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GOD, HISTORY, AND DIALECTIC

THE THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE TWO EUROPEES AND THEIR CULTURAL CONSEQUENCES

Volume III - History: A Theological Pathology of the Second Europe
PART THREE: HISTORY, A THEOLOGICAL PATHOLOGY OF THE SECOND EUROPE
The Legal Stuff

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IX. THE VISION OF THE CHAMELEON GODHEAD

A. In Theology and Philosophy: The Gnostic Tactic of Changing The Terms and the New Names of God

Once in place in the Second Europe, the new Augustinian Gnosticism that consummated the marriage of Theology and Philosophy influenced every attempt to apply Christian theological conceptions to the broader culture. Before the currents of that movement can accurately be understood, however, one must first have an understanding of the more immediate effects that the emerging Gnosticism had upon theology and art, while not intentionally contrived by their sires for the subversion of the Second Europe’s Christian underpinnings, nevertheless did exactly that.

In the Gnostic tactic of assigning new meanings to texts, for example, the term “God” came increasingly to be associated with metaphysical conceptions, and from there, became more and more a term of academic art, a linguistic symbol which referred less and less to the character of God as revealed in the context-specificity of Christian spiritual experience – Father, Son, and Holy Spirit – and more and more to the terms and ideas of scholastic theology. Thus, the tetragrammation of Exodus 3:12 – I AM Who I AM – came to be interpreted according to the new Augustinian ordo theologiae as a reference to the “summun ens”, the “Supreme Being”, to the divine simplicity itself. The revelation was no longer the Burning Bush itself, typical for the Fathers of the Divine and human natures of the Person Jesus Christ, Who was understood to be the “I AM” referred to in the verse. It was now a revelation of a proposition about God: simplicity. In this milieu, the Burning Bush itself faded as the context of interpreting the revelation. With this, the scope of Revelation is began to be narrowed, from words and events to just the words themselves, words which take on increasingly propositional character. 621
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The truthfulness of this observation may, perhaps, best be approached from rather unusual, non-Christian sources, themselves experiencing their own “Hellenization”: Judaism and Islam. The great Jewish and Muslim Medieval scholastics can refer to the “being” and “simplicity” of God just as easily as their Christian counterparts, and just as easily, they can ignore their own religion’s “historical context specificity.” The terms thus favored by the scholastic theology of the Second Europe – Absolute Being, Essence, Actus Purus, or, more lately, “Universal Gravitation”, “Cosmic Watchmaker”, or “infinite horizon” – signify not only the great Gnostic transformation of culture that the potency of that Hellenization and the controlling grip it has begun to exercise on the religious mind of the Second Europe.

The “new” dialectical method that had been introduced into Trinitarian formulation by Augustine had, by the time of Anselm of Canterbury, come to dominate every aspect of theological exposition, for it is Anselm who first explicitly enunciates the formal principle inherent in the Augustinian ordo theologiae itself: the possibility of “doing theology” without the specifics of the Christian revelation, of explicating Christian doctrine without reference to the specific doctrines themselves. The most succinct, and indeed chilling, statement of this futile enterprise is announced at the very beginning of Anselm’s classic work on the doctrine of the atonement, the Car Dues Homo (Why the God-Man?):

In fine, leaving Christ out of view (as if nothing had ever been known of him[sic. Et. Passim.]) it proves, by absolute reasons, the impossibility that any man should be saved without him. Again, in the second look, likewise, as if nothing were known of Christ, it is moreover shown by plain reasoning and fact that human nature was ordained for this purpose, viz.„ that every man should enjoy a happy immortality, both in body and in soul...623

These remarks cannot be lingered over too long, nor their consequences
for the culture of the Second Europe be exaggerated.

In order to appreciate these consequences, one must pause and consider each step in the developing cultural logic precisely.

(1) Augustine wedded philosophy and theology by employing the unreconstructed Neoplatonic definition of simplicity and its accompanying dialectic of oppositions as the basis upon which to explicate the doctrine of the Trinity. As such, it became “impossible” to “so theology” without the positive content of philosophical metaphysics.

(2) Since God’s essence was now defined to be “simplicity itself”, God’s essence became identical to His existence and attributes. At the level of the Persons of the Trinity, they were now distinguished by means of the dialectics of oppositions between them, or, put differently, the Trinity was reduced to an interior dialectic process within the divine process within the divine essence.

(3) The Analogy off the Trinity within man was thus the rational and dialectical analogy of the faculties of the individual soul.

Thus far, these are the implications that have already been encountered, but as was seen in the previous chapter, Photius predicted that the Augustinian method would compel the introduction of dogmas “in rivalry with the Master.” This is precisely the deduction that Anselm arrives at two centuries after Photios first warned of this implication. Thus:

(4) If God Himself be a dialectical process, then He can be known by means of the dialectic itself – Anselm’s of the revelation of Christ, “as is nothing had ever been known of Him.”

Consequently, one might envision, extending Anselm’s principle, a “Christology without Christ” and a “Theology without God” and an “ecclesiology without the Church,” or, as we shall see, a “Eucharistic sacramental doctrine” without the “Body of Christ,” or, in secular
applications, a “Law without a Lawgiver”. In short, if one allow the principla with respect to God, then there is little inhibition to follow it in reference to any other aspect of doctrine.

Anselm has detected yet another implication to the Augustinian ordo theologiae and its implied Hellenization of the doctrine of God in terms of simplicity, and this is the rationalism that is implied in the doctrine. If God’s essence can be defined as simplicity, then the very act of definition itself implies that God’s essence is intelligible and knowable to the human intellect and its metaphysical categories. And if that definition is “simplicity”, then all categories in God are ultimately equivalent to all other categories. Thus, if one proves that God exists, then one also proves that God is also holy, just, good, One, truth, and all the other attributes normally attributed to the concept of God.

It is this definition of simplicity and its accompanying dialectic of oppositions, therefore, which lies hidden at the heart of Anselm’s “Ontological argument” for the existence of God. The argument maybe summarized as follows: since the mark of perfection is Being Itself, i.e, “simple existence”, if one imagines the most perfect being in the mind, it perforce must also really exist, since not to exist would detract from its perfection. Anselm’s arguments four centuries earlier, on Aristole’s principle of non-contradiction: two contrary attributes cannot cohere in the same subject at the same time. In this case, the two contrary attributes are perfection (simple existence) and imperfection (non-existence). But a non-existent perfection, “God”, must exist.

But the grounding of theological in the method of dialectical proof also carried with it an implication the full ramifications of which, perhaps, Anselm and the other scholastics were not aware, for if one can prove any aspect of Christian doctrine on the basis of “absolute” or dialectically necessary reason, one also opens the possibility of disproof. Before proceeding to the examination of the first proffered disproof of the existence of God”, we must be clear about the long term implications of
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the possibility of disproof for the Second Europe. Philosophical atheism and agnosticism, as articulated systems of belief, may certainly be, and have been, advance against almost any religious system of doctrine and belief. But on the point of historical pedigree, such systems arose in the culture of the Second Europe precisely as reactions to and implications of Anselm’s scholastic statement of the Augustinian dialectical God, for it is that God, with the whole intellectual cathedral of medieval scholastic philosophy and Catholicism, which before animus of philosophical criticism as the Middle Ages waned and the “Modern” era began in the Second Europe. One is led to an ironic inevitability, for “critical philosophers” such as Immanuel Kant would reject the same Augustinian dialectical concept of God as did earlier Byzantine theologians, though they would do also on philosophical and not on theological grounds.626

We may now turn to the first “disproof” of the existence of God” itself: Gaunillon’s response to Anselm’s argument. If, says Gaunillon, we can imagine a perfection, we can imagine a “perfect island” of dialectical necessity actually exists.627 Analyzed carefully, Gaunillon’s argument is less an attack on the existence of the Christian God than it is an attack on the conceptualized God-in-general of “philosophical monotheism”, for at the heart of this “disproof” is the attack on the definition of simplicity itself and its implication that all categories – including those of essence and existence – are identical in God. It therefore is likewise an attack on Anselm’s use of the principles of non-contradiction, which likewise depends upon the simplicity of the divine essence. But in the milieu of the Second Europe’s Hellenization, such an attack was bound to be perceived as an impiety, since it was no longer possible in the general culture to attack the one without, so it seemed, attacking the other. After all, true philosophy was itself a kind of revelation, and revelation was the true philosophy.628

Anselm’s scholastic method thus carried with it a further, nastier, implication, for there was no clear boundary between Reason and
revelation, or rather, between what doctrines were demonstrable by reason and what were only accessible by faith. Since God was simple, and dialectically necessary – and we are here once again perilously close to the later Medieval reiteration of the Origenist Problematic – and since the Trinity, by dint of the filioque, was an interior dialectical process within the Godhead, the Trinity itself became a subject capable of demonstrations by "absolute reason" divorced from revelation.

The key to this program is Augustine’s psychological analogies of the Trinity in the individual soul. One who knows Himself (the Father) and remembers Himself (the Son) must necessarily love Himself (the Spirit). Anselm stands the Augustinian analogies of their head, however, for it will be recalled that Augustine did not start his own exposition of the dialectical Trinity from that point, but rather, derived the analogies from the already extrapolated dialectical structure of the filioque that followed from the definition of simplicity. But since for Anselm a conceivable perfection must necessarily really exist, elsewise it remains an imperfection, then the psychological analogies must necessarily point to an apodictically certain dialectics within God. To put this in quasi-Cartesian language, it is an if Anselm has said, cogito ergo Deus est (I think therefore God exists.”) With this step, the Persons have been reduced to natural operations.

The radical nature of this program could not have been expected to endure, and indeed, for Aquinas the dogmatician, there was no natural knowledge of the Trinity of Persons. Nonetheless, Aquinas the scholastic philosopher, both by dint of the common cultural inheritance of, as well as of dogmatic adherence to, the Augustinian triadology, and inevitably to deal with the psychological analogies and their inherent dialectical process and implications. And this led inevitably to the same tendency as it did in Anselm: For Aquinas, this was simply an impossibility to faith. But why then did he attempt his own explication of the trinity in terms of the dialectics of the psychological analogies? The Roman Catholic Jesuit Robert J. Richards, in a seminal work published in 1963, The Problem of
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an Apologetical Perspective in the Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, proferred the following answer, an answer heavy-laden with broad cultural implication:

...only one answer is possible: the ideal of Anselm's rationes necessariae had come to obsess the medieval School, St. Thomas (sic) included.

Thus, even where Aquinas clearly sees that he cannot apply this rigorously deductive ideal in its purity, he will nonetheless imitate this ideal as closely as possible, and present a sort of substitute process giving at least its aesthetic illusion. 634

But, asks Richards, the “aesthetic illusion” itself requires better explanation. What motivated it?

First, says Richards, for Aquinas, God is

simply intelligible – there being in God no distinction between essence, existence, intellect, operation of intellect, or event between esse natural and esse intelligible. 635

If this be so, should we not expect Aquinas to reproduce some version of the Origenist Problematic, some indication that the operations of God ad extra are in fact problematical? Indeed he does. Articles 73 and 74 of Part one of the Summa Contra Gentiles, for all their apparent reliance upon Neoplatonic simplicity:

(3)...But the understanding of God is His being, as was proved above. For, since the divine beings is in itself most perfect, it admits of no superadded perfection, as was proved above. The divine willing also is, therefore, His being; and hence the will of God is His essence.

(4) Moreover, since every agent acts in so far as it is in act, God, Who is pure act, must act through His essence. Therefore. His will is His essence.
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74. (I) From this it further appears that the principal object of the divine will is the divine essence.\(^636\)

But one must observe a very crucial difference between Origin’s version of this problematic, and Aquinas’s: Origen’s is more Christian. In Aquinas’s reproduction of the dilemma, however, one observes the total return to purely abstract philosophical statements of the principle that we first encountered long ago in Plotinus.\(^636\)

Thus, Aquinas’s treatment of the Trinity, notwithstanding the “rediscovery of Aristotle”, proceeds along the same broadly Platonic lines of the old, “traditional” Augustinian *ordo theologiae*, and its “three simple steps, moving out from the oneness of the divine essence, to the plurality of *rationally* distinct attributes and finally to the plurality of really distinct Persons,”\(^637\) a method which starts “with the uniquely simple divine essence as the ‘given.’”\(^638\) So, like Augustine before him, and utilizing the new Aristotelian category of “potency,” linked in turn to the Anselmian dialectic of perfection and imperfection, Aquinas must conclude that the plurality of attributes “must exist in God in unqualified ontological identity with the divine essence.”\(^639\) But what then of the Persons?

Aquinas begins his exposition of the strictly Trinitarian component of the doctrine of God by an astonishing assertion of the original category error that St. John of Damascus detected at the root of all heresies; person *is says Aquinas, the* divine essence.\(^640\) Insofar as Person *is distinct* from the divine essence, it is so only *rationally*.\(^641\) But how then does one distinguish between the Persons themselves, for if one could not so distinguish them, then one ended with Sabellianism. At this point, Aquinas’ solution, like Augustine’s, is novel, brilliant, and, unlike Augustine’s, more sophisticated. But, like Augustine’s, it is equally futile. “the Names Father and Son,” he says, “follow upon Generation.”\(^642\) in other words, a *fourth* category has been added to the *ordo theologiae* in the rational exposition of concepts, the category of the relation of
opposition between any given Two Persons. Where before one had this:

1. Essence (simplicity)
2. Attributes
3. Persons

One now has this:

1. Essence (simplicity)
2. Attributes
3. Relations of Opposition (Generation Ingenerateness and Generateness)
4. Persons (Father-Ingenerateness and Son-Generateness)

And in the *In I Sententiae*, this structure is further expanded, since Aquinas, before turning to consider the Trinity of relations and Persons, first asks a question couched in terms of philosophical abstraction: “Is there a real plurality of Persons in God” and not: “Is there a real Trinity of Persons in God”. Consequently, the Augustinian *ordo theologiae* bears with it yet another implication, that what is first known of god is dialectical structure.

With this, the “middle step of Two”, excluded by the Cappadocian – and oecumenical – doctrine of the Church, has not only been reintroduced, but a structure of exposition remarkably like that which attended Eunomianism has resurfaced. This not coincidental, since both Aquinas’s and Eunomius’s structures derive from the inherent logic of the same initial presupposition common to both Hellenized structures, the “simplicity”, the datum which, in the words of St. Gregory of Nyssa, was “not granted.”

It is to be stressed, however, that this step is merely a rational one, for Aquinas, having stated this, goes on to identify Person and relation, or rather, to define Person as the relation. This, however, highlighted another problem with the introduction of the “step of Two” and the element of “twoness” in God: the proliferation of constituent elements, as was encountered in the “Iamblichian” school of the Neoplatonic dialectic. If, for
example, relations were, as they were for Aquinas, relations between a
given Person and the Other Two, one ended with a veritable plethora of
new “relations” that could be – and as we shall see with Joachim of Flore,
were – “deducted” from the initial dialectical premiss.

(1) The Relation between Father and Son (generation)
(2) The Relation between the father on the one hand, and the Son
and the Spirit on the other (production, προοδος), 645
(3) The Relation between the Father and the Son on the one hand,
and the Spirit on the other, where the Spirit as the mutual love
of the Father and the Son, “becomes the bond of union
between the Father and the Son” 646
(4) Since there is a step of Twoness between Father, Father-Son –
Sabellius’ “Son-Father” (υιοπατερ) again! 647 – and the Spirit,
inevitably and by a similar kind of dialectical necessity some will
posit a relationship of the Father and the Spirit to the Son, 648
as implied by the Carolingian “Trinitarian shield” seen throughout
this work, and exactly as St. Photius predicted long before, 649
(5) The relations of mutual identities between each Person and the
divine Essence, as Aquinas asserted; leading to the question of
(6) Whether or not those identical relations of each Person to the
essence were therefore identical with each other.

In other words, throughout the exposition, Persons, whether
defined as relations of opposition identical to the essence, or, in terms of
the psychological analogies, as perfect intellectual operations, are
reduced to nature and emptied of the mystery of their “Personality”.
Person as such, as a category, has faded altogether in inverse proportion
to the multiplication of structural entities necessary to the “scientific”
exposition of the doctrine.

There is a final irony to Aquinas’ exposition of the doctrine, and that
is his explicit denial that the name Holy Spirit can be used to designate the
divine essence, that very identification implied by his own statement that
“the cycle (of processions) is concluded when it returns to the very same
substance from which the processing began” 650 and by the explicit
statement of St. Augustine. 651 Why does Aquinas assert this? Because
one cannot ever say of the divine essence that which is said about the Holy Spirit, namely, that it proceeds from the Father and the Son. But what does this mean?

It means, very simply, that Aquinas has contradicted himself, or rather, that the dialectical implications of *filioque* are counter to Christian Trinitarianism. And Aquinas has seen it, and is caught, like all of the Second Europe, in a self-contradiction.

This inherent contradiction could not long be maintained, especially after Aquinas had so clearly stated its inherent lack of clarity. It is, therefore, in the collapse of this system that one discerns, at least from the standpoint of intellectual history, the transition to the Modern era in the Second Europe. Of course, it is relatively easy to discern the signal events which mark the end of the Western European Middle Ages. But one might point to other equally important developments: the rise of mercantile capitalism, the explicit beginnings of modern science and the impact of technology on everyday life, and, of course, the discovery of the New World by the Second Europe.

There are, however, independent intellectual roots to the Renaissance and Reformation, and it is with there that we are primarily concerned, for each of these movements represents a distinctive development in their own right of implicit paradigms of the common Augustinian heritage of the Second Europe. For our purposes, we may conveniently choose two of these, and exhibit the inner dynamic within them which direct subsequent developments. These two concepts are Simplicity, and its methodological corollary, Simplification ($\alpha\pi\lambda\omega\omicron\omicron\varsigma$), and the controversy which initiates the eruption of the Renaissance and Reformation by laying the philosophical framework that makes them possible is the celebrated Nominalist versus Realist disputes of the Late Second European Middle Ages.

The basis of this controversy lies in the status of universals: Are universals real, do they possess real existence or not? The realists, of...
course, said yes, and the Nominalists said no, maintaining that universals were merely “names”. But there was a deeper issue at stake. Both Realists and Nominalists alike agreed that it was necessary to employ universal terms and categories, howsoever one understood their significance. The central issue really was over the specific universals posited as necessary and why they were necessary. The issue was crucial because, in the great cathedrals of philosophical intellection erected during the Second Europe’s Middle Ages, universal terms, as we have seen from the foregoing exposition, were in great abundance. Indeed, the whole scholastic method of “natural theology”, ascending and depending as it did on the hierarchy or analogy of being (analogia entis) to arrive at Being Itself – a universal – depended upon the real existence of universals at every step. Thus, if one disputed the fact that universals as such really existed independently of particulars, one would be disputing the existence of God Himself, the Universal Universal, the Absolute Being.

When William of Ockham formulated his famous logical “razor”, therefore – “plurality is not to be posited without necessity” -- he was in fact challenging the foundation of the cathedral of Medieval Scholasticism, and laying the basis for a long philosophical development which will only culminate with Kant. Ockham’s Razor arises out of his problems with the inherited Augustinian formulation of the Trinity.

Accepting the dialectical method common to scholasticism, Ockham maintained that “contradiction is the most effective way to prove the distinction of things,” itself testimony to the lingering Neoplatonism of the West, being almost an exact quotation of Plotinus’ “Distinction is opposition.” This, however, presented Ockham with a problem:

Whether, with all the authority of the faith or of any of the philosophers whatsoever excluded, it can be more easily denied than maintained that every relation is something on the side of the thing in some way or other distinct from every absolute or absolutes?

…As to what one would maintain who wishes only to be supported by the
reason possible in this present condition, and who does not wish to accept any doctrine or authority, just as one who wished to be supported only by the reason possible to him and who did not wish to accept any authority whatsoever would say that it is impossible for three persons distinct in reality to be one supremely simple thing.  

The problem, in other words, is the simplicity of God, to which we shall return in a moment. But one must also note a secondary problem for Ockham: that of the whole implication of Anselm’s “theology without God” approach.

He then continues: “There are several arguments for this opinion. The first is this: Nothing is in reality the same as A without which A can exist in reality the same as A without contradiction.” His resolution of this difficulty goes to the heart of the Second Hellenization and the scholastic edifices erected upon it:

I reply otherwise to the question, that whatever the truth may be, one wishing to be supported by reason, so far as it is possible for a man to judge from what is purely natural, in this present condition, would more easily deny that any relation of the genus of relation is a different thing, as previously expounded, than maintain the opposite…. Indeed, I also say that the arguments for proving such a thing which are not supported by Scripture and the sayings of the saints are in no case fundamentally efficacious. And hence I say that just as one who would wish to follow reason possible for us in this present condition would equally have to hold that a relation is not any such thing in reality as many imagine.

This little paragraph, superficially sounding like a restatement of the standard scholastic method in standard scholastic terminology, is nothing less than a total, and revolutionary, rejection of it, and by implication, of the whole Second Augustinian Hellenization. Before, however, we undertake to explain the revolutionary nature of these statements and the logical perdigree behind them, we should have an understanding of why,
superficially, it may be maintained that Ockham, in this passage, still remains within the general scholastic culture.

Seen against the backdrop of Aquinas' version of scholasticism, a certain relationship of Faith and Reason was asserted to be true, regardless of howsoever that relationship was maintained in fact. Aquinas's “Five Ways” or “Proofs” of the existence of God are well known; he did believe that one could, by the use of the unaided reason, give a rational defense by the proposition “God exists.” It is important to note carefully what has been claimed. “Rational defense” is not to be confused with “ironclad and irrefutable proof”. Once reason “proved” or “defended” the existence of God, the reason could not go on to “prove” the existence of a certain specific God, namely, the Christian Holy Trinity Aquinas's Five Ways thus only prove the existence of our old friend, the “God-in-general.” Whatever the indications of his system to the contrary, Aquinas steadfastly maintained that the Trinity could only be known through faith in the divine revelation. Hence, if one reads the quotation from Ockham cited above with perhaps a more restricted role or limitation of the powers or reason. We are now in a position to appreciate his subtlety, and the intellectual pedigree of its revolutionary character.

We may begin to trace this pedigree by asking the question, why did Aquinas believe that one could “prove” the existence of God? What, in other words, did he have to presuppose about God to assume that one could prove certain things about Him (It?) Recall that, as the very first step in the Augustinian ordo theologiae, God’s essence was defined by the Neoplatonic doctrine of “simplicity”. One must therefore recall what the consequences of this doctrine within Neplatonism. In effect, the simplicity functioned as the “Great Metaphysical ‘Equals’ Sign”, and thus, to maintain that God was simple one also had to maintain that the distinctions between will, operations (or attributes), and existence was only mental or rational, that no corresponding distinctions existed in reality. Therefore, what God is (His existence) is ontologically
equivalent to what God wills (His will and the object of that will), and that is in turn ontologically equivalent to what God does (His operations). And all of this, in turn, is identical to His existence. Thus, any attribute or universal posited of God – wisdom, justice, holiness, goodness, truth, omnipotence, predestination, foreknowledge, and so on—do not possess and distinct reality; the attributes are just that, attributions, or names.

From the outset of the Augustinian Hellenization, then, there has been an implicit tendency towards Nominalism, at least as far as the attributes are concerned. Consequently, the Neoplatonic understanding of the doctrine of the simplicity of the divine essence allowed Augustine, as we saw, to manipulate the “attributes” is syllogistic and dialectical fashion: in God, “to be true (attribute) is the same as to be (essence and existence) and to be (essence and existence) is the same as to be great (attribute), therefore to be true (one attribute) is the same as to be great (another attribute).”

But there was another conclusion which, as we also discovered, followed from this philosophical doctrine, and Augustine did not hesitate to draw it: “Just as to Him to be (essence and existence) is the same as to be God (attribute), or as to be great, or as to be good(other attributes), so it is the same thing to Him to be (essence and existence) as to be a person (person).” And so the third category in the Augustinian ordo theologiae, Person, ends up being a attribute with, as it were, some very special attributes: Person was an attribute of relation of opposition within the simplicity itself, as we saw with Aquinas.

So after all is said and done, Aquinas’s protestations notwithstanding, the logical possibility does arise that one may, by dialectics of opposition, not only prove the existence of “God”, but that “God” is a “Trinity” of dialectical relations that may be called “Father, Son, and Holy Spirit,” since these terms designate dialectical processes at work in the simple essence, with which they are identical.

Now let us return to Ockham, for we are now in a position to
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appreciate why his remarks, coming as they do after the scholastic refinements and additions to the Augustinian Trinitarian formulation are already in place, are so revolutionary. First, there is the structure against the unnecessary multiplication of constituent components of the system, particularly the multiplication of universals. Therefore, what Ockham is saying is merely this: it is not necessary to make of relation itself a wholly new category.

But the most devastating statement, and the real heart of his Razor, is the assertion that “a relation is not any such thing in reality as many imagine.” Given the cultural context in which this remark occurs, there are two main ways it could be interpreted, and both are thoroughly subversive of the reigning orthodoxy of the Second Europe. On the other hand, since by his time Aquinas and others had made the relation itself real and the Persons nominal – “the Names Father and Son follow upon generation” – by maintaining that relation is unreal, Ockham could be signaling his desire to simplify the system, and return to the older more simple system of Augustine. This way of interpreting him is devastating enough, but it was not unfortunately, the way in which the Second Europe understood him, which leaves the second way: that relations, and hence the persons derived from them, are not real in any sense. This in turn means that philosophically there is no Trinity, and that theologically the whole scholastic method, which depends upon the reality of distinct dialectical oppositions as entities, collapses.

But there is more. If relations as really distinct dialectical oppositions-as-entities collapses, then so does any proof of the existence of God based upon comparisons of creatures to God on the basis of their common possession of “being”. And as if that were not enough, since “Being Itself” is a universal posited in relationships between the Three Persons, or between God and creatures, is it is unreal it is therefore impossible to posit Being among several different and distinct entities, be they Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, or between God and creatures. Stated
succinctly, Ockham has simply said that the Neoplatonic simplicity, upon which so much depends, is unreal, because it is a relationship, that of ontological identity.

One cannot overestimate the importance and revolutionary character of what Ockham has done. He has, so to speak, detonated the equivalent of a metaphysical hydrogen bomb in a philosophical cathedral constructed out of tinkertoys and Lincoln logs. Ockham distantly echoes the sounds of the ultimate cutting of his Razor in the hands of Kant, who will transform it into a chain-saw and lay it to the root of the whole edifice of the Second Europe’s theistic philosophy and cultural monotheism and belief in the God-in-general. He will leave it, not even with a Divine Simplicity, but only the moral imperative to act “as if” certain universals were true. Ockham made possible the subsequent development of philosophical agnosticism and even atheism by exploding the Second Europe’s Hellenized inheritance. After Ockham, God will neither be so Simple, nor will His cultural effects for the Church, for history, or (as we now shall discover) for the interpretation of texts.

In the Recapitulatory Economy of Christ that centered patristic theology and exegesis of the Scriptures, the “Vision of God” was understood to be “the face to face vision” of “the person of the Incarnate Word”, a vision which was reflected in the First Europe’s iconographic theology and art. In the fourteenth century of the First Europe, this “vision of the of the luminous face of God turned toward each man, the vision of Christ transfigured, is given its theological structure in the doctrine of St. Gregory Palamas and in the definitions of the nature of grace in the (Byzantine) councils of the fourteenth century. Briefly put, a crisis had emerged within Byzantium itself over what, exactly, was the Light which was seen by the mystics, was it created effect, or itself one of the Uncreate, and deifying, energies or operations of God?

Byzantium during this period had no lack of “humanists”, men who approached things from a philosophical, and deliberately Hellenized turn
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of mind, such that, “overcome within theology, the old Hellenism (sic.) reappears in the writings of the humanists who, formed by their studies in philosophy, wish to see the Cappadocians through the eyes of Proclus, Maximus, and John Damascene, through the eyes of Aristotle.” As such, “simplicity” itself was once again interpreted in its exact philosophical sense, as a “philosophical notion which claims to determine the indeterminable,” and the patristic texts which spoke of the Vision of God were read, according to the now familiar tactics of Gnostic Hellenization, that is, according to the Hellenized philosophical paradigms. As such, the “Light” seen by the mystics and ascetics could not be, so the humanists claimed, anything but a creature, since, if it were divine and eternal, it would be the essence itself, and the mystics, by “seeing” it, would cease to be creatures and become identical with God in essence.

St. Gregory Palamas became the great defender of the patristic *ordo theologiae* of Persons, operations(energies), and essence, maintaining that the distinction between the divine and uncreate operations on the one hand, and the divine and uncreate essence, was both formal and real. As such, he confronted them with the following dilemma: either (the humanists) must admit the distinction between essence and operation, but their philosophical notion of simplicity would oblige them to reject the existence of the glory of God, grace and the light of the transfiguration among creatures; or else they must categorically deny this distinction, which would oblige them to identify that which cannot be known(the essence) with that which can be known (the operations), the incumminicable with the communicable, essence and grace. In both cases the deification of created being and therefore also all actual communion with God would be impossible.

Palamas, in other words, is defending the very old, and very Hebrew, understanding that the glory of God was itself something very tangible,
and fully divine, but not, as it were, God essentially, but God in a wholly different mode, as He is participable in his very holiness, glory, immortality, and so on. The “attributes”, in other words, were real “realities”, the infinite and eternal revelations of God “around” the essence. Accordingly, for Palamas, as for earlier fathers of the First Europe, the operations remained “essential”, i.e., they remained rooted and grounded in God’s essence, but they were not identical to it. Yet they also did not detract, any more than did the Three Persons, from God’s “simplicity”. Here again, the ultimate mystery: God’s uncreated energies did not “divide” God into parts; each energy was fully divine, but fully distinct both from the essence and from each other.  

Needless to say, this doctrine, and the underlying patristic ordo theologiae and recapitulatory economy of Christ which went with it, posed immense difficulties for the Augustinized ordo theologiae of the Second Europe, beginning as it did not with the Persons, but with the essence of God, an essence defined as a simplicity understood in precisely Hellenized philosophical ways, a simplicity which effectively identified the categories of the essence and attributes such that the latter were not really distinct, but only formally so. Indeed, Aquinas had devoted whole sections of his various works to treatments of the vision of God, now understood along the lines dictated by the Augustinian ordo theologiae, as a vision, not of the transfigured “context-specific” Person of Christ, but as the vision of the divine and simple essence. The difficulty, for Aquinas, as for subsequent scholastic theology, was the problem of reconciling the patristic testimonies to the older traditional doctrine with their own newly assumed Hellenism. Moreover, the new scholastic doctrine of the vision of the divine essence had even received papal approval.

Pope Benedict XII, in hid constitution Benedictus Deus of January 29, 1336, consuring the opinion of his predecessor John XXII, according to whom the face to face vision of God would take place only after the resurrection, has this to say among other things: ‘...after the passion and
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depth of our Lord Jesus Christ, they (the elect) will see and do see the
divine essence in an intuitive and face to face vision, without any created
intermediary which would interpose itself as an object of vision, the divine
essence appearing to them immediately, without a veil(*nude*), clearly and
openly; so that in this vision they might enjoy the divine essence itself. 674

One is reminded of the Monophysite theologian Stephen Bar-Suhaille’s
“final consubstantiality” of the saints with God. 675

Nor was this all. The question of “final consubstantiality” between
God and the saints was, in its own way raised during the Monothelete
crisis, for St. Maximus the Confessor devoted a whole section of his First
Opuscule to the question of whether or not in heaven there would be “one
will of God and the saints” in the formal sense of one faculty of will. 676

Moreover, the vision of the simple essence once again raises the question
of Origenism, for it bears a strong resemblance to Origen’s pre-existent
“henad”, the state where pre-existent souls are locked, as it were, in the
static contemplation of the simplicity of God, from which they fall if they
direct their wills to any other object, for any other object would be, by
definition, less than simple, and less than the Good. Thus, the definition of
the divine essence as simple in the Neoplatonic sense carries with it
another implication: any exercise of choice, since it must choose between
distinct objects, must be a choice between morally opposed objects, since
in god there are no irreducible distinctions to which the will may be
directed.

This point has not gone unnoticed. The contemporary historian of
doctrine, Jaroslav Pelikan, has noted of the scholastic doctrine that
“Western theologians have been somewhat less successful in
appropriating the results of the Eastern controversies over one or two wills
in Christ, as in Anselm’s statement that Christ ‘came not to do His own will
but that of the Father, because the righteous will that He had did not come
from His humanity but from His divinity.’ 677 The vision of the divine and
simple essence in scholasticism further accounts for the “blandness of

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heaven” that one feels so often as an undercurrent in Second European spirituality. Heaven is bland and monochrome, so to speak, precisely because at its center lies the vision of something which, in the final analysis, admits of no ultimate distinctions, or “Goods”, within “the Good.” Indeed, since the plenitude of the divine attributes was, on this view, only formal and rational and not real, the chief good of man thus comes to be defined in terms of the very same ultimate simplicity, and conversely, hell became the place where ultimate diversity was ultimately preserved, both in popular and artistic conception. On this view, creation itself, being the world of diversity and of opposition on the broadly Neoplatonic framework which the Second Europe has adopted, is the source of evil in a certain sense, and in this, one senses one of the ultimate roots of western Nihilism, the struggle to wage war against the natural established order of God. Another, of course, was the doctrine of transubstantiation, to which we shall refer to in due course.

So, with this question as with many others, in the end we “find ourselves confronted by two formulae neatly opposed, the first of which resolutely denies all possibility of knowing the essence of God,” the First Europe’s vision of the transfigured Christ, and the Second Europe’s, which “explicitly insists on the fact that it is the actual essence of God which must be the object of beatific vision.” In the ambiguous atmosphere of the Second Europe, therefore, the meaning of primary religious texts will be interpreted according to the preponderance of the specifically philosophical, or explicitly Christian, component and upon which element predominates in an individual’s consciousness, whether one is seeking to interpret the old Welsh hymn “Immortal invisible God only wise; in Light inaccessible hid from our eyes” – is it the divine Light itself which is inaccessible (the philosophical “second European” view), or is it that uncreate Light itself veiling the inaccessible essence (the theological, “first European” view) – or the actual texts of the fathers of the undivided Church before the schism that created the Second Europe?
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Here as elsewhere, then, the scholastic doctrine and its underlying Augustinian Hellenization compelled a massive attempt to reconcile texts which implied the older view to the new assumptions of the Augustinian *ordo theologiae* and its new dialectical method, a method which was now turned upon the texts themselves in the attempt at harmonization. The Jesuit Vasquez, for example, noticed the discrepancy between the theological view of the First Europe and the view which had come to prevail in the Medieval West. But he does not stop there. Accepting the vision of the simple essence of God, and therefore its ultimate intelligibly, he goes on to profess an admiration for the Arianism of Eunomius!

“Eunomius was after all not mad,” says Vasquez, “in maintaining that the idea he could have of God was equal to the idea and knowledge God has of Himself. The equality of knowledge which he upheld as opposed to the fathers was related solely to the object of this knowledge. He meant that the whole formal content of the divine nature, since it formed the object of divine knowledge, could also be seen by himself, Eunomius. But this must necessarily be concerned to the blessed who see God as He is, for all that is in God formally is God, being identical with hid essence; therefore nothing that is in God and forms the object of His knowledge can remain hidden to the blessed.” 681

This, of course, produced massive difficulties when confronted by the statements of the fathers themselves, for having harmonized Eunomius’ rationalist doctrine of knowledge to the mystical realm of the scholastic vision of the simple divine essence, Vasquez must inevitably accuse, not the heretic Eunomius of error, but the fathers: John Chrysostom, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril of Alexandria, John of Damascus and so on. 682

These difficulties serve to highlight the overriding difficulty that the Second Europe is now in, for the antiquities which, at least formally, it shares with the First Europe must now be reinterpreted, on almost every point of doctrine, according to the new paradigm of the Augustinian *ordo*
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Theologiae. And they highlight the futility of the program "raised by Vasquez: the impossibility of interpreting the Fathers properly and at the same time remaining within the normal framework of scholastic thought." The program is therefore a total one: the Second Europe must undertake such a massive Gnostic reinterpretations, and invest them with canonical, and eventually infallible, status, or it must admit that it has been in error, and seek to adjust its cultural mind to that which it encounters in the common antiquities. That it close the first course is obviously a matter of historical fact, a fact which one encounters wheresoever one seeks to catch a glimpse of the Chameleon Godhead, not the least of all in the emerging style of its religious art.

B. In Art:

The symbolic personalism of the First Europe’s liturgical iconography likewise suffers from the increasing predominance of philosophical metaphysics and abstractionism of the Second Europe; increasingly, after the Schism between the two, the religious art of the West becomes Hellenized examples of these abstract principles, and increasingly divorced from the context-specific history and traditional liturgical use for which art, in the First Europe’s mind, existed. Art becomes, in a word, “decoration”, no longer an essential artistic confession of the Incarnation, but a symbol opposed to and devoid of, the reality toward which it is supposed to be directed. Here as elsewhere, the Medieval West had to undertake the Gnostic reinterpretation of texts, or in this case, symbols, along the lines of its newly assumed ordo theologiae. Even here, it is less true that the Second Europe turned its gaze upon nature, as it is that it turned its gaze upon a cultural inheritance which it, in common with the First Europe, shared, but which it interpreted along massively different and increasingly philosophical lines. In the very apt
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summary of Umberto Eco, “medieval (sic.) culture was based, not on a phenomenology of reality, but on a phenomenology of a cultural tradition.”

Medieval art in the Second Europe, like all else, depended upon and was grounded in the metaphysic of the analogy of Being, at the height of which was that simple, divine essence. Absent is the ikonographic portrayal of Hypostasis in the theological sense, and increasingly, in texts on the subject of aesthetics, one encounters terms dealing wholly with the “nature and essence” term within the ordo theologiae; terms such as “dimension, form and order (modus, forma, ordo); substance, nature, and power (substantia, species, virtus); that which determines, that which proportions, and that which distinguishes (quod constant, quod congruity, quod discernit); and so on and so forth” predominate the mental world of the Second Europe’s aesthetic.

And predictably, the dialectic of oppositions which was basic both to the First Hellenization and to the Second, finds expression, for “even ugliness found its place, through proportion and contrast, in the harmony of things. It was a view common to all the Scholastics that beauty was born out of contrasts. Even monsters acquired a certain justification and dignity in their participation in the music of creation. Evil itself became good and beautiful, for good was born from it and shone out more brightly by contrast.”

In this “Artistic vision of the Origenist Problematic”, where good is impossible without evil, the counterpart of the blandness of heaven and the monochrome and monotonous “sameness” of its Beatific vision and the multitextured polychrome diversity of Hell finds expression.

Not that, immediately, morality in art loses its role, but it is a morality that is dialectically conditioned and defined. The “monsters” of the Second Europe’s Medieval art, its griffins and gargoyles and basilisks and unicorns, as distinct from the monstrous blobs and blotches and creations of its modern art, find some justification because, with the marriage of Philosophy and Theology, the Classical myths and forms assume as equivalent with the forms and symbols of revelation. But again, this new
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symbolism has ultimately no room for the traditional patristic *ordo theology* and its context-specific, and more rigorously Christian, recapitulatory economy of Christ as expressed in its iconography. This new symbolism takes on essentially two forms, a *metaphysical* symbolism where certain abstract truths are expressed in artistic form, and a kind of “universal allegory”, where the particular forms of art seek to typify universal moral principles.688

As metaphysical symbols and universal allegories of an ultimately “simple” reality which the created order could not hope to participate in (due to its inherent lack of simplicity), or, conversely, into which it would ultimately be locked in a static immovability, the art of the Second Europe increasingly reflects a new “autonomy”, that of nature itself. This autonomy likewise becomes, to certain extent, the artistic function or equivalent to its natural theology, exhibiting those “truths about god” which can be known, or in this case portrayed, by the unaided human reason and apart from revelation. There is likewise another consequence, unforeseen by the Second Europe’s scholastic philosophers to be sure, but nevertheless important for the subsequent history of art. In the effort to capture the particularly *personal* in art, the artistic notion of person suffered the same reduction to essentialist and relational categories as did the theological. Duns Scotus, for example, began the long process of “subjectivizing” the notion of Beauty by stating that it was “not some kind of absolute quality in the beautiful object. It is rather an aggregate of all the properties of such objects – for example, magnitude, shape and colour, and the sum of all the connections between themselves and between themselves and the object.”689 As a statement of aesthetic theory, Scotus’ remarks are perhaps only vaguely compelling, unless one take them also as a statement of artistic criticism, for they might aptly be applied to, for example, a Picasso or a Pollock as to a fourteenth century altar triptych. This meant only that his vast multiplicity of forms reduced to the relations between them,690 and with the advent of Ockham and his Razor’s attack
on the reality of relation, the “object” of art and its depiction began a along descent into dissolution, inspite of various attempts to revive it.

One need of the Chameleon Godhead through the institutions of the Second Europe, that nowhere is it glimpsed more clearly than in the magnificent, and magnificently flawed, theological vision embodied in its great Gothic cathedrals. Wherever one looks, one can easily find carved images and statutes of saint and a veritable overgrowth of gargoyles, griffins, and basilisks, but at the end of the long high transcepts, high upon the distant mount of an altar beneath an unadorned vaulted ceiling mounting up to the transcendent simplicity, one finds a sparseness and emptiness that is in stark contrast to the ikons adorning even a San Marco in Venice. The only thing one might encounter linking these magnificent edifices to the context-specificity, of Christian history is the cruciform floor plan, and, of course, a tabernacle or monstrance containing the consecrated unleavened Host, a Host which has become the Body in response to the utterance of a formula that it may convey the transcendence of divine grace. But that is another topic which must await the discussion of the contractual and legal obligations which bound God, the papacy, the church, and the society of the Second Europe together.
X. THE LAW OF THE CHAMELEON GODHEAD

A. The Emerging Secular Jurisprudence

1. Some Preliminary Remarks

In its scholastic pseudomorphosis, the Augustinian *ordo theologiae* of essence, attributes, and persons was, as far as the exposition of Christian doctrine itself was concerned, nothing less than a program of Gnostic Revisionism, a total technique for the dialectical manipulation of culture through similar manipulations of its foundational theological texts and doctrines. But the totality of this program was, indeed, a *total* one, and not limited merely to its more immediate and obvious effects in theology or art. For from Augustine's faith in the Holy Trinity to his conviction that the Trinity was capable of dialectical formulation and that God, as thus formulated, was the Sovereign God of History, vast and complex historiographical, legal and scientific implications proceeded to manifest themselves, slowly at first, and then with gathering momentum, in the history of the Second Europe.

The logical pedigree of the historiographical implication is the most clearly discernable, and capable of the simplest articulation, for once the Trinity was dialectically formulated, it was only a matter of time before someone would make the deduction that if God be a dialectical Trinity and the Sovereign Lord of History, then the key to the historical process must be revealed in the dialectical process at work within the Trinity itself. Once these dialectical processes were loosed in (or perhaps upon) historiography, it was not long before the category errors and confusions implicit in Augustine's trinitarian formulation – the confusion and identification of the persons with natural operations and with nature – were
applied to law, politics, science, ethics, in short, to areas of social and intellectual organization that, at first glance, seem to have little connection to something so “irrelevant” as theology and so obscure as the *filioque* or the Augustinian *ordo theologiae*.

The christological doctrine of the compenetration (*perichoresis* περιχωρήσεις) or “communication of attributes” (*communication idiomatum*) affords our entry into the discovery of this process. As was seen in Part One, the doctrine, as originally formulated and the way the First Europe still understands it, referred to the fact that each nature in Christ, the divine and the human, “communicated” its natural operations to the other nature *through the Hypostasis of the incarnate Son and Word* (δθα την θποστασιν). The doctrine did not, therefore, express so much a generalized “abstract principle” of the deification and salvation of humanity through the compenetration of it by “deity”, but the formulation of the implications of a concretely specific and personal and unique phenomenon: the Incarnation. To be sure, the Incarnation meant that all those who were and are and will be consubstantial with Christ’s humanity were effected by the union and compenetration of the divine and human natures in Him; they are, in a sense, compelled by the common human nature which they share with Christ to a kind of “natural” or “inevitable” deification. But to stop here would be to misunderstand the doctrine profoundly, because men are not just individuations of human nature, they are also *hypostases*, irreducible concrete personal “uniqueness” which have absolutely no analogies to anything or anyone else. Deification of the human nature flowed not from a “human nature in the abstract” but from *Christ’s* humanity. Reflected here is the traditional patristic *ordo theologiae* in a new guise, for the emphasis proceeds from the starting point of Christ’s incarnate Hypostasis to the conclusion that His two natures compenetrate each other. The same thing could be said of the Chalcedonian definition of faith itself: it is not so much about the two *natures* but about the One Person of Christ.
In the inversions that permeate the Augustinian *ordo theologiae*, however, and particularly the most basic one of essence, attributes, and persons, the Incarnation became increasingly the Incarnation of an attribute of a particular type (a relation of opposition), and accordingly, the “compenetration” or περιχωρησις of attributes came to be interpreted, as did the Chalcedonian definition itself, less as a statement about His Person and more as a statement about His natures. Thus, the compenetration came increasingly to be misunderstood as the compenetration of the attributes of either nature directly to the other, or by the same token, the hypostasis came to be viewed as one such presentation of that compenetration, as “the most illustrious example” of the general phenomenon, and not as the cause of the general phenomenon. Once this step was taken, the compenetration doctrine ended as a mechanism and technique of the Gnostic detachment of terms from their symbolic basis in theology, and a means of their transference elsewhere, a transference that superficially preserved all the appearances of doctrinal rectitude.

Consequently, the Trinitarian Name – Father, Son, and Holy Spirit – as well as other terms and conceptions of theology, could be transferred to the abstracted human nature, i.e., to the world of man in all its aspects, not the least of which was *history*. This transference began in the historiographical thought of Rupert of Deutz and Hugh of St. Victor, and reached its first lofty and systematic treatment in the dialectical dispensationalism of Joachim of the Fiore and found its apotheosis in the system of his modern counterpart, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, for in both men, historiography and eschatology unite and fuse. Not surprisingly, all the dialectical, Sabellian and Polytheistic implications which St. Photius had earlier deduced from the doctrine of the *filioque* likewise came to be applied, not only to theology and art, but to historical science, ethics, politics, and most importantly, law. As late as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in the legal texts of English courts, one can find
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evidence of this process.

Anyone familiar with the christological discussion of the early centuries of the Christian era will be struck by the similarity of speech and thought in the Inns of Court on the one hand, and in the early Church Councils on the other... Taken all by itself, this transference of definitions from one sphere to another, from theology to law, is anything but surprising or remarkable. The *quid pro quo* method – the taking over of theological notions for defining the state – had been going on for many centuries, just as, vice versa, in the early centuries of the Christian era the imperial political terminology and the imperial ceremonial had been adapted terminology to the needs of the Church.

The Byzantines, long before, had claimed that the so-to-speak ‘haloed’ essence of ancient Rome on the Tiber, or her sempiternal *genius*, had been transferred to New Rome on the Bosphorus, and that whatever remained on the banks of the Italian river, was bricks and stones and the rubble of buildings out of which the *genius loci*, the life perennial had evaporated.

... Thus it happened that “Rome” migrated from incarnation to incarnation, wandering first to Constantinople and later to Moscow, the third Rome, but also to Aachen where Charlemagne built a “Lateran” and apparently planned to established the *Roma future*.

Here as elsewhere, however, at least as far as the Second Europe is concerned (we shall deal subsequently with the First Europe’s ‘transference’ of Rome), the Augustinian Hellenization seemed only to spell the end of common terms.

Where before both the Papacy and Byzantium may have agreed on at least the theologico-cultural meaning of “Rome” and “Roman Faith” to the extent that the First Europe could now just as easily claim to be “Roman Catholic”, though in a far different sense than is now understood, as the Second Europe, the new paradigm serve to reinforce the necessary interpretation of the old common terms, ending that common cultural
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paradigm. Increasingly “Rome” for the post-schism Second Europe came to mean the place itself and more importantly, its premier institution with all its claims, the Papacy; no longer did “Rome” or “Roman” denote its essential and transferable cultural core: Christian imperial Orthodoxy, “Roman Faith” or Christian Orthodoxy, the very essence of which was cultural autonomy from any place or political embodiment or worldly philosophy, was increasingly tied to a particular polity, location, and worldly philosophy and its Augustinian counterpart, all of which was embodied in the fixed institutional stability of the Papacy. Thus, by a quasi-Gnostic kind of reinterpretation, “Roman Faith” came to mean not the Faith of the First Europe, its Empire, or oikoumene, but the augustinized faith of the Papacy.

All of this is paralleled by a movement in law and jurisprudence, for if Rome was not “transferable”, then a Gnostic redefinition, transformation, and transference of loyalties had to be undertaken, and faith in The Faith had to be made over into faith as fidelity:

...Under the impact of the well-known imperializing tendencies which transformed Church administration into a centralized papal monarchy, the ancient oath of office taken by bishops as prescribed in the Liber Diurnus was replaced by a new form. It has been observed that after the Church reform of the eleventh century the old profesio fidei changed into a juramentum fidelitatis, and that this change affected also the secular sphere; the king’s coronation promissio was gradually transformed into a coronation juramentum. Whereas the old formularies of the Liber Diurnus demanded from the bishop assurances mainly in matters of faith; and of devotion to the papal head of the Church, the new oath was rather an administrative oath of office and fealty in which the word “faith” no longer had a place.693

For the First Europe and the older mentality which had prevailed even in the West prior to the Schism, “faith” was understood to be “membership in
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the Church, belief in her doctrines, life in her sacraments in communion with a bishop confession her doctrines.” But for the new Second Europe, faith was redefined as institutional and even as bureaucratic fidelity, and that as a fidelity first and foremost to one particular bishop, whether “Orthodox” in the older sense or not; adherence to the Bishop of Rome came increasingly to ground rectitude of doctrine, not the other way around.

These new oaths, dating from 1073 and therefore shortly after Rome’s schism from the First Europe, are in the part the consequence of the feudalization of the Papacy which had begun to occur a little earlier under the German-Papal Reform movement. What these oaths signify is the complete transformation of the idea of ordinary ecclesiastical authority, for what has been Gnostically reinterpreted is the nature of Episcopal authority itself. The bishop in the Second Europe will be less and less the guardian of doctrinal and sacramental integrity, and more and more the local administrative functionary and acolyte of the “real” and “only” bishop, the Pope.

It might be suggested that the fact that the church on earth came to be regarded as a juristic, corporate, and governable body of Christians demanding to be ruled on a monarchical basis, and the fact that the model for this monarchy was found in the Roman Principate forced on the Roman Church and its advisers that particular interpretation of the Petrine commission and its consequences which is maintained down to the present day...

This then is the character of the Petrine office which the pope occupies. Its occupation, it is clear, at once sets the pope apart from other bishops, who participate equally with him in the powers of ordination as successors of the apostles... From one point of view, indeed, these (papal) powers are not intrinsic to the Church at all. They are not autonomously in the Church. For their conferment upon Peter by Christ preceded the founding of the Church: Peter was not built on the Church,
the Church was built on Peter. He could therefore exercise them independently of the Church. They are therefore not powers in or of the Church which Peter, and subsequently the popes, possess by virtue of being members of the Church or of holding a special office in the Church. They are powers over the Church. Hence, strictly speaking, the papal office is not an office in or of the Church. It is an office, or function, above and outside of the Church. It exists on its own; it is an estate of its own.  

The papacy and its subordinated bishops thus embody an institutional version of the One Essence transcending the Many Persons that is inherent with the Augustinian *ordo theologiae*, the Papal Office being the ecclesiastical version – possessed of supreme and universal jurisdiction without borders or limits – of the supreme, all-encompassing, limitless Simplicity, with the penumbra of lesser emanation from it, the cardinals, archbishops, bishops, abbots, priests, and so on on the institutional version of the *analogia entis*.

When this ideal scheme of things is translated into the visible forms of the Church on earth (which must imitate ...its celestial paradigm), it follows that emphasis will be placed on an impersonal principle of unity in a way which parallels that placed on such a principle in the Latin conception of the Trinity. This means that the unity in diversity and diversity in unity which characterize the relationships between local churches and between their bishops in the patristic conception of things, have to be replaced with a system in which the unity and Catholicity of the Church on earth are identified first of all in a single office that claims precedence in this respect over other Episcopal offices and acts as the determining principle in establishing the relationships between them and between the local churches over which they preside. In effects, this office is given concrete form in the papacy. The pope presides over the Church on earth in a way analogous to that in which the essence presides over the Trinity.  

Thus the logic of the emergent mind of the Second Europe compelled the
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bishops, the “shadows of papal power”, in the new oaths, not to alienate the property of the pope, since to do so would have been to abrogate in practice that which had already attained, by virtue of its schism from the First Europe, the status of a dogma: the supremacy and supra-ecclesial estate of the papal office.

The consequences of these movements, from the cultural and historiographical standpoint, are enormous. The Second Europe, by means of the instrument of papal supremacy in league with the Augustinian triadology, has come to view itself as the only “Europe” with the Christian East as a “qualified” Europe, as “Eastern Europe.” But that Europe, the First Europe – “cut off” from the enlightened stability of the papal supremacy because its bishops refused to accept subordination to Rome, thinking themselves, mistakenly, already to be Roman – was viewed now by the Second Europe as something aberrant and incomplete. For the Second Europe, its continuity with its past thus undergoes the most profound Gnosticitization of all, for that continuity by definition is no longer in a faith which it holds in common with its past, rather, that continuity is now understood as juristical connection and submission to the one institution with a connection to that past, the Papacy. Continuity is no longer continuity in doctrine and tradition, in the wholeness of common cultural forms and attitudes, for it has suffered a massive reduction. Like its third-hand reception of Aristotle through Arabic and then Latin translation, the Second Europe’s continuity with its common past with the First Europe is now only third-hand, third hand, because its tie to the institution linking to its past is only juridical.

Moreover, once this institution ceased to embody its claimed universal authority and estate during the Avignon Papacy and the sad episodes of first two, and then there simultaneously reigning Popes, all basis for universal Christian historiography within the Second Europe would collapse with it. A new search perforce had to be begun to find new universal paradigms of continuity.
The idiom of this new continuity is, of course, Law, with all its increasingly Augustinian pseudomorphosis, and its universal *lingua franca et catholica* is Latin. This cannot be pondered too carefully, for it means that the predominating influence of legal abstractions affects the understanding of the Second Europe’s conceptions not only of its own “canonicity”, but also of its own destiny, for its cultural cohesion has now been reduced to juridical connection to the Papacy, and through that connection it manages to maintain a loose and tenuous connection to its Christian Roman tradition. Law, Latin, and Papal “Catholicism” thus represent another significant feature of the Second Europe’s cultural reconstitution, for that new Papal Catholicism is international in outlook and organization. It truly is less “catholic” in the patristic sense of the word καθολική, “according to the whole”, and more catapantic” (καταπαντική), “for everybody”, for as one of its papal exponents would put it, “it is altogether necessary for salvation for every human creature to be subject to the Roman pontiff.” With this, Catholic Faith has indeed suffered a reduction to a merely profane conception of jurisprudence: universal jurisdiction; it has been reduced to mere “universalitly” and “internationalism”. In short, its pseudomorphosis and schism form the First Europe has resulted in the total secularization of the notion of catholicity itself.

This fact grounds the subsequent Investiture Crisis as the Empire and Church of the Second Europe struggled to sort out their respective “jurisdictions” and “spheres of influence”. A new dialectical implication thus immediately presents itself, and becomes another symbol of the Second Europe’s cultural consciousness: on the one side of this dialectic we shall see emerge a “catholic’ internationalism”, and on the other, a new “national secularism” and the merely “profane” local autonomies, the secular monarchies of England and France, for the local and particular, as such, is an “incomplete” vessel” that is incapable of being the fullness of universality. In this milieu, the lingering cultural ideal
of the First Europe that, albeit in imperfect form, was represented by the Holy Roman Empire had no place. In the Brave New World of the Second Europe, the prize which will be lost is Russia, for like the Byzantium from which it derives its national and religious consciousness, it, like the Holy Roman Empire which it must destroy, cannot be fit into either pole of its dialectical cultural paradigm.

In contrast with the Second Europe’s emerging view of the First Europe we shall see emerge the First Europe’s altered view of the Second, for it too was culturally affected, and deeply so, by the Schism. The First Europe, no less than the Second, had to adjust its understanding of Christian culture and history in a broad and profound manner, taking into consideration the new circumstance of an independent and Catholic Second Europe. The most obvious terminological symbol of this cultural gulf is the new terminological distinction between “Catholic” Second Europe and “Orthodox” First Europe. Where before the two terms were synonymous, they are now separate, for the Gnostic pseudomorphosis under way in the Second Europe has torn them asunder: to be “Orthodox” in the traditional sense now meant “not to be catholic” in the new sense. Consequently, the First Europe, which had always viewed itself as the canon of cultural Christian orthodoxy vis-à-vis heretical groups had to perform a massive readjustment of its own historiographical and cultural assumptions, for a vast portion of its own oikoumene had been torn from it. Thus the Second Europe came to be viewed for what it was, something discontinuous and peculiar. For it, the nature of “Roman continuity” remained what it always was, universal Christian vernacular and local culture which was the fullness, in each place and time of Catholicity, a cultural and liturgical, not juridical, fullness which was translatable and transferable from local vernacular to local vernacular precisely because its theology was not dependent upon juridical connection to any one bishop, emperor, or locality. What it lost was the West, but what it won was Russia, which took over whole cloth from Byzantium all these cultural and
dogmatic assumptions, even, as we shall see, the idea that Rome itself, the cultural core of Orthodox Faith and its institution, the Church, could be “transferred”, first to Kiev, and eventually to Moscow. And the idioms of this transference were what they had always been, Roman Law, the Liturgy, ikons, and the Episcopal-national polity of the Church.

2. The Historical Siglum of These Processes: A Prologue to Legal Inquiry

The historical siglum of these two processes – the juridical internationalism of Latin-Papal Roman “Catholicschism” and the vernacular national Catholicism of Graeco-Roman Orthodoxy – is the Schism of 1014-1054, for in it; the Second Europe creates itself formally and juristically by mean of ecclesiastical schism. Nothing better illustrates this divergence than Cardinal Humbert’s dictatorial tone in his letter to the Patriarch of Constantinople, Michael Cerularis (1043-1058), where the categories of person and nature are apparently confused with those of person and office:

…Wherein should the superiority of one archbishop over another archbishop be found. In eone quod homo est, an in eo quod in archiepiscopus est? (Is it that which is in the man, or is it in that which is in the archbishopric [itself]?)”

True, at the end the author comes to reject the claims altogether’ but the main point is that in employing his usual tactics he sets the homo (man) against the archiepiscopus (archbishopric), the man against the office and the “bricks” against the “See”… just as on another occasion he sets the “corporeal sky” against the “incorporeal heaven.” And in a similar fashion he rends asunder the unity of the Roman Pontiff, sets the office against the person of the pope, and confronts, as we might say by analogy, the pope’s “body politic” with the pope’s “body natural” – adding, however, in this case, an “infra-human” stratum for a pope who should
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happen to be a peccator (sinner).

With due alteration, such distinction was formulated also in a latter of Humbert of Silva Candida to the patriarch Kerullarios: “(Papa) quails Petrus officio… non quails Petrus merito – “The Pope is like Peter by his office… he is not like Peter by his merits.” And during the great conflict between Empire and papacy, the emperor Henry IV drew a clear line separating the papal office from the individual Hildebrand when pronouncing his sentence of deposition against Gregory VII. 701

Three conceptions are now at the center of legal debate: person, office, and nature. Notably, in the quotation cited above, there is a confusion of the metaphysical categories by the canonists of the Second Europe, for it is difficulty, “nay, impossible, to interpret the divine nature of Christ as an ‘office’, since the divine nature is His ‘Being’.” 702 This confusion raises certain dilemmas: does episcopacy, and more importantly, the papal “plenitude of power” (plenitude potestatis) inhere in the person, or the office? Is office a personal characteristic (υποσταίκη ιδιότης) or a natural operation (φυσική ενεργεία)?

To pose the question in this fashion is to explore the theological roots of the dilemma, and in order to resolve it, the canonist of the Second Europe resorted to the definition of the office by its functions, i.e., they defined nature (φυσις) by its operations (ενεργειαι). This much still remained traditional in their method, and was not the occasion or source of their difficulties. The dilemma stemmed rather from the fact that, in the process of such definition, the categories themselves were blurred; operations became attributes of the office and identical with it, as they had already done long before in Augustine’s formulation of the filioque. Thus, as the ordo theologiae began with essence and then moved to consider operations, the ontological and functional categories, in law at least, began to blur. The typology of Christ, in legal theory came thence to “cover two aspects of the royal office, one ontological and the other functional.” But what does “aspect” mean here? Nestorius’ prosopon of
union, or its underlying prosopa, or the “manifestations” (apotelesmata, αποτελεσµατα) of the Monophysites? In either case, the king as the “image of Christ” and the king as the “vicar of Christ” were titles that, respectively, referred to the Being of the King and to His activity.703

We have seen that in the flight from the personal and concrete that is so much a component of the Augustinian ordo theologiae; terms are increasingly transferred from the personal and specific application to the more general essentialist. This process, already under way in the Second Europe’s “reinterpretation” of Chalcedon and the compenetration of the attributes in Christ, was even more rigorously applied to legal conceptions in the post Schism period. What had begun as a doctrine about Christ was first reapplied to the God-in-general dialectical construct of Augustinism, and from thence to the abstract metaphysical categories themselves. So when one turns to the development of the Second Europe’s jurisprudence, one sees the same ordo theologiae, proceeding in exactly the same sequence of application, from reflections on the legal implications of faith in the dialectical God-in-general and finally, to reflections of the implications of the belief in the divine essential simplicity itself.

3. Quo Procedit Auctoritas Regis, Ab Patre aut ab Filio?

A. The Emperor Heinrich II and Canossa: The Augustinian Theology, and Law

When the Holy Roman Emperor Heinrich II stood, shivering, in the snows outside the castle at Canossa waiting for the absolution of Pope Gregory VII in 1077, more than just imperial or papal power was at stake for the two men. The Emperor and the Pope represent, respectively, the lingering ideals of the First Europe with its conceptions of sacred and liturgical imperium, which is coming to a shuddering end in the snows, and the juridical absolutism of the Second Europe, coming into existence, snug
and confident within its walls, and with the death of the old and the birth of
the new cultural ideal, yet another Gnostic pseudomorphosis was taking
place, the transformation of “tradition” into a new meaning, that of “legal
precedent”. The absolution which Pope Gregory VII finally bestowed upon
Heinrich represents the nullification of the older, quasi-Byzantine
understanding that the imperial consecration and anointing conferred, in
quasi-sacramental fashion, a divine charism and character whose effects,
similar to baptism, prepared the Emperor for his new imperial life. That
liturgy was understood to confer a kind of “diadem absolution”, and to
prepare the Emperor for his new liturgical functions of overseeing the
liturgy of state. But at Canossa, this understanding of the imperium as a
liturgical office liturgically bestowed and executed gave way to a new
juridical conception of legal right and power, bestowed by the functionary
who exercised it in all its fullness; Gregory’s papal *plenitude potestatis*
conferred an absolution that *jurisically* allowed Heinrich to continue in
office, an office that, by that act, had itself been profoundly transformed
into a juridical character. Gregory’s lesson was plain: all powers, including
the imperium, derived their authority by virtue of juridical connection, i.e.,
submission, to the papacy. These new powers of the “reformed” papacy
and the legal ideas connected with them spread throughout the Second
Europe, such that the English Investiture controversy may itself be seen
as yet another of the confrontations of the lingering cultural attitudes of the
First Europe – in this case Anglo-Saxon and Orthodox England – and the
Norman conquerors, whose leader, William, Duke of Burgundy, had been
given the papal blessing of the Second Europe for the conquest. What
may be called “Augustinian law” is thereby imported into England, with all
the salutary, and deleterious, consequences that this implies for the
development of The English constitution and jurisprudence.

The term “Augustinian law” here designates not only the application
of trinitarian and christological theological categories to the Second
Europe’s legal theories on the nature of the king and kingdom, but also the
fact that initially, prior to such application, those theological categories
have themselves been confused by the Augustinian *ordo theologiae* to
such an extent that the formal heresies which St. Photius saw as implicit
in the *filioque* are likewise *explicitly* reproduced in law, for in the new,
Neoplatonized Christian legal universe, the king comes to be seen less
and less as a royal *alter Christi* and more and more as the embodiment of
the abstracted Reason (*Nous*) of State.  

Nowhere is this new Augustinizing tendency in law more in
evidence than in the legal reflections of the High Middle Ages on the
“King’s Two Bodies.” The two bodies are, of course, his “natural” body,
which is corrupt and mortal, and his “body of state”, which, like the gold of
his crown, never perishes.

It was anything but a simple task to remain consistent when one had to
defend at once the perfect union of the king’s two bodies and the very
distinct *capacities* of each body alone… therefore, when two bodies in the
King are becomes as one Body, to which no Body is equal, this double
Body, whereof the Body politic is greater, cannot hold in Jointure with any
single one.

“Nothwithstanding that these two Bodies are at one Time conjoined
together, yet the *Capacity* of the one does not confound that of the other,
but they remain distinct *Capacities*.

“Ergo, the Body natural and the Body politic are not distinct, but
ignited, and as one Body.”

This understanding of the King’s Two Bodies illustrates the crisis that the
legal theory of the Second Europe was then, and is now, in, for – its
theological categories hopelessly compromised and confused by the
Augustinian triadology – close examination of the quotation above will
indicate that the legal theory has collapsed into a form of legal
Monophysitism.

But just how is this passage Monophysite? The key to such an
interpretation lies in the fact that the King’s Two Bodies are defined solely by their “capacities” or “manifestations” – to use the old Monophysite term *apotelesmata* (αποτελεσματα) – in each realm of activity, the natural and the political. The Two Bodies, being two *natures* rather than Nestorius’ two *persons*, combine to form but one Body or nature, and from that one politico-natural body emanate two distinct sets of manifestations, much like the Monophysite Christ, possessed one divine-human nature and two sets of manifestations. Legally speaking, there is at the end of the English constitutional development *no one person underlying two united natures* giving rise to these two “capacities”. Thus, in a kind of legal nihilism, the “king” himself has been transubstantiated into the “substance of kingship”, and only the accidents or capacities remain.

The confusion between Theology (θεολογια) – that which is revealed about God as He is in eternity and apart from relationship to the world – and Economy (οικονοµια) – that which is revealed about God in His relationships with the created order – which so marked the Augustinian trinitarian and predestinarian formulations likewise reproduces itself in a legal version. The Adoptionism of the Spanish Adoptionist controversy, for example, reproduced itself rather neatly in the legal formulations of one anonymous Norman lawyer of the thirteenth century: “there was… perhaps only a single – though essential – difference between the anointed in Eternity and his terrestrial antitype, anointed in time: Christ was King and *Christus* by his very nature, whereas his deputy on earth was king and *christus* by grace only.” Here not only is the language inadvertently Monophysite – the anonymous Norman canonist speaks of only one nature in Christ – but Christ Himself is no longer, as least as far as this formulation is concerned, genuinely Incarnate and currently active in this world, for the formula describing Incarnation here, even as far as His humanity is concerned, is applicable only to the supernatural world of eternity. Christ must therefore, in this new dualistic political world, have a representative in time of His very “Real Absence” in
the temporal world of human politics and society. There are thus in legal theory at this stage, two christs, the “real” Christ of eternity, and the “Christ type” of grace, the king in time. With this formulation, therefore, one approaches the opposite christological heresy to Monophysitism: Nestorianism.

The Chalcedonian Definition is thus capable of translation into legal terms for the Second Europe, but because it begins in its ordo theologiae not with Person but with Essence or Nature, and because of the category error of Augustinian theology which confuses Person and Nature, the Second Europe, when it applies that definition to legal embodiment, can only give it a Nestorian or Monophysite case, depending on the individual lawyer’s turn of mind:

… The king’s duplication of persons is not founded in law or constitution, but in theology: it mirrors the duplication of natures in Christ. The king is the perfect impersonator of Christ on earth. Since the king’s divine model is at once God and man, the royal christomimetes (Christ-imitator) has to correspond to that duplication; and since the divine model is at once King and Priest, the kingship and priesthood of Christ have to be reflected in this vicars as well, that is, in the King and Bishop, who are at the same time personae mixtae ["mixed persons", ed.] (spiritual and secular) and personae geminatae ["compounded persons", ed.] (human by nature and divine by race). At any rate, theories of the Anonymous are not centered in the notion of “office” as opposed to man, nor in constitutional or social considerations; they are christological and christocentric. 710

Here then is the legal and metaphysical dilemma: either the king represents the aspect or presentation (προσωπον) of union of two underlying and distinct persons, and is in that Nestorian sense, a “mixed person”, or he is a “mixed person”, an individuated “Self-subsistent Hypostasis”, composed from an underlying “self-subsistent hypostasis”, the man himself, and an underlying non-self subsistent hypostasis: the
kingship to borrow the language and analysis of the Monophysite Severus of Antioch. Thus the two dialectically opposed christological heresies, by dint of the Augustinian theology’s inability to distinguish adequately between person, operation, and nature, are reproducing christological heresies in law itself. The fourteenth century English lawyer and scholastic, John of Salisbury, reproduces this dialectical dilemma rather compactly when he asserted that the king was both lord and serf of the law.\textsuperscript{711}

But it is not only the christological heresies that are reproduced within the legal theories of the Second Europe; the trinitarian errors implicit in the \textit{filioque} reproduce themselves as well. The English jurist Bracton, for example, made the king the “vicar of God”. Bracton’s “God”, however, is now the God-in-general of the Augustinian “simplicity”, which (if we may be permitted to quote the Jesuit Eugene Portalie somewhat out of context) is “conceived concretely and personally no doubt, but not as any one person in particular.”\textsuperscript{712} For Bracton, then, the king could represent both “the humbled Christ whose manhood has been submitted to the Law”, but just as easily could typify “God the Father with the divine Christ on the Throne of heaven.” The king, in other words, is the antitype of Christ’s humanity whenever he is \textit{not} judging, but is “God-like” and “above the Law when judging, legislating, and interpreting the Law.”\textsuperscript{713} This inability to decide just whom in the Trinity the King actually \textit{does} represent, the Father or the Son, was likewise reflected in the art of the period. Whose hand is it, for example, that emerges from the clouds of so many mediaeval pictures to bless so many mediaeval kings? We do not know for certain, because, in Bracton’s case at least, the “Trinity” is now that of Augustine’s \textit{filioquist} and dialectical construct, where the personal characteristics may be exchanged one with the other on the basis of their common essential (\textit{υποστατικαι ιδιοτηται}) may be exchanged one with the other on the basis of their common essential attributes; the Persons themselves have disappeared, swallowed up into their mutual dialectics.
and relations of oppositions; *persona est relation* says Aquinas. In the new Sabellian “Son-Father” of the *filioque*, where the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, from both as from one principle (*ab utroque u tab uno principio*) the king may represent both the Father or Christ because they in turn, as persons, represent to the world only certain dialectical functions within the move abstract notion of the Godhead itself. And, if one recalls that the name “Holy Spirit” could, for Augustine, mean the entire Trinity as well as the Person of the Spirit all at one and same time, then the king, too, could come to represent, as in Bracton’s formula of the king as the “vicar of God”, the entire Godhead. Thus, inspite of the Chalcedonian timbre of the Second Europe’s legal theories, the Augustinian theology serves to contort and distort any possibility of a correct application of dogmatic conceptions to law, for in each and every instance, those conceptions have been defined positively in terms of philosophical content.

This becomes more evident in yet another application of theology to law: the sempiternity of the crown and the perpetual necessity of taxation. The king’s crown was the visible, golden circlet, the symbolic and sacramental representation of powers “perpetual and descended from God” directly or through the mediation of dynastic inheritance. But the Incarnation was the once-for-all-times perjuring order of God’s Economy with the world, it was, so to speak, the “extraordinary ordinary jurisdictional scheme” of divine-human relations. The transference of Christ-like powers to the King therefore meant that the permanence of Christ King became, through the King, the permanence of the State. For the early mediaeval state, taxation was an “extraordinary” phenomenon, not at all a part of daily life. But once the State itself becomes endowed with divine “sempiternity”, the State’s needs likewise became permanent, and therewith taxation became permanent. This permanent taxation is one of the most visible signs of the inward transformation of the culture of the Second Europe; it marks the secular apotheosis of the new Augustinized
The Augustinian confusion of person and nature was not only manifest in law, but also in ethical theory, which in turn fed more implications into law in the form of legal variations of the Augustinian theory of an original guilt and moral culpability inherited from Adam. Guilt, in Aquinas’ understanding for example, becomes not only corporeal or bodily, i.e., a property of the human nature as such, but also corporate. On this view, one may say “that all men born from Adam can be considered as one man (possunt considerari ut unus homo) in so far as they concur in the nature which they have received from the first man – just as in civil affairs all men of a community are reputed, as to say, as one body and the whole community as one man.”

Thus "Mankind" (is) a corporation by the unity of the original sin, but by the unity of the intellect,” as we might sum up the collectivism of Aquinas, thereby leaving undiscovered the curiosity that a collectivity by sin should be orthodox, and a collectivity by the intellect, to say the least, suspect of heterodoxy. It is evidence, however, how closely interrelated the arguments of Dante, Aquinas, and the jurists were, and how narrow the margin was which separated corporational doctrines from pure collectivism.

Indeed, as we saw in part one, the Augustinian doctrine of original guilt is neither Catholic nor Orthodox, for it derives from the same set of assumptions about the interchangeability of Person and Nature that vitiated his exposition of Trinitarian doctrine. Just as the Spirit had to proceed from the Father and the Son on the basis of the Father’s and the Son’s common attribute of life, so Adam passes his personal guilt and culpability to his human nature, and all persons thereafter born in that nature thus inherit the guilt and culpability of Adam’s sin. In both cases, something personal and hypostatic has been made a natural attribute.

The ethical and moral consequences are thus evident: humanity is
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a collective, and in so far as one can speak of the human person, one can only do so in the aggregate, for sin and guilt have become properties of nature, they have become systemic, and are no longer exclusively personal. From this it is a short step to the next consequence: if sin and guilt are systematic, then their eradication require increasingly systemic solutions rather than personal askesis. The eradication of evil in human society, like the evil itself, lies within nature and solutions dealing with nature, with political solutions to be applied to the corporation of humanity, and not in spiritual solutions to be applied to the personal human heart. Consequently, the modern Second Europe’s preoccupation with grizzly and genocidal political solutions of this type stem, in part, ultimately from its false Trinitarianism, for once guilt is collective and corporate, it perforce ceases to be personal.

Inspite of all superficial contra-indications, politics for the Second Europe ceases to be genuinely spiritual and liturgical; it becomes an area of merely secular activity, a fact mirrored in the reduction, during its Middle Ages, of the sphere of God’s sacramental dealings with the world to seven, and only seven sacraments, for only those acts, given their juridical definition, confer certain grace, for certain grace is restricted to those seven channels alone. For this reason, too, the sacramental anointing of a king or emperor increasingly is understood to convey no grace. The act existed solely to attest or “signify” a new king’s orthodoxy.

Consequently, in the next stage of the Augustinianism development of law, as kingship itself becomes more and more the province of abstraction and theorizing apart from the virtues or vices of individual, personal kings, so theology became increasingly the playground of the new method of doing theology without God-in-particular of the Holy Trinity that was previously seen with Anselm. The logic which impels the Inquisitional opposition to Galileo and to the Albigenses is similar, for since doctrine is no longer rooted in a historical tradition but in the wedding of theology to philosophy, adherence to doctrine is no longer by
faith but by demonstration by Anselm’s “absolute reasons”. Those therefore who refused to accept those “proofs” were perforce both heretical and insane. This logic, wedded to the implication of the doctrine of inherited guilt with its “systemic evil” or “corporate humanity” was bound to have bloody consequences.

Before we can turn to these, however, we must take what will, at first, seem like a detour into canon law.

B. Canon Law

1. Which Body is it, the Real of the Mystical?

That privileged conception of the King’s Two Bodies that arose within the mediaeval legal theories of the Second Europe was sooner or later inevitably to be tied to another area of doctrine, the Eucharist, or Holy Communion, for in his divine “bodily capacity”, which “body” of Christ did the King typify, His incarnate Body, the “Body made present during the Eucharist”, or the Church? One may understand the earliest manifestations of scholasticism in the doctrinal disputes surrounding the Real Presence in the Eucharist and the doctrine of predestination not only as the extensions of the Augustinian dialectic, but also concurrently, as the collapse of doctrine and of Augustinism itself. To perceive this, however, one must return for a moment to a pivotal ninth century, for that century of the open break between St. Photius and Pope Nicholas I saw also, within the Augustinizing West itself, a contest between a traditional statement of Eucharist doctrine in the hands of St. Paschasius Radbertus and a new dialectical and Augustinized statement of it at the hands of Ratramnus, the very same dialectician who crystallized the filioque doctrine in the heat of the dispute with Photius. In presenting these disputes, we are intentionally relying upon secondary Second
European texts in order to indicate the degree to which they themselves are misunderstanding the terms used in the primary texts.

Radbertus, like others before him, speaks of a “change” in the “elements” of bread and wine during the Eucharistic consecration, a change which makes them the Body and Blood of Christ:

The change is an inward one, not apparent to sight or taste, but the elements are wholly and substantially converted into the body and blood of Christ... “Let no one then be disturbed concerning this body and blood of Christ, that in the mystery there is real flesh and blood, so long as He who created has so willed... and since He has willed, though the figure of bread and wine remain, these must be altogether a figure, and after consecration to be nothing else than the flesh and blood of Christ.” He goes on to identify the Eucharistic body of Christ with the historical body, which was born of the Virgin, suffered on the Cross, and rose from the dead.726

At this point, even many theologians, even Orthodox ones such as Fr. Alexander Schmemann, read into the texts of the dispute an opposition between the “reality” of the body and the blood, and the “figure”, to use Radbertus’ own term, of the bread and the wine. And by this means, so it is argued, it is further possible to read into Radbertus the later scholastic doctrine of substantial conversion – for so Radbertus speaks – and “accidents”, referring to Radbertus’ “figure”. And thus the debate between Radbertus and Ratramnus, who defends the “symbolic” view, is misunderstood and misinterpreted as a dialectical debate between a “symbolic” and therefore “unreal” presence of Christ in the Eucharist, and a “realist” and therefore “unsymbolic” presence of Christ in the Eucharist, and, voila, one has the “original sin of the West”,727 the opposition between “symbol” and “reality”.

But we have, in fact, encountered language remarkably similar to Radbertus’, as early as St. Ignatius of Antioch, or again, in St. Cyril of
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Alexandria. So an important question occurs, why read the dispute as a dialectically conditioned dispute between Radbertus and Ratramnus, when it is possible to understand at least Radbertus as employing the same type of “mystical realist” language as one would find in many other fathers, including Augustine? If one reads Radbertus from this point of view, then he will be understood as advancing not a metaphysical theory of the mode or manner of the presence of the Body and Blood, but rather as advancing a defense of the Church’s traditional doctrine of the identity and continuity of the Body and Blood made really present in the Eucharist with that Body and Blood in which Christ was born, crucified, dead, buried, and risen and ascended. The last point needs to be stressed, for upon it Radbertus’ whole christological and mystical approach depends. He is asserting, in other, perhaps more technical, terms that same principle of faith that occurred in the writings of St. Ignatius of Antioch seven hundred years before him. This fact may be appreciated by consideration of the corollary doctrine of the sacrifice of the Mass:

Paschasius Radbertus quite definitely regarded the Eucharist as a sacrifice. The action is twofold. “We continually reproduce the memory of his most holy death by daily offering the sacrifice of His most sacred Body and Blood on the altar.” But Christ the High priest ever stands at the altar on high, which altar is His own body “by means of which and on which He offers to God the Father the offerings of the faithful and the faith of believers.” Just as there is a new creation of the Body of Christ at every Eucharist, so the offering (oblatio) is also daily repeated. But it is only fair to point out that Paschasius nowhere speaks of a repetition of the death of Christ. He holds that because “we daily fall, Christ is daily immolated for us mystically (quotidie pro nobis Christus mystice immolatur), and the passion of Christ is presented in the mystery (et passio Christi in mysterio traditur), so that he who by once dying conquered death may daily forgive recurring sins. “He daily takes away the sins of the world… when the commemoration of His blessed passion is reproduced at the altar, when the creature of bread and wine is translated into the sacrament of His
flesh and blood by the ineffable sanctification of the Spirit.” But the bread and wine consecrated to be the body and blood of Christ by the power of the Holy Spirit are uplifted into the heavenly sphere at consecration and offered by Christ Himself as His own sacrifice on the heavenly altar of His body.728

These passages and Anglican C. W. Dugmore’s quite accurate assessment of them, fly in the face of what has come to be a “popular” misconception, both among Roman Catholics and Protestants, of what the original doctrine of the Sacrifice of the Mass was.

This misconception, which began to grow during the Late Middle Ages, is that each Mass is not only a repeated sacrifice, but a repetition of the sacrifice of Christ on the Cross of Cavalry. But for Radbertus, the principle of the real identify between the Eucharist and Christ’s crucified, risen and ascended body means the exact opposite: one partakes of the ascended, heavenly, High priestly body of Christ, and because of that, partakes of the whole Economy of Salvation, past (Incarnation, Passion, Crucifixion, Death, Burial, Harrowing of Hell, Resurrection and Ascension), present (High priestly intercession at the right hand of the Father), and future (Christ’s second coming in glory). Because of this, one partakes of the sacrifice of Calvary and its ongoing pleading by Christ Incarnate in heaven before the throne of the Father. This knocks the whole, attempt of those who view the conflict between Radbertus and Ratramnus as a dialectical one between “realism” and “symbolism”, including the view of Orthodox theologian Alexander Schememann, into a cocked hat.729 On that erroneous view, Radbertus is defending an indefensible and grizzly “realism” over against the more noble and lofty “symbolism” and “spiritual conceptions” of Ratramnus.

A reexamination of key terms in Radbertus’ language will reveal where such a misinterpretation of flounders. For Radbertus, there is a certain ordo theologiae between a “symbol” and “reality” for precisely the reason that these two things do not constitute equally opposed polarities

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in a dialectical opposition. Rather, the Eucharist, because it is “real” is also a “symbol”, and because of that realism, “mystical”. Realism grounds the Mystery and makes it a symbol, whereas, if one started from the notion of symbol itself, realism, and with it, the mystery disappears. And the clue which signals that is that Radbertus is not so clumsy or ignorant of the stages of the Economy of salvation history as to identify the Body made present temporally with the crucified, but with the risen and ascended body, a body which, according to Scriptural testimony itself, had some very unusual properties. It is real, and therefore mystical, and therefore symbolic. Thus, there is in Radbertus’ thinking, at least, no opposition between symbol and reality, but only an understanding of “symbol” as conveying not substantial absence but presence. Moreover, that Radbertus specifies the substantial presence of the Body and Blood is brought about by the operation of the Holy Spirit, and not by utterance merely of “the words of institution”, is in itself interesting and the strongest testimony of all that Radbertus is operating with a patristic view of the Liturgy of the Mass, for such has been the traditional doctrine of the Eastern Church to this day.730

It is, conversely, RAdbertus’ opponent, the great Augustinian dialectician of the filioque, Ratramnus, who begins the process of isolating the Eucharistic theology from its liturgical context and of treating it in solely metaphysical and dialectical categories. It is he who begins the process of opposing “symbol” and “reality” in a dialectic of opposition, and presages future controversies. Thus the conflict is between a western, “non-Augustinian” representative of the theology of the First Europe, Radbertus, and the Augustinian representative of the emerging theology of the Second Europe, Ratramnus; all of the subsequent misunderstandings of the dispute between the two men arise from treating both men as thorough going Augustinians.

Where Pachasius identifies the Eucharistic body with the historical body…
Ratramnus holds that they differ from one another no less than things corporeal and spiritual, visible and invisible, divine and human.  

It is at this juncture that the dialectical chasm opens between “symbol” and “reality” or, in terms of the debate at that time, between spiritual (spiritualiter) and a corporeal (corporaliter) body.  

The Lutheran scholar Jaroslav Pelikan comes the closest to appreciating the full meaning of the controversy:

(Ratramnus) based his interpretation of the Eucharistic presence on a different definition of “figure” and “reality” from that of Radbertus. “The most simple and comprehensive statement that can be made of Ratramnus’ Eucharistic beliefs was that he thought the Eucharist to be in the real order what a metaphor is in the logical order.”

The traditional meaning of terms, which Radbertus had assumed in his mystical realism, was altogether abandoned by Ratramnus’ dialectical and syllogistic treatment of the subject. In short, the terms used to discuss the Eucharis, coporaliter, spiritualiter, res, sigilu, symbolum, sacramentum, mysterium, have undergone the familiar Gnostic pseudomorphosis of assigning new meanings for old terms, for the terms remain the traditional ones, but the meanings or “substances” associated with them have been annihilated and turned into something else, only the terms themselves, the accidents, remain.

Thus, it is for Ratramnus that the Eucharist is a mystery in the sense of a metaphor, for the reality presented outwardly to human senses is one thing, by the metaphor presented to the contemplation of faith is another. One has returned, almost to the very identical language, of the Monophysite Philoxenus of Mabbug’s dualistic treatment of the Eucharist in terms of an opposition between “nature” and “miracle”.

Only when he goes on to ask the question “whether that very body
which was born of Mary, suffered, dies and was buried, and which sits at
the right hand of the Father is what is daily eaten in the church by the
mouth of the faithful..." does he expose his departure from Orthodox
Catholic tradition, for his answer is in the negative. The “historical” body
was properly called the real flesh of Christ, while the “Eucharistic body”
was called “the sacrament of that flesh. What is present in Ratramnus’
conceptualization of the Eucharist is not the same identical, continuous
body of Christ, but a kind of abstract “bodiness” and “bloodness”; what
one ends with, by way of a comparison to Radbertus, is a mere symbolism
opposed to a "crass physicalism", an important point, for with this,
Ratramnus has transformed the meaning of symbol itself from its original
meaning of “binding together” two distinct realities to a new meaning: the
indication of a real absence and to the presence of an abstraction:
bodiness and bloodness.

Thus, Ratramnus’ objections to Radbertus’ realism are couched in
precisely philosophical and dialectical terms: how can the body be here,
and be in heaven at the same time?734 In contrast to this, Radbertus had
not offered a philosophical or metaphysical explanation of the Real
Presence, but rather an explanation couched in terms of The Economy of
the Incarnation itself.

It is when one turns to the next series of Eucharistic debates within
the Second Europe, however, that the dialectical method breaks out with
full force.

2. Lanfranc of Bec and Berengar of Tours: The Triumph of
the Dialectical Body and the Emergence of the Doctrine
of Transubstantiation

The debate between Lanfranc of Bec (1010-1089) and Berengar of
Tours (1010-1088) marks the real beginning of the recurrent dialectical
eucharistic debates within western Christendom over whether the Eucharistic presence of Christ was “symbolic” or “real”. It was in fact Lanfranc of Bec who first formulated Radbertus’s “realism” in dialectical fashion, in opposition to his equally dialectical, opponent, Berengar of Tours, who, predictably path outlined by Ratramnus.

Lanfranc's language occupies a fuzzy and hazy middle ground between the mystical realism of Radbertus, and the later Aristotelian formularies of high scholasticism:

Lanfranc, in common with Berengar, does not use the terms “accidents” and “substance”; he defines the Eucharistic change as a change of essence… “in their interior nature… (we) believe,” he says, “that those earthly substances on the Lord’s table… are converted into the essence of the Lord’s body, their aspects together with certain other qualities being retained lest men perceiving them in the crude and bloody state should shudder, and in order that those who believe should receive greater rewards of faith, while the Lord’s body itself is in heaven and the right hand of the Father… so that it is possible to say that we partake of the very body which was taken or the Virgin, and yet not the body itself.”

Even in this there is nothing too peculiarly “western” about such language as the Body and Blood being “veiled” beneath bread and wine lest the sensibilities of the communicant be replied, for such language one encounters often enough in the early Latin and Greek Fathers. The ‘grinding of the teeth’ which many members of the First Europe would be tempted here to dismiss as “typical western crudeness” or “typical materialism” has an echo in the eastern liturgies: “broken yet not divided, every eaten but never consumed.” The real thrust of Lanfranc’s language was again to stress the identity of the Body present in the Eucharist with the Body and Blood of Christ’s whole Incarnate Economy.

What then was the focus of Berengar’s objections to Lanfranc? What he objected to was precisely Lanfranc’s contention that accidents, or
"natural properties", can exist apart from their underlying nature. What he objected to was Lanfranc’s contention that the properties or attributes of bread and wine could remain when their underlying substance or nature did not. With this, the mask is off the dialectical construction, for Lanfranc’s doctrine of transubstantiation – the first formulation of it in these terms – stands revealed as a kind of sacramental version of the heresy of Doketism, which, it will be recalled, was first encountered long ago in St. Ignatius of Antioch, where it was also found in a sacramental context. For Doketism, Christ only appeared in the properties or “accidents” of human nature, but He was not really Incarnate in human nature itself. For Berengar, Lanfranc’s formulation is the very opposite, therefore, of what a sacrament is supposed to be, the union of the heavenly and the earthly, of the material and the spiritual, of created nature and divine grace. Lanfranc’s doctrine is therefore the first formal and explicit formulation in the Christian culture of the Christian West of the philosophical doctrine of Nihilism, for in his view of transubstantiation, in order for a divine grace to be conveyed, something – in this case, the substance of bread and wine – has to be destroyed and replaced with some new substance: “bodiness” and “bloodness”.

Berengar’s response to this is no less dialectically problematical, for it too misses the incarnational perspective of Radbertus’ risen and ascended body, and replaces it with a purely metaphysical discourse. As Dugmore aptly summarizes:

If Christ is corporeally present on the altar, whole and undivided, He cannot be corporeally present on a million others altars and in heaven. Then what is present in the sacrament must be a little portion of flesh. But Christ’s body cannot be cut up into little pieces, since it is indivisible. Finally, there cannot be a creation of a substance, viz..., the body of Christ, to take the place of the substance of bread, since Christ’s body is in existence already.
A further Gnosticizing of doctrine has taken place here. It will be recalled that for the traditional theology, exemplified more or less accurately in the work of Radbertus, the resurrection and ascension of Christ and the unusual properties of the post-resurrectional body and the operation of the Holy Spirit where the guarantee of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist. But now, for Berengar and the school of dialectical Eucharist theology which he and Lanfranc help to inaugurate, the Resurrection and Ascension are the guarantees, not of Christ’s real presence, but of His very real absence. Wycliffe would carry the implication of this pole of the dialectic to its ultimate reduction when he observed that “it is nothing, or as he puts it elsewhere, it is ‘a bundle of accidents in which Christ is.’”

He is reaching to a development which took place from the period of Lanfranc and Berengar in the eleventh century, to Aquinas and Scotus in the thirteenth and fourteenth. For Aquinas, “transubstantiation” meant not the annihilation of the substance of bread and wine, nor its augmentation, but merely that Christ’s body and blood were present substantially, i.e., “not as in a place, but after the manner of substance, which is of an order superior to space.” The doctrine of “transubstantiation” which popular perception ascribes to Aquinas and to the papal church is actually that of John Duns Scotus, who prefers not to speak of transubstantiation by conversion of substance but by “abduction”, which is “no longer to admit the conversion of one substance into another, but the substitution of one by another.”

In any case, the dispute between Lanfranc and Berengar has changed the whole character of sacramental theology in the Second Europe in two fundamental ways: first, both sides now define their positions by deliberate opposition to the other; symbol and reality are indeed opposed in dualistic fashion; and second, both sides elaborate their positions by a heightened reliance upon dialectic and upon assumed
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value of the positive content of the categories of philosophical
metaphysics. With this transformation, one also began to “eat” Christ in
one way of two mutually opposed ways, *mente non dente* or *dente non
*mente*, “mentally not dentally” or “dentally not mentally”. The “mental
eating” clearly foreshadows the Protestant “memorial meals” of Zwingli,
with “communicants” piously “remembering Jesus” as they drink some
wine and eat some bread, and the “dentally not mentally” the crass
materialism of the late Mediaeval liturgical practice, with priests holding
their chalices as close as possible beneath the blood-stained figures on
increasingly grizzly crucifixes, or Luther’s reference to “pressing the teeth.”

With this new dialectical turn, the way was now open for each side
to claim, and to read, Augustine himself in a dialectical fashion scarcely
intended by him. He who like all the fathers could speak in boldly “realist”
terms could likewise say “believe and you have eaten already” and
yet not mean by either statement what his more Augustinian-than-
Augustine theological progeny would take such statements to mean. One
or another set of texts was compiled for each pole, and the opposed
series of texts interpreted from whatever dialectical position one took
initially. Such treatment could and did, of course, spread from Augustine to
other fathers, as increasingly such dialectical “contradictions” were sought
in texts. These texts, suffused with the traditional doctrine, construed no
opposition between the symbolic and realist aspects of the Eucharistic
mystery, but once the dialectic was unleashed, it had to construe such
language as genuine opposition, and then it had, again by means of
dialectic itself, to resolve the contradiction.

This dialectical organization and treatment of texts became the
hallmark of the emerging cathedral schools, and later the great
universities, of the mediaeval Second Europe. And of course, the first
“textbooks” were exactly that: collections of primary texts excerpted and
neatly arranged to exhibit seemingly dialectical contradictions, on which
the student-scholar debated and demonstrated his facility for dialectical

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harmonization. Ultimately such an attempt was bounding to fail, just as it failed in the attempt to harmonize the patristic and the scholastic doctrines of the Vision of God and their corresponding textual contradictions. By the time of the Protestant Reformation, these contradictions will themselves become the data for the dialectical criticism to effect yet another erosion of the authority of the *consensus* patrum, as Photius predicted, and to confect yet another advance in papal claims:

Even the church fathers were undercut by the Jesuits... They knew about the historical problems and used them to undermine the authority of the church fathers. Protestant historiography did much the same thing, to make possible the prophetic authority of the Reformers. So both sides used criticism, the Jesuits to give absolute power to the pope, and the Protestants to liberalize the authority of the Bible.  

In the face of such dialectical contradictions, one is left ultimately with no other option than to plead the case of papal infallibility on the one hand, or the “practical infallibility” of the isolated individual believer of Protestantism interpreting an infallible Bible without the aid of “tradition” on the other. With the Eucharistic debates, then, we have another plain and visible sign of the inward and spiritual decay of the Christian West.

3. Predestination, the Corpus Mysticum, and the Law

The Eucharistic debates of the eleventh century parallel a similar withdrawal of the divine from other spheres of human activity and a commensurate secular application of Augustinian Christian doctrine. Predestination manifests itself in secular form during the High Middle Ages with the increasing assertion by the French and English kings that they possess by birth a dynastic “election from God” to be king, that is, birth itself into a dynastic house is itself proof of God’s favour, over and apart
from the act of ritual consecration. By extension, this providential favor could come naturally to dwell upon the nation itself, apart from any ecclesiastical connection to grace. Within the dialectical scheme of things, however, that had come to prevail in the Second Europe, the old opposition of nature and grace now manifested itself as an opposition of the State, the new realm of nature, and the Church, the old realm of grace.

With the "rediscovery" of Aristotle and the extension of dialectical methods to the rest of the theological system, the additional elements of a dialectical explication and exegesis of texts also manifested itself, not only in the Eucharistic debates, but elsewhere as well. With the "advent of Aristotle", one encounters an Augustinism that needed to be entirely reworked, inasmuch as it stemmed from a basically Neoplatonic premises. Much has been written of the far-reaching ramifications for Western culture of this signal "reworking", and most of it concludes that its chief significance, for mediaeval theology, at least, was the abandoning of that "Neoplatonic" model and the construction of a new "Aristotelian" model in its place.

But this perhaps overlooks the most significant of that "reworking", and that is that nowhere nor at no time did the Second Europe abandon that underlying Augustinian, and Neoplatonic, ordo theologiae, for what would have seemed a more "Aristotelian" one of Persons (particulars), attributes, and essence. Thus, the recasting of western theology in terms of Aristotle in only half the picture, and not, in the end, the most significant half, for the other half is precisely that Aristotle has been forced into a much broader and deeper all-pervasive and underlying Augustinian ordo. An "armistice" of sorts was achieved, for example, in the magisterial synthesis of Thomas Aquinas who, far from following all the dialectical implications of Anselm to their logical conclusions, attempted to set limits as to how far, and of what sort, of questions to the human reason could reasonably be allowed to treat. Unfortunately, however, Aristotle's philosophy was nevertheless perceived to be the sine qua non of...
Theology and Philosophy that lies at the core, not only was revelation “true philosophy”, but philosophy could acquire equal status with revelation. With the deification of the details of Aristotle’s system, the conflict with Galileo must become an inevitable consequence.

What may be said to be the deification of Aristotle may therefore also be said to be the “secularization” of theology. The dialectic, as was stated long before, is “very flexible, and will not always do what it was intended to do.”

Consider, for example, the following quotation of mediaevalist Ernst Kantorowicz, who in turn is citing and commenting upon the celebrated papal bull *Unam sanctam* (302):

> While it has often been felt that the new monarchies (of France and England) were in many respects ‘churches’ by transference, it has less often been pointed out in detail to what extent late mediaeval and modern commonwealths actually were influenced by the ecclesiastical model, especially by the all-encompassing spiritual prototype of corporational concepts, the *corpus mysticum* of the Church.

> The corporational doctrine of the Roman Church has been summarized and dogmatized, in 1302 by Pope Boniface VIII in the lapidary sentences of the bull *Unam Sanctam*:

> “Urged by faith we are bound to believe in one holy Church, Catholic and Apostolic… without which there is neither salvation nor remission of sins… which represents one mystical body, the head of which is Christ, and the head of Christ is God.”

> The general content of the bull leaves no doubt about the meaning of the introductory sentence. It betrays the supreme effort on the part of the spiritual power to answer, and, if possible, to overcome the challenge of the nascent self-sufficient of the secular bodies politic. Pope Boniface was bent upon putting political entities in what he considered their proper place, and therefore stressed, and overstressed, the hierarchical view that the political bodies had a purely functional character within the world community of the *corpus mysticum Christi*, which was the Church, whose
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head was Christ, and whose visible head was the vicar of Christ, the Roman pontiff. 748

The connection between such corporational doctrines and the Augustinian understanding of ancestral (original) sin as an inherited guilt has already been touched upon.

But it is worth exploring within the new context. The King’s body politic, once the secular impulse was carried to its full end, came to be understood precisely as the “members” of the nation, his individual subjects. But Kantorowicz misses an important point.

To which pole of the dialectic would one assign Boniface’s use of the term “mystical body of Christ” (corpus mysticum Christi)? To the realist, or symbolist side? It should be recalled that the terms corpus verum and corpus mysticum, the “real body” and the “mystical body”, had by 1302 acquired diametrically opposed meanings: to assert that the Eucharist was a corpus verum was, by that time, also to assert that it was not a corpus mysticum, and vice versa. Dialectically then, there can be but one meaning of Boniface’s statement, and it is certainly not the meaning he intended: if the Church be a corpus mysticum Christi, perforce it must be some other body, or perhaps another kind of body, than His real body.

Boniface is reflecting the Gnosticizing of law, in this case, canon law, that has occurred elsewhere; in this case, a new doctrine of the Church is being formulated in a contrived “orthodox context”, and the foundations for this effort lie, once again, in the corporational legal thinking that had taken hold upon theology through the identification of person and nature at the root of the Augustinian theology:

Aquinas, quite frequently, used the term corpus ecclesiae mysticum, “the mystical body of the Church.” Hitherto it had been the custom to talk about the Church as the “mystical body of Christ” (corpus mysticum Christi) which sacramentally alone make sense. Now, however, the Church, which had been seen as the mystical Body of Christ became a
mystical body in its own right. That is the Church organism became a “mystical body” in an almost juristic sense: a mystical corporation. The change in terminology was not haphazardly introduced. It signified just another step in *ecclesiae juridicum* to coincide with the *corpus ecclesiae mysticum* and thereby to “secularize” the notion of a “mystical body.” In that development Aquinas himself holds a key position. For it is not devoid of some inner logic that the *Doctor angelicus* on several occasions saw fit to replace, straightforwardly, the liturgical idiom by a juristic idiom.

That last link to the sphere of the altar, however, was severed when Aquinas wrote: “it may be said that head and limbs together are as though one mystical person.” Nothing could be more striking that this *bona fide* replacement of *corpus mysticum* by *persona mystica*. Here the mysterious materiality which the term *corpus mysticum* – whatever its connotations may have been – still harbored, has been abandoned: “The *corpus Christi* has been exchanged for a juristic abstraction, the “mystical person”, a notion reminiscent of, indeed synonymous with, the “fictitious person,” the *persona repraesentata* or *ficta*, which the jurists had introduced into legal thought and which will be found at the bottom of so much of the potential theorizing during the later Middle Ages.

In other words, the several persons of the Church have become one person by means of their membership in Christ’s mystical body, His human nature. And that means, at root, that all Western legal theory of the “corporate person” are founded upon then same theological error as the *filioque*.

Aquinas has thus described three processes predicted earlier: (1) the move from the concrete and personal to the abstract and “essential”, a now familiar characteristic of the inversion that constitutes the Augustinian *ordo theologiae*; and (2) that movement is denoted by the use of the new term *persona mystica*, which, let it be noted, has not further concrete definition or reference than that. Who is this *persona mystica*? Christ? Hardly, since the term is feminine. The Church? But if so, then the Church and Christ are not one identical body, and a gulf looms between the two.
Finally, (3) the abandonment of liturgical grounding of theology parallels, and occasions, the rise of something else in their place, a new juristic language and content.

Consequently, a further “category error” arises when one considers exactly what Aquinas meant by “person” in this juristic context. Unbelievably, the meaning is to be sought in his confusion of nature – in this case by his use of the term “species” – and person when discussing the subject of angels. In his understanding, every angel was a distinct species, since, following the Aristotelian doctrine of individuation, immaterial beings could not be differentiated, since differentiation was a property of matter. Thus,

In the center of the corporational doctrines of the jurists were the collective abstractions, or immortal and immutable species, in comparison with which the mortal, and ever replaceable, individual components appeared of lesser importance and in many respects negligible. The de-individualized fictitious persons of the lawyers, therefore, necessarily resembled the angels, and the jurists themselves recognized that there was some similarity between their abstractions and the angelic beings.

Two processes are at work here. On the one hand, the category error – the confusion of person and nature – is the root difficulty. But in addition to this there is a wholly new element, for just as Augustine adopted the positive Neoplatonic definition of simplicity as an adequate definition of the divine essence of God, so Aquinas has adopted the Aristotelian conception of form, individuation, and matter, as an understanding of “person”, in this case, the “mystical” and “angelic” persons. Raphael’s great painting, “The School of Athens”, sums up the predicament of the Western Middle Ages by drawing attention to the fact that, insofar as the Second Europe can speak of universals, whether divine, angelic, or human, it can only do so by borrowing “Plato”, and insofar as it can speak of individuals or particulars, it can only do so by borrowing Aristotle.
God, History, and Dialectic

Philosophy is indeed the handmaiden of theology. Indeed, it must be more accurate to say that Philosophy has become Sarah to Theology’s Hagar.

The effect of such category confusion, when applied to law, contained within it a Gnostic-style heuristic device for divining all manners of properties of the king’s person by virtue of his possession of the office, or species, of kingship, not the least of which was the fruitful deduction that, like as the king in his body politic was immortal, so too in moral attributes the king’s body politic was incapable of impropriety. Law was thus granted a moral autonomy and status as emanating from the king, and in turn, the new secular monarchies gained for the state an absolute and autonomous status such that one may safely conclude that “what is lawful is moral.” Presumably because the king is also immortal, the Law must be unchangeable. In any case, the immorality of the king’s body politic alters the natural capacity of his body mortal, “and the effects thereof are changed by its Union with the other Body, and don’t (sic.) remain in their former Degree, but partake of the effects of the Body politic.”

Note that here and throughout similar texts previously cited, that the language is either Nestorian or Monophysite: one always speaks about two things, body politic and body natural, either as capacities of the one king, or as two underlying natures which communicate their properties directly to each other. For some reason – hidden within the Augustinian ordo theologiae itself – one who never discusses the person who unites them both or his actual personal morality or habits; what is moral is what the king legislates. So at last we have arrived at the Anselmian “theology without God” in the realm of jurisprudence, a jurisprudence done increasingly without reference to the Divine King and His law.

Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo heralded the beginning of the attempt to only to prove the existence of God philosophically, but of the attempt to prove that the God which exists is the Christian God. The conception of the divine simplicity itself is the essential component in such a program, for if one can prove that God exist, since existence and essence are
identical in the divine simplicity along with everything else, then one will have proven all other things as well. Of course, the “God” which is proven by this method could only be the philosophical God assumed at the outset of the system, the “God-in-general” of the philosophical genus of “monotheism.” This much we have already encountered.

But there is yet more. In the developing legal theory of the Second Europe and the Augustinian *ordo theologiae* of essence, attributes, and persons, it would not be long until Reason or Logos in Law itself was detached from the third level and elevated to the second. Logos or Reason was no longer understood to be the Second Person of the Trinity but to belong to the second category of the *ordo theologiae et justitiae*, more like the abstract, disembodied reason of the Stoics.\(^{753}\) Once transferred to the political and legal sphere, this abstracted Reason became the autonomous “Reason of State”, which, when coupled to the absolutization of the autonomous state – the king can do no wrong – could, and did, lead to bloody consequences. “Reason of State” increasingly became the principal motivation of “Christian” rulers and often the justification of wholesale slaughter, from the Inquisitions to the French and Russian Revolutions. Such could only have occurred within the Second Europe if at some point the state was able to throw off ties to the Church (or vice versa, for both where in fact working toward that end), and absoultize itself as the final arbiter of morality.

Thus a new process is given impetus with this new and juristic view: there was an analogy of Law and Justice in the political sphere, just as there was an analogy of Being in the metaphysical:

Reason… eventually revealed herself as identical with the Law of nature which was practically one with the Divine Law. Equity belonged without question to the sphere of Positive Law, the human or man-made laws issued for the government of the state. That left Justice, the most prominent figure to whom the shrine was dedicated, in an intermediate position. She along had a share in both (sic.) the Natural Law above and
the Positive Law below her, although she was equal to neither.\textsuperscript{754}

In other words, one significant development within legal theory in the Second Europe, and the Augustinian \textit{ordo theologiae} itself required that Law come to be the province of the Platonic abstractions: Law, Goodness, Truth, Beauty, Justice, Reason, and so on, increasingly without reference to any specifically Christian concept of them. Law, as it were, reflects the \textit{first two} categories of the inverted Augustinian \textit{ordo}, essence and attributes.

\textbf{4. Dialectical Christology: The Investiture Controversy and the Emerging Secular, Autonomous State}

It is at the third level of the Augustinian \textit{ordo theologiae}, the persons, that the category error of confusing person and nature reproduces legal version of the Trinitarian and Christological heresies of classical patristic theology that were examined in Part One. The English jurist Bracton, for example, reproduced a whole host of “legal heresies”, from the King being the vicar of God to the requirement that, in order for him to be the vicar of God, he must be “subject to the law” in order to have royal prerogative, an obvious allusion to Christ’s voluntary submission to the Law, and His disavowal of using His omnipotent to avoid the Crucifixion. This “reluctance” bears a resemblance to yet another christological heresy that the Second Europe would revive only much later, “Kenoticism.”\textsuperscript{755} Of course, by Bracton’s time, the notion of which person of the Trinity the king was supposed, as God’s vicar, to represent also had become confused, for the underlying doctrine of the Trinity upon which Bracton had to rely, the \textit{filioque}, had already confused the persons.

Bracton’s comparison of the king with the humbled Christ… may lead us to yet another problem of Bracton’s concept of kingship, a problem of...
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political “Christology”. He writes:

“For that end had he (sic.) been created and elected a king that he may give justice to all, and that in him the Lord be seated (Ps 9:5 also 88:15) and that through him the Lord discerns his judgment (III Kings 3:11).”

It would appear from the biblical passages, which Bracton quotes, that the “Lord” who dwells in the king and decrees justice through the king, is God the Father rather than the Son, although admittedly in the later Middle Ages it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish clearly between the first and second persons of the Trinity.756

Such confusion recalls, once again, that of Sabellius’s “Son-Father” (υιοπατέρ) and the accusations of Photius against the filioque as “hammering together” the Father and the Son.757 The Augustinian trinitarian theology is thus hardly restricted to merely ecclesiastical effects.

The broad period in which Bracton writes, 1100-1300, marked not only the zenith of the Second Europe in terms of the architectonic structures which privileged scholasticism, but also the period of the greatest social and political changes, changes based in part upon a deep rooting in the underlying dialectical structure of the Augustinian filioque. By the time of Aquinas, as has been seen,

the classical christological distinction of the Two Natures in Christ, still powerfully alive in the political theology of the Norman Anonymous (canonist) around A.D. 1100, has all but completely disappeared from the orbit of political discussions and theories. It has been replaced by the corporational, non-christological concept of the Two Bodies of Christ: one, a body natural, individual, and personal (corpus naturale, verum, personale); the other, a super-individual body politic and collective, the corpus mysticum, interpreted also as a persona mystica.

The new and quasi-territorial state, self-sufficient according to its claims and independent of the Church and Papacy, quarried the wealth of ecclesiastical notions, which were so convenient to handle, and finally...
proceeded to assert itself by placing its own temporariness on a level with
the sempiternity of the militant Church. In that process the idea of the
corpus mysticum, as well as other corporational doctrines developed by
the Church were to be a major importance.

An early example of setting the state as a “body” over against the
Church as a “body” emerged from the pamphlet literature struggle of
investiture, when an imperial writer advocated unum corpus repblicae to
supplement unum corpus ecclesiae.\footnote{758}

This new notion of “sempiternity” was the result of the mediaeval
theorizing on the nature of “time” and “eternity”. It was “a kind of
infiniteness and duration which had motion and therefore past and future,
a sempiternity which according to all authorities was endless.”\footnote{759}
To the
king as a persona mixta the state over which he ruled had thus become a
persona mystica et corpus mysticum.\footnote{760}

We have observed that the filioque was derived by the confusion
and identification within Augustine’s On the Holy Trinity of the Holy Spirit
with the two natural attributes of holiness and spirituality, and that a
Person of the Trinity was thus confused with a natural attribute which was
common to all three persons. And since that was true, a Person was
confused and identified with the divine nature itself and thus all basis for
real distinction of persons collapsed. This logic began to reproduce itself
directly in the legal theorizing that took place within or in regard to the Holy
Roman Empire, and both presaged, and underwrote, the Investiture
controversies. In order to appreciate this development, we must treat it in
detail, to see how a certain combination of theological developments that
stemmed from this root produced an overgrowth of legal difficulties, and
with them and their “resolution”, a new society, culture, and social outlook.

The confusion of person with natural operation is manifest in the
legal theories of the Emperor Frederick II, the last and greatest of the Holy
Roman Emperors. In this development, the emperor himself is still viewed
as a type of Christ, but with unusual results.
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It was the language of christological examplarism which was used throughout to proclaim the king a *typus Christi*. This typology actually covered two aspects of the royal office, one ontological and the other functional, and both were reflected in the honorary titles which so often exalted the mediaeval ruler: “Image of Christ” and “Vicar of Christ.” While the former designation referred perhaps more to his Being, the latter stressed juristically his administrative functions and referred primarily to his doing. 761

Once we recall, however, that the doctrine of the *filioque* taught that the divine attributes of holiness and spirituality, and hence the Holy Spirit Himself, proceeded from the Son as well as from the Father, since both were “holy” and “spirit”, then we have the basis for the next stage of imperial legal thinking, for the emperor, as the type of Christ, causes an attribute to proceed from himself, in this case, Justice:

… from the very same person… there might progress the origin of Justice, from whom also the defense of Justice proceeds. Provision, therefore, was made, for reasons of utility and necessity, as can be proved, that there concurs in the selfsame person the origin as well as the protection of Justice, lest Vigor be failing Justice, and Justice, Vigor. The Caesar, therefore, must be at once *Father and Son of Justice, her lord and her minister; Father and lord in creating Justice*, and protecting what has been created; and in like fashion he shall be, in her veneration, the Son of Justice, and, in ministering her plenty, her minister. 762

How did we get from the emperor-as-type-of-Christ, to the emperor, in Sabellian fashion, being both the Father and Son of the attribute of Justice?

There are several factors of the Augustinian religious mind at work in this legal reflection, and to understand them, they need to be examined carefully. First, at the level of the *filioque* itself, there is the “of equals from” argument that the Spirit, because He is the Spirit *of* Christ necessarily
eternally proceeds from Him. In addition to this, however, is the dynamic of the opposition between nature and grace, between divine freedom and election and the natural human inheritance of original guilt, a modification of human nature that so affects the human will that it can do nothing, even in Christ’s case, but that of “lusting in opposition” to the divine will. This led inevitably in the fifth and sixth centuries to the heresy of Spanish Adoptionism, which, on the basis of this opposition between nature and grace within Christ, as well as on the basis of Augustine’s own problematic statements, led to the affirmation that in Christ there were two sons, a divinely predestinating Son of God by nature, and a humanly predestined son of David by grace.

When combined, these two ideas produced a further difficulty, one which St. Photius was quick to point out in the ninth century: if the Spirit proceeds from the Son, and the Son is Christ, then does the Spirit began to proceed in time from that which is “Christ” or anointed i.e., the human nature? If so, then He is less than God since that nature is not eternal, or the human nature must become eternal if the Spirit is to proceed eternally from the Father and the Son. Moreover, if the spirit proceeded “from Christ” as from the humanity, there was a danger that a Nestorian separation would be introduced within Christ. That confusion of natural operations (φυσικαι εωεργειαι) with personal characteristics (υποστατικαι ιδιοτηται) which reproduced a whole which reproduced a whole warren of familiar difficulties in the ninth century filioque debate now reproduced the same set of difficulties within the legal arena in the thirteenth: thus, the “emperor” is not only both Father and Son of Justice, but, as in the filioque itself, the attribute of “Justice” has itself come, like the Spirit, to a kind of dual procession, proceeding from the Father, it and from the Father in turn cause, within the “legal processions”, the emperor to proceed from them, and conversely, the emperor causes it to proceed from him.

The subordination of persons to attributes within the Augustinian ordo theologiae that resulted in their becoming special kinds of attributes
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is likewise faithfully reproduced here in the legal theory of Frederick II’s lawyers; the emperor is Father and Son (persons) of Justice (attribute), because the emperor is both the source of Justice and subordinate to it.

While the antiphrasis pater et filius Justitiae seems to be a new formula, metaphors of intellectual paternity of that kind were common property of the jurists’ idiom of that age. The emperor a pater legis, Justice a mater juris, and ius itself the minister vel filius Justitiae: all that may be found in contemporary legal literature…. The emperor acts the exemplo Dei patris et filii, wrote Mattheus de Afflictis, who on that occasion recalled also that the emperor according to Roman Law, was pater legis as well as lex animata. 765

Thus a king-making Law and Law-making King mutually conditioned each other, therewith the well-known relations between the king and the Law reappear in Bracton; the king, the Law’s son, becomes Law’s father. It is the kind of reciprocity and interdependence of Law and Prince which may be found in practically all politico-legal theories of that period. 766

The Sabellian legal legacy leads to, and is based upon, yet another heritage of the Augustinian theology.

We have seen the difficulties occasioned by the dialectical formulation of Eucharistic theology led, in part, to the opposite of the corpus mysticum, the mystical corporation and the body of the Church, to the corpus verum, the real body of Eucharist. In this opposition was contained the whole long development of Hellenistic dialectical formulations with its oppositions of the spiritual, good, and infinite on the one hand, and the material, evil, and finite on the other. Sacred was opposed, increasingly to the secular, the hieratic to the political. The Investiture Crisis is, in its deepest theological roots therefore, the result of this dualistic structure, and the inability of the underlying dialectical paradigm by which both tried to resolve it.
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It was the ambiguity which in the later Middle Ages led, among other solutions, to the construction of the dual sovereignty, a *maiestas realis* of the people and a *maiestas personalis* of the Prince. Frederick II did not arrive at the duality of that kind. Nor did he, as yet, come to described the ruler’s position as one deriving equally from the people and from God, *populo faiente et Deo inspirante.*

Lest the importance of these new formulations be obscured, note the opposition of the “real majesty of the people”, the “corporate” entity, to the personal majesty of the prince, a majesty which, in the dialectical construct, must perforce be a *mystical* and therefore *unreal* majesty. Again, one here has the now familiar inversions of the Augustinian *ordo theologiae* manifesting themselves in yet another color, but with far reaching results, for the personal is the following upon the corporative abstraction; the corporate abstraction itself has become real in the secular sphere to the “mystical” body of the Church by the process of opposition to it. Thus the symmetry is at last perceivable: the Prince has a mystical majesty, derived *from* the secular and the real body of the People, a mystical majesty which is intern opposed to the *real* majesty of the Pope – with his plenitude of power – in the “ecclesiastical” sphere. A table will assist to make this new cultural paradigm clear

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State (Empire)</th>
<th>is opposed to Church</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Prince’s Majesty</td>
<td>The Pope’s Majesty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mystical</td>
<td>Real</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The People</td>
<td>The Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Body</td>
<td>Mystical Body</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is the historical progress and derivation of this structure which interests us here. While the point of entry for the dialectical opposition was in the *filioque*, the doctrine of God, the immediate carriers of virus were
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the Augustinian doctrine of original guilt, with its opposition of nature and grace, and the Eucharistic debates and the dialectical formulations of Ratramnus, Lanfranc, and Berengar and their opposition of the real to the mystical bodies.

This opposition of the royal and secular to the ecclesiastical and sacred intensified certain tensions inherent within feudal law itself. In feudal conceptions, the king was the principal landholder of the kingdom. With some exaggeration, it might be said that the “kingdom” was his private land, on which he permitted his “subjects” to live and work for their incomes, in return for “service”, usually of a military nature, when called upon. In the case of the higher nobility, this “service” of course was personal military service, with usually the added provision that they supply a certain number of knights or soldiers in addition to their own personal military service. As feudal law developed, however, the service could be rendered in another fashion, the provision of money – “taxes” – to “supply” the king’s military ventures.

As kings divided their lands into fiefs, they naturally retained some lands for themselves, from which they derived their direct personal incomes, incomes, which, in the scheme of things, were used to fund the operations of government. These lands therefore existed to a certain extent outside of the normal tapestry of contractual, obligations which existed between a king and his feudal tenants who held their lands, and incomes, from the king in return for personal loyalty and service to him when called upon. This royal land, the royal fisc, and the extra-jurisdictional royal privileged it represented, became the focus of increasing tension between kings and their nobilities, especially in England, as the dialectical tensions inherent in the west began to widen.

Frederick II, as Kantorowicz has noted, increasingly formulated the emperor’s office not in terms of vicarious Christi, but, as the Augustinian ordo theologiae came to dominate formulation, increasingly as vicarious Iustitiae, as both Father and Son of Justice. Occupying this new middle
ground, therefore, the imperial principate defined itself by relationship not to God or contractual, but to Justice, which in turn formed the middle term in the *analogia iustitiae*:

Law (i.e., Natural Law, Reason)
Justice
Law (i.e., human laws)

This scheme was well-known in the Middle Ages, and not a distinctively Christian phenomenon in the Second Europe, for Averroes, Avicenna, and Moses Maimonides with all produce some variation of it, though in their systems it is often the imam, or judge or rabbi, and not the king, who occupies the crucial middle term, like a demiurgic mediator, interpreting the “order and reason” of the divine realm to the “chaos” of the lower.\(^\text{768}\)

In England, however, a further distancing from the original Christological and Trinitarian basis of political theorizing took place, for the King became the representative, not of Frederick II’s Neoplatonic *analogia iustitiae*, but the royal fisc itself, of the extra jurisdictional privilege attaching to the royal lands:

A split, as yet hardly visible, between the “reigning king” and the financial “holy district” within the realm began to show up. But while the English kings reigning in the thirteenth century tried to ignore even the existence of a cleavage between themselves and the things public, the various baronial opposition groups were ready to widen that split and to pit the *res publicae* against the *res regnans*. It is significant that during the constitutional struggles of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the baronial objections were always centered on the fiscal-domain sphere, including the prerogative rights attached to it, whereas the strictly feudal sphere – including feudal aids and other rights exercised by the king as personal liege lord – remained, on the whole unchallenged.

The Norman Anonymous had expressed the king’s supra-temporal qualities by attributing to him a divine and God-like nature by grace. But
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the ideas of the Norman Anonymous propounding the king as a *gemina persona* because he was the “image of Christ” even with regard to the natures, belonged to the past. Frederick II, as the lex animata, had sought the semptiternal essence of his rulership somewhere in an undying Idea of Justice, and had changed, so to speak, from a *vicarious Christi* to a *vicarious Iustitiae*, an office which still had semi-religious connotations. However, the metaphysical concepts and eschatological ideas of the imperial court may have fitted the conditions of Italy and of the great war against the papacy; they did not fit Bractonian England, Bracton himself was more sober, and in a way, more secular than were lawyers at the court of Frederick II... the king in the Bractonian age changed also... we might perhaps say that he changed from a *vicarious Christi* to a *vicarious Fisci*. That is, the perpetuality of the supra-personal king began to depend also on the perpetuality of the impersonal public sphere to which the fisc belonged.  

In the time of Ivo of Chartres (ca 1040-1115), however, long before this development was completed, yet another inheritance of the Augustinian religious mind was at work.

Some method had to be developed whereby to maintain that the king was, or represented, an eternal perpetual function, and this method was discovered in the corporative theories of the mediaeval canonist.

... Ivo of Chartres – merely reproduced a famous letter of St. Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage in the third century, which has always been taken as a cornerstone of the doctrine “monarchical episcopate” and in which Cyprian declared: “The Bishop is in the Church and the Church is in the Bishop”  

This form of inversion goes back to the Fourth Gospel (John 14:10): “I am in the Father, and the Father is in me,” a verse to which (together with John 10:30) not only Andreas of Isernia referred, but also – very long before him, an din a most curious fashion – the staunchest fighter against Arianism, Athanasius of Alexandria, when defending the Pauline doctrine of Christ as the Image of God and, therewith, the divinity of the Son and his coequality with the Father, Athanasius resorted to the
simile of the emperor’s image, which he called the “idea and form of the emperor,” and said: “The image might well speak: ‘I and the emperor are one, I am in him and he is in me.’”

The King was thus the “real majesty” of the people and since the people, as a corporate entity, was perpetual, the spiritual res or “reality” of kingship itself was perpetual, and transmitted from successor to successory.

If the factors Time, Perpetuity, or Identity despite Changed formed a decisive feature of the bodies corporate, and if further the present constituents of a body corporate were of relative unimportance as compared to the immortal universitas as such, then it might not appear too difficult to isolate, as it were, those decisive features and to arrive at a new construction: the corporation existing exclusively in Time and by succession. Normally the “plurality of persons” needed to form a collective body was constituted both ways, as it were, “horizontally” by those living successively. Once, however, the principle was found that “plurality” or “tonality” (totum quoddam) was contrary, or even diametrically opposed, to the purely organologial concept – not restricted to Space, but could unfold successively in time, one could discard conceptually the plurality in Space altogether. That is to say, one construed a corporate person, a king of persona mystica, which was a collective only and exclusively with regard to Time, since the plurality of its members was made up only and exclusively by succession; and thus one arrived one-man corporation and fictitious person of which the long file of predecessors and the long file of future or potential successors represented, together with the present incumbent, that “plurality of persons” which normally would be made up by a multitude of individuals living simultaneously.

There is, in other words, a king of “transmigration” or μετεµψυχωσις of “kingship” in each successor, by virtue of his birth and blood descent from previous kings. Lest we misunderstand the importance of this new step, we must compare it to the earlier hieratic conception inherited from
Byzantium and Frankish kings. Only then will the truly occult significant of the new conception be apparent.

But why such urgency attached to the notion of the kingship “which never dies”? In this regard, the King, especially in English law, was responsible for maintaining the peace of the realm, the “King’s Peace”. Disputes between nobles were no longer private “feudal disputes” in the ordinary sense of the term as disputes between private signatories of feudal contracts or charters. They were disputes within law which literally threatened the peace of the realm. But what happened when the reigning and ruling king died? Some reasoned that the peace died as well, which was tantamount to maintaining that Law died along with the king:

...descendants of the Englishmen of 1135 or 1272 who were said to have indulged in robberies and other disturbances because allegedly on the king’s death the king’s peace ceased to exist – or of those people of Pavia, who on the death of Emperor Henry II, destroyed the imperial castle...

Hence, the notions of the people as a real majesty, from which the king derived his personal majesty, was a political necessity, for if he derived his majesty from something which itself did not cease to exist, then the Law of which he was the source and to which he was submitted could not, itself, die.

And from this it was a short step to the position that the royal coronation and anointing conferred no special grace or empowerment, and was therefore not a sacramental act, a conception enhanced, during the Middle Ages by the definition of Seven and only Seven, sacraments. Lest it be thought, however, that this development was wholly on the political and royal side of kings, emperors and jurists, it should be stressed that the papacy was equally a contributor to the process:

(Pope) Innocent argued that chrism and head anointed were withheld
from the Prince because Christ, the Head of the Church, had received the head anointment from the Holy Spirit. That is to say, in order to stress the dissimilarity with the anointment of Christ, the anointment of the Prince was removed from the head to arms and shoulders, and it was performed, not with holy chrism, but with lesser oil. 784

As so often, the Roman pontiff appears here as the chief promoter of precisely that “secularism” which in other respects the Holy See tended to fight. Somewhat contemptuously Pope John XXII could allow King Edward II to repeat his anointment if the king so desired, because any how “it left no imprint on the soul,” that is, it had no sacramental value. 785

The ritualistic lowering of the value of consecration would have had little importance beyond the coronation liturgy of Rome had not, at approximately the same time, canonist and legists started to reduce the value of coronations in the legal-constitutional sphere as well. 786

This is to explain the diagram produced earlier: Church and State defined themselves increasingly by mutual opposition to the other, and therefore, both parties are equally responsible for the growing secularization of the general culture and society, not to mention the more specialized legal and constitutional theorizing, of the Second Europe.

In fact, not only do the two conceptions, the older hieratic one and the new “juristic” one coexist side-by-side in the thinking of the “secular” jurists, but the same situation continued to exist within the thought of the Church’s canonist throughout the Middle Ages.

The Canonist, however, who came to think of coronations as a matter of lesser importance were not the representatives of the hieratic wing, that is, of those defending the theory that all power ultimately culminated in or derived from one man: the pontiff and his pontifical plenitude. On the contrary, the hieratic canonists favored the interpretation that in the imperial consecration the power of the material sword was conveyed from the pontiff. The other group of canonists, however, the “dualists”, who favored a balance of power of the two universal powers, held that the
imperial power… derived from God alone – through the act of election. The customary argument of these “dualistic” canonists of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries was that emperors in former days had full power even without a consecration, because all power was from God anyhow.\footnote{787}

Why did these canonists focus on the powers of election versus those conferred at consecration? Because of the inherent difference between the offices of a bishop, and that of the pope:

Moreover, the canonist made many subtle and often highly important distinctions concerning the extent of actual power which the elect was entitled to exercise before his consecration, and naturally they visualized as a pattern of the imperator electus the “bishop elect” whose powers before his consecration were restricted, whereas the “pope elect” exercised practically full power from the moment of his election, especially if he ascended an ordained bishop.\footnote{788}

One cannot ponder this too long, for as was seen in relationship to the conflict between Pope Nicholas I and Patriarch St. Photius, part of the problem was occasioned by the difference between those offices which were inherent to the Church – episcopacy, priesthood, the diaconate – and those which, for administrative reasons only, were added after the Conversion of Constantine, and which represented imperial jurisdictions – archbishops, metropolitans, and patriarchs. Nothing could be more positive evidence of the fact that the papacy is not an office in the church than this fact that its powers can be exercised to a great extent prior to and apart from any ordination or consecration. Conversely, the authority of a bishop, by the nature of the office itself, cannot be exercised without, or prior to, the act of consecration.

This focus on the role of election, the function of office, and what powers, if any, were conferred by anointing and consecration, were, as was noted, brought about by the problem of the little interregnum, the
period between the death of one king and accession of another. But the little interregnum had another role to play in the history of the Second Europe: the Investiture Controversy, which was in large part about whether or not fiefs conferred by the emperor to bishops were perpetual and inalienable, or had with every new bishop or emperor to be reconferred. The emperors and their Episcopal partisans said that they did need to be reconferred, or “vested”, upon the bishop. The popes and their Episcopal partisans said they did not:

Whereas the perpetuality of Church property was stressed, time and again, during the Investiture struggle... the defenders of the imperial cause, who denied the perpetuality of the temporal properties of the Church, came to deny also the perpetuality of the secular power as such; they insisted on ever-repeated investiture, that is, confirmation of grants to the Church, on the accession of every new king and new bishop... Wido, it is true, tries to construct perennial imperalia iura, but he does not carry this notion far enough to overcome the break of continuity which he was bound to construct in order to maintain the necessity of new Investitures of the bishops at the hands of every new emperor.  

Eventually, of course, the position of perpetuality won out in both sides of the dispute. The crown itself, the visible golden symbol of royalty, conveyed symbolically – so it was argued – a valid point about the nature of royal authority. Its sempiternity and quasi-indestructible character symbolized the royal “dignity that did not die”, and the new king’s coronation with the same crown as rested upon the head of the old symbolized the transmigration of the office from soul to soul.  

5. The Dialectical Crack-Up of Feudal Law

The “applied Augustinism” of the historiographical and philosophical theories of Joachim of Fiore which will be examined in the next chapter
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also contributed to the development of late Mediaeval law and to the trend toward the increased secularization of the State. Essentially Joachimism made this contribution by taking the increasingly secular condition of society and remythologizing it by applying dialectics of the Augustinian triadology to history itself. The combination of this Joachimite “historiography” with the already-derived legal theories of the jurists produced yet another development within the Second Europe’s political culture.

The “powers of the Crown” could be defined, as was seen, in terms of a corporation, even to the extent of making “the Crown,” in English law at least, a “corporation sole.” This view of the Crown as a corporate entity derived, as has been seen, from the view of the People as a corporation, a doctrine in turn derived from the Augustinian doctrine of original guilt. Since sin could, in Adam, be transferred from the person of Adam to his nature, one could thus inherit a natural guilt to the extent that all men are “one in Adam.”

One detects here the vague outlines of the emergence of the now familiar symbol of “globalism”, for once the doctrine of original guilt is fully appreciated, it was only a matter of time until someone, in this case, Dante, could come to refer to humanity as “One Man”, a “single all-embracing community, a universal body corporate.” In Dante’s hands, this became the secular version of counterpart to papal Catholicism, for such a doctrine of humanity meant in turn that man,

or briefly, the totality of humanitas, could become actuated only by the collective effort of the corporate body of mankind. The fact that this perfection of the human totality was a desirable task, and even a necessary one, is a different matter. Dante’s intent perhaps may be conveniently gathered from a stanza in the Comedy:

“The human nature, when in its totality
It sinned in its first seed, was parted both
From its own dignities and from the paradise."

That is, with regard to original sin the whole of mankind was like one body and one man, as Aquinas put it. Against that totality of mankind which fell guilty potentially in the first man, Dante set the totality of mankind which potentially can regain “its own dignities” and paradise as well. It can achieve, by its own power and through the intellectual virtues, its own actuation in the terrestrial paradise whence Adam had been expelled. 793

One can, in other words, only derive this doctrine from two sources. On the one hand, the original confusion of person and nature which occasioned the Augustinian doctrine of the filioque. On the other, Dante’s corporate humanity owes much to Aquinas’ exposition of the doctrine of original guilt and to the secularization of the broad culture that if represents, for as Aquinas’ doctrine might be said to be a doctrine of “mankind as corporation” not by unity of intellect but by the unity of the common nature and guilt – “thereby leaving undiscussed the curiosity that a collectivity by sin should be orthodox”794 – Dante simply extends the logic implicit in the category error to conclude that there is a corporate unity of mankind in all this natural faculties, intellect and will included, and that these can naturally effect a state of “natural paradise” with collective, i.e., global, human effort.

Screen in this fashion, Adam himself became the first example of the “corporation sole”, since prior to the Fall and the engendering of offspring, he is both person and the “totality of existing genus humanum. He was at once man and manind.”795 Or to put it differently, Aquinas’ doctrine that individual angels are both individuals and entire species is reproduced in human form: Adam the person is identical to the entire genus or nature of humanity. In Dante’s hands, this corporate unity of mankind therefore works in tandem with the dualistic thinking that had
begun to dominate political thought, the dualism between the sacred and the secular, the Church and the State, the hieratic and the juristic and political. For Dante there is both a celestial paradise, and a natural and earthly, one. Collective humanity can, by employing its natural virtues, bring about the later on earth.\textsuperscript{796} This “nestorianizing” serves in Dante’s scheme only to separate the “theological virtues” – Faith, Hope, and Charity – from the realm of politics altogether.

One end is the political “iconography” of the day with the portraiture of Christ as a “haloed man” – i.e., without the iconographic nimbus denoting His unique and eternal Sonship – representing a \textit{Deus absconditus}, a God who has begun to absent Himself from politics.\textsuperscript{797} This opens up another dualism in legal thought, and that is the opposition between Christ as \textit{King} to Christ as \textit{Priest}, a duality of function rendered increasingly by the antithesis of the two functions to each other. But Christ is King precisely in that He is God; He is a priest only insofar as He is a man. Thus, since priesthood is a function of Christ-in-humanity, and since humanity is inferior to deity, then in the legal theories of the emerging secular monarchies of England and France, the sacerdotal office is inferior to the royal and political, and moreover derives its sacred powers \textit{within} and \textit{from} the crown.\textsuperscript{798} Even the opposition of nature and grace will have its own consequence: the king is “anointed” – when such was still understood to convey something - as king by grace, whereas only Christ was King by nature.\textsuperscript{799} That feudal law, with its vast theological and legal complexity, could be, and moreover was, the occasion for the vast consolidation and centralization of the power of the crown in the new secular monarchies of England and France. But when employed as a principle of international consolidation, as in the Holy Roman Empire or a short-lived “Plantagenet Empire”, the inherent theological contradictions proved too powerful and centripetal a force to maintain cohesion, and the Second Europe spun apart into a series of warring oppositions, not the least of which were the legal and canonical “wars” between rival popes.
XI. THE HISTORY OF THE CHAMELEON GODHEAD

A. Joachim to Marx: From the Dialectical God of History to the Dialectics of History as God

1. Joachim of Fiore

A. History as the Vehicle of God and of the “Spiritual Intelligence”

If the Trinity be the sovereign Lord of history, and if that Trinity was not only capable of dialectical explanation but was, as it was in the filioque, dialectic in its very essence, then the key to history would inevitably be seen to lie in the dialectical processes and processions thought to be at work in the Trinity itself. With Joachim of Fiore (ca. 1130-1200), it is no longer the specific history of salvation that becomes the means of the knowledge of God, but the dialectical nature of History itself becomes “another path to knowing God.” Historical inquiry, based upon that Augustinian Trinitarian dialectic, provided the means to unlock the meaning of the Scriptures, “not only to understand the past, but to interpret the future.” This kind of “dialectical divination”, or what Joachim called “spiritual understanding,” indicates the massive degree to which historical thinking had become subsumed within dialectic itself. This conviction maintained that the God had so ordered history “as to reveal the divine Trinitarian nature” in such a fashion that “through history one can come to know and to contemplate the Trinity in all its dynamic relationships,” a conviction which, In Joachim’s conception, meant that God the Trinity “would be fully manifested in the historical process.”

1. The Eschatological Turn

This aspect of Joachim’s thought is well known, so well known that
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it, in fact, serves to obscure a rather important point and one deeply rooted within the Augustinian dialectics of the filioque, and that is that the Trinity for Joachim has not already been fully manifested – which is traditional Christian belief, whether that of the First or the Second Europe – but at some point would be. The relationship to the filioque is found in nothing less than the fact that, as we saw in St. Photius’ observations, the filioque reduced the Trinity to a kind of “Binity-and-a-half”, not yet fully a Trinity, but not completely a Monad either. With Joachim, therefore, a distinctive and new period of the transformation of the Augustinian paradigm begins, for with him, the Trinitarian dialectics of Augustine are transformed into a fully fledged Philosophy of History itself. Basically put, Joachim’s conception is quite simple:

In his speculation the history of mankind had three periods corresponding to the three persons of the Trinity. The first period of the world was the age of the Father, with the appearance of Christ began the age of the Son. But the age of the Son will not be the last one; it will be followed by a third age of the Spirit.

This “futurist orientation” or “eschatological turn” to history, with which we shall be dealing with in more detail in a moment, marks the first appearance within the cultural paradigm of the Second Europe of the idea of progress, for it is not the Church which awaits that future outpouring of the Spirit, but the world.

This connection of the Trinity of History to the Trinity as History was not, however, new to Joachim. In fact, here as elsewhere, Joachim is reliant upon an explicit precedent within Augustine himself.

St. Augustine had done this in his City of God, in which he proclaimed three stages of history; those “Before the Law (Adam to Moses)” “Under the Law (Moses to Christ),” and “Under the Law (Moses to Christ),” and “under the Gospel (Christ to the last Judgment).” Joachim simply
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applied a direct involvement of each member of the Trinity to each epoch.

Augustine comes readily enough to the pen of the abbot of Fiore, most especially in his reliance on Augustine’s *City of God* and, of course, his *On the Trinity*.

With this, however, comes the explicit enunciation, within Joachim’s Philosophy of History, not only of the “canonicity” of the Second Europe, but of its messianic role in the future as the anointed Europe to which the Jews and the Greeks would eventually return:

The larger theme of the movement of God’s favor within the Gentiles from the Greek Church to the Latin Church is dealt with primarily in the allegorical sections of Book V of the *Liber Concordiae*, in the *Exposito*, the *Psalterium*, and especially in the *Tractatus*...Not long after the death of Pope Sylvester (d.335),

so Joachim’s theory ran,

the Greeks left the Church of St. Peter and established their own authority in the patriarch of Constantinople. According to Joachim, God’s favor passes from the Greek churches to the Latin Church. Although the Greek churches are older, the younger Latin Church receives the inheritance through grace...Joachim holds, however, that the great work of the third epoch will be the conversion of the Greek Christians and of the Jews to the universal Church of St. Peter. With the return of the Greeks to the true Church, the fullness of the Gentiles will be completed.

The allusion to Esau being cheated of his inheritance by his younger brother Jacob is not accidental, for such “parallelisms” between the Old Testament and contemporary events were an essential component of the Joachimite method of discovering “dialectical concordances” between the specific history of the Scriptures and the History of the World at large.
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2. The Five Principles of Allegory

There are five principles of allegory by which one can, according to Joachim, “read” the sacred history of the Scriptures and the History of the World as a whole.

The historical understanding (historia intelligentia) relates a person to a person regarding a quality of worth. According to this understanding, Sarah, for example, represents a free woman, while Hagar represents a slave… The moral understanding (moralis intelligentia) is the likeness of a visible thing to an invisible one: for example, Hagar represents the servitude of the flesh; Sarah represents spiritual leisure. The tropological understanding (tropollogica intelligentia) relates to doctrine: Hagar signifies the letter; Sarah, the spiritual understanding of the words of God. The contemplative understanding (contemplative intelligentia) teaches one to leave behind the flesh and cross to the spirit: Hagar thus signifies the active life; Sarah, the contemplative life. Finally, the anagogical understanding (anagogica intelligentia) teaches one to despise earthly things and to love heavenly things: Hagar signifies the present life; Sarah, the future life.\textsuperscript{812}

These five principles are, in turn, understood by Joachim to “represent in an appropriate way the mystery of the Trinity.” Why? Because each one “relates to one of the five possible relationships involving the divine Persons: the relation of the Father to the Son, the relation of the Son to the Father, the relation of the Father and Son to the Holy Spirit, the relation of the Son and Holy Spirit to the Father, and the relation of all three to creatures.”\textsuperscript{813} Thus in Joachim was fulfilled St. Photius’s prediction of the “multiplication of constituents”, manifested here in the multiplication of relations themselves, which, if one take Aquinas’s principle that “person is relation” (persona est relatio)\textsuperscript{814} then one has ended with no less than five personal relations of opposition. Moreover, one notes that “semi-Sabillian” element of “twoness” for which Photius
criticized the filioque in the ninth century. 815

But more than this, it is the fifth of Joachim’s enumerated relations that should give one pause, for the first four relations are at least relations within the “godhead” itself, but the last is between that of the godhead and creatures. By dint of the internal dialectical compulsions of the Augustinian Trinitarian doctrine, Joachim has unwittingly restated the Origenist Problematic in yet another guise, for either the relations between the “godhead” and creatures is the same type of relation as inheres in the first four, i.e., a divine relation, or it is not, and is, perforce, a creaturely or created relation, a conclusion which seems to cast the first four in the same category, since Joachim does not consider that by enumerating the fifth relation with the first four, he has elevated the fifth to the same logical status as the first four, or demoted the first four to the same status as the fifth.

However, before we can understand the process by which Joachim came to argue for five, and not three, relations within what was otherwise supposed to be a Trinity, one must pause to consider the implications of Joachim’s five allegorical principles for the more traditional view of salvation history as a “Recapitulatory Economy in Christ.”

3. The Eschatological Turn Versus Recapitulation

In the apocalyptic atmosphere in which Joachim lived and wrote, with the apparent collapse of “Christian civilization” before the onslaught of the Tartars and the “schism” of the Greeks and the “obstinate ‘stubborness’ of the Jews”, Joachim’s nascent “messianism of the Second Europe” took on the distinctive lines of the assertion of the defeat of the Tartar beast and the “reconversion” of the Greeks and the “conversion” of the Jews that we have seen already. 816 But the “eschatological turn” in Joachim’s historiography is founded upon a much more detailed basis than mere apocalyptic hope; it is, rather, the deliberate result of the application of his method of “concordances”, a method which ultimately

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destroys the last vestiges of the patristic idea of salvation history as a “recapitulatory economy in Christ”, a view which, at least superficially, Joachim attempts to preserve. Seeking as he did on the basis of the “type-and-fulfillment” paradigm which operated within that more traditional view a direct “correspondence of each person, event, or period in the Old Testament with a person, event, or period in the New Testament,” Joachim then extended this principle from the New Testament – the age of the Son – into the present and the future: the Age of the Spirit. With this, Joachim has abandoned the recapitulatory economy, and substituted for it the Second Europe’s first “grand philosophy of history.”

With this, Joachim’s method diverts the cultural attention of the Second Europe from a concentration on “past fulfillment in Christ” to “future fulfillment in the Spirit”, and extended that principle of “progress” that was first enunciated by Paulinus of Aquileia as a justification for the filioque. We are now in a position to consider Joachim’s Trinitarianism itself.

B. The Trinitarian Dialectic in History

(1) Its Explosive Nature

During his lifetime, Joachim expounded his “concordances” between the Old, the New, and the Future Testaments in pattern of Two’s (The Old and New, the New and the Future), and Three’s. But the latter and most explosive aspect of Joachim’s philosophy of history was not exposed until some fifty years after his death. Once detonated, however, the full force of his ideas became immediately apparent, if not fully understood. The heart of Joachim’s Philosophy of History lies in what he calls “spiritual intelligence”, that intelligence which transcends the five allegorical principles by proceeding beyond them to decipher the dialectical code of history itself.
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(2) The “Spiritual Intelligence” as Proceeding from History: The New “Psychohistorical” Analogies of the Trinity

The conception behind the “spiritual intelligence” in Joachim is “clearly a Trinitarian one:

In Joachim’s phrase, the *Spiritualis intellectus* proceeds from both the Testaments, just as the Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son. This relationship interpenetrates the history with which the two Testaments are concerned. In the Old dispensation one unitary line of Fathers proclaims God the Father as far as Jacob, but from this point onwards the double lines of Fathers and Judges (or Kings) show forth the procession of the Son and the Spirit from the Father...

With Joachim, in other words, the tendency to view the Old Testament as primarily a revelation of the Father and not, as it was for the church fathers, a revelation primarily of the Son, is thus transformed into one of the pillars of his historical philosophy. As Joachim puts it, “the letter of the former Testament seems properly to pertain to the Father. The letter of the New Testament pertains to the Son. Likewise the spiritual understanding proceeds beyond both Father and Son to the Holy Spirit.” History itself, in other words, becomes an extrapolation of “concordances” by the *spiritual understanding* proceeding beyond the Father (Old Testament) and the Son (New Testament). On this view, history has become a kind of “psychohistorical” analogy of the Trinity, as the “spiritual understanding”, like the later “Consciousness” or “absolute” of German Idealism, “actualizes” itself within history.

(3) The Patterns of Two’s and Three’s

As one sought such “concordances” by means of the “spiritual intelligence”, then, one could detect the Son and the Spirit proceeding from the Father in, for example, the two genealogies of Christ found in St. Matthew and St. Luke. Thus there was not only a pattern of Two’s within
History, but of Three’s, a pattern which was reflected faithfully in the overall ordering of History into Three Ages defined by their respective “states”, the first age of the Father being defined by the “conjugal” or “layman’s state”, the second Age of the Son by the “priestly” or “clerical” state, and the coming third Age of the Spirit by the “monastic state.” Thus, the “essential framework of all of Joachim’s thought about the meaning of history” is to be found in this “double pattern of twos and threes,” with the first two Ages coming to an end in the First and Second Advents respectively.

When the method of “concordances” is applied by the spiritual intelligence according to the pattern of Three’s and not Two’s, however, Joachim reproduces within History the “hammering together” of Two Persons of the Trinity into One that Photius likewise predicted as an inevitable consequence of the Augustinian dialectic, for Joachim insists that when viewed in this way, each of the Three Ages overlap or “spill over” into each other, the Age of the Father into that of the Son, and that of the Father-Son into that of the Spirit. Joachim, then founded his interpretation of history upon a belief that it reflected the nature of the Godhead, sometimes in the twofold relationship of Father and Son, sometimes in the threefold relationship of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

In this view of History as the Trinity “actualizing itself” one may detect the ultimate roots of the assertions of some Western scholars that there is a kind of pre-Augustinian or pre-Cappadocian “Binitarianism”, a statement more reflective of their own inherited Second European prejudices than of the reality of the patristic texts themselves.

(4) The Patterns of Two’s and Three’s and The Incipient Dispensationalism of Joachimism

From this basis it was a short and easy path to the deduction that there “would be a third epoch, yet to come, springing naturally from the other two and following their pattern.” But since this coming Third Age
of the Spirit was based itself on the psychohistorical analogy of the “spiritual intelligence”, then that meant that the

Destiny of mankind was a pure religious society in which all would read the scriptures with ‘new eyes’ that would reveal to them the fullness of God’s plan. Just as the Holy Spirit proceeded from both the Father and the Son, so a new understanding of the Gospel message would proceed from the Old Testament and the New, and a new epoch would emerge from the First and Second. 828

What began with Paulinus of Aquileia’s “Theology of Interpolation” as a justification for the addition of the novel doctrine of the filioque to the Creed has ended in a growth of enormous proportions, i.e., in the assertion that a wholly new understanding of the entirety of the Scripttures was bound to proceed from the two epochs at some future state. In a sense, this is indeed “self-fulfilling” prophecy, for Joachim has said nothing different from what has been said throughout these essays: the filioque, once adopted by the Second Europe as the official statement of its Trinitarian faith must inevitably lead to the dialectical reconstruction of every other aspect of doctrine and of the understanding of salvation history and ecclesiastical authority itself. 829 Since he was so taken with the pattern of Two’s and Three’s and with “the idea that there is one divine Person (Father) from whom two proceed (Son and Spirit) and one divine Person (Spirit) who proceeds from two (Father and Son),” 830 that coming age of the Spirit would reflect a synthesis of the lay and clerical “states” in the new order of monks which, like the Spirit of the filioque Who is the dialectical synthesis and “consubstantial love of both” the Father and the Son, 831 is itself the synthesis and union of the opposites from which it proceeded. With this, one is perilously close to a return not only of the heretical doctrine of “chiliasm”, of a future “golden age” or “millenium” on earth, but also perilously close to reasserting the ancient Gnostic opposition of the Old Testament and the New, again, on the basis of
interior “dialectics” alleged to be at work in the Trinity. But why was chiliasm understood to be heretical? Precisely because it was a confession contradictory to the Church’s understanding of the Recapitulatory Economy of Christ and of the fulfillment in Him and inauguration in the Church of the millennium. Chiliasm said, in effect, “not all is fulfilled,” and is saying that, it said Christ’s work was not yet complete. Joachim, in fact, asserted this as well, but that must wait other “more problematical” problems.

(5) Joachim versus Lombard: The Dialectical God of Philosophy Verses the Dialectical God of History: The Detection of the “Quaternity” in the Trinitarian Shield

As was stated previously, Joachim came to teach the doctrine that there were five, and not three, relationships within the Trinity. This, of course, clearly marked Joachim’s doctrine as suspect, even to the Second Europe, and his attack on Peter Lombard’s formulation of the Augustinian Trinitarian error itself called forth a formal condemnation by the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215. Though Joachim’s attack on Lombard is not extant, enough remains within his writings to allow a reasonable conjecture of what in the Master of the Sentences’ doctrine disturbed him. In essence, Joachim noticed a flaw in the doctrine, a flaw which can easily be seen by pointing out that, in our now familiar “Augustinian Trinitarian shield,” there are not three, but four circles, a fact which led Joachim to accuse the Lombard – though he was no more, nor less, guilty of it than anyone else in the Second Europe – of teaching a “Quaternity”. As Marjorie Reeves, in her essential study The Influence of Prophecy in the Later Middle Ages: A Study in Joachimism comments,

So far as we can reconstruct it, Joachim’s main attack on Peter Lombard was focused on his belief that the Lombard postulated his “summa res non generans, nec genita, nec procedens”(the highest reality is not generating, nor generated, nor proceeding”) as something distinct from
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the three separate Persons of the Trinity, Joachim calls this the *perfidia* (*Petri*) and accuses Peter Lombard of belief in a *quaternitas*. The full evidence for Joachim’s view and an exposition of his *figurae* on the subject has been given elsewhere. The study of Joachim’s *figurae*, in particular, has made clear his passionate belief in the *natura indivisibilis* of the Trinity, which he expounds through a striking variety of images…but the intensity of his opposition, derives from the peculiar integration of his Trinitarian doctrine with his understanding of history which, as we have seen, characterizes the Abbot’s thought. To him the abstraction of a “summa res non genrans...”, aloof from history and unable to enter into it – for so he conceived Peter Lombard’s doctrine to be – was utterly repugnant. The essence of the Trinity could not be thought of apart from its interpenetration of history: its unity in the divine sphere could only be expressed in terms of the “Three-are-One” in the human sphere, by the unity of the three status (sic.) in history, developing towards one goal. Threeness and Unity were of equal importance in Joachim’s view, whereas the Lombard’s doctrine implied that unity transcended all differentiation. No doubt Joachim failed to understand the Lombard’s metaphysical concept as a notional distinction, mistaking it for a real entity, something “fourth” which he abhorred, but his whole approach was anti-dialectical, and he believed, as we have seen, that the mystery of the Trinity could only be understood through deep spiritual experience not by the philosophical way of the carnalis intellectus. 833

What Joachim objected to, and rightly so, was the philosophical and dialectical, cast of the Lombard’s doctrine, a doctrine which, as we long ago discovered and as Joachim was quick to point out – notional distinctions notwithstanding – tended to the transcendence of the *Summum Ens* over the Three Persons. But what Joachim did not perceive was that his own opposition of the Dialectical God of History to the Dialectical God of Philosophy was but another aspect of the common Augustinian *ordo theologiae* which was the common religious inheritance of the Second Europe.
(6) The Joachimite-Gnostic Pseudomorphosis: Changing the “IAM” from Christ to the Trinity and The New Trinitarian Shield

What then of Joachim’s own understanding of the “Augustinian Trinitarian Shield”? That will never be known, since Joachim said nothing about it, but one may perhaps guess what it might have been by an examination of his “first generation” disciple, the Cistercian Abbot Werner of Rochefort who, sometime between 1208 and 1210, performed the Gnostic changing of meaning of the “I AM” of the Tetragrammaton from its traditional patristic meaning as referring to Christ to meaning that it referred to the entire Trinity. Placing the Latin form of the Tetragrammaton, IEUE, “in its three combinations of IE, EU, UE, at the angles of an quilateral triangle, with the whole Name, encircled, in the centre,” as follows:

(7) The Spiritual Franciscans and the Fleshly versus Spiritual Church

The Joachimite teaching had a profound influence upon the Franciscan order as well as upon the formation of heretical orders outside the pale of the Second Europe’s “orthodoxy”. The “Spiritual Franciscans” would distinguish between the “fleshly” or “carnal” church and the “spiritual”, which in the hands of overtly heretical groups such as the
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Beguins was reflected in the absolute adherence to “apostolic poverty” and the renunciation of property, a development which did not put them in good stead with a Church which was at that time struggling to enshrine the inalienability of Church property both in canon and in secular law. In their version of the future Age of the Spirit, after the persecutions of the Antichrist, “all religious orders” would perish, “except a third part of the Order of St. Francis from which will be drawn the handful, perhaps a dozen, of chosen men…” men who would found the spiritual church, after which the Holy Spirit would be poured out in a new Pentecost.  

(8) The New Patripassianism: “Pneumatopassianism” and The Joachimite Feminization of the Godhead

The confusion of the Persons with the divine essence and with each other that lingers constantly at every step throughout the filioque doctrine also gave rise to, or rather, was the occasion of the return of the Gnostic version of the Holy Spirit as the “feminine principle” in “the godhead.” In the year 1325, a woman named Proust Boneta and an initiate into the Beguins, proclaimed herself “the incarnation of the Holy Ghost.” Extending the logic of concordances inherent in Joachim’s system of “Three’s”, she taught that in order to usher in the New Age the Holy Spirit had to become “incarnate, undergo passion and death, and rise again.” This too was but an ancient heresy, Patripassianism, revived, for Patripassianism taught that the Father died with Christ, since the two were, after all, only one person. This new form, “Pneumatopassianism”, was balanced in yet another form of “concordance” by yet another woman, Guglielma, who maintained that the Holy Spirit had to become incarnate in a woman in order to “balance” the Son’s becoming incarnate in a man.  

The originality of this doctrine lay not only in the fact that it was yet another assault on the existing polity and ecclesiastical authority of the Second Europe’s Church in the person of Pope Boniface VIII, but also “in the daring logic that, if the revolution was to be absolute, there must be a new incarnation of the Godhead, and this must be in the opposite
(9) Joachimism in the Jesuits: The Reappearance of The Origenist Problematic as the Dialectic of Reformation and Counter-Reformation

By the time of the sixteenth century, the Joachimist dialectical trinitarianism of psychohistory had, at least as far as some Jesuits were concerned, given birth in their order to the Joachimite ideal of a monastic order combining or mediating elements of the lay and clerical states of the First and Second Age. For some Jesuits at least, this fulfillment expressed itself in a new form of the Origenist Problematic, or rather, in an outright resurgence of the kind of “dualism-in-history” that characterized the system of the second century Marcion. The aptly-named Jesuit, F. Montanus, maintained that good and bad were ever in conflict in an endless series of “concordances”. Jacob and Esau were mirrored in the conflict between Loyala and Luther. From there the route of Joachimism into modern thought must be followed through Kant, to Schopenhauer, Fichte, Scheling, and finally, to its modern-day apostles, Hegel and Marx. The key to this pedigree is the emerging “periodizations” of history into a scheme of dispensations, a scheme that itself bears other resemblances to modern teachings than just Hegel’s or Marx’s.

C. Joachimite Dispensational Theology: The Seven Seals of the Apocalypse and the New Age

When the federal “agents” ruthlessly burned down the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas on April 19, 1993, murdering scores of people, including children, the divine simplicity of the American civil religion confronted the Joachimite dialectical God of history in the form of David Koresh and his misguided, and unfortunate, followers. Koresh had negotiated with the federal “agents” to be allowed to complete his treatise on the interpretation of the seven seals of the Apocalypse of St. John, long
a favorite pastime of “dispensational theologians” and philosophers of history, Joachim of Fiore included. In the Joachimite version, the seven seals are mirrored by the system of historical concordances into seven “states” or “dispensations” within each Age. Thus, in the First Age of the Father, the seven seals denote, respectively, the time from Abraham (or Jacob) to Moses and Joshua from Joshua to David, from David to Elijah and Elisha, from Elisha to Isaiah and Hezekiah, from Hezekiah to the Babylonian captivity, from the return to the death of the prophet Malachi, and from Malachi to the appearance of John the Baptist and of Christ. In the Second Age, these seals are “mirrored” in the time from Christ to the death of John the Baptist, from the death of St. John the Apostle to the Emperor Constantine, from Constantine to Justinian, from Justinian to Charlemagne, from Charlemagne to the Joachim’s time (ca. 1200), from the times about to begin, and finally the end of the second “Age” with the conversion of the world and the final Sabbath. Notably in this scheme Joachim places Charlemagne at the exact mid-point of the “historical development” of the Second Europe. But within this scheme, vast new “possibilities” of futurist speculation and concordances proffered themselves on the basis of the Apocalypse of St. John. The most significant of these were the emergence of the myth of the last great Christian “World Emperor” or “second Charlemagne” with their corresponding “Last World Empires”, the “Duke of Babylon”, the “Angelical” pope, and predictably enough, from Joachim himself, not Two but Three Advents of Christ, with a corresponding doctrine of the millennium. It was precisely within the Trinitarian dialectics of the filioque that Joachim could, as we have seen, give the ultimate theological basis or grounding to these essential concepts, particularly those of the final Millenium, a “crowning age of history,” set in the future and therefore not yet attained, whilst unmistakably within the time-process, preceding the winding-up of history in the Second Advent and Last Judgment.\textsuperscript{843}

In the spirit of Joachim, oracles or “words of prophecy” began to
appear as the Second Europe entered anxiously into what its professional academic historians have called the “Modern Age” in their own lingering secular versions of Joachim’s Three Ages, “words of prophesy” which predicted a final human Christian emperor who would usher in an era of peace and of the final conversion of heretics, schismatics, Jews and infidels, before the onslaught of the Antichrist and the consummation of evils.

(1) The Last World Emperor and the “Second Charlemagne.”

In some versions of this theory, this “Last World Emperor” takes the form of a “Second Charlemagne.” Not that such conceptions had not been around before. Indeed, in the year 1095 Ekkehard of Aura remarked that there was widespread belief that Charlemagne would be resurrected and lead Christians to triumph over the Muslims, and before the First Crusade in that same year, Benzo of Abba wrote a “poem to the Emperor Henry IV in which he say him as the heir to all the great emperors of the past…and prophesied for him the programme of the Last World Emperor: the conquest of Byzantium and the infidel and the establishment of a universal empire at Jerusalem.” This not only grounded the Second Europe’s view of itself as “canonical”, but now prophecy was added to give that canonical status even more rectitude.

But beyond this there is another factor, one which only Joachim’s filioquism could give:

Thus, in spite of warnings of orthodoxy, the dream of a last human glory under a Last World Emperor was one which men could not abandon. It was cherished not only by the crazy and fanatical, but by sober historians and politicians. Yet the hope was usually tempered by a final capitulation to pessimism. Joachim’s exposition of the Trinitarian structure of history revived a conception which, so far as we can see, had been virtually neglected. This put the expectation for the future on an entirely new basis. Joachim, we must reiterate, did not lose sight of orthodox
pessimism; he saw that no age of human history could achieve the perfection beyond history and so he postulated final recrudescence of evil. He himself quotes the text in St. Matthew which prophesies a deteriorating situation at the end. But he did believe that the major victory against Antichrist was to be won before the apotheosis of history and he believed this because he believed in a third “act of God,” to be manifested in a third stage of spiritual illumination. Thus Joachim’s age of bliss is placed after Antichrist and before the Second Coming and Last judgment, precisely because it stems from a belief about the structure of the whole of history. Within this Trinitarian framework he could give a new force to both (sic.) the concepts of the Millenium and the Sabbath Age. 846

Only when viewed against the backdrop of the nineteenth and twentieth century revivalism, however, does the significance of this observation bear full fruit, for in effect, Joachim laid the basis for (or rather discovered) that system of “post-tribulational millennial dispensational theology” so typifical of the “biblical” preaching of television evangelists in the false and heretical doctrine of the filioque!

(2) The “Dux e Babylon”, The Angelic Pope, The Spiritual Church, and the Last World Empire

Within Joachim’s own understanding and writings there was no place for a “Last World Emperor”, such a secular conception being altogether foreign to his understanding of the “spiritual intelligence” and the end-time order of monks. His “Duke of Babylon” was n fact originally “conceived as a religious leader.” 847 But there are reasons why such speculations arose from his system. Each of Joachim’s three “Ages” – the Age of the Father, the Age of the Son, and the coming “Age of the Spirit” – could be deliberately characterized as

Intelligent increases of spiritual fulfillment. The first age unfolded the life of the layman; the second age brought the active contemplative life of the priest; the third age would bring the perfect spiritual life of the monk.
Moreover, the ages had comparable internal structures and a calculable length. From the comparison of structures it appeared that each age opened with a trinity of figures, that is, with two precursors, followed by the leader of the age himself, and from the calculation of length it followed that the Age of the Son would reach its end in 1260. The leader of the first age was Abraham; the leader of the second age was Christ; and Joachim predicted that by 1260 there would appear the Dux e Babylon, the leader of the third age.

In his Trinitarian eschatology Joachim created the aggregate of symbols which govern the self-interpretation of modern political society to this day. 848

The dialectics at work in Joachim’s inherited Augustinian “Trinity” have thus not only produced a discernable dialectical “shape” to history, but that shape is in turn heralded by its own “trinity” where the two “precursors”, analogous to the Father and the Son in the Trinitarian dialectics of the filioque, give rise to a third, who is analogous to the Spirit. Only one more step need be taken to transform Joachim’s “leader” of the third age into Hegel’s “World Historical Individuals” whose stamp is impressed upon each age of his version of dialectical history. In Joachim, all the prerequisites for that step are in place, for in his system the social dialectics of the previous two ages are overcome in a new synthesis: the layman, and the priesthood, will give way to a new society in which there are neither priests nor laymen, but a “new man” who combines the functions of the previous two classes, the monk. With Joachim, the symbol that will so dominate the last two centuries of the Second Europe has finally been created. Every “Christ” figure has his John the Baptist, every Crowley, a Blavatsky, every Hitler, a Sebottendorff.

This “apocalyptic monasticism”, moreover, heralds the debut of yet another standard Second European cultural symbol, that of the end-time
utopia where personal property and other indicators of individualism disappear, for that new monastic and spiritual church will possess all in common. In the hands of Joachim’s less “orthodox” successors, however, this final age and its attendant “monastic estate” soon became “vulgarized into dreams of world-wide empire. What distinguished these later dreams from the pre-Joachimist ones was that the decisive battle of history against the greatest Antichrist was to be won before the apotheosis of history took place. In this sense Joachimism exercised a decisive influence on political prophecy.

In order to take the step into the secular “Hegelian” versions of Joachimism, in other words, it is only necessary to recall what the “Persons” of the trinity are within the Augustinian ordo theologiae: they are nothing more than stages of a dialectical process. As such, Hegel’s “Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis” – or, if one prefer Plotinus’s version, “One, Nous, World Soul”—will do as well as “Father, Son, and Holy Spirit” as names for these stages. Once the dialectic itself has been re-secularized, it is but a short step to “demythologize” the three-storied universe of the Augustinian ordo itself, or to “demythologize” Joachim’s dispensationalism. Consequently, the Augustinian filioque, through its Joachimite transformation into the immanent dialectics of history, is the ultimate basis not only of the standard periodizations of “History” within the Second Europe’s academies, but also of its more perverse manifestations:

As variations of this symbol are recognizable the humanistic and encyclopedist periodization of history into ancient, medieval (sic.), and modern history; Turgot’s and Comte’s theory of a sequence of theological, metaphysical, and scientific phases; Hegel’s dialectic of the three stages of freedom and self-reflective spiritual fulfillment; the Marxian dialectic of the three stages of primitive communism, class society, and final communism; and finally, the National Socialist symbol of the Third Realm (Third Reich, ed.) – though this is a special case requiring further attention.
In other words, the dialectical historiography itself undergoes the Gnosticizing process we have seen at work elsewhere, as the three Ages become less and less connected to anything specifically Christian, Augustinian or otherwise. Comte’s theological, metaphysical, and scientific phases or Hegel’s states of freedom or the Marxist stages of communism are simply the new names for the names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

There are other implications of Joachim’s dialectical dispensationalism. Let us return, for a moment, to recall how Augustine came to argue for the Spirit’s procession from the Father. As the Father is holy, and spirit, and the Son is holy, and spirit, the Holy Spirit turned out to be the attribute common to the Father and the Son, their new principle of unity, the “consubstantial love of both” the Father and the Son. As such, the name “Holy Spirit”, according to Augustine, was appropriate to the entire Holy Trinity, since His name was a name suitable to all three names. Confusing enough as it was, it should also be recalled that Aquinas deduced yet another consequence: since the Holy Spirit became the new personal locus of unity within the Trinity, the “cycle” of procession had ended “in the very same substance in which it began.” In short, the dialectical process concluded when it finally returned to that state of the absence of all distinctions, to the Simplicity itself.

This is what is reproduced in Joachim’s – and Marx’s – utopian sociology of a “classless” society where the only class, monks, combines the elements of the previous two ages and classes. In short, the class society of Joachim’s time with its bishops, popes, priests, princes, and laity, would give way to a future state and age wherein these classes would disappear in an ecclesiastical version of final “simplicity” or communism. In this, Joachim is the first appearance in the Second Europe of yet another of its distinguishing cultural ikons, that of the “idea of a community of the spiritually perfect who can live together without institutional authority.” Indeed, as a “mysticism of the realm of freedom and the withering away of the state,” Joachimism will only enter
Hegelianism and Marxism after a prolonged stay in the “spiritually illuminated” lodges and secret societies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In its eighteenth century Gnostic pseudomorphosis at the hands of the “Bavarian Illuminatus” Adam Weishaupt, Joachim’s classless society of monks will be transformed into a universal “brotherhood” without “princes” (Illuminati shorthand for nations), or “priests” and “superstitions” (Illuminati shorthand for “distinct religions”). Likewise, much of the contemporary creedal cant regarding “globalism” or the “world community” with its reliance upon universal economic and technological interdependence has its roots in Joachimist apocalyptic expectations.

It is when the “eschatological turn” of the Joachimist historical dialectic is understood in its social implications that its most chilling legacy is detected, for it means that Gnostic assignation of a new meaning to the “millenium”; the old term no longer means the present Church age, but a future coming age, a literal Thousand Year Heavenly Kingdom of the Saints, mediated equally well either in the radical Anabaptist wing of the Protestant Reformation and finding almost “universal” adherence by the “bible believing Christians” of the American civil religion, or by Adolf Hitler’s very Joachimite Dritte und Tausendjahrige Reich, which had its own precursors in the German emperors, its own prophet in Dr. Goebbels, and its own Emperor-messiah on a mission from God to purify the body politic from “foreign and contaminating” elements.

(3) The Works and the “Three Advents” of Christ

Seen from this dialectical perspective, it was the Fransiscans who, taking from Joachim the dialectical basis of their own philosophy of history, produces the necessary theological edifice for the final transformation of Joachimism from a Christian heresy into a Hegelian philosophical orthodoxy. Central in this process is the conception of the Three Advents of Christ, “first in the flesh, second in the spirit of evangelical reform” which would produce a new age and a new Church,
and at the end of history, the third advent in final judgment.\textsuperscript{859} Here too lies the ultimate theological basis for all those “modern” systems of “biblical prediction” of a “Rapture” preceding the actual second advent of Christ, an event whose sole function is to remove the Church from the stage of history and final suffering in order to restore the Old Dispensation of animal sacrifices which, supposedly, Christ came to abolish, for very clearly, the Franciscans have proceeded that final Advent of Christ with a new stage. For those following his new “tradition”, the quest was on to find the “leader” or embodiment of the new preaching; Ubertino de Casale, for example, would see in Francis of Assisi himself the embodiment of the Second Advent of Christ in preaching.\textsuperscript{860}

Joachimism achieved its final and most brilliant apotheosis, however, only in the early nineteenth century, in the work of Hegel.

\textit{2. The Hegelian Apotheosis: Dispensationalism Secularized}

\textbf{A. The Kantian “Real Self” and the Ding-an-Sich}

The Kantian “Real Self” consequently appears here as the “equivalent”, more or less, of the Christian “person”. It is this “real self” which, in the Kantian metaphysic, is “pre-phenomenal” and indeterminate to the soul, for it lies in the realm of the “thinkable”. On this “noumenal” plane, the real self possesses the faculty of will (\textit{Wille}), which allows it, so to speak, to “pre-phenomenate” its choices which are then “mirrored” in the phenomenal world. Thus, while Kant explicitly states that the real self is subject to a kind of dual prior causality both by the phenomenal and noumenal worlds, it is in the finaly analysis without any analogy and intelligible determination. Consequently the Kantian “real self” is something which is not in time or in space because it cannot be determined by past events. In a certain sense, then, he has broken the
person (persona) equals soul (anima) equation that has persistently
dogged the Augustinian theological mind of the Second Europe.

(1) The Reemergence of the Metaphysic of the Nestorian Dual Subject
and of the Monophysite "Ikonic Levels"

While he may have broken that equation, however, he did so at the
cost of reintroducing a quasi-Nestorian “dual subject” metaphysic with a
new twist: its deliberate coupling to a quasi-Monophysite conception of the
“ikonic” levels of reality, where the phenomenal “mirrors” or represents the
noumenal realm and the real self in the world. Herein lies the origin of
Kant’s categorical imperative and his understanding of the relationship of
freedom, morality, and law.

(2) The Categorical Imperative

This quasi-Monophysite and quasi-Nestorian distinction between
the phenomenal and noumenal worlds is the sine qua non of Kantian
ethics. In every action of the real self as persona, i.e., as the “aspect of
presentation” (Nestorius’s underlying προσωπα, not his “aspect or
presentation of union”) in the phenomenal world, it must be construed by
the faculty of the transcendental aesthetic to the single unchanging
“thinkable” subject called the “real self”. For this reason, the “real self”,
Kant insists, is not knowable to theoretical knowledge nor is an exhaustive
definition of this subsistence possible.

The reason for this is that if the real self were intelligible, it would be
possible to determine, on the basis of the categories of the transcendental
analytic, not only the Mind of that real self, but the uses and deployments
(wilkur) of the Will (Wille). Put differently, for Kant the Will (Wille) is free,
because there are absolutely no metaphysical or physical analogies given
by the categories themselves for the real self.

(3) Wille and Wilkur as the Phenomenal and Noumenal “Manifestations”
(αποτελεσματα)
Thus one arrives at the Kantian distinction between \textit{Wille} and \textit{Wilkur}. The faculty of Will as such (\textit{Wille}) is noumenal and therefore indeterminate, and as such formally “one”, but in the structural dichotomies that permeate Kant’s system, it occurs under two formal appearances (\textit{προσωπα} or \textit{αποτελεσματα}), the noumenal \textit{Wille} and the phenomenal \textit{Wilkur}. Thus in Kant there is no equivalent to the Christian Hypostasis, for while Kant \textit{does} explicitly forbid any determination or analogy of the real self, this real self, unlike the Christian Hypostasis, does not unite the phenomenal and noumenal worlds, but merely remains beyond them.

\textbf{(4) Schopenhauer and the World as Will and Representation}

This provides the transition to Arthur Schopenhauer, for if the \textit{Wille} as such is “one subject” and the \textit{Wilkur} its appearances in the phenomenal world, then the next logical step, taken by Schopenhauer, was to redefine the phenomenal world itself, not as a \textit{Ding-an-Sich} which the intelligence ordered by space and time, but merely as the representations of the \textit{Wille}, by which the mind “imposes” space and time upon the world.

\textbf{(5) The “Psychohistorical Analogies” in Fichte: The Determinations of the Will Produce the Movements of Consciousness in History}

Once this step had been taken, one then could assume, as did Fichte, that not only the world, but the real self itself are the determinations of the \textit{Wille} as such. In this, one may again detect the lingering influence of the Augustinian \textit{ordo theologiae} of essence, attributes, and persons, for once again, the person, in the form of the Kantian “real self”, is subordinate within the structure of the system to the attribute, in the form of the Kantian \textit{Wille}. Thus for Fichte, even the notion of “Consciousness” is itself a form of the ordering of the phenomenal experience, and therefore a determination of the Will. This is quite the crucial matter, for it marks the transition from Kant’s to Hegel’s dialectic,
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for Fichte also concludes that the Determinations of the Will produce the dialectical movements of Consciousness in History. Only if this principle is stated in more Hegelian language however, will the truly “secularized Joachimist dispensationalism” of Fichte’s dialectic become clear: Consciousness is moving to the point that will fully actualize within the phenomenal world the determinations of the Will.

(6) The Dialectical Function of Consciousness in Schelling

Once Fichte has taken this step yet another logical entailment of Kant’s system could be developed. If Consciousness be the actualizations of the determinations of the Will in the phenomenal world, then its basic function as consciousness is the act of Dialectical Synthesis itself, i.e., of the identification of opposites. From here, a further possibility develops: if Consciousness is the Act of Dialectical Synthesis, then by the same token, those oppositions which go to make up the synthesis can themselves be viewed as the various “forms” or “manifestations” (αποτελεσματα) in the phenomenal world. With this, we have at last arrived at the great dialectical magus himself, Georg Wilhelm Friederich Hegel.

B. The Salient Philosophical Influences on Hegel

(1) Hegel’s Claim to Completeness

Hegel claims that the essence of all previous philosophical systems is “contained, preserved, and absorbed” in his own. While such claims may sound grandiose, Hegel meant them to be taken in all seriousness for the claim is less a claim to completeness than it is to a certain kind of historical relationship to the philosophies he claims to have subsumed. Indeed, Hegel quite deliberately made the history of philosophy itself one of the fundamental components of the act of “philosophizing”, a process which implied its own philosophical implications.861
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(2) The Greek Idealists

The ultimate origins of Hegel’s claim to completeness and of his dialectical system are to be found in the Eleatics, particularly in Parmenides and Zeno. Eleaticism maintained that becoming, or change and multiplicity, in short, all that one perceives in the natural world, had no ultimate reality. True reality was rather, “Beijing” (το ειναι). Being, as such, is therefore One, and Real, or as W.T. Stace aptly put it, “nowhere and nowhen;” it is simply “the not-this” (το ουκτουτο).\(^{862}\) Paradoxically this meant that while Being is real, it does not exist, since existence implied, as per Kant, something within space and time. Thus, Eleaticism may be summed up in two propositions, “firstly, existence is not real. Secondly, what is real does not exist.”\(^{863}\) Most of the popular difficulties in understanding Hegel, not to mention the popular misinterpretations of it, stem from misunderstanding of this particular point and its Kantian basis.\(^{864}\)

(3) Plato and Hegel

For Hegel, the essence of Plato’s refutation of sensory knowledge is that sensation cannot give real knowledge at all and in fact barely conveys any notion of “consciousness” whatsoever.\(^{868}\) Since the act of knowing anything whatsoever involved comparison or forming relationships in the mind, knowledge must be an essentially cognitive and conscious function, not a sensory one. In this, says Hegel, one may also perceive the similarities of Plato’s, Spinoza’s, and of course Descartes’s critiques of knowledge based upon sensation.

But here, he maintains, differences begin to manifest themselves. Acts of comparison involve classifications, such as Descartes’s “body” or “bodily extension”, which classifications are not of particulars but of generalities or universals. With Plato, however, this “universal” is something which not only really exists, but it is only through the universal that one is able to know any particular object. Put differently, Hegel is
agreed with Kant that one can never know the Ding-an-Sich without universals. Thus the essential component of the universal philosophy is this insistence that “the real is the universal.”\(^{669}\) Herein, claims Hegel, is the chief difference between his system and that of Plato, for while Plato would have agreed that universals are “noplacemat” and “nowhen”, he would not have stated that they have no existence, i.e., that they are real but do not exist. For Plato, there could not have being if they did not exist, and vice versa. Rather, for Plato, the universals or ideas had existence on a different plane of reality transcending that of space and time, i.e., transcending the Kantian manifold of sensory experience and cognitive ordering. On that plane, he maintained, they had separate and cognitive existence from the particulars which we perceive in this world. Stated in Kantian language, Plato’s universals are similar to Kant’s “things-in-themselves”, but unlike Kant, we cannot only know them, but must know them in order for us to know anything at all.

But it is precisely this doctrine that Aristotle, of course, understood Plato to have taught, and that doctrine – that the universals have separate independent and real existence – that his own system was designed to respond to, because for Aristotle, the universals were indeed real, but they did not for that reason have separate existence apart from the world of matter, and therefore apart from the world of particulars. Every individual thing which we “know” was compounded from two elements, its form (\(\varepsilon\iota\delta\omicron\zeta\)) and matter (\(\upsilon\lambda\eta\)). Matter is that formless “substrate” (\(\upsilon\pi\omicron\kappa\epsilon\iota\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu\)) or “substance” (\(\upsilon\pi\omicron\omicron\omicron\sigma\tau\alpha\omicron\omicron\zeta\)) which, when combined or impressed with form yielded the particular individual thing which we perceive and know. Thus only the particular individual really exists.

(4) Aristotelian Teleology

Form, for Aristotle, indicates also the End (\(\tau\epsilon\lambda\omicron\zeta\)) of a thing. Thus, the End is prior to its Beginning (\(\alpha\rho\chi\eta\)), not as a temporal, but as a logical,
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priority. Failure to understand this point, Hegel maintained, would lead to massive misunderstandings both of Aristotle and of his own system, for since history was made up of the succession of individuals, its End, so to speak, preceded its beginning; “Just in this way, Aristotle means, the end of a thing is prior to the thing; or in general the end of the world-process is prior to the world...There is, according to Aristotle, no mind which consciously designs and executes. The world-purpose is immanent in the world itself. It is not a psychic event which happens in the mind.”

Thus, the “eschatological turn” which characterized Joachimism was, both for Aristotle and Hegel, an essential philosophical principle immanent, and detectable and knowable, in the world process. Thus, there was an assumed End to History, as well as a determinate shape that the End would take. For Hegel, then, the world’s dependency upon universals was not causal, but logical, or, more explicitly, dialectical. In other words, as W.T. Stace again so aptly put it, for Hegel “the world flows from the universal, not as an effect flows from its cause in time, but as a conclusion flows from its premises.” The existence of universals, or “Being Itself” is not a conclusion from any prior Reason, it is the first reason, and “things’ are its logical consequences.

(5) Potency, Act, and The Absolute

The above considerations leads, as Hegel would say, inexorably to the next major influence upon him, that of Aristotle’s doctrine of potency and act, which Hegel calls “implicitness” and “explicitness.” The acorn is “in potency” or “in itself” (an Sich) is the oak, but only to the perception of Consciousness and metaphysics. It is an oak for us but not yet for itself (für Shich). Only when sown and fully grown does what is implicit become explicit, in act, for itself.

The final Aristotelian influence upon Hegel is his doctrine of the Absolute, which, as “utterly matterless form” caps Aristotle’s hierarchy. This is a kind of “form of all forms” (εἰδος τῶν πάντων εἰδῶν); its only
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content is itself, utterly devoid of matter or any material reference or relationship. It is, so to speak, pure relationship or as Aristotle put it, “the thought of thought.” This is the decisive link to Hegel’s system, for in his version of this “pure relationship”, the formless form is utter and absolute “Self-Consciousness.” In Hegel’s hands, however, this is given a revolutionary Gnostic twist: “The Absolute” is Thought, or Mind or Spirit (Geist). It is as if, after all the peregrinations of the Neoplatonic dialectic from Plotinus, through Augustine, Aquinas, Ockham, and Joachim, that the original Neoplatonic ordo itself has been subverted, for Hegel has discovered a “new one”, or rather, changed the original order of Plotinus from “One, Nous, World-Soul” to “World-Soul, Nous, One”. How did this happen? The answer lies with Hegel’s more immediate philosophical forebears, not the least of whom is Spinoza.

(6) Spinoza: “All Determination is Negation”

It was Spinoza who formulated that most profound, and profoundly Hegelian, of metaphysical principles that all determination is negation. To define (περιγραφειν) is to set boundaries and limits. To say something is iron is to limit it by cutting it off from the realm of fluids, or gases, or woods. Thus whatever is affirmed of anything is also an implicit denial of other qualities, and thence one may formulate the general principle that “all determination is negation.”

Hegel provided the Gnostic twist with his rather startling corollary: if whatever is said of a thing denies or negates something else of it, then by the same token, the act of negation itself is a positive determination of a thing, and therefore, “to negate is to posit.” With this assertion, we are but one logical step away from the dialectical foundations of the entire Hegelian system, but before that step can be taken, we must see how, according to Hegel, Hume and Kant stumbled when they tried to take it.
Hume, of course, demonstrated that mere experience could never give a universal category which is true, i.e., that causality, necessity, miracle, identity, substance, and whatever else one might say, could never be a necessary nor universal truth if experience (and hence, History), were made the basis of knowledge. Lessing’s “religious version” of this was, of course, his famous “Big Ugly Ditch”: one could never claim on a merely historical basis the universality of the Christian religion, or, put differently, the Universal Logos did not become incarnate and be fully manifest – Joachim again! – within History. Thus, for Hum the axiom “there is a uniform, universal experience against miracle” would be as equally untrue as “there is a uniform universal experience of causation.” Both are untrue because no one has yet achieved such a uniform or universal experience of causation.” Both are untrue because no one has yet achieved such an experience, if achievable, can only come about in the future, at the End of History.

For Kant, then, this could only mean that things such as “causation”, or even the more basic “space” and “time” were forms in the mind by which we order our experience of sensory data.

Philosophy, then, according to Kant, is to abate its claims. It is warned off the premises of everything except immediate existence in space and time. It must give up all attempts to know reality, to penetrate behind appearances. But the effect of this solemn warning upon the philosophic world was truly astonishing. No sooner had Kant thus cried “Halt!” to philosophy than philosophy, forming its adherents into a sort of triumphal procession, proceeding, so to speak, with bands playing and flags waving, marched victoriously onward to the final assault, confident of its power to attain omniscience at a stroke, to occupy the very citadel of reality itself. And, strangest of all, this was to be done with the very weapons which Kant himself had forged. It was under the Kantian banner that philosophy moved forward...
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The reason for this astonishing change was that while philosophy fastened upon the ideas of universality, necessity, and pure thought as an a priori construction of mind, it rejected the Kantian thing-in-itself. Everyone saw at once that the conception of the thing-in-itself is a self-contradictory and impossible abstraction. It is a flat self-contradiction. Its existence is assumed because Kant thought there must be an external cause of our sensations. On the one hand, therefore, the thing-in-itself is alleged to be the cause of appearances. On the other hand, however, it cannot be a cause, because cause is a category of our minds, and the categories do not apply to the thing-in-itself.876

Hegel did not gloss over the sweeping implications of the self-contradiction of Kant’s Ding-an-Sich. Indeed, those implications are made the whole foundation of his system, for the Thing-in-Itself, the world of “pure matter” is likewise a form in, and product of, the mind. “This means that the whole object of knowledge, and every object, and so the entire universe, is a product of mind...hence everything must be knowable. There is no limit to the aspirations of human knowledge. The infinite, the Absolute itself, lie open to us...”877 Hegel, like his heretical forebear Eunomius, believes he knows “The Absolute” as well as it knows itself.878

C. The Hegelian Logic, Categories, and Dialectical Method

(1) Monism and the Uni-Multiplicity of the Hegelian Absolute

For Hegel, philosophical explanation therefore necessary implied “monism”, or the idea that everything was to be explained by reference or relationship to One underlying Principle. But for Hegel, this could be no mere Abstract Oneness, for “to exclude the many altogether from our conception of it is to cut off all possibility of deriving the manifoldness of the actual world from it.”879 Thus, what we said long ago in reference to Plotius’s One – that It had to have the Many standing over against It and deriving dialectically from It in order for It to be the One – was essentially
the deduction that Hegel was to make; it is the ultimate Hegelian distillation of the essence of the Origenist Problematic. And this dialectical necessity for the Absolute to be a Principle of Unity-in-Diversity and Diversity-in-Unity (a form in which one often encounters modern day “Second European” arguments for the “Trinity”) provided Hegel with his most important clue to the nature of the categories, that clued which was to become the hallmark of his system.

(2) The Dialectical Necessity of the Hegelian Categories

Recalling that Plato taught a world of self-existent Ideas transcending the particulars, Hegel observed that the chief difficulty of his system was that there was no way Plato could account for the existence of certain kinds of universals, such as “whiteness” in “the white horse”, nor was there any way of relation the universal to the particular necessarily. Hegel’s Logic was precisely his attempt to explain the necessary, rational, logical, and dialectical derivation of the categories one from the other, and in their proper order.

Briefly put, the essence of his Logic is the demonstration that (1) every category necessarily and logically involves every other category, either by way of negation or affirmation; and (2) that there is a precise, dialectical, logical order in which the categories are thus logically, necessarily, and dialectically derived and related. With Hegel, then, one encounters a philosophy of Logic, Metaphysics, and History in which the “Augustinian inevitabilities” are worked out consciously, deliberately, and in detail. Kant himself had undertaken no such derivation of the categories because they were for him “merely subjective epistemological forms of our minds” and not “an ontological principle of the explanation of the universe.” Once we have deduced these two things, says Hegel, we may then ask the obvious questions: (3) what is the First Category, i.e., where do we start? and (4) how do we deduce all other categories from this first category?
As was seen, Hegel, like Duns Scotus or Eriugena long before him, made Being itself that first category. The next task was how to discover or detect the method by which the categories deduced themselves. How does one, for example, deduce any given species from any given genus? Hegel gave the standard answer that it was by the introduction of differential, and thus we have arrived at one of Hegel’s “primary triads”: genus, differentia, species. But coupled to this standard answer is the revolutionary Hegelian, and Gnostic, twist alluded to above in reference to Spinoza: to negate is to posit. Consequently, and in contradistinction to Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction which we encountered in Monotheletism, for Hegel every category or universal contains its own opposite in itself at one and the same time.

(3) The First Categorical Triad: Being, Nothingness, Becoming

Once this has been said, if one says “Being” one, according to Hegel, immediately also posits its negation: Non-Being, or Nothingness. Thus Being, the thesis, contains Non-Being or Nothingness, its antithesis. But Hegel, following the Augustinian and Joachimite pattern of the dialectic, maintains that from the two arises a third term, a “consubstantial love of both”, as the two inevitably, in the process of thought, pass it into each other. Thus, we derive the following structure in Hegels First Triad:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Genus:</th>
<th>Being</th>
<th>Thesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Differentia:</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>Antithesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Species:</td>
<td>Becoming</td>
<td>Synthesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Genus + Differential)</td>
<td>(Being + Nothing)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

W.T. Stace puts the *filioquist* dialectic very succinctly:

The first category contains its own opposite and is identical with it. At this point the two categories stand confronting and contradicting each other.
But it is impossible to rest in this contradiction for it means that opposite categories are applicable to the same thing at the same time...The category of becoming therefore resolves the contradiction. *In other words the contradiction between the first and second categories is always reconciled in a third category which is the unity of the two preceding. The third category contains within itself the opposition of the other two, but it also contains their underlying harmony and unity...* The three members of the triad are sometimes called the thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, respectively.\textsuperscript{883}

The language, being so close to the original statements of Augustine in his *On the Trinity* suggest this Hegelian variation on a now familiar theme: \textsuperscript{883a}

The allusions to Augustine are more than just allusions, for Hegel was quite familiar with the Augustinian trinitarianism, as we shall see in a moment. For the present, however, it is crucial to note that Hegel sees the deduction of categories as a potentially infinite process, recalling the prediction made by St. Photius in the ninth century:

The synthesis being reached now posits itself as a new assertion, as an affirmative category which thereby becomes the theses of a new triad.
For as soon as it lays itself down as a positive assertion its opposite is seen to issue out of it and to involve it in self-contradiction. This new contradiction has again to be resolved in the higher unity of a new synthesis. This in turn becomes the thesis of a new triad, and so on throughout the whole series. 884

If the person of Plotinus, Augustine, Aquinas, Stace, Hegel and Kant are all beginning to blur in the reader's mind, that is not accidental, because in the final analysis, they have nothing new to say, but are, as Photius indicated long before, led to their conclusions by the very dialectical inevitability which, in a Hegel and Second Europe, is accepted and celebrated, and in a Photius and First Europe, is rejected and lamented. Indeed, when Hegel finally conceives of Matter as a “deduction” of “Pure Consciousness” he is doing little more than restate Plotinus, for whom matter was “the uttermost emanation from the One.” 885

D. The Filioquism of Hegelian Dialectics: The Movement of Spirit in History

It is not enough, however, to demonstrate implicity formal or structural parallels to Augustine’s filioque in Hegel in order to show the persistence of the Augustinian mind; one must also show, especially in Hegel's case, the logical pedigree and the explicit reliance of Hegel upon that doctrine. Only then will it be seen as the absolutely necessary key to his philosophy which no merely “secular” Second European approach to his system has yet given its just due. Hegel was, after all, attempting, so he thought, to do a “Christian Ontology” and a “Christian philosophy of history.” The filioquist Trinity is not some accidental afterthought, nor even the summit or End to which his system tended; it was its dialectical sine qua non. Without the filioque there simply would have been no Hegelian, or Marxist, dialectic.

For Hegel, History is the Absolute (or Geist) deducing itself
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dialectically within the historical process. History itself is the double procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. In this, Hegel is a pure Joachimist, and one of far greater sophistication than Joachim ever imagined or dared to be.

In quasi-nestorian fashion, there are two aspects (προσώπος) to Hegel’s Weltgeist, the Subjective Spirit, and the Objective Spirit. The “Subjective Spirit” is turned entirely “inward” upon itself, but “Objective Spirit” is the “Subjective Spirit” as it goes forth (the Hegelian term is “diremption”) and “embodies” itself in the external and outward world. But this is not merely the external world of nature, for that world has already been brought forth by Spirit. This world is rather that world transformed by Spirit into institutions in which it may embody itself ever more perfectly, institutions such as the state, the family, the church, corporations, but also law, customs, procedure, and even manners or courtesy. It is clear from this that Hegel means to give a dialectical account of the historical or chronological order of their unfolding and of their metaphysical basis. “To deduce an institution is to show its necessity, to show that there is a logical necessity, a necessity of reason that should arise at the place and in the way in which it does arise. Hence all the institutions which we study in objective spirit are regarded by Hegel as the necessary forms in which reason embodies itself.” In other words, the Incarnation of the Son, but only an incarnation of the Absolute; it is, to recall what was said earlier about the Augustinian doctrine of predestination, a particular example, the “most perfect one” perhaps, of a more general phenomenon.

With the manifestation of Spirit as Institution, one returns to Kant’s categorical imperative and the distinction of Wille and Wilkur, for the manifestations of Spirit in the World are dependent upon its exercise of Its perfect Freedom and Will. In willing, therefore, Spirit principally wills the universal, which is to say it wills itself. Paradoxically, then, in the Hegelian system the more progressively “secular” the world becomes the more progressively “spiritual” it becomes. “Notion is threefold; and God
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therefore is threefold in Himself. As universal He is God the Father. The universal produces the particular out of itself, i.e., God the Father begets God the Son. The particular returning into the universal, is the individual, i.e., God the Holy Spirit.889 Notably, Hegel has finally produced a trinitarian version of Anselm’s “Christology without Christ”, for in the quotation just cited, the Trinity is a deduction following upon the idea of Notion as threefold. It is a particular example of a general phenomenon of Unity-in-Diversity.

It is this History-as-Spirit-unfolding-Itself that is taken as the central core of Hegel’s philosophical system, and it is his enormously complex, and turgid, Phänomenologie des Geistes (Phenomenology of Spirit) that is usually understood to be the quintessential expression of this thesis. And while that monumental, occult and magical opus does indeed constitute the heart and soul of his mature philosophical system, it is founded upon the much deeper historical and theological analyses he undertook in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, delivered at the University of Berlin from 1824 to 1831. For Hegel, the highest religion was that of the Protestant (Lutheran) Christianity of the Second Europe, and its affirmation of the Kingdom of God was a simultaneous assertion of the possibility of the radical negation of the present world.890 With this “eschatological turn”, Hegel then indicates what he means by the coming Kingdom or “eternal homeland” of Spirit; it is the “dwelling place of subjectivity.”891 This is to be accomplished by the radical negation of the world, a kind of “breaking away in the negative sense from everything established,” a proposition which Hegel himself acknowledged was “revolutionary.”892

Hegel’s “Spirit”, however, was none other than that of the Holy Spirit of Augustine’s filioque, immanentized within the dialectical process of History. Accordingly, for Hegel there are Three Kingdoms; these are vast extrapolations of the “spiritual demographics” or Joachim’s Ages of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Consequently, according to one
According to the first of these, God is [present] for finite spirit purely and solely as thinking. This is the theoretical consciousness in which the thinking subject has an attitude of full composure and is not yet posited in this relationship itself...Here God is thought for thinking spirit, the latter’s thought consisting in the simple conclusion that God brings himself into harmony with himself is immediately present to himself by means of his differentiation...This is the first relationship...the kingdom of the Father.

In this very important passage, not only is Hegel to be understood as having transformed the definition of the Father as a dialectical relationship into a definition of the kingdom of the Father, but he has done so by extending the process begun by Bernard of Clairvaux in the Middle Ages, who inverted Augustine’s Trinitarian “psychological analogies”. Hegel has thus taken the final step: the analogies are not, as with Augustine, discoverable in the soul by means of the Trinity, but discoverable in the Trinity by means of the soul. In doing so, he has objectified and universalized the more subjective orientation of Bernard.

We now continue the passage where we left:

The second transformation is the kingdom of the Son, in which God is [present] for the element of representing as such...Considered from the first standpoint, God as the Son is not distinguished from the Father but is merely expressed in the mode of sensibility. In the second element, however, the Son obtains the determination as other, and thus we pass out of the pure ideality of thinking and into representation. If, according to the first determination, God begets only a son, here he brings forth nature. ...But since in this history the divine steps into view for spirit, the history loses the character of external history. It becomes divine history, the history of the manifestation of God himself.

This constitutes the transition to the kingdom of the Spirit, which
comprises the awareness that human beings are implicitly reconciled with God.\textsuperscript{898}

Hegel himself states all this with uncharacteristic clarity:

We shall have to consider this idea, this content, in three spheres:

1. The idea is free universality, or the pure essence of God – the \textit{kingdom of the Father};
2. There inward diremption of the idea, held fast for a moment in its differentiation – the \textit{kingdom of the Son};
3. The reconciliation of this finite spirit with spirit that has being in and for itself – the \textit{kingdom of the Spirit}.

The relationship between these spheres is more specifically as follows: in all three the idea is \textit{divine self-revelation}...Thus the \textit{doctrine of the Trinity} pertains to this sphere, although it is preferentially termed the \textit{kingdom of the Father}.\textsuperscript{899}

Hegel very clearly follows the Augustinian redefinition of the Three Persons in terms solely of their dialectical functions, for the term “Father” represents for him the “inner dialectic of the divine life... rather than a divine ‘person’ related to other divine ‘persons’. This inward dialectic is outwardly reenacted in God’s relation to the world as signified by the kingdoms of the Son and of the Spirit.”\textsuperscript{900}

When he provided his critique of the \textit{filioque}, St. Photius observed that if the Spirit lacked a similar prerogative and share in the Monarchy as the Son had, the Spirit, logically, would be less than God, and thus there could be no basis for distinguishing between the Spirit and the human spirit. \textsuperscript{901} It is Hegel who finally ‘actualizes’ this consequence within his dialectical philosophy of history:

...The kingdom of the Spirit... involves knowing oneself as having within oneself, as this individual, infinite worth, absolute freedom, and the infinite power to maintain oneself in this other pure and simple. Love \textit{equalizes} all things...in the sense that...others ought to give themselves up to the
Lest there be any lingering doubts as to Hegel’s deliberate reliance upon the dialectical basis of the *filioque*, his own descriptions of the controversy, as well as his modern editor’s comments, are worth citing in full:

The great controversy of the Eastern and Western Christian churches was joined over the issue of whether the Spirit proceeds from the Son or from the Father and the Son, since only the Son is manifest in activity and is revelatory, and hence only from him [would] the Spirit [proceed].

Not only has Hegel misunderstood – perhaps intentionally – the nature of the controversy, but the editor’s note to this passage is even more illuminating:

The controversy between the Eastern and Western church was not, as Hegel here claims in accord with his comparison of the Eastern church with Gnosticism, whether the Spirit proceeds from the Son or from the Father and the Son, but whether it proceeds from the Father alone (as the Eastern Church held) or from the Father and the Son…Hegel’s next sentence suggests that this is not simply a compositional error but an error in his knowledge of the history of dogma. The error may have been prompted in part by the New Testament references to the sending of the Spirit by the Son upon his departure from the world (an important theme for Hegel, see John 16:7), even though it is clear enough that the Spirit is *sent* by the Son but *proceeds* from the Father (see John 15:26).

One should not be too hasty in assuming that Hegel was simply mistaken or misinformed in his knowledge of the controversy for his editor seems not to have noticed that the “error” stems not from an erroneous knowledge of the history of dogma, but from the dialectical dictates of Hegel’s own system and from his thorough knowledge of the history of an erroneous dogma.
By so faithfully reproducing the Augustinian dialectic as an historical process, Hegel pointed the way forward to two further interpretations:

(1) An endless and infinite progression of Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis, following the "lamblichian" side of the dialectic, first criticized by St. Athanasius as a form of polytheism,\textsuperscript{905} and reiterated later by St. Photius in reference to the \textit{filioque} until "the series they imagine grows into a multitude of processions" and collapses into polytheism and anarchy,\textsuperscript{906}.

(2) A \textit{return} to the state of the original and undifferentiated differentiation which began the process, following the Porphyrian side of the dialectic, and reproduced by Aquina’s characterization of the \textit{filioque} as a cycle which concludes in the same substance in which it began.\textsuperscript{907}

This return to the “State of Simplicity” constitutes the Hegelian End of History, that moment when the process of dialectical conflict of thesis and antithesis resolves into an ultimate synthesis from which no further dialectical procession arises. This option, well-known in its Marxist version of “final Communism”, has been more recently “revised and updated” by one Francis Fukuyama as an apologetic for the emerging global triumph of the Second Europe.

But what of that other “incarnation” of the Hegelian-Joachimite Zeitgeist, the “world historical individual”?

\section*{B. The Dialectical Misery of History: The Cult and Culture of Human sacrifice}

Since the historical process is dialectical, it is, according to Hegel, “not the theatre of happiness. Periods of happiness are blank pages in it, for they are periods of harmony – periods when the antithesis is in abeyance.”\textsuperscript{908} As the field for the emergence of Spirit as the Will to Absolute Freedom, History has a triadic structure that contains several oppositions:
The implications of this new “manifestation” will be completely lost unless one recalls the equally important Hegelian notion that not only every category contains its opposite, but that every category is formally *identical with* its opposite. Thus, freedom *is* necessity and bondage. As for Plotinus, free choice is the necessity or bondage to choices between good and evil.

Therefore “historical men – *World-Historical Individuals* – are those,” he says, “in whose aims such a general principle lies.”909 Such an individual is one who knows – whether intuitively or analytically is of no consequence to Hegel – the inherently dialectical processes of History, and acts upon them to actualize an universal destiny for man. As he puts it, “Such are all great historical men – whose own particular aims involve those large issues which are the will of the World-Spirit.”910 Lest there be any doubt as to the type of personage he has in mind, he enumerates three: Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, and Napoleon.911 Thus the “World-Historical Individual…is devoted to the One Aim, regardless of all else…But so mighty a form must trample down many an innocent flower – crush to pieces many an object in its path.”912 Freedom, therefore, in all three senses described above, is the realization of the *Weltgeist* of man’s ultimate destiny, the realization within human institutions of the dialectical nature of freedom itself. “This,” says Hegel, “is the seal of he absolute and sublime destiny of man – that he knows what is good and what is evil; that his Destiny *is* his very ability to will either good or evil.”913

Of course, one adoring prophet of such a “World Historical Individual” would, in a frenzy of anthropolatry, declaim “*Sie sind der Garant des Sieges. Wann Sie richten, richtet das Volk. Wann Sie handeln. Handelt das Volk!*” 914 The transition from the Historical Dialectic of the
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*Weltgeist* to the smoke in the chimneys of Auschwitz is, unfortunately, all too easy to trace. Hegelianism produces from its identification of opposites not only a crisis in cognition, language, and metaphysics, but a deep and profound moral crisis, for the “virtues” of classical philosophy have collapsed, and in their place have come the relativized ethical “functions” – “values” – which obtain a proximate absolute “status” only as stages in a particular cultural dialectic, the “actualizations of Spirit” in institutions.

With his reliance, or rather, return to the dialectical principles of the Eleatics, a particularly grizzly application of Zeno’s paradox occurs within the Hegelian “actualization” of the Augustinian mind. The paradox, which asserts the infinite divisibility of the continuum, may be understood to be the State itself, within which the individual person may, or may not – depending on the exercise of the absolute Freedom embodied in the State – be understood as contributing to the actualization of the *Weltgeist*. Indeed, the State may construe some persons, in Joachimite fashion, as positively inhibiting or hindering such actualization. At this point, the philosopher Edith Wyschogrod, in her terribly important book, *Spirit in Ashes*, introduces what she refers to as “the sorting myth” as the selection mechanism of the culture of mass death.

Since the World-Spirit must eventually universalize itself into a global state-culture in which the institutions and customs of the culture, i.e., all those things which, on Hegel’s own estimation, embody the Spirit, are universalized, then any particularizing customs, institutions, or “histories” must perforce disappear. Mass terror and genocide become the mechanism of homogenization. The seemingly infinite divisibility of the continuum, however, from the standpoint of these essays, is rooted less in the application of Zeno’s paradox and more in the confusion of Person and Nature that is at the root of all heresies, the *filioque* included. This confusion means, as was seen, that evil becomes, *via* the Augustinian doctrine of original guilt, natural to human nature, both in its transmission, culpability, and exercise. It becomes something systemic, almost requiring
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evil and systemic solutions. And the “infinite divisibility” of that continuum is the result: when evil is no longer personal, it can be “eradicated” in its personal manifestations almost endlessly, without any real “loss” to the human nature as such.915

A rather different approach, but no less penetrating analysis of the relationship between Hegelianism, mass death, and dialectic was offered by the political philosopher Eric Voegelin in a small but seminal study, *Science, Politics, and Gnosticism*. On his view, Hegelianism was but the ancient Christian Gnosticism recast. In his analysis, there are three salient movements of the one must undergo in order to approach the Gnostic forms of political utopia: (1) man experiences an injustice in some fundamental political and cultural ordering of the world, and effectively blames it on God or the gods, depending upon the period in question; (2) But “God” (or the gods) is discovered to be the work and creation of man in the Hellenistic deconstruction. Thus, “God” is murdered *speculatively or metaphysically* by the “critical” effort of explaining that He is in reality man’s creation. Or in the words of St. Photius, in the final analysis, “it is really we men” who determine the processions of the Persons.915a Therefore, (3) one arrives at the stage of the Murder of God with Niezsche or Marx. Marx, explains Voegelin, does not stand Hegel on his head so much as he works out certain implications already implicit within Hegel’s system.

“Thus, the critique of heaven,” writes Marx, “is transformed into the critique of earth; the critique of religion into the critique of law; the critique of theology, into the critique of politics.”916 How did we arrive here, Voegelin maintains, other than through that remarkable passage in the *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, written years before Nihilism was a smile on Nietzsche’s face?

The death of the mediator is not just the death of his *natural* aspect...What dies is not merely the dead husk that has been stripped
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from the essence, but the abstraction of divine being as well...The death of this mental image (Vorstellung), therefore, comprises at the same time the death of the abstraction of divine being, which is not established as self. This death is the unhappy consciousness’ painful feeling that God himself has died. 917

What has died is the Second europe’s “God-in-general”, because it was, according to Voegelin, “no more than a phase of consciousness that is now outmoded. And it is outmoded because consciousness in its dialectical progress has gone beyond it. The death of God is not an event, but the feat of a dialectician.” 918 Thus, Hegel rehearses an old theme the “return of consciousness to the depth of the night where the ego=ego, where the night no longer distinguishes or knows anything outside of itself.” 919 Hegel, who like Plotinus made matter the “uttermost emanation from the One” has, like Plotinus, ended in the “flight of the alone to the alone”, and to the discovery there, in the cave of his own isolation, unilluminated by any fire, the illusory light that the self is God.

Voegelin then makes a truly insightful observation. Hegel ended his masterpiece with a bit of poetry; the dialectical movement of history

Forms the recollection and the Golgotha of the absolute spirit, the actuality, truth, and certainty of its throne, without which it would be a lifeless solitary thing; only-

From the chalice of this realm of spirit
its infinity foams out to it.
(aus dem Kelche dieses Geistesreiches
schäumt ihm seine Unendlichkeit) 920

But the original poem by Schiller, “Friendship”, actually reads rather differently:

Though the Superme Being found no equal,
From the chalice of the whole realm of souls
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There foams to him – infinity.
(Fand das höchste Wesen Schon kein Gleiches, aus dem Kelch des ganzen Seelenreiches Schäumt ihm – die Unendlichkeit.)

Voegelin’s conclusion forms a fitting epitaph for this survey of Hegel: “For the fate of the order of being when Gnostic magicians lay hands on it Hegel has found a fitting symbol: the mutilation of a poem.”

That mutilation of texts in order to fit the presuppositions of a dialectical philosophy of history itself forms part of the cultural inheritance of the Second Europe, in its endless search to rewrite History in its own image of Power. That effort, in its full historiographical effect, is the legacy of Criticism.
XII. THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE CHAMELEON GODHEAD

A. The Higher Critical Defense of Atheism

Consider the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protestantism</th>
<th>is opposed to</th>
<th>Papalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faith (Luther)</td>
<td>is opposed to</td>
<td>Works (Trent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grace (Calvin)</td>
<td>is opposed to</td>
<td>Works (Trent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predestination (Luther)</td>
<td>is opposed to</td>
<td>Free Will (Erasmus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Piety</td>
<td>is opposed to</td>
<td>Institutionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scripture</td>
<td>is opposed to</td>
<td>Tradition/Magisterium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>True Church is the Invisible Church</td>
<td>is opposed to</td>
<td>True Church is the Visible Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priesthood of all Believers</td>
<td>is opposed to</td>
<td>Priesthood of Clergy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many Popes</td>
<td>is opposed to</td>
<td>One Pope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preaching of the Word</td>
<td>is opposed to</td>
<td>The Celebration of the Mass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Vernaculars</td>
<td>is opposed to</td>
<td>International Latin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kergyma (Bultmann)</td>
<td>is opposed to</td>
<td>Dogma (Bultmann)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Jesus of History</td>
<td>is opposed to</td>
<td>The Christ of Faith</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

And, if one follow the self-definations of the classical post-Reformation Anglican divines, Anglicanism itself is the synthesis of the two, neither really “Catholic” in the papalist sense, nor really Protestant in the Continental sense.

The table could, of course, be expanded. One might, for example,
have mentioned the Predestination versus Free Will disputes within Protestantism itself, the endless debates between Martin Luther, John Calvin, Theodore Beza, George Whitefield, Jonathan Edwards, or even Abraham Kuyper on the one hand, and Jacob Arminius, the Wesleys, or Francis Asbury on the other. One might just as easily have mentioned the recurring debates on the Eucharist, with the “Realists” – Luther, Bishop Gardiner, Martin Chemnitz – squaring off against the Virtualists, John Calvin, Theodor Beza, Jacob Arminius; or both Realists and Virtualists squaring off against “Mere Symbolists” Huldrich Zwingli, Archbishop Cranmer and the Radical Anabaptists Menno Simons or Muntzer. Seen in this light, the Catholic and Protestant Reformations are but the end result of a long dialectical development that, to a certain extent, viewed history itself in dialectical terms.

The modern discipline of historiography owes much of its existence to its beginnings in this internecine dialectical warfare of the Second Europe. The rise of this discipline in a specialist guise, Patristics or Patrology, was designed to resolve the conflicts of historical vision brought about by the collapse of the Second Europe’s cultural and religious unity during the Reformation. “History” became the hope for reestablishing some form of cultural cohesion, and as such, quickly degenerated into the historiography of a phenomenology of culture. “Patristics” contributed backhandedly to the development of a thoroughly secularized version of Joachim’s dialectical historiography.

It is possible to trace the rise of this discipline in three stages, paralleling the hardening of the Protestant and Papalist positions which increasingly defined themselves by their mutual oppositions. In the first stage of this dialectical movement, Protestant historiography attempted to prove, on the basis of patristic tradition, that the Papal church had departed from the authority of Scripture. There are certain features of this appeal, however, which should be noted carefully.
First, the Protestant appeal to Tradition is an *academic* one almost exclusively, since patristic, extra-Scriptural references were deliberately purge from their liturgies and hence unavailable or inaccessible to the majority of Protestant believers. Patrists remained the sole and exclusive province of study of the Protestant cleric-scholar. It was not, as it was for the Romanist, a constituent element of the monastic tradition (for monasticism had no place within its conceptions), nor was it, as it was for the Orthodox laymen of the East something to which he was exposed in the liturgical cycle of corporate worship. In the initial Protestant appeals to Tradition, therefore, one senses that the citations are not so much citations of the *Fathers* as a living body of witnesses, but are citations of *ancient authorities* as justification for contemporary Protestant doctrine and practice. As such, for all their learning, the Protestant scholars for the most part do not penetrate very deeply into the acquisition of the Patristic mind (*Φρονηµα*).

Second, this means that the patristic witness would never be allowed to penetrate and speak directly to the level of the individual Protestant layman, it was, and remains a witness filtered through the prism of academic inquiry, a prism itself forged in the dialectical crucible of the common Augustinism which was the inheritance of the Second Europe, both Papal and Protestant. As such, one sees the emergence of a kind of “Patristic scholasticism” in the hands of, for example, the Lutheran Martin Chemnitz or the Anglican Bishop John Cosin.

Third, the Protestant appeal inevitably initiated a dialectical reaction within the Papal church. This movement brings us to the second stage of the dialectical emergence of modern historiography, for faced with this patristic end-run around papal authority, the scholars of the papal church responded with a novel and ingenious response of their own; they tried to prove, on the basis of Scripture, that the Protestant reconstruction of ecclesiastical history was incorrect. Nor was this limited solely to a Scriptural assertion of papal claims. Much more was at stake. Papal
biblical scholarship had to prove, from Scripture, a whole host of contested doctrines to which the Reformers objected, as well as defending from the same patristic witnesses the claims of the papacy. It quickly became apparent, therefore, that history itself could not be done without presuppositions. Moreover, as the papal appeal to Scripture inevitably included references to the deuterocanonical books, the third stage, in the Protestant response to the Papalist reaction, was initiated.

In this third stage, Protestant authors had to clarify two things:

1. the *sola Scriptura, sola gratia, sola fidei* itself, and,
2. what the historical witness of patristic tradition really meant for the doctrine of the Church as well as for the whole spectrum of Christian doctrine.

All of this led, or course, to a reconsideration of what *texts* constituted the basis of the Second Europe’s cultural canon, and naturally, the Papist and Protestant fragments of the Second Europe gave different answers, thereby indicating that the whole “phenomenology of culture” is itself beginning to break down, for as a reaction to “tradition”, Protestantism can be conceived, in one sense at least, as the rejection of the Hellenization that had occurred during the Middle Ages. Its affirmation of the *sola Scriptura* was meant, in this sense at least, as a denial of the marriage of theology and philosophy that was so recognizable in the works of the Medieval Scholastics. But very clearly, as even a cursory glance at the predestinational disputes within Protestantism itself will demonstrate, the Reformation failed to detect the fundamentally Augustinian basis of its own premises.

This redefinition of the cultural canon took place principally in the exclusion of the deuterocanonical books of the ecclesiastical text from the canon of the Old Testament Scriptures. The argument began to be advanced that the only genuinely canonical Old Testament books were the books of the Hebrew canon recognized by the Jewish council of Jamnia in 70 A.D. One entirely misses the significance of the
Protestant *sola Scriptura* if one forgets that the dispute was about which underlying *texts* of the Scriptures were being referred to Protestantism, following the lead provided by Erasmus and the North (Second) European humanist, referred to and based their appeals to Scripture, particularly where the New Testament was concerned, on Greek manuscripts, while the Papists appealed to the Latin Vulgate of St. Jerome. In response to the Papist objections to their *sola Scriptura*, Protestantism had to define which *manuscripts* it based that appeal upon and well as having to define how they were selected and distinguished.

Thus in the third stage of the emerging historiographical matrix, Protestantism came to articulate a rather interesting, and peculiar, formulation of its *sola Scriptura*, one all but forgotten by modern Second European scholarship, for the manuscripts selected as the basis of the *sola Scriptura* were none other than the Greek manuscripts underlying the so-called “Received” or “Traditional” text-type, sometimes called the “Byzantine text type”. The Protestants had, in short, adopted the ecclesiastical text-type of the Greek Orthodox Church of the First Europe, without, of course, adopting the non-Augustinian paradigm of that Europe.

The implications of this are, to say the least, sweeping, for in one and the same breath, Protestantism was implying that there was indeed an uncorrupted tradition of the transmission of accurate and authentic copies of the Scriptures – that of the First Europe – while its historiography was busily adopting and engaged with the dialectical presuppositions of the Second. Not surprisingly, as the Protestant scholars were coming to this conclusion in the late sixteenth century, they also sought to initiate serious contact with the First Europe through the Patriarchate of Constantinople in their effort to universalize the conflict against Papal Rome.

We must pause here to consider a second important implication of the classical Reformation *sola Scriptura*, for it has been profoundly misunderstood in recent years, and nowhere more so than in the circles of
American evangelicalism. For the latter, the doctrine of biblical infallibility has come to mean that the Scriptures are “infallible in whatsoever they teach concerning doctrine, history, or science, in the original autographs (αὐτογραφα).” But for the classical Reformation doctrine, it is concerned not so much with original autographs as with faithful and accurate copies or apographa (απογραφα). Contemporary American “evangelicalism”, in other words, does not possess those autographs – indeed, no one does – and therefore by its own formularies, it does not posses any reliable basis for authority, biblical or otherwise, since the autographs are not extant.

This important distinction provides the profound clue to the nature of religious historiography and scholarship since the Reformation, for on the one hand, contemporary “evangelicalism” must adopt a scholarly posture of recovery; it must recover autographs which have been lost. This in turn means that “evangelicalism” of this type carries within it the seeds of a historiographical self-contradiction, for it assumes that whatever manuscripts as are extant are not accurate. History, so to speak, must be rewritten under the guise of the reconstruction of that original text. But conversely, for those included to follow the classical Reformation view of the matter, it implies an equally self-contradictory enterprise: it must defend the accurate transmission of a particular text-type in the patristic tradition while simultaneously rejecting the doctrinal and ecclesiological witness of that tradition to such things as apostolic succession, the perpetual virginity of Mary, or the liturgical use and purpose of ikons.

The exemplars of these “paradigm shifts” – to employ that often over-worked cliché – are the Wescott-Hort Hypothesis of the Recovery of the New Testament text, and the Documentary Hypothesis of the Evolution of the Pentateuch, two hypotheses that are in their way as significant for the Second Europe’s intellectual historiography as was Darwin’s *Origin of the Species* for its cosmic and biological historiography.
1. The Documentary Hypothesis

And so we turn from the dialectics of Reformation and counter-Reformation to the dialectics of historical revisionism in the form of the radical biblical “Higher Criticism” and its new tetramgrammaton, JEDP, the four sacred sigla by which the Documentary or Wellhausen hypothesis is known. In its recognizable modern form, the concept that the first five books of the Old Testament, or “Pentateuch”, were composed from different documentary “sources” had its origins in Enlightenment France with the physician Jean Astruc. He noticed that in the Hebrew text of the first two chapters of Genesis, each chapter referred to God by a different name, Elohim, translated “God” in the Authorized Version, and Jahweh, translated “LORD” in the Authorized Version. In order to account for this, he maintained that Moses, when composing the “creation accounts” which he assumed both chapters represented, had in fact utilized two independent sources, or “documents”. In so arguing, he provided the metaphysical first principle of the Documentary Hypothesis: different Divine Names indicate the presence in the text as it stands of different underlying sources.

By 1853, nearly a century later, the German critic Herman Hupfeld would extend this principle to its logical conclusion: differences in overall style or vocabulary in a passage constitute a sufficient basis upon which to posit different underlying documentary sources from which those stylistic differences derive. With “Astruc’s principle” and “the Hupfeld corollary”, one may discern the Gnostic tactic of retaining old terms, in this case the divine Names, but attaching new meanings to them, for these Names, which had for traditional Jewish and Christian theology revealed specified moral and metaphysical characteristics of God, now came with a certain brazen and nominalistic elegance to stand for something entirely different and completely mundane; they indicated, for the historiographical phenomenology, only the source documents from which the final text
The divine Names no longer revealed God, but were only the revelations, the residue so to speak, of no-longer-extant documents with their own relative “viewpoints” and “perspectives”, which it was the task of critical scholarship to discern and disentangle.

Once the first two chapters of Genesis were subjected to these principles, there was nothing logically to prevent their application elsewhere.\textsuperscript{936} But there was another implication of the “name equals source” formula: what was previously understood to be a continuous narrative had now been rendered discontinuous and contradictory, since the order of God’s creative operation in chapter was of Genesis was different than that in chapter two, assuming that the latter chapter as the “J” account of creation. This “names equals source” equation is still encountered in the editorial annotations of many modern translations of Bible, even though “scholars” have long since abandoned the classical Documentary Hypothesis.\textsuperscript{937}

There are, typically, three arguments advanced for the assertion that the first two chapters are contradictory: (1) the second is separate, and therefore superfluous, account of creation; (2) it is different from the first account and irreconcilable with it, and (3) its diction and style are different.\textsuperscript{938} At this point, the nineteenth century Princeton professor of Old Testament, William Henry Green, stated the logical case against the emerging Hypothesis with such lucidity that his arguments have never really been adequately countered; they are more usually simply ignored:

The critics here bring into operation at the outset tow vicious methods, which characterize their whole procedure and are the most potent instruments which they employ in effecting the partition of the text.

The First is the arbitrary assumption that two different parts of a narrative, relating to matters which are quite distinct, are variant accounts of the same thing. It is very easy to take two narratives or two parts of the same narrative, which have certain points in common but which really describe different transactions, and lay them aside one another and point
out the lack of correspondence between them. The artifice of the critics consists in their identifying distinct things, and then every divergence one from the other is claimed as evidence that these are variant traditions, and that these discrepant accounts cannot be by the same author; they must have been taken from different documents.

In other words, there can only be two different creation accounts if one assumes that the initial equation of “names equals sources” is a sufficient basis upon which to distinguish discreet documentary sources, and secondly, only if one assumes that the second of these discreet entities is a creation account at all. As Green aptly put the case: “the difference (in diction) arises from the nature of the subject, not from the habit of the writer.”

The “contradictions” between chapters one and two consequently can arise only if the second chapter is read in the same way as the first, i.e., as having been organized around blocks of time:

(But) the order of statement is plainly not that of time, but of association of thought... The allegation that it does rests upon the assumption that the Hebrew tense here used necessarily implies a sequence in order of time, which is not correct. The record is (ver. 19, “And of the ground Jehovah God formed all the beasts of the field, and all the fowls of heaven, and brought them to Adam...”) If, however, this is insisted upon, and we are told that according to the ‘natural interpretation’ of this passage that it teaches that the birds and beasts were not made until after Adam, then it must be said that the same sort of natural interpretation’ will create absurdities and contradictions in many other places beside... So Ex. IV. 31, “And the people believed and they heard... and they bowed their heads and worshipped.” According to this the people believed the words of Moses and Aaron before they heard them.

Thus the second chapter is not a creation account in the chronological sense at all, for as Professor Green observed, it utterly lacks organization
around sequential blocks of time.

It was Johann Gottfried Eichhorn who first extended Astruc’s criterion of the divine names as indicating separate source documents to the remainder of the book of Genesis and on into the first two chapters of the book of Exodus in his *Introduction to the Old Testament*, published in Germany between 1780 and 1783. This work earned him his lasting epithet of “the father of Old Testament criticism.” What is new with Eichhorn is the assumption that Moses did not author any of the Torah, or the first five books, the “Books of Moses.” This position implied that a new task of massive historical revisionism would have to be undertaken on the basis of the new critical and metaphysical principle of Astruc. It is Eichhorn who advances this new historiographical paradigm. What is it? It is the old assumption of the Second Europe that doctrine develops. With Eichhorn, however, the paradigm which was first unleashed in the ninth century upon the non-Augustinian patristic texts was extended back into what had always been understood to be the earliest textual components of the cultural legacy of the Second Europe, the Books of Moses. Once applied, Eichhorn maintained that the ancient Hebrew theology evolved or developed from a primitive polytheism to an advanced monotheism, an evolution which would have impelled a post-Mosaic date for the emergence of the final form of the Torah.

It is crucial, however, to note what Eichhorn did not maintain; he did not maintain, at least initially, that in its final form the Torah was not the product of one author-editor. But once the Torah was no longer the work of Moses for “modern scholarship”, the way was clear to question the compositional, and therefore the metaphysical and moral integrity and unity of the Torah. It is a fact that, as the presupposition of unitary authorship collapsed within Old Testament pentateuchal criticism, the discovery of alleged textual, moral, and metaphysical contradictions grew. Thus at the end of the development of the critical structure from Astruc to Eichhorn, two source documents had been posited, “J”, representing the
“Jahwist” document, and “E” representing the “Elohist” document.

One of the first to pursue the implications of Eichhorn’s abandonment of Mosaic authorship was Wilhelm M.L. DeWette in the first half of the nineteenth century. He maintained that the Book of the Law which was discovered during King Josiah’s reign in 621, as recounted in II Kings 22, was in fact the Book of Deuteronomy. DeWette argued that, since King Josiah and the high priest Hilkiah were concerned to abolish localized sanctuaries and places of sacrifice and to centralize worship in the Temple at Jerusalem (and thus to solidify the kingdom by not only abolishing idolatry but also by enriching the royal treasury), then, so his argument ran, the book which was “discovered” had in fact been deliberately composed for that purpose by an agent of the Temple, and its discovery was staged at the appropriate moment. This pinpointed the dating of the Book of Deuteronomy to the year 621 B.C., the date of Josiah’s reformation, or shortly before.\textsuperscript{944} With DeWette’s “discovery”, the third document, “D” for the “deuteronomist” document, has been found. We now have “J”, “E”, and “D”.

With the work \textit{Die Quellen der Genesis (The Sources of Genesis)} by Herman Hupfeld in 1853, the “Copernican revolution” in the history of the Documentary Hypothesis occurs.\textsuperscript{945} His contributions to the evolution of the final form of the Hypothesis were three new principles of examination of the Torah, and a newly discovered source document.

First, by subjecting the previously isolated “E” document to a new philological examination, he discovered that there were portions of “E” which, with the exception of the divine name \textit{Elohim} itself, otherwise greatly resembled the “J” document in diction, style, and thematic focus. There were some portions of “E” which, in the historical scheme of the emerging Hypothesis, appeared to be material as early as “J”. Hupfeld was obliged, therefore, to separate “E” into two further documents, an earlier document where “E” resembles “J” with the exception of the divine name \textit{Elohim} itself, a document which had called “E\textsuperscript{1}”, and the rest of “E”,
which became “E²”, or more simply, the original “E”. There were now
four documents, displaying the following chronological order of
composition: E¹EJD. It was this E¹ document which was to become the
later “priestly” or “P” document, and it will henceforth be referred to as
such. With this change in nomenclature, the order of documents now
reads PEJD.

To this apparatus Hupfeld added a second, and perhaps the most
important principle, to the arsenal of presuppositions of the Critical
Historiography, for he maintained that the documents thus distinguished
by the criteria of different vocabulary, diction, and interest themselves had
integrity, i.e., that the documents not only could be distinguished within the
final form of the text, but actually reconstructed as separate documents
from the text. The text, in short, could be rewritten. This assumption was
posited out of the perceived need on the part of Criticism to justify its
increasingly radical reconstructions of biblical and early Hebrew history
with a measure of rational and scientific verifiability.

Thirdly, Hupfeld posited the existence of an editor, or redactor,
designated as “R” in the growing non-propositional calculus of the critic,
an “R” who edited the portions of the text in “E” which resembled “J” which
according to the theory, should have belonged in “J” except for the fact of
the presence of the name Elohim itself! If this is not confusing enough, it
can be restated even more clearly to render the confusion more apparent:
“R” lay behind the conflation of “P” and “E” into “E”. This “R” was therefore
truly a godsend, a literal redactor ex machine, for “whenever the theory
ran into trouble with the facts or ran counter to the actual data of the text
itself, bungling hand of R (the anonymous redactor) was brought in to
save the situation.”⁴⁶ This assumption of a redactor indicates the
dialectical mess the theory was becoming, for the discovery of “P”
contradicted Hupfeld’s own assumption of the integrity and recoverability
of the source documents, for if “P” which so closely resembles “J” in
diction can only be posited by positioning a Redaktor, who is posited
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precisely in order to account for resemblances, then the integrity of the posited document falls.\textsuperscript{946a}

The theory, with Hupfeld’s “Copernican revolution” thus ends where it began, for it began with the assumption of the unitary authorship of the Pentateuch based upon underlying sources, then rejected that unitary authorship but kept the sources, then posited a redactor who combines the sources into a coherent unity and thus performs exactly the same function as a unitary author; and all this militating against the integrity of the sources thus utilized! With Hupfeld, then, one encounters the first instance in modern literary criticism of the absence of the notion of an author as such, and with the absence of the author comes the absence of the author’s intention, for there is no author to have intended to communicate anything at all.

The ultimate reduction was reached in the work of Karl Heinrich Graf in 1866. as Hupfeld had divided “e” into “E” and “E\textsuperscript{1}”, Graf in turn distinguished within “P(E\textsuperscript{1})” between two further sources. He claimed to have detected material in “P” which could only have been written later than the deuteronomic legislation allegedly discovered by king Josiah in 621 B.C. Thus, there was some “P” which could only have come from a period later than “D”. However, there was also historical material in “P” which could only have come from a period earlier than “D”. Thus “P(E\textsuperscript{1})” became “P\textsuperscript{1n}” and “P\textsuperscript{2n}”. And now the chronological order of documents in the Documentary Hypothesis was “P\textsuperscript{1} (historical P), E, J, D, P\textsuperscript{2} (legal P).”

Graf’s separation of “P” into two further documents was not to endure. In 1869 the Dutch critic Abraham Keunen argued that P was a unified source, since the legal and legislative portions could not be separated from the historical portions without resulting in confusion, since the proper understanding of the one depended upon the proper understanding of the other. But since Graf had “prove” the post-Babylonia Exilic origin of the priestly legislation, the entire “P” document had to have been composed after the discovery of “D” in 621. Thus arose the final and
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definitive ordering of documents, the one popularized in Julius Wellhausen's massive reconstruction of ancient Hebrew history on the basis of the Documentary Hypothesis; his *Introduction to the History of Israel* gives the now familiar order of JEDP.

The essence of Wellhausen's reconstruction of ancient Israel's history is as follows:

(1) The text of the Pentateuch as it stands is the product of an evolutionary process, involving several sources, editors, and recensions;

(2) The basic historical outline of Israel's history as presented in the text as it stands is therefore incorrect;

(3) Therefore the history of Israel must be reconstructed to reflect the state of critical findings;

(4) And therefore the events described in the Pentateuch (particularly as they pertain to the founding of Israel), if they happened at all, did not happen when the text as it stands says they did, nor for the reasons it advances; and finally,

(5) If the events did not happen when the text implies they did not for the reasons it avers, then it inevitably follows that the events and their interpretation are to that extent the creations of Israel, and did not, as the texts avers, create Israel.

The resemblance between this and Hegel's assertion earlier in the nineteenth century that God is the creation of man and not vice versa is obvious. Wellhausen, after all, was the quintessential Hegelian, and advanced the theory of Israel's spiritual evolution from polytheism to monotheism on a Hegelian basis.947

From this vantage point, the dialectical peregrinations of the Documentary Hypothesis may be analyzed, and its roots within the Neoplatonic-Augustinian Hellenization exposed. First, one must observe
that the criterion of the divine names as sigla of underlying sources documents contains within it a fatal flaw:

All hinges ultimately, therefore, on the exact transmission of these fundamental and determining words... and an error in these initial lines, by confusing the limits of the documents, would introduce error into their respective criteria as deduced from the inspection of these faulty passages. If there is anything that must be absolutely fixed and resolutely adhered to, it is the accuracy of these divine names, which are the pillars on which the whole critical structure stands... The current hypothesis of the critics is built on minute verbal distinctions, which imply an accuracy and certainty of text which they themselves unsettle by their frequent assumptions of errors and manipulations by the redactor... The hypothesis is self-destructive, for it can only be defended by arguments which undermine its foundations. 948

In other words, the accuracy of the transmission of a part of the text is assumed in order to overturn the assumption of the accuracy of the transmission of the integral texts and the history it relates. We shall encounter this methodology again in the examination of the Wescott-Hort Hypothesis.

There is a second flaw, and it is one fraught with portentous and genocidal implications, and that is that with the equation “names equal sources”, language can have only one level of meaning. Thus, the Documentary Hypothesis depends for its success upon making the Hebrew Scriptures fit a metaphysical-critical principle which holds for no other sacred literature in the whole world at that time, which know of more than one name for God. There is at work throughout the hypothesis and its dialectical derivation, in other words, the assumption of a “critical” version of the Divine Simplicity. With this, the mask comes off the whole enterprise, for the words of St. Basil of Caesarea, cited long ago in explaining the operative principle underlying Arianism, cited in Part One,
are equally applicable to the Documentary Hypothesis:

They (the Arians and Critics) have an old sophism, invented by Aetius, the champion of this heresy, in one of whose letters there is a passage to the effect that things naturally unlike are expressed in unlike terms, and, conversely that things expressed in unlike terms are naturally unlike. Both the Arian and Documentary heresies are based upon the same presupposition and method: each assumes that a different name for God indicates entirely different underlying entities, entities which, in the case of the Arian-Eunomian complex, are natures, and which in the case of the Documentary complex, are documents. It is only the underlying reality that these names are taken to signify that is different, for both systems operate from the presupposition of “linguistic simplicity”, the idea that language can signify only one underlying reality at any one time.

The tragedy which that Hypothesis helped to spawn unfolded only in the twentieth century. Assuming that the ancient Hebrews were unique among the literate cultures of their day, knowing no more than one Name of the Supreme God at any one literary moment, this inherent anti-Jewish prejudice of the German Higher Criticism, busily, and happily, went about its “scholarly” enterprise of discovering and multiplying the endless errors and “contradictions” of the clumsy Hebrew Redaktor, and thereby provided much of the fertilizer for the emergence of a more vitriolic, and less critical, form of bigotry.

2. The Documentary Hypothesis and the Collapse of Meaning

The dialectical contradictions and chameleonlike flexibility of the Hypothesis would seem to be readily apparent. One might therefore justifiably ask, why were they not obvious to the critics themselves? By
the turn of the century, most critics were, in fact, aware of the grave metaphysical shortcomings of the theory, and a few brave souls imperiled their careers by rejecting the enterprise altogether, knowing that would mean academic ostracism. But for the most part, rather than return to a traditional view both of the authorship, transmission, and basic meaning of the text of the Pentateuch, however, scholars continued to teach the Hypothesis not only in universities and seminaries, but to utilize it in the commentaries and annotations in many modern versions of the Bible. This is the surest testimony to the contemporary moral crisis of the Second Europe, for its religious scholarship is primarily not only a scholarship of unbelief, but that unbelief manifests itself in the perpetuation of a theory for popular consumption that it has long ago abandoned. In this, one may discern the manifestation of another Gnostic basis of the modern Second Europe’s culture: the “Prohibition of Questions” encountered in Part One.

The eclectic and confusing variety of post-JEDP theories simply testify to the fact that the assumptions and methods of criticism itself have become the “interpretative tradition” of the text, supplanting the previous view. With this, a “Copernican revolution” did indeed occur, for the Gnostic transference of authority was in the end the only appreciable result of the Hypothesis, for it is the idea of an inherent meaning itself within the text which had altogether collapsed. The observations of the political philosopher Eric Voegelin here assume some importance, the more so since he does accept the results of much of the skeptical type of biblical criticism just surveyed.

He begins with a summary of the position of Old Testament criticism by the middle of the twentieth century:

We must recognized the difficulties presented by a symbolism that has absorbed primary traditions and records of more than a thousand years, and overlaid them with interpretations, with interpretations of interpretations, with redactions and interpolations, and subtle imposition
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of new meanings through integration in wider contexts.  

It is to be noted that Voegelin broadly assumes the position criticism had come to, i.e., that the Old Testament is the result — howsoever construed — of a gradual process of redactions. “Hence it is possible,” he goes on to say, “to find a tradition from the seventeenth century, side by side with an editorial interpolation of the fifth century, in a story that has received its literary form in the ninth century B.C.”

Having made history adherence to the general results of the modern criticism quite clear, he then turns to a withering critique of the Wellhausen Documentary Hypothesis, that very Hypothesis which led to the state of affairs Voegelin himself embraces as being the results of modern scholarship. The first critique is directed at the weak metaphysical foundation of the edifice. He complains that Two centuries of Pentateuchal criticism cannot be dismissed with a brief footnote. In the first place, it is not easy to give satisfactory references at all, because the lack of adequate philosophical foundations, which in general is the bane of Old Testament science, makes itself especially felt in the treatment of the historiographic complex.

This caveat entered for the record, Voegelin then provides history philosophical critique. The first is directed at the conception of the “authors” of the various “documents” allegedly discovered by the Hypothesis, for by Voegelin’s time, the work of critics themselves had abandoned the attempt to arrive at authors of discreet documents, and began to utilize the sigla JEDP in an entirely different manner altogether. They were now agreed “to stand not for definite authors but rather for ‘schools’ of historiography.” At this point, Voegelin observes that the foundation of the whole edifice is quite simple: its presumptive hostility to Mosaic authorship:
Bible criticism, as we have indicated, is burdened with its origins in theological concerns. Pentateuchal criticism, in particular, is a traditional unit of study, because it is in search of a substitute author for the Five Books ascribed by the Biblical tradition to Moses. It is a unit, not because philological criteria draw a forceful line between the first five and subsequent books of the Biblical narrative, but because of its opposition to the Moses tradition. When the tension of the opposition is relaxed, though it never disappeared completely, philological considerations could assert themselves more freely; and only then, as a secondary development, did the source analysis expand beyond the Pentateuch. The J and E sources, reworked by a Deuteronomist hand, seemed to extend so clearly into Joshua that the term hexateuch was coined for aggregate of books. And the same structure of sources was found, though with hesitations and qualifications, to continue in Judges. Samuel, and the first chapters of Kings. Continuous component narratives, thus, were considered to extend beyond the Pentateuch into the Former Prophets of the rabbinical canon. Under that assumption a J narrative would extend from the creation of the world to the accession of Solomon (Genesis 2 – I Kings 2); an E narrative from Abraham to the death of Saul (Genesis 15 – II Samuel 1); and a P narrative from the creation of the world to the death of Joshua (Genesis 1 – Joshua).

In other words, Mosaic authorship was the obstacle which, if removed, allowed the whole dialectical process of textual partition to be extended throughout the whole Old Testament, and by the same token, Mosaic authorship was also the obstacle which, if allowed to remain in place, prevented the extension of that method to other books. While the Old Testament was therefore philologically unified, the history it related was not contemporaneous, but spanned several centuries. Philology became the tool in dialectical hands of a radical surgery which was used to cut the presumptive historicity of the events away from the text.

Once this position was arrived at, it then inevitably followed that the “true” meaning of the text was hidden in the earlier sources which were
presumed to underlie it. But this, Voegelin notes, produced no meaning at all:

From the labors of the Wellhausen school there emerges a definite conception of the composition of the Pentateuch and, beyond it, of the Biblical narrative in general. The Mosaic authorship of the tradition was the starting point for a work of literary criticism which distinguished “sources” or “documents” designated by the sigla J, E, and P and assigned them to definite authors. With the advancing philological dissection of the documents into component strands, which underwent recensions, editions, amalgamations, ad redactions, the number of “authors” had to be multiplied; and since the main units of literary criticism were retained on the whole, the “authors” had to be bunched into “schools” corresponding to the sigla. Moses as the author of the Pentateuch had ultimately been replaced by the authors of the various component strands of the narrative. Whatever meaning could be found in the narrative had to be found on the level of the “sources” distinguished by literary criticism.958

In other words, the meaning of the text was not to be found within the text, but within the method of criticism itself as applied to the text. At this point, Voegelin then cites some critics themselves on the disquieting nature of their “results”:

Still, there are occasional outbursts hitting close the mark, such as Volz’s complaint about Eissfeldt’s synopsis, which arranged the fragments of the presumed sources in parallel columns. “I see in this Synopsis the culmination of the hitherto prevailing method, and I find that it proves exactly the opposite of what it is meant to prove, for the miserable fragments of narrative which for the most part the columns contain prove precisely that there were not four original narratives, and that this entire Pentateuchal Synopsis is nothing but the artificial creation of modern erudition.” And in his gentler manner, Gerhard Von Rad sets himself the new task of going “beyond the source analysis which has been run to
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death: and then quietly proceeds to unfold the problems of the Hexateuch from its final form. 959

Voegelin’s footnote is even worth quoting: “The reader should be aware that source criticism of the type which aroused the blast of Volz, though notably discredited today, has by no means been given up.” 960 Indeed it has not, for while most critics themselves have abandoned it, the study apparatus of the annotated Bibles which they provide to the public continue to utilize the discredited method, for the real damage – the denial of Mosaic authorship and hence of the general historical accuracy of the narrative – has been accomplished.

At root then, this new historiography is Gnostic in nature, for the critical scholar must intend to deceive himself, and then willfully persist in that deception. Lest all this be said to be going far beyond Voegelin, he should be allowed to speak for himself. Summing up the state of criticism, he formulated three propositions, devastating in their comprehensiveness:

1. The disappearance of Moses as the author of the Pentateuch entailed the disappearance of the meaning of the Biblical narrative in its final form.

2. What was found in its place turned out to be not worth finding, measured by the treasure of meaning that had always been sensed in the narrative but (which) now escaped the critics.

3. It is doubtful whether, beyond the strictly philological results of criticism, anything was found at all. 961

The conclusions which Voegelin himself draws from these observations, however, indicate the degree to which Gnostic attitudes now suffuse the scholarly endeavor, for having abandoned Mosaic authorship and the integrity and meaning of the text, Voegelin goes on, like so many others, to abandon the idea of authorship altogether!

The assumption that the collections in question are documents emanating
from definite authors rests on nothing but a nineteenth century conceit that bodies of literary text, if they have a certain length and show definitive characters of style, are “books” which inevitably must have “authors.”

But there is more:

The unanalyzed conception of authorship facilitated the belief, in the Wellhausen school, that one knew what the presumed authors had written in one called their product a “narrative” or “history”, even though behind such vocabulary lurked the formidable questions of the symbolic form not only of the narrative itself but of the canonical collection of the Old Testament as a whole. Questions of this nature, however, can not be approached through dissection of a text into sources, by literary criteria, but only through analysis of the contents; and by contents are meant the units of meaning that can be found in the text as it stands.

Voegelin’s remark really requires a second reading before the significance of it sinks in.

Here is a learned man, a scholar of repute, a man of letters and culture, a university professor of some stature, who, having imbibed the mind-altering drugs of criticism, no longer thinks that books require authors! His plight illustrates how far the theory has come, for what began as a presumptive hostility toward Mosaic authorship has become an almost subliminal hostility against the very idea of authors and books. Voegelin thus fulfills his own criteria of the description of the internal psychology of the Gnostic-scholar, for if it be true that the conception of authorship “can not be approached through an analysis of the contents” and if “by contents are meant the units of meaning that can be found in the text as it stands,” then why ignore the fact that the text as it stands is divided into distinct units called “books”, many of which specifically attribute their authorship?
Meaning therefore now had to be consciously sought in, and articulated within, what Voegelin called “a philosophy of symbolic forms,” which is the connecting link of “the symbolic narrative with the problems of human existence in response to the divine revelation in history.”\textsuperscript{964} In other words, the text has now become the product of “circles” or “schools” with their own emphases and interests.\textsuperscript{965} The text is but the product of Israel and the actualization of its consciousness of itself as a chosen people.

There are two questions that must be put here. First, if the notion of “authorship” and “books” be a nineteenth century conceit, is the twentieth century conceit of “circles” and “schools” any more adequate a tool for the apprehension of a text? And secondly, that there have been schools and circles with their points of view is undeniable, and that the Old Testament shows evidence of this type of human activity is also undeniable. But do not the “school” and “circle” alluded to by Voegelin bear a striking resemblance to the “school” and “circle” of priests and Israelites described by the text itself as having been instituted by Moses?

3. The Background to the Lower Criticism of the New Testament

A. The New Gnostic Dualism: The Spirit Versus The Letter

In order to understand the full implications of the rise of the higher critical school, and particularly the critical approach to New Testament studies, one must turn at least to the beginning of the Reformation and survey the course that philosophical dualism and dialectic took in their march through the Scriptures and ecclesiastical institutions.

The Gnostic systems examined in Part One employed an assumed dualism between the Law (Old Testament), and Gospel (New Testament),
a dualism posited in the form of the opposition between two divine attributes which are in turn hypostasized into separate and opposing Gods: the God of Wrath and Justice of the Old Testament, and the God of Love and Mercy of the New. As a result of this systemic philosophical dualism the metaphysical, historical, and ethical unity of the Old and New Testaments was shattered: the God of the Old Testament is other than the Father of the Lord Jesus Christ, and Christ in turn is not the prophesied Messiah of the Old Testament.

This philosophical assumption gave Gnosticism four ways it could approach Scripture:

1) New Scripture could be grafted into the Christian tradition in the form of so-called “Gnostic Gospels” which embodied these philosophical principles and which could claim the aura and trappings of genuine scriptural magisterium and apostolicity. This “new corpus” or “alternative tradition” could be engrafted into the Christian scriptural tradition either by constituting an outright addition or “supplement” to it, or by substitution for it.

2) The existing Scripture, and primarily the New Testament, could be modified by the rejection of those portions which conflicted with the received metaphysical, historical, and ethical assumptions of the system itself, as with Marcion’s rejection of whole portions of the New Testament.

3) Modification of the interpretive method of exegesis in accordance with the metaphysical and historical assumptions of the system as regards the transmission of texts.

4) Micromodification of seemingly trivial externals, such as the alteration of words, phrases, spelling or even punctuation here and there in the text.

Whichever of the four methods is pursued, the end result was first
the destruction of the unity of the two Testaments, a unity which was destroyed by a denial of the fulfillment of the Old in the New by Jesus Christ. With the destruction of this unity went also the destruction of the historicity of the events behind and leading up that fulfillment: history thus became merely symbolical or even “allegorical”. Scripture thus became a “source book” of relevant cultural symbols and self-referential metaphors which could only be adequately and accurately appropriated within the philosophical dictates of the Gnostic systems themselves. In place of Christian emphasis on the historicity and metaphysical unity of the two testaments came a complex system of demiurges, aeons, and layers of “gods” connecting the material world to “the All”, designed to help man escape the cycle of the world.

The Radical Reformation inherited from Erasmus and the Renaissance a similar radical “Neoplatonic” dualism of spirit and Letter. This development has a long pedigree, and in order to avoid confusion, for the present no attempt will be made to present its history from the 3rd century to the beginnings of the Reformation. For the moment, we must be content to resume the story at the beginning of the “modern period”.966

B. Wycliffe and Dualism

For Wycliffe, the Bible, viewed in a platonic fashion, belonged to the platonic realm of eternal ideas, and was itself identical with the Logos. This was not as problematical as the conclusion which Wycliffe drew from it: if the Bible was identical with the Logos, then the truths of the Bible were predominantly truths about eternity and not time, and were discoverable a posteriori in the world by reason. As such, Scripture had primarily a metaphysical but not a moral and historical, trustworthiness.967

At this point it is also necessary to observe that Wycliffe has identified the Scripture less with the Incarnate Logos of the first chapter of
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St. John but more with the abstract and disembodied Nous of Plotinus. In short, Wycliffe’s identification of Scripture with the Logos may or may not be problematical, but far more critical is the fact that once so identified, the Logos is not understood christologically, but merely philosophically. A wide dualistic chasm thus opens between the moral trustworthiness and authority of Scripture on the one hand, and the metaphysical and historical trustworthiness of Scripture on the other.

At the next stage, during the Radical Continental Reformation, the dualism inherent in Wycliffe’s view sharpens into outright opposition between the Old and New Testaments, between and “inner”, “spiritual”, and therefore “true” religion, and an “outer”, “material”, and “ceremonial” religion, represented by the New and Old Testaments respectively. And with this metaphysical opposition came the historical assumption that the “development of the outward church since the time of the apostles [was] one long period of decay and devastation…” 968

Hence, once the Reformation is well underway, even Martin Bucer will reject Luther’s indissoluble connection of word and spirit and posit a dualism in the name of “true spiritual religion”, a dualism which will prevent him from formulating a doctrine of verbal inspiration of the scriptures!969 From this point, the focus of the debate shifts to England, for it is there, owing to peculiar geographical, political, and theological circumstances, that the conflict of the proper reception of the Old Testament and its relation to the New will become most intense.

C. The Rise of English Deism: Puritans versus Anglicans on Natural Law

The initial conflict between Puritans and Anglicans occurs precisely over the manner of receiving the Old Testament. The Puritans challenge Anglicanism’s external ceremonial and monarchial episcopate on two grounds: 1) neither are spiritual; and 2) neither are scriptural. Richard
Hooker responds that Scripture contains not only spiritual but natural and rational law. This, however, serves only to transform the debate into a debate on what constitutes natural law. And with this, the debate also becomes a debate on the powers of man’s reason after the fall of Adam.

Hooker’s doctrine of man is that of Aquinas, i.e., that man’s reason is not totally given over to sin but only weakened by the fall. Thus, in his weakened condition, man can still attempt to follow the natural law. For the Puritans, the natural law was the Mosaic law – Wycliffe’s identification of Logos and Scripture in a new form – repromulgated since after the Fall man’s reason was not only weakened but entirely dead. From this position it is only a short step from natural law to covenant law, a step which the Puritans do not in fact take. In any case, some observations must now be made. For Hooker, the unity of the two Testaments appears to be primarily historical and ethical, i.e., he presumes the metaphysical unity of mankind both before and after the fall is stronger than the Fall itself, and secondly, he assumes the actual historicity of Adam and his fall. To this extent, the Hooker also assumes the ethical unity of mankind, and therefore the ethical unity of the Two Testaments. On the other hand, while his Puritan opponents likewise take for granted the historicity of Adam’s Fall, they appear to assume that the ethical unity of mankind is broken by it. From this point, the unity of the two Testaments is focused in their ethical and legal unity, an ethical and legal unity which, it might be added, is “imposed” externally onto the Old Testament by a sovereign God. Thus, the unity of the Two Testaments reduces almost to a legal unity, and the genuinely “Natural Law becomes synonymous with the Mosaic Law, all else being devolutions from this point. One cannot help but observe the strong resemblance here to Ptolemy’s Gnosticism.

_D. Milton_
By the time of Milton the picture is modified. Puritanism has been “defeated”, and the Thomistic view of mankind reigns more or less securely within the established church. What remains of Puritanism, however, is the spiritualistic humanism and dualism, with its attendant emphasis on the legal unity of the Two Testaments. In this situation, Milton makes several assertions: First: that everything necessary to salvation is easily comprehended, including God Himself, who is intelligibility and simplicity itself; second: that everyone may be his own interpreter of scripture since everything is clear; and third: natural law now finally and formally replaces typology as the paramount tool of exegesis. With this, Christology and its related typological and patristic exegesis is no longer the point of departure for exegesis. Exegesis is thrown back upon philosophy. Milton thus opposes the Anglican attempt to ground episcopacy in the apostolic imitation of Old Testament types, since this was an institution not demonstrable in natural law. The way is now open to oppose the very notion of the Church as an institution, since no such example exists in natural law. With Milton the exegete is now entirely freed from the necessity of considering ecclesiastical tradition in his exegetical work. The way is now open to the radical secularization both of humanism and therefore of scriptural criticism, including, as we shall see, the secularization of the assumptions of the way that the manuscripts of Scripture are transmitted; a theoretical and historiographical construct must be supplied to fill the vacuum created by the absence of ecclesiastical tradition and its sanctions.

E. Deism and the Augustinian Ordo Theologiae: The Priority of Natural to Revealed Religion

Having once replaced typology, and with it the recapitulational fulfillment of the Old Testament in Christ, with the notion of natural law, the way was clear for Deism, the metaphysical and theological pillar of which
was that “it can be perceived that a supreme deity is worshipped all over the world, [that] it is possible to use the fact as a basis for a natural religion which relates to all men…”973 There is, in short, a kind of “God in General”, the true God, variously acknowledged by all men in their several different religions under different names. Thus, in Deistic studies of religion, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, for example, “thought that he could discover everywhere behind the polytheistic face the worship of one God as the perfect, infinite and eternal being…”974 One might be tempted, with the benefit of hindsight, to accuse the Deists of a very fanciful sort of wishful thinking, that genuine polytheism and paganism does not really exist. As a philosophical assumption and critical method for the unmasking of the “God in General”, Deism had, and continues to have, a tremendous effect on the philosophical assumption behind higher critical studies of Scripture in the Second Europe. If behind the Allah of the Mohammedans, the Jehovah of the Jews, the Tao of the Taoists and the Buddha of the Buddhists there is really only one thing, then the same principle must be applied to the Christian Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, which become mere attributes predicated by Christians to this God in General. With this, the Gnostic Sitz-Im-Lebenism returns with a vengeance, for as applied to Scripture itself the Deistic principle shatters the identification made by Wycliffe: God’s word is to be found in the Bible, but is not the Bible per se, since this word can be found everywhere in nature and in each religion. It is to be observed, however, that while Wycliffe’s identification of Logos with Scripture is shattered, his identification of Logos with an abstract philosophical conception is not. The Deists accept that conception of the Logos bequeathed to them by Wycliffe. They are merely more consistent in applying the logical ramifications of that identification. With this step, the apostles and prophets could therefore be subjected to the same critical appraisal as the literature any other religion, or even of literature in general.

But one must not leave Deism there. Its final component provides
what perhaps is its most important interpretive key, and one which we shall have occasion to return to much later. This is the deistic assumption that natural religion is to take priority to revealed religion: thus, the Deists take yet another step in their consistent application of principles: natural theology has itself been transcended and replaced by natural religion, and finally today by a religion of nature, behind and prior to all the diversity of particular religions. In this, Deism has actualized another consequence of the Augustinian ordo theologiae of essence, attributes, and persons, for now the "God-in-general" of the first step, essence, has also produced a "religion-in-general" behind all peculiar religions of the third step, persons.

From this point on, then, the final blows then fall in rapid succession. Thomas Hobbes, for example, in the forty-fourth chapter of Leviathan, refutes what he considers the most abusive of the misuses of Scripture, the Puritan idea that the present Church age is the Kingdom of God. For Hobbes, fulfillment of Scripture lies not in Christ, nor in the Church-as-Kingdom, as with the Puritans, but in the future, after Christ’s second Advent. For Hobbes, there is no divinely instituted polity of Church and State. The Episcopal polity of the established Church was to be respected simply and merely because established by the State.

But in fact, this means that the Puritans have won the struggle for the control of Scriptural exegesis, for if that Scripture was not fulfilled by Christ at the beginning of the present Church Age, it is but a short step to the next question: why is there need for any special revelation at all?

The exegetical effect of this is sweeping. At the beginning of the Deistic period, for example, Toland disassociates himself from Patristic and Scholastic theology on the grounds that no doctrine is nor can be a mystery, and with this, the patristic triad of Scripture, Tradition, and Reason has been reduced to Scripture and reason, both divorced from Tradition. Thus, his explanation of the pillar of fire in Exodus, while intended to rescue the Exodus account from the category of fiction, unreality, and symbol, does so only by rejecting the miraculous element
and explaining it in purely naturalistic, i.e., physical and “scientific” terms. And from this position, the Earl of Shaftesbury will draw the general proposition that accounts of miracles in Scripture can be explained in terms of natural phenomena, since miracles are opposed to the natural order which reason discerns in nature. That is to say, the dialectic now surfaces in the form of an opposition between miracle and history, and presents two mutually exclusive alternatives of exegesis: 1) accept the historicity of the events recorded, but reinterpret the miraculous elements in naturalistic terms in order to retain their historicity, or 2) accept the miraculous element, and reinterpret them as not actually having occurred in history but only in “myth”. This leads to the paradoxical conclusion that miracles can even lead to atheism, since God is only to be discovered in the disruptions of this natural order of things! One detects here the momentous consequence of the rejection of typological exegesis, for its rejection has only served to introduce in its place an opposition of nature and miracle. That is to say, after the Deistic period, miracles come to be understood not as types of the same Logos who governs both nature and performs miracles, but as pseudo-events opposed to reason, and not as reflective of it, in nature. The natural realm alone is rational, and the miraculous, “spiritual” realm is, predictably, irrational. There are, of course, connections between this and the “religion versus science” debates of the eighteenth through the twentieth centuries. It is unfortunate, however, that the origins of this debate, lying as they do in the rise of criticism itself, would astonish many scientists and, regrettably, perhaps as many theologians as well.

F. Sir Isaac Newton and the New Name of the God-In-General

And so we inevitably arrive at the figure of Sir Isaac Newton, a crucial focal point for the whole issue of Christianity, Science, Bible, and Criticism. Briefly, Newton is generally within the tradition of the dualistic
Radical Reformation, and of the Puritan and the Deistic spiritualism, since he accepts, as part of his general philosophical, historical, and scientific world view, that Christianity devolved from its pure and simple apostolic gospel of Love and faith and good will into a religion encrusted with Greek metaphysics and Jewish priestcraft. The Universe and its laws are the product of, and subject to, the “rule of One." Newton’s Christology is accordingly Arian, that is, Christ is not the Son of god Incarnate, but merely a very good man. Christ is thus one link in the great chain of being, or *analogia entis*, which connects the harmonious order of the world to the rule of The One God-in-General, whose ways and laws are discoverable by the gnostic initiated into the arcane sigla of the Calculus. The person of Christ stands at the bottom end of a chain of attributes which stretch upward until they reach the pure essence of the One. The *ordo theologiae Newtonae* is, in short, essence (God-in-General), attributes (the particular things known about or predicated to Him), and persons (Christ, who is the best example of all the things known about God-in-General). Any understanding of Scripture, and in particular, the phenomena of the New Testament, from the described events to the text and manuscripts themselves, must now be done in accordance with the new philosophical assumptions which place Scripture on the same level as any other book.

With these cursory observations in hand, it is now time to consider in detail the propositions of the Wescott-Hort theory of nineteenth century New Testament Textual Criticism.

**G. Galileo: A Telescopic Synopsis of the Second Hellenization of Dogma**

Galileo’s glance through the telescope has come to epitomize for the advancing secularism of the Second Europe its emancipation from the consequences of the Second Hellenization of Dogma. Indeed, Galileo’s
difficulty arose in no small part because the marriage of Philosophy and Theology that was accomplished in Augustine’s identification of The One of Neoplatonism with the One God the Father of Christian doctrine was a marriage of theology and philosophy which produced the unnatural deification of Aristotle, including, of course, the doctrine that the heavens rotated around the earth at the center of the universe.

But the picture which results from that glance is more complicated, and spells out yet another series of implications that spin forth from St. Augustine’s original fusion of the Neoplatonic simplicity with the unity of the Christian Trinity. For the Second Europe’s theological interpreters of science, the new attitudes epitomized not so much the emerging “freedom from religious dogma” – which was really Aristotelianism raised to the status of revelation – as a new subservience, in this case, to Platonic dogma, freed more or less from Christian constraints. Hence one may explain, if not fully agree with, the preoccupations of Copernicus and his demonstrations of perfectly circular orbits of the planets around the sun, or the pleadings of a Kepler to Galileo to look more closely at those orbits which, being elliptical, failed to fit into a preconceived Platonic notion of perfect, that is, circular motion.

**H. Sir Francis Bacon: Mechanism and Organism as the New Philosophical Dialectic**

It was the English philosopher and Renaissance man Francis Bacon, himself the son of a strictly Puritan and Calvinist mother and of a father of highly placed political connections who would, in the court of his royal mentor James I, give philosophical expression to the divorce of theology and philosophy pronounced by Ockham and who would draw the fullest set of implications of that divorce for science:

In this vanity some of the moderns have with extreme levity indulged so far as to attempt to found a system of natural philosophy on the first
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chapter of Genesis, on the book of Job, and other parts of the sacred writings, seeking for the dead among the living; which also makes the inhibition and repression of it the more important, because from this unwholesome mixture of things human and divine there arises not only a fantastic philosophy but also a heretical religion.  

Ironically, at approximately the same time that Bacon was pronouncing his quasi-Nestorian divorce of “things divine and human” in science, the English jurists were formulating their own quasi-Monophysie blending of the two with their theories of the King’s Two Bodies. But for Bacon, the Second Hellenization was fraught with difficulty not only for theology but also for science, or “natural philosophy”:

To the same result, through in a different way, tend the speculations of those who have taken upon them to deduce the truth of the Christian religion from the principles of philosophers, and to confirm it by their authority, pompously solemnizing this union of the sense and faith as a lawful marriage, and entertaining men’s minds with a pleasing variety of matter, but all the while disparaging things divine by mingling them with things human. Now in such mixtures of theology with philosophy only the received doctrines of philosophers are included; while new ones, albeit changes for the better, are all but expelled and exterminated.

The Galileo case was, in other words, an inevitability.

In its place, however, Bacon, like Descartes and Newton, erected a new version of the old dialectical opposition of nature and grace, and this is the new dualism of nature and supernature. The created world becomes a thing with no inherent metaphysical connection to the divine, and thus capable of manipulation in any fashion that will benefit man. And technique or technology is the means of that manipulation: “I mean,” he writes in his Great Instauration, “to be a history not only of nature free and at large (when she is left to her own course and does her work her own way) – such as that of the heavenly bodies, meteors, earth and sea,
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minerals, plants, animals – but much more of nature under constraint and vexed; that is to say, when by art and the hand of man she is forced out of her natural state, and squeezed and moulded.982

What has changed here is the understanding of nature, history, and man’s place within both, for very clearly, Bacon means by “history” something mechanistic and purely natural. From this, it is a short and easy step to maintain that the manuscript transmission of the New Testament is subject to the same natural and mechanistic processes as any other body of historical or literary data. But more significant is man’s place within this picture, for it is man, and not God, who now stands outside “nature” and who, by Bacon’s “arts”, moulds and squeezes nature into something it otherwise would not be, into something unnatural. Man has become the demiurge.

This “art” to which Bacon so often refers bears a strong resemblance to magic in its proper sense. Indeed, for Bacon and other natural philosophers of the day, there was little to distinguish the two philosophically.

The sciences themselves, which have had better intelligence and confederacy with the imagination of man than with his reason, are three in number; astrology, natural magic, and alchemy; of which sciences, nevertheless, the ends of pretences are noble. For astrology pretendeth to discover that correspondence or concatenation which is between the superior globe and the inferior; natural magic pretendeth to call and reduce natural philosophy from variety of speculations to the magnitude of works; and alchemy pretendeth to make separation of all the unlike parts of bodies which in mixtures of nature are incorporate. But the derivations and prosecutions of these ends, both in the theories and in the practices, are full of error and vanity; which the great professors themselves have sought to veil over and conceal by enigmatical writings, and referring themselves to auricular traditions and other such devices, to save the credit of impostures.983
Bacon, along with Descartes, Galileo, and Newton, is the apostle of this new magic called science and of the new historiographical attitude that goes with it. The ends, however, between science and magic are not different nor are their underlying presuppositions dissimilar. Only the techniques are.

4. The Wescott-Hort Hypothesis

If God is simple in the Neoplatonic sense, then God is intelligible. And if intelligible, any “revelation” by that God must follow the rules of intelligibility; such a revelation must perforce be propositional in character, and dialectical in its structure. But in order to ascertain this “propositional revelation” in its purity, one must first recover the actual, original message.

The methodological foundations of this complex of propositional revelation, as well as the techniques, of nineteenth and twentieth century New Testament textual criticism derive ultimately from the theory of Wescott and Hort, a theory which occupies the same place and importance in New Testament studies as the JEPD theory occupies for Old Testament studies.

Wescott and Hort construct their theory on the foundation of an assault on the transmission of the text. They begin their Introduction to the New Testament in the Original Greek with a characteristic claim, i.e., that no attempt to recover the text can occur without the use of criticism (thereby assuming that the text has been lost and is in need of recovery):

This edition is an attempt to present exactly the original words of the New Testament, so far as they can now be determined from surviving documents. Since the testimony delivered by the several documents or witnesses is full of complex variation, the original text cannot be elicited from it without the use of criticism, that is, of a process of distinguishing
and setting aside those readings which have originated at some link in the chain of transmission. This Introduction is intended to be a succinct account (I) of the reasons why criticism is still necessary for the text of the New Testament; (II) of what we hold to be the true grounds and methods of criticism generally; (III) of the leading facts in the documentary history of the New Testament which appear to us to supply the textual critic with secure guidance; and (IV) of the manner in which we ourselves endeavored to embody the results of criticism in the present text.

At this point, the statement of their method and aims seems innocuous enough. But contained within it are two almost hidden premises, first, that the received Greek text of the New Testament does not contain a close approximation of the original autographs, and second, that this can only be recovered through the process of textual criticism itself. Seen in this light, the opening paragraph of Wescott and Hort’s textual critical opus magnum takes on a radical significance, for it clearly implies that the received text, and hence, theological traditions and doctrines dependent upon it, are subject to revision. Why? Because the history of the transmission of the manuscripts and texts itself must be investigated and itself reconstructed. To put it differently, a significant segment of early Church history must be reconstructed in the guise of, and by means of, textual criticism. With this form of textual criticism, in other word, the Gnostic implications of the Augustinian Hellenization resurfaces with full force, as a total technique for the manipulation of the text in the service of a preconceived dialectical structure.

But since the traditional New Testament text is itself both a product and a source of that larger tradition, to reject it is precisely to reject Christian tradition as a controlling factor in the textual critical process, and to replace it with something else. The “something else” is the theory itself.

At this juncture, Wescott and Hort offer some reassurance:
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The proportion of words virtually accepted on all hands as raised above doubt is very great, no less, on a rough computation, than seven eighths of the whole. The remaining eighth therefore, formed in great party by changes of order and other comparative trivialities, constitutes the whole area of criticism. If the principles followed in the present edition are sound, this area may be very greatly reduced.985

With this anesthetic administered, they are now in a position to state the most important principle of their theory: that the transmission of accurate copies of the New Testament text occurs in a completely natural manner, a manner no different from the transmission of any other ancient text.

The originals must have been early lost, for they are mentioned by no ecclesiastical writer, although there were many motives for appealing to them, had they been forthcoming, in the second and third centuries: one or two passages have sometimes been supposed to refer to them, but certainly by a misinterpretation. The books of the New Testament have had to share the fate of other ancient writings in being copied again and again during more than fourteen centuries down to the invention of printing and its application to Greek literature.986

With this assertion, any attempt to rely on the assumption of the accurate preservation of authentic copies (apographa) of the New Testament text have been laid aside, and a different premise put in its place, that of the quest for reconstructing the original, and probably irrecoverable, autographs (autographa). With this assertion, the whole basis of the Christian tradition is itself shrouded with the fog of uncertainty, an uncertainty that can only be dispelled by the Gnostic illumination of their theory itself. The passing reference to the early Christian Fathers and other ecclesiastical writers may seem offhand and incidental to their point, but it is in fact an important component of the new assumption they wish to enthrone.

The principle of uncertainty, set free of the guidance of tradition,
must now be applied uniformly. Hence, the next principle is simply to extend the naturalistic assumptions of textual transmission by means of a familiar illustration:

When the transcript becomes itself the parent of other copies, one or more, its errors are for the most part reproduced. Those only are likely to be removed which at once strike the eye of a transcriber as mere blunders destructive of sense, and even in these cases, he will often go astray in making what seems to him the obvious correction. In addition to inherited deviations from the original, each fresh transcript is liable to contain fresh errors, to be transmitted in like manner to its own descendants. 987

These leads to the next principle, as the logic of naturalist assumptions of textual transmission works itself out:

...repeated transcription involves multiplication of error; and the consequent presumption that a relatively late text is likely to be a relatively corrupt text is found true on the application of all available tests in an overwhelming proportion of the extant (manuscripts) in which ancient literature has been preserved. 988

Thus, one may derive the convenient formula, “late manuscript equals error-prone manuscript”, because the text of the New Testament has undergone the same process of textual decay as any other document.

This last observation compels some comment, for it means that insofar as Wescott and Hort (or anyone assuming the transmission of the New Testament text along naturalist lines) are able to conceive of biblical inspiration, this must be confined to the original autographs themselves, and not to the preservation in the copies of an accurate and authentic text of those autographs. And with this comes another corollary, that, if this assumption be allied with High Church ecclesiology, the Church had sufficient inspiration to preserve Christian doctrine, but not the texts on
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which it is founded; and on the Low, Liberal or Evangelical views, since the Church was not sufficient inspiration to determine doctrinal tradition, it certainly was not of sufficient inspiration to preserve Scriptural tradition. Wescott and Hort’s “theory”, in other words, is a wholesale assault, in the guise of critical science, on the pillars of Christianity: Scripture, the Church, and the ecclesiastical tradition, or, in short, text, community, and interpretation.

The assumption of the early Church’s “laxity” as regards textual transmission follows inevitably from the above implications.

The reverence paid to the apostolic writings, even to the most highly and most widely venerated among them, was not of a kind that exacted a scrupulous jealousy as to their text as distinguished from their substance... After a while changed feelings and changed circumstances put an end to the early textual laxity, and thenceforward its occurrence is altogether exceptional; so that the later corruptions are almost wholly those incident to transcription in the proper sense, errors arising from careless performance of a scribe’s work, not from an imperfect conception of it.

With this statement of general principles, Wescott and Hort are in a position to deal with the most troubling bit of textual critical evidence, the fact that the overwhelming majority of extant manuscripts and versions evidence a type of text that is both stable and uniform, distributed over both a vast geographical area and great amount of time, a text which preserved a remarkable tendency not only to doctrinal orthodoxy, but whose existence challenged the naturalist assumptions on which they constructed modern textual criticism. How, then, do they account for this fact? It is one of the most remarkable cases of scholarly subterfuge ever undertaken, and in order to understand it, a more detailed examination of the particulars of their theory is in order.
5. The Particulars of Wescott and Hort’s Theory

The key method in Wescott and Hort’s naturalist textual critical arsenal is the genealogical. By this method, an explanation for the phenomenon of the majority text is advanced, and coincidentally, much of early Christian history rewritten.

The first way to account for the phenomenon is to assume that the majority text is the result of a process of conflation, whereby many variant readings are compiled and “strung together” or conflated.

Manuscripts are written in which there is an eclectic fusion of the texts of different exemplars, either by the simultaneous use of more than one at the time of transcription, or by the incorporation of various readings noted in the margin of a single exemplar from other copies, or by a scribe’s conscious or unconscious recollections of a text differing from that which lies before him… Within narrow geographical areas it was doubtless at work from a very early time, and it would naturally extend itself with the increase of communication between distant churches. There is reason to suspect that its greatest activity on a large scale began in the second half of the third century, the interval of peace between Gallenius’ edict of toleration and the outbreak of the last persecution. 990

Of necessity, then, the majority text cannot be the earliest text, and therefore the authentic text, for according to the theory, it exhibits “conflation”. This cannot be lingered over too long, for it means nothing less than the fact that from roughly the third or fourth century, until the nineteenth and the advent of Wescott and Hort themselves, the Church, East and West, Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox, were relying on New Testament texts that are prima facie unreliable and unauthentic:

The gain or loss to the intrinsic purity of texts from mixture with other texts is from the nature of the case indeterminable. In most cases there would be both gain and loss; but both would be fortuitous, and they might bear
to each other every conceivable proportion. *Textual purity, as far as can be judged from the extant literature, attracted hardly any interest.*

What guided this mixture? No concern for textual purity or doctrinal content. Rather,

the only influence which can have interfered to an appreciable extent with mere chance and convenience in the selection between existing readings, or in the combination of them, was supplied by the preferences of untrained popular taste…

In other words, Wescott and Hort assume that the guiding principle in the alleged gradual conflation and mixture that accounts for the majority text is nothing more than popular sentiment.

These propositions may now be stated in terms of the textual details of their theory:

1. The main positions of Hort were “there are no signs of deliberate falsification of the text for dogmatic purposes.

2. “Witnesses [manuscripts] are not to be counted individually, but grouped by the genealogical method.

3. “This method gives three (main) ancestral types: Syrian, Western, and Neutral (Alexandrian).

4. “The Syrian text, though represented by a majority of [manuscripts] is inferior because:

   a. it is a late text, the result of authoritative revisions completed about 350 A.D.;

   b. its characteristic readings are not found in texts or quotations before that date; and

   c. it was ‘conflated’ from the other two,” that is, is the result of an editorial process which utilizes passages form the other two
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manuscript traditions;

5. “Judged by internal criteria, then, the Western text, however early, is an edited text and inferior to the Neutral tradition.

6. “The Neutral text, headed by B and Aleph, is close to the original.”

At this point, Wescott and Hort’s theory itself steps in to offer an explanation as to why these manuscripts were previously neglected: they were neglected because, in the uncritical age of the early church, their was no scientific perception that they might be valuable. In stating this, the theory again exhibits its utterly naturalistic assumptions, for it could equally be true that they were rejected precisely because they were perceived as having been corruptions of received texts and doctrines.

To put this point differently: it is entirely possible that there are no significant numbers of extant manuscripts of the Majority text simply because they were in such constant use, and prone to much more wear than the unused, neglected manuscripts on which the theory is built. And if this be the case, then one is forced back on the question of why these manuscripts were used, while Wescott and Hort’s preferred manuscripts remained unused and outside the mainstream textual tradition. It remained for “science” to recover the “true” importance of these neglected manuscripts:

Even Griesbach was content to start from the traditional or revised Erasmian basis, rather than from the manuscripts in which he himself reposed most confidence.

A new period began in 1831, when for the first time a text was constructed directly from the ancient documents without the intervention of any printed edition, and when the first systematic attempt was made to substitute scientific method for arbitrary choice in the discrimination of various readings... This great advance was however marred by too narrow a selection of documents to be taken into account and too
Furthermore, “These facts justify, we think, another attempt to determine the original words of the Apostles and writers of the New Testament.” The raw data which confronted them in this task was enormous.

It is worth reflecting at this point on the relationship between the cosmological, Christological, and textual critical assumptions that may have been at work.

Assuming that Resurrections and Ascensions cannot happen because there is, to employ a “Hume-ian” convention, a “uniform, universal experience against miracle”, the Western Omissions would constitute an opportunity for critics to reject the Byzantine readings in favor of the Western omissions for just such reasons. The cumulative effect of the Western Omissions and a critic’s acceptance of them is devastating:

The omission of these eight readings in the Revised Standard Version and the New English Bible is certainly not a matter that can be taken lightly, for it means, as far as these two modern versions can make it so, that all reference to the atoning work of Christ has been eliminated from Luke’s account of the Lord’s Supper, and that the Ascension into heaven has been entirely removed from the Gospels, Mark’s account of the Ascension having already been rejected by the critics.

With this, one may detect the tactic of “quietly dropping” those portions of things which do not accord with the metaphysic.

A. *The Particular Methods of Wescott and Hort and Subsequent Criticism utilized in Arriving at The Rejections of Select New Testament Passages*

What now follows is a synopsis of the methods of textual criticism
as explained by Wescott and Hort, in their own words, and in the general order in which they present them. While it is readily acknowledged that some of the methods have been significantly modified by other scholars, it must also be acknowledged that this modification has occurred precisely because of the inadequacies of the original theory. What has not been modified are the initial presuppositions: the rejection of the Majority Text, the naturalist assumptions of the transmission of the text, and the rejection of supernational and providential preservation of the authentic text in and by the Church as the most crucial component of Her tradition.

In formulating these methods, Wescott and Hort observe:

Every method of textual criticism corresponds to some one class of textual facts: the best criticism is that which takes account of every class of textual facts, and assigns to each method its proper use and rank. The leading principles of textual criticism are identical for all writings whatever. Differences in application arise only from differences in the amount, variety, and quality of evidence. The more obvious facts naturally attract attention first; and it is only at a further stage of study that any one is likely spontaneously to grasp those more fundamental facts from which textual criticism must start if it is to reach comparative certainty. We propose to follow here this natural order, according to which the higher methods will come last into view.

The first principle is that of Uncertainty, or what Wescott and Hort call “Probability”. There are two kinds of probability, Intrinsic, and Transcriptional.

B. Intrinsic and Transcriptional Probability

Internal evidence of Readings is of two kinds, which cannot be too sharply distinguished from each other; appealing respectively to Intrinsic Probability, having reference to the author, and what may be called Transcriptional Probability, having reference to the copyists. In appealing
to the first, we ask what an author is likely to have written: in appealing to
the second, we ask what copyists are likely to have made him seem to
write. Both these kinds of evidence are alike in the strictest sense
internal, since they are alike derived exclusively from comparison of any
relative antecedent creditability of the actual witnesses. 999

It is to intrinsic probability that the critic’s first impulse is to turn. In
determining this, the critic must rely on “the various elements which go to
make up what is called sense”, including “conformity to grammar” and “the
purport of the rest of the sentence and of the larger context”, the latter of
which rightly includes “congruity to the usual style of the author and to his
matter in other passages.” 1000

What is the value of such probability? That depends on who is
using it.

The value of the Intrinsic Evidence of Readings should of course be
estimated by its best and most cultivated form, for the extemporaneous
surmises of an ordinary untrained reader will differ widely from the range
of probabilities present to the mind of a scholar prepared both by general
training in the analysis of texts and by special study of the facts bearing
on the particular case. But in dealing with this kind of evidence equally
competent critics often arrive at contradictory conclusions as to the same
variations. 1001

Such a clumsy knife must be sharpened if the textual critical surgery
necessary for the recovery of the text is to be successful, and for this
sharpening, the whetstone of transcriptional probability is needed.

The next step in criticism is the discovery of Transcriptional Probability,
and is suggested by the reflection that what attracts ourselves is not on
the average unlikely to have attracted transcribers. 1002 If one variant
reading appears to ourselves as to give much better sense or in some
other way to excel another, the same apparent superiority may have led
to the introduction of the reading in the first instance. Mere blunders
apart, no motive can be thought of which could lead a scribe to introduce consciously a worse reading in place of a better.\textsuperscript{1003} We might thus seem to be landed in the paradoxical result that intrinsic inferiority is evidence of originality.\textsuperscript{1004}

It is crucial to observe what Wescott and Hort have actually stated here, and to compare it with what has already been said about the early Gnostic and Marcionite handling of the text of the New Testament Scriptures, for what they are actually saying is that those readings which favour the “late” readings of the orthodox majority text are not original, and that the most original readings are those which tend not to favour orthodoxy.

\textit{C. Crude vs. “Scientific” Statements of Probability}

This is but a crude statement of Transcriptional Probability. A more accurate way of stating it is to say that it is “not directly or properly concerned with the relative excellence of rival readings, but merely with the relative fitness of each for explaining the existence of others.”\textsuperscript{1005}

\textit{D. Dialectics}

In order to understand the role of dialectics in the formulation of the Wescott-Hort hypothesis, one must turn to the history of the debate between the Protestant Reformers and the Roman Catholic Church over the relationship of Scripture and tradition. This process undergoes four steps. The first step is the formulation of the \textit{sola Scriptura} itself by the Reformers. As we saw previously, by so doing, the Reformers took the initiative, forcing the Roman Church to define itself. The second step is the Roman Catholic response itself, formulated at Trent, that Scripture and Tradition constitute two separate sources of authority in the Church. The third step takes place when Roman Catholic scholars, in the aftermath of Trent, bring up the fact that the Protestant \textit{sola Scriptura} contains
variations, i.e., that it is based on a manuscript tradition which itself contains variations, some differing widely from others. This potent observation in turn forced the Protestant scholastics to define their position with more accuracy. It no longer sufficed simply to cite sola Scriptura. They were now forced to declare themselves in favor of one or another manuscript tradition of that Scripture. The dialectical element is in evidence, for the process “dramatizes the antithesis between these two positions. Both parties have been forced to their logical conclusions. And neither party can be fully comprehended without seeing both its positive thesis, plus its defensive clarification of that thesis.”1006 This clarification receives a detailed exposition in the works of the Calvinist John Owen.

The essence of the Protestant clarification was that one manuscript tradition, that of the majority of manuscripts, or the Byzantine text type, was providentially preserved. John Owen states that there are twelve aspects to this preservation.

1. The providence of God watching over His Word as “the most glorious product of His wisdom and goodness,” because of His “promise and purpose”, is the presupposed premise of all the other propositions.

2. The religious care of the church (the “Romish synagogue” excluded) existed among those to whom the oracles of God were committed.

3. The very first transcribers used care in making the first copies from the originals (these were the authors themselves), “unto many” and provided a precedent for other transcribers.

4. By multiplying copies “to such a number that it was impossible any should corrupt them all, willfully or by negligence.” (sic.)

5. Both the Jewish synagogue as well as the Christian assemblies used “reverence and diligence” in preserving “authentic copies.”

6. The frequency of the reading of Scripture by “all sorts of persons” provided a familiarity with the wording of texts that alterations would have been easily detected.
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7. Those who studied, especially Hebrews, were conscious of every letter of the texts.

8. Ezra and his associates took care to assure that the correct Old Testament texts were restored to the people of Israel.

9. The care of the Masoretes. (sic.)

10. The unanimity of Old Testament readings in the Mishnah, Gemara, and the Talmud, with the Masoretic Text. (sic.)

11. Jesus did not once accuse the Jews of corrupting their copies, but, rather, assumed their purity.

12. The checks and balances that the Jews and Christians provided for each other in preventing corruption (sic.).

Owen’s propositions, from an ecclesiological standpoint, raise as many questions as they answer. But these ecclesiological questions serve to highlight the significant fact that no textual criticism whatsoever is “neutral” or even “lower” criticism. The historical background to the debate makes it impossible that it should be. All textual decisions presuppose certain philosophical, ecclesiological, and historical commitments.

At this point, the “scientificity” of Transcriptional Probability stands in dialectical relationship with the more intangible nature of Intrinsic Probability.

The true nature of the difficulty will be best explained by a few words on the mutual relations of the two classes of internal evidence, by which it will likewise be seen what a valuable ancillary office they discharge in combination… with the exception of pure blunders, readings originating with scribes must always at the time have combined the appearance of improvement with the absence of its reality. If they had not been plausible, they would have not existed: yet their excellence must have been either superficial or partial, and the balance of inward and essential excellence must lie against them. In itself therefore Transcriptional probability not only stands in no antagonism to Intrinsic probability, but is its sustaining compliment. It is seen in its proper and normal shape when
both characteristics of a scribe’s correction can alike be recognised the semblance of superiority and the latent inferiority.\textsuperscript{1008}

But if it followed that in ancient times, “with the exception of pure blunders, readings originated with scribes must always at the time have combined the appearance of improvement with the absence of its reality”, then what is to prevent the same principle from being applied to Wescott and Hort themselves? This principle, in other words, is self-refuting, for the “Uncertainty Principle” of textual transmission in turn swallows up the attempts of modern scribes to improve the text, which are shown to be only one more corrupting transmission to a process which, on naturalist assumptions, makes each generation of transmission more corrupt. How much more so, then, when the process of transmission is turned into a process of scholarly recovery and criticism? Thus, the more criticism such as that of Wescott and Hort and their progeny grows, the more uncertain and confusing the text is bound to become. In short, the critics, having injected themselves into the process of recovering the text have also injected themselves into the process of its transmission, and therefore, according to their own principles, of the corruption of the text, for according to the theory, transmission is corruption.

\textit{E. The Hidden Assumption Variant Readings = Different Documents: JEDP Revisited}

Here one approaches the keystone in the arch of skeptical criticism, that of the confusion of readings with manuscripts.

It would be a long litany indeed to cite every example of every instance in a seminary or an academy where the majority text’s readings were neatly dispatched with the statement that there are no extant manuscripts of such readings prior to the middle of the fourth century.\textsuperscript{1009} Save for one lone voice in the nineteenth century (about whom more
later), no one seemed to have noticed the flaw: readings and manuscripts are not the same things. Absence of extant manuscripts of the Majority text from earlier than the fourth century does not logically imply that the readings themselves were not in existence or not in use at or prior to that time. This rather graphically highlights the purely subjective nature of the Wescott-Hort theory itself, not to mention it basis in a logical and metaphysical confusion. According to the theory, readings in manuscripts of the second century must spring from earlier exemplars which are no longer extant, but the readings of the Byzantine text type must not, in order for the theory to work. Byzantine text type readings therefore must spring from some process of conflation of existing manuscripts, otherwise, on the assumptions of the theory, they too could reflect earlier exemplars which are no longer extant.

Why, then, has this logical non sequitur become almost an axiom for most products of the seminaries? Because Wescott and Hort said so:

Yet a moment’s consideration of the process of transmission shews how precarious it is to attempt to judge which of two or more readings is the most likely to be right, without considering which of the attesting documents or combinations of documents are the most likely to convey an unadulterated transcript of the original text; in other words, in dealing with matter purely traditional, to ignore the relative antecedent credibility of witnesses, and trust exclusively to our own inward power of singling out the true readings from among their counterfeits, wherever we see them… The first step towards obtaining a sure foundation is a consistent application of a the principle that KNOWLEDGE OF DOCUMENTS SHOULD PRECEDE FINAL JUDGEMENT READINGS.¹⁰¹⁰

Thus, one arrives at an interesting conclusion: through a route vastly different, but founded upon the same skepticism regarding the received text of Scripture as that operative for the higher criticism of the Old Testament, Wescott and Hort have arrived at the formula that the relative

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integrity and antiquity of documents indicate the relative antiquity and integrity of readings. Where there are no documents, there can have been no readings; Documents=Readings.

For Hermann Hupfeld, differences of diction indicated different underlying source documents. For critics after Graf-Wellhausen, differences in diction between Genesis One and Two indicated not only different, and no longer extant, source documents, but two contradictory Creation accounts as well. For Wescott and Hort, operating with the same basic methodological assumption, the reverse is true, different extant documents indicate different readings. But since there existed no extant document with a Majority text reading earlier than their favoured manuscript (Codex Siniaticus), then the readings could not have existed in an earlier time, but are later corruptions.

F. The Characteristics of Documents

In this critical Sitz im Leben, the characteristics of different documents assume enormous importance. “Continuous study” of the whole of a given document and an accurate cataloging of its features by comparison with other documents “alone supplies entirely trustworthy knowledge as to the relative value of different documents.” Thus, it is necessary “to observe and discriminate the classes of clerical errors by which their proper texts are severally disguised.”

G. Documentary Mixture

How then to account for the fact that the readings of the Majority text exhibit not only “clean” readings, but readings which are in some cases longer or grammatically more difficult? Wescott and Hort attempt to explain this by assuming that such readings result from a combination of two underlying readings which exist in earlier manuscripts.
A third and especially important loss of homogeneity occurs wherever the transmission of a writing has been much affected by what we have called mixture, the irregular combination into a single text of two or more texts belonging to different lines of transmission. Where books scattered in two or more copies are transcribed continuously into a single document, the use of different exemplars is successive: here it is simultaneous. In this case the individuality, so to speak, of each mixed document is divided, and each element has its own characteristics; so that we need to know to which element of the document any given reading belongs, before we can tell what authority the reading derives from its attestation by the document. Such knowledge evidently cannot be furnished by the document itself; but, as we shall see presently, it may often be obtained through combinations of documents.\textsuperscript{1013}

With this principle in hand, Wescott and Hort are now free to construct a theory of the history of the relationships of the various documents:

There is evidently no way through the chaos of complex attestation which thus confronts us except by going back to its causes, that is, by enquiring what antecedent circumstances of transmission will account for such combinations of agreements and differences between the several documents as we find actually existing. In other words, we are led to the necessity of investigating not only individual documents and their characteristics, but yet more the mutual relations of documents.\textsuperscript{1014}

This leads to the next stone in the arch, the Genealogical Method.

\textbf{H. The History of Texts and Textual Restoration: The Genealogical Method}

The first step, as was seen, “was taken by ceasing to treat Readings independently of each other, and examining them connectedly in series, each series being furnished by one of the several Documents in which they are found.” The second necessitates that Documents can no
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longer be treated “independently of each other”, but insists upon “examining them connectedly as parts of a single whole in virtue of their historical relationships.”\textsuperscript{1015} It is necessary to stress Wescott and Hort’s word “single”, for it means that all documents, regardless of their doctrinal differences, are to be treated as if they sprang from the same ultimate source document. Thus, at a single stroke, the entire early history of the Church and its struggle with Gnosticism and other heresies is rendered useless to the task of discernment. The possibility of several original source documents, some tainted, some not, never enters consideration, for that, of course, would throw the whole enterprise back to a consideration of doctrine, and that would not be “scientific”! Quite the converse, all extant documents are fragments “of a genealogical tree of transmission.”\textsuperscript{1016} Wescott and Hort are even more emphatic.

\textit{It may be laid down emphatically, as a second principle, that ALL TRUSTWORTHY RESTORATION OF CORRUPTED TEXTS IS FOUND ON THE STUDY OF THEIR HISTORY, that is, of the relations of descent or affinity which connect the several documents.} \textsuperscript{1017}

If this be the case, then what is the value of a textual critical theory of the history and relationship of documents which ignores the fact that both orthodoxy and heresy are present from the beginning?

\textit{I. The Effect of the Genealogical Method: The Majority Text}

Wescott and Hort’s own words on the effects of the Genealogical Method on the vast majority of manuscripts, i.e., the Majority, or Traditional Text, cannot be improved upon:

\textit{It is hardly necessary to point out that the total change in the bearing of the evidence here made by the introduction of the factor of genealogy. Apart from genealogy, the one (manuscript) becomes easily overborne by}
the nine; and it would be trusted against their united testimony only when upheld by strong internal evidence, and then manifestly at great risk. But if it is found that the nine had a common original, they sink jointly to a numerical authority not greater than that of the one; nay rather less, for that one is known absolutely, while the last copy is known only approximately. Where for want of sufficiently clear evidence, or for any other reason, the simplification of pedigree cannot be carried thus far, still very approximation to an exhibition of their actual historical relations presents them in a truer light for the purposes of textual criticism than their enumeration in their existing form as so many separate units… It would be difficult to insist too strongly on the transformation of the superficial aspects of numerical authority thus affected by recognition of Genealogy. In the crude shape in which numerical authority is often presented, it rests on no better foundation than a vague transference of associations connected with majorities of voices, this natural confusion being aided perhaps by the application of the convenient and in itself harmless term ‘authorities’ to documents. No one doubts that some documents are better than others, and that therefore numerical preponderance may have rightly to yield to a qualitative preponderance.

J. The Effect of the Genealogical Method: The “Minority” Text

This only serves to dethrone the Traditional text and put in its place a “minority” text, for “as soon as the numbers of a minority exceed what can be explained by accidental coincidence, so that their agreement in error, if it be error, can only be explained on genealogical grounds, we have thereby passed beyond purely numerical relations, and the necessity of examining the genealogy of both minority and majority has become apparent.”

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K. Genealogy and Mixture

But the mere fact of the vast numerical preponderance of the manuscripts of the Majority text is not the only problem which Genealogy and Mixture dispense with. There is also the worrisome fact that the traditional text type's manuscripts exist in such wide geographical distribution. Conflated readings or mixture allies itself with the genealogical method very conveniently at this point:

Whenever mixture has intervened, we have no security that the more complex arrays of existing documents point to the more ancient ramifications: they may just as easily be results of a wide extension given comparatively late by favourable circumstances to readings which previously had only a narrow distribution. Conversely, a present narrowness of distribution need not be a mark of relatively recent divergence: it may as easily be the only surviving relic of an ancient supremacy of distribution now almost obliterated by the invasion of mixture. This is of course a somewhat extreme case, but it is common enough: as a matter of fact, mixture is found to operate on every scale, from the smallest to the largest. 1020

L. In Search of “O”, by Arguing in a Circle

The search for the Original Autograph, “O”, is thus to be undertaken by utilizing the Genealogical method itself to detect mixture, and to reconstruct the earlier documents which do not exist, on the basis of the readings thus detected:

The proper method of Genealogy consists… in the more or less complete recovery of the texts of successive ancestors by analysis and comparison of the varying texts of their respective descendants, each ancestral text so recovered being in its turn used, in conjunction with other similar texts, for the recovery of the text of a yet earlier common ancestor. 1021
It is important to observe quite carefully what has now happened and what is not being advocated. The theory began by assuming that documents and readings are identical. On that basis, the Traditional text cannot be the earliest text, since 1) there are no extant documents of this text prior to the earliest codices such as Siniaticus; and since 2) the Traditional text is “obviously” the product of conflation and mixture, a necessarily late product of the process of textual transmission.

Therefore, an attempt must be made to reconstruct earlier documents on the basis of the earliest extant readings of the codices. This is the task of criticism. But note what Wescott and Hort go on to say, for on the basis of these critically reconstructed earlier documents, the critical task then utilizes these documents to posit yet other, still earlier, and therefore, more authentic, reconstructions of the text! With this brazen stroke, criticism not only empowers itself and its practitioners as the means for the recovery of the text, but also as the primary means for its perpetual and continued transmission. But since each critically constructed text only approaches the asymptomatic limits of the original text, the process must repeat itself definitely. Yet, with each revolution of the critical process, the text changes. With that, there is no transmission of the text, but only the perpetual modification of the hypothetical relationship of the documentary data; the idea of the text and its transmission is therefore lost. With this, the critical enterprise collapses, for it is in fact arguing in a circle. Its sole effect is merely to empower its practitioners in the academy, and to leave the Church concussed with a barrage of Bibles, each different from the others according to the critical text “recovered” and then translated.

M. Conflate Readings and the Integrity of Documents

It is evident from the foregoing that yet another familiar assumption underlies the enterprise, namely, that the documents recovered by
criticism “have integrity”, i.e., the critical reconstructed texts which result from the theory, even though there be no extant manuscript to support it, are simply assumed to be accurate approximations of what must have been the original autographs. With this, the similarity to Hupfeld’s assertions of the integrity of the documents recovered in Old Testament criticism is all too apparent, and the reasoning no less circular.

N. When All Else Fails: Invent New Terms, or “Emendation By Conjecture”

Wescott and Hort reserve until last their comments on Conjectural Emendation, i.e., when all else fails to remove of the readings of the Traditional text, the critic may resort to supplying readings which, on the basis of the state of critical theory at any given time, seem the most plausible.\textsuperscript{1022} The end product of all of this theory has already been stated: in the Revised Version of 1881, the cumulative effects of these methods served only to undermine key doctrinal elements of Christian faith, since the New Testament passages upon which they were based were relegated to the footnote apparatus.

What is remarkable is that in this situation, when Wescott and Hort propose their theory, is that within the ecclesiastical and academic structures of the Second Europe, most traditionalists, and almost all modernists, hastened to embrace the theory and its techniques for widely different reasons: the neo-traditionalists, because it seemed to afford them a sure and certain apologetical method in defense of their several confessional orthodoxies, and the Modernists because it represented an apparent advance towards the scientific appropriation of the Scriptures. For both, however, there was the high price that the original New Testament text was lost, and probably irrevocable. There were only approximate and, in Deistic fashion, \textit{probable} approaches to it. And this brings us to the philosophical heart of Wescott and Hort’s theory, which
may be summarized in three propositions: (1) textual criticism must assume complete neutrality as regards all variant readings; (2) no textual family is therefore a providentially preserved copy of the original text; (3) it is therefore impossible to ascertain the quality of any extant manuscript family on the basis of the doctrine it contains nor of the number of manuscripts within a type. The primary criterion is therefore that of the age of the manuscript. In practice, however, Wescott and Hort for various reasons assumed in practice, as did Griesbach, that orthodoxy did deliberately alter the text, and the heresies did not.\footnote{1022a}

Wescott and Hort’s “neutralism” has led to the phenomenon of Modernist twentieth century New Testament textual criticism known as “eclecticism”, the skepticism of which is aptly summarized by K.W. Clark: “Great progress has been achieved... in recovering an early form of the text, but it may be doubted that there is evidence of one original text to be recovered.” Textual criticism, in other words, has reached an impasse; scholarship has failed to come to any consensus save that consensus of prejudice against the Byzantine text type.\footnote{1024} With this “new ‘consensus’” around Baconian and Enlightenment rationalistic presuppositions, “the Protestant text consensus collapsed.”\footnote{1025}

And what of the “traditionalists” who embraced Wescott and Hort’s philosophy? One such – Dr. Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield, a professor of theology at Princeton and one of the so-called founders of the Princeton “fundamentalism” – wishing to embrace both the new criticism and the traditional doctrine of inspiration of Scripture, posited the doctrine of the infallible, verbal, plenary inspiration of the original New testament autographs, thus seemingly preserving Protestant orthodoxy, and yet opening wide the door to wholly naturalist textual criticism of the extant copies, upon which the critic could operate with impunity, since they were not inspired. In effect, Warfield viewed the skeptical-neutralist criticism of Wescott and Hort was “God’s means of restoring the true text.” He thus “shifted from the notion of providential \textit{preservation} to one of providential
restoration in the new text of Wescott and Hort.” And what of Burgon in Warfield’s view? He “accused Burgon (and Edward Miller, Burgon’s coadjutor) of appealing to Providence to legitimize a text that rested on “ecclesiastical authority”, while conveniently ignoring the fact that, implicit in all neutralist assumptions was a similar appeal to providence. The effect of Warfield’s redefinition of inspiration upon Protestantism in America has been enormous, for it meant for those denominations willing to embrace it that they could replace the authorized King James Version of Scriptures, based on a close approximation to the Byzantine text type and in all but universal use in English-speaking Protestant churches, with version of the Scripture based on critical reconstructions of the text, reconstructions in turn based on a philosophy of criticism entirely at variance with their own orthodoxy. If one seeks an explanation of why once “conservative” churches such as the Disciples of Christ or the Episcopal seem inexplicably to have lost their direction and bearings, that is it. Warfield was not deaf to the dangers that his reinterpretation of inspiration posed, and sought to intercept potential critics of his view by maintaining that “providential preservation” of the text meant precisely the rise of textual criticism as a science for reconstructing the text, particularly in the form advocated by Wescott and Hort! He did not notice that this meant nothing less than that Christians had for nineteenth centuries been operating with a wildly inaccurate and unauthentic scripture.

Warfield’s approach did something more. Persuading everyone “within the old Princeton tradition that his apologetic techniques would place Scripture forever beyond the reach of antagonistic critics,” he in fact allowed the process of criticism to proceed unimpeded. Once one abandons the ecclesiastical preservation of the text for the critical recovery of the text, one is forced to admit that any “recovery” is at best an approximation. With this, one has placed the text, and to that extent, the Christian faith, beyond the bound of history, for only this will make it immune to attack. But by making it immune to attack, one also makes it
impossible to defend reasonably. The parallels with the motivations behind the promulgation of Papal Infallibility at approximately the same point in history and for the same reasons is hardly accidental. The issue, in short, is not really textual critical, but ecclesiological: is either tradition correct in its reception of the text, the interpretations drawn from it, and the methods used to draw them, for both sides in the debate, at some point in their history, have begun to treat Scripture as if it were "any other book", the Roman Catholics doing so after the Council of Trent by pointing to the existence of variations in the textual data and the proffered extra-Scriptural tradition as the resolution of the problem.

The essence of the critique of the foregoing development lies, then, in its perception that the fundamental issue is not over the existence of certain classes of evidence, but over whether the neutralist method of criticism, with all of its naturalistic corollaries, was in fact a correct method for Christian scholars. Any critique of the enterprise will thus hinge upon attacking the theory at its pressure points:

1. Its identification of readings and documents;
2. Its assumption of a common genealogical tree;
3. Its assumption of the corollary that if there be a common genealogical tree, all manuscripts are to be viewed not for the quality and content of their doctrine, but primarily in terms of their age and proximity to the uncorrupted original autographs;
4. Its assumption that the New Testament manuscripts are like the manuscripts of any other book, and suffer the same sorts of decay over time.
5. Its assumption that all alterations of textual readings are merely innocent and scribal in nature, and not the deliberate and malicious attempt to corrupt the text for other ends.

The essence of the critique is that there is more than one genealogical
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tree, and that the manuscripts upon which the whole of Wescott and Hort’s theory and its subsequent modifications are based on corrupted manuscripts, and that there is a providentially preserved text of Scripture, itself a component of a providentially preserved Church and a means of the Church’s preservation.1029

6. Burgon’s Patristic Critique of Wescott-Hort and the Second Europe’s Silence

Almost as soon as its appearance, Wescott and Hort’s theory and the 1881 Revised Version of the Bible which was its issue called forth a torrent of withering and unanswerable criticism of its underlying principles. The trouble was, the torrent came mostly from only one man, John W. Burgon, Dean of Chichester cathedral and an Anglican priest of decidedly Anglo-Catholic sympathies. In him was combined the Low Churchman’s high view of Scripture and the Anglo-Catholic’s high view of Scripture and the Anglo-Catholic’s high view of the Church, and behind both was a razor-sharp intellect, a vast and scholarly knowledge of Scripture and the Church Fathers in the original languages, and a lively facility for polemics.

Fr. Burgon’s critique of the Wescott-Hort theory was at root philosophical, though every minute detail of the Wescott-Hort critical text was also subjected to careful scrutiny, and found wanting. Unfortunately, so voluminous was Fr. Burgon’s output, that no attempt will be made here to examine the details of his critique. Attention must be focused on his critique of the fundamental assumptions undergirding the Wescott-Hort theory. Burgon’s work was delivered in several treatises: The Traditional Text of the New Testament, The Causes of the Corruption of the Holy Gospels, The Last twelve Verses of the Gospel of Mark, The Revision Revised, God manifested in the Flesh, The Woman Taken in Adultery, The Secret Spanking of Wescott and Hort, and Conflation and the
“Neutral” Text.

The point of departure for Burgon is the analogy of faith: the textual criticism of the New Testament is not like that of any other book because of its inspiration and preservation. While critics of the Wescott and Hort school pointed to the complaint of Jerome that copyists “write down not what they find, but what they think is the meaning; and while they attempt to rectify the errors of others, they merely expose their own” as evidence of early and widespread corruption, Burgon’s methodology from the outset opposed to this approach:

There exists no reason for supposing that the Divine Agent, who in the first instance thus gave to mankind the Scriptures of Truth, straightway abdicated His office; took no further care of His work; abandoned those precious writings to their fate. That a perpetual miracle was wrought for their preservation— that copyists were protected against the risk of error, or evil men prevented from shamefully adulterating copies of the Deposit— no one, it is presumed, is so weak as to suppose. But it is a quite different thing to claim that all down the ages the sacred writings must have been God’s peculiar care; that the Church under Him has watched over them with intelligence and skill; has recognized which copies exhibit a fabricated, which an honestly transcribed text; has generally sanctioned the one, and generally disallowed the other.\textsuperscript{1030}

It is the absence of this perspective of faith which, for Burgon, means that the type of criticism advocated by Wescott and Hort is utterly unable to come to any firm textual conclusion, since the doctrinal basis for discernment between various readings is absent.

In order to convey the devastating effects that Wescott and Hort’s theory has on the text, relying as it does on a few early manuscripts and not the vast majority of Traditional manuscripts of later date, Burgon resorts to a humorous device to illustrate the effect of their reliance on Codices Siniaticus and Vaticanus to someone unacquainted with all the
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minutiae of varying readings which they contain:

Could ingenuity have devised a more severe satire than such a description of four professing transcripts of a book, and that book the everlasting Gospel itself? These transcripts now are even used to rely on implicitly for the very spelling of proper names, the spelling of common words, the minutiae of grammar. What would be thought of four such diverse copies of Shakespeare? Imagine that anyone would propose with the aid of four such conflicting documents to readjust the text of the funeral oration of Pericles, or to re-edit Hamlet. Why, some of the poet’s most familiar lines would cease to be recognizable. For example: (Codex Alexandrinus) might read Toby or not Toby; that is the question. (Codex Vaticanus) might read: Tob or not, is the question. (Codex Siniaticus) might read: To be a tub, or not to be a tub; the question is that. (Codex Ephraemi rescriptus) might read The question is, to beat, or not to beat Toby. (Codex Bezae) might read: The only question is this, to beat that Toby, or to be a tub?

In the main, however, Burgon confines his remarks to a more serious tone.

Burgon begins with a brief history of textual criticism in the period immediately prior to Wescott and Hort’s Revised Version of 1881 by observing the subjective and tentative nature of textual criticism. No less than Tischendorff, the discoverer of the fourth century Codex Siniaticus, lynchpin of the Westcott-Hort theory, was subject to sweeping reversals over a short period of time of his own positions. Burgon observes that his “last two editions differ from one another in no less than 3,572 particulars. He reverses in every page in 1872 what in 1859 he offered as the result of his deliberate judgement.” Burgon then notes the pivotal role of Westcott and Hort’s theory as a “paradigm shift”:

But till the appearance of the dissertation of Dr. Hort no one was so obliging as to tell us what the principles are to which we might have
arrived at the same result ourselves. And Dr. Hort’s theory, as will be shown later, involves too much violation of principles generally received, and too devoid of anything like proof, ever to win universal acceptance. As matters of fact easily verified, it stands in sharp antagonism to the judgment passed by the Church all down the ages, and in many respects does not accord with the teaching of the most celebrated critics of the century who preceded him.¹⁰³³

Burgon then goes on to note that the results of the theory are based on its initial assumptions, and that assumption in turn does not constitute proof. Therefore

\[\ldots\text{apart from proof of some sort it shall } not \text{ be taken for granted that a copy of the New Testament written in the fourth or fifth century will exhibit a more trustworthy text than one written in the eleventh or twelfth. That indeed of two ancient documents the more ancient might not unreasonably have been expected to prove the more trustworthy, I am not concerned to dispute, and will not here discuss such a question. But the probabilities of the case at all events are not axiomatic. Nay, it will be found that in many instances a fourteenth century copy of the Gospels may exhibit the truth of Scripture, while the fourth century copy in all these instances proves to be the depository of a fabricated text.}\]

Why is this so? Because of the nature of the case, one must start from different presuppositions.

For we assume that the Bible is to be taken as inspired, and not regarded upon a level with the Books of the East, which are held by their votaries to be sacred. It is chiefly from inattention to this circumstance that misconception prevails in that department of Sacred science known as Textual Criticism. Aware that he New Testament is like no other book in its origin, its contents, its history, many critics of the present day nevertheless permit themselves to reason concerning its text, as if they entertained no suspicion that the words and sentences of which it is
composed were destined to experience an extraordinary fate also. They make no allowances for the fact that influences of an entirely different kind from any with which profane literature is acquainted have made themselves felt in this department, and therefore, that even those principles of Textual Criticism which in the case of profane authors are regarded as fundamental are often out of place here.

It is impossible that all this can be too clearly apprehended. In fact, until those who make the words of The New Testament their study are convinced that they move in a region like no other, where unique phenomena await them at every step, and where seventeen hundred and fifty years ago depraving causes unknown in every other department of learning were actively at work, progress cannot really be made in the present discussion. 1034

In other words, because the initial presupposition towards the text is one of belief and not of doubt, the particulars of the methodological approach to the text will differ from that of naturalist criticism significantly.

For Burgon, this belief in the providential preservation of the authentic text is part and parcel of his belief in the Church; Scripture and Tradition cannot be separated. The opposite starting point of Wescott and Hort was for Burgon a sure and certain dead end:

I am utterly disinclined to believe -- so grossly improbable does it seem -- that at the end of 1800 years 995 copies out of every thousand, suppose, will prove untrustworthy; and on the contrary that one, two, three, four or five remain whose contents were until yesterday as good as unknown should be found to have retained the secret of what the Holy Spirit originally inspired. I am utterly unable to believe that God’s promise has so entirely failed, that at the end of 1800 years much of the text of the Gospel had in point of fact to be picked by a German critic out of a waste-paper basket in the convent of St. Catherine, and that the entire text had to be remodeled after the pattern set by a couple of copies which had remained in neglect during fifteen centuries, and had probably owed their
survival to that neglect while hundreds of others had been thumbed to pieces, and had bequeathed their witness to copies made from them.  

This, then, is the initial critique of Wescott and Hort’s Genealogical method and the results it obtains. The positive statement of Burgon’s position, however, begins with a crucial observation: that the two manuscripts which are the pillars of the Wescott-Hort theory were well known long before Wescott and Hort’s theory, and that the entirety of the theory itself is but a clever guise for extreme philosophical subjectivism:

The verdict of the several periods since the production of those two manuscripts has been given until a few years ago in favor of the Text which has been handed down. Let it be further borne in mind that the testimony is not only that of all the ages, but of all the countries, and at the very least so strong a presumption will ensure on behalf of the traditional Text, that a powerful case indeed must be constructed to upset it. It cannot be vanquished by theories grounded on internal considerations – often only another name for personal tastes – or for scholarly likes or dislikes, or upon fictitious recensions, or upon any arbitrary choice of favorite manuscripts – or upon a strained division of authorities into families or groups, or upon a warped application of the principle of genealogy. In the ascertainment of the facts of the Sacred Text, the laws of evidence must be strictly followed… In short, the Traditional Text, founded upon the vast majority of authorities and upon the Rock of Christ’s Church, will be found upon examination to be out of all comparison superior to a text of the nineteenth century whatever skill and ingenuity may have been expended upon the production or defense of it.  

Burgon then contrasts this with his understanding of the Traditional Text.

The present New Testament Canon is neither more or less than the probat of the orthodox Christian bishops, and those not only of the first or second, but of the third and fourth, and even subsequent centuries. In
like manner, whether men would, or would not have it so, it is a plain fact that the Traditional Greek Text of the New Testament is neither more or less than the probat of the orthodox Greek Christian bishops, and those, if not as we maintain of the first and second, or the third centuries, yet unquestionably of the fourth and fifth, and even consequent centuries. 1037

With this, Burgon has touched upon a crucial weakness in the Wescott-Hort and subsequent New Testament textual critical theory: the status of the received, majority text. 1038

In order to account for the fact that the majority text in evidence already in the fourth century had attained such widespread use and documentation, Dr. Hort was led to propose a theory in order to justify his use of the non-traditional codexes which formed the pillars of his theory.

The text found in the mass of existing (manuscripts) does not date further back than the middle of the fourth century. Before that text was made up, other forms of text were in vogue, which may be termed respectively Neutral, Western, and Alexandrian. The text first mentioned arose in Syria and more particularly at Antioch. Originally there had been in Syria an old-Syriac, which after Cureton is to be identified with the Curetonian. In the third century, about 250 A.D., an authoritative revision, accepted by Syriac Christendom, was made, of which the locality would be either Edessa or Nisibis, or else Antioch itself. This revision was grounded probably upon an authoritative revision at Antioch of the Greek texts, or a third counting the Syriac revision, similarly authoritative, was completed at Antioch by 350 or thereabouts: but what was now the ‘Vulgate Syriac’ text, that is, the Peschito, did not again undergo any corresponding revision. From the last Greek revision issued a text which was afterwards carried to Constantinople – Antioch being the true ecclesiastical parent of Constantinople – and henceforward became the Text dominant in Christendom till the present century. Nevertheless, it is not the true Text, for that is the ‘Neutral’ text, and it may be called ‘Syrian.’ Accordingly, in
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investigations into the character and form of the true text, ‘Syrian’ readings are to be rejected at once, as proved to have a relatively late origin. ¹⁰³⁹

Burgon’s response is simple yet unequivocal:

Dr. Hort, as soon as he found that he could not maintain his ground with history as it actually was, instead of taking back his theory and altering it to square with the facts, he tampered with historical facts in order to make them agree with his theory. This is self-evident. During the quarter of a century that has elapsed since Dr. Hort published his book, no one had been able to adduce passages to show that Dr. Hort was right that his supposed revisions took place. ¹⁰⁴⁰

In other words, the revision process proposed by Dr. Hort would have been so extensive and massive an effort that one should expect some historical evidence to exist to indicate that such an undertaking occurred, yet none is to be found. This leads Burgon to a direct assault on the claim of Wescott and Hort’s revised text to be more ancient, and therefore, more true.

A. Antiquity

The chief characteristic of the Traditional text is its preponderant numerical weight as evidence. But for Burgon this weight inheres in more than just its overwhelming numerical attestation. It is a product of that and its continuity over time and space: “The advocates of the Traditional text urge that the Consent without Concert of so many hundreds of copies, executed by different persons, at diverse times, in widely sundered regions of the Church, is a presumptive proof of their trustworthiness…”¹⁰⁴¹ Conversely, the advocates of the five manuscripts favored by the Wescott-Hort theory “seem to base their claim on ‘antiquity’.”¹⁰⁴² But mere antiquity of this sort is uncertain:
In and by itself antiquity will be found to avail nothing. A reading is to be adopted not because it is old, but because it is the best attested, and therefore the oldest. There may seem to be paradox on my part, but there is none. I have admitted, and indeed insist upon it, that the oldest reading of all is the very thing we are in search of. 

It is clear that Burgon has a very different conception of antiquity than mere appeal to one or two early manuscripts. The reasons why are illuminating.

I repeat that it is to Antiquity that I make my appeal. Further, I insist the ascertained verdict of Antiquity shall be accepted. But then, inasmuch as by Antiquity I do not mean any one single ancient authority, whatever its age, to the exclusion of and in preference to, all the rest. But it is precisely to the whole collective body, the body of ancient authorities, which I propose as the arbiters. Thus, I do not mean by Antiquity either, (1) the Peschito Syriac; or (2) Cureton’s Syriac; or (3) the Old Latin Versions; or (4) the Vulgate; or (5) the Egyptian; or indeed (6) any of the other ancient Versions -- nor (7) Origen; nor (8) Eusebius; nor (9) Chrysostom; nor (10) Cyril -- nor indeed (11) any other ancient Father standing alone -- neither (12) (Codex Alexandrinus); nor (13) (Codex Vaticanus) nor (14) (Ephraemi Rescriptus); nor (15) (Codex Bezae); nor (16) (Codex Siniaticus) -- nor in fact (17) any other individual Codex that can be named… By Antiquity I understand the whole body of documents which convey to me the mind of antiquity, which transport me back to the primitive age, and acquaint me, as far as is now possible, with what was its verdict.

And by parity of reasoning, I decline to accept a fragment of Antiquity, arbitrarily broken off, in lieu of the entire mass of ancient witnesses.

At this point, Burgon’s reasoning becomes at once subtle and profound.

It was necessary, in his critique of the Wescott-Hort theory’s misuse
of antiquity, to restate a fact of the history of the early church’s use of Scripture all but forgotten by modern criticism, and in doing so, he points out the singular relationship between the Old and New Testaments, and therefore between the Septuagint Greek Old Testament and the Majority, traditional Text of the New. In doing so, Burgon also points out the fact that there was malicious tampering with the text from the beginning, as well as more innocent scribal errors. Commenting on St. Matthew 27:46, Burgon points out that the Revisers of the 1881 version follow a reading of the verse attested by Justin Martyr (ca. 164 A.D.) and the Valentinians (ca. 150 A.D.), as well as the favorite early manuscripts of Wescott-Hort, Codexes Sinaiticus and Vaticanus. To the superficial eye, Burgon notes, the critics’ evidence “is really wondrous strong.”

And yet the evidence on the other side, when it is considered, is perceived to be overwhelming… Add the discovery that the less well-attested reading is the established reading of the familiar Septuagint, and we have no hesitation whatever in retaining the commonly Received Text. For the secret is out when it is recognized that these were sure to follow the Septuagint, and it was very dear to Origen besides.  

The whole tenor of Burgon’s critique is that ancient authorities must not be indiscriminately used, even Patristic witnesses, particularly those who were themselves practitioners of indiscriminate criticism.

I consider that such illustrious Fathers as Irenaeus and Hippolytus; Athanasius and Didymus; Epiphanius and Basil; the two Gregories and Chrysostom; Cyril and Theodoret, among the Greeks, and Tertullian and Cyprian; Hilary and Ambrose; Jerome and Augustine, among the Latins -- are more respected witnesses by far than the same number of Greek or Latin Codexes. Origen, Clemens Alexandrinus, and Eusebius, though first-rate authors, were so much addicted to Textual Criticism themselves, or else employed such inconsistent copies, that their testimony is that of indifferent witness or bad judges.
Why this is so becomes apparent when one compares the relationship of the extant manuscripts to each other. Briefly, Burgon’s appeal is that of the Vincentian Canon, *quod simper, quod ubique, quod omnibus*, to that which has been believed, or in this case, received, everywhere, always, and by all, and not to a “narrow sectarian interest” which finds expression in only a few manuscripts.\textsuperscript{1047}

\textbf{B. The Relationship of Extant Evidence}

For Burgon, the principle fact which explains both the vast numerical quantity of manuscripts which support the Traditional text, as well as the relationship between the different types of evidence -- liturgical books, Patristic quotations, Versions and so on -- to each other is simply the fact of the \textit{liturgical use} of Scripture.

From the very necessity of the case, copies of the Gospels and Epistles in the original Greek were multiplied to an extraordinary extent all down the ages and in every part of the Christian Church. The result has been that, although all the earliest have perished, there remains to this day a prodigious number of such transcripts; some of them of very high antiquity. On examining these with care, we discover they must have been (a) produced in different countries; (b) executed at intervals during the space of one thousand years; (c) copied from originals no longer in existence. And thus a body of evidence has been accumulated as to what is the actual text of Scripture, such as is wholly \textit{unapproachable with respect to any other writings in the world}. More than two thousand manuscript copies are now known to exist. It should be added that the practice of reading Scripture aloud before the congregation -- a practice which is observed to have prevailed from the apostolic Age -- has resulted in the increased security of the Deposit. For it has led to multiplication by authority, of books containing the Church lessons; and by this it has secured a living witness to the \textit{ipsissima verba} of the Spirit, in all the churches of Christendom. The ear once thoroughly familiarized
with the words of scripture is observed to resent the slightest departure from the established type. As for its tolerating important changes, that is plainly out of the question.  

In addition to this body of evidence, there is a peculiar fact of patristic writings, particularly as reading their attestation of the antiquity of the particular reading of a passage:

These men often comment upon, freely quote, habitually refer to the words of Inspiration. And by these it comes to pass that a host of unsuspected witnesses to the truth of scripture are sometimes producible. The quotations of passages by the Fathers are proofs of the readings which they found in the copies used by them. They thus testify in ordinary quotations, though it be at second hand, and sometimes their testimony has more than usual value when they argue or comment upon the passage in question. Indeed, very often the manuscripts in their hands, which so far live in their quotations, are older, perhaps centuries older, than any copies that now survive. In this way it will be perceived that a three fold security has been provided for the integrity of the Deposit: in Copies, in versions, in writings of the Fathers.

This means that when fathers in the fourth century quote the Traditional text type, there must have been copies, even though there are now no such extant copies. This in turn undermines yet another important principle of naturalist criticism.

C. The Identification of Readings with Documents

Isolating the methodological principle which underwrites much of textual criticism, and particularly that of Wescott and Hort, Fr. Burgon pointed out both the logical fallacy of the principle, and what its consistent application by critics would mean.
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Are we… to put up with the transparent fallacy that the oldest reading must of necessity be found in the oldest document? Well, if we have made up our minds that such is to be our method, then let us proceed to construct our text chiefly by the aid of the old Latin and Peschito Syrian Versions, they being the oldest authorities extant of a continuous text. 1050

Why then are there no significant numbers of manuscripts supporting the Traditional text earlier than the fourth century? Burgon’s answer turns the naturalist assumptions of Wescott-Hort on their head:

D. The Antiquity of the Favored Documents of Naturalist Criticism, and the Reason for the Preservation of Their “Various Readings”

We have seen that Wescott and Hort theory, and subsequent criticism indebted to it, is based on naturalistic assumptions: (1) earliest document = most authentic document; (2) documents = readings. We have also seen how Burgon responded to these assumptions. But what is the exact nature of the “various readings” and “other ancient authorities” that litter the marginalia of modern critical translations of Scripture? The favored manuscripts of naturalist criticism, Burgon notes, have undergone apparently an habitual, if not systematic, depravation and has been manipulated throughout in a wild way. Influences have been demonstrably at work which altogether perplex the judgment. The result is simply calamitous. There are evidences of persistent mutilation, not only of words and clauses, but of entire sentences. The substitution of one expression for another, and the arbitrary transposition of words, are phenomena of such perpetual occurrence, that it becomes evident at last that what lies before us is not so much an ancient copy, but an attempt at an ancient recension of the Sacred Text… these Codexes abound with so much licentiousness ore carelessness as to suggest the inference that they are in fact indebted for their preservation to their hopeless character. Thus it would appear that an evil reputation ensured their neglect in
ancient times and has procured that they should survive to our own times, long after multitude of much better had perished in the Master’s service. Let men think of this matter as they will, whatever fact may prove to be the history of that peculiar Text with finds its chief exponents in (Codexes Vaticanus, Siniaticus, Bezae and Regius), in some copies of the Old Latin, and in the Curetonian Version, in Origen, and to a lesser extent in the Sahidic and Boharic translations -- all must admit, as a matter of fact, that it differs essentially from the Traditional Text, and is no mere variation of it.  

As if this were not enough, Burgon points out that the favored manuscripts of naturalist textual criticism do not constitute one given family of text types, but many, whereas the Traditional text is “unmistakably one”, not withstanding its slight variations. Thus, far from being the result of redactions from the favored manuscripts of naturalist criticism, the Majority text is their archetype; it is they which are the edited recensions. But how then account for the fact that there is such early attestation for corrupted texts? In answering this question, he exposes the fact that textual criticism must always consider the doctrinal causes of corruption.

**E. Doctrinal Causes of Corruption: Gnostic and Heretical**

The assumption of naturalist criticism is to assume a neutrality as regards the transmission of the text. In doing so, Burgon argues, it ignores the unique facts of early Christian history, for from the period in the aftermath of the composition of the Gospels, corruption occurred almost immediately. That much is argued by the naturalistic critic. But Burgon adds that in addition to this corruption, and simultaneously with it, that there is a uniform and consistent testimony in favor of orthodoxy and the traditional text.

The nature of tradition is very imperfectly understood in many quarters, and mistakes respecting it lie close to the root, if they are not themselves
Tradition is commonly likened to a stream which contracts pollution in its course the further it goes. Purity is supposed to be attainable only within the neighborhood of the source. And it is assumed that distance from the source ensures proportionally either greater purity or more corruption.

In the first place, the traditional presentment of the New Testament is not like a single stream. Instead it resembles rather a great number of streams of which many have remained pure, but some have been corrupted. One cluster of bad streams of manuscripts was found in the West, and as is most probable, the source of very many of them was in Syria. Another occurred in the East with Alexandria, and afterwards Caesarea as the center, where it was joined by currents from the West. A multitude of different parts of the Church were kept wholly or mainly clear of these contaminants, and preserved the pure and precise utterance as it issued from the springs of the Written Word.  

The fact of the international corruption inheres in Scripture, according to Burgon, by dint of it being the written Word of God. For that reason, it was subject to the alterations both of heretics – as we have already had occasion to mention with the Gnostics – as well as orthodox. This fact makes it “reasonable that they should now at least be approached by ourselves as no other ancient writings are, or can be.” Burgon’s rejection of naturalist criticism, then, is based not only on the fact of inspiration and preservation of Scripture, but also on the facts of ecclesiastical history. Textual critical method, to be reasonable and condign to its object, must bear these points in consideration of the data.

From this standpoint, there are no more “variant readings”, for it is in fact “a term which rightly belongs only to the criticism of the text of profane authors.” After a minute and detailed examination of both unintentional and intentional scribal glosses and errors, Burgon then focuses on the fact of early Gnostic and heretical textual micro-corruptions.
of the text. It is these corrupted and heretical texts which the naturalist modern criticism attempts to revive:

What with those who like Basilides and his followers invented a gospel of their own -- what with those who with the Ebionites and the Valentinians interpolated and otherwise perverted one of the four Gospels until it suited their purpose -- what with those who like Marcion shamefully maimed and mutilated the inspired text -- there must have been a large mass of corruption festering in the church throughout the immediate post-apostolic age...

He then repeats the observations of Wescott and Hort respecting the uncritical nature of early copies of Scripture, but pursues them to an entirely different conclusion:

In a singularly uncritical age, the seductive simplicity of one reading -- the interesting fullness of another -- the plausibility of a third -- was quite sure to recommend its acceptance among those many eclectic recensions which were constructed by long since forgotten Critics. And from these came forth the most depraved and worthless of our existing texts and versions. Emphatically condemned by ecclesiastical authority, and hopelessly outvoted by the universal voice of Christendom, buried under fifteen centuries, the corruptions I speak of survive at the present day chiefly through that little handful of copies which the school of Lachmann, Tischendorff, Tregelles, etc. look upon as oracular. And calamitous to relate, many scholars are refashioning the evangelical text under the mistaken title of ‘old readings.’

One cannot help but observe that St. Irenaeus’ struggle against the Gnostics -- by reliance upon apostolic succession in faith and episcopate -- was also simultaneously a struggle to preserve an unmutilated Scripture. Consequently, with the contemporary endorsement by many Anglican, Roman Catholic, and Orthodox hierarchs of modern bibles which have as
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their basis a corrupt critical text, the apostolic succession itself is in severe jeopardy. Why this is so Burgon explains. “It is a memorable circumstance that it is precisely those very texts which relate either to the eternal generation of the Son -- to His Incarnation -- or to the circumstances of His nativity -- which have suffered most severely, and which retain to this hour traces of having been in various ways tampered with.”

F. A Special Case of Corruption: Origen and the Alexandrian School

Where, then, is the origin of the corrupted text of the Codexes Siniaticus and Vaticanus, favorites of naturalist criticism, to be sought? Burgon’s speculation accounts for several facts and offers a novel conclusion: The origin is Origen, so to speak.

Yet I also venture to think that it was in great measure at Alexandria that the text in question was fabricated. My chief reasons for thinking so are the following:

1. There is a marked resemblance between the peculiar readings of (Codexes Vaticanus and Siniaticus) and the two Egyptian versions.
2. No one can fail to have been struck by the evident sympathy between Origen (who had passed more than half of his life at Alexandria) and the text in question.
3. I notice that Nonnus also, who lived in the Thebaid, exhibits considerable sympathy with the text which I deem so corrupt.
4. I cannot overlook the fact that (Codex Siniaticus) was discovered in a monastery under the sway of the patriarch of Alexandria, though no evidence remains to tell us how it got there.
5. The licentious handling so characteristic of the Septuagint Version of the Old Testament -- the work of Alexandrian Jews -- points in the
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same direction, and leads me to suspect that Alexandria was the final source of the text of Vaticanus and Siniaticus.

6. I further observe that the sacred Text in Cyril's Homilies on S. John is often similar to (Codexes Vaticanus and Siniaticus); and this, I take for granted, was the effect of the school of Alexandria -- not of the patriarch himself.

7. Dionysius of Alexandria complains briefly of the corrupt Codexes of his day.

8. Clemens, who also was of Alexandria habitually employed copies of a similar kind.\textsuperscript{1059}

In plain words, there is a relationship between centers of corrupt doctrine - as was the Alexandria of Origen and Arius -- and corrupt texts.

In a manner that recalls Irenaeus' complaint against the Gnostics of his day, the issue for Anglo-Catholic Burgon was thus one of doctrinal and textual catholicity versus a narrow geographical sectarianism of a critical "bible" with a peculiar text:

We have with us width and depth against the narrowness on their side. They are conspicuously contracted in the fewness of their witnesses which they deem worthy of credence. They are restricted as to the period of history which alone they consider to deserve attention. They are confined with regard to the countries from which their testimony comes. They would supply Christians with a shortened text, and would educate them under a cast-iron system. On the contrary we champion the many against the few. We welcome all witnesses, and weigh all testimony. We uphold all the ages against one or two, and all the countries against a narrow space. We maintain the genuine and all-around Catholicism of real Christendom against a discarded sectarianism exhumed from the fourth century.\textsuperscript{1060}

The weight of Burgon's philosophical and theological critique is as disturbing as it is overwhelming. Given the relationship of Scripture and
Tradition and Liturgy which Burgon’s detailed and exhaustive examination of the text of Scripture indicates, it is inevitable that the revision of the text of the New Testament along naturalist critical paradigms will compel a similar revision of liturgies, hymns, and the translational philosophies underlying translations of Scripture. How, indeed, will the Christian listen to God in the Scriptures if he is (1) unsure of the text, (2) unsure of its words, (3) unsure of their meaning, (4) uncertain that the events they described happened in the manner described, (5) unable to translate all levels meaning since the meaning itself and the text underlying it have been altered, and (6) busily engaged correcting scripture at all these levels by means of the very critical principles which produced the dilemma?!

On answer, of course, is that all such textual problems can be resolved by the appeal to the superintendence of the Chameleon Godhead’s vicar on earth, the Papacy.
XIII. THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE CHAMELEON GODHEAD’S VICAR

A. The Papacy and the Historiography of the Artful Dodge

For some of the Fathers of the First Europe, the reason that the daemons could not repent and be redeemed was the fact that, being incorporeal, they in habited a quasi-timeless world, i.e., a temporal world, which, while it was created and began to be, nevertheless “after” that point, was timeless, or rather, and everlasting “now”. For this reason, once the will of a daemon was fixed in the will to power, it remains forever so. The first use of their faculty of will was at one and the same time the formation of a habit of will; they were committed to an invariable and irreformable course. 1062

The earthly image of this fixity of will into and irreformable course of will is the papacy; locked into claims which prohibit its institutional repentance, it epitomizes not only the root sin of the fall of man -- pride -- but also its daemonic, counterpart: and ineluctable determination to the supremacy and historical certitude of its claims, no matter what may be brought against them. 1063 This of course, means that, in quasi-Hegelian fashion, the History of the Church must perforce exhibit the gradual unfolding of the History of this Will, and all be interpreted according to it. It is this Will to Power -- even in the control of historiography -- which is the basis of the Second Europe’s crypto-Roman Catholicism in general culture. It is in the historiographical complex surrounding the papal claims and their “historical” justification that the gnostic strategies and tactics of revision are most clearly manifest. They had been known long before papal infallibility became an official dogma of the Roman church at the First Vatican Council of 1870-1871, and both scholars and theologians,
throughout the period from the Protestant Reformation to that council, had pointed out serious historiographical and theological consequences if the doctrine were ever to become a dogma. But with the event itself, it was the German scholar of church history, Josef Ignaz von Döllinger who, under the pseudonym “Janus”, was to write the most extensive philosophical examination of the implications of that dogma, with his *The Pope and the Council*.

The essence of Döllinger’s critique was that papal infallibility ran counter to the evidence, even the evidence of the Second Europe after its schism from the First.

Those also will become guilty of heresy who write or teach that the extravagant pretensions of the Popes contributed to the separation of the Eastern and Western Churches, though this may be discovered in official documents from the twelfth to the sixteenth century, and the avowals of a number of contemporary authorities.

This revisionist orientation to ecclesiastical historiography would effect -- in words that almost recall St. Photius almost exactly one thousand years before -- both the evidences of the past as well as be a commitment to a certain orientation to the evidences of the future.

If this desire (i.e. the proclamation of papal infallibility) is accomplished, a new principle of immeasurable importance, both retrospective and prospective, will be established -- a principle which, when once irrevocably fixed, will extend its dominion over men’s minds more and more, till it has coerced them into subjection to every Papal pronouncement in matters of religion, morals, politics, and social science.

This would likewise result in yet another departure from the traditional and lingering “First European” understandings of ecclesiastical authority that still remained within the papal church.
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For example, “the form hitherto used by the Bishops in subscribing to the doctrinal decisions of Councils, \textit{definiens subscripsi}, would for the future be a blasphemy.”  

Moreover, the new dogma would add yet another complex to the overall Augustinian \textit{ordo theologiae}. In place of the prolengomena of Scripture to the knowledge of the intelligible and simple essence that was encountered in the previous chapter, will come the prolegomena of the papal claims as the sole arbiter of doctrine, morals, and as the “resolver” and court of final appeal in matters of internal -- textual -- disputes.

In the next place, the newly-coined article of faith will inevitably take root as the foundation and corner of the whole Roman Catholic edifice. The whole activity of theologians will be concentrated on the one point of ascertaining whether or not a Papal decision can be quoted for any given doctrine, and in labouring to discover and amass proof for it from history and literature. Every other authority will pale beside the living oracle on the Tiber, which speaks with plenary inspiration, and can always be appealed to.

What use in tedious investigations of Scripture, what use in wasting time on the difficult study of tradition, which requires so many kinds of preliminary knowledge, when a single utterance of the infallible Pope may shatter at a breath the labours of a lifetime, and a telegraphic message to Rome will get an answer in a few hours or a few days, which becomes an axiom and article of faith?

This enormous commitment requires the complete reinterpretation of the testimony of Church history by means of the techniques of Gnosticism.

In the first instance, contradictions in the record will have to be resolved by dialectical means designed to yield the new meaning supportive of the infallibility:

The declarations of Popes which contradict the doctrines of the Church, or contradict each other (as the same Pope sometimes contradicts himself),
will have to be twisted into agreement, so as to show that their heterodox or mutually destructive enunciations are at bottom sound doctrine, or, when a little has been subtracted from one dictum and added to the other, are not really contradictory, and mean the same thing.\textsuperscript{1070}

The Gnostic tactic of assigning new meanings to old terms, Döllinger suggests, must be accomplished by the utilization of three other tactics: the “quiet omission” of certain things, and the deliberate addition of others within contexts derived to convey orthodoxy.

The example of these processes for Döllinger is the Jesuit falsification of Spanish church history, which, in the hands of a Roman De la Higuera, took the form of the invention of chronicles and archaeological records, relics, and the accompanying mechanism of miracles to attest authenticity.\textsuperscript{1071} A more problematical form of this falsification -- though Döllinger could not have foreseen it -- was the Franciscan charge of heresy brought against Pope John XXII, who maintain that “what the popes had once defined in faith and morals, through the keys of wisdom, their successors could not call into question.”\textsuperscript{1072} A thorny problem indeed, since a \textit{plentitudo potestatis} which was limited by previous papal decrees was not a \textit{plenitude potestatis}. Conversely, a \textit{plentitudo potestatis} which could lay down laws at one time which could be reversed at a later time likewise is not a \textit{plentitudo protestatis}. This has been dramatically highlighted by the recent Second Vatican Council and the liturgical “reform” that emanated from it. At Trent, an oath was required from priests not to celebrate “any other mass” than that text approved by the council; in the aftermath of the Second Vatican Council that decision was reversed by the promulgation of a new order of the mass, and order inimical to traditional Roman doctrine at worst, or highly suspect from traditional Romanist points of view at best.\textsuperscript{1073}

The case of heretical popes was the most problematical. Liberius, for example, had once been an Adrian. Sensing the difficulty, Anselm, himself an advocate of the German Papal Reform movement in the
eleventh century, resolved the difficulty by the expedient of maintaining that upon Liberius’ exile, he had ordained Felix his successor on the advice of the clergy of Rome, and abdicated, so that his subsequent apostasy did not matter. It was not so simple or easy as all this, however, for Liberius only was able to purchase his return from exile by anathematizing St. Athanasius. At that point, St. Hilary, Bishop of Poitiers, anathematized him. Moreover, throughout the middle ages, “this apostasy of Liberius sufficed … for a proof that Popes could fall into heresy as well as other people.” Pope Nicholas I had not only engendered the schism of the ninth century, but, in contradiction to the unanimous testimony of the Eastern and Western Churches up to that point, as a means of asserting raw papal power had assured the Bulgarians that Trinitarian baptism into the Name of Christ alone was sufficient.

It is illuminating that, for Döllinger, in the Gnostic pseudomorphosis of church doctrine and history that papal infallibility would require, all the Gnostic tactics are clearly in evidence.

1. The Gnostic Tactic of Supplying New Meanings to Old Terms: The redefinition of “Church” to mean “Pope”

Chief among the transformations of traditional terms is the equation of “Church” with “Pope”, to the extent that, for the Second Europe, regardless of one’s ecclesiastical commitments (or lack of them), to say “the Church” is to conjure in most Second European minds the image of the Vatican City and the Papacy: “when we speak of the Church, we mean the Pope, ‘says the Jesuit Gretser, at the beginning of the seventeenth century.” Gone is even the mention of the corpus mysticum of the Middle Ages, and of course, there is no mention, because it has altogether disappeared, of the patristic polity of the Church.
2. The Gnostic Tactic of Assigning New Meanings to Old Terms through Terminological Transference

This statement indicates the degree to which the tactic of the transference of terms from one sphere to another underwrote the Jesuit historiography in support of papal infallibility, right down to the first Vatican Council. The Apostle St. Paul’s statement in Acts, “in him we live, and more, and have our being” was “transferred to the Pope.” As Döllinger notes, “few even of the Italian canonists of the fifteenth century could screw themselves up to this point,” since it was, and is, a blasphemy. But that, notes Döllinger, did not stop the redoubtable Cardinal Bellarmine, for whom the Pope was designated not only the “Vicar of Christ” but a “Vice-God”!

Moreover, the traditional episcopal authority of binding and loosing itself was transferred to the pope (since he was a bishop), and then reinterpreted as “an inexhaustible treasure-chamber of rights and claims, including the claim to the right to dethrone kings and emperors.” This included likewise the right to dispose of other people’s property, as Gregory VII declared at the Roman synod of 1080. Excommunication itself became subject to the process. For Isidore, no one should hold conversation with an excommunicated person, a statement that seems extreme if one forget the patristic, First European context in which his remarks were uttered, a context which meant simply that one should not pray with schismatics or heretics in their assemblies. But in Gregory VII’s hands, this becomes a power to forbid any social intercourse with an excommunicate person, including that social and political intercourse of being subject to a deposed or excommunicated emperor.

But most important is the transformation of the understandings of the episcopacy, priesthood, and diaconate itself, for ultimately, only the Pope is really any of these things. Others are so because he has allowed them to partake of limited measures of his plenitude potestatis. Priesthood
itself becomes the sole genuine rank of authority both in the church and the world, since it alone is introduced by the ordinance of God. In this assertion, earlier witnesses against this conception, even if they stemmed from Rome itself, had to be quietly dropped.

It was said in Part one that the papacy was the new pontifex maximus of a Gnostic mystery religion, and was meant seriously, for in the Gnostic redefinition and transference of terms, even liturgical texts themselves, particularly of the divine offices, were blasphemously twisted and reapplied to the popes, and uncomfortable breviary references expunged:

The name of Pope Honorius was struck out the lection for Leo II’s feast, in the passage where his condemnation by the sixth Oecumenical Council had been related, for since the Popes wanted to be infallible, this inconvenient fact ought at least to be obliterated from the memory of the clergy...Then the word “souls” had to be expunged from the Missal and Breviary in the collect for the feast of St. Peter’s Chair. It was now held scandalous at Rome, that the ancient Roman Church should have restricted Peter’s power of binding and loosing to souls only, whereas the full right was claimed for the Pope to bind bodies also, and to put them to death. One of the enrichments of the breviary was the putting of Satan’s words to our Lord in the Temptation, “I will give thee all the kingdoms of the world,” into the mouth of Christ, who is made to address them to Peter. These forgeries and mutilations in the interest of the papal system were so astonishing, that the Venetian Marsiglio thought in the course of time not faith would be reposed in any documents at all, and so the Church would be undermined.

This is a breathtaking display of three Gnostic tactics, all at once: (1) the assignment of new meanings to old terms; (2) the addition of new terms; and (3) the quiet excision of terms that cannot be readily dealt with in any other way, i.e., the excommunication of Pope Honorius I. And finally, any passage of the Gospels involving Peter become, of course, arsenals
in the Gnostic interpretation of texts for the establishment of papal claims. Innocent III, for example, could refer to Peter’s walking upon the sea of Galilee as an allegory that the papal power included the governance of the whole world, given to it by Christ. Innocent neglected to mention that Peter lost faith and began to sink, having to be upheld by Christ and pulled back into the boat with the rest of apostles.

3. The Gnostic Tactic of Creating New Terms

Some of these examples have already been touched upon, and so they will not be repeated here. But one example is crucial to mention, and that is the decree of Pope Eugene IV to the Armenian Church, “dated 22d November 1439, three months after the Council of Florence was brought to an end by the departure of the Greeks.” Döllinger’s commentary needs no more than to be cited to understand the enormity of Eugenius’s decree:

If this decree of the Pope were really a rule of faith, the Eastern Church would have only four sacraments instead of seven; the Western Church would for at least eight centuries have been deprived of three sacraments, and of one, the want of which would make all the rests, with one exception, invalid. Eugenius IV determines in this decree the form and matter, the substance, or the sacraments, or of those things on the presence of absence of which the existence of the sacrament itself depends, according to the universal doctrine of the Church. He gives a form of Confirmation which never existed in one-half of the Church, and first came into use in the other after the tenth century. So again with penance. What is given as the essential form of the sacrament was unknown in the Western Church for eleven hundred years, and never known in the Greek. And when the touching the sacred vessels, and the words accompanying the rite, are given as the form and matter of Ordination, it follows that the Latin Church for a thousand years had
neither priests nor bishops – nay, like the Greek Church, which never adopted this usage, possesses to this hour neither priests nor bishops, and consequently no sacraments except Baptism, and perhaps Marriage.  

The similarity of Döllinger’s observations to those of the Anglican Archbishops of Canterbury and York’s response to Pope Leo XIII’s decree on Anglican orders is apparent.

Even the new term for the Popes, “Vicar of Christ”, is the invention of a new term designed to manifest the new claims, for the older term of mediaeval popes prior to the Hildebrandine “Reform” had been “Vicar of Peter” predominantly. And even the definition of infallibility *ex cathedra* must bee seen as a Gnostic tactic to protect the claims of the papacy to infallibility form any inconvenient historical evidence to the contrary. Was Honorius sitting down on his cathedra when he taught the heresy of Monotheletism, or Liberius when he anathematized St. Athanasius and embraced Arianism?

4. **The Gnostic Tactic of Contriving “Orthodox” Contexts**

The papal claims thus constitute a fundamental and radical revolution in the structure of the post-schismatic Second Europe’s church, for the “chair of unity” and its historic primacy had to be fundamentally altered in order to accommodate those claims, just as the schism with the First Europe evidenced a fundamental alteration in the ecclesiastical structure, culture, and meaning of “Europe”. The relationship of the papacy to the Church “had to be fundamentally revolutionized, and the idea of Primacy altered, before there could be any room for this doctrine to grow up.” This radical gnosticizing was not accomplished, as we have seen, without the Pseudo-Isidorian decretals, which first sprang up in that tumultuous and stormy ninth century. These decretals are the first
appearance of the “contrived contexts” that lend the patina of orthodoxy to the papal claims. Döllinger puts their influence very bluntly: “it would be difficult to find in all history a second instance of so successful, and yet so clumsy a forgery. For three centuries past it has been exposed, yet the principles it introduced and brought into practice have taken such deep root in the soil of the Church, and have so grown into her life, that the exposure of the fraud has produced no result in shaking the dominant system.” 1092 In other words, the foundation of the papacy is exactly the same as that of the Gnostics in the second and third centuries; it rests upon deliberate and intentional falsifications made in the interests of a metaphysical theory which, in turn, was designed to prop up an existing politico-spiritual order.

5. The Revolutionary Use of the Symbols of the Authority of the Old Order

The decretals, however, are evidence of yet another device in the gnostic revolution that swept the Western Church out of the ambit of the First Europe and into the subjection to the papal dictatorship. Nicholas I was, of course, the first pope to make genuine revolutionary use of the symbols of the episcopal office and dignity which he held, 1093 but the hand of Gregory VII, synods themselves becomes the symbols manipulated to effect the revolutionary transference of power from the bishops to the papacy, a process that culminated, of course, with Vatican One, where, in the pronouncement of Pius IX to one of his cardinals, “I am tradition,” it reached its logical denouement. 1094

Like all revolutions, however, it gathered its own momentum, and its own inertia. By the time of Vatican One, then, the claims of the Popes, and the evidences of the Second Europe’s own history and historical scholars, were in tragic conflict. Like the Princetonian fundamentalists, the
papal infallibility was designed, in part, to place the institution beyond the possibility of historical critique or limitation of its power by the creation of a kind of “metadogma”. This confronted those within the papal church who were determined to maintain their own understanding of traditional Catholic orthodoxy, howsoever flawed it may have been by the fact of the schism from the First Europe, with a tragic choice: accept the heresy and stay within the institution and work to reverse the effect of the doctrine, or accept the choice of schism, break with Rome, and maintain doctrinal rectitude but at the cost of yet another ecclesiastical division. Those who chose this latter course, Döllinger among them, became known as Old Catholics.

6. The Gnostic Tactic of the Ad Hominem Prohibition of Questions

This tragic choice between schism or heresy was, however, “resolved” for most by yet another Gnostic tactic, that of the “ad hominem prohibition of questions.” For those unable to bear the thought of an institutional break with Rome, the “sacrifice of the intellect” was urged as a step of Christian faith to be exercised in opposition to all contradictory evidence. With this, the papal revolution is completed, for the meaning of Christian faith has itself been transformed to such an extent that, for many modern Roman Catholics in the Second Europe and its North American satellite, adherence to Roman doctrine is no longer a sine qua non of catholic identity, for that has been reduced to mere membership in and juridical connection to the institution of the papacy itself. The content of faith itself is no longer important, but, by a process of attrition, has been reduced to the bare minimum.
7. The Gnostic Tactic of Creating Parallel Magisteria of the Scholarly Elite

As with the earlier form of Gnosticism, the new papal form required its own creation of parallel “bureaucracies” or teaching authorities of “experts” within the one organism of the church. These were the great universities and the new religious orders that arose in the Second Europe. These orders with their rigid monarchial organization, was the third great lever whereby the old Church system, resting on the gradation of bishops, presbyteries, and parish priests, was undetermined and destroyed. Completely under Roman control, and acting everywhere as Papal delegates, wholly independent of bishops, with plenary power to encroach on the rights of parish priests, these monks set up their own churches in the Church, labored for the honour and greatness of their order, and for the Papal authority on which their prerogatives rested...They became masters of literature, of the pulpits, and of the university chairs...And thus the spiritual campaign organized at Rome was carried into every village...

In other world, the events of the Middle Ages of the Second Europe, with the revolutionizing of papal power and ecclesiastical polity, furnish a thorough textbook on the gnostic techniques of revolutionizing and subverting an institutional structure. Parallel structures are created which, making revolutionary use of the symbols of the old order, extend that revolution to every level of polity. These bureaucracies acquire their own revolutionary momentum and inertia, since they have a vested interest in change and the success of the revolution.

From the most famous of these orders with a vested interest in revolution, the Jesuits, came that revolutionary distinction to be made with regard to papal utterances, the proclamation ex cathedra.
This distinction is, at first glimpse,

A perfectly reasonably one, not only in the case of the Pope, but of any bishop or professor...No reasonable man will pretend that the remarks made by a Pope in conversation are definitions of faith. But beyond this the distinction has no meaning. When a Pope speaks publically on a point of doctrine, either of his own accord, or in answer to questions addressed to him, he has spoken *ex cathedra*, for he was questioned as Pope, and successor or other Popes...This holds good equally of ever bishop. The moment any accidental or arbitrary condition is fixed on which the *ex cathedra* nature of a Papal decision is to depend, we enter the sphere of the private crochets of theologians, such as are wont to be devided simply to meet the difficulties of the system...It is just as if one chose to say afterwards of a physician who had been consulted, and had given his opinion on a disease, that he had formed his diagnosis or prescribed his remedies as a private person, and not as a physician. As soon, therefore, as limitations are announced, and the dogmatic judgments of the popes are divided into two classes...it is obvious that the sole ground for this arbitrary distinction lies in the fact that there are sure to be some inconvenient decisions of Popes which it is desirable to except from the privilege of infallibility generally asserted in other cases.¹⁰⁹⁸

This, of course, only serves to empower that parallel bureaucracy even more, and to transform the nature of theology entirely. As Aquinas put it, a Council derives its authority from the pope, who has the right of establishing a new confession of faith.¹⁰⁹⁹ In other words, *the papal infallibility is the logical consequence of the papacy’s adoption of the filioque and the Augustinian *ordo theologiae*, and in turn, the Gnostic tactics of historiography used to justify the Second Europe’s departure from the First, whether in Protestant “biblical-critical” or Jesuit “Ultramontanist”¹¹⁰⁰ is the logical consequence of that decision.
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Scholarship and its techniques have supplanted living ecclesiastical and liturgical tradition altogether, and substituted new notions of authority in its place.

As shall be subsequently, these tactics of revision reach their full hurricane force in the gale of ecumenism and its schemes for “church union” in the twentieth century.
XIV. THE REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS OF THE CHAMELEON GODHEAD

A. The Three R’s: Renaissance, Reformation, and Revolution, and the “Line of Despair”

The great mediaevalist and historian of jurisprudence, Ernst Kanatorowicz, suggested that there “were very great and serious advantages in the English doctrine of the King’s Two Bodies.” Indeed there were!

With the execution of Charles Stewart I, one could, with some exaggeration perhaps, speak of the doctrine of the King’s Body Politic as symbolizing, not the real presence of the King, but his very real, and fatal, absence. Like the God of English Deism, the King had served to wind up the watch of State, and withdrew, or rather, was withdrawn, from perpetual oversight and involvement with it. The parallel, of course, was the Protestant Reformation, which threw off the oversight of the papacy. One could begin (and in the absence of the king was forced to begin) political and philosophical speculation on the genuine origin and exercise of political power that was devoid of explicit and specific Christian references. It is ironic that it is precisely because of the category error of the confusion of person and nature found within the Augustinian Trinitarian dialectics, mediaeval law in general, and English law in particular, happened on to the development that political power came not from the king, but from the Body Politic itself, a new secularized and Gnosticized version of he corpus mysticum, the Church. This “corporatism” in secular and sacred jurisprudence itself to a certain extent underlies the debates between Charles Stewart and the Roundheads, a debate which has the trappings of the old “realist” versus “symbolist” Eucharistic debates. Did the king, as a symbol of the Body Politic, constitute the means of the
exercise of that Body Politic's power, i.e., was he substantially identified with it, or was he merely a symbol of its real absence from his person? In any case, Charles's execution prompted a new and critical reevaluation of previously existing legal theories and texts, and a massive reinterpretation of them, a reinterpretation designed to reflect and reinforce the new, and very real, Absence.

In this the movement of political reflection parallels the movement of English Deism and the rise of biblical criticism, and in this, it heralds the beginning of new post-Christian attitudes towards the lingering social conventions of the Second Europe, conventions which were the residue of its collapsing Christian culture. These new attitudes may be traced by examining the evolution of the principal meaning of the term "religion" itself. As a word, "religion" originally translated the Greek word εὐσεβία, which might be translated as "piety" or "devotion", and in some cases, even by the word "worship". As such, it was a convenient word to designate not only the tenets, but also the liturgical and moral practice of Christianity. It was employed in this sense, and very deliberately, by the translators of the King James Bible. But in the hands of the Deistic reinterpretation that was beginning to fuel the new criticism and "science of religion", the term came to mean something else entirely. Just as one could, by the observation of he multiplicity of natural events arrive at the induction of certain natural laws applicable at all times and in all places under similar circumstances, so one could, argued the Deists, arrive at the True Religion by a careful examination and comparison of the specific tenets and practices of all the specific "religions" of the world, none of which in themselves were that True Religion. Thus, one ends with a "Religion-in-general" which, like the God-in-general behind all religions, is the true and only religion. With this, one returns to the "fractional theology of the Logos" encountered long ago with St. Justin Martyr, but without Justin's own still exclusively Christian qualifications of the scheme.

This Universal religion moreover increasingly came to be
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understood as an ethical truth, devoid of any metaphysical content other than its underlying simplicity of “the Deity” itself. That ethical content was embodied in a phrase that became the *sine qua non* of post-Deistic reflection on “religion” the Universal Brotherhood of Man, and its corollary, that all religions were created equal, endowed by their creator, man, with certain inalienable rights. Thus came the word “religion” to acquire that general and unspecified content that it has for so many of the Second Europe today, a meaning utterly devoid of the context-specificity that it had had for an earlier age. ¹¹⁰²

1. The German Illuminati: Kant, Eichhorn, and Weishaupt: the Prophet, the Priest, and the Order

There are, in Joachimist fashion, a trinity of men who might be taken as the heralds of the New Order. Two of them, Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottfried Eichhorn, the philosophical prophet and higher-critical priest of the new order, have already been encountered. The third, Adam Weishaupt, was to embody the new understanding of things in the creation of a secret society – itself a deliberately Gnosticized and secularized version of the Mediaeval Jesuits – designed to implement where necessary, or hasten where needed, the political and cultural consequences of the New Order. Weishaupt is the typical eighteenth century “magus”, who, lost in the labyrinth of his own dark visions and conspiracies, embodies Bacon’s design to “squeeze and mould” the societies of man into the “natural” political and social program of his order of Illuminati. As such, these new Gnostic “experts” are the reaction to the growing claims of the papacy, and the inevitable dialectical counterpart to them.

Let us reprise the steps of this dialectical march thus far:

(1). It began in God Himself, with the dialectical formulation of the
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Trinity by St. Augustine;

(2). That formulation required the dialectical corollary that doctrine developed, as expounded by Paulinus of Aquileia in the ninth century;

(3). That in turn required that the foundational texts, the Scriptures and patristic writings, be scoured for references that could be taken as implicit “anticipations” of the filioque;

(4). Once discovered, such texts were then reinterpreted according to the new Augustinian philosophical paradigm, with Augustinism becoming the measure of patristic orthodoxy as other fathers were increasingly interpreted along Augustinian and dialectical lines;

(5). Once this occurred, Augustine himself came to be interpreted dialectically, as in Ratramnus of Corbie’s expositions of Trinitarian or Eucharistic doctrine;

(6). This began to open a split within the patristic grounding of the Second Europe, since a sectarian basis had been adopted in opposition to more universal consensus;

(7). This dialectical process extended itself, through Anselm, to the treatment of the whole range of doctrines;

(8). Once this occurred, texts themselves came to be arranged dialectically to exhibit contradictions, which were then resolved into a dialectical synthesis, as with the Book of Sentences of Peter Lombard or Abellard’s Sic et Non;

(9). The dialectical treatment of texts and doctrines led to further metaphysical and conceptual refinements, with the multiplication of entities and categories (e.g., the treatment “primary” versus “secondary” attributes within God, or the scholastic treatment of the relations of oppositions between the...
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Three Persons of the Trinity) within the exposition of doctrine, as well as to the creation of whole new areas of theological exposition;

(10). This led to the dialectical reduction of entities in the hands of Ockham;

(11). And this in turn led to the dialectical reduction or “simplification” (απλωσις) of ecclesiastical authority in the hands of Luther and the Protestant authorities, or conversely to the dialectical pleading of the superintending authority of the papacy in the hands of the Jesuits;

(12). Which led to the birth of patristic σ as an academic discipline in the hands of the Protestant reformers, seeking to justify their reforms on the basis of appeals to Christian antiquity.

The dialectical march through the institutions of political society was begun, as we have seen, in mediaeval jurisprudence, but it was Weishaupt and the other eighteenth century revolutionaries who laid the basis for its final triumph in that sphere. The movement toward political revolutions that stripped the Christian underpinnings from beneath the foundations of the modern secular state of the Second Europe was well under way by the 1770s. Indeed, the English Civil War had unleashed the political, and English Deism the philosophical forces which propelled the two great revolutions of the late eighteenth century, the American and the French. These overt movements and their exponents are well-known to the standard historiography of the Second Europe. Not so well known, and indeed, positively shunned by the standard historiography are the more occult and hidden roots of revolutionary organization and orchestration. Weishaupt’s Bavarian Illuminati are the first examples of such covert organization around, and for, revolutionary political, economic, and religious principles.1103

In the secretive movements which his order is the first to herald, the
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Trinity undergoes its last phase of Gnostic pseudomorphosis. The Freemasonry of Continental Europe, for example, could speak of the “holy Trinity”, meaning by this the now familiar watchwords of the French Revolution, Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité. This wholly politicized “trinity” then gave birth to two further political currents in the nineteenth century, one based upon a “nationalist”, and the other upon an “internationalist” interpretation of the three terms.

In the nationalist interpretation, Liberty is applicable to those citizens of the nation in question, who by virtue of their natural birth within the nation, are heirs to the divinely sanctioned rights and constitutional guarantees of those rights. “Equality” thus becomes the equality of all Frenchman in France or of all Americans in America. And of course, fraternity refers to the common cultural and linguistic, and most importantly, constitutional heritage of Frenchmen or Americans. It is this “constitutional heritage” which becomes almost synonymous with the national “culture”, particularly in America. One might say that there, “culture” has been defined in the most Gnostic form of secularization possible: culture-as-constitution.

But in the “illuminated” internationalism of a Weishaupt, “liberty” came to mean freedom from particular governments. Likewise, “equality” meant the absence of all qualities or conditions which could give rise to the infringement of absolute liberty, conditions such as differences of economic, social, racial, national, and of course, religious affiliation. Equality is thus a condition of “sociological simplicity”, to be achieved, in Joachimist fashion, in the future, but nowhere present as yet. In practical terms, “equality” came to mean the eradication of all currently existing religious, economic, or culturally distinguishing marks. With Weishaupt’s Illuminism, one discovers the first appearance of communism as a doctrine and as a program to implement it. The role and influence of this international and illuminist “simplification” made itself felt, even in the nationalist aspirations of the French revolution, in the genocidal and
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Malthusian excesses of its Radical phase:

If one were to use a single word to describe what the original French revolutionaries were really seeking, it might well be a key term later used by the Russians, oprostit'sia, to simplify. The desire for radical simplification (even of oneself as the reflexive verb suggests in Russian) impelled intellectuals following Rousseau to reject personal pretension as well as social convention. A similar striving toward simplicity compelled politicians leading up to Robespierre to rely increasingly on liquidation as well as inspiration. At the root of everything lay the passionate desire of thinking people to find a sample, unifying norm for society like the law of gravity that Newton had found for nature.

In their drive toward revolutionary simplicity Frenchmen melded many estates into one state; discarded innumerable titles for the uniform “citizen”, “brother,” and “tu”, supplanted elaborate rococo art with a severe neo-classicism; discarded complex Catholic traditions in the name of Dame Nature or a Supreme Being; and replaced reasoned argument with incantational slogan. 1105

In other words, the loss of courtesy and civility as well as the loss of the social distinctions which underwrote them were themselves a consequence of the desire to enact the metaphysical conception of simplicity as a political and social principle of organization, and, like the earlier program of the Gnostics, the new consciousness is symbolized by a new and rigid adherence to a linguistic agenda which replaced reasoned argument and symbolized the raised revolutionary consciousness.

With this revolutionary defiance of Christian social conventions came yet a new dialectical polarity, one with us still, for the “subsequent equation” of the delegates in the French national assembly who sat in the left side of the chamber with “virtue” served to focus opposition to Christianity and its advocates, who sat on the right, and whose creedal and liturgical affirmations “had always represented those on the right hand of God as saved and those on the left as damned.” 1106 It is Weishaupt's
Illuminati who first systematized these linguistic and social conventions of revolt – before the French Revolution occurred – in their plans for the redistribution of wealth, the creation of a United Republic of Europe and then of a Global Federal Republic, and of the gradual hollowing out and blending of all religions into the religion of Universal Brotherhood. It was, in short, a total program, a program which, as its contemporary English critic, Edmund Burke, was to point out, had redefined “religious tolerance” from “impartial kindness” to “equal neglect.”

B. The Collapse of Sacramentalism: The Failure of the American Baptist Culture and its Roots in the Collapse of Sacramentalism

In the other great eighteenth century revolution, the politicization of the Augustinian Trinity to a very different if not ingenious, form, that of the dialectically constructed machinery of constitutional government, with its built in relations of opposition in the form of “checks and balances” between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government the Gnosticization of secular politics reached its apotheosis. In other words, the American federal constitution of 1789, as originally conceived and without the massive modifications which occurred after 1865 and 1913, was a brilliant adaptation of the original Augustinian dialectical scheme, giving a concrete mechanism of State, and founding it upon the new manifestation of the Chameleon godhead: the People.
And, lest it be misconstrued, the “People” here embodied a unique synthesis of the nationalist and internationalist understandings of “fraternity”, for all national, ethnic, and religious heritages could, in theory, be “American”, because what defined the “People” in America’s case was something negative: the mutual recognition of the moral sovereignty and sanction of the individual person within the local sovereign state, a sanction not mediated by any intervening political instrument or agency, including any specific religion. Like Leibnitz’ monads, the “person” in this sense became a legal entity unto itself. The solution to the long legal dilemmas posed by the development of law within the Second Europe which this arrangement embodied was therefore both brilliant and breathtaking.

But there was (and is) an inherent problem which this arrangement poses, a problem that can best be illuminated by stating it in the terms of St. Gregory Nazianzus: what is the relation of origin, if any, between the people and the mutually opposed organs of federal government? If there be none, then those relationships reduce to merely dialectical oppositions, a problem first posed by the Anti-Federalists:

Mr. Adam’s sine qua non of a good government is three balancing
powers, whose repelling qualities are to produce equilibrium of interests, and thereby promote the happiness of the whole community. He asserts that the administrators of every government, will ever be actuated by views of private interest and ambition, to the prejudice of the public good; that therefore the only effectual method to secure the rights of the people and to promote their welfare, is to create an opposition of interests between the members of two distinct bodies, in the exercise of the powers of government, and balanced by those of a third. This hypothesis supposes human wisdom competent to the task of instituting three co- equal orders in government, and a corresponding weight in the community to enable them respectively to exercise their several parts and whose views and interests should be so distinct as to prevent a coalition of any two of them for the destruction of the third. Mr. Adams…has not been able to adduce a single instance of such a government.¹¹⁰⁸

The essence of the Anti-Federalist critique of the 1789 constitution then, was that it tended, if one may so put it, to collapse, through the multiplication of governmental agencies and the relations of oppositions that distinguish them, either into perpetual anarchy on the one hand, or into an eventual amalgamation of all powers of government into a new and superintending form of tyrannical simplicity.

A particular focus of their critique was on the fact that the Supreme Court had no direct connection to the People from whom it supposedly derived its authority, but rather that it was a body whom they could influence only mediately, via the hypostasized executive and legislative relations of opposition within the government. The parallel to the place of the Holy Spirit within the Augustinian Trinity is intriguing, for there too the dialectical construction served only to divorce the Spirit from the Father by making the Son a mediating step in the dialectical process between the two. The Anti-Federalists feared what has since become a reality, that once in place the Court would begin non only to review cases and act on legal precedent, but actually to create law out of very flimsy legal materials in a judicial Activism that sought not to adhere to the strict construction of
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the law, but which sought to embody changing moods and political trends in its decisions. The parallel to the change in ecclesiastical law of the status of the papacy is obvious. In short, the Court would become, on their view, a virtual second legislative body, not subject to any checks and balances. Conversely, the federal government, which takes on the increasingly menacing aspects of tyranny, also takes on the increasingly menacing aspects of anarchy, as the several departments of the executive and legislative branches of “government” not only multiply like rabbits, but multiply increasingly contradictory regulations and edicts, squeezing and molding the “people” into ever more restricted fields of “liberty”.

The fundamentally dialectical, Augustinian, and therefore Neoplatonic basis of the American constitution-culture is reflected in yet another, though very different, way: in the primary “Anabaptist” basis of its popular “Christian” religious culture, a culture one readily identifies with its television “evangelists” and their Tilt-a-whirl blend of pietism, fideism, Anabaptist theology, and American patriotism, a spiritual poison that we shall here refer to simply as “the American Civil Religion.” Much has been written elsewhere on American “revivalism”, and no attempt will be made here to survey this complex and warped phenomenon. The task here is limited to exposing the Joachimist and Anabaptist roots of the religion, and its disastrous moral and social consequences.

To understand the evolution of the American Civil Religion, it is necessary to survey the collapse of sacramentalism within the Second Europe. For the medieval West, sacraments were those material and liturgical acts that conferred grace. As such, they were understood to have on of two necessary origins: (1) they had either to be instituted by Christ Himself, as with Holy Baptism and the Eucharist; or (2) they had to have been instituted by the Holy Spirit Himself in the tradition of the Church, as with Holy Matrimony, Unction, Chrismation (Confirmation), Penance, and Holy Orders. For the First European, this in itself constitutes a massive reduction of the sphere and scope of God’s activity, for which everything in
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the Church, not just the sacramental mysteries, is sacramental. But for the Second Europe, the spheres of God’s activity in nature is more or less effectively reduced to only seven channels, and these channels are further classified into “dominical” channels, the first two sacraments, and “ecclesiastical” channels, the last five.

When the Reformation occurred, there was a massive reinterpretation of authority, for authority was restricted to the confines of the sola scriptura. With this restriction, came a corresponding reduction in the number of sacramental channels of God’s gracious activity, at first to three (baptism, confirmation, and the Eucharist in some cases, baptism, confession, and the Eucharist in others) and then only to baptism and the Eucharist, for only these had to clear and explicit institution by Christ Himself.

With this, yet a new principle was enshrined, i.e. that in order for something to be “biblical” it necessarily had to have the explicit example in Scripture. And with this, a new division manifested itself. For the Calvinists, infant baptism was biblical because there was clear Old Testament precedent in the circumcision of infants, which baptism had replaced (being applicable to women as well as men). But for the Anabaptists, inheriting the other quasi-Joachimist tradition of discrete “dispensations”, a manifest division between the Old and New Testaments was enshrined in the form of a radical opposition between the two, such that the thought forms of the Old Testament, which were “Law”, were no longer applicable to the thought forms proper to the new dispensation of “Grace.” One had freely to embrace Christianity at an age when one was capable of understanding that commitment. With this, the Anabaptist religion and its American civil Religion counterpart actualize yet another consequence of the Augustinian ordo, in this case, the consequences that spill over from the definition of the divine essence as simplicity, and therefore as intelligible to the mind of man. The Gospel perforce essentially something “simple”, i.e., easy to understand, and impossible
without such understanding. Accordingly, infants cannot be baptized for two reasons: (1) there is no clear scriptural warrant, and (2) because they do not understand what is taking place. 1111

Thus, as one contemporary Calvinist observer of the American Civil Religion put it, “preaching is not for nurturing or edification: there is not exposition of God’s Law. Week after week, fundamentalist congregations are told that God stands helpless while the sinner decides for or against Him. And the congregation hears this ‘altar-call’ whether or not there are any bonafide sinners in the house.”1112 with the absence of Law, of course, comes the absence of its fulfillment in Christ, and with that, there is no genuine understanding of the depths of repentance and contrition necessary to follow Him. 1113 The “altar-less altar calls”1114 have nothing to do with Christ’s Body and Blood except only in a mentalist and emotionalist sense dependent upon the individual. As emotionalist sense dependent upon the individual. As such, “soul-winning” turns out to be the selling of fraudulent promises of soul-insurance for the after-life. 1115 Consequently, the religious conservative of the American Civil Religion cannot convert men, much less change society, because the bifurcation of man into soul, the religious sphere, and body, the political and social, has been accepted in the place of sacramentalism. Cultural and social action are therefore the only expedients, a cultural and social that must deify the very constitution which strips them of the ability to assert any religion as absolutely true and to follow those assertions out in the political and social sphere. Faith, in the American Civil Religion is reduced from a life lived under the lordship, and therefore, the moral and spiritual demands of Christ, to mere personal sentimentalism and intellectual assent to “propositional revelation.”

This in turn conditions how most Americans understand “the church” and “church membership”. The salvation-by-momentous decision leads to the dangerous tendency towards cultism, for “it invests someone with the responsibility of making a subjective evaluation of another man’s
heart condition… Thus, Baptist leadership begins to take on a “vicar” position which is not much different from the position of the pope of Rome.” Once subjective individual experience is made the basis so salvation in place of objective sacramental reality and moral life, the variety of experience contributes greatly to the mutual distrust between individuals. This is reflected in the on-going proliferation of “bible churches” and non-denominational denominations and at a birth rate that would alarm a Malthus.

But the most obvious, and yet, unappreciated fact of the American Baptist culture is its link between “believer’s baptism”, a kind of spiritual abortion, and the actual practice of abortion, the murder of the unborn itself. With this, the moral confusion and persisting (nay, galloping) theological illiteracy of the American version of the religion of the Second Europe is evident:

The greatest damage to the home of Baptist theology has been the change it brought in the status of children. The exclusion of children from the covenant completely alters how they are approached. One, since they are outside the church they should not be prayed with. John Bunyan is an example of one who pressed his theology to consistency at this point. Second, they should be preached to as lost. Thus the child is pressed to have an experience. Jesus said that the standard of faith was that of a little child (Luke 18:15-17). The Baptist makes it the opposite. The child must become like the adult.  

The moral inconsistency of the position of most American evangelists on this point does not even seem phase them, perhaps because of the confusion within their ranks over baptism itself.

The insistence upon a mentalist “conversion experience” deepened what was already in evidence long before within the Second Europe, the division of the physical and spiritual dimensions of a sacrament in a kind of “sacramental Nestorianism”. Thus, for the
“traditional” Baptist, the water of Baptism and the Baptism of the Holy
Spirit are separate, the former being administered only after the “decision”
for Christ is made, which constitutes the latter. But the scriptural testimony
that baptism was regenerative could not be ignored. Thus, in the
nineteenth century, to compound the picture, the denomination of
Campbellites emerged, for who infant baptism was denied decisions for
Christ preached, and for whom Baptism was regenerative, but in a non-
sacramental sense. It was regenerative in the legal sense, since one
submitted to it in obedience to Christ, a new form of “law” and “works
righteousness”. Added to this confusing picture in the twentieth century
are the numerous groups of “charismatics”, for whom initial decision for
Christ and water baptism are followed by, or accompanied by, yet a third
work – resonances of Joachim again – the baptism of the Holy Spirit,
manifested principally in the speaking of tongues or glossalalia.

Here too there are deep Augustinian roots to the dilemma. St.
Augustine, in combating Donatism, had formulated the doctrine that all
sacramental mysteries were objectively ministered by Christ if the person
administering them were themselves validly ordained. In the case of
Baptism of schismatics, then, this meant that the sacrament was truly
performed, but that, immediately upon administration of the sacrament,
the Spirit left the individual, since it was administered in schism. This
begins the process of widening the gulf between the spiritual and physical
aspects of the sacrament.

C. A Synoptic Look at the First Europe

During this entire period from the schism of Rome in 1054 to the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the First Europe was not, of course,
forgotten, not did it forget the Second Europe. A word about it must now
be said, not so much to explore in detail the vicissitudes of its own
historical inevitabilities, but to explore those inevitabilities as they reflect on, or in some cases, simply reflected the massive upheavals in the Second.

Initially, the schism between Rome and Constantinople was not perceived as a final or irreparable breach, though certainly the perception was that the breach was a serious one. The first Europe’s response may be appreciated in the fact that it did not initially perceive the necessity of “re-evangelizing” the West, for preserving the West’s liturgical heritage for Orthodoxy, for it did not yet realize that that ancient western patristic and liturgical inheritance had, in a certain sense, been stolen from it.

Not until the Fourth Crusade and the sack of Constantinople in 1204 did the First Europe come to understand that the break, as far as the Second Europe was concerned, was permanent. The institution of a Latin Empire with a Latin hierarchy within Byzantium was the catalyst of this realization, for, contrary to its own understanding of the sacramental validity and efficacy of schismatic mysteries, the Second Europe did not recognize the sacraments of the Greek Church and its hierarchy and rites upon it. With this act, the imperialistic impulse within Augustinism that first manifested itself in the conflicts of the ninth century came home to the First Europe with revolutionary violence and force, and sadly, not for the last time.

At the Council of Ferrara-Florence (1438-1445), the First Europe rejected a scheme of ecclesiastical union with Rome, a scheme which would have meant complete doctrinal surrender to the Second Europe. Thereby, the First Europe rejected the political survival of its Empire in order to secure the survival of its Church. “Better the turban than the tiara” became the slogan. But in its way, the Council also symbolizes new dangers that were developing for the First Europe, albeit at a slower pace than in the Second.

When Russia accepted the Christianity of the First Europe from the Roman Empire in 988, it quite literally accepted a specifically Christian
basis of literary and national culture, for prior to the Baptism of Kievan Rus, there was no high Russian culture. That new culture was something unique and without parallel, for unlike the West, or even Byzantium itself, Russia had not literary equivalent to the classical pagan inheritance of antiquity. This meant that, to an extent far beyond any other nation or empire, including Byzantium itself, Russia’s initial national culture was one and the same as its liturgical and ecclesiastical culture. This is a deeply rooted phenomenon, and persists down to our own day, with important consequences for Russia’s relationship to the Second Europe. Put differently, the Byzantine imperial and Orthodox internationalism was, in Russia’s case, transformed into a national culture with international ambitions.

This gives Russia culture that aspect which, to the appearance of one familiar with the culture of the Second Europe, is often labeled “messianic” or “Russian messianism.” That “messianism” was given a powerful stimulus with the fall of Constantinople to the Turks (1453), and by the drive of the Grand Duchy of Moscow to “recover the Russian lands” and to explore and conquer Siberia as a buffer against the Mongols. Feudal institutions began in Russia as they ended in the West serving to fuel and propel that expansion. But the main basis of Russian imperialism was the realization that the Tsars had inherited the mantle of the Byzantine Roman Autocrats, and in that capacity, had a sacred role and duty to defend Orthodox Christianity and to support its evangelistic efforts. The Tsar was not only the Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russians, but also the “Little Father” who, as late as Nicholas II, was required by Christian duty to entertain Individual petitions.

The fall of Constantinople and the Russia turn eastward, toward Siberia, produced its own cultural effect as the Second Europe entered the great upheavals of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. Confronted by Roman Catholic and Protestant envoys eager to enlist the Eastern Church’s support in their respective polemics, the Greek Patriarchs of
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Constantinople were often left to a kind of “western captivity” in theology, employing Roman Catholic arguments against Protestants and Protestant arguments against the Roman Catholic, and making sense to neither party. In Russia things were not much better. Latin theological methods, including the use of the Augustinian *ordo theologiae*, without the *filioque*, of course, became the norm of seminary instruction. Thus, until the nineteenth century, Orthodox theology and its patristic *mind* (θρονησις) were often submerged in the academics, leaving the monasteries to preserve that mind, and giving contemporary Orthodox theology the unhealthy cast of an academic modernism opposed to a monastic traditionalism, where in Byzantium the “academic” theology of a Photius coexisted quite well with the “monastic” theology of a Symeon the New Theologian.

In any case, Russian “messianism” took its cue from the prophesy of one monk Filofei to one of the first great Muscovite Tsars, Basil I (1511). The essence of his prophecy, like all prophecy, was less the prediction of the future than the spiritual analysis of contemporary social reality. It consisted of a series of apparently simple propositions: papal Rome had fallen into heresy and schism, and was replaced in its patriarchal function as the first See of Christendom by the New Rome, Constantinople. But Constantinople too had fallen to the Turks, as a punishment for its earlier heresy on the part of its last Emperors and some of its bishops, for entertaining the spurious “union” with Rome “enacted” at Ferrara-Florence. As a result, Moscow had risen to take its place as the Third Rome, i.e. as the capital of the Orthodox Christian Empire and therefore as the most important See within the Orthodox Catholic Church. Only at the end does Filofei’s prophecy take on a “futurist” orientation: “a fourth Rome there will not be.” Rather, when Orthodox Russia finally fell, a long period of decline and persecutions of Orthodox Christians would begin, culminating with antichrist and the final and almost total destruction of Orthodoxy before the Second Advent.
It would be easy to dismiss this prophecy if it were not for the fact of its profound cultural, historiographical, and theological insights. One detects, for the first time, both a comprehensive and explicit outline of the First Europe’s philosophy of history and culture taking shape before the disasters of the Great Schism of 1054 and the Fall of Constantinople. In it, one detects the realization that the ancient oikoumene of Orthodox Christian civilization had indeed disappeared and the realization that the Second Europe was not going to disappear any time in the near future. It is the first enunciation of the canonicity of the First Europe in its new, restricted, “East European” sense, a sense that would be explored more fully by the Slavophilic intellectuals of the nineteenth century.

But the most significant aspect of Filofei’s prophecy is that aspect which one might, at first glance, be tempted to dismiss as the most superficial because it is the most apocalyptic: “A fourth Rome there will not be.” In other words, Filofei restates the original patristic realization formulated in the first three centuries of the Church’s existence: the Church was an autonomous culture, separate and independent of any Empire, no matter how Christian or Orthodox it might be. Filofei’s view of the end of history is that of a vast cultural conflict between an increasingly apostate and anti-Christian world culture, and that of the Church.

Against all this background, the convulsions that surround the Patriarchate of Nikon of Moscow may be appreciated, for the Old Ritualists’ schism which resulted from his attempt to conform Russian liturgical practice to that of the Greek Church exercised a profound and enduring effect on the autocracy of Peter the Great and subsequent Russian attempts to turn “westward.” The popular perception in Russia was moulded, as it was everywhere else within Orthodoxy, by the liturgical traditions. But the Greeks had apostasized at Ferrara-Florence, and had it not been for one Greek archbishop, Mark of Ephesus, who refused to sign the conciliar decrees, the Greek Church might have totally apostasized.
Into this picture steps the powerful personality of Nikon (1652-1658). To appreciate the disastrous effects of his patriarchate, one must recall also that it was the Church which had been the instrumental force in hollowing out the Mongol conquerors of Russia from within, for the Church remained the repository of national culture precisely because that culture was liturgical. It was the essential nucleus around which the Grand Dukes of Moscow were able to revitalize the Russian nation and eventually throw off the Mongo invaders. As such, a pre-Nikonian Tsar could not rule effectively without the support of the patriarch of Moscow. This was true to such an extent that it is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that no mediaeval western Pope enjoyed as much *de facto* secular authority and moral suasion as did Nikon when he became patriarch.

Then, in 1656, just as the Second Europe was beginning to emerge from the devastation of the Thirty Years’ War, Nikon summoned a council, to do something so seemingly minor as to adjust the Russian liturgical practice more closely to the Greek. The result was at least predictable in form, if not in intensity. Schism erupted, as clergy and laity alike say in the reforms the same “Greek apostasy” as had led to the Fall of New Rome. Nikon himself was vilified by these simple but good people as the very Antichrist himself. What Nikon and his bishops were not prepared for were the massive numbers of clergy and laity who abandoned all communion with him and his hierarchy, and who persisted in the older forms, hence the name “Old Believers” or “Old Rituals”.

Thus, two things had happened as a result of this constellation of events: Byzantine international Christian culture had been transformed, in Russia, into a national culture, and that culture now had within itself a major schism. After Nikon’s death, therefore, and impelled in part by the fact that Russian Cossacks, explorers and missionaries had reached the Pacific by 1685, a turn westward became part of the policy of the autocracy of Peter the Great. The consequence to Russia of these two things, the Old Ritualists schism and Peter’s “westernization” were
disastrous to Russian culture and history. Peter, intoxicated with all things “western”, learned from the Second Europe how to subordinate and control the Church. In 1721 he promulgated his famous *Spiritual Ukase*, abolishing the office of Patriarch, confiscating Church and monastery lands, and placing the Church into the hands of a layman, the *oberprokurator*, a secular “Minister of Religious Affairs.” This act, which no Byzantine emperor would have dared contemplate, transformed the nature of the autocracy itself. The epithet “caesaropapist” is far more true of Russia after Peter the Great than of Byzantium, for by this Ukase, the Orthodox Church in Russia was transformed into a ministry of State, if not always in deed, then at least in law.

This sowed the basis of a new tension in Russian culture, for at this point, Second and First European cultures entered an uneasy kind of synthesis inside of Russia. Politics was divorced from the national ecclesiastical culture. After Peter, for example, the imperial court took on the trappings, and some of the rituals and regalia appropriate more to the secular monarchies of the Second Europe. The Russian people could not help but perceive this development as the encroachment of “foreign”, and in some cases, “heretical” ideas inimical to Russia’s heritage. It is not accidental, then, that when the autocracy begins the process of the reform and eventual abolition of serfdom in the nineteenth century, that part of that work of reform will be perceived as the necessity of restoring the office of the Patriarch of Moscow and the independence of the Church from the autocracy. More important, however, is the fact that when Stalin needs a model on which to permit the continued existence of the Church under the officially atheism of the Communist Party’s control of the Soviet Union, he will see the Ukase of 1721 as the model on which his own *modus vivendi* with the Church is erected.\textsuperscript{1124}

Finally, Peter’s Ukase serves to open up a massive cultural schism, between the forcibly “westernized” customs, manners, and philosophical outlook of the aristocracy, and the still First European popular culture of
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the vast majority of Russian people. In doing so, Peter imports into Russia that quasi-dualistic culture that so pervaded the Second Europe. This, by the nineteenth century, will magnify itself into two trends within the Russian intelligentsia: “westernizers”, who wish essentially to throw off the influences of Orthodoxy and the First Europe, and “Slavophils”, who wish to throw off the influences of the Second Europe. Seen in this trend begun by Peter, and in a sense becomes the Russian equivalent of the Fourth Crusade, as a civilization based on the First Europe’s dogmatic tradition is violently overthrown by coup d’état, and a civilization bases upon the Second Europe’s aberration from that tradition is imposed upon it the Bolsheviks thereby resolved a dialectical tension first posed by Nikon and hardened by Peter. With them the “Trinitarian faith” of Hegel and the dialectical technique of Marx became the ideology and occult mechanism of power: the creation of endless class crises to be “managed” by the apparatchik in an endless series of “syntheses”.

And the most ironic aspect of that revolution – a Second European revolution in every sense – is that it had to overturn the one step taken by the autocracy in the economic and legal spheres to ensure equality before the law of all Russian subjects: the abolished of serfdom. It did so by returning the Russian people to an oppressive form of collectivism that had superficial resemblance to the serfdom that was abolished. It is significant that, as of this writing, the most clear choices facing “post-Communist” Russia are not political at all, but cultural, as the “westernizing” and “Slavophilic” solutions each contend for control of Russia’s future cultural and national identity. Nowhere else is it more true than in Russia, that the Great Schism is with us still.
D. The End of History: The Cult and Culture of Human Sacrifice

It is the twentieth century that has seen the application of the logic of the Augustinian category confusion of person and nature in the wholesale programs of government sponsored genocide and terror.

Systemic evils, after all, require systemic solutions. It has been the century of unparalleled scientific, technological, and economic achievement. It has likewise been the century unleashed by the Great Powers of the Second Europe. Russia, as the last surviving representative of the First Europe participated in the first of those genocidal conflagrations, suffering the indignities of surrender and the wholesale destruction of a vast segment of its population. It participated in the second of those conflagrations as a fully-fledged Second European power, suffering more than any other, yet inflicting its own genocidal toll as well.

The twentieth century is, then, uniquely the century of death. Perhaps no one has better summarized this tragic development than the American composer and musicologist Leonard Bernstein in his memorable Harvard Norton Poetry Lectures of 1973:

Why is our century so uniquely death-ridden? Couldn’t (Sic.) we say this of other centuries as well? What of the nineteenth century, so poetically preoccupied with death, whether as late as Wagner’s Liebestod or as early as Keats’ Nightingale:

“I have been half in love with easeful Death,
“Call’d him soft names in many a mused rhyme…”

Yes, true; poetically, symbolically, true. And haven’t (sic.) all centuries, all human histories been a long record of the struggle to survive, to deal with the problem of mortality? Again, yes; but never before has mankind been confronted by the problem of surviving global death, total death, the
extinction of the whole race. And Mahler was not alone in his vision; there have been many prophets of our struggle. Freud, Eistein, and Marx have also prophesied, as have Spengler and Wittgenstein, Malthus and Rachel Carson – all latter-day Isaiah’s and saint Johns, all preaching the same sermon in different terms: mend your ways, the Apocalypse is at hand. Rilke said it too: “Du must dein Leben andern.”

The twentieth century has been a badly written drama, from the beginning. Act I: Greed and hypocrisy leading to a genocidal World War; postwar injustice and hysteria; a boom; a crash; totalitarianism. Act II: Greed and hypocrisy leading to a genocidal World War; postwar injustice and hysteria; boom, crash; totalitarianism. Act III: Greed and hypocrisy – I don’t (sic.) dare continue. And what have been the antidotes? – I don’t (Sic.) dare continue. And what have been the antidotes? Logical positivism, existentialism, galloping technology, the flight into outer space, the doubting of reality, and overall a well-bred paranoia, most recently on display in the high places of Washington, D.C. And our personal antidotes: Making it, dope, sub-cultures and counter-cultures, turning on, turning off. Marking time and making money. A rash of new religious movements from Guruism to Billy Grahamism. And a rash of new art movements, from concrete poetry to the silences of John Cage. A thaw here, a purge there. And all under the same aegis, the angel of planetary death.

While too modest to mention it himself, Bernstein might also have included his famous *Mass*, which, while far from remaining faithful to the traditional text and theology of the Roman Catholic Mass, manages even in that faithfully to portray not only the state of contemporary Catholicism and its own jettisoning of the traditional text, but also mirrors the collapse of orthodoxy – of *any* orthodoxy, artistic, poetic, theological, or otherwise – within the Second Europe’s culture. His *Mass*, too, is born of the despair, of which he wrote so eloquently, for it is a blasphemous, theologically scrambled, illiterate, and irreverent work. It is for that reason also great art, for it reflects with amazing fidelity the spiritual condition of the Second Europe.

From what has preceded in these essays, one answer suggests itself. Our culture of genocide is in part the result of the trivialization of the Person in the Augustinian *ordo*. If the Three Persons of the Trinity can be construed by the dialectic to be but relations of opposition and therefore become subject to dialectical manipulation, will human persons fare any better? Consequently, wherever one encounters propaganda for the circumscription of the rights of individuals or groups, from the American South to Petrine or Soviet Russia, from the Inquisition to the Nazi death camps, at some point at the metaphysical root of the genocide, one will encounter the category error of the confusion of Person and Nature. The First Europe, in its Russian manifestation, when it resorts to these grizzly expedients, must do so in betrayal of the moral implications of its dogmatic tradition. But the Second Europe is founded *upon* that precise betrayal. When it resorts to these grizzly expedients, it is not betraying its faith, but working out the moral implication of its own metaphysical confusion.

But how are these “final solutions” examples of the confusion of Person and nature? Recall that, in the *filioque*, the two categories were confused by means of the intervening category of operations, or attributes. And thus, the Nazi “race laws” and “final solution” defined the truly “human” person by their utility and conformity to the State and its arbitrary
laws. In the United States, *Roe vs. Wade*(1973) defined person by “viability” and ultimately made possible the definition of “person” in terms of selfish or social convenience. In the new feudalism of the multinational corporation with its legions of executives all with degrees in “management”, person is defined in equally functional terms, as the “employee” or “team player”, or worse, as a human “resource” to be used and consumed like silicon or oil. And in psychology and sociology, the same occurs, for both deals only with *individuals*, i.e. with the union of body and soul, both natural entities, and not at all what classical patristic theology meant by person: irreducible, irrepeatable, concrete persona uniqueness without any analogy to any other person. The Second Europe’s psychology and sociology can, like Monophysitism, or Thomism, construe the person only in terms of the environment, of the tapestry of its relationships, or as the accidental genetic combination of form and matter. When St. Photius said of the *filioque* that “it has said all the rash impudence that there is to say”, he was certainly speaking the truth, though not even he, for all his metaphysical perspicacity, could have foreseen the moral implications of that assessment.

For the fortunate who have not been defined as non-persons, a different cultural experience awaits: the culture of Human Sacrifice, with its own Gnostic propaganda designed to persuade the living to accept meekly the various forms the newly emerging tyranny will assume. A whole arsenal of terminology has been constructed to indicated whether or not one possesses this “raised consciousness”, from appeals to “community” or “team spirit”, to the incantatory Wall Street mantras invoking the Global Village. In every case, this perverse and debased jargon has but one end, to seduce the person to forego his own thoughts, actions, inclinations, and opinions, and most importantly, to relativize his own religious and cultural tradition, and to adopt those of the bureaucrats who administer “policy” and determine human “values”.

For socialism and Communism, this Gnostic goal and
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technique is employed to foster advent of the Kingdom of Mass Humanity, and thereby to eclipse the personal. In the vast assault on personal property rights, it betrays, the Trinitarian and heretical roots of its ideology, for religion had ever been the only true cultural adhesive known to man; it is a property of human nature. Communism, then, commits a twin confusion of person and nature, on the one hand by relegating religion to the sphere of the exclusively personal, while simultaneously transforming property into a natural property of a human collective.

For the new multinational corporate feudalism, the cult of human sacrifice takes the form of the invocation to maximize corporate profits, and if one lose one’s livelihood due to “downsizing”, to “adjust” to the “new realities” of “the global marketplace”. It, too, relies upon that category error, for as was seen, the notion of corporation in law defines the legal “person” in functional terms, terms which confuse a multitude of persons in those functions, and reduce them to mere individuals.

And to all this economic, sociological, and psychological “simplification” (απλωσις) the pundits must inevitably add a political counterpart. One encounters the Marxist or Trilateralist advocates of internationalism. The cause of wars and human suffering are all the competing national sovereignties which, if borders were only eliminated or at best the internal departments of a global state, would disappear. Deviant “particularities”, whether nationalist or religious should be quickly brought to heel. Indeed, the last half of our century has seen an almost endless progression of such “police actions”. Peace, peace, but there is no peace.

In 1989, a deputy director of the American State Department’s policy planning staff, a former analyst for the RAND Corporation, wrote an article which touched off something of a firestorm of political and historiographical debate in the scholarly journal, *The End of History?* And its author was Francis Fukuyama. His respondents included no less than Professor Allan Bloom, Gertrude Himmelfarb, and U.S. Senator Daniel
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Patrick Moynihan (D., NY). What touched off the firestorm was Fukuyama’s “endism”, i.e., his deliberate employment of quasi-Hegelian dialectics to argue that history was indeed, ending, not with the triumph of international socialism, but rather with the transformation of the economic, political, and religious liberalism of the Second Europe into the new principle of international organization. As he put it:

…The century that began full of self-confidence in the ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy seems at its close to be returning full circle to where it started: not to an “end of ideology” or a convergence between capitalism and socialism, as earlier predicted, but to an unbashed victory of economic and political liberalism.

The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism.¹¹²⁹

The spread of this triumph is indicated not only by the triumph of liberalism not only in high politics, but also “in the ineluctable spread of consumerist Western culture in such diverse contexts as…the Beethoven piped into Japanese department stores, and the rock music enjoyed alike in Prague, Rangoon, and Tehran.”¹¹³⁰ What the world may be witnessing, he says,

Is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalizing of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.¹¹³¹

In support of this apocalyptic contention, Fukuyama returns to the Joachimist-Hegelian tradition, though he is little aware of the Joachimist and Augustinian components of his utopian vision.

Why Hegel? Because, according to Fukuyama, Hegel believed that History would issue in an ultimate “absolute moment – a moment in which a final, rational form of society and state became victorious,” a state
whose rational form would be evidenced by the universal application of man’s mastery “and transformation” of the “natural environment through the application of science and technology.” This universal and absolute historical moment – the end of History as a dialectical process – would be reached when the ideological conflicts of the dialectic ceased.

But by relying upon Hegel, Fukuyama poses the theological question: What, exactly, will religion “look like” in the brave new world of the internationalizing of the Second Europe? His answer is revealing of some persisting difficulties:

Contrary to those who at the same time believed that religion was a necessary and permanent feature of the political landscape, liberalism vanquished religion in Europe. After a centuries-long confrontation with liberalism, religion was taught to be tolerant. In the sixteenth century, it would have seemed strange to most Europeans not to use political power to enforce belief in their particular sectarian faith. Today, the idea that the practice of religious other than one’s own should injure one’s own faith seems bizarre, even to the most pious churchman. Religion has thus been relegated to the sphere of private life – exiled; it would seem, more or less permanently from European political life except on certain narrow issues like abortion.

He adds something equally revealing: “If nationalism is to fade away as a political force, it must be made tolerant like religion before it.”

What is most revealing about these quotations is the fact that Fukuyama presupposes the canonicity of the Second Europe, itself a religious principle and derived from religion, or rather, a heresy. And what he has completely ignored is that the tolerance of which he is an advocate was imposed by violent coup d’etat upon Russia (or by international “peacekeepers” since he wrote his book before the “intervention” in Bosnia and Serbia). Finally, he has ignored the root causes of the religious opposition to abortion, for the “tolerant” liberal state of which he is the
advocate is forcing upon religious people an ethic and moral standard which the tenets of most religions deny, i.e., a redefinition of the human person in terms of functionality. In short, Fukuyama seems to dismiss the possibility that such moral issues indicate the reverse of what he takes them to mean: the reemergence of specific theologies into the broader culture of the emerging “global” society. He likewise neglects to mention that religion was "made tolerant " by almost a century of incessant warfare, culminating in the devastating Thirty Year’s War (1618-1648).

The implications of Fukuyama’s endism are indeed ironic, and threatening, for he implies that nationalism cannot coexist with extreme tolerance, that it is a kind of slave ideology which must crumble, or be made to crumble, before the relentless march of Internationalism, Globalism, and, yes, Ecumenism:

The problem with Christianity, however, is that it remains just another slave ideology, that is, it is untrue in certain crucial respects. Christianity posits the realization of human freedom not here on earth but only in the Kingdom of Heaven. Christianity, in other words, had the right concept of freedom, but ended up reconciling real-world slaves to their lack of freedom by telling them not to expect liberation in this life. According to Hegel, the Christian did not realize that God did not create man, but rather that man had created God. He created God as a kind of projection of the idea of freedom, for in the Christian God we see a being who is the perfect master of himself and of nature. But the Christian then proceeded to enslave himself to this God that he himself created…Christianity was thus a form of alienation, that is, a new form of slavery where man enslaved himself to something that he himself created, thereby becoming divided against himself. \(^\text{1136}\)

The Gnostic discovery that man creates his gods, essential to Hegel as much as to his second and third century heretical forebears, is thus the root of Fukuyama’s religious “vision.”

Thus, all that diversifies and distinguishes, from religious to
nationalist culture, must be made to be tolerant in the new order in which global markets, technological extension, and the God-in-General triumph. In short, he is the latest in a long line of dialectical futurists, extending back through Hegel to Joachim and ultimately to Augustine. In this, he exposes the political designs that motivate those other great twentieth century utopian movements, science and ecumenism. In this, he likewise exposes the fact that political and economic forces are compelling toward the creation of a global version of the Roman theokrasy, and toward the obliteration, by the Gnostic strategies and tactics of ecumenism if possible, or by force if necessary of the cultural autonomy of what remains of genuine Christianity, at the core of which autonomy lies the dogmatic formulations of the First Europe and its Orthodox Church.
XV. THE SCIENCE OF THE CHAMELEON GODHEAD

A. Modern Science and Hellenization

Modern science is perhaps the most visible, and distinguishing feature, of the general intellectual culture of the Second Europe, of the general intellectual culture of the Second Europe, particularly since the end of the Reformation. Not surprisingly, here too its first roots lie deep within the Christian Tradition of the First Europe, and like other aspects of the Second Europe’s culture, these roots have become intertwined with the vines of the Augustinian Hellenization. As shall see, the Augustinian Hellenization serves to mask the spiritual implications of some aspects of modern science, while simultaneously interpreting others in a manner fundamentally different had they surfaced in the culture of the First Europe. Finally, and most importantly, the Augustinian Hellenization serves to divorce science on the one hand, and morality and piety on the other, with a finality that is almost, but not quite, irrevocable, for it is here that the effects of the abandonment of the Recapitulatory Economy of Christ are most clearly visible.

The theory of evolution has been the most visible component of disputes between “science and religion” for the Second Europe, and, since that topic groans under a mountain of literature on the subject, our focus here shall be on the physical sciences, using them rather that evolutionary biology as the paradigm by which to approach the influences of the Augustinian Hellenization on modern science.
1. Ancient Hebrew and Christian Opposition to Hellenization

Most scholars are agreed – at least in general principle – that Christianity contributed mightily, perhaps indispensably, to the origin and growth of the scientific method and technique. The very explicit biblical statements on the essential goodness of matter, for example, gave the first principle of the metaphysical basis for science. The orderly arrangement of nature, subject to the laws of the same God Who ordered the moral life of man, is a constant theme of Scripture, and provides the first insight into the nature of early Christian views of science: the rational order and moral order of nature and nature’s laws were one and the same, because their origin is in God. And thus a corollary immediately followed: to break the moral order was likewise to break the cosmic order.

This is evident in how the First Europe views the Fall of Adam. Briefly put, Adam and Eve personally willed something to come into existence which was an inherent contradiction, namely that which had been prohibited by God and which was perforce evil; evil could have, as such, no substantial existence; it could not and does not possess being in the way that rocks, fish trees, or planets possess being. It does not possess nature, in the theological sense, at all.

However, this is not to say that it not real, nor without its effect both on the life of man and on the cosmos. As we stated in the very first chapter, man fell into a dialectical contradiction, one which, by opposing his personal use of the will to that which was natural, subject to the laws and principles (λόγοι) of human nature which God the Word implanted in it, and therefore good. Adam and Eve tore their personal existence from thief God-given nature, and opposed it to their nature. This fundamental “schism” within the body of mankind introduced death, to which, with all its dialectical consequences, man was been subject until the resurrection of Jesus Christ. Once under way, almost every good distinction fell under the
paradigm of the dialectical oppositions of the fall: male opposed female, heaven opposed earth, spirit opposed matter, infinite opposed finite, and so on.

Death, however, was also seen by the Fathers of the First Europe, most notably by St. John Chrysostom, not only as the consequence of the Fall, but was also understood to be the foundation of the possibility of man’s repentance, for it brought an end to the temporal process, and prevented man’s further progression in evil. It was man’s very physicalness, and materiality, with all the subjection to laws of decay and death, that indicated that his nature was indeed changeable. And if changeable, he could, in fact, repent, exercising his personal choice over a prolonged period of time in a series of choices, each of which over time contributed to a personal habit (γνωµη) of willing.

The angels, on the other hand, who inhabited a different dimension of being, one where there was not temporal progression owing to their spiritual nature, existed in a state where the first personal use of will instantaneously established a habit of will which was irrevocable. The daemons a habit of will which was irrevocable. The daemons thus are perpetually locked in a personal mode of willing which is at variance with the natural goodness, and thus inhabit a world of a perpetual spiritual death: Hell.

It was this perception of the inherent goodness of matter and the spiritual implications it presented that gave rise to the first concerns with Hellenization, about a century before the first advent of Christ. A Christopher Kaiser put it in his masterful study Creation and the History of Science, “there was a conservative reaction against the process of Hellenization based on the quite legitimate fear that it would undermine the distinctive values of the Jewish law (1 Macc. 1:11-15; 2 Macc. 4:4-17).” Jewish thought, especially during the period of the Maccabees, was quite alive and sensitive to the dangers of Hellenization, and it is ultimately to these Jewish roots that the early Christian Patristic skepticism
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as regards Hellenization in matters of science is to be traced.

But here too, this was not merely a kind of Jewish “Luddism”, an indiscriminate rejection of all things Hellenistic. Joshua Ben Sirach, for example, could simultaneously caution against metaphysical speculation\textsuperscript{1140} while simultaneously endorsing Hellenic medicine. In short, so long as Hellenistic conceptions “could be Judaized” all knowledge was acceptable. We thus find ourselves back where we began: what elements of philosophy could be utilized, and more importantly, how were they to be utilized? St. Justin Martyr, it will be recalled, borrowed from Stoicism his conception of the “seminal rational principles” (λογοί σπερματικοί), a conception found later in such disparate Church Fathers as St. Augustine of Hippo,\textsuperscript{1141} St. Dionysius the Areopagite,\textsuperscript{1142} and St. Maximus the Confessor.\textsuperscript{1143} It was the latter, however, who most explicitly understood these seminal rational principles as being implanted in all of creation by Christ, the Λόγος, Himself, such that he laws of typology which we encountered in the first chapter bore an intimate and close metaphysical connection with the laws inherent in the physical creation. Here, as elsewhere, it was the work of the Greek Cappadocian Fathers in general, and St. Basil the Great of Caesarea in particular, which provided the first detailed exposition of the metaphysical basis of Patristic Christian Creationism (as distinguished from the pseudo-philosophical and pseudo-scientific version espoused by modern American evangelicals)

2. St. Basil the Great’s Critique of Aristotle

The connection between Creation and Redemption that gave rise to the Crisis of the First Hellenization was not simply a crisis concerning the dogmas of Christ and the Trinity, it was simultaneously a crisis of the conflict of reason and revelation, or in this case, science and Scripture. In this milieu, Aristotle represented the \textit{ne plus ultra} of Hellenic metaphysics,
logic, and science.

In the aftermath of that Crisis it was St. Basil who not only provided a more thorough refutation of Arianism than had St. Athanasius, but he also engaged heavily in the similar conflict between Aristotelian science and the implications of the Judeo-Christian doctrine of creation.

Basil established what was to become a long-standing tradition in the Church known as the Hexaemeron (Work of Six Days), a popular series of sermons or lectures on the work of God during the first six days of creation...

Basil’s Hexaemeron was one of the first in a series of criticisms of Aristotle, a series that was to last for over twelve hundred years and give rise at last to modern (post-Aristotelian) science in the seventeenth century. Some of the key points of this critique were:

1. That the behavior of the elements must be understood in terms of law ordained by God rather than in terms their essences;
2. That the heavens are corruptible like the earth so that the same laws of physics should apply to both;
3. That nature, once created and put in motion, evolves in accordance with the laws assigned to it without interruption or diminishment of energy.\textsuperscript{1144}

This deserves some comment. As we saw in part one, the persistent underlying metaphysical error to all Hellenized systems of doctrine which culminated in the Arian-Origenist heresy was the definition of God’s essence in terms of some positive philosophical construct. The response of Athanasius, Basil, the two Gregory’s, Hilary, Ambrose and others was simply to deny the logical consequent that had established the dilemma in the first place: God’s essence was unknowable and unpaticipatible absolutely. However, that essence was revealed in its divine energies of operations, which not only could be known, but participated in. These
energies existed “around the essence” (περὶ τὴν ουσίαν).

But as we also discovered, the same ordo theologiae of persons, energies, essence applied not only to the Three Persons of the Trinity, but also to the One Person and Two Natures of Christ, since He clearly exhibited two sets of operations, one divine, and the other human. Consequently, energies as such existed around natures as such, regardless of the nature in question.

This provided the clue to Basil’s first critique, for he is maintaining, centuries before Kant’s “Copernican Revolution” and in quasi-critical fashion, that essences-in-themselves are known only through their operations or the laws implanted in them by Christ, but they remain unknown as such. It is here, on the order of metaphysical principle that the real conflict between “evolution” and “religion” in fact originates, as we shall come to see. The conflict lies on the metaphysical and physical, not the biological and geological, levels.

This unitary view of the cosmos sets up and establishes his second critique, for there is no bifurcation or cosmic dualism such as dogged the Gnostic systems. In turn this meant that the energies of various essences did not diminish over time. Here one must be careful to understand what he intends to say, and not read into him the developments of the Laws of Thermodynamics. Basil is not saying that individuals do not die or end, as is clear from his first critique. He is saying, however, that the laws, or energies in this sense, do not die. Energies, in this sense, are conversed. More will be stated on this point in a moment when we turn to consider the “Sabbath Rest” as understood by the Church Fathers.

3. The Patristic Creationist Tradition

Kaiser summarizes all this with some lapidary sentences that are as revealing for what he does not say – given his Second European
The fundamental idea in the creationist tradition is that the entire universe is subject to a single code of law which was established along with the universe at the beginning of time...but its subsequent operation can be understood due to the fact that human reason is in some way a reflection or image of that same lawfulness or reason that governs the world.\textsuperscript{1145}

What is revealing here is not so much the profundity of Kaiser’s observations, but the lack of it, as has been made abundantly clear by now, the doctrines of Creation, Man, and Recapitulation were all, for the Fathers, inextricably intertwined. Granted, he does mention as the fourth essential component of the patristic creationist tradition the “ministry of healing and restoration”\textsuperscript{1146} but his observations are not grounded in the Recapitulatory Economy of Christ and its cosmic and anthropological consequences. One is left with a “ministry of healing and restoration” that is insufficiently grounded in the patristic understanding of Christ’s Person and Work. Kaiser is thus still writing, albeit subconsciously, with the idea of the “God-in-general” in mind. As such, he ignores (perhaps because he is unaware of) the signal contribution of the greatest of systematic thinkers among the Church Fathers, St. Maximus the Confessor.

4. The Six Days of Creation and the Sabbath Rest of God: The Liturgy of Creation and Redemption

Crucial to the patristic creationist tradition is the distinction between the first six days of creation and the “Sabbath Rest” of God. “During the first ‘six days’ all depend directly on God’s immediate activity. As of the seventh (Sabbath) day, however, God rested and nature could operate in accordance with the laws already established.”\textsuperscript{1147} The “Sabbath Rest” of God connotes the point at which the innate natural and seminal rational
principles within nature (\(\lambda \sigma \omega \gamma \nu \iota \iota \varsigma \sigma \kappa \iota \omicron \) \(\phi \nu \zeta \kappa \iota \omicron \varsigma \kappa \iota \omicron \sigma \tau \epsilon \omicron \mu \alpha \iota \nu\)) take over. But one would entirely misunderstand – as does Kaiser – this “Sabbath Rest” of God if one understood it in a “deistic” sense, as God “winding up the clock” of creation during the first six days, and then retiring from the scene ever after. That such a view would come to prevail in the Second Europe is itself a legacy of the Augustinian Hellenization and \textit{ordo theologiae}.

For the Fathers, however, the Sabbath Rest was viewed from the standpoint of the Recapitulatory Economy of Christ. In other words, the Sabbath Rest of God in Creation was prefigurative, was a type, of the rest of Christ in the Tomb after His death on the Cross. That natural corruption and death, the separation of the soul and body of His human nature, was a true human death experienced and undergone by the eternal and divine Person of the Son and Word. Yet, both body and soul remained united to Him, though for that moment in the Tomb, they were not united to each other in life. Their separation from each other could not endure, since each remained united to the Son and Word, and their reunion in the Resurrection accomplished the “Eighth Day”, the inauguration of the Kingdom of God and the conquest of the kingdom of death.

Thus, the seminal rational principles continue to operate, not because God withdrew from the world, but because He purposed to enter the world personally. The laws of Creation are implanted for the precise reason that man be able to recognize the Creator when He appeared in His Incarnate Economy. As Maximus the Confessor puts it:

\begin{quote}
The mastery of the incarnation of the Logos is the key to all the arcane symbolism and typology in the scriptures, and in addition gives us knowledge of created things, both visible and intelligible. He who apprehends the mystery of the cross and the burial apprehends the inward essences of created things; while he who is initiated into the inexpressible power of the resurrection apprehends the purpose for which God first established everything.\textsuperscript{1149}
\end{quote}
Consequently, the Sabbath Rest of God also contains a moral dimension, namely, the possibility of the restoration or mankind, through personal askesis, to a state where his personal passions and his natural passions and virtues are no longer disjunctive, corruptible, and mortal, as they became at the fall:

For it is not right to say that the kingdom of God had a beginning or that it was preceded by ages or by time. We believe the kingdom to be the inheritance of those who are saved, their abode and their place, as the true Logos has taught us. For it is the final goal of those who long for that which is the desire of all desires. Once they have reached it they are granted rest from all movement whatsoever, as there is no longer any time or age through which they need to pass.\textsuperscript{1150}

In direct contradistinction to the Augustinian doctrine of original guilt, with its implications of an inheritance of “sin nature”, a human nature which is evil, the Pastristic Doctrine of the First Europe stresses both the natural goodness and virtue of human nature, and its corruption and death by virtue of the Fall.\textsuperscript{1151}

Within this patristic creationist tradition, then, there are three essential “stages” that all laws of nature operate, include the psychological laws appropriate to human willing and intellection; everything has a Beginning (αρχη), a Middle (μεσοτης), and End (τελος).\textsuperscript{1152} In the “cosmos of virtues” in Christ and the limitless perfections of all the infinitely numerous energies around the divine essence, each energy which is itself infinite, the individual experiences a rest from motion, which is more than just the cessation of “physical” motion. It is rather the “rest” from dialectical perceptions and the disjunctions and distortions it produces. Motions of choice for those who have conformed their wills to these natural λογοι in Christ are no longer of uncertain outcome.\textsuperscript{1153}
5. Typology and “Natural Agnosticism”

All this meant that there was a kind of “natural” or “physical agnosticism” regarding the phenomena of nature in the patristic creationist tradition. As Kaiser puts it, “it is not the facts themselves that are in doubt, but the reasons for them. This agnosticism with regard to causes and the consequent restriction of natural philosophy to the knowledge of patterns in nature was quite in keeping with general trends in the science of late antiquity.”¹¹⁵⁴ It is the visible, observable reiteration of patterns in nature that provides the link between how the Fathers viewed Scripture and how they viewed natural laws, for both views are in fact founded upon a common method, typology. Typology provided no insight into the reasons why God ordered the world as He did, rather it testified to something far more important: the consistent character of God and the consistent nature of His dealings in relationship to the world (οἰκονομία), a relationship summed up or recapitulated in Christ.

6. The Typologies of Nature and History

This means that the world, in terms of the rule types by which it operates possessed for the Fathers a certain “inexhaustibility.”¹¹⁵⁵ The world is, so to speak, “inexhaustively comprehensible” ¹¹⁵⁶ This operational unity in typology unifies, for the Fathers, the spheres of nature, history and salvation history, as we saw in chapter one. ¹¹⁵⁷ They thus anticipated the insights of the nineteenth century historiographers who insisted upon history as a fundamental component of scientific disciplines. Once fixed upon its center, nature continued its natural operation, like a spinning top.¹¹⁵⁸ It was this celebrated figure that gave rise to the mediaeval concept of “impulse” or inertia.
7. The Neoplatonic and Gnostic Pseudomorphosis of the Hexaemerist Tradition

Not surprisingly, however, with the advent of Neoplatonic philosophy and its tremendous and deleterious influence upon Christian doctrine, the Crisis of the First Hellenization took on scientific implications which it was left for the Second Europe, with its embrace of the Augustinian Hellenization, to work out. Mediaeval Islamic philosophers, working under this influence, could not allow any semi-autonomy to the created order. Consequently, the “impulse” had continuously to be imparted to nature by the God-in-general. This weakened the semi-autonomy of nature, and this in turn vitiated the metaphysical basis for the idea of a conservation of momentum in nature.\textsuperscript{1159}

B. The Augustinian Ordo Theologiae and the Origin of the Deistic “Watchmaker” God

Here as elsewhere it is in the theological formulations and inversions of the Augustinian \textit{ordo theologiae} that one must seek the ultimate sources for the view of the completely autonomous world of nature that comes to play such a prominent role in the natural philosophy and physics of the Second Europe. Like the other Fathers, St. Augustine acknowledges the presence in nature(s) of the seminal rational principles, what he called the \textit{rationes seminales}. Augustine’s formulation of them was designed to resolve a problem he encountered in the biblical text. Unfortunately, his resolution of that difficulty was based upon the abandonment of the patristic \textit{ordo theologiae} and the substitution of the Augustinian inversion of that \textit{ordo}:

Augustine could account for the fact that heaven and earth were created in the beginning of God’s work (Gen 1:1) yet did not take form as
firmament and dry land, respectively, until the second and third ‘days’ (Gen 1:6-10). He solved the problem by referring the initial act of creation (Gen 1:1) to the seeds (as well as the unformed material) of heaven and earth. In effect, the seeds of all things were created at once. And the work of the ‘six days’ in Genesis 1 was really an inventory of the potencies contained in those seeds.

As a result of Augustine’s interpretation, the seminal causes, which had been so closely related to the divine world soul in Stoicism and Neoplatonism and to the Wisdom or Word of God in intertestamental Judaism and early Christianity, could now be regarded as distinct from God’s (trascendent) essence. Moreover, the beginning of God’s rest and of nature’s relative autonomy were pushed back from the first Sabbath (Gen 2:2) to the very first instant of time. This is, therefore, the first clear indication we have of the concept of autonomous nature that was to prevail in the West after the seventeenth century.

Augustine was not a deist in the modern sense, however, for he regarded God’s eternal will and power as terminating in time. God’s eternal decree functioned as a continuously creative activity by virtue of which seminal causes could produce their respective effects. Still, given the fact of that continuous activity, the inevitability and predictability of cause-effect sequence seemed to follow.

What is to be especially noted here is the emphasis given to the fact that the rationes seminales are created, i.e., began to exist at the moment creation and time began to exist.

For Sts. Dionysius and Maximus and the whole non-Augustinian patristic tradition, however, the rationales seminales were uncreate: “The One Logos is the many logoi, and the many logoi are the One Logos.” The logoi were thus one and the same as the eternal and uncreated energies around the divine essence. This accounts for the fact that creation in the patristic creationist tradition was viewed, not as entirely autonomous, but semi-autonomous, for creation was interpenetrated (περιχωρησις) by the divine operations in virtue of Christ’s incarnation into
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it. On Augustine’s view, however, one is dealing with two autonomous entities, God and creation, a feature which opens the door to all the disjunctive dualisms in science which occasioned similar disjunctions in Gnostic metaphysical speculation.

Kaiser is alive to the Christological dimensions of this problem:

Such an emphasis did begin to enter the tradition with Augustine’s separation of the seminal causes from God’s consubstantial Word and Spirit, but it was not essential to the traditional itself. The idea of the complete autonomy, or even mechanicity, of nature did not enter until the gulf opened by Augustine widened to the point of suggesting a dichotomy between God’s ordering of nature and his absolute power, or even between nature itself and God. This did not happen until the eleventh or twelfth century. In our view, them, it was not the original biblical and patristic tradition, but a distortion of it, that tended toward the determinism, reductionism, and atheism that characterizes so much of modern Western thought.

Notably, Kaiser points out what has become obvious in other spheres: the sea-change within the defining feature of the Second Europe’s general culture occurs in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, within a hundred years of so of its final schism from the First Europe.

Not surprisingly, the reasons for the change are to be found dint he Second Europe’s doctrine of God. In the fourteenth century, for example, Oresme could draw the following observation on the way in which God imparted impetus and impulse to creation. In doing so, he unwittingly founded a new implication within the developing “inevitabilities” of the Augustinian Hellenization: “the situation,” he wrote, “is much like that of a man making a clock and letting it run down and continue its own motion by itself.”
1. Distinction equals Opposition: Natural Law versus Miracle

This divorce of God and creation did not reach its zenith until the “fragmentation of the disciples” was well under way in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But once Augustine had opened that gulf by referring to the rationes seminales as created things, the mediaeval Second Europe was confronted by yet a new dialectical opposition: “either an autonomous world, created by God but virtually independent of his continued presence and power; or else a world so utterly dependent on God’s will moment by moment that all rational, scientific investigation became impossible.” Implanted into nature as inflexible and autonomous (created) entities, the seminal rational principles allowed only one type of active intervention by God, their suspension. In the inevitabilities that spin forth from Augustine’s recasting of the doctrine of the seminal reasons, the rationes seminales are no longer the typologies of Creation and Scripture which Christ the Son of God fulfills, but are the unvarying laws of nature which God must suspend. on the patristic view, miracles operate according to the same principles (λογοί) as does creation, since both are perfomed by the Word (Λογος). But in the Second Europe, miracles are now oppositions to the natural order and its laws. On this view, the Recapitulatory Economy of Christ has collapsed, and in its place has been put the Augustinian ordo theologiae of essence, attributes, and persons. The consequence of this is yet another dialectical inevitability, the separation of the moral, spiritual and religious spheres of human existence, from the scientific and technological.
2. The Scientific Version of Transubstantiation by Annihilation

Not surprisingly, the mirror of this new scientific attitude is the theological formulations of sacramental doctrine and piety in the mediaeval church of the Second Europe. If God were to intervene in the realm of nature, He could increasingly only do so by a suspension or annihilation of it:

As we have seen, the theological idea that lay behind Aquinas’s interest in the quantification of matter was the absolute obedience of all things to the determination of God as exemplified in the transubstantiation of the Eucharistic elements and the resurrection of the body...

... The theological motive behind these bold suggestions was the desire to acknowledge the absolute power of God and the contingency of the natural order: God could have created a different order than the one he did, and he was not bound by the present order but could alter or even annihilate and recreate any portion of it.1171

Why was this necessary? First, still lingering in the Second Europe’s spiritual consciousness is the patristic doctrine of Recapitulation: that God can create ex nihilo, rise bodily from the dead, and transform bread and wine into his Body and Blood (without, it should be noted, “annihilating” the bread and wine, for that would have been perceived as sacramental “Doketism”), were all related doctrines.

But more important in Aquinas’s and the Second Europe’s understanding of the sacraments is the new “scientific” conception of matter: matter inevitably possesses spatial extension as a fundamental property. As we saw earlier, it was this very property of matter, and the naturalistic thinking behind it, that led Ratramnus to posit his dialectical formulation of Eucharistic doctrine as a “metaphor” of Christ’s Body and Blood, since those could not be present wholly and substantially on a
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multitude of altars around the world.¹¹²³ Ratramnus is thus the precursor to Descartes in his emphasis on the spatial and geometric extension of matter.¹¹²⁴

C. The Augustinian Ordo Theologiae and Science

1. Dialectical Deduction

But how, exactly and explicitly, does the Augustinian ordo theologiae contribute to this process of opposing God’s activity to the natural laws of creation? How does one derive, with Oresme, the Deistic watchmaker God-in-general from the Augustinian ordo? Kaiser is worth citing in this regard, for he unwittingly pinpoints the ordo as the source of the problem. In citing him, we shall add that level, in italics, of the ordo that he is referring to:

The net effect of the synthesis with Aristotelian philosophy on the procedure of theology was threefold. First, the order in which topics were treated tended to proceed from those truths that were though accessible to reason (1. essence, and 2. attributes) – a “general revelation” available to all humans – to those truths that were known only on the basis of biblical revelation (3. persons) - a ‘special revelation’ unique to Christian faith. This procedure was followed by Thomas in his two great ‘summas’

Before proceeding further, it should be noted that Kaiser’s remarks – and they could be duplicated by citing any number of historians of doctrine in the Second Europe – accurately depict the ordering of questions within the Augustinian ordo. What is inaccurate, however, and it is a persistent error in the Second Europe’s historiography, is the attribution of this erroneous ordo to the mediaeval scholastics. As we have
seen, it was not the advent of Aristotle in the twelfth centuries that founded the ordo, it was the Neoplatonized Hellenization of Augustine himself which founded it. The ordo was there when Aristotle was “rediscovered”. All that remained was to engraf Aristotle onto the basic structure, a marriage which produced more bastard offspring. We now continue with Kaiser:

The second effect of the scholastic synthesis was a heightened emphasis on rigorous deduction within the treatment of revealed theology itself. In natural theology, as we have noted, one could use the abstractive method of the sciences, that is, one could begin with what is known empirically and reason inductively toward the principles that must be posited in order to account for the known facts.

Again we must pause, for as has been abundantly observed throughout these essays, the process of deduction and rigorous dialectical formulation of principles was not begun with the mediaval scholastics. It is one of the many inherent “inevitabilities” of the Augustinian ordo itself.

2. The Filioque

Kaiser does sense, however, that there is a deep seated relationship between the Augustinian ordo and its doctrine of God:

Take, for instance, the procession of the Holy Spirit, an issue that divided the Christians of the West from the Eastern Orthodox. In his Summa against the Gentiles, Aquinas presents a series of arguments. In the first of these, he begins with Romans 8:9 which refers to the ‘spirit of Christ’ and proceeds to show (a) that the Spirit is ‘of Christ’ as Christ is the natural Son of God and (b) that the Spirit must be ‘of Christ’ in the sense of having its origin from Christ because the only relations found within the Godhead are relations of origin (IV: 24:2).
This effect of the *filioque* shows up even in something seemingly as unrelated as Johannes Kepler's "Trinitarian Cosmos", with the sun representing the dynamic center of the solar system as the image of God the Father, the other stars of the heavens representing God the son, and the space of the realm of earth and the planets representing the Holy Spirit.\[^{1175}\] This is revealing, for it is to be noted that the sphere of the earth and the planets, wholly different orders of celestial objects than stars, are representative of the Holy Spirit, Who in the Augustinian doctrine of the *filioque* is relegated a secondary status behind the Father and the Son.

### 3. The division of Theology into “Loci”

With the emphasis on dialectical deduction as the basis of "scientific theology" came the "fragmentation" and division of theology into "loci". This fragmentation of the disciplines was begun by the division of theology into distinct "loci" or areas or doctrines to be considered. This is the third effect of the Augustinian *ordo theologiae*,\[^{1174}\] for its consequence is the loss of the wholeness and unity of the theological mind of the First Europe.

### 4. The effects of the Ordo Theologiae Augustinianae

The Augustinian *ordo theologiae* proceeded in a certain order: (1) essence, (2) attributes, and (3) persons, which was the opposite order of theology from the Patristic *ordo* of (1) Persons, (2) energies, and (3) essence. One of the most serious consequences of this inversion was the relegation of revelation, the third component in the Augustinian *ordo*, to a subordinate position of importance, behind those general philosophical truths of scientific natural theology.
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The placement of revelation in the synthesis, which corresponded to the place of theology in the university curriculum, had the effects of:

(1) Establishing the order of the theological curriculum as proceeding from natural theology to revealed theology;
(2) Encouraging the use of rigorous deduction in the treatment of revealed theology;
(3) Increasing the isolation of distinct theological ‘loci’ as topics for consideration. 1176

Here one must be attentive to the implications of the first and second steps, for inherent in the ordo is the implication that theology (as revelation) should be subordinated to the insights of natural and deductive science.

5. The Bifurcation of the Cosmos

With the subordination of revelation to philosophy, the patristic creationist tradition bifurcates for yet another reason, for each component of the Augustinian ordo the natural and philosophical theology — steps one and two (the essence and attributes) of the ordo — and the revealed theology (step three, the persons), leads to two new opposing methodological inevitabilities:

(1) Treat revealed theology with the method of natural philosophical theology; or
(2) Maintain that natural and revealed theology are each to be treated according to two wholly different and to a certain extent mutually exclusive methodologies.

While mediaeval science did develop three doctrines as direct influenced of theological doctrines, namely, the possibility of a void (the
nihilo in the doctrine of creation ex nihilo), the idea of impetus, and alternative cosmologies to geocentrism, these doctrines were increasingly viewed as attacks not only on Aristotle, but, since his system had been so closely, and wrongly, identified with the content of theological doctrines as such, the vies that science and theology were in conflict began subtly to enter the cultural consciousness of the Second Europe, the most visible evidence of which was the Galileo case.

6. The Spiritual Consequence of the De-Sacralization of Space

With the Ratramnian-Cartesian doctrine of extension came the inevitable corollary that space was de-sacralized, and with this, moral and spiritual conceptions and virtues could not longer find a place in the external world, and had to be reoriented inward to the interior life. It should be recalled in this regard that this movement parallels the developments in politics and law that have already been surveyed, during the same period.

7. The Reduction of Revelation

This bifurcation of two autonomous spheres finally came to have an effect on the conception of the nature of revelation itself during the Protestant Reformation, Revelation, in order to be “certainly” objective and not subject to the vissicitudes of the world, or of speculative science or natural theology, came to be narrowly circumscribed in the sola Scriptura itself, understood in conjunction with the interiorizing of the spiritual and moral realms within the life of the individual believer in the corollary sola fidei, sola gratia. Once this had been done, the way was clear for science and scientists to pronounce on metaphysical, philosophical, and ultimately theological questions that were located in all three areas of the
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D. Sir Isaac Newton’s Critique of the Ratramnian-Cartesian Notion of Extension

It fell to Sir Isaac Newton to begin the process of scientific extrapolation of the inherent principles and implications of the Augustinian ordo. He began by refuting the Cartesian notion of extension as an attribute of matter, and maintaining that spatial extension and temporal duration are primarily attributes of God’s essence, rather than of matter’s:

If we say with Descartes that extension is body, do we not manifestly offer a path to Atheism, both because extension is not created but has existed eternally, and because we have an absolute idea of it without any relationship to God,…Moreover, if the distinction (made by Descartes) of substances between thinking and extended is legitimate and complete, God does not eminently contain extension within himself and therefore cannot create it; but God and extension will be two substances separately complete, absolute, and having the same significance. 1177

Newton has detected, in other words, the residual influences of the Neoplatonism which entered Augustinian triadology, for it will be recalled from Part One that one of the consequences of Plotinus’s doctrine of the one was that matter was “the uttermost emanation” from It, and was, like the One itself, wholly simple, but possessed of a moral character the exact opposite of the One’s in that it was uttermost “evil.” 1178

1. The Newtonian Version of the Origenist Problematic

Thus, to preserve one from dualism, Newton had to maintain that
extension (space) and duration (time) did not fall on the side of matter, but were properties of God. But this impales him on the horns of the same dilemma upon which Origen and Arius and the whole First Hellenization found itself fastened: either one had to affirm the eternity of the world in order to affirm the eternity and deity of the Logos, or one had to deny the eternity and deity of the Logos in order to affirm the genuinely created and temporal nature of creation itself. Newton has reproduces it by maintaining that in order for creation to have extension and duration, these must be properties of God primarily.

Nothing better suffices to demonstrate the exact parallelism between Newton on the one hand and Origen and Arius on the other than fact that Newton was led, by the force of the dialectical structure which he inherited, to accept an Arian Christology.

This can be seen by looking again at his concept of the relationship between God, space, and time. For Newton, God was not outside space and time.

"He is not eternity and infinity, but eternal and infinite; he is not duration or space, but he endures and is present. He endures forever, and is everywhere present; and by existing always and everywhere, he constitutes duration and space...he is omnipresent not virtually only, but also substantially..."\textsuperscript{1179}

What one sees here is the old heresy of identifying operations (infinitude and eternity) with essence; Newton is defining God as infinity and eternity of spatial and temporal extension. Kaiser’s comments are worth citing, for he detects the error, but here, as elsewhere, is ignorant of its ultimate roots and connection to the Second Europe’s heretical Trinitarian formulation:

Therefore, Newton could not differentiate between God’s internal operations (\textit{opera ad intra}), like the generation of the Son and the
procession of the Spirit, and his external operations (\emph{opera ad extra}) by
appealing to a qualitative difference between eternity and time. Christ
was, for Newton, the pre-existent Son of God, begotten before all worlds,
but his generation was an event on the same time line as the creation of
he world. The only difference was that the former was indivisible and
temporarily prior to the latter. Before the creation of this visible world, God
exercised his omnipotence by creating an invisible world, as Origen and
Basil had led...But, for Newton, this invisible creation included the Son of
God as well as the angels. The Son, was, therefore, a perfect creature,
the first and greatest of all God's creatures, but
neither co-eternal nor
consubstantial with the Father. Thus the notion of God's eternity as
limitless duration or unending time made Arianism a plausible Christology
for Newton.\footnote{1180}

In other words, Newton, like Arius, opted for the non-eternity of the world,
and with it, like Arius, opted for the non-eternity of the Son, and therefore
denied His consubstantiality and deity with the Father.

But whence this denial? The simplicity of God, of course, which
fueled the growing skepticism in Deistic England regarding the doctrine of
the Trinity. Samuel Clarke would deny the deity of Christ on the basis of
his interpretation that the divine simplicity meant the circumscripive and
defining indivisibility of the divine essence. Thus, following Eunomius and
Arius, he emphasized the reliance of the Son's creation on the Father's
will.\footnote{1181} With this, the Deistic God-in-general makes Its first formal
appearance in scientific and philosophical literature, though It had long
held the preeminent position in the general culture of the Second Europe.

With this, it became fashionable no longer even to speak of "God",
for that term had lingering connotations of the context-specificity of
historical Christian revelation. Lest the term or ultimate principle to which it
referred be misunderstood as "Father, Son, and Holy Spirit" due to this
residual influence, Deists adopted the much more serviceable and (to
them) accurate term, "the Deity", a term which in certain circles is still
spoken with a rather too hushed tone of voice.

**E. Buffon’s Natural Historiography**

“The work of Georges Louis Le Clere, Comte de Buffon (1707-1788), represents a major watershed in Western ideas about nature,” writes Christopher Kaiser. It may indeed be a watershed, but it should not be a surprising one, for the logic of Buffon’s natural historiography is contained in the Augustinian ordo theologiae itself. The basic idea of Buffon’s work was to draw out the hidden implication of Augustine’s making created entities of the seminal reasons, the first-created things by which everything else is made and to whose laws everything else is subject:

As a result of the self-sufficiency of nature, everything since the first moment of creation, even the emergence of life itself, had happened in accordance with immutable laws of nature. Or, turning the problem around, human reason could now reconstruct the history of nature, going all the way back to the first moment of creation, simply on the basis of the laws and present state of the world.

Buffon thus simultaneously had the metaphysical foundation for the “scientific historiography” of the nineteenth century and also of the natural and geological historiography of that century, including its most famous conceptual icon, the theory of evolution.

Buffon’s achievement was that he did not view the operation of these laws as occurring in a steady state, but rather, that they could give rise to very different “eras” of natural and human history. Thus:

For the first time in human history the age of the cosmos could be estimated using scientific methods that were not based on ancient texts.
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This led to the first paradox: a discipline that was the outgrowth of the special history of a peculiar culture had now become so comprehensive and so well established that its view of the world appeared to be entirely independent of the discipline of history itself.\textsuperscript{1184}

In other words, Buffon merely applied the “collapse of context specificity” already in evidence in the physical sciences and English Deism to the sphere of historiography – human and natural – itself.

F. Science, Morality, and the Future

That modern technology promises imposing, promising, and perhaps foreboding, developments in the future non would deny, but the question of the morality of those developments has already been relegated to a secondary consideration by the force of the underlying Hellenized structure of the Second Europe’s though. While a complete survey of these developments is not here possible, it is necessary to survey and critique a few of them.

1. Cloning: the Immaculate Conception Revisited

The cloning of animals from basic DNA material and without a sire has already engendered the possibility of biologically engineered “immaculate conceptions”, even in the case of human beings. The temptation in the latter case is all too obvious: human clones, if such will ever exist (and I personally have no doubt that they will, though I certainly deplore that development), will likely be treated by the rest of mankind, engendered the “old-fashioned way”, as somehow less than human. A state will arise rather similar to the Roman Catholic Dogma of the Immaculate Conception, which states that Mary was singled out for the
special privilege of having been born free from the taint of original sin, a
dogma which in fact severs her (and therefore her Son’s) connection with
the rest of humanity. The temptation might also arise in whatever human
clones might exist to view themselves as somehow exempt from the
inheritance of ancestral sin. Here the reaction of “scientifically informed
minds” is almost too predictable. Theologians and commissions might be
called upon to render verdicts in favor of the clone population’s exemption
from original sin. They will point – one-sidedly – to statements in the
patristic record that the Virgin Birth of Christ is what preserved Him free of
sin. On this basis, perhaps it may even be argued that such human clone
populations may be granted special privileges in law or society, over and
above the rest of their lesser subjects. Of course, what will be ignored is
the fact that the Virgin Birth did not prevent Christ from inheriting the post-
lapsarian mortality of human nature. The denial that He did was of course
a heresy that we encountered long ago with Aphthartodoketism.

2. Nanotechnology and “Virtual Immortality”

But why bother about clones and genetic engineering? The “moral”
and “theological” dangers that are often paraded by the theologically
ignorant media of the Second Europe invoke images of monsters being
conjured in forbidden laboratories by an amoral science are reason
enough, to be sure. The real reasons for concern, however, are not so
much the monsters conjured in the minds of genetic scientists or in the
popular imagination, but the pervading inclination to misinterpret the
significance of these events as being somehow a great challenge to the
tenets of “traditional religion”, namely, Christianity.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

In a breathtaking work, Engines of Creation: The Coming Era of
Nanotechnology, K. Eric Drexler hypothesizes a future of miniaturization
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that has attained the technological capacity to engineer at the most basic molecular and atomic levels. One of the extrapolations he deduces – in our opinion correctly – from this emerging capability\textsuperscript{185} is the ability of mankind to bioengineer a “virtual immortality”, i.e., a vastly expanded life-expectancy running into the hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of years.

Of course, there will be those who will point to this as being “final disproof” of the Orthodox Christian doctrine of ancestral sin and inherited mortality. But this interpretation and the people proffering it will not constitute the real danger. The real danger will lay in the technology itself and the total lack of moral visions of those seeking to acquire it, for perforce, they must ignore the lessons from the tradition latent in such capability.

It will be recalled that St. John Chrysostom taught that death was both the natural consequence of Adam and Eve’s sin, as well as the grounding of the possibility for man’s repentance; death put an end to the growth of the habit of sin and evil within the individual person. With a “virtual immortality”, however, there exists a potential for depravity, despair, and weariness in evil such as mankind has never before seen, not, as Christ Himself put it, since the days of Noah.\textsuperscript{186} This capacity, coupled with the already emerging capability to engineer cloned life, could conceivably spawn and race of men with little regard for their less fortunate fellow man, and for that matter, with perhaps little more than contempt for other forms of life, for once this stage is reached, technology will no longer be seen as the means to an end, but as equivalent with the end: the improved life of mankind. “Virtual immortality” promises to be the technological fulfillment of the promise the serpent first made in primordial paradise: an “immortality” without God, and therefore, without moral constraints, the closes possible human image to that hellish personal existence of the fallen daemons. In such a world, the spiritual choices Orthodox Christians will face will be enormous, and clear. It will indeed take men and women of great faith to reject the proffered “immortality” of a
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life of hundreds or thousands of years for the short three score and ten
and the promise of genuine immortality with Christ and the saints.\textsuperscript{1187}

with Edward B. Anderson, M.D.

“…for that day shall not come, except there come a falling away first…” St. Paul, II Thessalonians 2:4

A. Introduction

So what, after all is said and done, is the actual religion of the Second Europe? From the Orthodox perspective of these essays, it is apostasy, or, to give it its euphemistic name, ecumenism, and its tactics are the familiar ones of all Gnostic systems of Hellenization.

Apostasy is a harsh word, and we choose it with care. For those who do not believe that apostasy has been and is taking place in various Christian ecclesiastical bodies today, our writing will have little meaning. Likewise, those who view deviations from historic and received confessional positions as ‘healthy and natural’ will find little of interest, and perhaps little of comfort, in these pages. Similarly, those who consider themselves ‘practitioners of ecumenism’ and who look upon the various organs and plans of the institutional ecumenical movement as to the hope for Christian unity will, no doubt, not welcome this contribution to their practice, and, more than likely, contrive to dismiss it.

That many Christians agree with our concerns, however, is evidenced by the numerous organizations and movements, and even whole denominations, devoted to traditionalist resistance which exist within or parallel to most major Christian ecclesiastical bodies. It is our aim to help those sympathetic to these organizations and movements to understand the similarities which exist between the pattern of any given
denomination’s destruction and those of another. We thereby intend to help those devoted to maintaining the integrity of their received ecclesiastical tradition to understand their situation more accurately, to understand that theirs is not an isolated case, but that the pattern of destruction is always the same, and applied across existing denominational boundaries, and that therefore the process of resistance must likewise extend across denominational boundaries. We believe these things are possible, because we believe that there is indeed a pattern of apostasy, utilizing the standard tactics and strategy of political revolutions, only applied to the churches. Others have referred to the disease as a kind of spiritual or metaphysical “AIDS”, spreading across denominational boundaries. Hermann Sasse wrote:

In spite of all divisions and separations, the Christians and the churches of whatever denomination are bound together by the strange solidarity of a common history. They experience the same joys and disappointments, success and failures.

Great spiritual movements, healthy or unhealthy, spread through the whole of Christendom irrespective of denominational borders. It is by no means so as it was believed forty years ago that the fall one one church means the rise of another. They are all confronted with the same enemies, the same emergencies. Together they rise, together they fall.

Our task in this final essay is to analyze the method and symptoms of this spiritual and metaphysical disease.

Since we mean to explore and draw comparisons between trends in Protestant, Roman Catholic, Anglican and Orthodox Christian bodies, identifying the Gnostic methods of Second Hellenization of Doctrine as they present themselves in these several bodies may seem a bit Procrustean, since orthodoxy for one maybe heresy for another. This
method, however, is not at all Procrustean. By simply allowing each group to define itself by its own classical formulations, as evidenced by its creeds, confessions, and common devout, practice, without, here at least, a consideration of their respective claims or truth and apart from the historical contexts in which they occur, “apostasy” is then defined in each case as the deliberate deviation from these positions. That is, the method will be to suspend theological analysis and historical context so as to distill simply the method of apostasy and all of the strategy and tactics involved in subverting that is, changing, the belief and practice of a given ecclesiastical body in order to remake it in the image of the deviations. This method might be described simply as an examination of the practice of ecclesiastical politics involved in apostasy, as a “sociology” or even “meta-theology” of apostasy.

In this final essay, therefore, theological judgments on these positions will, to the extent that it is possible, be avoided, since, as Orthodox Christians committed to the Tradition of Holy Orthodoxy, we would be compelled to measure the merits both of the classical confessions of the West, as well as the recent doctrinal, moral, and liturgical deviations from them, by the standards of Eastern Orthodoxy. This has, to a certain extent, already been done in previous pages, and would be self-defeating, since it would then tend to mask the fact that the same strategy and tactics are being applied within the contemporary Orthodox Church as well, and with no little measure of success.

To say that this method of examination suspends historical contexts does not, however, mean that there is no historical focus to this essay. For reasons which will have become apparent through the course of these essays, we have focused upon the major struggles in the latter half of the Twentieth Century, both those that appear to be over and settled, and those which promise to be with us for some time. Specifically, we shall consider the doctrinal and liturgical changes emanating from Vatican Council II in the Roman Catholic Church, the onslaught of modernism
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throughout the Anglican Communion, the secularization of the Protestant denominations, and the often unnoticed (and unmentioned) but nevertheless grave struggle within Eastern Orthodoxy, especially in the “diaspora” of the West in general and in America in particular.

As themes, we will focus, within each ecclesiastical body, on the changes in confessional positions, the dilution of the authority of ecclesiastical tradition, the assault on the authority of Holy Scripture, the alterations of the structure of ordinary ecclesiastical authority, the ‘politicalization’ of church polity and the collapse of discipline, and liturgical revisionism.

One final caveat must be added. We do not wish to imply by the phrases “pattern of apostasy” or “methods of apostasy”, a kind of “master plan” to subvert a denomination which is followed in a rigid chronological sequence, nor that all of the methods described must be present or used in order for apostasy to take place. Once again, the emphasis here is not on theological analysis or historical context and sequence which will, inevitably, vary in details or sequential ordering on case to case basis. The methods which are described in the following pages may be utilized at any given point of the process of subversion, and in any number of combinations which will best produce the desired “results”.

Finally, we do not plan to address, in this last essay, the spiritual reasons why individuals or groups within a church come to the point not only of departing from their received faith, but also to the point of desiring to alter the faith of others within their church by altering their church’s official formulae themselves. The psychology of apostasy is a profoundly spiritual phenomenon, intimately connected to the Fall of Man, which deserves a separate and careful examination of its own. We simply assume that such individuals exist, and then examine the external manifestations of the course they have followed in the past, and are now following.
B. The Pattern and Phases of Apostasy

It has reached the status almost of an axiom in most churches that ‘liberals’ or ‘progressives’ are not, for the most part, base people who do base things for base reasons. Indeed, apostasy can only take place when those who really desire it are able to enlist, by overt or covert means, the support of those who love their church the most and whose motivations are noble. Ann Roche Muggeridge, a traditional Roman Catholic, states this with elegant simplicity in her classic evaluation of post-Vatican II changes in the Roman Catholic Church, The Desolate City: Revolution in the Catholic Church:

Ironically, at the beginning, “liberal” Catholics were for more Catholicism rather than, as now, for less. They wanted more and better preaching, more decorum and splendor in the liturgy, expansion of every apostolate. They criticized the clerical laziness, which, they said, had reduced the parish churches to the level of “ecclesiastical filling stations”. They wanted to elevate the religious style of Catholic popular culture, to replace the “Viennese Masses” with Gregorian chant...\[1190\]

With a few changes in specifics to suit one’s individual denomination, her words will sound hauntingly familiar to those who look back on “how it all began” in their own church.

Thus, at least some of the instigators are not necessarily attempting to subvert or overturn the orthodoxy of their ecclesiastical body, and those who approvingly acquiesce in them are also often doing so for what they are persuaded good reasons. Many of those within the Episcopal Church in America, for example, who regarded themselves as orthodox Anglo-Catholics, were excited at the prospect of being able to introduce more “catholic” liturgies and rubrics into standard usage in the 1979 version of the American Book of Common Prayer. The much-contested revisions of the Methodist, Presbyterian, and other Protestant hymnals have likewise
been impelled in part by real perceived needs regarding narrow hymn selection and the sometimes inadequate theology expressed in them.

But what begins as an opportunity for traditionalists is an opportunity for subversives as well. What many perceived as a forum and opportunity to make the liturgical practice or confessional position “more Catholic” or “Methodist”, in short, from the reformers’ perspective, “more Christian”, is also an opportunity for the subversive, who seizes upon it as a license to revise the very meaning of Christian faith itself in a radical way by altering what apparently is only superficial and external.

This illustrates two crucial points about all examples of apostasy seen throughout this work. First, the well-intentioned reformer seeking to correct abuses does not need the radical subversive in order for his programs to be accepted, since in most cases a vast majority of faithful will accept what is in accordance with their faith. Second, the radical subversive does need the well-intentioned reformer, since his program will only be accepted to the extent that he is able to disguise his program and invest in with the symbols of received orthodoxy.

There are, as noted earlier, certain features common to revolutions: as aggrieved class, a climate conducive to radical change, a weakened government, a triggering incident, a moderate phase stressing continuity with the old order, a radical phase proclaiming a new order, consolidation and institutionalization or counter-revolution.1191

A political alliance of expediency must therefore be made between the two groups in order for apostasy to take place, and this alliance then goes through three basic stages.

In the first stage, there is a tacit or open support on the part of both groups for “good” changes, that is, for those changes intended to serve the advancement of confessional orthodoxy within a given church. At this stage, coalitions between those seeking to institute moderate changes for promoting denominational orthodoxy, that is, the first group of well-
intentioned reformers, and those seeking to introduce changes subversive of that very denominational orthodoxy, must occur. In this stage, there are two essential steps for the subversive. He must first disguise his unbelief while remaining in office, in order, secondly, to make “revolutionary use of the symbols of power.” At this stage, the crucial goal of the subversive is simply to introduce the notion of change itself and, by carefully disguising it with the well-intentioned reformer’s “good” changes, to inculcate the notion of change itself as being inherently good and acceptable.

If this is accomplished, and the coalition between radical subversive and well-intentioned reformer be achieved, the task or the radical in the second stage is to co-opt any good changes by entwining them inextricably with more revolutionary and anti-orthodox changes, that is, to contrive “orthodox contexts” in which a subversive change occurs. The orthodoxy of these contexts disguises the radical nature of the revolutionary change itself, and, since the subversive must still not declare himself as such, these contexts often function as “theological time bombs” to be detonated when the subversive is in enough positions of denominational power and authority to do so. At this stage, the virtue of the orthodox reformer is entangled even more with the vice of the radical revisionist. In this second stage, the phenomenon of the coalition begins to break down, as the well-intentioned reformer is either won over to the subversive program, or breaks the alliance.

As the revolutionaries succeed in isolating the government from the mass of the governed, the government’s prestige declines rapidly... Therefore, it tries conciliatory gestures, which the revolution correctly interprets as weakness. As the government becomes increasingly unable or unwilling to govern, the revolutionaries throw off all pretence that their movement is merely a logical development of the old system or a legal reform. 1192

At this point, parallel magisteria of scholars and experts, both orthodox and subversive, emerge to exert pressure in favor of the ultimate adoption
of one or the other of their interpretations of the same package of reforms, and this provides the transition to the final stage.

In the final stage, when enough subversives and former orthodox reformers, now turned fellow travelers, occupy enough positions of power, the subversive changes alone are promoted openly by the ordinary authority of the ecclesiastical body in question, giving them at least the sanction of “legality”. At this final stage, the traditionalist faithful are compelled to make the “tragic choice” between the sins, or at the very least, the unpleasantries, of formal schism from the ecclesiastical body, and the sin of remaining within it, but tolerating deviations from that body’s previously received orthodoxy. In other words, inevitably there comes the “tragic choice” between schism, or heresy, both, to the traditionalist, equally serious.

Throughout these stages, the underlying grand strategic principle of the subversive, and that principle which underlies all his methods, strategies, and tactics of apostasy, is “Disguise unbelief, and put virtue in the service of vice, truth in the service of falsehood.” The collation of Stage One would not be possible unless the subversive was successful in disguising his unbelief and his program, nor if he were unable to put the program of “orthodox” reforms in the service of “unorthodox” ones. The program accepted in Stage Two would not be accepted, unless the same held true, for it is promulgated by an authority which has the sanction of prior legality and orthodoxy. The breakdown of the coalition which occurs in this stage, when the subversive program gradually and inevitably emerges and is openly proclaimed, nevertheless continues to be sold to the vast majority of the denominations faithful by propaganda which utilizes this very same principle. Even in Stage Three, where the coalition breaks down completely, the principle is still in evidence, for now unbelief disguises itself by processing itself of all the symbols, offices, and authority, of orthodoxy.

The Anglican example in North America perhaps affords the best
perspective from which to observe each of these three Stages and the altering political shifts between orthodox reformer and subversive revisionist. As Anglicanism lacks a central ecclesiastical authority and invests much of its ecclesiastical authority in the Book of Common Prayer, its wording, liturgy, and rubrics are therefore central to the program of the Anglican subversive. It constitutes the key point at which an Anglican ecclesiastical revolution must come; it was therefore necessary to place the Prayer Book on the agenda or reform. And this could be done only by persuading the influential Anglo-Catholic wing of the Episcopal Church that such revision would allow a return to more ancient, and thus “more catholic”, formularies and rubrics.

Thus, the next step in the “virtue in the service of vice” principle involved tying “liberal” revisions to “traditional” ones in the spirit of compromise. As a consequence of this, Anglo-Catholics would be able to be rid of some of the more uncomfortable “Protestantism” of the Prayer Book, but only at the cost of having to accept (to choose but one example), an altered service for the consecration of bishops which removed the traditional scriptural reading which specified that the consecrant must be a man. While the consecration service retained the structure, i.e., the context of orthodoxy, a seemingly minor omission was in fact introduced as a preparation for future innovations; a time bomb was planted for detonation at a later date. Similarly, while the 1979 book contained largely unaltered services from the 1928 Book, the retention of these was tied to the acceptance of greatly innovative services which had to be received as being of equal status and validity. During this stage, many in the Episcopal Church were forced to make the tragic choice. Some opted for “schism”, and consecrated their own bishops, severing all ties with the institutional church and becoming “Continuing Churches.” Others opted for “heresy” and remained in the institutional church in the hope that it could be recovered. The blow to the latter strategy came, however, in the third stage, when enough subversives were in positions of
power to ban the use not only of the old 1928 book but even to ban the use of the so-called traditional services of the new book. The coalition of Stage One has become the opposition of Stage Three.

The words of Roman Catholic traditionalist Michael Davies, for whom the Anglicans, be they traditionalist Anglicans or liberal ones, are apostates, have an ironic application to the contemporary Anglican situation, even though he is describing the situation in the Roman Catholic Church:

It is clear that the *Novus Ordo* [the liturgies which replaced the ancient liturgies collected and codified after the Council of Trent] no longer intends to present the faith as taught by the Council of Trent. Yet the Catholic conscience is bound to the faith in eternity. Hence the true Catholic, by the promulgation of the *Novus Ordo*, is faced with the tragic necessity of a choice.

What constitutes the nature of this “tragic choice”?

... The situation is destructive... because it has led to a revival of Donatism, whereby one finds oneself sitting out Holy Communion if one has doubts about the validity of the Mass in progress, and judging the validity of the Mass by the way the priest says it. This is dreadful... The Mass is valid if said according to the mind of the Church. But how does one know if the priest is actually saying it according to the Church’s understandings? In general, the outward sign of inward accord is adherence to the Church’s rule of worship. But what is the priest departs significantly from the prescribed form in the wide extra-legal fashion tolerated by most bishops? And far more serious, what if the Church’s legal form of worship is theologically divided against itself?...

Therefore, I go to the new Mass, although I recognize that attendance is an act of passive acceptance of the revolution’s world view... and although I know from experience that attendance demands a constant struggle to maintain the Catholic world view against the current liturgical expression of it.
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According to Davies, this whole utilization of the principle of “virtue in the service of vice” in fact leads to a devaluation of the concept of obedience:

(By) the making of formal obedience the most important virtue, by blurring the essential difference between moral virtues and mere disciplinary correctness... those in authority proclaimed a state of affairs in which... the sense of a hierarchy of values was almost inevitably deadened.

The extent of this devalued concept of obedience before the Council is reflected in the almost total lack of resistance on the part of the priest and religious to the revolution imposed upon the Church in the name of Vatican II. Those who had initiated the revolution were only too well aware of the fact that, provided their innovations could be imposed as orders from above, they could expect to encounter very little effective opposition from priests and religious... the prevailing attitude was that the role of the laity was to follow whatever lead the clergy gave them. 1197

Thus, the choice presented by the subversive is either to hold the traditional faith of the given church, or obey the church hierarchy. 1198

C. The Basic Methods, or Strategies of Apostasy

All strategies are but more particularized examples of the principle of putting virtue in the service of vice. There are several basic such strategies of apostasy:

(1) Create the state of two Churches within one Institution, i.e., of two organisms within one organization.

(2) Subvert the leadership of the denomination by capturing the education of its future leaders, i.e., seize control of the
semunaries and publishing houses.

(3) Establish a parallel magisterium of scholars who then insinuate
theirhemselves and their ideas into the circle of advisors around the
denominational authorities.

(4) In order to institutionalize apostasy, one must identify its
received authority and attack it through analytical-critical
decomposition of it, and supplant this deconstructed authority
with that of another idea of authority, while simultaneously
making use of the symbols of the old idea of authority until the
transfer is complete and the apostasy is in place.

(5) Once the transfer is complete, or well under way, one must
attack the symbols of the old authority, that is, one must ritually
mock the accepted symbols of the authority of the old order.

(6) Since one must, however, retain the loyalty of the majority of
the laity of an ecclesiastical body to the subversive changes
while they are introduced, it is necessary to introduce changes
at the pace which will best serve their ultimate acceptance by
the majority, and co-opt a potential counter-revolution. In
practice, this most often means that apostasy must be
introduced at a relatively slow pace, though sometimes, speed
is useful to shock and demoralize the potential opposition.

(7) Since in any apostasy there is always the danger of a potential
counter-revolution, or simply an exodus of a denomination’s
faithful to another ecclesiastical body with similar theological
and liturgical ethos, it is necessary to co-opt any such counter-
revolution. Thus, the apostasy must be extended outside of a
given ecclesiastical body’s boundaries to engulf those other
bodies likely to become the place of refuge for any
disenchanted elements which seek to flee rather than fight. The
goal is to force the question, “Why go elsewhere, when it is just
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as bad there?”, upon the potential opposition.

In this task, the revolutionary is really attacking language and meaning in such a manner as ultimately to blur linguistic and confessional differences between denominations.¹¹⁹⁹ Crucial to this process of changing the linguistic landmarks¹²⁰⁰ is the process of the prohibition of questions, usually practiced, as we shall see, in dual form: ad hominem attacks on conservative traditional opposition, and the claim to a “raised consciousness” – to the special gnosis claimed by the Gnostic – usually exhibited in the form of rigid adherence to a linguistic agenda.¹²⁰¹

(8) Not only extend the methods of apostasy so that they cut across all denominational boundaries, but maintain that any differences which one might have existed between them are really not substantive, so that there is no reason to leave. Of course, if the “friendly subversives” in the other denominations are successful in their program, the other denominations’ classical formularies will fall anyway, making it impossible to distinguish between old boundaries.

(9) Involve all levels of a given ecclesiastical body in the apostasy, be at the level of the individual parish or congregation, the local or regional body, and the denominational super-structure itself.

Each of these principles has a variety of tactical applications, which we shall now examine.
D. The Nuances, or Tactics of Apostasy

1. Create the state of two Churches within one Institution, i.e., of two organisms within one organization

   The “tragic choice” presented to the traditionalists of a given denomination (which if a subversive program of apostasy is successful) is the ultimate statement of what has, in fact, become the state of two Churches within one Institution, or better, of two organisms, one a church, one an anti-church, within one shared organization, for it is this state which ultimate issues in the tragic choice. This state serves two functions in the program of the subversive. In the first stage of the phases of apostasy, it serves to cloak the subversives’ activity and goal. In the final phases of stage two and throughout stage three, it effects the old adage divide et empera, “divide and conquer”, by dividing the opposition between those who flee the apostasy and those who remain to fight it. The first stage of installing this state is, of course, to infiltrate and finally capture a denomination’s seminaries.

2. Subvert the leader of the denomination by capturing the education of future leaders, i.e., seize control of the seminaries and publishing houses.

   Education is always the key to the success of any revolution. For this reason, it is crucial to the process of radical ecclesiastical revolution that the seminaries be captured.

   To overthrow the government of the Church, it is therefore necessary to seize the power of interpreting the Scriptures and the tradition. No one better understands this imperative, or is better placed to affect it, than the professional class of theologians and the teachers upon whom the Church depends so heavily for the propagation of the faith.
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Indeed, the progress of the revolution within a body’s seminaries is often a microcosm of the progress of the revolution in the whole body, proceeding through the same stages, and making use of the symbols of power, in this case, academic credentials.

It is first necessary to infiltrate the seminaries with key personnel; “first capture the education of the next generation: in the Church, the next generation of clergy”. At this stage, overt public statements of radical, subversive, intentions are to be avoided. Use is rather to be made of debunking pedagogical method, so that not one incrimination word is ever put to paper. The process is easier than it might at first seem.

The smile, the raised eyebrow, the incredulous little laugh, the mock serious reading – Alfred Loisy described Ernest Renan doing it and the glee of his class when ‘a tall ecclesiastic’ slammed out of the classroom in disgust. Everyone... knew a Jesuit or a Dominican who was a past master of debunking body language.

The slightly sarcastic tone of voice, or a mocking facial expression, or even body language, can communicate as much disbelief as the most overtly unorthodox statement, and often do so more effectively than a bald statement of unbelief. But should it be necessary to commit ideas to paper, there is yet a way around traditionalist superiors:

In France and Germany, professors had one set of notes to show the Roman authorities as the substance of their lectures, and another set of notes for actual use in class. There was ‘double bookkeeping’ at work in a wholesale manner.

At the second stage of the revolution in the seminaries, when the process of infiltration is well under way and the radical revolutionaries have more strength, the tactics may change to more overt methods, but still fall short of outright advocacy of revolutionary change. Two things may then occur:
first, the entrenched subversives, confident that a given seminary now constitutes a “church within a church”, then begin to purge the student body of “unsound”, i.e., anti-subversive, elements, and also to promote those sympathetic to their views.1209

A second favorite tactic is the academic citation of anomalies in denominational or cultural history, without further elaboration, thereby planting useful ideas, “time bombs”, for subsequent exploitation. Two interesting case are illustrative of this type of tactic. Prior to and immediately after the abandonment of its traditional doctrine of apostolic succession and priestly ministry in favour of women’s ordination, the Episcopal Church’s revolutionary scholars availed themselves at every opportunity to mention the strange incident of the emergency ordination of two Chinese women to its priesthood during World War Two to serve Anglican Christians trapped behind Japanese lines. A similar tactic is also used, for example, by some Eastern Orthodox subversives who cite the fact that in some languages, the name Holy Spirit occurs in the feminine gender. In neither case is commentary extensive. Nor need it be. The real goal is simply to implant an idea in the audience’s mind that will be of subsequent use in the revolutionary program.

Once the revolution has successfully subverted a denomination’s seminaries, it may then reach out to engulf the seminaries of other bodies as well. A kind of “theological d’etente” is here the goal, with the “exchange of scholars and students”1210 between seminaries presumably the prelude to the “integration” of textbooks and academies, the “re-writing of Church History”1211, and even the building of “common research centers” and shared facilities,1212 all under the control of the subversives. Once this level of revolutionary success has been achieved, the very idea of the unity of a given church body may then be redefined on the basis of mere political consensus, as a consensus or unity in something as nebulous as the true “intentions” of a doctrinal formula, or in something as atheistic as unity in “asking the same questions.”
3. Establish a parallel magisterium of scholars who then insinuate themselves and their ideas into the circle of advisors around the denominational authorities.

The effect, and the ultimate goal, of the previously described activities is to establish a parallel, or even a counter, magisterium of scholars, whose authority lies not in their maintenance of ecclesiastical symbols, be they doctrinal, political, or liturgical, but rather in their possession of academic credentials. Thus, not only do denominational seminaries emerge as a key point of attack for the revolution, but once they are successfully subverted, they become in effect a church within a church, the parallel body of authority.

This has a double effect on the progress of the revolution itself. First, the revolution begins to acquire a momentum of its own, since there is now a group or class with a vested interest in constant reform. Secondly; it reduces the denominational ordinary authority to the status of merely assenting to or acquiescing in the "assured scholarly findings" of its "experts".

4. In order to institutionalize apostasy, one must attack received authority through analytical-critical deconstruction of it, and supplant this deconstructed authority with that of another, while simultaneously making use of the symbols of the old authority until the transfer is complete.

This is not the place to undertake a detailed examination of the history of the academic deconstruction of authority, or what is popularly known as the discipline of "Biblical Criticism". A detailed examination of this issue is not possible here. However, some observations are necessary in order to make clear the pivotal role it has played in the
program of ecumenical subversion. Criticism as the discipline of deconstruction is a discipline which, by its own admission seeks to transcend Theology, i.e., any received ecclesiastical interpretive tradition, and to get to the “true” meaning of biblical texts which can only be “obscured” they Theology. As such, criticism itself is the principal weapon in the subversive arsenal, for it provides the means by which the revolution is extended across all denominational boundaries. As a method, criticism, which began as an attack on the Holy Scriptures, has been extended to cover all areas of ecclesiastical authority: to ecclesiastical tradition, history, polity, and liturgy. It is thus the regnant trans-confessional discipline which has contributed significantly to the production of a trans-confessional crisis.

One effect of criticism, at least in the mind of the critic, has been to destroy the veracity of the Holy Scriptures as a historically trustworthy document. What they record is, rather the product of the Church’s own need to create myths corresponding to its given historical situation. Briefly put, the events recorded in Scripture, and more particularly those events recorded in the New Testament, do not create the Church, but the reverse, the Church create the “events”. This approach can only have profound implications for every aspect of ecclesiastical life and doctrine. According one Anglo-Catholic traditionalist

If we dodge the questions ‘What does our Lord tell us to do? And how has the church put this into practice? We run the risk of doing what our faith (or our need, or worse, our sentiment) suggests and of relying upon our sincerity to ensure that God does His part. Unless we are concerned to obey our Lord under the new covenant, we shall be standing the sacraments upon their heads and turning them into cultic rites devised by the Church to help man find God (and expendable if they don’t).’

This then inevitably leads to the idea that the Church itself is the sacrament, free to create “sacraments” as the situation seems to demand.
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“Where once we found the sacraments according to our Lord’s command in Scripture, we find the Church as the sacrament without any suggestion of Scriptural warrant.”¹²¹⁶ And thus, as the modernist Orthodox scholar, Fr. Alexander Schmemann put it, this “means that... the liturgical life is the living source and ultimate criterion of all Christian thought.”¹²¹⁷ Thus, all “events” recorded in the New Testament, for example, go the way of subjectivity:

(Christ) remained “alive” among His followers. He was present in the prophetic spirit released in the early Christian community... All intellectual content has been removed from the Resurrection proposition of the Creed. The “resurrection experience” is entirely subjective...

Modernists are thus able to retain the creedal formulas while at the same time emptying them of their traditional meaning, indeed, of any historical significance or objective content whatever.¹²¹⁸

Biblical Criticism, then, is a principle component of the methods of apostasy.

5. **Once the transfer is complete, or well under way, one must attack the symbols of the old authority, that is, one must ritually mock the accepted symbols of the authority of the “old order”**.

This principle has a number of tactical applications which, depending on the denomination in question, may be pursued in a variety of combinations.

Peter Shaw, in his recent book on the subject, calls [them] “*The Rituals of Revolution.*” These rituals are designed to diminish the power of existing authority by destroying its mystique during a process in which the
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symbols that inspire awe are mocked and degraded in ‘reversed ceremonies of legitimacy’. The mocking reversal of sacred symbols serves as psychological preparation for transference of allegiance.

Rituals of revolution function as rites of passage; the public defiance they allow makes acceptable hitherto private desires and defiances, and coalesce nebulous, unassociated discontents...

The Catholic revolution’s preparatory rituals involved class mockery, mockery of the empowering symbols, dressing-up, role reversal, use of the crowd for intimidation, parody, and charades.1219

At the outset, it is important to realize that every ecclesiastical body, from the “lowest” and most evangelical country Baptist church, to the “highest” and most liturgical Lutheran City, Parish, has a liturgy, i.e., a set of prescribed rituals, symbols, and a vast amount of unwritten protocols that includes everything from architecture, music, the design of the anterior of a church building, and the placement of objects in it, the order in which a service proceeds, to the received confessional formulae, doctrinal statements, and even vestments and clerical dress.

An important question then occurs. What is the purpose of ritual mockery? The American Continuing Anglican Bishop, Rt. Reverend Robert Harvey, answers:

Is is (sic) really to make the holy relevant to the world? Not at all. Every traditionalist understands one thing that is beyond the grasp of the brightest intellectual – that it is only in the ritualizing of the grotesque that the mind becomes unglued. We all have limits as to what we will and will not do; it is only when we consent in a ritual act of destruction that the walls come tumbling down.1220

In other words, the use of ritual mockery in the program of apostasy serves one purpose: to inculcate the concept that everything is subject to the program of revision.

This ritual mockery of received symbols comes in two main
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varieties: distortion, and abandonment, and they usually accompany each other. For example, abandonment of traditional styles of architecture of churches and clerical dress is a common method of ritual mockery. Ann Roche Muggeridge writes: “theologians intending to subvert an orthodox audience always wear their clericals; Jesuit William Ryan, appearing in an unaccustomed clerical dress for a debate with me, said to me with disarming candor that he always wore it when facing ‘people like you’.” The tactic is quite elegant by vesting themselves with the symbols of orthodoxy, the resulting distortion at best places an audience in the position of not being able to trust anyone.

Distortion oftentimes occurs in connection to the physical symbols of orthodoxy, i.e., in the art, music, language, and architecture of an ecclesiastical body. In a Roman Catholic higher educational institution in the southern United States, for example, there is a recently built chapel which contains multiple examples of this process, the cumulative effect of which is overwhelmingly subversive of traditional sensibilities. The Stations of the Cross ring the outside of what is for all intents and purposes an auditorium. This positioning itself is standard. What is not standard is the fact that the Stations of the Cross have been placed on the floor of the aisles that the congregation would naturally walk to reach their seats. Thus, one is forced to trample on the symbols of the Roman Catholic Faith, unless extra care and caution is taken to step around them. In the same chapel, the processional cross is a standard crucifix. What is not standard is the corpus on it: it is that of a faceless human being, only superficially male. The corpus is made out of semi-reflective metal. The point communicated is a subtle reflection on the state of contemporary biblical criticism, which long ago abandoned the presupposition that the Gospels give an accurate historical portrayal of the life of Christ: it could be anyone hanging on the Cross, including one’s own reflection. In the Lady Chapel, the tabernacle for the reservation of the Sacrament is placed opposite the representation of the Mother of God. In order to utilize the
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one in devotion, one must turn his back on the other. The positioning and manipulation of space is thus distorted; things are found where they should not be.

The same process can also be extended to clerical dress or liturgical vestments. In Evangelical circles, for example, the normal formal attire of the minister has usually been a dark, three-piece suit. This is not without its own liturgical and theological significance, for the point being communicated is the equality of the priesthood of all believers. This has given way in many cases to the garish and flashy or in some cases the wholesale importation of “liturgy”.

On the garish and flashy side, there is the example of one Christian broadcasting network, one of those favorite sets of guests is a body-building team, which appears in standard athletic dress, and proceeds to lift weights, break bricks, lie on beds of nails, and to blow up hot water bottles. On the liturgical side, there is a group of “liturgical renewalists” within various Protestant churches which bears close attention. One encounters Protestant ministers wearing cassocks and liturgical vestments, garnishing their services with a bit of liturgical pomp. Conversely, in more liturgical churches, the distinctive clerical dress has given way to the “clergy suit” (now usually in soft pastel hues, no real colours), and finally, to no distinctive dress at all.¹²²³

It may be ironic to some for two Orthodox Christians, who might be expected to endorse the view “the higher, the better”, to criticize the efforts of some evangelicals who are moving in a “high church” direction. But as indicated earlier, liturgy in any form, high or low, is not merely a matter of dressing up or of not dressing up. No mere matter of aesthetic preference, whim, or fancy. These little things are components of comprehensive theological traditions. They serve to symbolize theological attitudes and commitments.

To preach Presbyterian theology while simultaneously wearing Roman Catholic or Anglican liturgical vestments, however well intentioned the act
might be, is to send a mixed message to a congregation. This conflict of visions is received, consciously or unconsciously, by the faithful, and the message is clear: the “old order” is being dismantled, and the replacement has no clear commitment to any consistent tradition of Christian faith and worship.

As just one example of this latter phenomenon, a large Reformed, evangelical congregation in Oklahoma City, heralded for a time as the fastest growing church in its denomination, had a pastor in recent years who decided that he very much wished to be “liturgical”. The process started simply enough, but degenerated to the point that one never knew whether he would appear as a 19th century Methodist parson, Francis of Assisi, an Edinburgh academic, or a Roman Catholic cardinal. The accumulation of this liturgical experimentation was reached when, in a Maundy Thursday service, he appeared barefoot as a Jewish rabbi, huddled over and rocking as if in a synagogue. The whole experiment was purportedly part of a rediscovery of the ancient Christian heritage, but the message preached from the pulpit – a mix of self-help psychology, liberal social causes, with just enough evangelicalism, Reformed doctrine and sprinkles of charismaticism to keep the congregation from open revolt – never changed. This illustrates the peculiar way that apostasy can show its colors: on the one hand, a “liberalizing” of the theological and confessional positions, and on the other, a “traditionalizing” of worship. But in this case, even the “traditionalizing” was a form of ritual mockery, for it stood the real traditions of the ecclesiastical body, in this case Reformed and evangelical, on its head, a process which served the purpose of misdirecting the congregation and rendering it far more vulnerable to the new liberal theology than if it had been presented in the familiar, internally consistent form of the Reformed and evangelical service.

This implies that one should be circumspect in the assessment of moves by one group to become more like another, of moves by evangelicals to become “more Catholic” or Catholics to become “more
evangelical”. Casual, cynical, or ruthless attitudes towards the forms of worship reflect casual, cynical or ruthless attitudes towards theology and morality. The process is one of hypocrisy, of saying one thing, and doing something else.

Even standard gestures and postures are displaced or exaggerated, and the normal style of “religious” language is changed, whether it be the language of the standard translation of Holy Scripture, or (in more liturgical churches) the language associated with public worship.

In one local instance, a late-middle-aged priest hitherto notably pious bent exaggeratedly over the Mass book babbling nonsense “Latin” as a prelude to his sermon on how much more sensible the new way was than ‘the way we used to do it.’

Since the authority figure in the Catholic cult is already in ritual attire, parodic dressing-up meant not dressing up. Priests at university and group Masses wore ordinary clothes, more casual, if anything, then the norm; the age of the orange clerical turtleneck dawned. In the particular application of ritual disguise, priests and religious put aside religious dress altogether except when involved in some protest against religious or civil authority, where it served at the same time as usurpation of legitimate authority to make a point with onlookers and as a mocker of legitimacy.

Ritual postures were reversed. At small group-Masses, priests sat with the congregation around a table instead of standing at an altar… the altar was displaced and replaced by a table… the ‘clown Mass’ became popular...

Under the guise of “updating” or making the Scriptures more “intelligible”, or in the guise of using the vernacular in order to render a liturgy “more open to intelligent participation, the merely mundane and “colloquial” is introduced. The effect, and ultimate goal, however, is always the same: de-sacralization and secularization, for by adopting forms of language or gestures which is in fact “colloquial”, a surrender is made to those secular
forces which seek to enshrine their agendas in society by a manipulation of just such language and gestures. By adopting the colloquial expressions of the world, the revolution hopes precisely to detach an ecclesiastical body’s control of its own texts and formularies and transfer that control elsewhere. In the case of language, this has universally resulted in an endless plethora of translations of the Bible and with them, a bewildering array of “liturgies”, each of which supposedly reflects some perceived need or agenda.

But why all concern over apparently minor points as dress and gestures, whether the wrestling togs of the evangelical or the abandonment of the black robes of a liturgical minister? The answer of Anne Roche Muggeridge provides an answer, and yet another important tactic of the subversive:

They (the modernists) understood that there was no need to make a frontal assault upon ‘the immutable elements divinely instituted’¹²²⁵ in order to destroy belief in them; that could be done even more effectively under the cover of orthodoxy by a radical transformation of ‘the elements subject to change’, the ‘mere externals’… The immutable elements could not, in the early stages of the revolution, be got rid of entirely. They remain, but surrounded by a symbolism that acts to contradict them.¹²²⁶

That is, useful distinction is made between the so-called “essential” elements of liturgical worship and so-called “non-essential” ones. This point deserves fuller elaboration.

1. The Tactic of “Essential vs. Non-Essentials”

The trappings of liturgical worship which had developed over the centuries, as we have seen, could be safely jettisoned by the program of apostasy, and newer trappings substituted, while leaving the “essentials” untouched. These changes were made to seem minor by a clever use of
propaganda.

Were overt changes were to take place, it was not be in the name of liberal theology, but of the recovery of the ancient roots of the Christian tradition, the paring away of ‘accretions’. The Book of Common Prayer disappeared in church after church, not; it was said, because it stood in the way of progress, but because it represented a deviation from ancient tradition. The new services, so ran the claim, were modeled on the liturgies of the early Church.¹²²⁷

There were two questions begged in this process: First, and most importantly, was the distinction between “essential” and “non-essential” elements in the fact true?¹²²⁸ Secondly, does the mere existence of elaborate “non-essential” elements in fact obscure the earlier tradition of the Church, or are they simply developed implications of that tradition?

2. The Four Tactics of Liturgical Revision

This distinction allows for changes in the “non-essentials” according to certain principles.

1) intelligibility, 2) participation, 3) simplicity, 4) abolition, or subtraction of “meaningless repetitions”.

“Intelligibility” is best defined by Article II of the Second Vatican Council’s Constitution on Sacred Liturgy. It means that the faithful “take part knowingly, actively and fruitfully.”¹²²⁹

“Participation” likewise has resulted in a profound change in “non-essentials”. Thus,

In some parishes, lest any brief moments remain during which the members of the congregation are not being read at, jumping up and down, or shaking hands, they are ordered to sing.¹²³⁰
This implies a change of perspective:

(The Mass) has changed from a perspective that was egalitarian and popular – requiring minimal participation on the part of as many as possible, and also objective – involving the performance of certain rites and adherence to certain essential values, to a view that is essentially elitist – demanding external participation on the part of everybody, and also experiential – asserting the need for religious enthusiasm as a part of the conditions of membership.\textsuperscript{1231}

The intention of worship thus shifts, with the adoption of these two criteria for the alteration of “non-essentials”, from the worship of God to the education of man. Consequently, for as many to be educated as possible the rite must be pedestrian in its simplicity, and the point communicated as quickly as possible. Thus, “meaningless repetitions” are to be excised.\textsuperscript{1232}

3. The Tactic of Abandoning the Lingua Sacra, of Speaking the Vernacular, and Consciousness Raising

Since the primary aim of worship has now shifted to the education of man, and since both the Scriptures and the liturgy are the creations of the Church’s own “consciousness”, two more tactics inevitably follow in the method of apostasy. First, the lingua sacra of worship must be abandoned, be it Latin or “archaic” “Elizabethan” English or Luther’s High German, since the goal is no longer to reflect God’s transcendence, mystery, and permanence, but the shifting needs of the Church in the world. And thus, secondly, under the guise of “speaking the vernacular” the colloquialisms of the world are introduced in an effort to “raise the consciousness” of the worshipper. In short, entirely new liturgies must be created, and an entirely new vocabulary and style of speech adopted.
Women and men who are committed to liberating style of human partnerships are becoming unable to participate in the life of the churches as they now exist. These creative Christians can no longer give any legitimacy to the polarizing sexism that permeates the language and practice of worship, theology, styles of ministry, and the governing structures of all denominations. 

Those, of course, who object to such changes, open themselves to the charge of not having the proper ecclesial consciousness, that is, the subversive attacks them with ad hominem arguments.

4. The Gnostic Prohibition of Questions: The Tactic of the Ad Hominem and “Consciousness Raising”

The political philosopher Eric Voegelin offered a brilliant and penetrating analysis into contemporary social, cultural, and religious woes when he traced the sources to a species of modern Gnosticism. In describing its salient features, Voegelin spends a great deal of time with what he called “The Gnostic Prohibition of Questions”, what we have already called “The ad hominem Attack.” It is necessary at this point to digress somewhat, and allow Voegelin to describe the psychological process of the Gnostic, since these played a prominent role in the analyses offered in previous chapters.

The phenomenon of the prohibition of questions is becoming clearer in its outlines. The Gnostic really does commit an intellectual swindle, and he knows it. One can distinguish three stages in the action of his spirit. On the surface lies the deception itself. It could be self-deception and very often it is, when the speculation of a creative thinker has culturally degenerated and become the dogma of a mass movement. But when the phenomenon is apprehended at its point of origin, as in Marx or Nietzsche, deeper than the deception itself will be found the awareness of
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it. The thinker does not lose control of himself: the libido dominandi turns on its own work and wishes to master the deception as well. This Gnostic turning back on itself corresponds spiritually... to the philosophic conversion, the periangoge in the Platonic sense. However, the Gnostic movement of the spirit does not lead to the erotic opening of the soul, but rather to the deepest reach of persistence in the deception, where revolt against God is revealed to be its motive and purpose.

1) For the surface act it will be convenient to retain the term Nietzsche used, “deception.” But in the content this action does not necessarily differ from a wrong judgment arising from another motive than the Gnostic. It could also be an “error.” It becomes a deception only because of the psychological context.

2) In the second stage, the thinker becomes aware of the untruth of his assertion or speculation, but persists in spite of this knowledge. Only because of his awareness of the untruth does the action become a deception. And because of the persistence in the communication of what are recognized to be false arguments, it also becomes an “intellectual swindle.”

3) In the third stage, the revolt against god (sic.) is revealed and recognized to be the motive of the swindle. With the continuation of the intellectual swindle in full knowledge of the motive of the revolt the deception further becomes ‘demonic mendacity.’

With this analysis in hand Voegelin examines Karl Marx's revolt against God; he begins by citing Marx:

‘As being regards itself as independently only when it stands on its own feet; and it stands on its feet only when it owes its existence to itself alone. A man who lives by the grace of another considers himself a depending being. But I live by the grace of another completely if I owe him not only the maintenance of my life but also its creation: if he is the source of my life; and my life necessarily has such a cause outside itself if it is not my own creation.’
Marx does not deny that ‘tangible experience’ argues for the dependence of man. But reality must be destroyed – this is the great concern of gnosis. In its place steps the Gnostic who produces the dependence of his existence by speculation.

A passage from Marx’s doctoral dissertation of 1849-41 takes us still further into the problem of revolt:

‘Philosophy makes no secret of it. The confession of Prometheus, ‘In a word, I hate all the gods,’ is its own confession, its own verdict against all gods heavenly and earthly who do not acknowledge human self-consciousness as the supreme deity. There shall be none beside it.’

In this confession, in which the young Marx presents his own attitude under the symbol of Prometheus, the vast history of the revolt against God is illuminated as far back as the Hellenic creation of the symbol.\(^\text{1236}\)

Voegelin then continues by clarifying the relationship between Marx’s appeal to the Prometheus legend and the actual version by Aeschylus.

Prometheus is riveted to a rock by the sea. Below him on the strip of beach stands Hermes looking up at him. The fettered Prometheus gives his bitterness free reign. Hermes tries to calm him and urges moderation. Then Prometheus crams his impotence and rebellion into the line quoted by Marx: ‘In a word, I hate all gods.’ But the line is not part of a monologue. At this outbreak of hatred, the messenger of the gods replies admonishingly: ‘It appears you have been stricken with no small madness.’… And what does Marx say to this observation of the messenger of the gods? He says nothing. Anyone who does not know Prometheus Bound must conclude that he quoted ‘confession’ sums up the meaning of the tragedy, not the Aeschylus wished to represent hatred of the gods as madness.\(^\text{1237}\)

Voegelin then delivers a telling analytical blow:

In the distortion of the intended meaning into its opposite the
suppression of questions can be seen again on all its levels: the
deception of the reader by isolating the text (the confession occurs in the
preface to a doctoral dissertation), the awareness of the swindle (for we
assume that Marx had read the tragedy), and the demonic persistence in
the revolt against better judgment.

The revolutionary reversal of the symbol – the dethronement of the
gods, the victory of Prometheus – lies beyond classical culture; it is the
work of Gnosticism. Not until the Gnostic revolt of the Roman era do
Prometheus, Cain, Eve, and the serpent become symbols of man’s
deliverance from the power of the tyrannical god of this world.1238

While Voegelin’s focus is on the psychological processes at work in the
young Marx, our emphasis is for the moment confined to a statement of its
effect on Marx’s readers. Any reader unfamiliar with the Prometheus
legend will not be able to detect Marx’s distortion of the symbol. And those
who might be familiar with it, or who are brave enough to raise general
philosophical objections, may be glibly dismissed as not subscribing to the
enlightened consciousness and agenda which Marx advocates. In short,
the self-deception which the Gnostic practices on himself provides the
basis for dispensing with objections; objections are not refuted, nor can
they be, since deception is at work from the very beginning. Objections
can only be dispensed with by an appeal, a priori, to the deception itself, in
short, by ad hominem attacks on objections.

These ad hominem attacks thus usually take their cue from the
manner in which the changes are propagandized. If, for example, the
changes are touted as “pastoral”, then one who objects is “not pastoral”; if
they are touted as “relevant”, then one who object is “irrelevant” or a
“mediaevalist” or “baroque” or an “antiquarian”. If they are touted as
“gender inclusive” or “sexually neutral”, then the one who objects is a
“male chauvinist”, and so on. Since the changes usually accompany the
view that rites simply evolve out of the church’s consciousness, then one
who objects to them simply does not posses the "ecclesial
consciousness”.

5. Since one must, however, retain the loyalty of the majority of the laity of an ecclesiastical body to the subversive changes while they are being introduced, it is necessary to introduce changes at the pace which will best serve their ultimate acceptance. In practice, this most often means at a relatively slow pace, though sometimes, speed is useful to shock and demoralize the potential opposition.

The introduction of radical changes within an ecclesiastical body is to be done at the pace which will best enhance the potential success of the revolution. For example, if there is some possibility that the changes will provoke a counter-revolution if introduced too rapidly, gradual change is to be preferred, simply in order to accustom the potential opposition to the process of change itself. Thus, radical change is still the ultimate goal, but the spiritual discernment of the potential opposition is to be dulled and lulled into accepting the changes gradually that it would not have accepted if introduced suddenly. Conversely, if the shock of the sudden introduction of radical change will disorient and divide potential opposition, that method is to be preferred, since it will give no time for such an opposition to organize. This may occur in the form of a series of shocks delivered at precisely timed moments to achieve the desired psychological goal of driving the potential into despondency and despair.

6. Propaganda

Coupled with this type of planning is propaganda, which occurs in a variety of ways. The changes, if they are introduced slowly, may be 1) cloaked in euphemisms such as a) “liturgical renewal” b) “spiritual revival”, c) “pastoral”, or even touted as d) “inevitable outcomes of the processes of history and denominational self-evaluation.” The tactic at Vatican Two,
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for example, was to shroud reforms and promote their reception by calling them merely “pastoral” in nature.\textsuperscript{1240} The use of the secular media, academic press, and popular journals, as well as of the pulpit, to promote the reforms through propaganda is a necessary concomitant of the process of propaganda.

7. Since in any apostasy there is always the danger of a potential counter-revolution, or simply an exodus of a denomination’s faithful to another ecclesiastical body with similar theological and liturgical ethos, it is necessary to co-opt any such counter-revolution. Thus, the apostasy must be extended outside of a given ecclesiastical body to those bodies likely to become the place of refuge for any disenchanted elements which seek to flee rather than fight. In other words, force this question upon the potential traditionalist opposition: “Why go elsewhere when it is just as bad there?”

There are three very illumination statements of this principle made in the Consultation on Church Union document, The COCU Consensus.

The Consultation on Church Union is committed to a wider unity than its present nine bodies, although the agreement was drafted primarily by representatives of the present member churches. But a foretaste of the wider constituency is represented by the presence on the COCU Theology Commission of members of the Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed Church in America communities... The unity of Christianity is to fulfill its place in the healing of the divisions of humankind.\textsuperscript{1241}

“5) The Church Uniting may find that it will need the contribution of the traditions other than those of the presently participating churches, in order to become visibly a fuller and more diversified community of reconciled person and gifts. The call is to a new and growingly inclusive form of the Church. In this spirit what is envisioned is a Church Uniting bearing enough family resemblance to the separate traditions to manifest its continuity with them, yet unlike any of the churches in their past
separateness. In all that they do, they embody this reality and raise the question of unity for the Church Universal. Lay persons meet across denominational lines in prayer and common mission. Thus they can bring new expressions of the Church into being, acting out forms of unity which the institutional churches cannot yet express. They transcend divisions and express in anticipation the fulfilled reality of the one body as Jesus Christ.

The clear implication of these three statements gives a sobering example of how far the revolution is to be extended. COCU envisions that it is but a part in the great project of unifying all of humanity, presumably in some religious “super-'Church'”. Therefore, it is necessary for it to expropriate the traditions of churches not even officially represented on it, so as to create the visible impression of being not that much different than those churches not so represented. Presumably, one method of expropriating those non-represented traditions is by fostering contacts between the laity of its member churches, and the laity of non-member churches. Not only will this entail a massive revision of textbooks, the rewriting of church history, and so on, but it displays, for full view, the ultimate goal of the Consultation: to exhibit, by utilizing the expropriated traditions of non-member churches, a “family resemblance” between all churches, i.e., to render indistinguishable any visible elements, to make them “look” the same.

That this is COCU’s real intention is evidenced by a curious incident. In 1976, a COCU scheme for church union was rejected by the Episcopal Church. This event was then used by liberal Episcopalians to promote the idea that COCU was dead. However, a man by the name of Robert Strippey, who had worked in the Episcopal Church’s national headquarters, protested.

COCU’s ‘demise’ is an admission they can well afford. It is at worst a
tactical defeat in a war they expect to win, since they are already so close to their goal of neutralizing everything in the Episcopal Church that can prevent us from participating in their planned Protestant union.

Does this objective seem unlikely in view of our stepped-up discussions with Roman Catholics and the Orthodox? Again the answer is no, for it is the ‘liberals’ hope to reach out to kindred spirits in Rome and the East to draw them into ultimate union in an even larger church.

The fact is that a pan-American church is only the first of the liberal’s long-range objectives. When a successor to COCU is accepted – and it can hardly be anything but an identical twin – this will not satisfy the liberals. They will have succeeded only in turning the National Council of Churches from a club into a seemingly organic body. Their next goal will be to create an international church in which the World Council of Churches will become a formal religious body. By this time the Romans and the Orthodox may have come within the fold, but whether then or later, it does not matter, for the liberals will not stop until the entire of humanity is incorporated into the Coming Great Church. That church will not only include Christianity. It will include Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism – all the world’s religious and finally even the Jews. 1245

When those words were first published in 1976, *The COCU Consensus* document quoted above was still to be written eight years in the future.

The crucial key to the success both of this strategy and the one following is the reliance upon the general tendency of most laymen to acquiesce in a radical revolution, provided that their response is not co-opted by any traditionalist counter-revolution. The evangelical philosopher Os Guiness writes:

All we need is a passive acceptance by the general body of Christians on the one hand and a positive allegiance on the other... The fourth stage has been defection (or ‘bringing over’ of individual Christians), the stage through which we have kept up sustained propaganda designed to make the most of notorious defections from the Christian side (counter-conversions, if you like)... the final stage, which still lies ahead, is
liberation (or the ‘taking over’ of the whole church). This is the stage at which the degree of our influence will become absolute, and the secret operation will become public, through coup d’etat… ‘Remember 10-10-80.’ It is simply the shorthand for [this] axiom: Win over ten percent of the church to be a counter-elite on our side, reduce eighty percent of the church to a state of passive acceptance (either cowed or complacent), and we can disregard the remaining ten per cent (part of which is the lunatic fringe anyway).\textsuperscript{1246}

Dr. Guiness presents here not only the three stages of apostasy, and their politics, described above, but also presents the difficulty which faces the ecclesiastical revolutionary: how to marginalize the opposition? The opposition will not be marginalized if allowed to survive by transplanting itself to another ecclesiastical body from which it will launch counter-assaults with impurity, particularly if the body to which they have fled retains the reputation of respectable orthodoxy. Thus, the revolutionary must insure that the subversive program extends beyond the boundaries of the body being subverted.

This can only be accomplished by extending the methods of the revolution, i.e., by insuring that they will be utilized elsewhere. An interesting example of the degree of planning and organization which can go into this process presents itself with COCU. The acronym “COCU” itself was apparently consciously chosen to represent the initial superstructure for the ecumenical engagement of scholars from various Protestant and Evangelical denominations – The “Consultation On Church Union” – which was to reemerge in a new guise, the ecclesiastical structure which results from the various member denominations’ formal adoption of COCU’s recommendations, under which it is still known as “COCU”, but which now stands for the “Church of Christ Uniting.”

A starting glimpse at how the methods, and even the style of writing, of denominational subversion have been extending across existing ecclesiastical boundaries is again afforded by a comparison between...
COCU documents on the one hand, and the ecumenical discussions of the Eastern and Oriental Orthodox Churches. For COCU, the resulting “Church of Christ Uniting” comes together in a liturgical act:

The liturgical action in covenanting is much more than a ceremonial capstone for a uniting covenant which has been successfully voted; the liturgical action itself will be a sign and means of church unity.  

The “Agreed Statement” of the Eastern and Oriental Orthodox Churches could then very easily be appended to the above statement as an explication of certain details and problems that would have to be dealt with prior to such a “ceremonial capstone” taking place:

...The joint theological commission will also have to examine the canonical, liturgical, and jurisdictional problems involved – e.g., anathemas and liturgical deprecations by some Churches of theologians regarded by other as doctors and saints of the Church, the acceptance and non-acceptance of some Councils, and the jurisdictional assurances and agreements necessary before formal restoration of communication.

But the limits of pluralistic variability needs to be more clearly worked out (sic.) in the areas of forms of worship, in terminology expressing the faith, in spirituality, in canonical practice, in administrative or jurisdictional patterns, and in the other structural or formal expressions of traditions, including the names of teachers and Saints in the Church.  

Whatever cannot be dealt with by the above method is to be “quietly dropped”, while in turn, the various churches to be united do so on the basis of “mutual recognition” of each other’s faith and ministries.

These rather remarkable parallels in both method and style between COCU and the Eastern and Oriental Orthodox Churches’ “Agreed Statements” expose the underlying “consensus” ecclesiology and view of truth. In this view, closely allied to the deconstructive techniques of criticism, truth is what is simply “mutually recognized”.
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Through the different terminologies used by each side, we saw the same truth expressed. Since we agree in rejecting without reservation the teaching of Eutyches as well as of Nestorius, the acceptance or non-acceptance of the council of Chalcedon does not entail the acceptance of either heresy.

(a) Theologians from the Eastern Orthodox Church have drawn attention to the fact that for them the Church teaches that the seven ecumenical councils which they acknowledge have an inner coherence and continuity that make them a single indivisible complex to be viewed in its entirely of dogmatic definition...

As for the Councils and their authority for the tradition, we all agree that the councils should be seen as charismatic events in the life of the Church rather than as an authority over the Church. ¹²⁵⁰

Note that this view of the church as consensus has reduced any differences to mere differences of terminology, and thus tends to empty dogmatic technical symbols of any meaning entirely.

At this point, it is necessary to depart from the sociological method stated at the beginning of the essay, and to do a small amount of theological and philosophical analysis in order to make clear what has happened.

The church, in the classical senses understood by Protestants, Anglicans, Roman Catholics, and Orthodox, has always had the mark of distinctiveness, of differentiation, which was tied strongly to concepts of ministry, polity, and sacraments, however understood in the cases of individual churches. For each, the Church was always understood to be “called out”, “set apart” from other units, including other churches. Each ecclesiastical body was a church precisely in that it was distinct from others in its more or less uniform reception of a particular truth which was more or less its and its alone. Every “church” had, to some extent, the idea that it was the church because it taught this particular truth. All other
“churches” departed from this truth. In the case of Anglicans, for example, the particular truth constitute of their understanding of truth was the apostolic succession of validly ordained bishops who preserved the essentials of catholic sacramental faith and polity. Thus, by classical Anglican reasoning, only the Anglican Communion, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Eastern Orthodox Church, and various smaller groups, were, in fact, “the Church.” Protestant bodies, such as the Methodist Church, were simply “dissenters” or schismatic, and not “Churches” but ecclesiastical bodies. For Rome, the same held true, but was coupled with two more ideas: succession in dogmatic faith and communion with the Pope. By traditional Roman Catholic lights, therefore, the Anglicans were not a Church at all, and the Orthodox were schismatic. For the Orthodox, succession of bishops preserving uncorrupted the Holy Tradition, inclusive of unaltered dogmatic definitions, as well as the fullness of liturgical life, was “the Church.” Thus, even Rome, which has altered by faith by accepting the addition of the *filioque* and departing from other points of ancient doctrine, was not the Church; it was both schismatic and heretical. For the Protestants, the Church included all the above bodies, but with the caveat that in any given denomination’s case, its confessional formularies were not the only or even most important standard by which to measure other groups’ “churchness”; that was measures by “evangelical faith”. All Christians were the Church, but that did not imply that there were no real differences, and that these differences were not significant enough to maintain separate existence from each other. Thus, in each case, all four groups were operating with a common understanding of truth, i.e., that it is absolute, and that the reception of certain truths constituted the Church.

This conception presented clear ethical and moral choices.

If I do not believe that my own Protestant minister can or would even seek to transform bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, can I believe that a Roman Catholic priest is doing it when I attend Mass with a Catholic friend? And if I do not believe that he can do it, how must I look
upon his claim that he is doing it? It is not a question of finding differences between our beliefs, or of scoring debating points, it is a question of truth... In a real sense, ecumenical prayer ought to be more difficult for the believing Christian, of whatever denomination, that for the unbeliever, or the merely nominal believer... The only way to bring the different Christian traditions together in worship is to tone down doctrine and emphasize ceremony and ritual. This is precisely what is taking place.”

Dr. Brown’s words require some analysis. When the commitment to truth *per se* is abandoned, the moral imperative to convert Christians from one denomination to another is suppressed, and an effort must be made to show that everyone is really the same. The only way to do this, Dr. Brown suggests, is to amalgamate the rituals of each denomination, to deny each denomination its distinctive ritual. This process we have already seen at work in the COCU documents. But there is another method, not stated by Dr. Brown, and this is for each denominational to engage in such mutual activities as do not directly entail doctrinal issues. This is usually done by entering the social and political sphere with programs of social action disguised (!) as Christian action. Thus, there is within ecumenism itself a metaphysical and moral compulsion to syncretism and theocracy. Theocracy is here intentionally understood in both sense of the word as 1) the mingling of the gods in order to 2) establish a political order which owes its existence in part to such mingling.¹²⁵²

If such a state of affairs is the inevitable result of ecumenism, one must inevitably ask the question: Who will be in charge of this superstructure? In the absence of truth, the appeal must be to absolute final authority, and here it is significant to note that of all the ‘reforms’ propagated at Vatican Two, one thing was not reformed, and is the Papacy. At this point, we must beg our readers’ indulgence. We are not maintaining that the Papacy is the cause of syncretism, only that it may again be in the twentieth century as it was in the late ninth the inevitable
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beneficiary or even victim of it, due to its own extraordinary claims, an inevitability, given that those claims were wedded to the filioque.

The ‘save the church’ policy which sacrifices doctrine and a concern for truth automatically promotes the increase of hierarchical power. The antidogmatic Bishop Pike of California is a vehement critic of Roman Catholicism as well as of the teaching of his own church. It might therefore seem a blow to his work that his successor as bishop California, C. Kilmer Myers, has openly come out in favor of recognizing the Pope as ‘the chief pastor of men’. Actually it is a logical consequence of Pike’s efforts. Pike and others like him strike at the foundations of personal faith by attempting to discredit the historic doctrines of Christianity. His successor is then in a position to plead for the great power-structure of the papacy, which is less concerned with winning individuals’ trust than their obedience. 1253

A Papacy, in other words, cut loose from its own doctrinal traditions, yet not renouncing its claims to universal supreme and immediate jurisdiction would, on the one hand, be a boon to the anti-orthodox ecumenist, and a temptation to the traditionalist, who would be tempted to see in it a refuge, a safe harbor to return to a state of order and ecclesiastical stability. 1254 But this moral implication of the papal claims has been inherent in the Second Europe’s Augustinian Hellenization from the moment in the ninth century when those claims and the filioque first became fused. Such a temptation is the ecclesiastical counterpart to fascism and totalitarianism.

The ecclesiastical revolutionaries in each of the four groups operate with a radically different understanding of truth, for the obliterate this principle of ‘distinctiveness’ and substitute the principle of ‘mutual recognition’ and even voting, which are now the basis of truth.

The governmental dimension of entering into covenanting is also essential... It includes voting. For the church, however, voting is much more than an exercise of democratic rule. When Christians gather in
church governing bodies and seek God’s leading through prayer and careful listening to one another in faith, God is there in the midst of them.  

Thus, in different context, the church, now understood simply as consensus, is entirely free to reinterpret traditionally terminology. This consensus ecclesiology is in fact the underlying principle of Liberation theology.

Immediately, as Fernando Cardenal and the other Sandinista priests quickly realized, a new concept of ‘Church’ was born (out of the assignment of Marxist meanings to classical terminology). The ordinary body of believers, by revised definition, would become the very source of revelation. The faith of believers would ‘create communities among those believers. Base communities, they are called in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Latin America – communitates de base. And those Communities taken together would form the new ‘Church’, the ‘People’s Church.’”

Thus:

The people have the Word already. The collective religious life of the people is the ultimate criterion of truth… furthermore, as each age comes and goes, men invent formulas that reflect only one stage in the growth of the spirit in humanity. With another age, new formulas must be invented. Belief itself, therefore, changes. That is the true religious process. No intellectual truth, no dogma, has been given to us by God for our permanent assent. We have been given merely ‘a way of life’, the highest life of the soul. And all formulas or dogmas of churchmen have no more authority for individuals than the formulas of scientists about anthropology or atoms or history. They all change, because they all progress, as humanity progresses. 

This, of course, is the complete relativization of truth, and implies the very opposite understanding of Church’ as something called out and set apart.
It is, in fact, an anti-Church. Its membership depends only upon a “mutual and formal recognition by the participating churches of their respective members, churches, and ministries.”

This consensus view of the church as “mutual recognition”, when allied with the critically deconstructed Holy Scriptures of Biblical Criticism, compels the new liturgies. Even so minor a change in the Creed from “I believe” to “we believe”, superficially a return to the original Greek, in fact disguises and embodies a very different philosophy of truth and the church than that held by the early Fathers.

If it is asked how (one) continues to recite the creed when there are articles in it (one) does not believe, like the virgin birth and ‘the figure of a Logos mediating between the transcendent God and the world’, which (Pannenberg) judges to be incompatible with ‘today’s scientific perception of the world’, his answer is that they ‘can be confessed in worship without abandoning truthfulness,’ since ‘the repetition of the confession of the church is certainly something different from the statement of faith of an individual’... This, however, it to introduce an intolerable schizophrenia, for the congregation is compounded of individuals, and there is no way in which it can make sense for an individual who is a member of the Church to affirm the belief of the Church which is not his own personal belief. It is prescription for confusion and insanity; and it is also the demolition of scriptural canonicity.

This principle of church as “mutual recognition” and consensus is interpreted by the subversive as being but the application of the adage *lex orandi lex credendi est*, “the law of prayer is the law of belief.” Such an appeal is superficial, for the rule, as the Fathers used it, simply means an appeal to the liturgical and interpretive tradition of the Church when interpreting the holy Scriptures which were viewed by that Church as communicating historical facts. The Fathers appealed to it to demonstrate that their interpretations were not eccentric. The Modernist appeals to it because his interpretation is eccentric. The very fact that a revolutionary
feels simultaneously able to say the creed publically while holding contrary
doctrines in private is but another way of exhibiting the utter collapse of
morality in the Gnostic-revolutionary circles that now command the
churches. The Gnostic accomplished a kind of replay of the Fall of
Adam; his natural reason and morality tell him one thing, yet he persists in
personally holding the opposite.

These points constitute the theoretical and spiritual basis behind
the phenomenon often experienced by traditionalists who think they have
more in common with traditionalists of another ecclesiastical body,
regardless of their very real doctrinal differences, than they do with the
ecumenical ecclesiastical revolutionaries in their own body, for in fact the
traditionalists, regardless of his doctrinal commitment, works with the
same basic conception of truth, while the subversive does not. In his short
article, “Before the Face of Anti-Christ”, the Russian Orthodox
Archimandrite Constantine writes of this tendency in no uncertain terms:

Thus there appear two conflicting processes which cannot but develop
more and more clearly in the process of the unfolding of apostasy: on the
one hand, the appearance within all Christian denominations of a certain
kernel of “faithful” who are prepared to endure all in their faithfulness to
their denomination in its original form, not corrupted by the influence of
Antichrist, and at the same time, the appearance, completely natural, with
the drawing together in the name of faithfulness to Christ, of a
sympathetic interest in the content of the faith of all the denominations
thus drawn toether...

Conversely, it serves also to explain why the ecumenist revolutionaries
feel they have more in common with ecumenist in other denominations
that with the traditionalist in their own. The two sides are operating from
radically opposed understanding of truth and of what it is to be a church.
The ecumenist recognizes a fellow ecumenist simply on the basis of that
recognition itself; the traditionalist recognizes a fellow traditionalist,
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regardless of their real doctrinal differences which neither is willing to compromise, simply because they recognize in each other the same basic conception of truth. It is the underlying absoluteness or relativity of truth which allows both traditionalists and ecumenist to recognize fellow travelers. This is crucial, for it also implies a certain sociological analysis of the contemporary situation within Christianity. The crisis is thus now trans-confessional, as the principle of two churches within each ecclesiastical institution, each sharing the same corporate structure, but working and proceeding from entirely different philosophical assumptions, has now been extended across all ecclesiastical boundaries. Since these two conceptions of truth are mutually contradictory, the current contemporary situation cannot endure, but will lead to a massive redrawing of boundaries in the future, as both ecumenists and traditionalists seek each other out. In terms of ecclesiastical policy-making, the ecumenists have thus far been successful in recognizing this situation and tailoring their policies accordingly, for indeed, such a redrawing was their original goal. It is the traditionalists and their leaders who have the most to learn about formulating their policies (not their doctrines!) in accordance with this situation.

8. Not only extend the methods of apostasy so that they cut across all denominational boundaries, but maintain any differences which once might have existed between them is really not substantive, so there is no reason to leave. Of course, if the “friendly subversives” in the other denominations are successful, the other denominations’ classical formularies will fall anyway.

This principle is often heard in certain circles in both East and West regarding the “original divisive issue”, the addition in the West of the filioque clause:
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In the West it became customary to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, because it was felt that the Spirit, though proceeding ultimately from the Father as the Source of all being, was given to the world by Jesus Christ, and because the New Testament speaks of him as the Spirit of Jesus as well as the Spirit of the Father. But the Eastern Church never accepted this usage, although it was mainly a matter of words and terminology, no vital theological issue being involved.

The Important point here is simply that the *filioque*, which is about the most important of Christian doctrines, the doctrine of God Himself, is now reduced to a merely terminological dispute. Once this implication of the *filioque* is accepted, of course, all other dogmas fall since the same method, if accepted of the doctrine of God, can then be applied to any other doctrine and in any number of ways, as we have seen in previous pages. From the broad sociological and historical perspective of this essay, then *filioque* is the issue of issues. It is the historical and doctrinal point at which the processes we have surveyed were loosed upon the Second Europe’s culture.

The tactical applications of the subversives at this point are thus quintessential to the understanding of their program. Once the principle that differences are merely terminological has been accepted, a variety of methods of installing a revolution in a church then present themselves to the subversive.

9. The Assault on Language, Meaning, and Order: Retain Old Terminology and Symbols, but Change their Meaning

One method, and the most effective, is simply to retain the old terminology, the “received confessional formulae”, but to change the meaning of those formulae. Commenting on this process in the English Reformation, Roman Catholic traditionalist Michael Davies writes:
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The Reformers do, on occasions, use such words as offering, sacrifice, and even oblation – but always in a sense diametrically opposed to the use of those words in catholic theology, just as is the case with such expressions as “sacramental presence”, the bread being Christ’s “Body” and the wine His “blood”, or “consecration” of the bread and wine.

This restoration of the “true use of the Lord’s Supper was to be achieved both by using those parts of the Catholic mass which could be interpreted in a Protestant sense and by the addition of completely new formulas (sic) added under the guise of a “restoration of primitive Christianity”, a return to what the Reformers regarded as “primitive purity and simplicity” in contrast to the corruption and error of later Catholic times.”

Malachi Martin observes the same technique operating in an entirely different historical context, that of Liberation Theology:

Liberation theology was the perfect blueprint for the Sandinistas. It incorporated the very aim of Marxism-Leninism. It presumed the classic Marxist ‘struggle of the masses’ to be free from all capitalist denomination. And above all, the Marxist baby was at last wrapped in the very swaddling clothes of ancient Catholic terminology. Words and phrases laden with meaning for the people were co-opted and turned upside down. The historical Jesus, for example, became an armed revolutionary. The mystical Christ became all the oppressed people, collectively. Mary the Virgin became the mother of all revolutionary heroes. The Eucharist became the bread freely made by liberated workers. Hell became the capitalist system. The American president, leader of the greatest capitalist country, became the Great Satan. Heaven became the earthly paradise of the workers from which capitalism is abolished. Justice became the uprooting of capitalist gains... The Church became that mystical body, ‘the people,’ deciding its fate and determining how to worship, pray, and live, under the guidance of Marxist leaders.
10. Retain Old Terminology, and Change the Meaning by saying that Its Meaning is Latent in Its Intention.

Another method is simply the deliberate failure to define terminology at key points. Even more effective, however, is the retention of old formulae, coupled not only with a redefinition of their meaning, but with a redefinition of meaning itself as being latent in the “intention” of various terms or symbols. A distinction is therefore to be made not only between the doctrinal definitions and canonical legislations of a Council, but also between the true intention of the dogmatic definition of a Council and the particular terminology in which it is expressed, which latter has less authority than its intention.

...The Church has always the authority to clarify the decisions of a Council, in accordance with its true intention... Each council brings forth or emphasizes some special aspect of the one Truth, and should therefore be seen as stages on the way to a fuller articulation of the truth.1266

So long as the above-stated principles operate within the classical conceptions of “church” and of “truth” surveyed above, due allowances can be made for the legitimate development of the formulation of doctrine. However, when these understandings of the “church” and of “truth” are replaced by the “consensus” view of the Church as “mutual recognition”, and the method of recovering the true “intentions” are precisely those methods of critical deconstruction possessed only by the mutually recognized high priests of ecumenism, then the way is open to complete redefinition of meaning, and intention in terms of the ecumenical agenda itself. Thus, the COCU Consensus, when dealing with the differing polities of its constituent members, neatly disposes of the terms “bishop, presbyter, and deacon” by allowing its members to determine for themselves what the terms mean:
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Whatever offices these representatives may hold in their own churches, within the Councils they will be laypersons, deacons, presbyters, and bishops. The different nomenclatures and understandings of these ministries in the various churches will at the same time continue to exist. The old and the new orderings of ministry will thus exist side by side, informing and deepening each other. 1267

The Consultation assumes that each covenanted body (member churches involved in the Consultation’s scheme) will decide where in its own polity to find persons whose ministries correspond to those represented in the Councils of Oversight (the ecumenical super-structure itself). 1268

Why the inability to state a clear doctrine of ministry? Biblical criticism, of course:

Several doctrines of ordained ministry have arisen in the history of the Church. The exclusive warrant of the New Testament cannot be claimed for any one of them. They are adaptations of biblical forms to the needs of the Church in differing times and places. In the midst of this variety, however, one ordering has emerged as predominant: the threefold ministry of bishop, presbyter, and deacon. 1269

There is yet another way by which the meaning of received terminological symbols may be changed radically, and that is to contrive “orthodox contexts” in which they occur, i.e., to surround such changes with an abstract “pattern” which is only orthodox in its form. 1270 This has been particularly effective in those liturgically-oriented bodies which have experienced liturgical “renewal”, the changes thus initiated often being justified as “more orthodox” in structure than what they replaced.

11. Fail to Define Terms At All

One quite obvious, and for that very reason, subtle, tactic is simply
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the failure to define key terms at key points. Consider the following observations directed at the Second Vatican Council.

Cardinal Ruffini expressed particular concern at the fact that the Decree on Ecumenism failed to provide any adequate definition of the word 'ecumenism' itself – a factor which he considered dangerous as the word is used in a different sense by Catholics and Protestants. 1271

The new offertory prayers (based on a Jewish form of grace) grew from ‘forms already existing’. The Concilium presumably interpreted this phrase as already existing in the liturgy of any religion. 1272

Article 34 states that the reformed liturgy must be ‘distinguished by noble simplicity.’ There is needless to say, no attempt to explain what ‘a noble simplicity’ is. It must be ‘unencumbered by useless repetitions’ without explaining when such a repetition becomes useless. 1273


Malachi Martin, recalling the post-conciliar period in the Roman Catholic Church, observed the idiosyncratic manner of religious language which seemed suddenly to sweep his church:

A bizarre element of this disturbing euphoria is the way that people begin to talk, whether among themselves or to God. They seem in an instant to have learned a new language, to be thinking about everything with pop-up, prefab concepts. ‘Don’t worship vertically! Worship horizontally!’ ‘Whatever helps creative growth towards integration!’ ‘Facilitators are needed!’ How are you performing interpersonally?’ And, as if that were not disorienting enough, an almost manic tone pitched just this side of hysteria weaves its way from time to time into the vast confusion as men and women, claiming the Holy Spirit’s gift of tongues, begin to jabber such nonsense sounds. 1274
Nor is the idiosyncrasy restricted to the layman. On the contrary, modernists academics and Liturgical Mafia must invent their own version of Newspeak, “New Theolospeak”:

(Teilhard de Chardin’s) self-made vocabulary was dizzying-amortization, hominization, Christogenesis, christification,pleromization, excentration, biogenesis, are examples of a far longer of litany. Teilhard often hesitated in defining precisely what his hybrid terms meant. Still, his followers could excuse that; they felt they could usually grasp the general lines of thought along which he marshaled his ideas into theories.\textsuperscript{1275}

But this program is not merely the eccentric idiosyncrasy of the odd subversive. It is, in fact, a crucial tactic of the program, even in its extraordinary subjectivism.

1) the document, THE COCU CONSENSUS, is intended… to encourage the development of a common language for the expression of a common faith.\textsuperscript{1276}

To take but one example of this program:

Children… need instruction in the meaning of Christian faith and discipleship… Persons who are already members need continuing Christian education and training to develop… understanding and skills needed in the life of discipleship and witness. It is especially important in the present time that members learn how to develop and express their own contemporary interpretations of the Christian message and life.\textsuperscript{1277}

And what of the various confessions of the various members of COCU?

In the diversity of its life, the Church Uniting has room for those confessions which are cherished by any of the covenenting bodies. It will value such confessions as they serve the renewal and revitalization of the Church in a common spiritual faith. It will not permit any such confession
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to become an exclusive requirement for all its members, or to become a
basis for divisions within its community. As it grows in unity, it will outgrow
or resolve such divisive disputes as are no longer compelling to faith or
theology.

The responsibility of the Church Uniting as a guardian of the apostolic
tradition will include, as part of its preaching and teaching office, an
obligation to confess and communicate from time to time the substance of
the faith in new language to meet new occasions and issues. In
formulating such fresh confessions, it will work under the authority of the
scriptures, seeking the guidance of the Holy Spirit (sic.). 1278

The end result is an institutional amalgamation, partaking of all elements
of the “united churches” and resembling none of any of them:

20. The editing of liturgical texts and hymns to eliminate the
condemnations is but part of the task of liturgical renewal. We need also
to make use of the infinite variety and richness of our liturgical traditions,
so that each church can be enriched by the heritage of others. 1279

We have cited the previous paragraph out of context in order to make the
point that the methods of apostasy are always the same. Without the
benefit of the context and source of the passage, to whom would one
ascribe it? To the Consultation on Church Union and its pan-Protestant
church? Or to the National Council of Churches of Christ in the United
States of America? Or to a meeting of Anglican and Roman Catholic
liturgists? In reality, it is from the “Agreed Statement of the Eastern and
Oriental Orthodox Churches”, that is, of those bodies which accept, and
those which reject, the Fourth Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon as a true
definition of Christological orthodoxy. Having dispatched of the council,
they must dispatch of all the (imprecatory or laudatory, as the case may
be) references to it in their respective liturgies.
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13. Involve all levels of a given ecclesiastical body in the apostasy, be it at the level of the individual parish or congregation, the local or regional body, and the denomination superstructure itself.

Since a revolution is necessarily the supplanting of one idea of authority with another, this tactic varies according to the ecclesiastical body in question, since the structures and idea of authority and polity differ, but in any case, it is crucial to the success of the revolution that everyone be involved. For example, there must be “acts designed to reconcile the presently differing forms of ministry, to enable regular Eucharistic fellowship, and to creative various interim bodies for common life and action at each level of the churches’ life.” Here maximum independence must be promoted, particularly in liturgical experimentation, for the old idea of authority to be broken. Conversely, those bodies with a more Congregationalist polity must be made to centralize their structures and to introduce uniformity in their public worship.

The dialectical theme of “unity-in-diversity” may be invoked at this point to propagandize such a process, with emphasis being placed on one or the other pole of the dialectical according the needs of the revolution within a given ecclesiastical body.

The goal of this process is to let our participating churches to become one in the essentials of faith, worship, order, and witness. At the same time, it allows the churches to recognize and embrace the gifts of continued diversity our churches bring in their particular traditions, ethos, and racial and ethnic heritage, while we are spiritually renewed through these relationships and commitments.

This dialectical principle may in turn be propagandized as an extension of “Trinitarian” theology, which implies a dialectical understanding of the Trinity.
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Rooted in the nature and action of the triune God, who is revealed to us as unity in diversity…

It is church unity in a new form – not structural consolidation, but unity in diversity among churches which, though many, are one body in Christ. 1283

Once again, the filioque is the vital historical crux interpretum of the ecumenical program and its roots. 1284

E. The Necessary Philosophical Presupposition of Apostasy, and Its Supreme Goal

This is simply that theology cannot be done apart from worldly philosophy. This view has been promoted in a variety of ways, but perhaps the most lucid and scholarly proponent of this view was the nineteenth century historian of doctrine, Adolph von Harnack. It was his thesis that the Fathers of the Church had “Hellenized” the Gospel, that is, that they had imported, through their use of Greek philosophical terms, the philosophical conceptions, the philosophical meanings, associated with those terms. The whole history of the Church, in terms of these essays, was for Harnack a study of apostasy, a “change in the formulae”, the creation of new formulae with new meanings. But that thesis must no longer be construed to have universal validity in both East and West, nor should it be assumed that it is valid at all times. Rather, as a basic thesis of intellectual culture, it should now be apparent that it is true of the Augustinian religious mind of the Second Europe. The philosophy thus imported and commingled with the Gospel was Platonism. Thus, as the prevailing philosophy of the world changed (with the rediscovery of Aristotle in the West), so too the theology had to change, had to be reintegrated. With this presupposition, then, the corollary, that doctrine
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itself develops as a series of constantly adjusted and fine-tuned responses to the prevailing culture of the world.

With this also comes the presupposition of the church as always being in the process of reformation, that is, of adapting the Word to the conditions and philosophies of the world.\textsuperscript{1285} There is no surer testimony to the difference between the Two Europes, for the religion of the Second Europe is founded upon the surrender of the ancient cultural autonomy of the Church to the Hellenized philosophical doctrines of Augustinian theology. The early Gnostics took that course, taking Christian substance into a wholly different substance, preserving only the outward shell of Christian symbols.

Modernists and ecumenists, whether Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Anglican or Protestant know this story. The sad fact is that most traditionalists, the “confessional orthodox” of the First and Second Europes, do not. We must not remain willfully blind to that ancient and miserific providence which has guided religious leaders and academics into his situation; the providence was, and remains, a most subtle serpent.
XVII. EPILEGOMENA: THE DIALECTICAL ENTAILMENTS OF THE AUGUSTINIAN TRIADOLOGY

In Chapter VII, we gave an outline of the unfolding of the Augustinian *ordo theologiae*, showing how that *ordo* was inextricably coupled to the doctrine of the *filioque* itself; the two were, are are, mutually interdependent. This outline may conveniently serve here as a fitting summary of these essays, for by summarizing the derivation of the entailments we have just examined in detail, their place and logical derivation within the Augustinian *ordo theologiae* may perhaps be more readily appreciated. It should be noted that in some instances, the derivation of a certain entailment arises by more than one dialectical root.

I. Essence

A. The Divine Essence is Simple (απλως) by Definition. If it is simple by definition, it is also:

1. defineable, and therefore, intelligible.

2. defined in terms of an unconstructed pagan philosophical concept; philosophy becomes “handmaiden”, or actually, the mistess, of theology.

a. In this, Augustine has, like Origen or St. Gregory of Nyssa, made use of the “gold of the Egyptians”, but unlike them, he does not indicate the idolatrous use to which the ancient Hebrews put it, and himself ends up with a doctrine of God at root ultimately pagan.

b. Since God’s intelligibility has been construed in terms of an unreconstructed wordily philosophical principle, there is:

(1) one philosophical way of knowing both God and the world, i.e., dialectic, which leads to

(2) a reduction of words to one level of meaning, and
(3) the misinterpretation of the occurrence of philosophical words in theology as intended to convey the philosophical concepts of the systems from which they are borrowed;

   (a) St. Dionysius the Areopagite will be misinterpreted by the Christian West as a Neoplatonist in Christian guise;

   (b) the phenomenon of “Hellenization”, which is peculiar to the Second Europe, will be universalized, and the First Europe will be misinterpreted by the Second, but the First Europe, which has gone through and rejected the process, will be able to interpret the Second Europe correctly;

(4) the reduction of the Holy Scriptures to “propositional revelation about God” and the necessary Gnostic reinterpretation of them, along both dialectical lines (scholasticism), and higher critical lines;

   (a) The abandonment of the recapitulatory Economy of Christ as the means to understand revelation.

(5) The necessity to change theological formulations every time the prevailing philosophical fashion of “the world” changes, as with the “rediscovery” of Aristotle in the twelfth century, or the collapse of the possibility of such formulation on account of the alleged “plurality” of philosophical system current in the world, as in the twentieth century;

(6) The multiplication of “contradictory texts” or rather, the discovery of contradiction in texts, must be resolved by dialectical means, either by
(a) pleading the power structure of the papacy; or

(b) by erecting a dialectical structure -- JEDP -- which accounts for the appearances of contradictions;

(7) It becomes possible to do theology without the context specificity of Revelation, as with Anselm’s dialectical structure in the Cur Deus Homo

c. If God is intelligible, He can only be approached by men when they have reached some stage of the full use of their rational powers, as with the “Baptistic” doctrines of “salvation-by-decision-for-Christ;”

3. defined in terms of the identity of the impersonal, neuter “The One” and “That Which Is” (το ἐν, το ον) with the masculine and personal “The One Who” and “the One Who Is” (ο εἰς, ο ων).

4. the essence will be equivalent to the attributes both severally and individually;

a. the simplicity and impersonality of ultimate reality implies the “nominalist” construction of all language of multiplicity used of God, which establishes in a new guise the leveling of meaning and the univocal correspondence of such terms;

5. the essence will be equivalent to the attributes both severally and individually;

6. the simplicity of the divine essence transcends the multiplicity of the divine pluralities as unity transcends multiplicity, from which several things follow:

a. If God is simple and intelligible in logical priority to the revelation of the Three Persons, then the possibility of the emergence of a “religion-in-general” behind all mere human manifestations is also a logical possibility, each religion, as per the “fractonal theology of the Logos” possessing more
or less of the abstract principle of “Truth”;

II. Attributes

A. Structurally, the attributes are subordinate to the essence in the exposition of the doctrine, but

B. The attributes have the same ontological status and identity with the essence, and therefore

C. The divine attributes are identical to each other and wholly indistinguishable. From this, certain results inevitably follow:

1. The will of God is the same as the essence of God, which in turn means:
   a. The will of God is the same as the Object of the Will of God, which duplicates the Origenist Problematic in the mediaeval disputes over the operations of God outside Himself (\textit{ad extra});
   b. There is no distinction between Theology and Economy, which means:

2. to predestinate is to foreknow, and to foreknow is to predestine, which means:
   a. God predestinates some to sin because He foreknows their sins;

III. Persons: At this lowest level of discourse, the Persons are subordinated to the attributes because:

A. Christ is subordinate to an overarching theory of predestination which considers the attribute operative prior to, and apart from, the Persons, or, in Augustine’s words, Christ is the most “illustrious example” of our predestination, i.e., of a general phenomenon; which leads to:

1. The “supra-“ and “infra-lapsarian” debates as to whether the
abstract “God” predestines on the basis of foreknowledge or prior to it, which is a debate over the *ordo theologiae*, establishing a new problem:

a. which attributes are primary (prior), and which are secondary (posterior)?

b. the subordination of the Church and Her sacramental mysteries to the theory of predestination; which leads to

(1) The disputes with Donatism which compromises the note of the Church’s holiness on account of the confusion of personal holiness with the Church’s nature, which is Christ’s body;

(2) The disputes with Pelagianism, in which Augustine came to the same position via the theory of predestination;

2. The Limited Atonement, i.e., the doctrine that Christ’s death is efficacious only for those who have received prior predestination, which in turn is:

a. a confusion of person and nature since Christ’s humanity, consubstantial with all men, has been redefined as the sum total of all the elect; which leads to:

(1) massive application of Gnostic tactics of pseudomorphosis in key scriptural texts;

(2) confusion of person and nature, since in order to redefine the efficacy of His humanity as limited to the elect, one defines it by the sum of total of those elect;

3. Spanish adoptionism, which maintains that since Christ is “the most illustrious example of our predestination in that it is by grace” that His humanity is *adopted* to be the Son of God by grace, whereas His deity is Son of God by nature, which in
turn is Nestorianism; which is based upon:

4. Original guilt, which confuses person and nature by maintaining that Adam’s evil personal misuse of the natural human will transmits his culpability to the human nature; and thus maintains that Christ’s humanity is post-lapsarian because its will “lusts in opposition to the spirit;”

5. The confusion of natural operation with person affects all other attempts of the Second Europe to apply theological conceptions to secular pursuits, most notably in
   a. Law and Jurisprudence
   b. Psychology and Philosophical Ethics (or “moral philosophy”)

B. The attributes of God are causes of the Persons which derive from God, or, to put it differently, a new Gnostic tactic of supplying new meanings for old terms is discovered in the “of=from” argument for the filioque.

1. The Spirit “of Life” proceeds “from” the Father and the Son because they share the common attribute “of” Life, and because the Father’s personal property of causation has been given to the Son on that basis, a structure which parallels Eunomianism in the interposition of a category of attribute between one of the three Persons. And within this new level of discourse, yet a final form of subordinationalist structure occurs, because:
   a. The Father has no distinctions, and is the Uncaused Cause;
   b. the Son has one distinction, being the Caused Cause;
      (1) In this, one may discern the “middle step of two” explicitly prohibited by the Cappadocians;
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c. and the Holy Spirit has Two distinctions, being caused by two different types of causes.

2. The Holy Spirit becomes the new personal Locus of Unity -- the consubstantial love of both Father and Son -- in the Trinity, replacing the Father, because

a. The name “Holy Spirit” defines the divine essence by two of its attributes, holiness, and spirit, and therefore because

b. His name is capable therefore of signifying the entire Trinity. With this step, to cite Aquinas, the whole “cycle concludes” because it has returned “to the way substance from which the proceeding began.”

c. History itself becomes the dialectical Revelation of the dialectical God, as with Joachim and Hegel;

d. As such, the philosophical history of such structures must decompose in one of two dialectically opposed tendencies:

(1) that of Porphyry’s “Pantheism”, i.e., a reduction of entities to “monism;” or,

(2) that of Iamblichus’s “Polytheism” i.e. a multiplication of entities ad infinitum in “monadism”.

C. Since the Trinity is conceived in dialectical terms, the Persons then become less important than the relations of oppositions between them, and thus, all apparent contradictions in texts, including those of Augustine, must be resolved dialectically.

One could, of course, go on and on with the detection of such entailments. But a caveat must be registered, for the temptation arises all too often in certain circles of the First Europe to view the Second in a kind of “geographical Manicheanism,” to see in every cultural production of the West some sort of weedy overgrowth of the Augustinian seed. But such is
not at all the case. A glance at the above outline, and indeed, a considered reflection on all that has preceded it, will reveal the effects of the Augustinian mind to have been limited to three broad areas: (1) dialectical structures in theological exposition; (2) corresponding structures in disciplines where the effect of theology was direct, such as law, science, philosophy, and religious art; and (3) dialectical philosophies of History. Other effects, while perhaps traceable, for example in the modern secular art of the Second Europe, are nevertheless indirect and do not necessarily spring from the Augustinian ordo theologiae or paradigm. Moreover, it is not here claimed that the Augustinian theological paradigm is the sole cause of the phenomena surveyed. It is only maintained that it is an important and vastly misunderstood, cause, which to neglect in favor of merely secular explanations is to distort. At its core, the Second Europe remains a theological phenomenon.

As will also have been apparent in the preceding pages, the Second Europe did not just “fall into” Augustinian blindly, nor did it do so without struggling against certain of its implications. It is the tragedy of the history of doctrines that when it did struggle against those implications, it tended to do so in isolation from other areas of doctrine. It was not able, for example, in the disputes between Radbertus and Ratramnus, to draw general conclusions from the particular dispute, and to examine Augustinism itself as the source of its problems. This is due in part to the fact that it had, in some sense, already turned a deaf ear to the First Europe’s warnings, but it is also due in part to its genuine piety and reverence toward what it held to be the authentic patristic tradition. In doing so, the Second Europe closed its eyes to some uncomfortable facts of its own history, for example, to the fact that the Celtic Church did not embrace Augustinism, and for that matter, waged the longest struggle in the West against accepting the filioque. The First Europe, too, has been somewhat slow to appreciate these types of nuances in the Second Europe’s history, preferring in some cases to seek its own rationalistic
simplifications by not acknowledging Augustine as a Father of the Church, for what would mean an end to lazy clichés and superficial criticism in the beginning of the real, and necessarily lengthy, spiritual work of reclaiming the West for the Holy Orthodoxy that was once its dogmatic, spiritual, and liturgical core.
A Theological Pathology of the Second Europe

VOLUME III of
God, History, and Dialectic

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2016 Edition