name of the great Patriarch-scholar who occupied the throne of Constantinople: the Photian Schism. But as an examination of the events and claims of both sides will demonstrate, it might just as easily be termed the “Nicholatian Schism”, the first time the papacy, for the sake of Augustinism, went into formal schism from the Faith of the Church, including earlier Roman Popes. As such, this historiographic divergence, itself predicted by Photius as a consequence of the filioque, becomes itself a founding consequence of the Second Europe’s historiography. Indeed, it would be more accurate to say of Photius’ work that it was less a prediction than an analysis of what happened under Nicholas, since he wrote the Mystagogy long after his prolonged difficulties with that pope. For all that, it is predictive nonetheless.
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Turning to the internal situation of the Byzantine Church prior to Photius, Iconoclasm experienced a resurgence in the aftermath of the overthrow of the government of Irene. Nikephoros I, who overthrew her, remained adamantly opposed to any recognition of Charlemagne. To that end he might even have been motivated to invade Bulgaria. In any case, the invasion failed and Nikephoros found himself impaled, his skull hollowed out, on the stem of one of the Bulgarian Khan’s goblets. For a short interlude, Michael Rangabe reigned, and was apparently willing once again to come to terms with the great Frankish emperor, until another palace coup ended that policy and brought the Isaurian Iconoclastic emperor Leo to the throne. Thus began the second great period of iconoclastic persecution. Under Leo V (813-820), Michael II (821-829) and Theophilus (829-842), the pressure of the imperial government against the ikons and their defenders reached a fever pitch. It was the last of these emperors, Theophilus, who is the most significant, because like so many times before in Byzantine history, his wife, Theodora, stood in league with the opposing party, the Iconodules, and once she assumed power as regent for her son Michael III (Michael the Drunkard as Byzantine historiography remembers him), Iconoclasm finally came to an end. With her government taking de facto control in 842, Theodora ended the persecutions and restored the ikons, and caused the Synodikon to be written and celebrated on the First Sunday of every Lent thereafter, as was seen in chapter six.

Theodora’s government, however, faced a problem. There were two parties, each with a position based on canon law, on how to deal with the clergy who had “lapsed” during the iconoclastic persecution and had themselves become iconoclasts rather than risk exile or worse at the hands of the government. The first party, heavily influenced by monastics who had endured the severest persecutions, argued for a strict application of ecclesiastical law against such clergy, a position which, in effect,
required such clergy to retire from exercising their sacerdotal functions. Theodora’s government, and her Patriarch Ignatius (son of the Emperor Michael Rangabe), were of this party.

The second party, heavily influenced by the imperial Higher school and the nobility, argued for a relaxed view of canon law, or economy, when dealing with these large numbers of clergy, allowing them, on formal recantation of their iconoclasm, to resume their full sacerdotal functions. To this party belonged Theodora’s powerful and influential (and very unscrupulous) brother, Bardas, Photius, himself a “professor” in the Higher School and a former imperial diplomat, and eventually her own son Michael, who fell increasingly under the influence of Bardas.

It is this party, through Bardas, which eventually launched a palace coup against Theodora’s government and her patriarch, Ignatius, for precisely the reason that her government, by applying the strict letter of canon law, was denuding the church of needed clergy and thus fomenting a deep internal crisis within Byzantium. Once he obtained power in his own right, Michael III designated his uncle Bardas as “Caesar” or co-emperor. Bardas, in order to rid himself of the last vestiges of his sister’s government conceived of a plan to force Ignatius from the Patriarchate by ordering him to bless Theodora’s monastic veil. It is a carefully considered maneuver, for he knows that Ignatius will refuse on the grounds that Theodora had been forcefully exiled to a convent and forced to take the tonsure. Bardas could then have him arrested for treason against the government and deposed from the patriarchal office on the same grounds, which he does.

Let us note, however, what this does not mean. Bardas has no power or authority to depose Ignatius as a bishop, for that is an office solely of and within the Church, and would require other bishops to effect. An unlikelihood in any case, since Ignatius was guilty of no moral or doctrinal impurity. But Bardas can depose Ignatius from the patriarchate, since that is an office of the imperial government. Once deposed from
the patriarchal dignity, Bardas is free to elect a man from the second party of “economists” who advocate laxity in dealing with the lapsed clergy. This, of course, is Photius, who at the time of his imperial election, is a layman. Following earlier precedents, among whom is uncle Tarasius, Photius was ordained through the orders of the clergy in one week, one order per day, and enthroned as Patriarch of Constantinople at the end of the process.\textsuperscript{585}

All would have gone well, except for the fact that Ignatius was not about to go quietly into the night. Through various intermediaries, he appealed his deposition to Rome, hoping thereby to enlist Rome support in an eventual reinstatement. And thus began the momentous contest between Nicholas, St. Photius, and St. Ignatius, for Photius’ notice of election and consecration to the pope arrived in Rome almost at the same time as Ignatius’ appeal.

Pope Nicholas I began his encounter with Photius much more even-handedly than he would end it, first hearing the appeal of Ignatius’ legates, as well as Photius’ legates’ notification of consecration. Nicholas deferred to commune with them until he could reach a decision between the two claimants at a synod which he demanded be held at Constantinople to try Photius.

The motivation behind this demand is clear. For Nicholas there was no distinction between patriarchy and episcopacy, since in terms of the developing papal claims of his day, both were, at least in the Pope’s case, offices of divine right. But Nicholas must also be seen in a different light, for he is the first pope who actively seeks to press papal claims to canonical supremacy over the Eastern Church both on the basis of the Petrine theory, but also on the basis of the Pseudo-Isidorian decretals and especially the \textit{Donation of Constantine}, a word about which is now necessary.

The famous collection of “decretals” – i.e., pre-Nicene papal epistles, and letters of popes from Sylvester to Gregory, all of which were
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forgeries – allegedly written by St. Isidore of Seville (ca. 560-636), were composed to defend the rights of local diocesan bishops against metropolitans, but more importantly, they were written to advance the papal claims. And of course, they contain the celebrated *Donation of Constantine*, in which the first Christian emperor gives to:

> the most holy and blessed father of fathers, Silvester, Bishop of the Roman city and Pope; and to all his successors, the pontiffs, who shall sit in the chair of blessed Peter to the end of time; as also to the most reverend and God-beloved Catholic bishops, by this our imperial constitution subjected throughout the world to this same Roman Church.

585a

the use of the imperial Lateran palace and the right to wear the imperial diadem and purple. 585b

Many scholars have debated the origin of the *Decretals* and its famous *Donation*, most preferring to attribute their origin to the Christian West, either in southern Gaul or Rome itself. But his is unlikely, since the *Donation* makes it clear that papal authority over other bishops is not by divine right, but by "imperial constitution"; what the Roman emperors could give in law, they could take away in law. So where do they originate? Fr. John Romanides in his *Franks, Feudalism, and Doctrine* makes a most interesting case that they were the creation both of the Papal and of the Byzantine Roman courts to serve in their struggle against the common enemy: the Franks. 585c The reason, he says, is clear: the Frankish empire, in its proto-feudal constitution, depended upon the relationship between the emperor, metropolitans, and bishops for the smooth functioning of its imperial administration. By thus placing the Frankish bishops in direct feudal subjection to the Bishop of Rome, a blow was struck at the very heart of the Frankish empire, a blow presaging the future Investiture controversies:
The sixth and seventh centuries witnessed a continuing controversy in Francia over the place of the Frankish king in the election of bishops. One party insisted that the king had no part in the elections. A second group would allow that the king simply approve the elections. A third group would given the king veto power over elections. A fourth group supported the right of the kings to appoint the bishops. Gregory of tours and most members of the senatorial class belonged to this fourth group. However, while supporting the king’s right to appoint bishops, Gregory of Tours protested against the royal practice of selling bishoprics to the highest bidder.

From the time of Gregory the Great, the popes of Old Rome tried to convince the Frankish kings to allow the election of bishops according to canon law by the clergy and people. Of course, the Frankish kings knew very well that what the popes wanted was the election of bishops by the overwhelming Roman majority. However, once the Franks replaced the Roman bishops and reduced the populus Romanorum to serfdom as villains, there was no longer any reason why the canons should not apply...

It is within such a context that one can appreciate the appearance of the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals, a large collection of forged documents, mixed with and fused into authentic ones compiled and in use by 850...

Translated into feudal context, the Decretals supported the idea that bishops, metropolitans or archbishops, patriarchs and popes are related to each other as vassal and lords in a series of pyramidal relations, similar to Frankish feudalism, except that the pope is not bound by the hierarchical stages and procedures (of feudal law) and can intervene directly at any point in the pyramid...

Thus the pope sat simultaneously on the thrones of Saints Peter and Constantine. What more powerful rallying point could there be for that part of the Roman nation subjugated to teutonic oppression?...

The forged part of these Decretals were written in Frankish Latin, an indication that the actual work was done in Francia by local Romans. The fact that the Franks accepted the Decretals as authentic, although not in the interests of their feudal establishment, means clearly that they were
not a party to the forgery. The Franks never suspected the forgery until centuries later.

Both Old and New Rome knew that these Decretals were forgeries. Roman procedure for certification of official texts can leave no doubt about this. Therefore, it is very possible that agents of Constantinople, and certainly, agents of the Old Rome, had a hand in the compilation...

The Decretals were an attack on the very heart of the Frankish feudal system, since they uprooted its most important administrative officials, i.e., the bishops, and put them directly under the control of all things, of a Roman head of state.

In this context, the policy of Pope Nicholas I is clear.

By thus seeking to have Photius tried by papal legates, Nicholas is less concerned about coming to a decision regarding Photius and Ignatius, and more concerned to obtain what he believes is the Byzantine recognition and acknowledgement of papal supremacy. Once he has committed the moral force of the papacy to this project, he must seek to bring it to a favorable conclusion, or risk losing all basis for the alleged universality and universal recognition of those claims. Thus, for the first time in history, the papacy has committed itself to press its claims on Byzantium, a dangerous course, since Nicholas will ultimately seek to ally those claims with the Frankish-Augustinian triadology. It is therefore Nicholas and not Photius who precipitates the schism by so doing, because of course Photius will have no recourse but to reject both and excommunicate Nicholas for his heresy, which eventually, his patience exhausted, he does. Only when the two are disconnected is communion restored. In other words, only when Rome committed itself to formal abandonment of the filioque was the schism ended.

For Nicholas, the fact that Photius was also a layman when elected was, by Western and Roman standards, unacceptable, and on that view, Photius will increasingly call forth rather shrill denunciations from Nicholas as an “invader” and “usurper.” Having determined to try Photius in an
effort to secure recognition of the papal claims, Nicholas dispatched two legates, the bishops Radoald and Zachary, to Constantinople with two goals: (1) have the diocese of Illyricum which Leo III had transferred to Constantinople returned to Rome's jurisdiction; and (2) try Photius and gain his submission to Rome.

Upon their arrival in Constantinople, the papal legates spent several weeks negotiating with Photius and Bardas, both of whom insisted upon a bargain: Constantinople would not return Illyricum to Rome's jurisdiction in return for which they would allow a trial to go forward. The outcome of this was a foregone conclusion, since most of the bishops had already been won over to Photius' more relaxed economy in dealing with lapsed clergy. Radoald and Zachary, on the other hand, thinking that they have thereby obtained the more important of their goals, consented to this arrangement. Consequently, at the Synod of Constantinople in 861, Photius was tried and exonerated before the papal legates, who confirmed the decision for Nicholas, and returned to Rome, confident of Nicholas' approval.

The pope, however, did no such thing, refusing to confirm the decision and stating that the legates had exceeded the strict letter of their instructions. With this, too, Nicholas, and not Photius, initiated a schism. He has done so because, at this point, he wrote Photius and addressed him as a layman, in spite of the fact that Photius had been validly consecrated. By so doing, Nicholas is of course denying the validity of any sacraments administered by Photius or any of the clergy he ordained or that were in communion with him. He also wrote the Emperor Michael III and demanded that Photius step down and Ignatius be reinstated. With this step, he has also pressed the papal claim to intervene in the affairs of all local churches, although, to the East Romans, it was perceived as the attempt to interfere in local imperial policy. In effect, since the majority of clergy were in fact in communion with Photius, Nicholas’ demands are not only contrary to the ordinary understandings of
the sacraments which prevailed in his own church, but he has done so solely by the exercise of raw power. The normal machinery of church government has, by his actions, been overturned. At this point, Photius simply refused to communicate with Nicholas at all, choosing to ignore his letters.

At this juncture, Bulgaria, and through it, the Slavs, became an added geopolitical and ecclesiastical factor in this volatile mixture, for having carved out a kingdom on Byzantium’s back door, it became a crucial matter for the East Roman Empire to subdue it directly by military conquest, or to subdue it by converting it to its Church. It became an even more pressing matter when Bardas learned that Bulgaria had sought an alliance with the teetering Frankish Empire of Louis the Pious.

Naturally, Bardas chose to pursue both options, and struck first, and in a dazzling coordinated campaign by land and sea, quickly subdued the Bulgarian khan, Boris, and compelled his baptism, where he took the name “Michael” after the Roman Emperor. The new patriarch Photius began a vigorous campaign of sending missionary priests and bishops into Bulgaria and the Slavic nations to speed the process of conversion. These missionaries would, of course, eventually include Sts. Cyril and Methodius, whom he had selected for this mission precisely for their expertise in linguistics. They began the laborious process of creating the Slavonic written language, based upon the Greek and some added Hebrew characters, which allowed the translation of liturgical books into that language.

Boris, being much impressed by Photius upon meeting him, soon became dissatisfied with the subservience of his new Church to Constantinople, and requested a Patriarch from Photius. Photius, naturally, refused. Losing patience with this situation, and what he perceived to be excessive Byzantine meddling in the internal affairs of his youthful Church, Boris-Michael suddenly wrote to Pope Nicholas and requested to be placed under papal Roman jurisdiction in return for a
patriarch from the latter. With this, Nicholas’ policy toward the Eastern church acquired a new lease on life, as he saw this as the opportunity to change the ecclesiastical-political landscape and force Byzantine recognition of his claims. Bulgaria, perched as it was on Constantinople’s back door, was the lever in this scheme. During this period, a new factor had entered the Byzantine court in the person of Basil, who had gained the favor of Michael, whom he persuaded to murder his uncle Bardas, and install himself as co-emperor.

In any case, dispatching a very moderately worded letter to Boris, Nicholas promised to send the Bulgarian king an archbishop and two bishops to help organize the Bulgarian Church, and demanded that Boris expel all “schismatic clergy and bishops”, i.e., those ordained, consecrated, and/or in communion with Photius. The Pope added that a patriarch was nothing more than an archbishop anyway, and that Photius was not even really an archbishop, but only a layman.

The Pope then sent six sharply worded letters, including four addressed to the Emperor Michael, to the Roman Senate, to the Citizens of Constantinople, and one to Photius whom Nicholas now addressed not only as a layman, but a usurper, in which letter he sets out, more explicitly than ever before, the classical claims to primacy and supremacy. Taken together, these letters constitute nothing less than the demand for total ecclesiastical “unconditional surrender”.

Unfortunately for Nicholas, the archbishop and bishops he promised and eventually sent to Bulgaria were Franks, and were using and teaching the filioque. Photius, of course quickly learned of this, and since these clergy were under Nicholas’ direct jurisdiction, this meant nothing less than that Nicholas had abandoned the previous allegiance of the papacy to the traditional Byzantino-Roman Oecumenical Definitions of the Faith, and done so, as the Pope’s series letters to Byzantium indicated, almost exclusively for the sake of pressing his claims to total ecclesiastical power.
But, while it may have appeared this way to Photius, is there evidence that Nicholas himself had come to tie the papal claims with the heretical triadology? Indeed there is, in his letter to Archbishop Hincmar of Rheims, requesting assistance from the famous archbishop in defending and justifying the filioque. If there is one document that indicates that the Second Europe is in the process of being founded, this is it. This letter, dated 23rd of October 867, makes it abundantly clear that Nicholas has deliberately wedded the Augustinian Trinitarian theology to the papal claims. For him, in an almost exact duplication of the earlier Carolingian ecclesiastical policity, the East is no longer “Roman” at all, but only “Greek” and ergo heretical. In this letter, the filioque becomes the symbol of the contest between the Two emerging Europes, the now papal-Frankish West, and the Byzantine Rome East. The full text of the epistle is cited below, with the relevant passages to be discussed italicized and numbered:

The Epistle of Pope Nicholas I to Archbishop Hincmar of Rheims, 23 October, 867

Nicholas, bishop and servant of the servants of God, to the worthy and Most Reverend Hincmar, and to our other brothers, archbishops, and bishops, ruling the churches established in the kingdom of glorious King Charles:

You evidently know that the most blessed Peter, who protects and defends us, the heirs of his ministry, bears the burdens which weigh down all of Us. In fact he bears them in Us. Assuredly among the difficulties which cause Us great concern are those, especially disturbing to Us, (1) which the Greek emperors, Michael and Basil, and their subjects inflict on us, and truly on the whole West.

Inflamed with hate and envy again Us, as we will specify later, (2) they attempt to accuse Us of heresy. With hatred indeed, for We not only
disapproved but even condemned by deposition and anathematization the advancement attained by Photius, a neophyte, a usurper, and an adulterer of the Church of Constantinople. (3) *The ejection from this Church of Ignatius*, Our brother and co-minister, perpetuated by his own subjects and the imperial power, did not receive Our approval. And with envy (4) because they learned that Michael, king of the Bulgarians, and his people, received the Faith of Christ and now desired St. Peter’s See to provide teachers and instruction for them.

Instead, (5) they wish, rather, eagerly try to lead the Bulgarians from obedience to blessed Peter and (6) to subject them shrewdly to their own authority under the pretext of the Christian religion. (2) They preach such things about the Roman Church, which is without spot or wrinkle or anything of the kind, that those ignorant of the Faith who hear these things avoid Us, shy away, and almost desert Us as criminals spotted with the filth of various heresies…

While We were beset by these anxieties and overcome by great trials, the promised legates of the Bulgarian king suddenly presented themselves. Who can guess how great our joy and delight was! For (7) *We realized that their health-giving conversion came through the rich kindness of God*. We also found out that they had diligently sought the teaching of the blessed apostle Peter and of his See, and so even tough they lived far away, were nevertheless made close to Us by their faith. (8) *And finally We saw that an easy land passage to the East lay open for our messengers through their kingdom.*

Just as We had arranged for what was suited to the (9) fundamentals of the Faith of the Bulgarian people, so also We took care of what to send to Constantinople. We directed Our messengers with the legates now ready to pass through the region of the above-mentioned king. The Greeks not only refused to receive them, but were even furious at the Bulgarians for permitting them to travel across their country. They intimated, undoubtedly, that if our messengers had crossed over territory subject to them, they would have delivered them over to the danger to which the above-mentioned heads of (10) the heretical City are often read to have delivered the legates of the Holy See sent to them for the sake of
Further, and while they remained with the king of the Bulgarians, and while Our messengers tried to reach Constantinople, these officials sent a letter to the Bulgarian king. When he received it he loyally decided to pass it on to Us through Our legates. The We received it and after examining it along with other writings there could not be any doubt that the often mentioned leaders had not written this except with a pen (10) moistened in a pool of blasphemy and with the mud of error for ink.

They strive particularly to find fault with Our Church and (10) generally with every church which speaks Latin, (12) because we fast on Saturdays and profess that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, whereas they confess that He proceeds merely from the Father. Besides this, they claim that We detest marriage, since we do not allow priests to marry. They try to blame Us because We prohibit priests from anointing the foreheads of the baptized with chrism (which chrism, however, they falsely hold We make from fresh water).

They try to blame Us nevertheless because we do not fast, according to our custom, from meat during the eight weeks before Easter, and from cheese and eggs during the seven weeks before the Pasch. They also lie, as their other writings show, when they say that we bless and offer a lamb on the altar, after Jewish custom, together with the Lord’s Body on the Feast of the Passover. They are certainly content with fault-finding!

They complain that our priests do not refuse to shave their beards, and the We ordain a deacon not yet raised to the order of the priesthood to the episcopacy. They complain, even though they appointed as their patriarch a layman, hastily become a monk and tonsured, and then, as they realized, to advance him without any fear by a leap to the episcopacy through imperial power and favor.

Yet what is more insulting and foolish, they tried to demand a testimony of Faith from Our messengers, if they wished to be received by them, something which is against every rule and custom. In it these
doctrines and those holding them are anathematized. They even impudently demanded a canonical letter from them, to give to the one they call their “ecumenical patriarch”.

(12) it is certainly right, brothers, that you exert yourselves to the utmost in this affair, and put you other cares aside. Since these taunts are common, for they are hurled at the universal Church as we have shown, at least that part of it which is singled out by the use of Latin, (14) all together who are raised to the divine priesthood ought to fight to keep the ancient traditions from being exposed to such derogation. But these traditions, which such depraved men, lying and erring, try to defile by their contentiousness, must be entirely cleared of every blemish of blasphemy by the hand of common defense.

It is ridiculous and certainly shameful to allow the holy Church of God either to be falsely charged today, or its ancient customs handed down from our fathers to be disparaged at the pleasure of those always erring. Therefore, it is necessary to resist their efforts and to oppose to their deceitful barbs the shield of truth…

(13) Each and every one of you who enjoy metropolitan rank, joined with your brothers and their auxiliaries, are to take diligent care of these things. Take pains to search for whatever may be needed to rebut their hostile detractions. Eagerly search out, and by no means think it a light matter to send quickly what is found. Thus we will be able to send your answer along with Our other declarations against their ragings...

We should stimulate each other’s zeal and not be found as stragglers, but as an orderly line of defense arrayed against the common enemy. Then, (15) while We gain your adherence in the common conflict as you also enter into Our struggles, We will be seen to esteem you with an affectionate heart and to honor you as a brother. And you will be known as not being separated in any way from the See of Peter, the head of the Church.

With what great malice and foolishness these aforementioned Greek
leaders and their henchmen are armed against Us, because We did not consent to their evil designs, is clearly revealed. (15) Their Charges, with which they try to stain Us, are either false, or against what has been guarded in the Roman Church, indeed in the entire West, from the earliest times without contradiction. When great doctors of the Church began to rise among them, none of them was critical of these things. Only those among them who burned not with a just zeal but driven by an evil zeal seek to tear to pieces the traditions of the Church.

This was especially true since the Saturday fast was fully discussed and disputed during the time of St. Sylvester, a confessor of Christ, and defined to be observed everywhere. No one after that time has rashly presumed to attack it, nor even to murmur against it. Rather, on the contrary, what the holy See instituted and subsequently observed was hitherto found to be one and the same fountain of saving law.

As regards the procession of the Holy Spirit – who does not know that distinguished men, especially among the Latins, have written much about the matter? Supported by their authority we can reply fully and reasonably to their senselessness. Does any custom demand that they should go unrefuted, or that we should not answer their yelps and disputations tongues with reasonable argument?

It is even strange that they should allege such things since (16) they even glory in the assertion that when the emperors moved from Rome to Constantinople the primacy of the Roman See also went to Constantinople, and with the royal dignities even the privileges of the Roman Church were transferred? So that this same Photius, a usurper in the Church, even entitles himself in his writings, “archbishop and universal Patriarch.”

Therefore, consider, brethren, if these things do not prejudice the Church of Christ. See if they can be judged to be tolerable. Consider whether these men have the right to inflict derogations and detractions of this kind on the Roman Church. (18) From the time the Christian religion began to be spread she has held immutable and taught uncorrupted the doctrines which she once received form her patron and founder, St. Peter. Nor has anyone appeared, at least through all these past years,
Each of these points, if “lifted” from their context in the epistle, and arranged topically, reveal the sweeping extent both of Nicholas’ agenda, and of his very clear heretical and schismatic departure from his own predecessors’ understandings of doctrine and papal authority, most especially, of Leo III’s.

It is the pontificate of Nicholas I which marks the definitive move from the papal supremacy being a court of canonical “final appeal” to that of a “papal judicial activism” and interference in the affairs of a local Church. It is his attempt to solicit support for it in the contest with Photius that marks a distinct break not only with the East, but with his own papal predecessors. Nicholas, in short, has begun to exercise raw papal power, unfettered by any restraints of dogmatic tradition.

This will be evident from a consideration of the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRINCIPLE OF POLICY</th>
<th>CITATION IN THE EPISTLE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Universalize the Conflict</strong></td>
<td>(1) which the Greek emperors, Michael and Basil, and their subjects inflict on us, and truly on the whole West. (12) these taunts are common, for they are hurled at the universal church as we have shown, at least that part of it which is singled out by the use of Latin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Church of the Old</strong></td>
<td>(2) they attempt to accuse Us of heresy,</td>
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</table>

The Church of the Old
The Inception of the Two Europes

Rome and Papal Claims are Tied to the Filioque
(12) because we profess that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, whereas they confess that He proceeds merely from the Father.

Enlist the Aid of the Frankish Church to Justify the Filioque
(12) It is certainly right, brothers, that you exert yourselves to the utmost in this affair, and put your other cares aside. Since these taunts are common, for they are hurled at the universal Church as we have shown, at least that part of it which is singled out by the use of Latin, (14) all together who are raised to the divine priesthood ought to fight to keep the ancient traditions from being exposed to such derogation. But these traditions, which such depraved men, lying and erring, try to defile by their contentiousness, must be entirely cleared of every blemish of blasphemy by the hand of common defense.

Ignatius’ Ejection was by Imperial Power
(3) The ejection from this Church of Ignatius, Our brother and co-minister, perpetuated by his own subjects and the imperial power.

The Bulgarian Church is the Leverage Nicholas Plans to Use against the Greek Church
(4) because they learned that Michael, king of the Bulgarians, and his people, received the Faith of Christ and now desired St. Peter’s See to provide teachers and instruction for them. (8) And
finally We saw that an easy land passage to the East lay open for our messengers through their kingdom. (9) fundamentals of the Faith of the Bulgarian people, so also We took care of what to send to Constantinople. We directed Our messengers with the legates now ready to pass through the region of the above-mentioned king. The Greeks not only refused to receive them, but were even furious at the Bulgarians for permitting them to travel across their country. They intimated, undoubtedly, that if our messengers had crossed over territory subject to them, they would have delivered them over to the danger to which the above-mentioned heads of (10) the heretical City are often read to have delivered the legates of the Holy See sent to them for the sake of the Faith or ecclesiastical reform.

The Greek Church is Heretical and Schismatic

(4) because they learned that Michael, king of the Bulgarians, and his people, received the Faith of Christ and now desired St. Peter’s See to provide teachers and instruction for them. (5) they wish, rather, eagerly try to lead the Bulgarians from obedience to blessed Peter and (6) to subject them shrewdly to their own authority under the pretext of the Christian religion. (7) We realized that (the Bulgarian’s) health-giving conversion
The Inception of the Two Europes

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no Defense Because it 
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Filioque was in Use 
Throughout the Western 
Church

(15) Their Charges, with which they try to 
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When great doctors of the Church began 
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Since the Papal Claims 
are Tied to the Filioque 
and the Greeks 
Remained in Communion 
with the Western Church 
when it was being used, 
the See of Rome 
possesses an incipient 
Infallibility in doctrine

(18) From the time the Christian religion 
began to be spread she has held 
immutable and taught uncorrupted the 
doctrines which she once received from 
her patron and founder, St. Peter.

By his policies, Nicholas I was able to transform the claims of papal 
supremacy into a universal claim. But in doing so, he made the “chair of 
unity” one of the principal causes of the first major schism in Christendom, 
and presages the future history of that “chair of unity”. This one could 
have expected, for by tying these claims to the anarchical principle of the 
Filioque, ecclesiological unity was bound to collapse. Nicholas’ pontificate
is thus the pontificate which heralds the entry of a new dialectic into the emerging cultural constitution of the Second Europe: the dialectic of One versus Many within institutional structures.

**e. The New Dialectic: One Pope versus Many Bishops: Imperial, or Pontifical Unity?**

The new dialectic which has begun to emerge – One Pope versus Many Bishops – highlights the growing divergence between the understanding of ecclesiastical authority that has begun to emerge in the ninth century Second Europe’s schism. To understand this, we must, for a moment, recall what was stated in Part One of these essays on the Apostolic Fathers. It was seen that in the Eastern Mediterranean world, no special significance attached to the term “apostolic See”, since there was an abundance of such sees claiming apostolic origin. On this view, bishops of Rome itself were understood to be in the Church, not above her, for if they were above her they would by definition be outside of her.

But Pope Nicholas’ letters, and especially those to Patriarch Photius, exhibit the effects of the new wedding of papal claims to Augustinian triadology and the resulting breakdown of what constitutes true Christians ecclesial unity:

This new conception of the Church envisages at least two distinct and independent acts of institution performed by Christ: that by which He established the apostolic function of the Church, and that by which He established the church as a eucharistic reality... Incorporation into this mystical body, therefore, is not alone or even above all through participation in the eucharist. It is also – and in effect primarily – through membership of the visible institutional form of the Church and subscription to its laws. 599

Thus:
The Inception of the Two Europes

This means that the Church is seen to be manifest on earth not so much in each authentic – apostolic and Episcopal – local church, as in a collective, corporate, and social institution of which each local church constitutes a part. Thus, no local church can represent or embody the fullness of the Church, which would be like saying no Person of the Trinity is the fullness of the divine essence. Rather, each local Church manifests only apart of that fullness which exists only in the Roman Papacy, an office which, let it be noted, is not apostolic nor Episcopal, but a wholly new, fourth office, the “circle” in the center of the Augustinian Trinitarian shield. Not for nothing, then, does Nicholas support the Augustinian triadology, for the debate is not only over the ultimate basis of the divine unity of the Godhead, but also over the true nature of the unity of the Church: is that unity in Orthodox Catholic doctrine and polity, or in the papacy? Does one support a supreme and ultimate unity behind and prior to the multiplicity of person – be that unity an abstracted and impersonal divine essence or a supreme canonical “simplicity” – or does one begin multiplicity of persons, or bishops, and seek among them the proper ground of their unity? In any case, it is clear that with Nicholas, the pope has begun to preside “over the Church on earth in a way analogous to that in which the essence presides over the Trinity” within the Augustinian ordo theologiae of essence, attributes, and persons.

3. The Third Phase and Its Central Ikon: Otto III, Sylvester II, and the Renewal of “Rome” in the Second Europe through the Augustinizing of Law

a. The Christological Basis of Imperium: Augustine’s Conjunctio as Nestorius’ “Juxtaposition” (Συμπόσιος)
The Third Phase of the Inception of the Two Europes are the imperium of Otto III and the pontificate of Sylvester II. Each represents a last attempt to create and sustain within the Christian West the “symphony” of Church and Empire that existed more or less successfully in Byzantium. This symphony, embodied in throughout Byzantine imperial law and most especially in the Sixth Novella of the emperor Justinian the Great, deliberately founded the relationship between the Church and the Empire on *Economy*, i.e., on the Christology of the Incarnation. According to this text,

There are two greatest gifts which God, in his love for man, has granted from on high: the priesthood and the imperial dignity. The first serves divine things, the second directs and administers human affairs; both, however, proceed from the same origin and adorn the life of mankind. Hence, nothing should be such a source of care to the emperors as the dignity of the priests, since it is for the (imperial) welfare that they constantly implore God. For if the priesthood is in every way free from blame and possesses access to God, and if the emperors administer equitably and judiciously the state entrusted to their care, general harmony will result, and whatever is beneficial will be bestowed upon the human race.\(^{602}\)

If one senses the idealism and “vagueness” of this passage, one senses immediately the religio-political genius of Byzantine conceptions of the relationship between Church and Empire: since the basis of the relationship is Christ Himself, the relationship must *perforce* remain a mystery even when the ideal comes closest to realization in actual fact. In this regard it is important to recall that the great Christological heresies resulted form their attempt, at some point, to invest the conception of Hypostasis itself – in this case, the Hypostasis of the Son and Word, the Hypostasis of the union of the divine and human natures and operations in Christ – with *positive* definitions drawn from analogies to the world, or from
particular philosophical systems.

This is what happens under Otto III and Sylvester II, for while each had the Byzantine model in view, they both inherit the Augustinian trinitarian doctrine which impels the reinterpretation of patristic texts. It is this factor which works to counter their efforts, literally “subverting the concepts” and the language they employ to embody their policies in law.

The Ottonian period thus stands out, in spite of all its obvious Byzantine influences, as the period in which the Augustinizing of law being in the Christian west, propelled by, and propelling, the final creation of the “Body” of the Second Europe. But in order to understand this, we must briefly look at what the “body” had become for the Second Europe by turning to the eucharistic contest between Ratramnus and Paschasius Radbertus in that most significant ninth century. While much more will be said in due course on the nature of the dispute between these two men, a word is necessary here on the basic dialectical shape that the dispute took. For Ratramnus, the “Body” of Christ which was present in the Eucharist and in the Church was some other body than that in which He lived his life in the Incarnate Economy. This disjunction or discontinuity of Christ’s “real” body, that of the Incarnation itself, and His “spiritual” or “mystical” body was bound with dialectical inevitability to find expression in the canonical legislation. And this in fact, does occur, with the phrase *corpus mysticum* gaining increasing popularity in the canonical literature of the Second Europe after this period. For Radbertus, a dialectical opposition between “mystical” and “real” bodies meant that the “mystical” body was not a mystery at all. Accordingly, the Eucharistic and ecclesial bodies were *not* disjunct nor discontinuous with Christ’s Incarnate humanity, but were one and the very same body in which he was Incarnate, Crucified, Dead, Risen, and ascended.⁶⁰³

If all this seems familiar, it is.

Ratramnus may be understood as advocating a kind of
“sacramental Nestorianism”, for by opening the distance by a dialectical opposition between the eucharistic and the “real” body of Christ which is risen and ascended into Heaven, Ratramnus introduces a basic dualism into canonical and legal thought in the Christian West. And in turn, this dualism finds expression in the legal conceptions surrounding the person and office of the emperor. There was a growing opposition between the two aspects or “presentations” of the emperor, his divine and hieratic mission as the source of legislation and the orderly harmony of his rule, “omnipresent” throughout his realm, and his quite human attributes which meant that, after all, he was not everywhere “bodily” present administering justice. “There is discretion in space, but a conjunction in love.” This quotation, found often on the lips and pens of mediaeval canonists in the Second Europe, indicates that legal and theological thinking were already of a piece for the Augustinian religious mind.

But most interesting is the fact that Augustine describes the union of the two aspects of the imperial office as a conjunction, that is, by the same type of quasi-contractual language as Nestorius described the union of divine and human persons (προσωπα) in Christ. Augustine’s imperial conjunctio in law is but Nestorius’ juxtaposition (συναΦεια) in Christology. This definition of the imperial person as a “conjunction” is likewise founded in the filioque, for which the Holy Spirit is the “conjunction” of the Father’s and the Son’s mutual love, the “consubstantial love” of both. This definition of person in turn carries with it its own long-term implications for the imperial constitution.

b. The Constitutional Consequences of the Filioque:

1. The Divorce of Symbol and Reality: The Mystical Body and Law

The disputes between Radbertus and Ratramnus presage a long sacramental and legal development. The distinguished medievalist Ernst
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Kantorowicz traces it this way:

The Church as the mystical body of Christ – and that means: Christian society composed of all the faithful, past, future, and present, actual and potential – might appear to the historian so typically medieval a concept, and so traditional, that he would easily be inclined to forget how relatively new that notion was when Boniface VIII probed its strength and efficiency by using it as a weapon in his life-and-death struggle against Philip the Fair of France. The concept of the Church as corpus Christi, of course, goes back to St. Paul: but the term corpus mysticum has no biblical tradition and is less ancient than might be expected. It first came into prominence in Carolingian times and carried on over many years by Paschasius Radbertus and Ratramnus, both of the monastery of Corbie. On one occasion, Ratramnus pointed out that the body in which Christ had suffered was his ‘proper and true body’ (proprium et verum corpus) whereas the Eucharist was his corpus mysticum. Perhaps Ratramnus relied upon the authority of Hrabanus Maurus, who had stated, shortly before, that within the Church the corpus mysticum – meaning the Eucharist – was administered by the priestly office.

Here then in the realm of dogma and liturgy, there originated that notion whose universal bearing and final effects cannot be easily overrated. Corpus mysticum, in the language of the Carolingian theologians, referred not at all to the body of the Church, nor to the oneness and unity of Christian society, but to the consecrated host.

With the term corpus mysticum, we encounter once again a Gnostic technique, in this case, that of the invention of a new term for a new thing, a “body” of Christ opposed to and therefore distinct from that “body” in which He was and is Incarnate. By the twelfth century, this process will be completely inverted, the Pauline “Body of Christ”, designating the “Church” as well as the Eucharist in the pre-schism lexicon, will increasingly come to designate the Host itself, and in the contrary motion,
the term “mystical body” will come to designate the Church in all her sociological functions and manifestations.\textsuperscript{608}

Otto III’s reign stands midway between this process. As such, legal conceptions of the period can still describe the emperor’s powers and office not so much in terms of the power which he theoretically wields in the abstraction called “the State”, but in terms of his liturgical function as being the ikon or image of Christ’s providential ordering of the World in the continuous Economy of the Incarnation. As a man, however, the emperor is not, as we have seen, omnipotent nor omnipresent. In this duality, the Ottonian canonists (and their Norman French contemporaries), could and did apply Augustine’s sermon on the 90\textsuperscript{th} Psalm:

“The tabernacle of God is the flesh. In the flesh the Word has dwelt, and the flesh was made a tabernacle for God.” Augustine then continues: “In this very tabernacle the Emperor (i.e., Christ) has militated for us – \textit{in ipso tabernaculo Imperator militavit pro nobis}--… We thus have to recognize (in the king) a \textit{twin person}, one descending from nature, the other from grace… One which, by condition of nature, he conformed with other men: another through which, by the eminence of (his) deification and by the power of the sacrament (of consecration), he excelled all others. Concerning one personality, he was, by nature, an individual man; concerning his other personality, he was, by grace, a \textit{Christus}, a God-man.\textsuperscript{609}

One may easily discern here was had happened with Otto III and the Second Europe’s canonists and lawyers who are seeking to ground the office of the imperium, Byzantine-like, on the Incarnation:

(1) Otto III’s mother, the Byzantine princess Theophano, reinvigorates the understanding of “imperium” in the remains of the Frankish, Holy Roman Empire;

(2) Otto III is consecrated Emperor, and that act is understood, as it was in Byzantium, as conferring a grace or power for the office;
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(3) that office was likewise understood liturgically and hieratically, as “imaging” Christ’s providential ordering of creation as its Lawgiver and Fulfiler;

(4) but while the First Europe’s christological formulae speak of Christ as one person in two natures, the canonists of the West, following the inversion of the Augustinian ordo theologiae view those definitions, not by starting at the person but at the natures, and thus, construe the person in reference to the natures, in this case, in Nestorian fashion as one person who is at the same time two underlying “presentations”, one divine by grace, and the other human by nature.  

In contrast with the Byzantine view, for which the category of hypostasis was always undefinable and, ultimately, a mystery, the Second Europe has taken over the Hellenizing agenda of Nestorius and Severus, or rather, is pursuing the inherent implications of its own Augustinian Hellenization to their ultimate conclusions. Thus, the basic relationship of Empire and Church becomes increasingly formulated as a series of constitutional propositions. For the Byzantine “symphony”, the divine essence remained undefinable in theology, and the exact content of Hypostasis was never invested with analogical content. Thus, the emperor’s office and the relationship of empire and church was never defined positively, or in terms of any philosophical analogy. The two, like the divine and human natures, were known and distinguished by their functions or operations.

The Ottonian canonists seek to embody this negative or “apophatic jurisprudence” by distinguishing between the emperor’s two functions, his “human” and his “imperial” operations. But the person himself has, in the Augustinian theology, already been defined in positive philosophical conceptions as the dialectical function of the union of opposites. Hence, the “ecclesiastical” and “imperial” or “secular” functions of the emperor will
be increasingly construed to be opposed to each other.

Nothing more fully illustrates the dilemma into which Ottonian conceptions plunge legal developments than the fact that the language used to describe the emperor’s “twinned person” is that of an earlier western heresy, Spanish Adoptionism. Following a christological formulary of St. Augustine, the Spanish Adoptionists in the fifth and sixth centuries argued that Christ was the son of God by nature in that nature “which He is begotten from the Father” but Son of God by grace “in that nature in which He is descended from David.” In other words, the metaphor which Augustine uses in explicating Psalm 90 was applied from the emperor to Christ, to an analogous understanding of the Incarnation. But in the Ottonian period, the metaphor is inverted: it is now applied from Christ to the emperor. And in this step, the uniqueness with which Christ was conceived in Byzantine imperial thought was destroyed: Christ and the emperor now stood, at least as far as the law was concerned, as equals. As Christ in His human nature was “predestined to be the son of God by grace” so the emperor’s predestination to the grace of the imperium is sealed by his imperial consecration and anointing. And this, of course, presages a development that only works itself out much later in jurisprudence: if the emperor is “predestined” to imperium, what does the consecration itself confer, if anything?

There are now several things, working simultaneously, that will influence further legal developments:

1. The underlying Byzantine doctrine of “symphony”, with its “liturgical” conceptions of imperial polity;

2. The Augustinian christological formulation with its disjunctions of “nature” and “Grace” and the positive “kataphatic” character of its Christological formulations;

3. The Augustinian Trinitarian formulation, with its built-in structural dialectics which define persons as functions of those dialectics;
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(4) The Augustinian predestinarian doctrine which, based on an understanding of the divine simplicity that identifies foreknowledge and predestination, blurs the distinction between theology and economy;

(5) The Augustinian Trinitarian doctrine, which argues that since the Spirit is sent into the world by the Son (economy) and He therefore proceeds also from the Son eternally (theology), which likewise blurs the distinction of theology and economy;

(6) The Augustinian Trinitarian doctrine, which begins its theological expositions from the inverted ordo theologiae of essence (nature), attributes, and persons, and which has tacitly defined nature (essence) in terms of the positive conceptions of philosophy, subordinating revelation (persons) to philosophy (natures and attributes);

(7) And finally, in contradistinction to all those inherent impulses to blur theology and economy or the divine and the human, or nature and grace, there is an equally strong dialectical impulse to oppose each of these poles.

Needless to say, from these confusing and mutually contradictory influences will issue confusing and mutually contradictory developments in constitutional and legal theory. In the mass of details to be explored in future pages, it is important for the reader to remember that the confusion he experiences is not subjective; it is built into the system itself and derives from that system.

It was, after all, Augustine himself who, like other fathers of his day, began the process of transference of theological terms and sigla to imperial law. But in Augustine’s case, this was done by first transferring imperial law to theology – yet another Hellenization – a process which, during the century following the Ottonian period, undergoes profound legal
extrapolations in the works of an anonymous Norman canonist. For him, the personal constitution of the king:

mirrors the duplication of natures of Christ. The king is the perfect impersonator of Christ on earth. Since the king’s divine model is at once God and man, the royal christomimetes (lit. “Christimitation”, ed.) has to correspond to the duplication; and since the divine model is at once King and Priest, the kingship and priesthood of Christ have to be reflected in His vicars as well, that is, in the King and Bishop, who are at the same time personae mixtae (spiritual and secular) and personae geminatae (human by nature and divine by grace). 613

Thus, the sort of dialectical tensions that the future interplay of Augustinian theology, Byzantine imperial constitutionalism, and canonical reflection may be anticipated. By the fourteenth century, one will encounter a John of Salisbury, writing of the opposition of nature and grace in legal terms, speaks of the king as both Lord and serf of the law, a dialectical tension which inhered in the office itself. 614

c. The Significance of the Halo in Imperial Ikonography: The Augustinizing of Art

Arresting as the implications of the Ottonian period are for the development of law in the Second Europe, even more so are those implications which, in graphic form, signify the progress of the Augustinian mind in the general culture. Art is the lens that allows this progress to be seen clearly, and its theological roots clearly demonstrated, for the Ottonian period is the last period in the Second Europe where, without significant exceptions, the First Europe’s influence is still very much evident.

During the previous Carolingian period, the emperors were portrayed as receiving the blessing of God from the hand of the Father.
Christ is absent from these scenes. In the Carolingian conception of kingship, influenced as it was by heavy Old Testament allusions as well as by Augustinism, the king is God the Father’s representative, the earliest example in the history of the Second Europe of its tendency to read the Old Testament as a revelation, not of God the Son, but of God the Father. But in the “Byzantine correction” phase of the Ottonians, this spirit is replaced with a more patristic and Christocentric depiction of imperium. In the famous ikonography of the anonymous Ottonian painter from Reichenau, the emperor is in the place of Christ, and the hand stretching down from above is surrounded by a cross-halo: it is probably not the hand of the Father, but rather that of the Son. In short, the Ottonian concept of rulership displayed by the Reichenau artist was not theocentric; it was decisively christocentric… In fact, the unique Reichenau miniature is the most powerful pictorial display of what may be called ‘liturgical kingship’ – a kingship centered in the God-man rather than God the Father. 615

There should be no hesitations, however, concerning the “cross-halo” or “nimbus” as it is more accurately known, for this is the ikonographic symbol which distinguishes Christ from all others, and always contains on each of the three bars of the cross behind His had the Greek for “He Who Is’ (ο ων), or “I AM”. Thus, for the ikonography of the First Europe, the meaning of the Old Testament is clear: it is a revelation primarily of Christ Himself, a revelation continuing in more or less the same fashion in the New Testament, as exemplified in Christ’s many “I am”s in the Gospels.

But the hesitation in identifying the nimbus in the anonymous ikonographer from Reichenau’s depiction of Otto is symptomatic of a phenomenon that begins, very slowly at first, to manifest itself during the Ottonian period: the transference of artistic symbols of Christ to the Father, or vice-versa. This is the artistic version of the transference of the hypostatic characteristics (υποστατικαι ιδιοτηται) from the Father to the
Son in the *filioque*. Only now, such transference of symbols occurs in the context of artistic depictions of the emperor. Of course, in the Ottonian period, such transference is rare. But at the *end* of the process, as we shall see, ca. 1250 and the final collapse of the empire in the aftermath of Friedrich, the Augustinian trinitarian theology will have done its work.

But one would err if one did not place the Ottonian period in a rather more favorable light than this. The art of ikonography of the Ottonians is far removed from the “Augustinian art” of the Carolingians with its preoccupation with God the Father, as it is far removed form the religious art and merely “pious decoration” of the Second Europe which follows it. For during the Ottonian period, in ikonography, the influence of the First Europe and its theological and cultural conceptions predominate. The Crucifixion, for example, may be portrayed with Christ vested with imperial diadem, robed in the imperial purple, and literally reigning triumphant from the throne of the Cross, a figure known to the West as a *Christus Rex*. And Otto himself can be portrayed in a Gospel book like Christ, enthroned on a Byzantine style throne, vested and ruling over the orb of the world.

Even as late as the Emperor Heinrich II, one finds this same spirit depicted, but, likewise, growing indications of the “Augustinizing” of imperial law. In the folio proceeding the fourth Gospel in the Gospel book which Heinrich donated to the celebrated abbey of Monte Cassino, the Holy Spirit is depicted as a dove descending on the emperor, symbolizing the emperor’s infusion with divine judgment and reason. This is still a very First European notion, since no sacramental act or liturgical Mystery can occur in Byzantine (and contemporary Orthodox) conception *without* such a descent or *epiklesis* of the Holy Spirit onto the Church. As Kantorowicz notes, the emperor is still “the mediator and executor of the divine will through the power of the Holy Spirit, and not through the secular spirit of legal science.” But later, of course, the dialectical tensions evident in the Augustinian religious mind will drive the sacred and secular apart,
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such that these patterns will be “translated into new secular and juristic modes of thinking and thus (will survive) by transference in a secular setting.” The scope of this secularization and transference will be so extensive that the anointing of the king or emperor himself, dedicated so faithfully in Heinrich’s Gospel book, will lose all sacramental, and therefore, legal significance in the later Middle Ages and the beginning of the “Modern” era. Once the liturgical function of kingship, the ruler’s role as the ikon of Christ, is no longer in view, the act of ritual anointing will no longer be the sine qua non in society for the assumption of authority. “Rulership” will thus be defined, not as the headship of a “hierarchy of imperium” but as that of a bureaucracy, a bureaucracy whose powers – and limits to those powers – derive not form Christ, but, as we shall see, from an abstracted “reason” (νοῦς) of state.

The ikonographic depiction of the Ottonian polity is mirrored by a similar development in the application of terms to the emperors. As the Carolingian emperors rooted their authority in appeals to the Old Testament and to God the Father, the favored expression for the emperors in official documents was vicarious Dei, the “vicar of God.” But with the Ottonian Emperors, this is changed to vicarius Christi, or “vicar of Christ.” With this, one senses the looming cries of investiture that would plague the later Middle Ages of the Second Europe, for the latter title had already been used, and was increasingly being claimed as the sole prerogative of, the Popes. In the widening dualism between the sacred and the secular that was beginning to open, the contest over this term likewise will represent a contest for political and ecclesiastical authority within a unified ecclesio-feudal hierarchy.

d. Some Implications of the Imperial Constitution of the Ottonian Period

Cursory as this survey of the legal and artistic developments in the Ottonian period has had to be, and incrementally small tough the steps of
the political and constitutional development have been, they are nevertheless of momentous importance for understanding the emergence of the Second Europe and its culture. One may discern broad areas of development that the post-Ottonian period will bring to fruition. We have already hinted at the combination of theological factors underlying these developments. It is now necessary to say something about the form they will take.

(1) The first development springs from the wedding of Theology and Philosophy itself within the inversion of the patristic into the Augustinian *ordo theologiae*, a wedding in which, in the order of the exposition of concepts, the Christian component – Persons – is clearly subordinated to the merely philosophical – nature and attributes. Thus, as this *ordo theologiae* is more fully explored within the Second Europe, two broad avenues of its development may be discerned. On the one hand, sacramental theology will develop in a system and context almost completely devoid of references to the liturgical context in which the sacraments are performed. In short, the *abstract philosophical categories* will increasingly replace the *historical-context specific worship* of the Church as embodied in her liturgies. The emphasis will shift from what is prayed in the liturgical texts to what is understood about “proper form, matter, and intention” as opposed to and divorced from those texts. On the other hand, a parallel development will manifest itself in the development of law and ikonography. The liturgical context of kingship will recede into the distant and increasingly forgotten background, and a whole new type of legal theorizing will arise in its place, centering on ever larger and more grandiose abstractions: “king” will become “kingship”, and that will become “the State”. “Just rule” will mean less and less the rule of Christ, and more and more the rule of an abstracted “Reason of State”,

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devoid of Christian references save only in name. indeed, by
the time of Hegel in the nineteenth century, the names of God
within the Augustinian shield will, as we shall see, be replaced
with the “reasons of state’ in the dialectical unfolding of the
categories.

(2) These two processes will in turn be based upon a much deeper
transformation of the religious mind of the Second Europe. We
have seen how kingship for the Carolingians was rooted in the
Person of God the Father, and for the Ottonians in God the
Son. But increasingly the first step in the Augustinian ordo
theologiae, that of the divine and simple essence itself, will
come to dominate both the theological and therefore legal and
artistic paradigms. By so defining God’s essence as “absolute
simplicity”, Augustine had implied the intelligibility of God’s very
essence, and with that step, made possible the vast systems of
“natural theology” – which is neither natural nor theology – that
so dominate the scholastic period of the Second Europe. This
“natural theology” assumed the divine simplicity at the outset of
all its endeavors, and, thus assuming that God’s essence was
identical to his existence, assumed moreover that all essences
and all existences were somehow inextricably linked. And since
God was simple essentially, to prove that He exists was also to
prove that He was good, just, wise, holy. One ends, in this
development, with an abstract God-in-general, who could be
the God of the Christina Aquinas, or of the Muslim Averroes, or
of the Jew Moses Maimonides, all alike Second European
philosophers writing in more or less the same glowing terms
about the simplicity of God. Not only is Christianity in the West
Hellenized and Augustinized, one must say the same thing
about Islam and Judaism. With this growing abstraction of the
God-in-general a parallel development in law is presaged. God
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will become, in the legal as well as the philosophical texts of the Second Europe, the grand abstraction about Whom everything, anything, or nothing may be said. A God this generalized is also a God who is possessed of no moral character, who makes no specific claims or demands, and leaves no specific revelation to anyone. Once enshrined in law, this God will tolerate everything. Here too, then, the religious assumptions of the modern era have deep theological roots.

(3) Finally, the wedding of Philosophy and Theology that is at evidence in the first step of the Augustinian *ordo theologiae* committed the Second Europe to a theological world in which, at root, and in spite of all apparent changes to the contrary, remains essentially neoplatonic in its outlines and structure. When Arab scholars translated Aristotle, whom they have encountered in their growing pressures on Byzantium, and Jewish scholars turn that translation from Arabic into Hebrew and Latin, the stage will therefore be set for another convulsion in the Second Europe. For Aristotle, whom the First Europe, initially, in third-hand texts that have gone through no less than two translations. And with that “rediscovery”, the whole corpus of doctrinal formulations will have to be rethought. After all, philosophy is the handmaiden of theology. In this sense, too, not only does doctrine develop, but the simple theory of Paulinus of Aquileia – the “theology of interpolation” – will grow from an assumption made in reference to only one area of doctrine into an assumption made about the whole history of doctrine.

Anselm, Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, Wycliffe, Luther, and more recently, Descartes, Kant, von Harnack, Hegel, Newman and Schleiermacher all lie down this path, as does the Jesuit Karl Rahner,
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who, confronted with the philosophical “pluralism” of the twentieth century as well as with the “necessity” to “do theology” in league with philosophy, pronounced on the dilemma of the modern Papal church: it has lost its unified voice because it cannot make a unified philosophical articulation of doctrine any more.619 But perhaps nothing so illustrates the massive spiritual difficulties into which the adoption of the filioque and its Augustinian ordo theologiae plunged the Second Europe as the fact that the order in which the doctrine of God was explored in the cathedral schools, the great universities, and later the seminaries, was exactly the opposite order in which God was prayed to in Church. The latter said “one God’ and meant “philosophical simplicity”, and the former said “I believe in One God” and went one to say “The Father Almighty.” It is this division of the religious mind and heart that, perhaps, is the most fundamental legacy of the inception of the Second Europe in the ninth century. Indeed, to cite Patriarch St. Photius, the filioque said “all the rash impudence that there is to say.”620
The Hellenized Foundation of the Second Europe

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