God, History, and Dialectic
The Theological Foundations of the Two Europes and Their Cultural Consequences

Volume IV - The Apparatus
GOD, HISTORY, AND DIALECTIC:
VOLUME ONE:

THE APPARATUS

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ANNOTATIONS TO THE PROLEGOMENA

1 “First Europe” and “Second Europe”: the phrases are actually those of Professor Norman Cantor who utilizes them in a rather different sense. “First Europe” meaning the Western European civilization as constituted and actualized in the Carolingian and immediate Post-Carolingian “renaissance.” The “Second Europe” thus comes to designate the civilization of the High Middle ages of Western Europe. In neither case is the Christian East primarily in view. I have employed the terms in a fundamentally different sense than Prof. Cantor to indicate just a few of the shortcomings of the standard Second European historiographical paradigm. In each case the terms “First” and “Second” Europes define themselves principally in terms of their contrary understanding of the Two Hellenizations which define their core essence.

2 “Crypto-Roman Catholic”: the conception, as a cultural and historiographical principle, was suggested by the remarks of the 19th century Russian philosopher and Slavophil Alexis Khomiakov, who stated, “All Protestants are Crypto-Papists… To use the concise language of algebra, all the West knows but one datum \( a \); whether it be preceded by the positive sign +, as with the Romanists, or with the negative -, as with the Protestants, the \( a \) remains the same.”

It is the task of these essays to define and explore what Khomiakov and other Orthodox Slavophilic intellectuals meant by this datum \( a \). However, it may conveniently be labeled the “Augustinian religious mind” or, as the Prolegomena also refers to it, the “Second Hellenization of Dogma” which was given its enduring and definitive shape by St. Augustine of Hippo.

Ware, who has since been consecrated titular bishop of Diokleia by

\[ \text{W.J. Birkbeck, Russia and the English Church, p. 67, cited in Timothy Ware, The Orthodox Church (1964), p. 9.} \]
the Oecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, goes on to write of the phenomenon of the Two Europes.

Khomiatkov, when he spoke of the datum a, had in mind the fact that western Christians, whether Free Churchmen, Anglicans, or Roman Catholics, have a common background in the past. All alike (although they may not always care to admit it) have been profoundly influenced by the same events: by the Papal centralization and the Scholasticism of the Middle Ages, by the Renaissance, by the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. But behind members of the Orthodox Church -- Greeks, Russians, and the rest -- there lies a very different background. They have known no Middle Ages (in the western sense) and have undergone no Reformations or Counter-Reformations; they have only been affected in an oblique way by the cultural and religious upheaval which transformed western Europe… Christians in the West, both Roman and Reformed, generally start by asking the same questions, although they may disagree about the answers. In Orthodoxy, however, it is not merely the answers that are different -- the questions themselves are not the same as in the west.α

One might add that, as these essays shall demonstrate, it is not only that in the First Europe the questions are oftentimes different, but as is more often the case, the questions which the First Europe asks are the same questions that the Second Europe asks, but it asks them in a different order than the West and thus derives different answers and explanations of spiritual phenomena..

The Slavophilic though approached the problem of Eastern Orthodox Catholicism and Western Latino-Papal Catholicism primarily in conjunction with philosophical explorations of the desirable course which they assumed Russian cultural and political development must take. As Ivan (Vasilevich) Kireevsky put it:

α Ware, op. cit., p. 9.
The problem is usually posed in this way: was ancient Russia, where the general order of things flowed from native elements, better or worse than present-day Russia, where the order of things is subject to the predominance of Western European elements? If ancient Russia was superior to modern Russia, so the argument goes, then we must seek to restore the exclusively Russian past and do away with the Western influence which has disfigured the essential Russian character. If, however, ancient Russia was inferior then we must seek to impose the Western influence and eradicate the peculiarly Russian.

Thus, if one examines the three elements of the common European development, the “Roman Christianity, the primitive barbarian world which destroyed the Roman Empire, and the ancient pagan, classical world,” says Kireevsky, then one will notice immediately that “this classical world of ancient paganism… is absent from Russia’s heritage.”

The essence of this ancient pagan spirit, the spirit of Hellenism, was, according to Kireevsky, the spirit of rationalism, and it is this spirit which is foreign to Orthodoxy, but found in the Latino-Papal Catholicism of the Second Europe:

...The Roman Catholic, in splitting away from the Eastern Church, displayed that same triumph of rationalism over the tradition of immediate wisdom and inner, spiritual intelligence. Thus, on the strength of a superficial syllogism extracted from the concept of the divine equality of God the Father and God the Son, the dogma of the Holy Trinity was betrayed, contrary to all spiritual meaning and tradition; and on the basis of another syllogism the Pope replaced Jesus Christ at the head of the Church, acquiring first temporal power and finally infallibility. The existence of God was throughout the whole of Christianity demonstrated by means of syllogisms. The entire faith rested on syllogistic

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β Ibid., p. 81.
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scholasticism. The Inquisition, Jesuitism, in fact, all of those features characteristic of Catholicism, developed on the strength of that same formal process of reason; so much so that even Protestantism, which the Catholics reproach for its rationalism, emerged as a direct result of the rationalism of Catholicism itself. In this ultimate triumph of formal reason over faith and tradition the perceptive mind will already detect in embryonic form the whole of Europe’s present fate, which is the consequence of an ill-conceived principle.⁷

Thus, Kireevsky comes to state, in his own fashion, the basic approach of these essays: “Western Christianity itself, on breaking away from the Universal Church, acquired the germ of the principle which had been the basic characteristic of the whole of Greco-pagan development, the principle of rationalism.”⁸ From this point, Kireevsky developed certain crucial insights into the understanding of “right” and of “justice” in the First and Second Europes.

What is lacking, however, in the Slavophilic school, for all its profundity, is a formally explicit argumentation of its hypotheses; one senses that one is reading a philosophical school founded upon certain intuited truths that are never subjected to comprehensive treatment or development. Part of the explanation is to be sought in the Slavophilic preoccupation with such questions only in the context of the nineteenth century debates in Russia over the future direction its cultural and political policy should take. Nevertheless, the attempt should have been made, and these essays are in some sense the long-overdue attempt to make it.

³ cf. Hoyt and Chodorow, Europe in the Middle Ages, Third Edition, Chapter V, pp. 113-136. In Hoyt and Chodorow’s hands, this historiographical approach leads to an interesting distortion of its own, for in their treatment, Byzantium and the Rise and spread of Islam are linked

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⁷ Ibid.
⁸ Ibid., pp. 82-83.
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together in one (not very effective) treatment. The standard Second European historiography is implied throughout, that Byzantium’s primary importance for the moulding and shaping of “Europe” is that it acted as a breakwater, channeling the conquests of Islam into North Africa, and staving off the penetration of Islam into the European continent and culture, thus permitting the development of the consolidation of the Second Europe and the development of “Western Civilization”.

4 Patristic “mind”: in Greek, φρονημα or φρονησιζ. This will be more fully explored in chapter 2 in conjunction with the Apostolic Succession.

5 “The Pope is the first Protestant”, again, the insight of Alexis Khomiakov, cited in Ware, op. cit., p. 10.

6 “reliquary of unchangeable ritual”, the phrase is suggested by Malachi Martin, in his Three Popes and the Cardinal, p. 216. “Stupidly proud were we Greek and Russian Orthodox Christians, who nationalized the Gospel and conferred Greek and Russian citizens’ papers on Jesus, making Tsarist Russia... Byzance, and Greece the tabernacles of Jesus’ dwelling... with incense and robes and bearded magnificence to cloak our pathetic impotencies.”

Such a statement, coming from an adherent to a tradition with its own long history of trying to develop “Catholic social teaching” is indeed surprising. Martin misses the point of Orthodoxy entirely, for the creation of a Christian culture cannot but help be one of the implications of the Incarnation, if the Incarnation was genuine. That, indeed, was the whole point of the Iconoclastic controversy. But Martin’s remarks do serve to speak volumes about the West’s own religious mind, for it presupposes that it must constantly adjust itself to the cultural currents of the world, not adjust the world to the cultural implications of the Church. In short, on Martin’s view, there is no genuine cultural “repentance”.

Nor, on Martin’s view, does it seem appropriate to have made the
attempt to make Christian doctrine and culture vernacular. Such was, of course, the motivation, in part, behind the papacy’s retention of the Latin in its liturgical celebrations long after it had ceased being an international language. But at Vatican II, of course, the Papacy, in addition to gutting and bastardizing two thousand years of its own liturgical tradition, also took the step, advocated by the Reformers five hundred years before, and practiced always by the First Europe, of celebrating liturgical services in the national vernaculars. Martin’s complaints would thus seem best directed against his own “infallible” Papacy, and not against the Christian culture of the First Europe.

7 “Origenist Problematic”: its actual wording in Origen is as follows: “Now, as one cannot be a father apart from holding a possession or a slave, so we cannot even call God Almighty is there are none over whom He can exercise His power.” This is restated by Origen in a Trinitarian fashion, in which form it is better known: “Let the man who dares to say ‘There was a time when the Son was not’ understand that this is what he will be saying, ‘once wisdom did not exist, and life did not exist.’” (Origen, On First Principles (περὶ Αρχῶν), trans. Butterworth, I:2:10; IV:4:1 respectively).

8 Synodikon of Orthodoxy: the actual anathematization reads: “To all those whosoever would in a pretence of confessing Orthodoxy insolently into the Orthodox Catholic and Apostolic Church a new form of impiety, to wit, the godless doctrines of the Greeks concerning the human soul, or concerning heaven, or earth, or the rest of creation: Let them be:

“Anathema, anathema, anathema!

“To all those whosoever would adhere to the pretended and insane wisdom of the profane philosophers, aligned themselves with their opinions as unto their masters, and admit the transmigration of the human soul or that it perisheth as those of the beasts and returneth to nothingness, and by these means repudiate the Resurrection, Judgement, and Final retribution for the deeds of this life.
“Anathema, anathema, anathema!

9 cf. Paul Tillich, *A History of Christian Thought*, p. 220: “Even the church fathers were undercut by the Jesuits. The Jesuits were especially Anti-Augustinian. There is only one father of the church, namely, the living pope. All earlier church fathers are full of heretical statements, of errors, even of falsifications. As you see from this, the Jesuits were very modern people. They knew about the historical problems and used them to undermine the authority of the church fathers. Protestant historiography did the same thing, to make possible the prophetic authority of the Reformers. So both sides used criticism, the Jesuits to give absolute power to the pope and the Protestants to liberalize the authority of the Bible.

The concerns of these essays are rather different, however, than that which Tillich outlines as the motivations of the Reformers and Jesuits. While agreeing with him in the proposition that Protestant and Roman Catholic historiography shares essentially the same presuppositions, we shall maintain that (1) these presuppositions are the result, or the effect, of the Augustinian Hellenization of doctrine, and these are theologically, and not historiographically, grounded; and (2) that both, by employing “criticism”, are carrying forward the strategies and tactics of Gnosticism which are implicit in that Augustinian Hellenization. This is to say that, if Augustinian theological formulations be adopted at any time by the West as its dogmatic basis, then Western Christianity, in any form, can never be based upon tradition but must perforce perpetually depart from it and justify its departures by the techniques of Gnosticism.

10 “Niccolatian Schism”, the usual term for the schism between Nicholas I and St. Photius is the “Photian Schism”. Once again, the term results from the implicit assumption of the canonical status of the Second Europe’s historiography. But in point of fact, as shall be examined thoroughly in Part Two, the responsibility for the schism lies not with Photius, but with Nicholas, who very clearly and deliberately tied the
claims of papacy supremacy to the Augustinian triadology in the papal missions to Bulgaria.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I: THE RECAPITULATION ECONOMY OF CHRIST AND THE VISION OF GOD

11 Reflecting the patristic mind of the First Europe, St. Basil the Great contains an interesting variation of this tradition, but one, nevertheless, remaining within the bounds of the patristic ordo theologiae:

Furthermore, if (Eunomios) calls the Holy Ghost a creature he describes His nature as limited. How then can the two following passages stand? “The Spirit of the Lord filleth the world,” and “Whither shall I go from they Spirit?” But he does not, it would seem, confess Him to be simple in nature; for he describes Him as one in number. And, as I have already said, everything that is one in number is not simple. And if the Holy Spirit is not simple, He consists of essence and sanctification, and is therefore composite, and not simple, and consubstantial with the Father and the Son?α

The ordo theologiae here is that of Persons, operations and essence.

More importantly, however, St. Basil clearly reflects the Christological application of this passage in the deification and exaltation of Christ’s human nature hypostatically united to His divine nature.

They who divide their up and down between the Father and the Son do not remember the word of the Prophet: “If I climb up into heaven thou art there; if I go down to hell thou art there also.” Now, to omit all proof of the ignorance of those how predicate place of incorporeal things, what excuse can be found for their attack upon Scripture, shameless as their

antagonism is, in the passages “Sit thou upon my right hand” and Sat down on the right hand of the majesty of God? The expression “right hand” does not, as they content, indicate the lower place, but equality of relation; it is not understood physically, in which case there might be something sinister about God, but Scripture puts before us the magnificence of the dignity of the Son by the use of dignified language indicating the seat of honour."

While St. Basil does not explicitly identify or interpret the passage in terms of the descent of Our Lord’s into sheol, His resurrection and Ascension, that is to say, while he does not yet explicitly interpret it in terms of “recapitulatory economy,” he nevertheless still casts the Psalm verse, not as an exposition of certain abstract philosophical characteristics, but in specific reference to Christ. In this, he is following the patristic ordo theologiae once again.

A most telling indicator of the presence of the patristic ordo theologiae, and the recapitulatory economy, in the interpretation of this passage is actually supplied by a Latin father who is usually understood to be one of the signal “proto-Augustinian” influences on St. Augustine of Hippo. This is provided by St. Hilary of Poitiers on his On the Trinity. Here the reference is not only deliberately Christological, but recapitulatory:

It was written that in all born and created things God might be known within them and without, overshadowing and indwelling, surrounding all and interfused through all, since palm and hand, which old, reveal the might of His external control, while throne and footstool, by their support of a sitter, display the subservience of outward things to one within Who, Himself outside them, encloses all in His grasp, yet dwells within the

\[\beta\] Citing Hebrews 1:3. Note the reading “of God” for “on high.” St. Basil is clearly thinking of the Nicene symbol of the Faith. The reading is not a variant reading attested by any extant manuscript, and is most probably either a deliberate or unconscious creedal gloss.

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external world which is His own. In this wise does God, from within \textit{and} from without, control and correspond to the universe; being infinite He is present in all things, in Him Who is infinite are all included. In devout thoughts such as these my soul, engrossed in the pursuit of truth, took its delight. For it seemed that the greatness of God so far surpassed the mental powers of His handiwork, that however far the limited mind of man might strain in the hazardous effort to define Him, the gap was not lessened between the finite nature which struggled and the boundless infinity that lay beyond its ken.α

That this christological economy is ultimately in view is reflected in the fact that Hilary later refers to Christ in almost the same terms.β This is noteworthy, since Hilary can also refer to the revelation of the divine Name “I AM” in terms of the absolute existence of the divine nature, a tendency that will become a signal preoccupation of the Second Europe in its exegesis of the divine Name and in the interpretation of the Psalm itself.

St. Ambrose of Milan, like St. Basil the Great, refers the passage, following the same \textit{ordo}, to the Holy Spirit.γ

The most brief, though no less important, recapitulatory application of the Psalm occurs in St. Ephraim the Syrian, in his \textit{Hymns on the Nativity}:

On His living breath that quickeneth all, depend the spirits that are above and that are beneath. When He sucked the milk of Mary, He was sucking with all Life... He was wholly in the depths and wholly in the highest! He was wholly with all things and wholly with each. While His body was forming in the womb, His power was fashioning all members!δ

β cf. VIII:49, pp. 41-42.
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It is worth noting that the earliest Christian references to this Psalm in St. clement of Rome do not reflect the deliberate Christological or Penumatological interpretation of the passage.⁴ Novatian gives a standard “Second European” interpretation of the passage, perhaps understandable in the historical context, in terms of an exposition on the attribute of the incorporeality of God.⁵

Thus, in the fathers up to St. Augustine, one may observe two exegetical traditions coexisting, for indeed, in the patristic ordo theologiae, the two need not be understood to be in opposition to each other, though there is a clear trend toward the christological and recapitulatory understanding of the passage as the struggles with the great christological heresies begin to focus attention on such passages.

Most tellingly of all, the two traditions continue to co-exist in St. Augustine himself, for his inversion of the Patristic ordo theologiae had not yet taken hold on the mind of the Second Europe.

“Let God rise up, and let His enemies be scattered”. Already this hath come to pass, Christ hath rise up, “who is over all things, God blessed for ever,”... “Whither shall I depart,” saith he, “from Thy Spirit, and from Thy face whither shall I flee?” With the mind, therefore, and not the body, they flee; to wit, by being afraid, not by being hidden; and not from that face which they see not, but from that which they are compelled to see.

For the face of Him hath His presence in His Church been called...⁶

One can imagine what some Orthodox purists, who would, like the Second Europe itself, wish to read back into Augustine all the deviations of the subsequent Augustinism, would make of the references to the mind and body, taking them as “indications of the incipient and inherent dualisms”

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that pervade his thought. But one can find similar expressions in almost any passage of monastic literature and spirituality, and as such, the passage itself is still very rooted in the patristic *ordo theologiae* and the exegetical consequences that flow from it.

In a passage that parallels the ecstatic christocentric mystical vision of St. Ephraim, St. Augustine couples the Psalm to Christ’s Incarnation:

Doubtless the Lord Jesus Christ is even here: rather, was here as to His flesh, is here now as to His Godhead: He was both with the Father and had not left the Father. Hence, in that He is said to have been sent and to have come to us, His incarnation is set forth to us, for the Father did not take flesh.

8. For there are certain heretics called Sabellians, who are also called patripassians, who affirm that it was the Father Himself that had suffered. Do not thou so affirm, O Catholic; for if thou wilt be a Patripassian, thou wilt not be the same. Understand, then, that the Incarnation of the Son is termed the sending of the Son; and do not believe that the Father was incarnate, but do not yet believe that He departed from the incarnate Son. The Son carried flesh, the Father was with the Son. If the Father was in heaven, the Son on earth, how was the Father with the Son? Because both Father and Son were everywhere: for God is not in such manner in heaven as not to be on earth. Hear him who would flee from the judgment of God, and found not a way to flee by: “Whither shall I go,” saith he, “from Thy Spirit; and whither shall I flee from Thy face? If I ascent up into heaven, Thou art there.”

When one turns, however, form the fathers to the post-schism scholastics of the mediaeval Second Europe, a clear tendency has emerged. Since the inversion of the Augustinian *ordo theologiae* has by that time taken hold, the Psalm is interpreted along the lines of the first two categories -- essence and attributes -- which occur in that *ordo*. The clearest example

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of this occurs in the *Summa Theologica* of Thomas Aquinas, where ubiquity is discussed without reference to the Persons of the Trinity, but to the essence itself.\(^\beta\)

12 The Fathers refer often to the darkness and light that is “around God” (περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ) or “around the (divine) essence” (περὶ τῆς ουσίας). Such “spatial” language was employed to denote the “impracticability” and unknowability of the divine essence, while maintaining that the divine and uncreate light and darkness are themselves knowable and participatable. Cf. St. Dionysius the Areopagite, *The Mystical Theology*: I, II; *The Divine Names*, 11; St. Gregory Palamas, *The Triads*, I:III 23; III: I: 17 & 19. In such fathers as these, the christological and Trinitarian context, and therewith the patristic *ordo theologiae*, will be immediately apparent.

The domination of the Augustinian *ordo theologiae*, however, within the Second Europe, massively recasts this doctrine of the uncreated and participatable light of Christ into the created and sensible *illumination* of the sou. Since God is “absolutely simple” for the new *ordo*, all acts outside of Himself are perforce acts which are not eternal, and therefore, created “effects.” Cf. chapter , pp.

13 The “covering in the womb” is often coupled in the more extreme presentations of the doctrine with verses relating to the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart and so on.

14 Positive or “kataphatic” theology refers to that theology dealing with what can be known of God, or, more accurately, those things of God which can be *participated* in. Negative theology insists upon the unknowability, unintelligibility, and non-participatability of the divine essence of God absolutely. In the hands of the Orthodox fathers, negative theology is not, as it will become for the Second Europe, a transcendence of the multiplicity of beings to the utter simplicity of God’s essence, it is the going beyond all philosophical categories of being -- including therefore

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15 In the context of the Augustinian *ordo theologiae*, the exegesis of Romans 1:20 and the implications of its importance for theology change dramatically, since the “invisible things” no longer refer to *Christ*, i.e., to the first category within the patristic *ordo* -- persons -- but to the simplicity of the divine nature itself, abstracted and understood apart from the context-specific Trinitarian revelation. That this *ordo* was abandoned for the inverted Augustinian *ordo* is evident by a comparison of the use of Romans 1:20 in Aquinas to that which it had for St. Ambrose of Milan:

5. Again, is, as is shown in the *Posterior analytics*, the knowledge of the principles of demonstration takes its origin from sense, whatever transcends all sense and sensibles seems to be indemonstrable. That God exists appears to be a proposition of this sort and is therefore indemonstrable.

6. The falsity of this opinion is shown to us, first, from the art of demonstration which teaches us to arrive at causes from their effects. Then, it is shown to us from the order of the sciences. For, as it is said in the *Metaphysics*, if there is no knowable substance higher than sensible substance, there will be no science higher than physics. It is shown, thirdly, from the pursuit of philosophers, who have striven to demonstrate that God exists. Finally, it is shown to us by the truth in the words of the Apostle Paul: “For the invisible things of God… are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.”

7. Nor, contrary to the *first* argument, is there any problem in the fact that in God essence and being are identical. For this is understood of the being by which God subsists in Himself. But we do not know of what sort this being is, just as we do not know the divine essence. The reference is not to the being that signifies the composition of intellect. For thus the
existence of God does fall under demonstration; this happens when our mind is led from demonstrative arguments to form such a proposition of God whereby it expresses that He exists.\(^\alpha\)

The context has been cited extensively here to show that Aquinas’ reference is not to the revelation of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, or to the *oikonomia* of the Incarnation or salvation history, but to the abstract philosophical conceptions of God dictated by the Augustinian *ordo* itself.

In the *Summa Theologica*, a similar usage occurs in Part 1, Q. 13, Art 5, after Thomas refutes univocity or equivalence of philosophical categorical terms being used at once of God and creatures. Nevertheless, the Augustinian *ordo* itself remains, working counter to Thomas’ refutations, for, as any examination of the context of these refutations will show, again the use of Romans 1:20 is not in direct reference to the revelation of the Trinity nor to the recapitulatory economy of Christ, but to the God-in-general, since the refutations of univocity and equivalence are refutations of certain *philosophical* implications that inhere in the Augustinian *ordo*.

A related problem is caused by Thomas’ heavy reliance upon St. John of Damascus and his lengthy discussions of the meaning of the term “God” not only in the Damascene but also St. Ambrose and others.\(^\beta\) Here some care should be exercised, for it will be recalled that in the ante-Nicene period, there was an ambiguity caused by the simultaneous occurrence of the patristic *ordo theologiae* and the Hellenized *ordo theologiae*. Thomas rightly notes that “as we know substance from its properties and operations, so we name substance from its operation,”\(^\gamma\) he does *not* perceive the massive difference between the patristic application of that principle to conclude certain things about the trinitarian *Hypostases*

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\(^\beta\) Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Pt. 1, Q. 13, Art 7-8, 10, 11.

\(^\gamma\) Ibid., Pt. 1, I. 13, Art 8.
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-- i.e., their consubstantiality -- and the use of it to conclude certain things about the divine essence abstracted as an object in itself, over and apart from the Persons.


16a cf. note on p. concerning the “Augustinization” of Moses Maimonides, Avicenna, and Averroes.

17 For a discussion of St. Ambrose’s trinitarian doctrine as non-Augustinian, cf. note, on the filioquist interpretation of the pre-Augustinian Latin and Greek Fathers.


19 Ibid. It should be noted that the coupling of Romans 1:20 with the statement of Christ in St. John 10:38 here is deliberately made in order to demonstrate the context specificity of Romans 1:20: it is not a natural theology that Romans 1:20 presupposes, but rather a salvation history, a tradition.

20 Ibid., pp. 318-319.

21 The “First Europe” should thus be understood to be less a “geographical” phenomenon, and more a theological phenomenon, governed and defined largely by its adherence to the patristic ordo theologiae and all its cultural implications and consequences. Because of this, depending upon the era in view, the geographical boundaries of the First Europe, insofar as it is possible to draw them, will change.

22 The word hostia, normally translated as “host”, is here deliberately translated “Lamb” according to the Eastern tradition and in deliberate reference to the liturgical context of the Agnus Dei which occurs later in the Gregorian Liturgy. It is so translated because of the necessity to avoid the distorted connotations that subsequently attach to the term in the post-schism theology of the Second Europe.
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23 Office of Oblation of the Gregorian Liturgy, ed. Rev. Fr. Joseph P. Farrell, S.S.B. Originally, the Gregorian liturgy, like its Eastern counterparts, celebrated the office of oblation prior to the actual mass, and brought the gifts to the altar in a “Great Entrance”, a practice which one still finds employed amongst some of the Dominicans. The moving of the oblation to the middle of the mass and its performance on the altar itself was a legacy of the Council of Trent. The prayer here is not original to the Gregorian Liturgy, but form the provisional office for the celebration of the Oblation of the Holy Orthodox Church, American Jurisdiction.

24 St. John 5:19.

25 St. Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua 7: PG 91: 1077C-1080A:

For if beings were brought into existence by God out of non-being through the agency of a rational principle (λογος) and wisdom… when then cannot see that the one Rational Principle (Λογος) is in fact many rational principles (λογοι), and that created things were determined simultaneously by the agency of this distinction which is undivided, because their attributes are distinct from each other and without confusion? And again the many (rational principles) are in fact one (Rational Principle) existing without confusion by virtue of all things being offered up to Him through Him Who is their enessentialization and enhypostasization, God the Logos of the Father, Who is the source and cause of all things…

One should note that the context here remains both specifically christological, recapitulatory, and liturgical, for that which allows Christ to recapitulate all creation in Himself that He may offer it up to the Father is precisely the fact that creation contains the same rational principles which He enessentializes divinely (because they preexist with and in Him) and humanly (because He recapitulates them in His human nature), and which He uniquely Personalizes (enhypostasizes), showing Himself to be the
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very Creator.α

26 Colossians 1:18.

27 In this regard, one should recall that St. Irenaeus’ extrapolations of the doctrine of recapitulation were made in the service of an anti-Gnostic polemic, for as will be seen in chapter 2, Gnosticism’s metaphysical presuppositions were advanced in aid of a spiritually which “demythologized” Christian doctrine and piety, taking them as symbols of the merely psychological history of the illumination and knowledge the Gnostic achieved. On the Gnostic view, then, terms such as “Christ” or “Bishop” had only an interior, psychological significance, and therefore only a subjective basis.

28 Cf. John Lawson, The Biblical Theology of Saint Irenaeus, (London: Epworth Press, 1948), pp. 140-198. It is a mistake of academic theology that “recapitulation” is a theory or doctrine taught only by Irenaeus, due no doubt to the fact that he is the first Church Father to elaborate upon the doctrine rather extensively. But to understand the patristic tradition in this fashion is to ignore the recapitulatory implications of the fact that for the Fathers, the term οἰκονομία does not denote simply a series of general propositions about the relationship of God to the creation deduced from philosophical first principles, but rather denotes primarily the Incarnation of the Son and Word of God and the general “metaphysical” implications that follow from that for any generalized doctrine of οἰκονομία.


30 Colossians 1:26.

31 Revelations 13:8.


33 Ibid., III: 21: 10. There is a debate amongst scholars as to

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whether “allegory” and “typology” are synonymous terms and methods, or not. For my part, I do not believe that they are synonymous, for the principal reason that typology and types tend to rest upon their ability to be reiterated and recontextualized, whereas allegories tend to be capable of resting on metaphysical extrapolations from one event or Scriptural basis. Typology depends upon the historicity of certain events and recurrences.

By adopting a linguistic calculus, one can note the basis of typology in reiteration and recontextualization, as follows:

Let • • • on either side of a symbol mean “in the context of “
Let $\chi$ denote a specific context, and $\gamma$ a different context.
Let “S” denote a proposition or event.
Let $\Rightarrow$ denote “the left side of the arrow may be rewritten/recontextualized in the context on the other side of the arrow.”

Thus, all types will be found to obey the context specific linguistic rule:

$$\chi \cdot \cdot \cdot S \cdot \cdot \cdot \chi \Rightarrow \gamma \cdot \cdot \cdot S \cdot \cdot \cdot \gamma$$

It will be noted that this rule does not predict the occurrence of types, but only their conformity to the rule. It is as applicable to musical or literary motifs as it is to patristic theology. However, it should be noted that in the latter, the context itself is assumed the historicity of the context or occurrence of the type. While there are certainly dangers to the introduction of such formal specificity of the rule does serve to indicate that a similar rational process is involved in the detection of theological typologies as is involved in the detection of significant data from mere background noise, or of significant themes in literary or artistic works.

The rule also explains why it is so easy to confuse allegorical methods with typological ones. This may be done by assigning definite finite (i.e., “historical”) values to the contexts $\chi$ and $\gamma$. In this case, one has a typology or motif proper, repeated patterns which actually exist. If,
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however, one assigns the value “null” (symbolized in the linguistic calculus by $\varphi$) to the left hand side of the rule, one will have a rule of deduction of specific instances from a general proposition. If one assigns the value $\varphi$ to the right hand side of the equation, one will have a basic rule form for introduction, provided the type has been reiterated in more than one specific context prior to the formulation of a general rule (a proposition without specific context), as follows:

$$\{\chi \cdots S \cdots \chi \Rightarrow n \cdots S \cdots n\} \Rightarrow \varphi \cdots S \cdots \varphi,$$

where “$n$” denotes any number of specific contextualizations, and $\varphi$ denotes the “null” or no context form of a general law applicable to all contexts.

That the Fathers should therefore have coupled such typological thinking with the very Logos and Rational Principles not only of salvation history but the fundamental laws of creation is no accident, but one of their profoundest insights. (Cf. chapter 15: “The Science of the Chameleon Godhead” for the very earliest patristic application of this idea in the crucial insights of St. Basil the Great).


35 As I noted in note 16 of my Introduction to the translation of Saint Maximus' *Disputation with Pyrrhus* (St. Tikhon’s Seminary Press), p. viii:

This highlights another principle vital to recapitulation, that of the unity between the Old and New Testaments. For St. Irenaeus, this principle, and therefore the whole doctrine of Recapitulation, underpins his polemic against the Gnostics and marcionites, both of which separated the God and Author of the Old Testament, the Creator of matter and hence of evil, from the God of the New who, being spiritual and therefore good, could not have authored the Old.

In other words, the Recapitulatory Economy of Christ made possible not only the defeat of the Hellenizing and dialectical principles of Gnosticism,
but also fundamentally challenges the notion that the “Semitic mind” was incapable of metaphysical thought, or that the New Testament contains no metaphysical principles.

38 St. Athanasius, On the Incarnation of the Word of God, II: 9, (St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press), p. 35.
39 Ibid., III, 16, p. 44.
40 Ibid., III: 18, p. 47.
41 Ibid.
45 St. Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua 7: PG 91: 1077C-1080 C.

The role of St. Dionysius the Areopagite’s works in the Second Europe’s post-Augustinian attempts to reinterpret the Fathers along the lines of the Augustinian ordo theologiae of essence, attributes, persons will be explored in Part Two. Suffice it to say, that Dionysius’ heavy reliance upon rhetorical constructions which superficially resemble those of Neoplatonic philosophy will compel a profound misinterpretation of the Areopagite along Neoplatonic lines.

46 St. John 5:19.
47 The role of the Eliatic philosophies will be discussed in more detail in conjunction with the examination of Hegelian historiographical and philosophical theory in chapter , cf. pp.
48 St. Maximus the Confessor is thus seen to teach the opposite cosmology and historiography from Origen, for whom preexistent souls exist in a state of eternal Rest (Stasis), from which they moved (Kinesis) and therefore Fell into Becoming (Genesis). Cf. my Free Choice in Saint Maximus the Confessor, pp. 220-221.
49 St. Maximus the Confessor, First Century on Theology: 66, The

The mystery of the incarnation of the Lord is the key to all the arcane symbolism and typology in the Scriptures, and in addition gives us knowledge of created things, both visible and intelligible. He who apprehends the mystery of the cross and the burial apprehends the inward essences of created things; while he who is initiated into the inexpressible power of the resurrection apprehends the purpose for which God first established everything.

The psychology of willing in St. Maximus thus depends upon a beginning (Ἀρχή), Middle (Μεσοτητίς), and End (Τελος), since created things have as their natural and good property that they begin to be, exist, and come to an end.

Thus grounding of the psychological processes in the metaphysical assumptions of a cosmology which likewise has a definite beginning, middle, and end has been reiterated with some force more recently by Stephen Hawking (A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes, pp. 145-152). While there is much in Hawking’s work that, from a metaphysical and theological basis, is questionable, his clear statements on the directionality of psychological processes being grounded upon the similar directionality of thermodynamic ones is worth pondering carefully, since he is one of the few physicists to perceive the connection between cosmological theory and human psychology.

50 Cf. St. Maximus the Confessor, TheoPol 1: PG 21D-24A.

51 St. Gregory of Nazianzus is known in the Orthodox Catholic East as one of three “theologians” for the purity of his doctrine, along with St. John the Theologian (or St. John the Divine), and St. Symeon the New Theologian.
St. Maximus the Confessor, *Thal. 412B*:

...of (the tree of the knowledge of good and evil) cometh that knowledge of opposition which is a habit of opposing things, which is proper to the irrational and sensible...

In other words, man’s fall produced a sensory-based knowledge, which must perforce form in man’s intellect a habit of rendering metaphysically distinct things as metaphysically and morally opposed things.

53 “Deification” (θεωσιζ): the Fathers often refer to salvation and sanctification by this term. Its implications are explored in chapters 3-5.


55 I Corinthians 15:26: “The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death.” The differences between the Second Europe’s doctrine of original guilt and the First Europe’s doctrine of ancestral sin also have produced their own massive series of cultural implications, which can be examined by observation of the general cultural perceptions among religious people in both Europes of what holy day is accorded the most significance in the liturgical year, and why.

In the Second Europe, there are two days, Christmas and Good Friday, respectively, that assume prominence in homiletical presentations of the salvation that Christ brings. On the Second European view, since man’s fundamental problem is guilt and moral culpability, Good Friday, the Crucifixion itself, assumes the central prominence, as being the means by which the infinite moral debt and culpability of man was propitiated and ransomed by the God-man’s death on the Cross. Thus, following out the legal and moral implications of this doctrine, Anselm of Canterbury, in his famous *Cur Deus Homo (Why the God-Man)*? Dealt with in chapter) states “In fine, leaving Christ altogether out of view (as if nothing had ever been known of Him), we shall prove, by necessary reason, why it was God
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became man.” The “necessary reasons” are simply that man owed an infinite debt, but could no pay it, since as a creature he was finite. His guilt thus being infinite required an infinite sacrifice and propitiation, which he could not render. God, being infinite, could “pay” the debt, but could not do so without becoming man. Hence the Incarnation and Nativity of Christ are a means to an end, and not salvific in and of themselves. On this view, at some deep and basic level, the Second Europe also has difficulty incorporating The Resurrection of Christ into its popular piety. Likewise, if guilt is the principal problem of man, popular piety will increasingly concentrate upon interior psychological processes and their exterior manifestation that his guilt has, in the individual person’s case, been propitiated by their personal appropriation of Christ’s redemptive work on the Cross. Hence, the emotionalistic and pietistic and personal-subjective basis of much of the Second Europe’s Christianity is built into the system itself.

On the First Europe’s view, since death is the ultimate dialectical separation (of the immaterial soul from the material body), the Resurrection of Christ itself overcomes the “last enemy”. But it should be noted that this does not demote but promotes the other acts of the Incarnate Economy of Christ, for they become not means to an end, but themselves the moral and physical basis of salvation. On this view, the Incarnation and Virgin Birth is the necessary prerequisite not only to the Cross and Resurrection, but is also in itself the means of overcoming the distortion of the passions engendered at the Fall. Thus, as many an observer has noted about Orthodox cultures, the most festival day of the year is Pascha (Easter), the Passover of Christ from Death to Life.

II. SCriPTURE, TRADITIONS, GNOSTICISM, CRITICISM

56 St. Athanasius, Ad Serapion 11:7.
The term *ordo theologiae* is my own designation. I mean by it not the metaphysical priority of any one category to another as much as the fact that theological questions are asked in a certain order, and the resulting answers indicate any priority of categories, one to another. More importantly, the term designates also the fact that the *ordo* is very broad and contains basic implications not only for the formulation of doctrine, but its expression in liturgy and devotion as well.

In this work, the term has two applications. In Part One, it applies to the non-Augustinian patristic consensus of asking questions in the order indicated. In Parts Two and Three, the Augustinian *ordo theologiae* is encountered as the exact inversion of the patristic *ordo theologiae*, and as such asks questions in the following broad categorical order: (1) essence or nature, or sometimes being; (2) attributes or operations; and finally (3) persons.

On the subject of the *ordo theologiae*, St. Basil the Great writes: “If we have not distinct perception of the separate characteristics, namely, fatherhood, sonship, and sanctification, but form our conception of God from the general idea of existence, we cannot possibly give a sound account of our faith.” That this will be the exact error of the Augustinian *ordo theologiae*, especially of the Mediaeval scholastic theology, will become abundantly clear in Part Two.

Contained in this quotation is the implication that revelation (the Persons) takes priority to generalized abstractions concerning “the Deity” (essence). St. Basil is alive to the implications of this *ordo* to the question of faith and reason:

Which is first in order, knowledge or faith? I reply that generally, in the case of disciples, faith precedes knowledge. But, in our teaching, if any one asserts knowledge to come before faith, I make no objection; understanding knowledge so far as is within the bounds of human

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comprehension... In our belief about god, first comes the idea that God is. This we gather from His works. For, as we perceives His wisdom, His goodness, and all His invisible things from the creation of the world, so we know Him. So, too, we accept Him as our Lord. For since God is the Creator of the world, God is our Creator. This knowledge is followed by faith, and this faith by worship."

While this passage may be interpreted as implying the second, "Augustinian" ordo, it must be placed in the context of what Basil wrote elsewhere on this subject; indeed, as the context immediately following indicates, the subject of the knowledge of God is not, for Basil, the knowledge of an essence and abstraction, but of a specific person: The quibble is just as though any one were to say, Do you know Timothy?... Yes; but I am at the same time both know and do not know Timothy... I know him according to his form and other properties; but I am ignorant of his essence. Indeed, in this way too, I both know, and am ignorant of, myself."

Another indication that Basil is not operating with a proto-Augustinian ordo theologiae is his indication that there is a liturgical end to the processes of knowledge and faith.

58 Cf. for example, St. Basil of Caesaria, Letter 38:3:

Of some nouns on the other hand the denotation is more limited; and by the aid of the limitation we have before our minds not the common nature, but a limitation of anything, having, so far as the peculiarity extends, nothing in common with what is of the same kind...

My statement, then, is this. That which is spoken of in a special and

β Ibid., p. 275.
peculiar manner is indicated by the name of the hypostasis... Transfer, then, to the divine dogmas the same standard of difference which you recognise is the case both of essence and of hypostasis in human affairs, and you will not go wrong.α

The definition that St. Basil gives of hypostasis as that which has “so far as the peculiarity extends, nothing in common with what is of the same kind”, that is, another hypostasis, should be given due weight. He is maintaining (1) that any given hypostasis is undefinable absolutely, since that which distinguishes it as an hypostasis is without analogy -- it is irreducibly concrete and irrepeateable and without analogy in its differentiation -- to any other given hypostasis; and therefore that (2) hypostases can only be distinguished. Thus, no natural faculty or operation defines the content of any given hypostasis.

59 Cf. for example, St. Matthew 9:5-6.


61 St. Matthew 9:5-6.

62 The doctrine that there is really only one Person acting out different roles, as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, in history is called Sabellianism, or alternatively, modalism or Patripassianism (since, if the Son and the Father were the same person then the Father suffered and died on the Cross. It is usually known after the individual credited with inventing the doctrine, Sabellius, who taught that God was a “Son-Father” (υιοπατερ).

The doctrine that Christ was less than fully God goes under a variety of names, the most famous being Arianism and Eunomianism, after it most forceful expositors. But the doctrine itself is often called “subordinationism” or “subordinationalism”, since it subordinates the Son and the Spirit as lesser, creaturely, “quasi-gods” to the Father, the only

“true” God.


64 This fact should be born in mind in the discussion of Protestant attempts to discern in Scripture only a two-fold ministry, cf. note 69 below.


66 Ibid., 44, p. 76.

67 Note that for St. Clement, the “Scriptures” are the Old Testament Scriptures, which are now deliberately read in terms of the recapitulatory economy of Christ, a fact that, in Clement’s understanding, has clear implications for the polity of the Church, i.e., it is based upon Hebrew antecedents and in some sense is a continuation of them.

68 Cf. Hebrews 3:1; I St. Peter 2:25, where Christ is referred to explicitly as an Apostle, High Priest (Heb 3:1), and Bishop (I St. Peter 2:25).

69 The terms Bishop (ἐπισκοπός) and presbyter (πρεσβύτερος) only became a cause of friction and debate during and after the Protestant Reformation. In the Pastoral Epistles of St. Paul (I, II St. Timothy, St. Titus), the words are indeed synonymous and interchangeable. Because of this, a tradition developed in early Protestant exegesis that the apostolic succession and hierarchical polity of the (Roman) Catholic Church was an aberration from the “presbyterial polity of the apostolic church.” Accordingly, the synonymity of the two terms was used to strike a double blow at (1) the doctrine of the threefold polity, and (2) at the doctrine of the “monarchial episcopate” and apostolic succession itself, i.e., at the doctrine that no legitimate authority accrued to ministries not deriving from a bishop possessing succession to the apostolic office and commission.

Because of this, two implications emerged in some Protestant sections of the Second Europe: (1) that the office of apostleship had died
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out; and (2) that the Great Commission had therefore to be reinterpreted as being a specific charge to the apostles in the Church to being a general charge to all Christians. In the case of (1), the most common reason given for the end of the apostolic office was in terms of its relationship to the Resurrection: an apostle came increasingly to be viewed as one of the original Twelve (plus Paul) who had personally seen the Risen Christ. In this, there was a certain truth, as we shall discover, for there is a relationship between the Resurrection and the apostolic office, although the relationship is permanent and enduring, and not temporary.

More recently, in critical scholarship, the notion has been advanced that I and II St. Timothy and St. Titus are not by St. Paul at all, but by some anonymous second century author. The reason advanced for this view is that the pastoral epistles give strong evidence and testimony to the existence of the institutions of “the monarchial episcopate”, for which there is no good record until the second century (e.g., in the Epistles of St. Ignatius of Antioch). Supplemental arguments for this position include the argument in other known works of St. Paul. Of course, this latter argument is entirely specious, since style and vocabulary vary according to the subject in view as much as the habit of the author. So one is left to consider the historical argument itself.

Ironically, the very same Protestant biblical scholarship which now takes this view earlier provided the surest means of its refutation, the synonymity of bishop (ἐπισκοποῦ) and presbyter (πρεσβυτεροῦ). In the formative period, it was only natural that the first order of ministry should still have been called “apostle”. By the time of Ignatius, this first order was almost exclusively being called “bishop”, as the apostles themselves had all perished by that time.

But there is a very, very important clue that the pastoral epistles are early apostolic documents, and not from the second or third centuries, and that clue comes from canon law. Very early on, ca. 150-200 A.D., the
Church determined, through various local synods, that more than one bishop, preferably three, should be present at the consecration of another bishop precisely in order to insure that the succession was passed on. But one encounters no such developed canonical institutions in the allegedly second century pastorals. Paul very deliberately indicates that Timothy and Titus were consecrated “singly”, i.e., by Paul alone, with another laying on of hands of the presbyters.

Thus, the “monarchial episcopate” is an early apostolic, rather than post-apostolic phenomenon for another very important, though often overlooked reason: the doctrine of the Monarchy of the Father was the very first and apostolic doctrine of the unity of the Trinity, which doctrine tends to become more and more obscured during the second and third centuries in certain quarters, until its full rearticulation by St. Athanasius, the Cappadocians, and Sts. Ambrose and Hilary in the fourth century. It is the very patriarchy of the pastoral epistles and the doctrine of God upon which their polity is based that places them firmly within the Semitic framework of the Apostles and their immediate disciples, and not the “development of doctrine” that ecclesiastical theology allegedly underwent in the second and third centuries.

The epistles of St. Ignatius of Antioch are crucial because they were written ca. 100-125 A.D., and because Ignatius is documentably one of the earliest “disciples of the disciples.” Origen indicates that he is second in succession at Antioch after St. Peter, while Eusebius places him third in the succession.

St. Ignatius of Antioch, Ephesians 1:1, p. 137 (Lightfoot):

While I welcomed in God (your) well-beloved name which ye bear by natural right, (in an upright and virtuous mind), by faith and love in Christ Jesus our Saviour -- being imitators of God, and having your hearts kindled in the blood of God…”

cf. also Ephesians 1:7, p. 139:
There is only one physician, of flesh and of spirit, generate and ingenerate, God in man, true Life in death, Son of Mary and Son of God, first passible and then impassible, Jesus Christ our Lord.

72 St. Ignatius of Antioch, Ephesians 1:1, p. 137 (Lightfoot):

While I welcomed in God (your) well-beloved name which ye bear by natural right, (in an upright and virtuous mind), by faith and love in Christ Jesus our Saviour -- being imitators of God, and having your hearts kindled in the blood of God…”

73 St. Ignatius of Antioch, Smyrnaeans 6, p. 158:

... But mark ye those who hold strange doctrine touching the grace of Jesus Christ which came to us, how that they are contrary to the mind of God. They have no care for love, none for the widow, none for the orphan, none for the afflicted, none for the prisoner, none for the hungry or thirsty. They abstain from (the) eucharist and prayer, because they allow not that the eucharist is the flesh of our Saviour Jesus Christ, which flesh suffered for our sins, and which the Father of His goodness raised up.

74 St. Ignatius of Antioch, Ephesians 1:20, p. 142:

Assemble yourselves together in common, every one of you severally, man by man, in grace, in one faith and one Jesus Christ, who after the flesh was of David’s race, Who is Son of Man and Son of God, to the end that ye may obey the bishop and the presbytery without distraction of mind; breaking one bread, which is the medicine of immortality and the antidote that we should not die but live forever in Jesus Christ.

75 “Theology” (θεολογία) in this sense is thus almost synonymous with Trinitarian theology, or “triadology.”
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St. Ignatius of Antioch, Smyrnaeans 6, p. 158:

… But mark ye those who hold strange doctrine touching the grace of Jesus Christ which came to us, how that they are contrary to the mind of God. They have no care for love, none for the widow, none for the orphan, none for the afflicted, none for the prisoner, none for the hungry or thirsty. They abstain form (the) eucharist and prayer, because they allow not that the eucharist is the flesh of our Saviour Jesus Christ, which flesh suffered for our sins, and which the Father of His goodness raised up.

One most often encounters the word spelled with a “c”: “Docetism”, and sometimes as “Docetism”. Basically, Doketism is the idea that the humanity of our Lord is illusory. Thus, Doketism works out, according to St. Ignatius, in three implications: rejection of martyrdom (since the body, being illusory, could not be the subject of the resurrection); rejection of charitable works relating to the alleviation of bodily suffering in others; and rejection of the Eucharist because Christians believed in the real presence of Christ’s body and blood in it.

However, Doketism is more appropriately the belief that there was no underlying human nature that was the agency of the observed operations of Christ’s humanity. This definition is both more accurate, for the Doketists did not deny the operations, but merely that they were the operations of a real underlying nature (The Incarnation being a sort of “hologram”), and more significant as shall be seen in Part Three.

That this was the actual teaching of Doketism is disclosed by Ignatius:

For he suffered all these things for our sakes (that we might be saved); and He suffered truly, as also he raised Himself truly, not as certain unbelievers say, that He suffered in semblance, being themselves mere semblance… For I know and believe that He was in the flesh even after the Resurrection; and when He came to Peter and his company, he said
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to them, *Lat hold and handle me, and see that I am not a demon without body*, and straightway they touched Him, and they believed, being joined unto His flesh and His blood..."

77 St. Ignatius, *Trallians 9-10*, Lightfoot, p. 148:

But if it were as certain persons who are godless, that is, unbelievers, say, that he suffered only in semblance, being themselves mere semblance, why am I in bonds? And why also do I desire to fight with the wild beasts? So I die in vain.

78 St. Ignatius of Antioch, *Smyrnaeans 6*, p. 158:

... But mark ye those who hold strange doctrine touching the grace of Jesus Christ which came to us, how that they are contrary to the mind of God. They have no care for love, none for the widow, none for the orphan, none for the afflicted, none for the prisoner, none for the hungry or thirsty. They abstain form (the) eucharist and prayer, because they allow not that the eucharist is the flesh of our Saviour Jesus Christ, which flesh suffered for our sins, and which the Father of His goodness raised up.

79 St. Ignatius of Antioch, *Magnesians 13*, p. 146:

... in the Son and Father and in one Spirit, in the beginning and in the end, with your revered bishop and with the fitly wreathed spiritual circlet of your presbytery, and with the deacons who walk after God. Be obedient to the bishop and to one another, as Jesus Christ was to the Father (according to the flesh) and as the Apostles were to Christ and to the father, that there may be union both of flesh and of spirit.

Here one encounters again the familiar patter of God the Father, Christ as the first Apostle, and the apostles and after them the bishops that

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*Smyrnaeans VI: 2-3, PP. 156-157.*
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distinguished the understanding of St. Clement of Rome as well.

The Trinity thus represents the Council of God in the same way as the Apostles (Ephesians 2: p. 138):

It is therefore meet for you in every way to glorify Jesus Christ who glorified you; that being perfectly joined together in one submission, submitting yourselves to your bishop and presbytery, ye may be sanctified in all things.

One should note the clear distinction in St. Ignatius between bishops and presbyters.

The doctrine of the Trinity and of episcopacy are even more closely tied in Magnesians 6-7, p. 144;

... do all things in godly concord, the bishop presiding after the likeness of God and the presbyters after the likeness of the council of the apostles, with the deacons who are most dear to me, having been entrusted with the diaconate of Jesus Christ, who was with the Father before the worlds and appeared at the end of time... be ye united with the bishop and with them that preside over you as an example and a lesson of incorruptibility.

Therefore as the Lord did nothing without the Father (being united with Him), either by Himself or by the apostles, so neither do ye anything without the bishop and the presbyters. And (do not) attempt nor to think anything right for yourselves apart from others: but let there be one prayer in common, one supplication, one mind, one hop, in love and joy unblameable, which is Jesus Christ, than whom there is nothing better. Hasten to come together all of you, as to one temple, even God; as to one altar, even to Jesus Christ, who came forth from One Father and is with One and departed unto One.

The derivation of the apostolic ministry from Christ who is from the One Father means also that there is only one genuine apostolic ministry, precisely that from the Father through Christ. To maintain that there are
several apostolic ministries would mean that there either is more than One Father in God, or that there is more than One Son through Whom the apostolic succession comes. The canons of the early church regarding the presence of more than one bishop, preferably a minimum of three bishops, at consecrations of other bishops reflects this Trinitarian basis of the doctrine.

Moreover, common prayer in union with the bishop in union with Christ in union with God follows from the fact that in God there is no discord, no disharmony, but unity and agreement between the three Divine Persons in will, operation, and purpose. Thus, not only do the Church’s ministries grow out of her grounding in the Trinity, but her liturgies themselves arise out of the Trinitarian Mystery, since the Church herself is the theanthropic reality of a communion of many human persons in the thenathropic reality of Jesus Christ. According, the sacrificial ministry of the Christian priesthood is one, since there is one altar and one sacrifice, namely Christ in the Eucharist, celebrated by the bishop who is sent by Christ who is sent by God. “Monarchial episcopate” thus designates not a polity of the Church as much as it confesses the Mystery of the Trinity, for the bishop is the local father of all ministerial authority and fatherhood. St. Ignatius summarizes all this with two characteristically compact and profound sentences:

Be ye careful therefore to observe one eucharist (for there is one flesh of our Lord Jesus Christ and one cup unto union in His blood; there is one altar, as there is one bishop, together with the presbytery and the deacons my fellow-servants, that whatsoever ye do, ye may do it after God.\(^\alpha\)

Let that be held a valid eucharist which is under the bishop or one to

\(^\alpha\) St. Ignatius of Antioch, Philadelphians 4: p. 154.
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whom he shall have committed it." 

80 St. Ignatius of Antioch, Philadelphians 4, p. 154 (cited directly above, note 79).
81 Ibid., cf. note 79.
82 A rereading of the citations of St. Ignatius in previous notations will confirm this fact.
83 This is because the bishop’s ministry is that of an apostle: superintendency of a local church, including of its other ranks of clergy, its doctrine, morality, and worship. The term “bishop” naturally lent itself to the transference to the first rank of ministry, and became the natural term after the original apostles had died.
84 That is, women cannot be ministerial and liturgical ikons to the Church either of the Father’s Monarchy nor of the Son’s begottenness. Moreover, there is a clear Old Testament pattern of the maleness of the priesthood (cf. Exodus 23:17; 34:23).
85 Quasten, Patrology, Volume One, p. 256.
86 St. Irenaeus, Against Heresies, ANF, p. 349.
87 R.K. Harrison, Introduction to the Old Testament, p. 4. Notably, Harrison, who at the time of his writing of his book was Professor of Old Testament at Wycliffe College, the University of Toronto, was one of the first twentieth century biblical scholars of traditionalist leanings who pointed out the parallels between Gnosticism and the liberal Biblical Criticism. What is to be lamented however, is that he does not state the wedding of the dualistic and dialectical elements of a broadly Neoplatonic philosophical universe with the presupposition of radical skepticism as that specific feature which distinguishes both criticism and Gnosticism.

88 Quasten, Patrology, Volume One, p. 261.
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89 Ibid.
90 Ibid., pp. 268-269.
91 St. Irenaeus, Against Heresies 3:3:4, ANF.
92 R.K. Harrison, op. cit., p. 5. Harrison remarks on p. 6 that the Greek Neoplatonist Porphyry maintained that “Daniel was not the work of the prophet to whom tradition had attributed it... He based his conclusions on the premise that Daniel could not have predicted the future in such minute detail, and that therefore the later chapters of the book must have been roughly contemporary with the events described.” Notably, Neoplatonism hovers in the background here as the basis on which Porphyry 1) assumes a naturalistic attitude as regards the events described in the text, and 2) as the basis on which he challenges the traditional ascription of authorship by redating the latter half of Daniel to a period contemporaneous to the events described. One must therefore assume that there is some link between Neoplatonism and the presuppositions and methods of modern biblical criticism.

The entire discussion on pp. 7-8 is also significant, for it highlights the fact that other favorite critical theories -- the last twenty-six chapters of Isaiah being by a different man, for example -- are not new to the critic, but antedate the modern period by several centuries.

93 Gotthold Lessing, the “inventor” of “the Synoptic Problem”, in a letter to Moses Mendelssohn (father of the composer), stated that “You are the only one who may and can write and speak freely in this matter. You are thereby infinitely happier than all the other honest persons who can do nothing more to hasten the overthrow of this hateful edifice of nonsense than to hide behind the pretence of furnishing new bases for it.” Günther Dürr, “J.M. Goeze -- ein Kämpfer für die Wahrheit der Heiligen Schrift,” Bibel und Gemeinde, vol. 71:217, cited in Eta Linnemann, Is There a Synoptic Problem? Rethinking the Literary Dependence of the First Three Gospels, trans. Robert W. Yarbrough, p. 40.

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95 Ibid., p. xvii.
97 Ibid., p. 4.
98 Ibid., p. 5.
100 Ibid., p. 106.
101 Ibid., p. 110.
102 Ibid., pp. 32-33. Pagels goes on to note “The Protestant theologian Paul Tillich recently drew a similar distinction between the God we imagine when we hear the term, and the ‘God beyond God,’ that is, the ‘ground of being’ that underlies all our concepts and images.” (p. 33)
103 Ibid., p. 113.
104 Ibid., p. 116.
105 Ibid., p. xxxi.
106 Ibid., p. 10.
107 The consequences of this should be obvious. Those Churches claiming polities based upon apostolic succession while simultaneously supporting or endorsing versions of the Scripture which do not have their manuscript pedigree within this apostolic tradition are jeopardizing their succession.
108 Ibid., p. 22.
109 Ibid., p. 34.
110 Ibid., p. 38.
112 Ibid., p. 115.
113 Ibid., p. 21.
114 Ibid., p. 49.
115 Ibid., p. 111.

116 cf. Pagels, op. cit., p. 113. The close resemblance between these systems and much modern “evangelicalism” is apparent. Both base
their systems on this interior certitude, both reject sacramentalism, both reject apostolic succession, and both have doctrines of a true “invisible” church of the elect, whose “election” is evidenced precisely in the interior certitude of the individual.

117 Ibid., p. 122.
118 Ibid., p. 124.
119 Ibid., p. 131.
120 Ibid., p. 132.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid., p. 133.
123 Ibid., p. 133, emphasis mine.
124 Ibid., pp. 18, 19.
125 Ibid., p. 51.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid., p. 52. This conception is found in the Gospel to the Hebrews. The Hebrew for “Spirit” is ruah, a feminine word.

128 Ibid., p. 56.
129 Ibid., p. 53.
130 Ibid., p. 72.
131 Ibid., p. 114.
132 Quadratus, ca. 123-130 A.D.
133 Aristides, ca. 191-195 A.D.
134 Aristo of Pella, ca. 140 A.D.
135 Tatian (Diatesseron), ca. 150 A.D.
136 Athenagoras, ca. 170-180 A.D.
137 Theophilus, ca. 180-190 A.D.
138 St. Justin Martyr, ca. 100-165 A.D.
139 Johannes Quasten, Patrology, Volume I, p. 182 (Hereinafter, references to Quasten’s Patrology and its volumes will simply be designated as I, II, or III Quasten, followed by the page number).
140 Cf. Adolf von Harnack’s assessment, which can hardly be
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bested as a statement of the more extreme tendencies within the Second Europe’s historiography:

This hellenising (sic.) of ecclesiastical Christianity, by which we do not mean the Gospel, was not a gradual process; for the truth rather is that it was already accomplished the moment that the reflective Greek confronted the new religion which he had accepted. The Christianity of men like Justin, Athenagoras, and Minucius is not a whit less Hellenistic than that of Origen. But yet an important distinction obtains here. It is twofold. In the first place, those Apologists did not yet find themselves face to face with a fixed collection of writings having to be reverenced as Christian. They have to do with that Old Testament and the “Teachings of Christ” (διδαχας Χριστου). In the second place, they do not yet regard the scientific presentation of Christianity as the main task and as one which this religion itself demands... Justin and his contemporaries make it perfectly clear that they consider the traditional faith coexisting in the churches to be complete and pure and in itself requiring no scientific revision. In a word, the gulf which existed between the religious thought of philosophers and the sum of Christian tradition is still altogether unperceived, because that tradition was not yet fixed in rigid forms, because no religious utterance testifying to monotheism, virtue, and reward was as yet threatened by any control, and finally, because the speech of philosophy was only understood by a small minority in the Church... Christian thinkers were therefore still free to divest of their direct religious value all realistic and historical elements of the tradition, while still retaining them as parts of a huge apparatus of proof... The danger which here threatened Christianity as a religion was scarcely less serious than that which had been caused to it by the Gnostics. These remodeled tradition, the Apologists made it to some extent inoperative without attacking it...

But the main problem which the Apologists solved almost offhand, the
task of showing that Christianity was the perfect and certain philosophy, because it rested on revelation…\(^\text{a}\)

The presuppositions operative here have been noted in italics, but it is worth saying a few things about them. The “hellenising (sic.) of ecclesiastical Christianity” discloses one such common tradition -- though more common to Protestantism than to Roman Catholicism -- of the Second Europe’s historiography, namely, that “ecclesiastical” Christianity is to a large extent the result of the synthesis of the two dialectically opposed entities, “Hellenism” and “The Gospel”. This Hellenization, as Von Harnack puts it, “was already accomplished the moment that the reflective Greek confronted the new religion”, that is, Hellenization was “culturally inevitable” given the fact that the Gospel was posed in that cultural milieu. With this, Harnack has very subtlety done three things: (1) he has relativized traditional “doctrinal” Christianity by making it dependent upon Graeco-Roman culture: (2) he has thereby implied that Christianity, in order to become truly “universal”, i.e., “catholic” in the reduced sense of “culturally universal or eclectic”, must adapt itself constantly to whatever “culture” it finds in. Unwittingly, he has thereby “Hellenized” (or better, “Germanized”) Christianity far beyond its “ecclesiastical” manifestation at the hands of the clerical elite, for in its place Harnack has elevated the academic anthropologist, psychologist, and other “scholars of culture” to the central position of importance within “ecclesiastical Christianity”, for it is they, and not “theologians” or “clergy”, who must, on the basis of his theory, perform the all important task of “making Christianity relevant” to the culture(s) it finds itself in.

Finally, (3), he has unwittingly accused both the early Jewish disciples of Christ, as well as His early Jewish detractors, as being somehow “unreflective” on the “simple message” that was being conveyed. This subtle ant-Judaism permeates a great deal of nineteenth

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century German criticism and theological historiography. As I have attempted to demonstrate, however, the notion of “person” or hypostasis as “irreducible concrete uniqueness without analogy to any other hypostasis in that uniqueness” is more the influence of Hebrew and Scriptural thought forms upon the Fathers, than of philosophy. Indeed, insofar as philosophy could speak of “person”, it could only do so, e.g., in Aristotle, as the individuation of matter by form, or as in Aquinas, where person becomes defined by the tapestry of its relationships (persona et relation), rather than grounding the relationships.

Moreover, it is untrue that “the gulf which existed between the religious thought of philosophers and the sum of Christian tradition is still altogether unperceived”, for even in St. Justin, that “gulf” is expressed in the form of what I shall, in the main text, subsequently call the “fractional theology of the Logos”, i.e., the idea that the various non-Christian philosophies and religions all possess a part, or a fraction, of the truth, but only Christians possess its unifying and unified totality in all its interior consistency.

141 I Quasten, p. 182.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid., p. 232. The way in which Athenagoras strikes this blow against dualism is illuminating, for it is made on a summary of the biblical doctrine of creation and law:

For if the world, being made spherical, is confined within the circles of heaven, and the Creator of the world is above things created, managing it by his providential care of these, what place is there for the second god, or for the other gods?α

It would seem that Athenagoras perceives “altogether too well” the nature of the gulf between Christian monotheism and the Gnostic cosmology based upon a series of intermediating principles. Note also that

Athenagoras specifically indicates that the world is a *globe*.

144 Ibid., p. 233, citing ANF 2 p. 133.
145 Ibid., p. 232.
146 Ibid., p. 248.
147 Colossians 1:15.
148 I Quasten, p. 100.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid., *Dial.* 127.
152 Ibid., p. 208, *Dial.* 61.
153 Ibid., 2:123.
154 Ibid., 2:10.
155 Quasten give the date of St. Irenaeus’ birth as being between 140 and 160 A.D., and most probably in Smyrna, since Irenaeus refers to his acquaintance with St. Polycarp. We are unsure as to why St. Irenaeus left Asia Minor for Gaul, but given the zeal with which he addressed the Gnostic systems, one is permitted to speculate that as Gaul was the site for intense Gnostic activity it was probably out of missionary zeal that St. Irenaeus made his way there. Ca. 177-178 he became a priest at the church in Lugdunum (Lyons), for shortly thereafter he was sent to Rome to mediate in a dispute regarding Montanism. When he returned, he was consecrated a bishop to replace Photinus, who had been martyred in his absence.

After he wrote his letters to Rome concerning the date of The Pascha (Easter), Irenaeus seems to have dropped out of the historical record. St. Gregory of Tours’ *History of the Fathers* records that St. Irenaeus died a martyr’s death. Quasten says that this is questionable, since Eusebius does not mention it. I do not regard this, however, as sufficient testimony to offset St. Gregory, since the latter would have been in far better position to know. In any case, the Western calendar has always commemorated him as a martyr.
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In St. Irenaeus, the apostolic succession of bishops is clearly tied to the succession in preserving the rule of faith and the apostolic scriptures. Cf. Against Heresies, III: 1: 1-23; III: 2:1-2; III:3: 1-3.

By the term “Latin writers” or “ecclesiastical authors” or some equivalent, I mean to designate that class of authors who, while not being Fathers of the Church, i.e., commemorated liturgically during the ecclesiastical year, are nonetheless indispensible to the merely academic understanding of the intellectual and spiritual history of the period. Tertullian and Origen obviously rank in the first of these categories, though both men subsequently became heretics.

Tertullian (Quintus Septimus Florens Tertullianus) was born ca. 155 of pagan parents, his father being a centurion in the Roman Army. He was, of course, an expert lawyer. Quasten notes that he is “probably to be identified with the jurist Tertullianus, of whose writings the digests of the Corpus Civilis includes a few excerpts.” Ca. 207 he abandoned the catholic Church and joined the sect called Montanists, or “The New Prophecy”, a group claiming “Pentecostalist” style revelations, including the manifestation of “the Spirit” by speaking gloassalalia. Once there, he became a leader of a faction within the sect called “Tertullianists”, which maintained a presence in Carthage down to the time of St. Augustine of Hippo.

According to Quasten and many others, Tertullian was nevertheless the greatest theologian to write in Latin prior to St. Augustine. One detects here again the emergence of the Second European historiographical “attitude”, namely, that Augustine is the most important of the Latin Fathers, if not of all the Fathers, and other Fathers and writers are to be evaluated on the degree to which they “anticipated” Augustine.

α Il Quasten, p. 246.
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Tertullian’s character, like his writings, is both clear and unbending, one might also say “brittle”. He argues less to persuade than to annihilate his opponents.

The Praescriptio was most likely written ca. 200 A.D., according to Quasten, since in it Tertullian is clearly still a catholic Christian and has not yet joined the Montanists.

I St. Timothy 6:2-4: “If any man teach otherwise, and consent not to wholesome words, even the words of our Lord Jesus Christ, and to the doctrine which is according to godliness; he is proud, knowing nothing, but doting about questions and strifes of words, whereof cometh envy, strife, railings, evil surmisings, perverse disputings of men of corrupt minds, and destitute of the truth, supposing that gain is godliness; from such withdrawn thyself. But godliness with contentment is great gain” St. Titus 3:10: “A man that is a heretic, after the first and second admonition, reject.”


Subject to previously observed limitations.


Il Quasten, pp. 319-320.

Tertullian, Adversus Hermogenem, 2-3 (Bettenson, p. 108).

Ibid.

Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem 2:3 (Bettenson, pp. 105-106).

Ibid., 2:5, (Bettenson, p. 111).

III. THE FIRST HELLENIZATION: THE CRISIS BREAKS: CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, ORIGEN, ARIUS, AND ST. ATHANASIUS

Il Quasten, p. 2 (Cite and Quote Patr. I, pp. 1-3).
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169 Ibid., 20.
171 Ibid., 4:24 (Bettenson, p. 170).
172 Il Quasten, p. 23, emphasis mine.
173 cf. note 168.
175 Ibid., 5:1 (Bettenson, p. 171).
176 St. John.
177 Il Quasten, p. 40. Quasten states that in Origen, “the school of Alexandria reached its greatest importance.” He was “the outstanding teacher and scholar of the early Church, a man of spotless character, encyclopaedic learning, and one of the most original thinkers the world has ever seen.” The following vita is taken largely from Quasten:

Origen was mostly likely born in Alexandria to Christian parents, ca. 185 A.D. His father had suffered martyrdom for his faith in the persecution of Severus, and his family had all their goods confiscated as a result of that persecution. Origen supported his family by teaching. Upon Clement’s flight from the catechetical school there, he was put in charge of it when he was only eighteen years of age. It was during this period that Origen, taking literally the scriptural injunctions of St. Matthew 19:12, emasculated himself, ca. 202-203.

He remained in Alexandria until ca. 230-231, attending the lectures of the Neoplatonist Ammonius Saccas (cf. note 184 below), who in turn was the teacher of Plotinus. During the period he was in Alexandria, he also undertook several journeys to Rome and Jerusalem. While in the latter city ca. 215-216, he was ordained a priest. His own bishop in Alexandria, Demetrius, excommunicated him, since canonically, eunuchs could not be priests.

Once he left Alexandria, he founded a new catechetical school in

α Il Quasten, p. 37.
Caesaria ca. 231-232, where he remained and taught for approximately twenty more years. The persecutions of the Emperor Decius brought numerous sufferings to him, which broke his health and apparently led to his death, in Tyre, in 253.

178 Ibid., p. 75.

179 Ibid., p. 61.

180 Ibid., p. 73.

181 Origen’s writings include a vast amount of Commentaries, textual criticism (in the form of his critical edition of the Septuagint, the Hexapla), Scholia on ambiguous passages of Scripture, Homilies, and the massive Contra Celsum, the last word in the Greek apologetical literature. His dogmatic writings, upon which most of the commentary in the main text here is based, include the short, but pivotal, On First Principles and the Discussion with Heraclides.

182 Origen, On First Principles I:1:5-6, p. 10 (Koetschau).

183 Plotinus (ca. 205-270), became interested in philosophy when he was twenty-eight, according to his friend and disciple Porphyry, and was for eleven years the student and disciples of Ammonius Saccas (cf. note 184, below). In 243 he accompanied the Emperor Gordian to Persian to learn about eastern thought, returning to Rome in 244 to found a philosophical school there. The essence of his philosophy is discussed in the main text, though it should be noted that one of Plotinus’ concerns was to combat Gnosticism, though to avoid doing so by relying on Christianity. The exact nature of the influence of the latter upon his works is rather obscure, thought most scholars tend to the view that he exercised more of an influence on it that it on him. That is the view which, for the sake of argument, I have adhered throughout this work, though the question is not as easy as it might seem. We know little of the actual doctrine of Ammonius Saccas, the founder of Neoplatonism. It is, however, possible, at least form a purely logical and metaphysical point of view, that Plotinus’ work may have been a deliberate effort to
demythologize Christianity and to pose alternatives to mystical union with “The One” to the sacramental system of the Church.

184 Regarding the relationship between Ammonius Saccas, Origen, and Plotinus, one can safely say that, while the direct connection between the latter two is obscure at best, the fact remains that both men were directly influenced by Ammonius. Thus, while the historical relationships between Plotinus and Origen remain ambiguous, the logical and metaphysical ones are quite clear. Both men seem to have developed, within and outside of, the Christians context, two different, but ultimate parallel interpretations of Ammonius’ thought.

189 Ibid.
192 Vladimir Lenin, Thoughts on the Dialectic While reading Hegel.
195 Bultmann detected his three-storied universe, not so much because the Church universally enshrined it, but because certain Hellinizing elements within it did. In Bultmann it takes the crude form of a “heaven”, earth, and “hell” beneath the earth, a much cruder cosmology than any reading of its alleged examples in the Fathers or rabbinical literature will attest. It credits the patristic and mediaeval periods even of the Second Europe with a wooden literalism more appropriate to the higher critic.

196 The “alone to the Alone” is found in Enneads 5:1:6.

196a [author numbered for a note, but never added it to the
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manuscript]

[author numbered for a note, but never added it to the manuscript]

Origen, On First Principles, 1:1:6, pp. 10-11, emphasis mine.

Ibid., 1:2:10, p. 23.

Ibid., pp. 23-25.

Ibid., 1:4;3, p. 42, emphasis mine.

Ibid., 4:4;1, p. 315.

[author numbered for a note, but never added it to the manuscript]

Ibid., 1:8:1, p. 67.

Ibid., 1:8:2, p. 69.

Ibid., 2:9:2, p. 130.

Ibid. This is the other component of the origin of creaturely diversity and evil: the relative degree of declension of souls from the pre-existent state of unity and rest (Stasis) in which they pre-existed. Souls, as it were, form “parts” or components of the simplicity of God, but assume that status only after their movement (Kinesis) or fall into the world of becoming (Genesis). One detects a new dialectical structure emerging, that of potency (Stasis) and act (Kinesis and Genesis).

Ibid., 2:1:3, p. 78. “...we must see whether it may not be appropriate that the world should have a conclusion similar to its beginning. Now there is no doubt that its end must be looked for in much diversity and variety, and this variety, when found to exist at the end of this world, will in its turn provide causes and occasions of diversity in that other world which is to come after this; for clearly the end of this world is the beginning of the world to come.”

The obvious ambiguity of this passage should not be overlooked, for it is capable of being interpreted according to purely Orthodox lines, as indicating the persistence in the eschaton of the personal diversities of the
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saints. But it is likewise capable of a Hellenistic interpretation, as indicating an endless cycle of Stasis, Kinesis, Genesis, refounding in Stasis, which touches off Kinesis (as souls seek their actual diversity again), and thus fall once again into Genesis, and so on ad infinitum. St. Augustine of Hippo’s own ambiguous statements are capable oftentimes of a similar Orthodox vs. Hellenistic interpretation. Origen himself lays the basis of the latter interpretation in the very same work (II:3 3, p. 87): “But if what has been subjected to Christ shall in the end be subjected to God, then all will lay aside their bodies; and I think that there will then be a dissolution of bodily nature into non-existence, to come into existence a second time if rational beings should again fall.”

One should note the subtle inference or implication, Origen does not yet have a doctrine of Person in the fully theological sense, for it seems that he can only understand the Person as the individual, i.e., as the union of form and matter.

Yet, in spite of what has been said in note 206 above, Origen makes clear his Christian impulse in On First Principles III:6: 3, p. 248: “Now I myself think that when it is said that God is ‘all in all’, it means that He is also all things in each individual person in such a way that everything which the rational mind, when purified from all the dregs of its vices and utterly cleared from every cloud of wickedness, can feel or understand or think will be all God and that the mind will no longer be conscious of anything besides or other than God, but will think God and see God and hold God and God will be the mode and measure of its every movement; and in this way God will be all of it. For there will no longer be any contrast of good and evil, since evil nowhere exists.” (emphasis added) Clearly, Origen sees a dilemma, which on the basis of his Hellenized assumptions, he cannot resolve. Cf. my Free Choice in Saint Maximum the Confessor, pp. 59-65.

More importantly, Origen here sounds, very explicitly, a theme that will become a basic and central point to the First Europe’s monastic
theology and spirituality, the “remembrance of God”. That the constant remembrance of God by grace will produce a change, both cosmologically, and internally, within man himself and his psychological processes, is a subject explored extensively by St. Maximus the Confessor and other monastic Fathers of the First Europe. Here too we touch upon yet another basic difference between the Two Europes, for the First Europe’s theological is primarily ascetic and monastic, while the Second Europe’s increasingly becomes scientific and scholastic.

208 As above.

209 St. Athanasius was born ca. 295 in Alexandria to Christian parents, and from his earliest years had close contact and acquaintance with the monks of Egypt. He was ordained in 319 to the diaconate by St. Alexander, bishop of Alexandria, and for a short time after this was his secretary. It was in this diaconal and secretarial capacity that he accompanied Alexander to the first Oecumenical Council of Nicea in 325.

Athanasius succeeded Alexander as the Bishop of Alexandria in 328, and at this point, his serious struggles with Arianism and imperial authorities began. Within Alexandria, for example, a large body of Arians lobbied constantly for Athanasius’ removal from his See. The catalysts for the first Arian crisis of his life came when the Emperor Constantine ordered him to readmit Arius to the ranks of the clergy and to communion. Athanasius, of course, refused.

In 335, an Arian synod in Tyre deposed Athanasius, and the Emperor exiled him to Treves. Eusebius, Bishop of Nicomedia, had in the meantime convened a second synod in Antioch in 339, and deposed Athanasius, just for good measure, a second time and elected one Pistus to be bishop of Alexandria. He was too much even for the Arians, who forcibly installed Gregory of Cappadocia as the Bishop of Alexandria.

These events prompted Athanasius to seek refuge in Rome, where Pope Julius I convened a synod in 341 and exonerated Athanasius, further declaring him the only legal bishop of the See. When Gregory of
Cappadocia died, Athanasius accordingly returned to Alexandria. His protector, however, the Emperor Constans, died, leaving the Arian co-emperor Constantius as the sole emperor of the East and West. He reopened the Arian controversy by summoning synods at Arles in 353 and Milan in 355, which again condemned Athanasius and installed George of Cappadocia into the See.

Athanasius again fled the city, this time to the deserts of Egypt. In 361 Constantius died, and George of Cappadocia was murdered two days before Christmas that same year. Ironically, it was the new Emperor, Julian the Apostate, who wised to restore paganism, that issued an edict recalling all exiled bishops, allowing Athanasius to reenter Alexandria in 362.

At this point, as Quasten succinctly puts it, he began “without delay… (to) work for the reconciliation of the Semi-Arians (cf. chapters 3 and 4) and the orthodox party. He held a Synod in Alexandria in 362 to clear up misunderstandings. But none of this was to Julian’s taste who did not want peace but discord and dissention among the Christians. Thus Athanasius was expelled by imperia order as a ‘disturber of the peace and enemy of the gods.’”

Julian died in 363, allowing Athanasius to return once more to his See. One final exile followed with the accession of the Emperor Valens in 365, but when the people of Alexandria threatened to revolt after only four months, the emperor restored Athanasius to his See for the last and final time. Athanasius reposed in 373.

210 III Quasten pp. 1-3.

211 Excursus on Eusebius of Caesaria: Hellenization, Historiography and the Conversion of Constantine:
A. His Life and Significance for Patrology

1. As is often the case, Professor Quasten's remarks simply cannot be improved upon for placing Eusebius in his proper context:

The golden age of patristic literature opens with the splendid productions of the 'Father of Ecclesiastical History', Eusebius Pamphili, bishop of Caesarea in Palestine. He combines with the greatest interest for the past a very active participation in the shaping of the present. He is at the same time an historian and a controversialist, a leading figure in the religious struggle of his times, one of the last Apologists and the first chronicler and archivist of the Church.α

2. Caesarea was the focal point for Eusebius' intellectual training and literary activity as well as his episcopacy, and was a lifelong milieu for him, being born there ca 263.β It will be recalled that Origen had founded a school here after his exile from Alexandria, so it is not surprising that one encounters the occasional "whiff" of Origenist thought or expression in those who were trained there. Eusebius held a "life-long admiration of the great Alexandrian master."γ

3. After the martyrdom of his spiritual mentor and father, Pamphilus, during the persecution of Diocletian, Eusebius takes the name of Pamphilus to honour him, and escapes martyrdom himself by fleeing to Tyre. He is discovered there by the imperial troops, and imprisoned for a period.

4. Subsequently he is elected bishop of Caesarea in 313 and was obviously soon engaged in the polemics surrounding the Arian

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α III Quasten, p. 309.
β Ibid.
γ Ibid.
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controversy in the period prior to the First Ecumenical Council of Nicea in 325. Eusebius thought he could mediate between the orthodox and Arians by suggesting compromises and concessions on each side, “without realizing the importance of the doctrine at stake.”

5. While he was excommunicated at a synod in Antioch in 325, he is at the First Ecumenical Council later that year, but rejects the formula of the homoousios as leading logically to Sabellianism. While he signs the Nicene Creed to oblige the Emperor, he afterwards sides with Eusebius of Nicomedia and “took a prominent part in the synod of Antioch in 330, which deposed the local bishop Eustathius, and in the synod of Tyre in 335, that excommunicated Athanasius.”

6. Eusebius is best remembered for his connection to and admiration for the Emperor Constantine, and enjoyed special imperial protection and favour. It is widely thought that Eusebius was in fact Constantine’s theological adviser. He died in 339 or 340.

B. Writings

Quasten summarizes Eusebius’ writings as follows:

Except for Origen, Eusebius outdistances all Greek Church Fathers in research and scholarship. He was an indefatigable worker and continued writing until a very advanced age. His treatises represent storehouses of excerpts which he collected from pagan and Christian works, many of them no longer extant. For this reason his literary productions have mostly survived, although his Arian tendency stood against them. They reveal a breadth of learning which is simply astonishing. He shows himself well versed in Scripture, pagan and Christian history, ancient

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α Quasten, p. 310.
β Ibid., p. 310.
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literature, philosophy, geography, technical chronology, exegesis, philology and paleography… Although he is a resourceful apologist, he does not belong to the outstanding theologians of Christian antiquity. If he has won eternal fame, it is by his great historical works.7

Only the more important works are mentioned here:

1. The Chronicle:

Written ca. 303, it is divided into two parts, the first dealing with Hebrew history, based in part of the Old Testament, and in part on various pagan and Jewish sources (cf. III Quasten, p. 312).

The second part is composed of timelines in parallel columns and annotated at the crucial points of sacred history. The point of departure is Abraham’s birth (ca. 2015/16). Eusebius subsequently divides history into five great periods: from Abraham to the Fall of Troy, from the Fall of Troy to the first Olympiad, from the first Olympiad to the second year of Darius’ reign, from there to the death of Christ, and from the death of Christ to his present (303). The basic apologetic purpose of this work was to demonstrate that the Jewish religion was older than any other. In this, he echoes similar conceptions encountered earlier in the study of the Apologists. The chief benefit of Eusebius’ work is its more critical approach in his selection of better sources. According to Quasten,

The most important advance over his predecessors is that he rid the Christian chronicle of millenarianism. By his dating of scriptural events he wishes to prove that the system of Africanus was wrong and unscientific. He refuses to begin with Adam or the Fall, because nobody knows how long man was in Paradise, and also because the text of the numerals

7 Ibid., p. 311.
The Apparatus

given in the Bible is sound and certain only from the time of Abraham on.α

From this we may conclude that Eusebius is a “critical literalist”, he does not mythologize Adam and Eve in Paradise, but accepts its historicity, giving the chronological problem a slightly different explanation.

2. Ecclesiastical History:

It is this work in ten books for which Eusebius is most famous. Its purpose is cited by Eusebius:

I have purposed to record in writing the succession of the sacred apostles, covering the period stretching from our Saviour to ourselves; the number and character of the transactions recorded in the history of the Church; the number of those who in each generation were the ambassadors of the word of God either in speech or pen; the names, the number and the age of those who, driven by the desire of innovations to an extremity of error, have heralded themselves as the introducers of knowledge, false-so-called, ravaging the flock of Christ unsparingly, like wolves. To this I will add the fate which has beset the whole nation of the Jews from the moment of their plot against our Saviour; moreover, the number and nature and times of the wars waged by the heathen against the divine Word and the character of those who, for its sake, passed from time to time through the contest of blood and torture… My starting-point is therefore no other than the first dispensation of God touching our Saviour and Lord, Jesus Christ.β

Quasten’s summary is apt:

α III Quasten, p. 312.
β Ecclesiastical History, cited III Quasten, p. 314.
Thus it was the author's purpose to present (1) the lists of bishops in the most important communities, (2) the Christian teachers and authors, (3) the heretics, (4) the divine punishment of the Jewish people, (5) the Christian persecutions, (6) the martyrdoms and the final victory of the Christian religion. α

3. The Life of Constantine

This work consists of four books, and it is this work which has called forth more criticism from modern historians than any other, as shall be detailed below. Its basic purpose is to demonstrate that monarchy is the divine plan for human government and the fulfillment of Christian hopes. Eusebius sees Constantine as God's emissary rescuing the Church from persecutions. β

4. To the Assembly of the Saints (Ad coetum sanctorum)

This consists of collections of Constantine's sermons which stressed the providence of God, animadverted polytheism, and expounded on the Providence of God in bestowing the Empire on Constantine. This is often found as the fifth book of the Ecclesiastical History.

5. In Paradise of Constantine (Laudes Constantini)

Constantinople is compared by Eusebius in this work to the sun:

α Il Quasten, p. 314
β Il Quasten, p. 319.
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Thus our Emperor, like the radiant sun, illuminates the most distant subjects of his empire through the presence of the Caesars, as with the far piercing rays of his own brightness. His Empire is 'the imitation of the monarchial power in heaven', because he has consciously modeled his government after that in heaven: ‘...And surely monarchy far transcends ever other constitution and form of government: for that democratic equality of power, which is its opposite, may rather be described as anarchy and disorder.

Thus, Eusebius, for good or ill, draws a crucial, and some would say, debilitating parallel between Theology and polity. It is no accident that Eusebius, enamored as he was of Arianism, is also enamored of an absolute monarchy which admits of no equality of power and authority amongst co-equals. What is beneficial about this work, however, is that Eusebius does highlight the relationship between various constitutions and theology.

6. Preparatio Evangelica

This work forms part of a trilogy of apologetic works which begins with the General Elementary Introduction. The object of this work is to refute pagan polytheism and demonstrate the superiority of Jewish monotheism, which in turn existed as a preparation for the Gospel. Books one through three demonstrate the obscenity of pagan mythology as well as the attempted allegorical “demythologization” of them in the hands of Neoplatonists.α

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α Ill Quasten, p. 329.
7. Demonstratio Evangelica

The unusual theme of this work is stated by Quasten as follows:

Christianity is a continuation of the world-wide religion of the patriarchs, from which the Mosaic Law was only a temporary dispensation, serving as a transition between the age of the patriarchs and the coming of Christ. In the second book the author adduces abundant proof from the prophets that the downfall of the Jewish state, the coming of the Messias and the calling of the Gentiles were predicted. Books three to nine produce prophetic evidence for Christ's humanity (Book III), his divinity (Books IV and V), and the incarnation and earthly life of the Saviour (Books VI to IX)... The fragment of Book XV treats of the four kingdoms of the book of Daniel.β

8. The Evangelical Canons

This work is crucial for the textual critic, as it gives clear evidence of the state of the text in Eusebius’ time and place. It is really an attempt at a harmonization of the Gospels:

He first divided the Gospels into small sections which were numbered in succession. He then prepared a table of ten canons, each containing a list of passages in the following order: Canon I: passages common to all four gospels; II. those common to the synoptics; III. those common to Matthew, Luke, and John; IV. those common to Matthew, Mark, and John; V. those common to Matthew and Luke; VI. those common to Matthew and Mark; VII. those common to Matthew and John; VIII. those common to Luke and Mark; IX. those common to Luke and John; X. those peculiar to each Gospel; first to Matthew, second to Mark, third to Luke, and fourth

β III Quasten, p. 331.
EUSEBIUS, HISTORIOGRAPHY, AND THE CONVERSION OF CONSTANTINE

The conversion of the Emperor Constantine to Christianity is one of the signal events, both for the ancient as well as the modern historian, and is thus of crucial significance for the discipline of historiography (the "history of history": i.e., the historian's examination of the principles and presuppositions by which historians select significant events, interpret them, and write history). Thus, a brief word will be said here about it, and about Eusebius' own role in the beginning of the discipline.

There are broadly three interpretations of Constantine's conversion, which also broadly reflect the basic historical presuppositions which one encounters elsewhere, e.g., biblical criticism. These are:

1. The Ecclesiastical Tradition

This view is dependent upon not only Eusebius, but two other ecclesiastical sources: the historian Lactantius, more or less a contemporary of Eusebius and Constantine, and the much later hagiographical life, not to be confused with Eusebius' Life of Constantine.

The chief differences between the three accounts are that in Eusebius, there is no mention of the legend that when Constantine dreamed his famous dream, the divine Voice revealed the labarum to him and said *in hoc signo vicens*. The only thing Eusebius mentions is the labarum itself. Finally, the hagiographical life mentioned the dream, the labarum, as well as a life full of recurrent miracles, signs, etc.

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α Ill Quasten, p. 335.
2. The Enlightenment Critical: Rationalism

This view is exemplified by the famous work of Edward Gibbon, who attempted to separate what he called “the historical, the natural, and the marvelous parts of this extraordinary story which... have been artfully confounded in one splendid and brittle mass.” (The Conversion of Constantine). Gibbon, in a word, has a preliminary distrust of any historical account referring to miracles, a hallmark of the historico-critical approach, and indeed, its politically-correct and necessary presupposition. Of course, having stated this, Gibbon has begged the question, and is in no position to weigh the evidence on a case to case basis.

3. The Nineteenth Century Romantic Reconstruction: A non-miraculous Tradition

This is the view of the German historian Jakob Burkhardt and holds essentially that Constantine is the quintessential political hack, and ascends to his throne on the altars of the church. This view Burkhardt propounds on two bases:

Christianity was a sufficiently potent political force to enable it to enter into Constantine’s calculation. This is the strength of Burkhardt’s view, for it serves to highlight the genuine political motivations, if not of Constantine, then at least of the period in question.

However, having stated this, Burkhardt must then maintain that the writings of the ecclesiastical establishment, viz. Eusebius, are an attempt to disguise the real political motivations of Constantine behind a veneer of piety. This, of course, is the weakness of the view, for it requires a massive interpretation of the evidence. One is inevitably left with the question whether or not Burkhardt has uncovered the “historical Constantine” of simply made the emperor conform to the patter of political
behavior more appropriate to a nineteenth century politician of the house of Hohenzollern.

4. The Modern Views which accept Genuineness: Traditional-Rationalist

These views are akin to Burkhardt’s but tend to focus more directly on the nature of the ecclesiastical evidence by pointing out the discrepancies of detail between the three accounts of the conversion. Such attempts point out that Constantine had experienced an earlier conversion to Apollo, and maintain the later dream in hog signo vicens is simply a Christianization of this event.

5. Modern views which reject genuineness: Critical Rationalist

These views acknowledge the discrepancies in the three accounts, but likewise point to their similarities, but then argue that literary evidence cannot be determinative considered alone. In this case, Constantine’s subsequent policies become the determinative factor arguing for genuineness.

6. Modern views which view the conversion as progressive: Critical -Evolutionary

As a variation of argument five, some have opined that the Emperor underwent a gradual, or progressive, conversion, 1) first the to Unconquered sungod, 2) then to a more philosophical monotheism, and 3) finally to Christianity. Of course, such a view makes sense only if the
Christian doctrine of God is a species of the genus “Philosophical Monotheism”, which it would be is the Neoplatonic simplicity were in view in Christian doctrine. In this case, one can ascertain the hazards of doing history without an adequate knowledge of Christian theology.

212 III Quasten p. 6.
213 Ibid.
214 We have seen that in the subsequent history of Neoplatonic philosophy after Plotinus the dialectic takes two opposite courses: one the one hand the school of Iamblichus pursued the implication of the hierarchy of beings to posit ever more and more “Ones” above the One, and ever more and more beings derived from the Nous and World-Soul. In other words, the subsequent history of Neoplatonism exhibited the tendency of the dialectic to multiply the components of the system and to subordinate them one to another. On the other hand, in the implications pursued by Porphyry, the opposite tendency of the simplicity to reduce all distinct elements into an all-encompassing identity and unity was pursued.

This was mirrored in the Hellenized theological structures surveyed thus far. On the one hand, some, such as Tertullian, the Apologists, and Clement, the distinctions of the three divine Persons of the Trinity was secured only at the cost of the subordination of the Son and the Spirit to the Father. On the other hand, for those such as Sabellius, the equality of the Son and the Spirit with the Father was secured at the cost of the reduction of their distinctiveness to that of mere “appearances” or “modes” or “manifestations” in which the “deity” could operate.

Thus, we may now state a corollary to the main thesis of the entire work:

*The presence of the Subordinationist and Sabellian heresies within Christian doctrine no only exactly parallels the philosophical developments of Neoplatonism, but actually predate those developments. Their presence within any structure of doctrine claiming to be Christian therefore signifies the presence and operation of the two philosophical conceptions*
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of simplicity and the dialectic of oppositions.

It remains then, briefly to summarize Origen’s doctrine of the Trinity, in order to place it on the topography of this dialectical landscape.

We observe, then, the following facts:
Origen is aware of, and employs the term, “Trinity” (τριαζ).α
He describes the Generation of the Son in familiar imagery, but with subtle variations. It is worth citing both Quasten and Origen:

According to Origen, the Son proceeds from the Father not by a process of division, but in the same way as the will proceeds from reason:

“... the Son, who is born of Him, like an act of His will proceeding from the mind... And thus also the existence (subsistentia) of the Son is generated by Him. For this point must above all others be maintained by those who allow nothing to be unbegotten, i.e., unborn, save God the Father only... As on act of the will proceeds from the understanding, and neither cuts off any part nor is separated or divided from it, so after some such fashion is the Father to be supposed as having begotten the Son, His own image; namely, so that as He is Himself invisible by nature, He also begat an image that was invisible."β

From this, it will be apparent that Origen wishes to do theology according to the patristic ordo of persons, operations, and essence.

But what he wishes to do and what he does are two separate things, for he cannot separate the generation of the Son from the productions of the Father’s will. Both Creation and the Son may be described as products of the Father’s will.

Origen states that the Son’s generation is an eternal generation. It

β Origen, On First Principle, 1: 2: 6, cited in II Quasten, p.77.
God, History, and Dialectic

is “a sort of clean and pure outflow of omnipotent glory” (Wisdom 7:25). Both these similes manifestly show the community of substance between Son and Father. For an outflow seems ομοουσιος, i.e., of one substance with that body of which it is the outflow or exaltation. He thus recognizes the Son’s consubstantiality with the Father, but in terms of the paradigm of the identity of generation and productions of will which he has accepted, this means that Creation itself must be consubstantial and co-eternal with the Father and the Son.

Origen is consequently aware of the fact that he must therefore distinguish more clearly between the Son and the Father. This he does, notably, by calling the Father the “Simple Good” (ἀπλως αγαθος), and “God Himself” (αυτοθεος). The Son is thus a “second God”, or (δευτεροθεος). Thus, the Father and the Son are “two gods.”

This last confession that the Father and the Son are “two gods”, however, caused the Bishop Heraclides to suspect Origen of polytheism. Origen’s response is to point to the doctrine of the monarchy in mankind, by pointing out that Scripture refers to Adam and Eve as two, and yet one flesh, or that he who is joined to Christ is “one spirit with him.” Finally, says Quasten, “he adduces Christ’s saying that ‘I and My Father are one.’ In the first example, the unity consisted of ‘flesh’; in the second of ‘spirit’; but in third of ‘God.’

Thus, Origen has stated the unity of God in terms of “goodness”, or more appropriately, in terms of simplicity itself; what has begun to fade into the background, in spite of his attempts to preserve it, is the Monarchy of the Father. In fact, Origen appears to separate what for Clement and Ignatius of Antioch and Irenaeus were related doctrines: the Monarchy of

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α Ibid., Commentary on Hebrews, cited in II Quasten, p. 78.
β II Quasten, pp. 78-79.
γ ibid., p. 63.
δ I Corinthians 6:7.
ε II Quasten, p. 63.
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the Father, and the identity and unity of essence of the Son and the Spirit with the Father:

Now we must examine this question: Since it is true that “All things come into being through” the Word, did the Holy Spirit come into being through him? For I suppose that if anyone asserts that the Spirit has derivative being and puts forward the tact “All things came into being through him” he is forced to admit that the Holy Spirit came into being through the Word, the Word being anterior to the Spirit. While if a man refuses to admit that the Holy Spirit has come into being through Christ it follows that he must say that the Spirit is unbegotten… But… if he holds the Son to be distinct from the Father he will favour the identification of the Spirit with the father, since a clear distinction is made between the Holy Spirit and the Son. We, however, are persuaded that there are really three persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and we believe that only the Father is unbegotten; and we post as true, and as the most reverent proposition, that all things came into being through the Word, and that of all these things the Holy Spirit is the most honourable, ranking first of all that have been brought into being by God through Jesus Christ. And it may be that this is the reason why the Holy Spirit is not given the title very Son of God, that the only-begotten Son alone is by nature the original Son.α

The Spirit is not a Son, because the Son is the “original” Son, implying that the Son is a kind of grandson, proceeding from the Father “through” -- an important preposition as we shall see later -- the Word.

Quasten’s remarks now bear great significance, and should be borne in mind when we turn to examine the filioque:

From this and similar passages it can be easily understood why Origen has been accused of subordinationism. It is quite evident that he presupposes an hierarchical order in the Trinity and regards the Holy

α Origen, Commentary on John, 2:10, Bettenson, pp. 227-228.
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Spirit as ranking even below the Son.α

The same must be said of the *filioque*.  

215 III Quasten, p. 8. This subordinationist structure has, according to Quasten, a deadly effect on the doctrine of redemption, a deadly effect which should otherwise be born in mind when we turn to consider the parallel subordinationist structure of the *filioque*:

It attacked the very nature of Christianity, because it attributed redemption to a God who was not true God at all and for this reason incapable of redeeming mankind. Thus it deprived the faith of its essential character.β

But if this be true, can the equally subordinationist theology of the *filioque*, which deprives the Holy Spirit of a mark of deity common to the Father and the Son, i.e., that of causing a divine Person to proceed from Him, not suffer? What is the sanctification of the Spirit if, on the clear implications of this structure, it is conferred by a creature? Very clearly, that sanctification can only be *created*. Thus, the *filioque*, as we shall see, is necessary to the western doctrine that grace is created effect or character within the soul.

216 Didymus the Blind is so-called because he was blinded at the age of four. In spite of being unable to read, he assembled an encyclopaedic knowledge, being appointed by St. Athanasius to head the catechetical school of Alexandria. He was more a compiler of knowledge, however, than a systematizer or theologian in the sense of St. Athanasius.γ He did not discriminate in his assembly of knowledge, consequently coming under the influence of some of Origen’s doctrine.

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α III Quasten, p. 79.
β III Quasten, p. 8.
γ Ibid., p. 85
The Apparatus

For this reason, most of his writings have disappeared.\textsuperscript{α}

However, Didymus makes a very important contribution to the formulation of doctrine, for the formula one essence, three hypostases (μια ουσια, τρεις υποστασεις) first occurs in him. Moreover, he is clear as to the implications of the patristic ordo theologiae: “There is but one operation where there is but one substance, because whatever are homoousia with the same substance, have likewise the same operations."\textsuperscript{β}

“Since, therefore, these homoousia are worthy of the same honor and have the same operation, they have the same nature.”\textsuperscript{γ} The principle that different natures will produce distinct operations also leads Didymus to a clear confession of the two wills of Christ’s two natures.\textsuperscript{δ}

\textsuperscript{217} Ill Quasten, p. 93, citing Didymus the Blind, On the Trinity 2:6:4.

\textsuperscript{218} Regarding the doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit in Didymus’ doctrine, Quasten notes that “The Council of Florence praised him for his manifold and explicit testimony to the procession of the Holy Ghost from both the Father and the Son.”\textsuperscript{ε} He also notes that the Council could do no more than adduce the fact that Didymus, “in his treatise De Trinitate does not go farther than to state that the Holy Spirit ‘proceeds from the Father and remains divinely in the Son.’”\textsuperscript{ρ}

\textsuperscript{219} cf. above, note 209.

\textsuperscript{220} Something must be said here about the body of writings of St. Athanasius, including that pseudonymous body of works attributed to him. We shall reserve our comments only to those writings having a different bearing on the question in view, and here as elsewhere, follow Quasten’s presentation, since it is typical of the Second Europe.

\textsuperscript{α} Ibid., p. 86.

\textsuperscript{β} Didymus the Blind, On the Holy Spirit, cited in III Quasten, p. 93.

\textsuperscript{γ} Didymus the Blind, On the Trinity, 2: 6: 4, cited in III Quasten, p. 93.

\textsuperscript{δ} Ibid., 3:12, III Quasten, p. 95.

\textsuperscript{ε} III Quasten, p. 95.

\textsuperscript{ρ} III Quasten, p. 96, citing Didymus, On the Trinity, 1:31.
Apologetical And Dogmatic Works

Against the Heathen; On the Incarnation of the Word

For most people of the First and Second Europe, this is the most familiar of St. Athanasius’ theological works, familiar in only its second part, the *On the Incarnation of the Word*. The former is a refutation of paganism, polytheism, and idolatry, while the latter is an excellent summary of the Doctrine of the Recapitulatory Economy of Christ.

Three Discourses Against the Arians

Written ca. 358, these are St. Athanasius’ most thorough examination and refutation\(^\text{a}\) of Arianism. The *First Discourse* summarizes Arius’ doctrine as he himself wrote of it in his *Thalia*, and the *Second* and *Third Discourses* examine the effect of the Orthodox and Arian doctrines on the exegesis of Scripture.

Concerning the Incarnation and Against the Arians

Scholarly opinion is divided as to the authenticity of this work. The presence of the formula εἰς Θεός ἐν τρισὶν υποστασις has led some to content that it is not genuinely Athanasius’ work. As Quasten rightly observes, this line of reasoning is spurious, since Athanasius, at the Alexandrian Synod of 362, acknowledges that the term υποστασις can mean person, or προσωπον, even though he admits that in his own works, it retains is bare philosophical connotation of οὐσία. Theodoret of Cyrus refers to the work as genuine.

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\(^{a}\) Ill Quasten, pp. 28-29.
Spurious Dogmatic Works

The “Athanasian Creed”, or “Quicumque Vult”

Of all the spurious works attributed to St. Athanasius, the most famous and well-known is the so-called “Athanasian Creed”, which, as the old adage goes, is neither by Athanasius, nor a creed. Sometimes known as the Quicumque Vult, from its first two words in the original Latin, this work was first employed in the post-Augustinian West, though it achieved some popularity, without the filioque of course, in some circles in the East.

It was first demonstrated to be pseudonymous in the seventeenth century. The method of demonstrating this, it should be noted, was the observation of the fact that it embodied the Augustinian doctrine of the filioque, including its inverted ordo. The Roman Catholic Church appointed its use for certain Sundays in the Monsatic office of Prime, and it has been widely used throughout the Anglican communion. Though never used in public offices of the Eastern Church, it did, as has been mentioned, achieve some popularity with the monks of Athos in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries where it was published without the filioque.

The Tome to the People of Antioch

Written at the behest of the Alexandrian synod in 362, this deals with the state of the Church at Antioch and makes recommendations on how that Church should go about restoring its order and tranquility and heal the schism between it and Alexandria. It sets forth how Arians may be readmitted to communion: by confession of the Nicene formula, and anathematizing Arius. It is certain that the letter is addressed to the Semi-Arian party, i.e., that party which, for orthodox theological reasons, did not confess the Nicene formula, for its fear that the term οὐκονομιος implied sabellianism. This fact raises certain ecclesiological and canonical problems that are with the Orthodox Churches of the First Europe today,
in the form of canonical policies which have hardened into defining features of ecclesiastical identity (jurisdictions). This may be put in the form of the question, Are all schisms from the Church, or are there schisms that can be in the Church? Most contemporary Orthodox, both “Traditionalist” and “Modernist”, would answer the former, not realizing the serious historical difficulties the answer creates. Many Modernists and ecumenists give the latter answer, likewise not realizing that the answer is too simplistic.

Briefly put, there is no generalized formula or answer. Rather, a certain discernment is required to distinguish the two, based upon dogmatic, liturgical, and canonical factors. While this is not the place to delve into these questions, they are the most serious issue facing all Orthodox Christians today.

Letter Concerning the Decrees of the Council of Nicea

An important epistle, this describes the proceedings of the First Oecumenical Council of Nicea in detail, defending its twin formulae of the Son being begotten “from the essence of the Father” (ἐκ τῆς ουσίας του Πατρός) and “consubstantial” (ομοουσίως).

Letter to Rufianus

Likewise dealing with the readmission of the Arian clergy, Athanasius’ response is worth quoting:

The same decision was come to here and everywhere, namely, in the case of those who had fallen and been leaders of impiety, to pardon them upon their repentance, but not to give them the position of clergy; but in the case of men not deliberate in impiety, but drawn away by necessity and violence, that they should not only received pardon, but should

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α Ill Quasten, p. 61.
occupy the position of clergy."

A clear distinction is made, in other words, between those instigating and persisting in heresy, and those who, for whatever reason, find themselves in it, inheriting it, or, in the case of some of the "orthodox Semi-Arians", denying Nicea for essentially sound theological reasons.


222 St. Athanasius states the Recapitulatory Economy very directly as

He was made man that we might be made God (θεοποιηθῶμεν) [because] He manifested Himself by a body that we might receive the idea of the unseen Father…"\(^{\text{\textsuperscript{3}}}\)

That is, Christ's Incarnation, Death, and Resurrection affects the birth, death, and resurrection of all men:

And thus taking from our bodies one of like nature, because all were under penalty of the corruption of death, He gave it over to death in the stead of all, and offered it to the Father -- doing this, moreover, of His loving-kindness, to the end that, firstly, all being held to have died in Him, the law involving the ruin of men might be undone inasmuch as its power was fully spent in the Lord's body, and had no longer holding-ground against men, corruption, He might turn them again toward incorruption, and quicken them from death by the appropriation of His body and by the grace of the resurrection, banishing death from them like straw from the

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\(^{\text{\textsuperscript{3}}}\) III Quasten, p. 63.

God, History, and Dialectic

A word should be said about “unitary subject” Christology, St. Athanasius’ clear confession of it, and about his alleged “moderate Apollinarianism.”

He clearly confesses that the subject of the Incarnation is the One Incarnate Person of God the Word:

Wherefore neither was there one Son of God before Abraham, another after Abraham; nor was there one that raised up Lazarus, another that asked concerning him; but the same it was that said as man, “Where does Lazarus lie?” and as God raised him up, the same that as man in the body spat, but divinely as Son of God opened the eyes of the man blind from his birth, and while, as Peter says, in the flesh He suffered, as God He opened the tomb and raised the dead.

Because Christ is One Person, God and Man, Athanasius explicitly confesses the Ever-Virgin Mary to be ΘΕΟΤΟΚΟΣ, or Mother of God, in the Third Discourse to the Arians, 3:29; 3:14.

Likewise, because the One Son is both God and man, Christians do not worship His humanity with a separate worship from Him whose humanity it is; this point will become crucial during the contest between St. Cyril of Alexandria and Nestorius.

If there is a problematical aspect of his theology, lies in what some scholars have called his “moderate Apollinarianism”. Apollinarianism is the heresy that the humanity of Christ is without a soul or intellect, the Logos taking its place. On this view, the humanity of Christ is, if one may so put it, nothing but hamburger, lacking the human animating principle (soul) and having only a divine one. This point, too, will become a subsequent focal point of controversy.

α Ibid., 8, cited in Ill. Quasten, p. 71.
β St. Athanasius, Tome to the Church of Antioch, cited in Ill. Quasten, p. 73.
Quasten states the position of the modern scholarship of the Second Europe as follows:

(The Arians) based their objections to the divinity of Christ on Scriptural passages which mention the inner suffering, fear, and affliction of the Logos. One would expect Athanasius to show that all this has nothing to do with his (sic.) divinity but is caused by his human soul. But he never avails himself of this opportunity and never attacks the Arians for having made this mistake. The reason is that the characteristic form of Christology in early times was a Logos-Sarx Christology. Arius and Apollinarius, though at extremes in other respects, are its typical exponents. Neither of them admits the presence of a human soul in Christ because they are convinced that the Logos has taken its place. Even Athanasius might be called a moderate but orthodox representative of this form of Christology, though he differs from both, Arius and Apollinarius, in so far as he never explicitly denies the existence of a human soul in Christ... (He) abstains from answering questions regarding the connecting link between the Logos and his Flesh. This is even more surprising, if we remember that a century before Origen had introduced the concept of the soul to Christ as being intermediate between God and the Flesh.α

One must note here that the so-called "Logos-Sarx" Christology defines itself in precisely the philosophical terms of individuation, of form (ΣΩΦΩΞ = ΕΙΔΟΞ) plus matter (ΟΨΗ). While there may have been such a tendency in some quarters in the pre-Nicene period, to maintain that it is an observable, identifiable and crystallized formula or form -- like the Augustinian ordo theologiae itself, which can be observed explicitly and formally in any number of texts -- is another matter.

Quasten himself cites a passage where Athanasius very clearly refers to the soul of Christ's humanity:

α Ill Quasten, p. 73.
The Savior (sic.) had not a body without a soul (οὐ σώμα αἰωνίου), not without sense or intelligence; for it was not possible, when the Lord had become man for us, that His body should be without intelligence, nor was the salvation effected in the Word Himself of the body only, but of the soul also.α

Quasten then notes that Grillmeier (the principal advocate of the “Logos-Sarx” construction and of St. Athanasius’ “moderate Apollinarianism”) “is of the opinion that the words οὐ σώμα αἰωνίου must be rendered ‘not a lifeless body’, rather than ‘not a soulless body’ or ‘a body without a soul’, if justice be done to the context.”β

I cannot agree with Grillmeier that the translation of οὐ σώμα αἰωνίου is “not a lifeless” body simply because the historical consequences of the underlying presupposition of “Logos-Sarx Christology” would be ridiculous, for in the culture of the day, the soul (ψυχή, anima) was always the term for the animating principle of given forms of life. The point of Arius and Apollinarius was not that Christ lacked as human souls as much as it was that the Logos replaced it, made it, so to speak, “unnecessary”.

224 St. Athanasius, Third Discourse Against the Arians, NPNF, pp. 318-319.
225 Ibid., 10, NPNF, p. 399.
226 Ibid., 60, NPNF, p. 426.
227 Ibid., 63, NPNF, p. 429.
228 Ibid., 3-4, NPNF, p. 395.
229 J.M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, pp. 77: “The ‘nature’ of the One and its act as the One must be wholly indistinguishable.”
230 St. Athanasius, Third Discourse Against the Arians NPNF, pp. 427-428.
God is not as man; for men beget passibly, having a transitive nature...

But with God this cannot be, for He is not composed of parts, but being impassible and Simple (\( \text{ἀλλὰ καὶ απαθὴς ὦν καὶ απλὸς} \)), He is impassibly and individibly Father of the Son.

He also accuses the Arians of thinking of God the Father as compound, and not simple.\(^\alpha\) Moreover, he refers the simplicity to the Shena Israel in Deuteronomy 6:14, taking it to mean “the very simple, and blessed, and incomprehensible essence itself of Him that is (\( \text{τὴν ἀπλὴν καὶ μακαριὰν καὶ ακαταληπτὸν τον υἱοῦς} \))."\(^\beta\)

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV: THE DECONSTRUCTION OF THE FIRST HELLENIZATION FROM THE CAPPADOCIANS TO THE EVE OF CHALCEDON

\(^{232}\) St. Basil the Great lived ca. 330-379, and was the brother of St. Gregory of Nyssa and St. Macrina. He was consecrated a bishop ca. 370.

\(^{233}\) St. Gregory the Theologian (Nazianzen) lived ca. 329-389 and is the Cappadocian Father accorded the honour of being called “the Theologian“. Ca. 371 he was consecrated to the See of Sasima, but was summoned to Constantinople in 379, an expert Second Oecumenical Council of Constantinople in 381. It was during that council that he was appointed Bishop of Constantinople.

\(^\alpha\) St. Athanasius, De Synodis, 34, PG 26:753B, NPNF, p. 459.

\(^\beta\) Ibid., 35, PG 26:753C, NPNF, p. 469.

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St. Gregory of Nyssa lived ca. 330-395. Consecrated as Bishop of Nyssa in 371, he attended the Second Oecumenical Council at Constantinople in 381. He was a bold champion of the Nicene Orthodoxy, and his *Twelve Books Contra Eunomius* are perhaps the most sweeping analysis and refutation of the presuppositions and structural logic of the entire Arian system.

St. Ambrose of Milan was a contemporary of the Great Cappadocian Fathers (ca. 339-397). In 374, the Orthodox faithful of Milan demanded that he succeed Auxentius, the previous Arian bishop of Milan, an important fact, since Ambrose was at that time not even a baptized Christian, but only a catechumen. St. Augustine of Hippo greatly revered him, and attributes his own conversion to Ambrose’s great learning and piety.

St. Hilary of Poitiers was likewise a contemporary of the great Cappadocian Fathers, living ca. 315-367. He was elected and consecrated Bishop of Poitiers in 353, and at once championed the Nicene Orthodoxy against Arianism, a stance which brought him exile to Phrygia in 356 on the orders of the Emperor Constantius. His study of the Orthodox objections to the ὀμοονστος formula on the part of some of the Semi-Arians was crucially important, as shall be seen in the main text.

Available in the French *Sources Chretienne*.

So far as Arianism-Eunomianism endeavors to establish its doctrine, it must always do so by the implicit initial assumption of the intelligibility of the divine essence.

cf. pp. 177-178

In St. Basil, the *homoousion* formula is not to be taken as the *starting point* for theology, i.e., it is not first in the *ordo theologiae*:

For the maintained that the homoousian set forth the idea both of essence and what is *derived from it, so that the essence, when divide,*
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confers the title of co-essential on the parts into which it is divided. This explanation has some reason in the case of bronze and the coins made therefrom, but in the case of God the Father and God the Son there is no question of substance anterior or even underlying both; there mere thought and utterance of such a thing is the last extravagance of impiety. What can be conceived of as anterior to the Unbegotten? By this, blasphemy faith in the Father and the Son is destroyed, for things constituted out of one have to one another the relation of brothers.⁶⁹

241. III Quasten, p. 210

243. The argumentation may seem somewhat obscure unless one recalls the Aristotelian doctrine of form, matter and individuation. Since matter individuates the form, it possesses location in space and time. This, the prepositions “from”, “through”, and “in” refer to the agencies associated with this individuation.

245. Ibid., 1:4:6, NPNF, p. 5
246. Ibid., 1:5:7, NPNF, p. 5
247. Ibid., 1:5:10, NPNF p. 7
248. Ibid.
249. Ibid., 1:6:13, NPNF, p. 8
250. Ibid., 1:6:14, NPNF p. 8
251. Ibid., 1:6:15, p. 9. St. Basil insists that the Son cannot be second in order to the Father simply on the basis that He sits at the right hand of God, and is therefore not (as the Eunomians argued),

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omnipresent. As St. Basil notes, the phrase “right hand” is a metaphor for equality of dignity;

The expression “right hand” does not, as (the Eunomians) contend, indicate the lower place, but equality of relation; it is not understood physically, in which case there might be something sinister about God, but Scripture puts before us the magnificence of the dignity of the Son by the use of dignified language indicating the seat of honour. It is left then for our opponents to allege that this expression signified inferiority or rank. Let them learn that “Christ is the power of God and wisdom of God” and that “He is the image of the invisible God” and “brightness of his glory” and that “Him hath God the Father sealed,” by engraving Himself on Him.

Now are we to call these passages and others like them, throughout the whole of Holy Scripture, proofs of humiliation, or rather public proclamations of the majesty of the Only-Begotten, and of the equality of His glory with the Father? We ask them to listen to the Lord Himself, distinctly setting forth the equal dignity of his glory with the Father, in his words, “He that hath seen me hath seen the Father.” and again, “When the Son cometh in the glory of his Father,” that they should honour the Son even as they honour the Father,” and “We beheld his glory, the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father,” and “the only-begotten God which

\textsuperscript{α} I Corinthians 1:24  
\textsuperscript{β} Colossians 1:15  
\textsuperscript{γ} Hebrews 1:3  
\textsuperscript{δ} St. John 6:27  
\textsuperscript{ε} St. John 14:9  
\textsuperscript{η} St. Mark 8:38  
\textsuperscript{θ} St. John 5:23  
\textsuperscript{ι} St. John 1:14  
\textsuperscript{k} St. John 1:18. St. Basil, \textit{On the Holy Spirit}, 1:6:15, NPNF, p. 9. Notably St. Basil cites the reading of \textsuperscript{x} (Codex Sinaiticus), a reading which, if one follows closely the disputes between the Gnostic and Orthodox, or between the Arians and St. Athanasius, was a reading that Athanasius believed to have been corrupted.
Thus, the same adoration and worship is to be given the Son as to the Father:

...Can it be consistent with true religion for men taught by the Lord himself that “He that honoureth not the Son honoureth not the Father” to refuse worship and glorify with the Father him who in nature, glory, and in dignity is conjoined with him?... Standing and sitting, I apprehend, indicate the fixity and entire stability of the nature, as Baruch, when he wishes to exhibit the immutability and immobility of the Divine mode of existence, says, “For thou sittest forever and we perish utterly.”

The phrase “mode of existence” (τροπος υπαρξεος) is a technical term of Cappadocian theology, denoting, or being synonymous with, their understanding and use of υποστασις. It signifies that there is the divine nature does not exist in the abstract, but is “enhypostasized” in the Three Unique Hypostases.

252. Ibid., 1:8:17 NPNF p. 11.
253. Ibid., :21:52, NPNF p. 33
254. St. Basil Epistle 52:1, NPNF p. 55
255. The quotation is that of St. Augustine, On the Trinity 7:4:7
257. St. Basil, Epistle 52:3, NPNF p. 156; Cf. also Epistle 125:1, p. 194
258. St. Basil deliberately distinguishes between “The One” (neuter, το εν) that “That Which Is,” or “That Which Exists” (neuter, το ον) of Neoplatonic metaphysical speculation and “The One” (masculine, ο εις) and “He Who Is” (ο εις). Most importantly, the distinction of genders is not

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observed when St. Basil speaks of the Holy Spirit. Basil states “The Word is He who ‘was with God in the beginning’ and ‘was God’, and the Spirit of the mouth of God is ‘the Spirit of truth which proceedeth from the Father.’”

At this point in the Anglican, that is to say, Second European, translation of St. Basil in the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers text of On the Holy Spirit, the editors’ footnote (number 4), gives the original Greek of St. Basil: τὸν στερεοῦντα τὸ πνεῦμα. This usage follows that of the Council of Constantinople: τὸ κύριον καὶ Ζωοποιν τὸ εκ τοῦ Πατρὸς εκπορευομενον.

The Holy Scriptures, however, often intentionally “violate” the grammatical convention of the Greek, for which the term “Spirit” is neuter, by referring to Him in the masculine, as in St. John 16:13: οταν δε ελθη εκεινος, το πνευµα της αληθειας. St. John 15:26 uses the masculine emphatic pronoun εκεινος in apposition to the neuter το πνευµα.

According to the letter of the Emperor Justinian to the Fifth Oecumenical Council of Constantinople, doctors of the Church are Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Gregory the Theologian, Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, Theophilus, John Chrysostom, Cyril (of Alexandria), Augustine, Proclus, and Leo. “In the actual sentence of the Council, St. Augustine of Hippo’s authority is cited for the tradition that permitted heretics to be anathematized posthumously.”

The others being St. John the Theologian and St. Symeon the New Theologian.

I have translated υποστατικη ιδιοτης by “hypostatic feature” or “hypostatic characteristic” or “personal feature” or “personal characteristic” to avoid confusion of translating ιδιομα and its cognates by “attributes”. The confusion that translation of the word “attribute”, as in

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b Ibid., p. 309
“hypostatic attribute”, occasions is enormous, for its lends impetus to the idea that hypostasis is merely a special kind of attribute or operation of essence, whereas in the Fathers, is that unique and indefinable peculiarity that allows one to distinguish an individual hypostasis.

262. προσωπον can mean a persona or a “mask”, an “aspect” or “presentation” which serves more to hid that to reveal the real personal depth. Likewise, it can mean “person” in the ordinary sense. Nestorius will, of course, capitalize on the ambiguity.

263. Θεοτοκος as we have seen already, the term occurs in St. Athanasius, and is found also in Origen.

264. Ill Quasten, p. 253.

265. Ibid., p. 250. Gregory’s words are worth citing in regard to this principle:

The Father is Father and is Unoriginate, for He is of no one, the one is Son, and is not unoriginate, for He is of the Father. But if you take the word “origin” in a temporal sense, He too is Unoriginate, for He is the Maker of time, and is not subject to time. The Holy Ghost is truly Spirit, coming forth from the Father indeed, but not after the manner of the Son, for it is not by generation but by procession since I must coin a word for the sake of clearness; for neither did the Father cease to be Unbegotten because of His begetting something, nor the Son to be begotten because He is of unbegotten, nor is the Spirit changed into Father and Son because He proceeds, or because He is god – though ungodly do not believe it. α

266. Ibid., p. 249

267. St. Gregory the Theologian (Nazianzus), NPNF S2, p. 301

268. Ibid, Third Theological Oration, NPNF, p. 305:

α St. Gregory, Oration 39:12, NPNF.
What of Adam? Was he not alone the direct creature of God? \(\beta\) Yes, you will say. Was he then the only human being? By no means. And why, but because humanity does not consist in direct creation? For what which is begotten is also human. Just so neither He Who is unbegotten alone God, though he alone is Father. But grant that He Who is Begotten is God; for He is of God, as you must allow... Then how do you describe the essence of God? Not by declaring what it is, but by rejecting what it is not? \(\alpha\)

269. Ibid., p. 305
274. III Quasten, p. 283.
276. III Quasten, p. 284, citing *De Vita Moesis* 2:37-38. The incomprehensibility of the divine nature is St. Gregory’s precise point about using the positive and unreconstructed doctrines of philosophy to define the divine essence and thence to make an idol of the “gold of the Egyptians.”
277. III Quasten, p. 284, emphasis mine.

\(\beta\) That is, the Unbegotten source of humanity, the Monarch or “Father-Source” of humanity.
\(\alpha\) St. Gregory the Theologian, *The Third Theological Oration*, X, NPNF, p. 305

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280. Ibid. 107, III Quasten, p. 284.

281. III Quasten, p. 289

282. Ibid

283. Ibid. St. Gregory has three restrictions on the αποκατασις: (1) Souls are not preexistent; (2) Bodies are not a punishment for sins nor a result of the fall of preexistent souls into matter; (3) the αποκατασις happens only once, since Christ was crucified once for all time. Cf. note 290.


287. III Quasten p. 296.


289. Ibid.

290. Cf. Hebrews 9:28: “So Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many”; and Jude 3: “… earnestly contend for the faith which was once delivered unto the saints.”

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If any one has put his trust in Him as a Man without a human mind, he is a really bereft of mind, and quite unworthy of salvation. For that which He has not assumed He has not healed; but that which is united to His Godhead is also saved. If only half Adam fell, then that which Christ assumes and saves may be half also; but if the whole of his nature fell, it must be united to the whole nature of Him that was begotten, and so be saved as a whole.

This paradigm also provides yet another important insight into the patristic doctrine of ancestral sin, i.e., that man inherits a mortal nature, but not a sinful of guilty one, in which case Christ would have been a sinner as men. The doctrine of the soteriological paradigm reveals rather that in Christ human nature is restored to its natural purpose which is to be found in God, and that sin is no part of human nature. Moreover, as we have seen elsewhere, sin is wholly a personal misuse of the faculties and operations of human nature, and as such, has no essential existence.

292. III Quasten, p. 267

293. Ibid.

294. Ibid., III Quasten, p. 268. He notes that K. Holl maintained that it was mediaeval forgery made in the interest of defending the filioque. One thus detects the Gnostic tactic of “composing new texts” and “contriving orthodox contexts” in order to justify the metaphysical implications of the assumed system, all evidence to the contrary notwithstanding. For the “proto-Augustinian ‘anticipations’” of the filioque, cf. note. 295 below, and note 541.

295. For St. Gregory of Nyssa’s and other fathers’ alleged “anticipations” of the filioque, cf. note 541.

296. For other arguments, cf. above, note 295, and note 541.

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297b St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius* 1:15, NPNF, p. 52

297c St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius* 1:15, NPNF, p. 53

297d St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius* 1:16, NPNF, p. 54

297e St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius* 1:16, NPNF, p. 54

297f St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius* 1:9, NPNF, p. 54

297g St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius* 1:19, NPNF, p. 56

297h St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius* 1:20, NPNF, p. 58

297i St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius* 1:25, NPNF, p. 67

297j St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius* 1:19, NPNF, p. 57-59

297k For the period of St. Hilary’s life, cf. n. 236.

297l For St. Hilary of Poitier’s and other fathers’ alleged “anticipations” of the *filioque*, cf. note 541.

297m IV Quasten, p. 37.


297o Ibid., 74, pp. 48-49.

297p St. John Chrysostom was born ca. 344-354 in Antioch to aristocratic, Christian parents. His father died in infancy, leaving him to be reared by his mother Athusa, whose piety exercised a significant influence upon him. He was taught philosophy and rhetoric, but at age 18 he abandoned the emptiness of pagan learning for divine studies. He came to the attention of Meletius of Antioch, who allowed him to be continually in his company. It was Meletius who baptized him, and three years later ordained him to the minor order to reader.

He subsequently spend two years in a cave, living the monastic life,
but his health began to fail and he returned to Antioch, being ordained to the diaconate by Meletius in 381, and to the priesthood by Flavian in 386. When Patriarch Nectarios of Constantinople died in 397, John was elected to succeed him, but was unwilling to accept, and had to be persuaded by various devious and sometimes violent, means to come to the capital. Theophilus of Alexandria was compelled to consecrate him on February 26, 398.

His integrity did not lend itself well to the constant ecclesiastical politics of the imperial capital. At the so-called Synod of the Oak, composed of 36 bishops, 29 of whom were from Egypt, he was condemned on 29 spurious charges and declared deposed in 403; he was exiled by imperial edict to Bithynia, but immediately recalled to the capital when public outcry became too great for the government to ignore. Before his exile, Chrysostom appealed his case to Rome, and Innocent broke communion with Antioch and Alexandria until his name was restored to the diptychs.

After preaching a provocative homily on the Feast of St. John and Baptist, his imperial enemies again denounced him for treason, and the emperor demanded that he cease functioning as patriarch, claiming he was restored uncanonically. When Chrysostom predictably refused, the Emperor sent an armed guard to seize him during the baptism of several catechumens during the Paschal vigil in 404. He was exiled again on Pentecost later that year. He settled in Armenia for three years, and pilgrims again brought pressure again on the imperial government. In 407, the Emperor Arcadius banished him to exile in Pityus, on the extreme eastern edge of the Black Sea in every hostile environs. Forced to journey on foot through the rugged Caucasus mountains in severe weather broke his health, and he reposed on September 14, 407, before ever having reached his destination. His relics were returned and interred in the

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Church of the Apostles in Constantinople in 438.α

III Quasten, p. 478.

298. The persistence of the Augustinian dialectical doctrine of Original Guilt is truly remarkable, showing up in some unusual places, as for example, in Ayn Rand’s architectonic novel Atlas Shrugged. There, in a speech, that is more of a soliloquy on her philosophy of Objectivism, the hero of the work, John Galt remarks

“Damnation is the part of your morality; destruction is its purpose, means and end. Your code begins by damming man as evil, then demands that he practice a good which it defines as impossible for him to practice. It demands, as his first proof of virtue, that he accepts his own depravity without proof. It demands that he start, not with a standard of value, but with a standard of evil, which is himself, by means of which he is then to define the good: the good is that which he is not.

"It does not matter who then becomes the profiteer on his renounced glory and tormented soul, a mystic God with some incomprehensible design or any passer-by whose rotting sores are held as some inexplicable claim upon him – it does not matter, the good is not for him to understand, his duty it to crawl through years of penance, atoning for the guilt of his existence to any stray collector of unintelligible debts, his only concept of a value is a zero: the good is that which is non-man.

“The name of this monstrous absurdity is Original Sin.”

“A sin without volition is a slap at morality and an insolent contradiction in terms: that which is outside the possibility of choice is outside the province of morality. If man is evil by birth, he has no will, no power to change it; if he has no will, he can be neither good nor evil; a robot is moral... To hold man’s nature as his sin is a mockery in nature. To punish him for a crime he committed before he was born is a mockery of justice. To hold him guilty in a matter where no innocence exists is a mockery of reason. To destroy morality, nature, justice and reason by

α III Quasten pp. 424-427.
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means of single concept is a feat of evil hardly to be matched.” (Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged [New York, 1957], p. 951.

While most of Rand’s comments are quite to the point of the moral consequences of the doctrine of original guilt, she does not address the central existential issue of ancestral sin, because for her the account of the Fall in Genesis is a myth, and the dialectic of good and evil an essential component of the essence of mankind. Nevertheless, the quoted section, as a criticism of the sweeping consequences of the doctrine for the moral culture of the Second Europe, contains little that an Orthodox theologian could not agree with as far as it goes.

299. NPNF S1 XI, p. 401
300. Ibid
301. Ibid, pp. 401-402
302a. [author numbered for a note, but never added it to the manuscript]
303. Ibid, pp. 403.
304. The “unbaptized” infant remains a problem for the Second Europe, since, at root, its doctrine of “original guilt”, despite attempts to modify or mitigate it, maintains that every unbaptized person who dies “under wrath”, i.e., in punishing for inherited sin and guilt. In St. Augustine, this teaching leads to the condemnation of unbaptized infants. In Aquinas, whose heart, at least on this score, cannot be faulted, the attempt is made to mitigate the doctrine even further, by the doctrine of “Limbo”, which, if one may so put it, is “the least hellish” part of hell.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V: THE DECONSTRUCTION OF THE DIALECTICAL CHRISTOLOGY OF HELLENIZATION:
NESTORIANISM, MONOPHYSITISM, MONOTHELETISM

305. The current favorites among the rattles, blocks, and tops of the ecumenical playpen are the various “new revisionisms”, that Severus of Antioch and Monophysitism were really Orthodox, that Nestorius was really Orthodox. Cf. Milton V. Anastos, “Nestorius was Orthodox”, Studies in Byzantine Intellectual History (Variorum Reprints, pp. 119-140), who puts it very succinctly: “My own thesis is that Nestorius was not only thoroughly and indubitable orthodox, but also in many respects the profounded and most brilliant theologian of the fifth century.” (p. 123). It goes downhill from there. And that's the point; it takes only imagination, “originality”, to understand the next likely sounds of the ecumenical movement.

306. Cf. the remarks of the Monophysite Archbishop Severius in Paulos Gregorios, William H. Lazareth, Nikos A. Nissiotis, eds., Does Chalcedon Divide or Unite? Towards convergence in Orthodox Christology, pp. 43-44:

From our discussion so far I come to feel that there are no insoluble problems of doctrine between us concerning the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ. We affirm that our Lord Jesus Christ is perfect God and perfect man, and that He is one Person and one nature. You also maintain the same faith by affirming that He is “in two natures.” Whereas we emphasize the union of the natures, you insist on their distinctness. We were afraid that faith formulated by the Council of Chalcedon tended towards Nestorians, and you were led by the misunderstanding that we were holding there heresy of Eutyches. However, the fact is that we are not Eutychians; neither are you Nestorians...

I was glad to listen to Professor Karmiris. But I would request our Greek brethren to stop saying that the non-Chalcedonian fathers of the Church did not understand the terms used during the Christological controversy. The misunderstandings were due to the imprecise use of the Greek terms by the Greeks themselves, and not the inadequacy of the
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other languages...

It is interesting to note, that, for all the feelings of joy and goodwill with which the participants in the Orthodox-Monophysite dialogues congratulate themselves for experiencing both sides have not yet noticed a fundamental problem: each still accuses the other of having misunderstood its own position, while accusing the other imprecision in language. Such disagreements can only point to an underlying real disagreement, unless works mean nothing at all in dogmatic formulation.

307. Ibid., the remarks of Fr. John S. Romanided on p. 50: “The non-Chalcedonian Orthodox reject the Council of Chalcedon and accuse it of Nestorianism because it accepted the Tome of Leo, two natures after the union, and allegedly omitted from its definition of faith such Cyrillian expressions as One Nature of God the Logos Incarnate, hypostatic or natural union, and from two natures or from two One Christ. The failure of Chalcedon to make full use of Cyril’s Twelve Chapters, to condemn the Christology of Theodore and its acceptance of Theodoret and Ibas throws suspicion on it.”

308. Ill Quasten, p. 117: Quasten put this case in characteristically lapidary sentences:

It is in defense of orthodoxy against Nestorianism that Cyril appears as a prominent factor in ecclesiastical and dogmatic history. A student of the theological school of Antioch, Nestorius in his Episcopal sermons asserted that there are two persons in Christ, a divine person, the Logos, dwelling in a human person, the man Jesus, and that the Blessed Virgin could not be called Theotokos, Mother of God. His arguments were refuted as early as the spring of 429 by Cyril in his Paschal Letter soon after the Alexandrian defended the Orthodox doctrine in a long encyclical to the monks of Egypt. Thus the latent antagonism which existed for two generations in the Christological question became a public conflict not only between the representatives of the two schools but between the
enmity between these two sees that added a political factor to the theological controversy and gave it the appearance of a bitter personal quarrel.

309. St. Cyril of Alexandria’s activities during the period 400 – 433 revolves around his struggles against the incipient Nestorianism emerging in Antiochian circles. Among these activities in the struggle against Constantinople, he participates in the “Synod of the Oak” and helps to depose St. John Chrysostom from Constantinople. He restores St. John’s name to the dyptichs as Alexandria in 417. The year 429 marks the beginning of his struggle with Nestorius.

310. In the year 430, Pope Celestine convenes a synod in Rome, in response to the appeals both of Nestorius and Cyril. Celestine and his synod approve of Cyril’s theology and condemn Nestorius. Cyril dies on June 27, 444.

311. **Excursus The Reunion of 433 between John of Antioch and St. Cyril of Alexandria:**

In the *Formula of Reunion*, most probably composed by blessed Theodoret of Cyrus, Cyril accepts:

(1) The change of μιαν Φυσιν του Θεου σεσαρκομενην “One Nature of God the Word Incarnate” to μιαν υποστασιν του Θεου σεσαρκομενην σεσαρκα, “one hypostasis of God the Word Incarnate”, thereby inaugurating a new era in the formulation of doctrine.

The question now becomes: Does hypostasis here have the same meaning as it does in the Triadological formulae of the Cappadocians? The obvious intention of the formula is to force Cyril to clarify his own language, which he does.

(2) In the *Formula of Reunion* (433, two years after the Third Ecumenical Council of Ephesus), John of Antioch accepts:
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a. That Mary is *Theotokos*, and by implication thus accepts the whole "Unitary Subject" Christology of St. Cyril, including the Theopaschite formula.

3. Extracts from the text of the Letter of St. Cyril of Alexandria to John of Antioch:

Of the reason of the disagreement it is superfluous to speak. I deem it more useful both to think and speak of things suitable to the time of peace. We were therefore delighted at meeting with that distinguished and most pious man, who expected perhaps to have no small struggle, persuading us that it is necessary to form an alliance for the peace of the Church, and to drive away the laughter of the heterodox, and for this end to blunt the goads of the stubbornness of the devil. He found us ready for this, so as absolutely to need no labour to be bestowed upon us. For we remembered the Savior’s saying; ‘My peace I give unto you, my peace I leave with you’… as a matter of fact, the disagreement of the Churches happened altogether unnecessarily and inopportune, we now have been fully satisfied by the document brought by my lord, the most pious bishop Paul, which contains an unimpeachable confession of faith, and this he asserted to have been prepared by your holiness and by the God-beloved bishops there. The document is as follows, and is set verbatim in this epistle.

Concerning the Virgin Mother of God, we thus think and speak; and of the manner of the Incarnation of the Only Begotten Son of God, necessarily, not by way of any addition but for the sake of certainty, as we have received from the beginning the divine Scriptures and from the tradition of the holy fathers, we will speak briefly, adding nothing whatever to the Faith set forth by the holy Fathers in Nice. For, as we said before, it suffices for all knowledge of piety and the refutation of all false doctrine of heretics. But we speak, not presuming on the impossible; but with the confession of our own weakness, excluding those who wish us to cling to those things which transcend human consideration.
We confess, therefore, our Lord Jesus Christ, the only Begotten Son of God, perfect God, and perfect Man or a reasonable soul and flesh consisting; begotten before the ages of the Father according to his Divinity, and in the last days, for us and for our salvation, of Mary, the Virgin according to his humanity, of the same substance with us according to his humanity; for there became a union of two natures. Wherefore, we confess one Christ, one Son, one Lord.

According to this understanding of this unmixed union, we confess the holy Virgin to be Mother of God; because God the Word was incarnate and became Man, and from this conception he united the temple taken from their with himself.

For we know the theologians make some things of the evangelical and Apostle teaching about the Lord common as pertaining to the one person, and other things they divide as to the two natures, and attribute the worthy ones to God on account of the Divinity of Christ, and the lowly ones on account of his human.

These being your holy voices, and finding ourselves thinking the same with them ('One Lord, one Faith, one Baptism') we glorified God the Savior of all, congratulating one another that our churches and yours have the Faith which agrees with the god-inspired Scriptures and the traditions of our holy fathers.

... For it is necessary, it is undoubtedly necessary, to understand that almost all the opposition to us concerning the faith, arose from our affirming that the holy Virgin is Mother of God, But if from heaven and not from her the holy Body of the Savior of all was born, how then is she understood to be Mother of God? What then did she bring forth except it be true that she brought forth the Emmanuel according to the flesh? They are to be laughed at who babble such things about me.

For the blessed prophet Isaiah does not lie in saying ‘Behold the Virgin shall conceive and bear a Son, and shall call his name Emmanuel, which being interpreted is God with us.’ Truly also the holy Gabriel said to the Blessed Virgin: ‘Fear not, Mary, for thou hast found favour with God. And behold, thou shalt conceive in they womb, and bring forth a Son,
shalt call his name Jesus. He shall save his people from their sins.’

For when we say our Lord Jesus Christ descended from heaven, and from above, we do not say this as if from above and from heaven was his holy flesh taken, but rather by way of following the divine Paul, who distinctly declares; The first man is of the earth, earthy, the Second Man is the Lord from heaven.’

We remember too the Saviour himself saying, ‘And no man hath ascended up to heaven, but he that came down from heaven, even the son of Man.’ Although he was born according to his flesh, is just said, of the Holy Virgin, yet God the Word came down from above and from heaven. He ‘made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was called the son of man, yet remaining what he was, that is to say god. For he is unchanging and unchangeable according to nature, considered already as one with his own Flesh, he is said to have come down from heaven.

He is also called the Man from heaven, being perfect in his Divinity and perfect in his Humanity, and considered as in one Person. For one is the Lord Jesus Christ, although the difference of his natures is not unknown, from which we say the ineffable union was made.

Will your holiness vouchsafe to silence those who say that a crasis (κρασις) or mingling or mixture took place between the word of God and flesh. For it is likely that certain also gossip about me as having thought or said such things.

But I am far from any such thought as that, and I also consider them wholly to rave who think a shadow of change could occur concerning the Nature of the word of God. For he remains that which he always was, and has not been changed, nor can he ever be changed, nor is he capable of change. For we all confess in addition to this, that the word of God is impassible, even though when he dispenses most wisely this mystery, he appears to ascribe to himself the sufferings endured in his own flesh. To the same purpose the all-wise Peter also said when he wrote of Christ as having ‘suffered in the flesh’ and not in the nature of his ineffable godhead. In order that he should be believed to be the Savior of all, by an economic appropriation to himself, as just said, he assumed the
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sufferings of his own Flesh.

Nor would we permit ourselves or others, to alter a single word of those set forth, or to add one syllable, remembering the saying: ‘Remove not the ancient landmark which thy fathers have set, for it was not they who spoke but the Spirit himself of God and the Father, who proceedeth also from him, and is not alien from the Son according to his essence”

We shall see that St. Cyril has here modified his previous terminology to accept the usage of “two natures”, which means the subsequent claims of the Monophysites to follow St. Cyril, is spurious.

312. NPNF S2 XIV, pp. 251-252

313. Nestorius’ Bazaar was most likely written ca. 451-452 as it refers to the death of Theodosius II in 450. It was originally written in Greek, but a Syriac translation was made in 535 by Patriarch Paul. The title, Bazaar renders the Greek word πρα (treatise/business) by the Syriac te gurta (merchandise).

314. The only available translation of the Bazaar that I am aware of it:


315. Of the Scholia de incarnatione Unigeniti, Quasten summarized the following:

The entire text is extant in only Latin, Syriac, Armenian.

An explanation of the names Christ, Emmanuel, and Jesus. The hypostatic union is defended as opposed to mixtures of external association (sunapheia). Cyril refers to the combination of the body and

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ª NPNF S2, Vol XIV, pp. 251-252

ª III Quasten, p. 128.
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soul in man as the closet comparison in the created world.

This point deserves some comment. Nestorius, as was seen, maintains precisely that his doctrine is the only way to distinguish the Union in Christ from the union of body and soul in man. That is to say, the question of the *soul and hypostasis of Christ emerges as the center of the debate*, since, of course, Apollinarius maintained that the Logos replaced the soul in Christ, and Nestorius maintains the converse: that there is both a soul and *therefore* a human *prosopon* in Christ as well.

Cyril is in fact maintaining that the soul and the hypostasis man are *not* the same thing.

316. *Quod unus sit Christus (What the union in Christ is):*

A refutation of the Nestorian doctrine that the Word was not made flesh but united only to a man, “with the result that there is the true and natural Son of God and ‘another one’, an adopted Son of God, who does not share the dignity and honor of the first.”

cf. observations on Spanish adoptions below, note 498.

317. *Exursus on Theology, Christology and Eucharis: The Debate with Nestorius:*

Central to the debate between Cyril and Nestorius is whether Christology, and therefore Eucharistic doctrine, should be based upon a Unitary Subject, or a Dual One, i.e., whether there is one Hypostasis or two in Christ, and whether the Eucharist is one reality out of and in two, or two realities with no internal physical connection.

If there is a Unitary Subject underlying (*hypostasis*) all distinctions, then it follows that worship of the incarnate Son of God is one worship, i.e., there is not one worship of the divine nature and another veneration of the human nature, but a united worship of the incarnate Hypostasis. By the same token, the underlying subject of Scriptural and creedal

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α III Quasten, p. 129.
affirmations is the same: the same One Son was both eternally begotten and born of the Virgin, and she is therefore *Theotokos*. Likewise, it was the eternally begotten Lord of Glory who was crucified.

Cyril prefaces his anathemata to Nestorius with a letter, which raises the following points:

Following in all points the confessions of the Holy Fathers which they made (the Holy Ghost speaking in them), and following the scope of their opinions, and going, as it were in the royal way, we confess that the Only begotten Word of God, begotten of the same substance of the Father… was incarnate and made man; that is, taking flesh of the Holy Virgin, and made it his own from the womb, he subjected himself to birth for us, and came forth man from a woman, without casting off that which he was; but although he assumed flesh and blood, he remained what he was, God in essence and truth. Neither do we say that his flesh was changed into the nature of divinity, nor that the ineffable nature of the Word of God was laid aside for the nature of flesh; for he is unchanged and absolutely unchangeable, being the same always, according to the scripture. For although visible and a child in swaddling clothes, and even in the bosom of his Virgin Mother, he filled all creation as God, as was a fellow ruler with him who begat him, for the Godhead is without quantity, and cannot have limits.

Confessing the Word to be made one with the flesh according to substance, we adore one Son and Lord Jesus Christ: we do not divide the God from the man, nor separate him into parts, as though the two natures were mutually united in him only through a sharing of dignity and authority… Neither do we give separately to the Word of God the name of Christ and the same name separately to a different one born of a woman; but we know only one Christ, the word from God the Father with his own flesh.

We do not say that the word of God dwelt in him as in a common man born of the Holy Virgin, lest Christ be thought of as a God-bearing man; for although the Word tabernacle among us, it is also said that in Christ ‘dwelt all the fullness of the godhead bodily…
One therefore is Christ both Son and Lord, not as if a man had attained only such a conjunction with God as consists in a unity of dignity alone or of authority... Neither do we understand the manner of conjunction to be apposition, for this does not suffice for natural oneness, nor yet according to relative participation, as we are also joined to the Lord, as it is written ‘we are one Spirit in him.’ Rather we deprecate the term junction’ (συναφεία) as not having sufficiently signified the oneness.

We are careful also how we say about Christ: To worship the one clothed on account of the One clothing him, and on account of the Unseen, I worship the seen.’ It is horrible to say in this connection as follows: The assumed as well as the assuming have the name of God.’ For the saying of this divides again Christ into two, and puts the man separately by himself and God also by himself.

We will necessarily add this also. Proclaiming the death, according to the flesh, of the only-begotten Son of God, that is Jesus Christ, confessing his resurrection from the dead, and his ascension into heaven, we offer the Unbloody Sacrifice in the churches, and so go on to the mystical thanksgivings, and are sanctified, having received his holy Flesh and the Precious blood of Christ the Savior of us all. And not as common flesh do we receive it... but as truly life-giving and the very flesh of the word himself... for neither is he, the one and only Christ, to be thought of as double, although of two (ἐκ δύο) and they diverse, yet he has joined them in an indivisible union, just as everyone knows a man is not double although made up of soul and body, but is one of both. α

Anti-Nestorian Polemic: Theotokos

I. Cyril: If anyone will not confess that the Emmanuel is very God, and that therefore the Holy Virgin is the Mother of God (theotokos), inasmuch as in the flesh she bore the Word of God made flesh [as it is written, ‘The Word was made flesh’]: let him be anathema. β

α NPNF, S2 Vol XIV, pp. 202-204
β Ibid., p. 206
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Nestorius: “If anyone says that Emmanuel is true God, and not rather God with us, that is, that he has united himself to a like nature with ours, which he assumed from the Virgin Mary, and dwelt in it; and if anyone calls Mary the Mother of God the Word, and not rather mother of him who is Emmanuel; and if he maintains that God the Word has changed himself into the flesh, which he only assumed in order to make his Godhead visible, and to be found in form as a man, let him be anathema.

318. Unitary Subject Christology: Cyril’s Use of Hypostasis

II. Cyril: “If anyone shall not confess that the Word of God Father is united hypostatically to flesh, and that with that flesh his own, he is one only Christ both God and man at the same time: let him be anathema.” α

Nestorius: “If anyone asserts that, at the union of the Logos with the flesh, the divine Essence moved from one place to another; or says that the flesh is capable of receiving the divine nature, and that it has been partially united with the flesh; or ascribes to the flesh by reason of its reception of God, an extension to the infinite and boundless, and says that God and man are one and the same nature; let him be anathema.” β

Excursus: Nestorius’ Anti-Apollinarian Polemic and Cyril’s Anathema:

The Apollinarian doctrine, as well as the Eutychian, implies that only flesh without the soul is involved in the Incarnation. This is the basis for maintaining, on the one hand, that the Word moves (for it receives the flesh’s properties of temporality) and on the other that the flesh receives the ubiquity of the Word. All of this is to suggest that the ordo theologiae would be entirely overturned, since the basis of distinguishing the natures,
the separate sets of energies, become confused.

**Excursus on Lutheran Consubstantiation:**

Nestorius controverts the idea that the *perichoresis* which results form the union means that the divine nature in Christ communicates its energy of ubiquity to the human nature and that the human nature therefore becomes ubiquitous. This is the Lutheran explanation for the real presence of the body and blood in the Eucharist. Notably, Cyril denies that there is any such understanding of the *perichoresis* or of the hypostatic union itself. Nevertheless, the bread and wine are truly body and blood, and these in turn are truly life-giving, because the *hypostasis* underlying them is the Word and one and the same.

319. **Dual Subject Christology**

**III. Cyril:** “If anyone shall after the [hypostatic] union divide the hypostases in the one Christ, joining them by the connection alone, which happens according to worthiness, or even authority and power, and not rather by a coming together (συνοδος), which is made by natural union (ενωσιν φυσικην); let him be the anathema.”

320. **The Unitary Subject Underlies all Scriptural Expressions: Ordo Theologiae and Christology**

**IV. Cyril:** “If anyone shall divide between two persons or subsistence those expressions which are contained in the Evangelical and

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*Ibid., p. 211*

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Apostolical writings, or which have been said concerning Christ by the Saints, or by himself, and shall apply some to him as to a man separate from the Word of God, and shall apply others to the only Word of God the Father, on the ground that they are fit to be applied to God: let him be anathema."  

Nestorius: “If any one assigns the expressions of the Gospels and Apostolic letters, which refer to the two natures of Christ, to one only of those natures, and even ascribes suffering to the divine Word, both in the flesh and in the Godhead; let him be anathema.”  

The whole Nestorian debate is really over the applicability of the ordo which was used to successfully since the Apostolic period in Triadology to Christology. It will be noted that both men, in their fourth anathema, perceive the Christological issue to have profound consequences for the exegesis of Scripture.

Nestorius “God-Bearing Manhood” no different than the indwelling of the Saints

V. Cyril: “If anyone shall dare to say that the Christ is a Theophorus [that is, God-bearing] man and not rather that he is very God, as an only Son through nature, because ‘the Word was made flesh,’ and ‘hath a share in the flesh and blood as we do:’ let him be anathema.”  

Nestorius: “If any one venture to say that, even after the assumption of human nature, there is only one Son of God, namely, he who is so in nature, while he (since the assumption of the flesh) is certainly Emmanuel, let him be anathema.”  

One has only to read the anathema of these two men on this one point to conclude how ridiculous is Anastos’ assertion that Nestorius’...

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doctrine was Orthodox!

322. **Nestorius’ Dual Subject Christology Implies that the Word is Superior to the Person of the Assumed Man: The Anathema Against Dual Subject Christology**

VI. **Cyril:** “If anyone shall dare say that the Word of God the Father is the God of Christ or the Lord of Christ, and shall not father confess him as at the same time both God and man, since according to the Scriptures, ‘The Word was made flesh’: let him be anathema.”

**Nestorius:** “If anyone, after the incarnation calls another Christ than the Word, and ventures to say that the form of a servant is equally with the Word of God, without beginning and uncreated, and not rather that it is made by him as its natural Lord and Creator and God, and that he has promised top raise it again in the words: ‘Destroy this temple and in three days I will build it up again; let him be anathema.”

VII. **Cyril:** “If anyone shall say that Jesus as man is only energized by the Word of God and that the glory of the only begotten is attributed to him as something not properly his: let him be anathema.”

**Nestorius:** “If any one says that the man who was formed of the Virgin is the only-begotten, who was born from the bosom of the Father, before the morning star was, and does not rather confess that he has obtained the designation of Only-begotten on account of his connection with him who in nature is the only begotten of the Father; and besides if any one calls another than the Emmanuel Christ; let him be anathema.”

323. **Nestorius’ Dual Subject Christology Distorts the Proper Understanding of the Miracles of Christ and Thereby the Recapitulation:**

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Íbid., p. 213

α Íbid., p. 213

β Íbid., p. 213

γ Íbid., pp. 213-214
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VIII. Cyril: If anyone shall dare say that the assumed man ought to be worshipped together with God the Word and glorified together with him, and recognized together with him as God, and yet as two different things, the one with the other (for this ‘Together with’ is added to convey this meaning); and shall not rather with one adoration worship the Emmanuel and pay to him one glorification as [it is written] ‘The Word was made flesh’: let him be anathema.”

Nestorius: “If any one says that the form of a servant should, for its own sake, that is, in reference to its own nature, by reverenced, and that it is the ruler of all things, and not rather that [merely] on account of its connection with the holy and in itself universally-ruling nature of the Only-begotten, it is to be reverenced; let him be anathema.” ε

The aspect of Miracles plays an important and crucial role note only in the subsequent Monophysite Christology, but plays a similar role in the historiography of Barthian “Neo-Orthodoxy” as well, as we shall see.

324. Nestorius’ Dual Subject Christology, the Atonement, and the Eucharistic Sacrifice: Sacramental Nestorianism

IX. Cyril: Whosoever shall say that it is not the divine Word himself, when he was made flesh and had become man as we are, but another than he, a man born of a woman, yet different from him, who is become our great High Priest and apostle; or if any man shall say that he offered himself in sacrifice for himself and not rather for us, whereas, being without sin, he had no need of offering or sacrifice: let him be anathema.” α

Nestorius: “If any one maintains that the Word, who is from the beginning, has become the high priest and apostle of our confession, and has offered himself for us, and does not rather say that it is the work of

ε Ibid.
α Ibid., p. 216
Emmanuel to be an apostle; and if any one in such a manner divides the sacrifice between him who united [the Word] and him who was united [the manhood] referring it to a common sonship, that is, not giving to God that which is God's and to man that which is man's; let him be anathema."  

**Dual Subject Christology and the Eucharistic Real Presence:**  
"Sacramental Nestorianism":

X. Cyril: Whosoever shall not confess that the flesh of the Lord giveth life and that it pertains to the Word of God the Father as his very own, but shall pretend that it belongs to another person who is united to him [i.e., the Word] only according to honour, and who has served as a dwelling for the divinity; and shall not rather confess, as we say, that that flesh giveth life because it is that of the Word who giveth life to all: let him be anathema."  

Nestorius: "If any one maintains that the flesh which is united with God the Word is by the power of its own nature life-giving, whereas the Lord himself says, 'It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing', let him be anathema."  

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**The Meaning of Christ**: Dual Subject vs. Unitary Subject Christology

IX. Cyril: "If any man shall say that the one Lord Jesus Christ was glorified by the Holy Ghost, so that he used through him a power not his own and from him received power against unclean spirits and power to work miracles before men and shall not rather confess that it was his own spirit through which he worked these divine signs; let him be anathema."  

Nestorius: "If anyone says that the form of a servant is of life

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*β* Ibid.  
*γ* Ibid., p. 217  
*α* Ibid., p. 217  
*β* Ibid., 214-215
nature with the Holy Ghost, and not rather that it owes its union with the Word which has existed since the conception, to his mediation, by which it works miraculous healing among men, and possesses the power of expelling demons; let him be anathema.”

One notes that what St. Cyril is getting at here is that the name “Christ” itself will be redefined, ala the Gnostic tactic of assigning new meanings to traditional terms, according to the dictates of the Nestorian metaphysical system.

Dual Subject Christology, The Theopaschite Formula and Scriptures

XI. Cyril: “Whosoever shall not recognize that the Word of God suffered in the flesh, that he was crucified in the flesh, and that likewise in that same flesh he tasted death and that he is become the first-begotten of the dead, for, as he is God, he is the life and it is he that giveth life; let him be anathema.”

Nestorius: “If anyone, in confessing, the sufferings of the flesh, ascribes these also to the Word of God as to the flesh in which he appeared, and thus does not distinguish the dignity of the natures; let him be anathema.”

NPNF S2 XIV, pp. 264-265

Ibid., p. 55
Ibid., p. 66

\( ^7 \) Ibid., 215
\( ^\delta \) Ibid., p. 217
\( ^a \) Ibid., p. 217
The First European historian in view is Rev. Archpriest John Meyendorff, who coined the phrase “Cyrillic Chalcedonianism” or “Cyrillism” to offset the tendency to understand Neo-Chalcedonianism as a genuine novelty and departure from the Chalcedonian faith. Meyendorff writes: “If, as it seems, an impartial examination of the Acts of Chalcedon proves them right, neo-Chalcedonianism must be considered not as a disavowal of Chalcedon but as a return to true Chalcedonianism.” Then, this observation in hand, he goes on to suggest a profound implication of the debate for the manner in which Chalcedon was received and interpreted in the East and the West: “The importance of the debate must be emphasized, since it concerns the very meaning of the Chalcedonian definition and, by implication, all later theological developments in both East and West.”

What Fr. Meyendorff suggests is that when the Chalcedonian definition is read within the proper patristic ordo theologiae, one will read it as emphasizing the “Cyrillic” or unitary subject Christology, for precisely the reason that the patristic ordo starts from the hypostasis, and one will accordingly read Chalcedonian definition as being less a definition of the two natures and more a definition of the one hypostasis of union. If, conversely, one starts from the inverted ordo theologiae of Augustinian

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β John Meyendorff, *Christ in Eastern Christian Thought* (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press), p. 31

γ Ibid.
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triadology, essence, attributes, person, one will read the Chalcedonian definition in the opposite sense from which it was intended, i.e., as a definition more of the two natures of Christ and less of the hypostasis of their union.

With this observation, however, goes a corollary that is, unfortunately, all too often missed by the Orthodox participants in the Orthodox-Monophysite dialogues, and that is: If the Monophysites accused the Orthodox at some point of having departed from the Faith of St. Cyril and the Third Oecumenical Council of Ephesus, then that must mean that there was something present in their wider theological structure or ordo theologiae that led them to interpret the Chalcedonian definition as Nestorian in intent and content.

340. “Neo-Chalcedonianism” appears as a phrase to designate the dialectical assumptions of the Second Europe’s historiography of doctrine, for it denotes the fact that a certain body of its scholars understood the Fifth Oecumenical Council to be a “reaction” against Chalcedon, a “correction” to its alleged Nestorian impulses. Thus, the history of doctrines can be read in some circles of this historiography as precisely a series of dialectical movements.

343. Gray, op. cit. p. 5, emphasis in the original.
345. Ibid., Actio III: 24, A.C.O. II, 1:2 Schwartz II: 1:2, pp. 81-82.
347. Ibid, Actio III:26 A.C.O. II:1:2, Schwartz, p. 82
348. Ibid, Actio III:24-26 A.C.O. II:1:2, Schwartz, pp. 81-82
349. Patrick Gray, cp. cit., p. 10
Kenotic Christology as such is primarily associated with the theories of Bishop Gore in England and Thomasius in Germany. The basic theory is that the subject of the “emptying” and “humbling” is the eternal Son and Logos, Who, in order to become man, renounced His deity, which in the hands of these theories, means in effect the renunciation of certain of attributes, namely, omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence. Cf. George S. Henry, “Christology,” Dictionary of Christian Theology, ed, Alan Richardson (Philadelphia, Westminster Press), p. 60

After the second century, canon law required at least three bishops to be present for consecration, two being acceptable if consent from a third bishop could be obtained. This was done in order to ensure transmission of succession. Consecration by two bishops is not invalid, but is considered irregular. The objection to Timothy’s consecration may be due to a possible lack of a third bishop’s consent’s to the consecration. In any case, canonical issues aside, the real problem with Timothy was his doctrine.

Zachariah, Syriac Chronicle IV:11, cited in Gray, op. cit., p. 24
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Following in all things the decisions of the Holy Fathers, and acknowledging the canon, which has been just read, of the One Hundred and Fifty Bishops beloved-of-God (who assembled in the imperial city of Constantinople, which is New Rome, in the time of the Emperor Theodosius of happy memory), we also do enact and decree the same things concerning the privileges of the most holy church of Constantinople, which is New Rome. For the Fathers rightly granted privileges to the throne of old Rome, because it was the royal city. And the One Hundred and Fifty most religious Bishops, actuated by the same consideration, have equal privileges (ισα πρεσβεια) to the most holy throne of New Rome, justly judging that the city which is honoured with the Sovereignty and the Senate, and enjoys equal privileges with the old imperial Rome, should in ecclesiastical matters also be magnified as she is, and rank next after her…

362. “Diptych” is a two-sided folder or book in which were inscribed the names of Christians, living and departed, for whom prayers were offered during the Liturgy. In the case of Bishops, the diptychs indicated those with whom one is in communion, and a bishop’s removal from the diptychs indicated that he has considered out of communion with the Church.

363. Gray, op. cit., p. 50

364. Gray, op. cit., p. 52

365. Pope St. Agapitos was Pope from 535-536, when he reposed. He was a champion of the Chalcedonian and Cyrillic Orthodoxy, and visited Constantinople in the year of his death, where he was subjected to intense pressure from the Emperor Justinian and Empress Theodora to be less unyielding on the Monophysite question. He nevertheless deposed Patriarch Anthimus for his Monophysitism and consecrated means as his successor.

366. PG 83:1265A; 1279B; 1304 A; 1317 A
Theodore of Cyrus, *Demonstratio per Syllogismus*, PG 83:322D:

η....κατὰ τὸν ἀντὶς λόγον ἡ ζωὴ θνητὴ τῷς ἢν ἣς σάρξ ἢ Φυσεὶ θνητὴ διὰ τὴν ζωὴν γινομένην ζωοποιίας μειώᾳ ἢν οὕσα ζωοποιίας; Ἡ... Ἀλλὰς Θεὸς Λόγος Φυσεὶ αθανατος ἡ ἢς σάρξ Φυσεὶ θνητὴ Γεγονὲ ἢς καὶ αὐτῇ μετὰ τὸ πάθος τῇ πρὸς τὸν Λόγον μετουσία αθανατος Πως οὕς οὐν οὐ χειὶ λίπουν τὸν τῇ τοιαύτῃ θανάσιας δότηρα λεγεὶν μετείληχενει ἵσθριζομενοι, επικαθάσθωσαν τῷ βρῆτο τῇ διαωοιαν καὶ εἰ μὲν θαναὶ τολμήσαιεν, ὡς τοῦ σώματος προσήλωσενος τῇ διαωοιαν ἡ θεῖς Φυσίς υπεμεινε μανθανετεσὰς ὡς οὐ ψυχὴς χρειὰν ἡ θεία Φυσίς ἔπλησεν, καὶ θανάξῃ γαρ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἀνείληφει εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ὡς ἠθανατος ἀποστρεφοῦντο· Φησαῖν ἡν ἡ δείγας θανάσιας τὸν τῇ θεον λόγον ἐκεῖσθαι τῷ πάθος ὡς ἕδικας σάρκος μὴ γρίφωδες καὶ ζοφωδεὶς προφέρεσαι τῇ διανοιαν...

Theodore of Cyrus, *Epistle CXXX*, PG 83:1344:

Τὸν γαρ ἡ Ἐκκλησία καὶ Υἱὸν, καὶ Μονογενῆ, καὶ θεον Λόγον, καὶ Σωτῆρα Κυρίον, καὶ Σωτῆρα Κυρίον, καὶ Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν οἰκομαζέι. Λλλ ίους μὲν μονογενῆς, καὶ θεος Λόγος, καὶ Κυρίος, καὶ τρὶς τῆς οἰκομαζέως ωνομαζότο, καὶ μετα, καὶ μετα τῇ οἰκομαζέων ο αὐτος ωνομαζῇ, απὸ τῶν πραγμάτων τὰς προσηγορίας δεξάμενος.

Gray, op. cit., p. 84.

K. McNamara, “Theodore of Cyrus and the Unity of the Person in Christ.” *Irish Theological Quarterly* 22 (1955), p. 31. cf. also PG 83:504G-505A; Acts 2:25-28; Ps 16:8-11: “…in the tomb with the body...” etc.

Gray, op. cit., pp. 86

Ibid., p. 87

Cf. McNamara, op. cit., pp. 87-88
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374. Gray, op. cit., pp. 87-88

375. It is generally conceded that the authentic works of Leontius of Byzantium are: *Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos* PG 86:1268B-1357A, *Adversus Nestorianos* PG 86:1400A-1768B, *Contra Monophysitas* PG 86:1769-1901A, *Adversus Severum* PG 86:1901A-1916B. *Epilypsis* PG 86:1916C-1945D. Interestingly enough, Leontius of Byzantium is one of the few ecclesiastical writers to have been subjected to the “statistical criticism” that is all the latest craze of critics.

376. PG 86:1269A-B.
377. Ibid., 1276D-14
378. PG 86:1276D-1277A
380. PG 86:1281C4-5.
381. Gray, op. cit., p. 97
382. PG 86:1309 C
384. Ibid
385. Ibid., p. 102.
386. Photius, *Bibliotheka*, II:23-26
387. Ibid., II:22-26.
388. 1Corinthians 2:8 CITE
389. Photius, *Bibliotheka* II.
391. Ibid., p. 111; cf. also PG 86:
392. PG 86:1560A
393. “ανιδυποστασις”: The term is my own, designates “that which is without a hypostasis of its own nature, but which is
enhypostasized in the hypostasis of another nature."

394. This is Leontius’ own term: cf. PG 86:1556A.

395. PG 86:1485C-D.

396. Gray, op. cit., p. 131

397. Ibid., p. 132.

398. PG 86L1485C-D.

399. Διαυποστασις: again, the term is my own, and means “that which is ‘through’ the hypostasis,” namely the περιζωπησις.

400. The Confession of Right Faith, 1:20.


403. Severus of Antioch, Homily CXXV, PO 29:236, cited in Chesnut, op. cit., p. 11


405. Chesnut, op. cit., p. 29.


407. Georges Florovsky, “The Spirit of Monophysitism,” Collected Works of Georges of Florovsky, Vol. IX., The Byzantine Fathers of the Sixth to Eighth Century, p. 43. Florovsky writes, on p. 39, that “to certain extent, there is a similarity between Monophysitism and Augustinianism – the human is pushed into the background and, as it were, suppressed by the Divine.” (p.39) Nor it is an accident, he says, “that Monophysitism was so closely connected with ascetic fanaticism, with ascetic self-torture and emotional violence. Nor it is an accident that Origenistic motifs of a universal apokatastasis were once again revived in Monophysite circles. In
this regard the lone image of the Syrian mystic Stephen bar-Sudhaile and his doctrine about universal restoration and a final ‘consubstantiality’ of all creatures with God is significant.” (p. 43)


410. Ibid., p. 111.

411. Ibid., p. 112.

412. NPNF S2 XIV p. 308.

413. Ibid., pp. 308-309.

414. Ibid., p. 309.

415. Specifically, St. Maximus understands the *filioque* as teaching an economic procession, or rather, sending, of the Spirit into the world through the Son (διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ), and not an eternal procession *from* the Son as from the Father, which is how he seems to understand the “que” in *filioque*, indicating a rather sophisticated understanding of the Latin. Cf. *TheoPol* 10: PG 91:136AB.


419. Cf. note 499 for Augustine’s handling of the “things within our power” (τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν) and its place within the wider context of his anti-Pelagian polemic.

420. The idea of a “synthetic” or “theanthropic” will was suggested
by the language of St. Dionysius the Aereopagite, who in his fourth epistle referred to “a certain new theandric energy” (καινὴν τινα την Θεανδρικῆν ενεργείαν).”

421. A comparison of the *Ekthesis* with the “Agreed Statements” of the Orthodox-Monophysite dialogues will reveal the tactic of “quietly dropping” or agreeing not to discuss unwanted difficulties.


423. Ibid.


426. Lethel, L’Agonie du Christ, p. 43.

427. Ibid.

428. St. Maximus the Confessor, *Disputation with Pyrrhus*, PG 91:292B.

429. Ibid.

430. Ibid., PG 91:292B

431. Careful study of the Confessor’s *Opuscula Theologica et Polemica* will show that one of his principal concerns is precisely with the trinitarian implications of monotheletism.

432. St. Maximus the Confessor, *Disputation with Pyrrhus*, PG 91:293D.

433. The historiographical difficulties posed by the dogma of papal infallibility are surveyed on pp. 677-692 in the main text.

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a St. Dionysius the Aeropagite, *Epistle 4*: PG 3:1072
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI: THE DECONSTRUCTION OF PAGAN CULTURAL AUTONOMY: IKONOCLASM AND THE SYNODIKON OF ORTHODOXY


436. Ibid., p. 103.

437. “Ikonodules” are so-called because they rendered service and veneration to the ikons.


440. Ibid.


443. Hebrews 1:3 “… who being the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person, and upholding all things by the word of his power, when he had by himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high…”


445. Ibid., p. 117.

446. This in turn means that the essence of the iconoclastic dispute was in part of debate over the historical context-specificity of Christian worship, for again, no mere abstract God-in-general was the object of that worship, but the very specific Son of God Incarnate. Who had a unique history, and historical ancestry? Pelikan puts this points this way: “The real issue, as the iconophiles saw it, was the reality of the history of Christ, which the icons sought to portray. As the Christology of Cyril of Alexandria had been preoccupied with ‘the concrete scenes of the
God, History, and Dialectic

Gospel," so the iconophile argument hinged on the identity of content between the verbal and pictorial descriptions of such scenes." (Pelikan, The Spirit of Eastern Christendom, p. 130.)

447. Exodus 20:4: “Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth…”

448. While Irene’s government attempted to portray her in this fashion, the constitutional issue was the subject of internal tensions which ultimately led to a coup d’etat against her, led by the logothete of the Treasury, the future Emperor Nikephoros I.

449. The idea of the symphony has been criticized for its “ambiguity”. But a glimpse at the ikongraphy relating to the Christian imperium, both East and West, will give some indication of why the ambiguity was both necessary and intentional. In Byzantine iconography, very often the Emperors are depicted as offering the Church (in the form of a specific Church edifice), to Christ. The Emperors have their authority over the Empire largely in order to preserve the peace of the Church. Thus, there is not an authority over the Church, nor even necessarily in it, but, so to speak, around it. This is, so to speak, the interior aspect of the symphony. The external aspect of it is that of two coordinated (and hopefully, coordinating) hierarchies, the imperial and the ecclesiastical, both coordinating their policies in accordance with the Divine Son, Word, and Wisdom, Jesus Christ.

Notably, it is in the West, during the pontificate of Leo III, that the exterior aspect of this symphony receives graphic portrayal in the icons that Pope Leo III commissions. A famous icon has Christ delivering the keys to Leo, and the sword to Charlemagne. There is no notion of plenitude potestas of the papacy in this icon, which would encompass both ecclesiastical and temporal power. The dialectical inversion of this, which will occur once the filioque is accepted in Rome itself, is that the
fullness of power will proceed from God to the papacy, and the temporal power of the state will proceed from God and the papacy.

450. There were many instances in East Roman history of influential Empresses before, and after Irene. Justinian’s wife, Theodora, is of course the most famous.


453. The whole development of the formulation of Christological doctrine can thus be seen to be in deliberate protection of one principle, namely, that the Old Testament is primarily the revelation of God the Son. Thus, the tremendous implications of the patristic *ordo theologiae* become evident, for if thus *ordo* be born in mind when, for instance, one reads the Chalcedonian definition of faith, the primary emphasis is understood to be that the definition is referring to the eternal *Person* of the incarnate Son and Word, thus, references to Christ’s human nature are not references to an abstracted “humanity” devoid of specific history and ancestry, and this is in part, what the confession “perfect man” is intended to indicate. Conversely, if one reads it from the point of view of the inversion of the *ordo* that results from Augustinism i.e., from a *starting point* in abstractions of essences, then attributes, and then the particularized manifestation in particular persons, the Chalcedonian definition will be read in a quasi-Nestorian sense, as a confession primarily about Christ’s two *natures*, and the Cyrillic character and “historical context-specificity” of the definition will be lost or obscured.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VII: THE DIALECTICAL GOD OF AUGUSTINISM AND THE INVERSION OF THE PATRISTIC ORDO THEOLOGIAE

455 James Orr, The Progress of Dogma, p. 131.
457 Augustino Trapé, IV Quasten, P.342
458 Ibid., p. 351
459 Ibid., p. 354. Prof. Trapé also observes that the Roman Catholic magisterium “has followed no other theological author in its decisions as much as Augustine, even for the doctrine of grace.”(p.354). Indeed, this is true, and the ultimate source of the Second Europe’s elevation of itself to canonical status as the measure of Christian civilization.
460 For this point, cf. Vladimir Lossky, In the Image and Likeness of God, p.88:

By the dogma of the Filioque, the God of the philosophers and savants is introduced into the heart of the Living God, taking the place of the Deus absconditus, qui posuit tenebras latibulum suum. The unknowable essence of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit receives positive qualifications. It becomes the object of natural theology: we get ‘God in general,’ who could be the god of Descartes, or the god of Leibnitz, or
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even perhaps, to some extent, the god of Voltaire and of the dechristianized Deists of the eighteenth century.

Lossky’s statement is, of course, entirely the purpose of these essays. His statements belong to the heritage of the profoundly insightful intuitions of the Slavophilic philosophers of the nineteenth century. By calling them intuitions, I do not mean to do an injustice to them, for what their intuitions lacked was a documented presentation of the historical derivation of Descartes, Leibnitz, Hegel, et. al. from the Augustinian ordo. While I do not deal with Leibnitz and Descartes in this first volume, Hegel’s derivation from the filioquism of Augustine is treated in Part 3.

463 Ibid., pp. 99-100:

In the city of God (Augustine) congratulates (the Platonists) for having understood that “God is not a body...” that is to say, for rising above all sensible objects to the incomprehensible, ineffable simplicity of one in whom being, knowledge, love, and life are all identified. He was stirred to a keen appreciation of this extreme simplicity of the supreme One and made it the foundation stone of his theodicy. (Emphasis added)

Note that Portalie indicated that Augustine’s understanding of the simplicity is not theological and symbolic, as it was for the Cappadocians. It is definitional, and leads to the metaphysical identifications that typified the doctrine in the hands of a Plotinus and Origen.

465 St. Augustine of Hippo, *On the Trinity*, 4:20:29, emphasis mine. Augustine is still very much inclined to the older theology, as is evident from this statement. By the time of Hincmar of Reims, however, the
monarchy has begun to fade, and the essence itself takes over as the almost exclusive basis of the unity of the Trinity: “The Unity of the Trinity is the incorporeal deity.” a This approach will actually lead Joachim of Fiore to accuse Peter Llombard of the heresy of “quaternity”, as we shall see in our examination of Joachimism.

466 Ibid., 7:6:11
467 Ibid., 7:4:8
468 Ibid 2:10:18
468a But one example of this tradition of natural theology may be glimpsed in the “ontologist” tradition leading from Augustine to Anselm, Descartes, and Sir Isaac Newton(!). We may outline the development of this tradition by noting the salient steps of its logic:

(1) The divine essence is simple absolutely in the neoplatonic sense;
(2) All multiplicities or attributes of God are therefore identified;
(3) Therefore, essence, truth, and existence in God are identified;
(4) Therefore, one cannot doubt one’s own existence, since it comes from God (St. Augustine, City of God, XL 26);
(5) Therefore, God must exist since the dialectic implies a simplicity beyond the multiplicity of the world and all dichotomy of essence and existence (Anselm, Prologion);
(6) Therefore, if one thinks one must perforce exist, since radical doubt leads to this conclusion (Descartes, Meditations, II);
(7) Therefore, God is simple, and absolute, extension (Sir Isaac Newton, On the Gravity and Equilibrium of Fluids) or simply, “The All” (Porphyry, Isagoge)
(8) Therefore, all entities deriving from the Simplicity are equally simple “monads”, and the system multiplies entities below (Leibnitz, Monadology

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1-6) and above (lamblichus) the One.

(9) Therefore, Christ, as being involved in the world of multiplicity, only expresses partially the truths of the divine simplicity in the recurrence of the “fractional theology of the Logos (cf. Leibnitz, Theodicy37: “Christ alone expressed them divinely well and in such a clear and familiar way, that the most crude minds came to understand them”; or cf. also the nineteenth century kenoticists, etc etc etc)”

469 St. Augustine, On the Trinity 7:1:2.
470 Portalie, op. cit., p. 128.
471 Paul Tillich, A History of Christian Thought, p. 51
472 St. Augustine of Hippo, On the Trinity, 8:1:2
473 Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles I: Q 73 and Q 74.

Predestination and foreknowledge, if one hold the divine simplicity in the Neoplatonic definitional sense, are a blurring of theology and economy, whether or not one starts with predestination in the ordo theologiae (supre-lapsarianism) or with foreknowledge (infra-lapsarianism), since both variations occur only at the second stage of the ordo, i.e., the attributes. The starting place remains the same: the essence. Moreover, every argument for the eternal procession of the Spirit from the Son in eternity based upon the sending of the Spirit through the Son in eternity based upon the sending of the Spirit through the Son in the Economy is precisely such a confusion of Theology and Economy, and a massive reinterpretation of texts.

475 St. Augustine of Hippo, Ad Romanos Expositio 8:29.
478 Ibid., p. 132.
480 Portalie, op.cit.,p.131.
The term godhead or θεότης thus becomes separated from the Trinitarian Persons and the historical context-specificity of the Scriptures by dint of the Augustinian *ordo theologiae*. One interesting sideline on this is that it appears to be precisely *this* intellectualized and Gnosticized construct of the Trinity which Jehovah’s Witnesses appear to be contesting (latching into the opposing heresy of Subordinationalism and Arianism). I have talked to two converts to Holy Orthodoxy from that sect, and this is what they have told me.


[author numbered for a note, but never added it to the manuscript]

Ibid., 7:3:5.

Ibid., 15:27:47.


Ibid., 5:11:12.

Ibid., 15:27:50.


Bonaventura, CITE


This observation, I believe, has been made by some of the so-called “evangelical Orthodox” within the Antiochian Archdiocese. It is an important and timely observation.

St. Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine*, 40

St. Augustine, *On the Trinity* 5: 8: 10: “(The Greeks) indeed use also the word hypostasis; but they intend to put a difference, I know not what, between υσια and hypstasis: so that most of ourselves who treat these things in the Greek language, are accustomed to say, μιαν υσιαν
Once the door is opened to understanding the symbols of Trinitarian theology according to the conceptual and logical implications of Neoplatonism, then massive consequences also ensue for the interpretation of texts, a famous example of which is the persistent interpretation of St. Dionysius the Areopagite by the Second Europe as a Neoplatonist in very thin and skimpy Christian clothing. John Scotus Eriugena and Boethius, of course, do not help matters much, since they very much are Christian Neoplatonists, much more so than is Augustine. Indeed, it is Augustine, not Boethius or Eriugena, and certainly not Dionysius (who is not a Neoplatonist at all), who is the most Christian of the Christian Neoplatonists, and this is the true origin of the conflicts and tensions so in evidence throughout his theology. This ambiguity makes all the more difficult the proper reception by the Second Europe of statements such as Eriugena’s “true philosophy is true revelation, and vice versa”, since this could be understood in the sense that the Apologists would have understood it, or in the far more radical sense that some circles came to understand it.

cf. the works of such “biblical” evangelical theologians as Lewis Sperry Chafer, founder and first president of Dallas Theological Seminary, well-noted for its “pre-tribulationalist” dispensationalism. There, the Augustinian ordo theologiae is prefaced with a volume on “Bibliology”, i.e., on the propositional and infallible character of Biblical revelation of the intelligible God-construct of the ordo. Similar “prolegomena” occur of course in Aquinas’s Summa Theologica with the discussion of whether or not Theology is a science, and if so, in what sense, etc.

The theme of cultural philosophical pluralism is a major theme for Roman Catholic authors such as Bernard Lonergan, Karl Rahner, S.J., and the always arid David Tracy.

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles I: Q 73 and Q 74.
Augustine states that “the most illustrious light of predestination and grace is the Saviour Himself – the Mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus. And pray, (by) what preceding merits of its own, whether by works or of faith, did the human nature which is in Him procure for itself that it should be this?” α The subtlety “Nestorian” tinge to this passage cannot be gainsaid, and indeed, it focuses itself more clearly, since it became one of the foundations of the Spanish Adoptionism, for Felix of Urgel could assert that if Christ in His humanity was the son of God by grace and not by nature, then “He was adopted by the Father in that (nature) according to which He was the son of David, but not in that (nature) according to which He exists as Lord.” β

EXCURSUS ON ST. AUGUSTINE’S ANTI-PELAGIAN POLEMIC

A. The Manichaean and Neoplatonic Background

It is in his doctrine of predestination that all the seeds of Neoplatonic simplicity and dialectic sown in his doctrine of the Trinity have sprouted the most fecund and obvious growths. The dialectical framework of Augustine’s controversy with Pelagius are obvious to all.

In the checkered history of the philosophical speculation about the dialectical relation between free will and necessity, and thus of the (related, though not identical) theological speculation about the dialectical relation between nature and grace, Augustine occupies a fortunate place-

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or, as he would certainly have preferred to say, a providential place...What makes Augustine almost unique is that in the course of his lifetime he had the opportunity and the obligation to face equal threats from both poles of the dialectic—not indeed simultaneously, but successively. For first as an adherent of the deterministic theories of Manicheism and then as an opponent of those theories, he spent more than a decade of his early adult life confronting what he perceived to be an exclusive emphasis on necessity; and he spent more than a decade at the end of his life contending against what he believed to be a grave excess of generosity toward free will in the theories of his Pegaism opponents. And he therefore formulated his own theories about free will and necessity in the setting of detailed attention both to the continuity and the discontinuity between nature and grace. He did so successively, but that does not automatically guarantee that he did so successfully; but that does not automatically guarantee that he did so successfully; indeed, his opponents on all sides were quite sure that he had not been successful.\(^a\)

St. Augustine's formulation of the doctrine of nature and grace in the framework of a theory of predestination is the most personal, and novel, of all his theological work. "It was the most personal," says Portalie,

Because he was the first to synthesize the great theories of the fall, grace, and freedom of choice and still more because he has offered a profound explanation to reconcile them, truly his own since no trace of it is found in his predecessors. Thus the word *Augustinian* has commonly been reserved to designate Augustine's system of grace, not his entire teaching.\(^b\)

As Augustine struggled with Pelagianism, his emphasis became more and

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\(^a\) Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Mystery of Continuity: Time, History, Memory and Eternity in the thought of Saint Augustine*, pp. 69-70

\(^b\) Portalie, op. cit., p. 177
more rigorously focused upon the irresistibility of grace and the immutable, and inscrutable, “mystery” of predestination. All doctrines, as we shall see, came to be subsumed to the theory he adopted.

Yet even here Augustine is ambiguous. One would err in seeing his theory in merely philosophical terms. As will be immediately evident from the texts we have chosen for examination, he is greatly concerned to explicate predestination and grace from a Christological, ecclesiological, and sacramental framework. Nevertheless, the question will remain whether or not he correctly appropriated those frameworks to the exposition of these doctrines.

In this, the background of his doctrine of God must be born in mind, indeed, must be the ultimate point of departure for any examination of his doctrine.

For when Augustine moves from his defense of the institutional church, its episcopate and tradition, to his description of the eternal church, known only to God in his predestinating will but nevertheless real and in fact the only ‘really real’ church, it is unavoidable to hear the accents of his early and continuing Neoplatonism. Although, in The City of God and elsewhere, he conceded that there was in the thought of Plato ‘considerable agreement with the truth of our religion.’

Indeed, if everything in the final analysis was subsumed to predestination, “why bother at all with the church, with its episcopate or its sacraments?” It certainly is true that Augustine meant by predestination something very different than his later interpreters meant, or that even he himself meant later in the controversy, when his own position became more problematical, for throughout the bulk of his writings on Pelagianism, not only does God predestine man, but He predestines man through baptism,

α Pelikan, op. cit., p. 104
β Ibid., p. 101
γ Pelikan, op. pp.70-71
the sacraments, and the Church, and therefore, through Christ.

Nevertheless, the dialectic which so attended his exposition of the doctrine of God, the simplicity which obscured the distinction of person and nature in practice if not in Augustine’s own piety, makes its presence felt in his exposition of original sin, and in the dialectical treatment he accords Christ’s two natures. This dialectical treatment of the doctrine of predestination and free will, of nature and grace, was to lead even some of his orthodox friends, equally opposed to Pelagianism, to suspect him of a subtle form of Manicheanism. Indeed, there is a continuity of method in his refutations of Manichaeanism and Pelagianism, for at the center of both is once again, the definition of the divine essence of God in terms of the simplicity, in terms of the absolute identity of existence and essence in God.\(^7\)

This identity and simplicity allows Augustine to combat the Manichaean opposition between the Old and New Testaments on metaphysical grounds. Thus, against Manichaean insistence that the physical creation was the work of the Evil Principle opposed to God, Augustine could assert that “What ever is...must be either God or the creature.” In the ultimate and unambiguous sense of the verb ‘to be; of course, only God could be said to be’. The word to Moses from the burning bush, ‘I am that I am,’ implied that only God ‘truly is, because he is unchangeable. For every change makes what was not to be; therefore [only] he truly is who is unchangeable.’\(^a\) But this, of course, is to lock both God and created being within a framework of Being itself. Again, the abstract conception of being as conceived by neoplatonism is taking precedence over the Trinitarian revelation of God. The effects of this ordo, the now familiar Augustinian ordo of Essence, Attributes, and Persons, will only become apparent in a detailed examination of his anti-Pelagian writings.

\(^a\) Ibid., p. 72
B. The Fall of Adam

1. Death as a Sentence, the Opposition of Nature and Grace

In this words addressed to the Corinthians: ‘By man came death, and by man came also the resurrection of the dead; for as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive,’ (1 Cor.15:21) – what other meaning is indeed conveyed than in the verse in which he says to the Romans, ‘By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin?’(Rom 5:12) Now they will have it, that the death here meant is the death, not of the body, but of the soul, on the pretence that another thing is spoken of to the Corinthians, where they are quite unable to understand the death of the soul, because the subject there treated is the resurrection of the body, which is the antithesis of the death of the body.

But so far as I have discovered from others, they think that the death which is here mentioned is not the death of the body, which they will not allow Adam to have deserved by his sin, but the soul, which takes place in actual sin; and that thus actual sin has not been transmitted from the first man to other persons by natural descent, but by imitation. Hence, likewise, they refuse to believe that in infants original sin is remitted through baptism, for they contend that no such original sin exists at all in people by their birth. But if the apostle had wished to assert that sin entered into the world, not by natural descent, but by imitation, he would have mentioned as the first offender, not Adam indeed, but the devil, of whom it is written, that ‘he sinneth from the beginning’…”(Wisdom 2:24)

COMMENTARY

a. One notes at the very beginning of the controversy, and at the very beginning of Augustine’s dealings with the Pelagian heresy,
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the root of the heresy is simply in the denial that Adam’s sin effects a change in human nature. Adam’s sin, so reasoned the Pelagians, was only imitated, not propagated. There was thus no solidarity of the race in Adam.

b. Secondly, Augustine very clearly identifies one of the inheritances from Adam being precisely that of death, which, of course, if perfectly correct. Recall, in this regard, the treatment of St. John Chrysostom.

c. But one must also note that Augustine, unlike Chrysostom, comes to view that inheritance of death more and more exclusively as a punishment for sin, whereas, as was seen in Chrysostom, death was also a remedy for sin:

I however, affirm that an infant born in a place where it was not possible for him to be admitted to the baptism of Christ, and being overtaken by death, was placed in such circumstances, that is to say, died without the bath of regeneration, because it was not possible for him to be otherwise…Rightly, therefore, by virtue of that condemnation which runs throughout the mass, is he not admitted into the kingdom of heaven, although he was not only not a Christian, but was unable to become one.

But they say: ‘He is not condemned; because the statement that all sinned in Adam, was not made because of the sin which is derived from one’s birth, but because of imitation of him’…But I am not speaking of the case of an infant. I take the instance of a young man, or an old man, who has died in a region where he could not hear of the name of Christ. Well, could such a man have become righteous by nature and free will; or could he not? If they contend that he could, then see what it is to render the cross of Christ of non-effect, to contend that any man without it, can be justified by the law of nature and the power of his will. We may here also

say, then is Christ dead in vain, forasmuch as all might accomplish so much as this, even if He had never died; and if they should be unrighteous, they would be so because they wished to be, not because they were unable to be righteous.

...Let him ply his questions against any opponents he pleases, provided he only confesses this, which cannot be denied without the most criminal impiety that without the grace of God a man cannot be without sin.  

Now the problematical aspects of Augustine’s (not to mention Pelagius’) formulation of the question begin to surface in an acute form, and in manner dialectically opposed to each other. On the one hand, Pelagius cannot view sin as anything other than a personal act, and therefore, denies any original sin, since to him this would mean that nature itself bears a moral culpability for someone else’s, i.e., Adam’s sin.

Augustine’s response is equally problematical, for rather than saying all are “children of wrath” in Chrysostomic fashion as having inherited the consequence or penalty of Adam’s sin, to wit, the decay and death of human nature, Augustine begins to see it in terms of more culpability and condemnation in addition to death.

This highlights the underlying Trinitarian and Christological implication of the problem, for both men appear to be talking of person and nature as two isolated and opposed poles of the dilemma, rather than as complementary and mutually necessary terms in its solution.

An experimental explanation of Augustine’s reasoning is perhaps in order here to understand his thinking, and the underlying confusion of person and nature that occurs in it.

Step One: The person Adam sins, and by his sin, death passes into human nature;

Step Two: Death is the punishment for Adam’s sin, and as death

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* St. Augustine, *On Nature and Grace, 9,10,11* NPNF sl vol V, p. 124
passes into human nature, so does the moral culpability;

Step Three: Therefore, all progeny born to Adam in that nature not only inherit death, which is natural, but also the moral culpability, which is personal.

There is thus a fundamental confusion of person and nature in both the Augustinian and Pelagian anthropologies. It is this aspect which makes the confrontation so bitter.

For he says: ‘If I were to say, man is able to dispute; a bird is able to fly; a hare is able to run; without mentioning at the same time the instruments by which these acts can be accomplished – that is, the tongue, the wings, and the legs; should I then have denied the conditions of the various offices, when I acknowledged the very offices themselves?’ It is at once apparent that he has here instanced such things as are by nature efficient; for the members of the bodily structure which are here mentioned are created with natures of such a kind - the tongue, the wings, the legs. He has not here mentioned any such thing as we wish to have understood by grace, without which no man is justified; for this is a topic which is concerned about the cure, not the constitution, of natural functions.

That, too, which is said to him, ‘that it is nowhere written in so many words, A man can be without sin,’ he easily refutes thus: ‘That the question here is not in what precise words each doctrinal statement is made.’ It is perhaps not without reason that, while in several passages of scripture we may find it said that men are without excuse, it is nowhere found that any man is described as being without sin, except Him only of whom it is plainly said, that ‘He knew no sin.’(II Cor 5:21) Similarly we read in the passage where the subject is concerning priests: ‘He was in all points tempted like as we are, only without sin’ (Hebrews 4:15) - meaning, of course, in that flesh which bore the likeness of sinful flesh, although it was not sinful flesh; a likeness, indeed, which it would not have borne if it had not been in every other respect the same as sinful
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flesh. How, however, are we to understand this: ‘Whosoever is born of “God doth not commit sin; neither, can he sin, for his seed remaineth in him’… (I St. John 3:9)\(^a\)

But God forbid that we should meet him with such an assertion as he says certain persons advance against him: “That man is placed on equality with God, if he is described as being without sin; as if indeed an angel, because he is without sin, is put in such an equality. For my own part” I am of this opinion that the creature will never become equal with God, even when so perfect a holiness shall be accomplished in us, that it shall be quite incapable of receiving any addition. No; all who maintain that our progress is to be so complete that we shall be changed into the substance of God, and that we shall thus become what He is, should look well to it how they build up their opinion; for myself I must confess that I am not persuaded of this.”\(^\beta\)

2. Romans 5:12: En Quo Omnes Peccaverunt: The “All” and the “Many”

Thus one comes immediately to the locus classicus for the doctrine of original sin and what precisely constitutes the inheritance from Adam. As was indicated in the lecture on St. John Chrysostom, our exposition of this passage has been reserved until this point in order to make more apparent the differences between the Augustinian doctrine of original sin and the more universal patristic doctrine of ancestral sin.

For by his grace He engrafts into His body even baptized infants, who certainly have not yet become able to imitate anyone. As therefore He, in whom all are made alive, besides offering Himself as an example of righteousness to those who imitate Him, gives also to those who believe

\(^\beta\) St. Augustine, *On Nature and Grace*, 37, S1, Vol 5, p. 134
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on Him the hidden grace of His Spirit, which He secretly infuses even into infants; so likewise he, in whom all die, besides being an example for imitation to those who willfully transgress the commandment of the Lord, depraved also in his own person all who come of his stock by the hidden corruption of his own carnal concupiscence. It is entirely on this account, and for no other reason that the apostle says; ‘By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so passed upon all men; ’in which all have sinned.’ (Romans 5:12) Now if I were to say this, they would raise an objection, and loudly insist that I was incorrect both in expression and sense; for they would perceive no sense in these words when spoken by an ordinary man, except that sense in these words when spoken by an ordinary man, except that sense which they refuse to see in the apostle. Since, however, these are the words of him to whose authority and doctrine they submit, they charge us with slowness of understanding, while they endeavor to wrest to some unintelligible sense words which were written in a clear and obvious purport. ‘By one man,’ says he, ‘sin entered into the world and death by sin.’ This indicates propagation, not imitation; for if imitation were meant, he would have said, ‘by the devil.’ But as no one doubts, he refers to that first man who is called Adam: ‘And so,’ says he, ‘it passed upon all men.’

Again, in the clause which follows, ‘In which all have sinned,’ how cautiously, rightly, and unambiguously is the statement expressed! For if you understand that sin to be meant which by one man entered into the world, ‘In which [sin] all have sinned,’ it is surely clear enough, that the sins which are peculiar to every man, which they themselves commit and which belong simply to them, mean one thing; and that the one sin, in and by which all have sinned, means another thing; since all were that one man. If, however, it be not the sin, but that one man that is understood [n.b. by the phrase ‘en quo] ‘In which [one man] all have sinned,’ what again can be plainer than event this clear statement?...The apostle, however, has declared concerning the first man, that ‘in him all have
Commentary:

Before any examination of the verse Romans 5:12 can be undertaken, it is imperative to observe carefully the recapitulational context in which St. Augustine has couched his understanding of the doctrine. In other words, the initial framework in which he attempts to understand the doctrine of original sin is itself not problematical at all; Augustine is simply examining one of the poles of the Adam-Christ typology in order to gain a clearer understanding of the doctrine of man and the fall. In this, he is not doing anything different than the fathers before him.

However, once this is said, problematical elements do emerge from a consideration of the verse, and a factor which was beyond Augustine’s own control. This was the fact that in the Latin version of the Scripture he used, the crucial last phrase of Romans 5:12 is rendered *en quo omnes peccaveratn: “in whom(or in which) all have sinned.”*

This phrase, εφ ω παντες ημαρον, affords a unique basis from which to appreciate the interplay of doctrine and Scriptural translation. In this article “The English of αγωνα at Colossians 2:1” in the 1:2:1990 issue of *The Bulletin of the Institute for Reformation Biblical Studies,* Dr. Ward Allen indicates that there is a

Diversity of signification... in the Greek phrase εφ ω at Romans 5:12. The phrase may be idiomatic and mean ‘because, or the relative pronoun may refer to θανατς, ‘death’. English translators, Renaissance and modern, have been almost unanimous in choosing the former. The majority of Eastern Fathers chose the latter. The text of the A.V. (Authorized Version) is true to the uncertain Greek, ‘for that all have sinned,’ where the relative pronoun refers to ‘death’. An influential renaissance scholar,

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Theodorus Beza, pressed a third possibility, in quo, in whom', the reading of the Vulgate. Although some members of the General Meeting argued that the phrase was not an accurate rendering of the Greek and did not belong in the margin (of the Authorized Version, ed.), a majority prevailed. 'In Whom' is in the margin of the A.V. It is instructive to see that these translators did not dogmatize on the details of a doctrine so central to Christian faith, 'original sin.' They have left a warning that a reader must 'seek further,' must not 'conclude nor dogmatize on this or that peremptorily.'

As noted, for most Greek Fathers, the tiny phrase εφ ω means 'because', according to its customary idiomatic meaning. Thus, for St. Cyril of Alexandria, for example, the meaning of the verse is that by following the sin of Adam by one’s own personal acts of sin, one participates, as it were, in one’s own condemnation.

The Greek Fathers are also keenly aware, however, of the implications of the Adam-Christ typology, and also aware that the phrase is capable of a very different interpretation. St. Photios the Great, for example, perhaps best known for his role in articulating the East’s response to the Augustinian filioque, notes two interpretations in his Ad Amphilochium, and mentions yet a third possibility that follows from the grammar of the phrase:

Thou didst request to learn the exact meaning of the passage ‘for that all have sinned’. Which the divine Paul spake. For some, ‘for that’ refers to Adam, but others, responding, answer. ‘for that refers to death. For my

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β cf. In Jo. 1:29: “And when sin has been annihiliated, then death of which sin is the source and cause, must needs be annihiliated too.” Trans Henry Bettenson, the Later Christian Fathers (Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 264. But see also hom. pasch. 17: “…he took as his own a body by nature liable to destruction so that he might abolish the power of mortality that was in it, and transform it to incorruption.” (Ibid.) See also Glaphyrorum in Genesim II. PG 69:61 CD, where St. Cyril speaks of the “ancestral fall in Adam.”

α St. Photios, Ad Amphilochium, Quaestio 84, PG 101: 553D-556 B.
part, it seems to be neither... For the passage 'for that all have sinned' is indicative neither of a particular person, nor of a kind of person, but is rather indicative of cause...For he saith elsewhere, ‘For we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened,’ and then, ‘not for that we would be unclothed, but clothed upon.’ From this it is evident that the phrase ‘for that’ is to be acknowledged as denoting the cause of something in him, that is, ‘through this’ do we groan, not that we would ‘be unclothed’, but to be ‘clothed upon’. For, to speak more broadly, it is the sense of the passage...Thus, not only is it evident from this that the phrase ‘for that’ in this passage is indicative of a cause within him, but the same understanding also applies to the preceeding passage. For he saith on account of the sinning of Adam he is condemned to death, and therefore that the race engenered from him hath contracted death. But he did not say this simply, in a word, without just reason. Rather, he said ‘for that all have sinned’, that is, ‘since all, having engenered death, have sinned.’

The phrase for Photios thus seems to mean that mankind received death from Adam, and with death, the opportunity to add more evil to Adam's sin. Photios adheres to the view that mankind inherits death from Adam, not, it is to be stressed, sin or guilt. Thus, the phrase εφω refers to Adam, 'because of whom' we inherit death, and compound his sin by adding our own to it. This is a crucial observation, for it indicates that the most “anti-Augustinian” of Greek Fathers can accept an interpretation of the phrase that is close (but only very close) to the Latin in quo, though shorn of its “Augustinian” and “Calvinistic” overtones. St. John of Damascus also interprets the phrase in a similar manner: εφω means δια ou or “through whom”: “The phrase ‘for that means because of that, in other words, ‘through whom,’ for he saith that as soon as that one fell, that is, Adam, it came to pass from him that they also, that did not eat from the tree, all died.”

γ St. John Chrysostom, In Romanos Expositio, PG 60:474
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It is now clear why St. John Chrysostom, with his rigorously Antiochene grammatical-philological approach is so important, for it is he who most clearly take the relative pronoun ω as referring to the antecedent θανάτος, or death: “When that one fell, all who were born from him, even those who did not eat from the tree, became mortal.” For Chrysostom, although the ω in verse 5:12 is to be understood as referring to inherited mortality, at 4:19 the ‘many who were made sinners’ means that only those who themselves hypostatically commit sin are made sinners. One may, for Chrysostom, be ‘under wrath’, as inheriting the effect of Adam’s sin, death itself, as God’s punishment of it, but nevertheless not personally be a sinner, but only be naturally mortal. The distinction between υποστασις and ουσια would thus appear to be most clearly delineated in Chrysostom.

These three interpretations carry with them certain doctrinal implications regarding the relationship of sin and death in the Greek Fathers. For the first school of thought, which we shall designate the “Cyrillic” for the sake of convenience, there is a casual relationship between sin and death. The question of the Cyrillic school is thus “Why does one die?” one dies because one sins; death is the reward of sin. The exegetical and translational perspective is thus pastoral and ‘existential’: it is the individual person at any given moment who is the subject of the verse. The phrase εφ ω thus means ‘because’.

For the second, or “Photian” school, the question remains that same. Why does one die? One dies because Adam sinned, and mankind, inheriting the consequent natural mortality of Adam’s nature, has a certain inclination to sin and indeed, adds to Adam’s sin. The phrase thus means “because of whom”, though this is not understood in an “Augustinian” way, for the inheritance from Adam is understood not in terms of guilt, but of death.

For the third, “Chrysostomian” school, the question is really not “Why do all men die?” but one almost incomprehensible to the dialectical
approach of Pelagius or Augustine: “Why do all men sin?” The ultimate explanation is sought in the decay and mortality of human nature itself, in the death one inherits from Adam with all the physical and spiritual corruption that this entails. One is not guilty or personally responsible for this inheritance, but one does have a natural weakness. The exegetical and translational perspective is thus both pastoral and dogmatic: Why do men sin? Because they all die. What is the exact nature of the inheritance from Adam? Not guilt, but death. The phrase thus means ‘for that (reason) all have sinned,’ or more to the point, “because of death all have sinned.”

There is thus in the Greek of Romans 5:12 a three-fold ambiguity to the phrase εφ ο. It can mean simultaneously (1) “because” or (2) “because of whom” i.e., Adam; and (3) “because of which” i.e., death.

There are two questions here for the modern translator and critic: (1) Is the intention of the author the key to the exegesis of the passage? And (2) is that intention reducible to only one of the above interpretations, or are all to be understood, is there a fullness to the doctrine which can only be conveyed by ‘ambiguous’ language? For the Greek Fathers, the ambiguity is intentional, but for most moderns, the tendency is to translate the phrase εφ ο only in the first sense. And thus one notes that the first interpretation is precisely that most favorable to a Pelagian doctrine: that there is no inheritance from Adam. It is no accident that the King James, and only the King James of all versions of Scripture in the English, preserves the full meaning of the original ambiguity; it translates ambiguity faithfully by an ambiguity.

Before leaving the question of the Greek Fathers on Romans 5:12, it is helpful to turn to a modern Orthodox scholar to illustrate the dangers inherent in a too ready abandonment of the Authorized Version:

The scriptural text which played a decisive role in the polemics between Augustine and the Pelagians is found in Romans 5:12, where Paul, speaking of Adam, writes, ‘As sin came into the world through one man, and through sin, death, so death spread to all men because all men have
sinned [eph ho pantes hemarton]; in this passage there is a major issue of translation. The last four Greek words were translated in Latin as in quo omnes peccaverunt (in whom [i.e., in Adam] all men have sinned)...But such a meaning cannot be drawn from the Greek, the text read, of course, by the Byzantines. The form eph ho – a contraction of epi with the relative pronoun ho – can be translated ‘because’, a meaning accepted by most modern scholars of all confessional backgrounds...

...But there is also the consensus of the majority of Eastern fathers, who interpret Romans 5:12 in close connection with 1 Corinthians 15:12-between Adam and his descendants there is a solidarity in death just as there is a solidarity in life between the risen Lord and the baptized.

This interpretation comes, obviously, from the literal, grammatical meaning of Romans 5:12. Eph ho, if it means ‘because’, is a neuter pronoun; but it can also be masculine, referring to the immediately preceeding substantive thanatos (‘death’). The sentence may have a meaning improbable to a reader trained in Augustine, but which is indeed the meaning which most Greek Fathers accepted: ‘As sin came into the world through one man and death through sin, so death spread to all men; and because of death, all men have sinned...’

While it is true that a relative pronoun usually refers to its nearest antecedent, in this case, death (θανάτος), the fact that Adam (Αδάμος) is also a possible antecedent to the pronoun cannot be excluded for reasons already elucidated by St. Photios. What is surely the most important lesson to be learned from Fr. Meyendorff’s remarks is surely one he did not intend to convey: he has tacitly rejected the only English language translation that might have supported the doctrinal and translational contention is he trying to establish. In any case, none of the Greek Fathers speak of an inheritance of sin, since the Greek nowhere will allow such an interpretation, but of death.

With these considerations in mind, it is easier to see where the

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[a] John Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology: Historical trends and Doctrinal Themes, p. 144
difficulty between Augustine and Pelagius lies; it lies in the mistranslation of \( εφω\) πατες ημωρτον into Latin as \( in\ quo\ omnes\ peccaverunt\), which clearly implies just such an inheritance of sin. Thus, both Pelagius and Augustine are caught in a dialectical trap. The one, Pelagius, rightly wants to maintain that sin, as such, is always a personal and never a natural phenomenon; indeed, was it not the Manichees that maintained a doctrine of natural evil? But since this is the only way in which Augustine can conceive of original sin, Pelagius is led to a denial that there is any inheritance from Adam, and any corresponding weakening of mankind’s physical and spiritual nature. Augustine likewise is caught in the same dilemma, but the poles of the dialectic are reversed. Beginning with the doctrine of mankind’s inheritance from Adam, which Augustine rightly knows to be Catholic doctrine, he is led into the dangerous territory of coming perilously close to affirming that man’s nature itself is sinful, though to his credit, he never says this in so many words. But it is clearly implied by his condemnation of unbaptized infants, for the punishment of inheriting death from Adam is not enough. If they die unbaptized, they inherit a moral culpability and condemnation.

We may thus continue with Augustine’s commentary on the subject:

‘For,’ he says ‘as by the offense of one upon all men to condemnation; even so by the justification of one upon all men unto justification of life.’ (Romans 5:18)…Moreover, if Christ alone is He in whom all men are justified, on the ground that it is not simply the imitation of His example which makes men just, but His grace which regenerates men by the Spirit, then also Adam is the only one in whom all have sinned, on the ground that it is not the mere following of his evil example that makes men sinners, but the penalty which generates through the flesh, hence, the terms ‘all men’ and ‘all men’. For not they who are regenerated through Adam are actually the very same as those who are regenerated through Christ; but yet the language of the apostle is strictly correct, because as none partakes of carnal generation except through Adam, so
no one shares in the spiritual except through Adam, so no one shares in the spiritual except through Christ. For if any could be generated in the flesh, yet not by Adam, and if in like manner any could be generated in the Spirit, and not by Christ; clearly; clearly 'all' could not be spoken of either in the one class or in the other. But these 'all' the apostle afterwards describes as 'many,' for obviously, under certain circumstances, the 'all' may be but a few. The carnal generation, however, embraces 'many' and the spiritual generation also includes 'many' although the 'many' of the spiritual are less numerous than the 'many' of the carnal. But as the one embraces 'all' men whatever, so the other includes 'all' righteous men; because as in the former case none can be a man without the carnal generation, so in the other class no one can be a righteous man without the spiritual generation; in both instances, therefore, there are 'many': 'For as by the disobedience of one many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous.'

'Moreover the law entered, that the offence might abound.' (Rom 5:20) This addition to original sin men now made of their own willfulness, not through Adam; but even this is done away and remedied by Christ because 'where sin abounded, grace did much more abound; that as sin hath reigned unto death' – even that sin which men have not derived from Adam, but have added of their own will – 'even so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life.' (Romans 5:21) There is, however, other righteousness apart from Christ, as there are other sins apart from Adam. Therefore, after saying, ‘As sin hath reigned unto death,’ he did not add in the same clause ‘by one, or ‘by Adam’, because he had already spoken of that sin which was abounding when the law entered, and which, of course, was not original sin, but the sin of man’s own willful commission. a (On Forgiveness of Sins, and Baptism, 19-20, NPNF sl Vol 5, p.22)

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a St. Augustine, On Forgiveness of Sins, and Baptism, 19-20, NPNF sl Vol 5, p.22.
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COMMENTARY

a. Now that death itself is no longer chiefly in view and moral culpability is, Augustine cannot see the effect of Christ’s human nature and the resurrection of all men in it. In other words, Christology has begun to take second place to a more fundamental consideration: human nature and culpability in the abstract.

b. Thus, the “all” in St. Paul is increasingly defined by Augustine in terms of the “many”; “all” is no longer “all” but a hyperbolic expression meaning simply “many”. That is, the “all” is understood absolutely only of fallen man; in redeemed man “all” really only means “many”. In this, the Gnostic Tactic of changing the meaning of texts has begun to take over.

I suppose it will be the more convenient course simply to collect the passages together which may turn up, or such as shall seem sufficient for manifesting the truth, that the Lord Jesus Christ came in the flesh, and, in the form of a servant, became obedient even to the death of the cross, for no other reason than, by this dispensation of His most merciful grace, to give life to all those to whom, as engrafted members of his body, He becomes Head for laying hold upon the kingdom of heaven: to save, free, redeem, and enlighten them, who had aforetime been involved in the death, infirmities, servitude, captivity, and darkness of sin, under the dominion of the devil, the author of sin: and thus to become the Mediator between God and man, by whom (after the enmity of our ungodly condition had been terminated by His gracious help) we might be reconciled to God unto eternal life, having been rescued from the eternal death which threatened such as us. When this shall have been made clear by more than sufficient evidence, it will follow that those persons cannot be concerned with that dispensation of Christ which is executed by His humiliation, who have no need of life, and salvation, and deliverance, and redemption and illumination... Now, seeing that they admit the necessity of baptizing infants, - finding themselves unable to contravene that authority of the universal Church, which has been unquestionably handed down by the Lord and His apostles – they cannot
avoid the further concession, that infants require the same benefits of the Mediator, in order that, being washed by the sacrament and charity of the faithful, and thereby incorporated into the body of Christ, which is the Church, they may be reconciled to God, and so live in Him, and be saved, and delivered, and redeemed, and enlightened. But from what, if not from death, and the vices, and guilt, and thralldom, and darkness of Sin? And, inasmuch as they do not commit any sin in the tender age of infancy by their actual transgression, original sin only is left. 

**COMMENTARY**

a. One must note clearly that Augustine, for all the problematical features of his doctrine, nevertheless moves very firmly within catholic tradition as to the reasons for the baptism and communion of infants: there is an inheritance from Adam that can only be redeemed and put right in Christ.

b. Augustine's argument here is important: why baptize infants and deny them the necessary food that that baptism entitles them to? Augustine in this case is much more consistent with current Eastern Orthodox practice than that of the Western churches which claim him as their father. One must ask very bluntly, if one follows Augustine in the point of the filioque and his understanding of original sin, why does one not follow him in this as well?

Perhaps he will say in reply: 'When I said this, I was treating of the Holy Scriptures.' Oh how I wish that he were never willing to add, I will not say anything but what he reads in the Scriptures, but in opposition to what he reads in them; that he would only faithfully and obediently hear that which is written there: ‘By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men; in which all have sinned…’ (Romans 5:12)…For if natural capacity, by help of the free will, is in itself sufficient

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* St. Augustine, *On Forgiveness of sins and Baptism*, 39, NPNF sl, vol 5, p. 30
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both for discovering how one ought to live, and also for leading a holy life, then 'Christ died in vain,' (Gal 2:21) and therefore also 'the offence of the cross is ceased.' (Gal 5:11) Why also may I not myself exclaim? — nay, I will exclaim, and chide them with a Christian's sorrow, - 'Christ is become of no effect unto you, whosoever of you are justified by nature; ye are fallen from grace;' (Gal 5:4) for 'being ignorant of God's righteousness, you have not submitted yourselves to the righteousness of God.' (Romans 10:3) For even as 'Christ is the end of the law,' so likewise is He the Savior of man's corrupted nature, 'for righteousness to every one that believeth.' (Romans 10:4)” (On Nature and Grace, 46, NPNF sl Vol. V, p. 137)

commentary

a. St. Augustine has very carefully worded his exposition of Scripture here so as to avoid any hint of the doctrine of apokatastasis.

b. One must note, now, how both Pelagius and Augustine have restricted the meaning of the word “all” when used in reference to Christ.

1) Pelagius has restricted the meaning of “all” to “many” on account of the free will of individual persons responding to Christ: “not all men choose eternal life” is his argument.

2) Augustine’s restriction of “all” to “many” is conversely increasingly tied to the limited number of men predestinated to salvation in Christ.

“He adduces also this passages, whence he would prove that we ought not to understand all without exception, when “all” is used: -- ‘As by the offense of one,’ he says, ‘upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of One, upon all men unto justification of life.’ (Romans 5:18) ‘There can be no doubt,’ he says, ‘that not all men are sanctified by the righteousness of Christ, but only those who are willing to obey Him, and have been cleansed in the washing of His baptism.’ Well, but he does not prove what he wants by this quotation. For as the clause, ‘By the
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offence of one, upon all men to condemnation,' is so worded that not one is omitted in its sense, so in the corresponding clause, 'By the righteousness of One, upon all men unto justification of life,' no one is omitted in its sense, - not, indeed, because all men have faith and are washed in His baptism, but because no man is justified unless he believes in Christ and is cleansed by His baptism. The term 'all' is therefore used in a way which shows that no one whatever can be supposed to be able to be saved by another means that through Christ Himself. α

Now, whoever maintains that human nature at any period required not the second Adam for its physician, because it was not corrupted in the first Adam, is convicted as an enemy to the grace of God; not in a question where doubt or error might be compatible with soundness of belief, but in that very rule of faith which makes us Christians. How happens it, then, that the human nature, which first existed, is praised by these men as being so far less tainted with evil manners?...From the moment, then when 'by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, in whom all sinned,' (Romans 5:12) the entire mass of our nature was ruined beyond doubt, and fell into the possession of its destroyer. And from him no one-no, not one-has been delivered, or is being delivered, or ever will be delivered, except by the grace of the Redeemer. β

Commentary:

a. One now sees the ultimate end to which Augustine’s doctrine tends: man has become, if one may so put it, an inert “lump”, a “mass” to be moved from one state to another by God’s grace.

β St. Augustine, On Original Sin 34, NPNF sl, vol 5, p. 249.
3. *Adam in Paradise: Created as an Adult?*

Seeing now that the soul of an infant fresh from its mother’s womb is still the soul of a human being, - nay, the soul of a rational creature, - not only untaught, but even incapable of instruction, I ask why, or when or whence, it was plunged into that thick darkness of ignorance in which it lies? If it is man’s nature thus to begin, and that nature is not already corrupt, then why was not Adam created thus?...

Some one will ask, If this nature is not pure, but corrupt from its origin, since Adam was not created thus, how is it that Christ, who is far more excellent, and was certainly born without any sin of a virgin, nevertheless appeared in this weakness, and came into the world in infancy? To this question our answer is as follows: Adam was not created in such a state, because, as no sin from a parent preceded him, he was not created in sinful flesh... The question which we are now discussing is not about Adam in respect of the size of his body, why he was not made an infant but in the perfect greatness of his members.\(^a\)

**Commentary:**

a. One notes here the origin of the persistent idea which often occurs in the religious “subconscious” of many Western Christians, that Adam was created an adult. One notes that the actual implication of the doctrine of Recapitulation would seem to be the reverse that Adam was created ‘from infancy’ as it were, and fell at some later point in life.

\(^a\) St. Augustine, *On Forgiveness of Sin, and Baptism* 67-68, NPNF sl vol 5, p.42
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4. The Relationship of Sin and Death: Sin Leads to death, not Death to Sin

'The sting of death is sin; and the strength of sin is the law.' (I Cor 15:53-56) Now, because (as the apostle's words most plainly declare) death shall then be swallowed up in victory when this corruptible and mortal shall have then be swallowed up in victory when this corruptible and mortal shall have put on incorruption and immortality, - that is, when 'God shall quicken even our mortal bodies by His Spirit that dwelleth in us,' - it manifestly follows that the sting of the body of this death, which is the contrary of the resurrection of the body, is sin. The sting, however, is that by which death was made, and not that which death made, since it is by sin that we die, and not by death that we sin α

Commentary:

a. Here the relationship between sin and death is the opposite of what was discovered to be the case in the Greek Fathers: for them, death leads to sin. For Augustine, however, man, since he inherits a natural culpability, death is the reward of that culpability: thus one may say that sin leads to death. But this is now understood in a very different manner than that which St. Cyril of Alexandria understood it.

5. Infant Baptism, Condemnation, and Original Sin

...even that sin alone which was originally derived unto all men not only excludes from the kingdom of God, which infants are unable to enter...unless they have received the grace of Christ before they die...

And from this we gather that we have derived from Adam in whom we

α St. Augustine, On the Forgiveness of Sins, and Baptism, 20. NPNF sl Vol. 5, pp. 76-77
α St. Augustine, On Forgiveness of Sins, and Baptism 15-17, NPNFS1, Vol. 5, p. 21
all have sinned, not all our actual sins, but only original sin; whereas from Christ, in whom we are all justified, we obtain the remission not merely of that original sin, but of the rest of our sins also, which we have added…

…men were bound by the chain of death in that one man in whom all men sinned, even though they added no sins of their own.α

…let us I say, hear what the Lord says – not indeed concerning the sacrament of His own holy table, to which none but a baptized person has a right to approach: ‘Except ye eat my flesh and drink my blood, ye shall have no life in you.’ (St. John 6:53) What do we want more? What answer to this can be adduced, unless it be by that obstinacy which ever resists the constancy of manifest truth?

Will, however, any man be so bold as to say that this statement has no relation to infants, and that they can have life in them without partaking of His body and blood - on the ground that He does not say Except one eat, but ‘Except ye eat;’ as if He were addressing those who were able to hear and to understand, which of infants cannot do? But he who says this is inattentive; because, unless all are embraced in the statement, that without the body and the blood of the son of man men cannot have life, it is to no purpose that even the elder age is solicitous of it… What also becomes of the statement which he makes in the same context on this very point: ‘The bread that I will give is my flesh, for the life of the world?’ (St. John 6:51) For, it is according to this statement that we find that that sacrament pertains also to us, who were not in existence at the time the Lord spoke these words; for we cannot possibly say that we do not belong to ‘the world,' for the life of which Christ have His flesh. Who indeed can doubt that in the term world all persons are indicated who enter the world by being born?...From all this it follows that even for the life of infants was His flesh given, which he gave for the life of the world; and that even they will not have life if they eat not the flesh of the son of man.β

a. Again, the recapitulatory principle informs some of

β Ibid, 26-27, p. 25
Augustine’s thought, though by no means exclusively so. Nevertheless, the point must again be made that Augustine very clearly supports the communion of infants. His reasoning is very similar to the expression we first encountered in St. Irenaeus in Part One of these lectures: Christ became “an infant to save infants”.

...sin, which came into the world by one man and has passed through unto all men...For who would dare to say that Christ is not the Savior and Redeemer of infants? But from what does He save them, if there is no malady of original sin within them? From what does He redeem them,. If through their origin from the first man they are not sold under sin? Let there be then no eternal salvation promised to infants out of our own opinion, without Christ's baptism; for none is promised in that Holy Scripture which is to be preferred to all human authority and opinion...

Whence, however, was this derived, but from that primitive, as I suppose, and apostolic tradition, by which the Churches of Christ maintain it to be an inherent principle, that without baptism and partaking of the supper of the Lord it is impossible for any man to attain either to the kingdom of God or to salvation and everlasting life?.. If, therefore, as so many and such divine witness agree, neither salvation nor eternal life can be hoped for by any man without baptism and the Lord’s body and blood, it is vain to promise these blessing to infants without them. α (On Forgiveness of sins, and Baptism 33-35, P. 28)

**Commentary:**

a. Now one notes, as Augustine progresses in his polemic against Pelagianism, that the emphasis becomes less one on death and one more on sin, for now it is sin which has passed into all men, a doctrine which cannot claim the direct support of Romans 5:12 even in the Latin, it is a deduction which must be made from it.

α St. Augustine, On Forgiveness of Sins, and Baptism 33-35, p.28

α St. Augustine, On the Forgiveness of Sins, and Baptism, 62, p.40
b. The clear implications of the Affirmation of St. Louis seem to imply yet more considerations for current Continuing Anglican practice, for with Augustine, we have an unexpected witness to the dogmatic basis, indeed, necessity, of communing infants.

In what class, then do we place baptized infants but amongst believers, as the authority of the catholic Church everywhere asserts?\textsuperscript{a}

For this is the point aimed at by the controversy, against the novelty of which we have to struggle by the aid of ancient truth; that it is clearly altogether superfluous for infants to be baptized. Not that this opinion is avowed in so many words, lest so firmly established a custom of the church should be unable to endure its assailants. But if we are taught to render help to orphans, how much more ought we to labour in behalf of those children who, though under the protection of parents, will still be left more destitute and wretched than orphans, should that grace of Christ be denied them which they are all unable to demand for themselves?\textsuperscript{b}

Commentary:

a. One notes that Augustine is arguing here quite in conformity to normal patristic argumentation, i.e., he is arguing from an established practice of the Church to the dogmatic reasons for it.

b. However, this being said, the dogmatic reasons which he gives are not the same as would be given by the majority of the other fathers. This is due, as was previously noted, in part on the fact that the Latin of Romans 5:12 contains a mistranslation for which Augustine is not responsible.

This grace, however, of Christ, without which neither infants nor adults, can be saved, is not rendered for any merits, but is given gratis, on

\textsuperscript{a} Ibid., III: 22, p. 78.
account of which it is also called grace... Whence they, who are not liberated through grace, either because they are not yet able to hear, or because they are unwilling to obey; or again because they did not receive, at the time when they were unable on account of youth to hear, that bath of regeneration, which they might have received and through which they might have been saved, are indeed justly condemned; because they are not without sin, either that which they have derived from their birth, or that which they have added from their own misconduct.\[\beta\]

Thus:

‘If righteousness come by nature, then Christ died in vain.’ If, however, Christ did not die in vain, then human nature cannot by any means be justified and redeemed from God’s most righteous wrath – in a word, from punishment – except by faith and the sacrament of the blood of Christ.\[\gamma\]

I however, affirm that an infant born in a place where it was not possible for him to be admitted to the baptism of Christ, and being overtaken by death, was placed in such circumstances, that is to say, died without the bath of regeneration, because it was possible for him to be otherwise...Rightly, therefore, by virtue of that condemnation which runs throughout the mass, is he not admitted into the kingdom of heaven, although he was not only not a Christian, but was unable to become one.\[\alpha\]

**Commentary:**

a. We note now that Augustine attempts precisely to draw the distinction between *person* and *nature*, but we note also that the terms in which he draws it are not directly tied to these distinctions; he refers rather to “original” versus “actual” sin, in order to distinguish the natural and

personal in his doctrine.

Then follow sundry statements charged against Pelagius, which are said to be found among the opinions of his disciple Coelestius: how that ‘Adam was created mortal, and would have died whether he had sinned or not sinned; that Adam’s sin injured only himself and not the human race; that the law no less then the gospel leads us to the kingdom; that there were sinless men previous to the coming of Christ; that new-born infants are in the same condition as Adam was before the fall; that the whole human race does not, on the one hand, die through Adam’s death or transgression, nor, on the other hand, does the whole human race rise again through the resurrection of Christ.’

The real objections against them is, that they refuse to confess that unbaptised infants are liable to the condemnation of the first man, and that original sin has been transmitted to them and requires to be purged by regeneration; their contention being that infants must be baptized solely for being admitted into the kingdom of heaven, who cannot have eternal life without partaking of the Lord’s body and blood. This, I would have you know, is the real objection to them respecting the baptism of infants. α

6. Original Sin and the Necessity of Sin

Well, but what does he mean when he says ‘Then again, how can one be subjected to God, for the guilt of that sin, which he knows is not his own? For,’ says he, ‘his own it is not, if it is necessary. Or if it is his own, it is voluntary: and if it is voluntary, it can be avoided.’ We reply: It is unquestionably his own. But the fault by which sin is committed is not yet in every respect healed, and the fact of its becoming permanently fixed in

us arises from our not rightly using the healing virtue and so out of this faulty condition the man who is now growing strong in depravity commits many sins, either through infirmity or blindness.β

**Commentary:**

a. One returns to the original problem for Pelagius: original sin for him meant the necessity of sinning. Augustine’s response has been, as noted, to insist on the inheritance not only of death but of sin, since “sin passes into all men”. This must be contrasted to the view of the Greek Fathers, for whom man inherits death from Adam, and because of that inheritance, a weakness of nature which impels men towards sin, but does not compel them toward the guilt for Adam’s sin.

b.

7. **Sin is not Natural, i.e., Is not a Property of Post Lapsarian Human Nature**

‘Again we must ask,’ he says, ‘what sin is, - natural? Or accidental? If natural it is not sin; if accidental, it is separable; and if it is separable, it can be avoided; and because it can be avoided, man can be without that which can be avoided.’ The answer to this is, that sin is not natural; but nature (especially in that corrupt state from which we have become by nature ‘children or wrath’ (Eph. 2:3) has too little determination of will to avoid sin, unless assisted and healed by God’s grace through Jesus Christ our Lord.α


Commentary:

a. Here one has the profoundest testimony that Augustine does not conceive of post-lapsarian (post-fallen) human nature to be a “sin nature.” This is a deduction that his followers will make from his doctrine. It is also clear testimony to the fact that Augustine once again refuses to press his logic to its implications. Thus, the tension in Augustine between genuine Catholic doctrine and something else is again exhibited.

Coelestius goes on to say as follows: ‘That infants, however, must be baptized for the remission of sins, was not admitted by us with the view of our seeming to affirm sin by transmission. This is very alien from the catholic meaning, because sin is not born with a man, – it is subsequently committed by the man: for it is shown to be a fault, not of nature, but of the will. It is fitting, therefore, to confess this, lest we should seem to make different kinds of baptism; it is moreover, necessary to lay down this preliminary safeguard, lest by the occasion of this mystery evil should, to the disparagement of the Creator, be said to be conveyed to man by nature, before that it has been committed by man.’

8. Humanity as a Massa Damnata: Origen Revisited

The entire mass, therefore, incurs penalty; and if the deserved punishment of condemnation were rendered to all, it would without doubt be righteously rendered. They, therefore, who are delivered there from grace are called, both vessels of their own merits, if not His who sent Christ Jesus into the world to save sinners, whom He foreknew and foreordained and called, and justified and glorified?...The man who correctly appreciated the whole subject could not possibly blame the justice of God in wholly condemning all men whatsoever.

α St. Augustine, On Original Sin, 6, NPNF Sl, Vol 5, p. 239.
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What then is the purpose or so severe a condemnation, when no willful sin has been committed? For it is not as certain Platonist have thought, because every such infant is thus requited in his soul for what it did of its own willfulness previous to the present life, as having possessed previous to its present bodily state a free choice of living either well or ill; since the Apostle Paul says most plainly, that before they were born they did neither good nor evil. (Romans 9:11) On what account, therefore, is an infant rightly punished with such ruin, if it be not because he belongs to the mass of perdition, and is properly regarded as born of Adam, condemned under the bond of the ancient debt unless he has been γreleased from the bond, not according to debt, but according to grace?γ

Commentary:

a. Once again, mankind is conceived in almost exclusively natural terms and not personal ones as well: he is a “mass” a damnable lump, or in Augustine’s own Latin, a massa damnata.

C. Anthropology

1. Will and Ignorance

Let us now consider the point which I mentioned as our third inquiry. Since by divine grace assisting the human will, man may possibly exist in this life without sin, which does he not? To this question I might very easily and truthfully answer: Because men are unwilling. But if I am asked why they are unwilling, we are drawn into a lengthy statement. And yet, without prejudice to a more careful examination, I may briefly say this much: Men are unwilling to do what is right, either because what is right is

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7 St. Augustine, On Original Sin, 36, NPNF sl, Vol 5, p. 250.
unknown to them, or because it is unpleasant to them...Ignorance, therefore, and infirmity are faults which impede the will from moving either for doing a good work, or for refraining from an evil one. But that what was hidden may come to light, and what was unpleasant may be made agreeable, is of the grace of God which helps the wills of men; and that they are not helped by it, has its cause likewise in themselves, not in God, whether they be predestinated to condemnation, on account of the iniquity of their pride, or whether they are to be judged and disciplined contrary to their very pride, if they are children of mercy."

2. Will and Faith

Do we then by grace made void free will? God forbid! Nay, rather we establish free will. For even as the law by faith, so free will by grace is not made void, but established. For neither is the law fulfilled except by free will; but by the law is the knowledge of sin, by faith the acquisition of grace against sin, by grace the healing of the soul’s freedom of will, by free will the love of righteousness, by love of righteousness the accomplishment of the law. Accordingly, as the law is not made void, but is established through faith, since faith procures grace whereby the law is fulfilled; so free will is not made void through grace, but is established, since grace cures the will whereby righteousness is freely loved.

Some one will ask whether the faith itself, in which seems to be the beginning either of salvation or of that series leading to salvation which I have just mentioned, is placed in our power. We shall see more easily, if we first examine with some care what ‘our power’ means. Since, then, there are two things, - will and ability; it follows that not everyone that has the will has therefore the ability also, nor has every one that possesses the ability the will also; for as we sometimes will what we cannot do, so also we sometimes can do what we do not will. From the words themselves when sufficiently considered, we shall detect in the very ring

α St. Augustine, On the Forgiveness of sins, and Baptism 26, p. 55.
of the terms, the derivation of volition from willingness, and of ability from ablleness. Therefore, even as the man who wishes has volition, so also the man who can has ability. But in order that a thing may be done by ability, the coalition must be present. For no man is usually said to do a thing with ability if he did it unwillingly. Although at the same time, if we observe more precisely, even what a man is compelled to do unwillingly, he does, if he does it, by his volition; only he is said to be an unwilling agent, or to act against his will, because he would prefer some other thing. He is compelled, indeed, by some unfortunate influence, to do what he does under compulsion, wishing to escape it or to remove it out of his way.

Attend now to the point which we have laid down for discussion: whether faith is in our power? We now speak of that faith which we employ when we believe anything, not that which we give when we made a promise for this too is called faith... Consider now whether anybody believes, if he be unwilling; or whether he believes not, if he shall have willed it. Such a position, indeed, is absurd, (for what is believing but consenting to the truth of what is said? And this consent is certainly voluntary): faith, therefore, is in our own power. But, as the apostle says: ‘There is no power but comes from God.’ (Romans 12:1)... Nowhere, however, in Holy Scripture do we find such an assertion as, there is no volition but comes from God. And rightly is it not so written, because it is not true; otherwise God would be the author even of sins (which heaven forbid!), if there were no volition except what comes from Him; inasmuch as an evil volition alone is already a sin, even if the effect be wanting, - in other words, if it has not ability...

Since faith, then, is in our power, inasmuch as every one believes when he likes and when he believes, believes voluntarily; our next inquiry, which we must conduct with care, is, what faith it is which the apostle commends with so much earnestness? For indiscriminate faith is not good. Accordingly, we find this caution: ‘Brethren, believe not every spirit,
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but try the spirits whether they are of God.' (1st John 1:1)  

Commentary:

a. Augustine here employs categories also utilized by Pelagius and later by St. Maximus the Confessor; these are the things “within our power” (Greek: τα εφ ημιν). Faith is one of the things “within our power.”

If we believe that we may attain this grace (and of course believe voluntarily), then the question arises, whence we have this will? – if from nature, why it is not at everybody’s command, since the same God made all men? If from God’s gift, then again, why is not the gift open to all, since ‘He will have all men to be saved, and come unto the knowledge of the truth?’ (1 St. Tim 2:4)

Let us then first of all, lay down this proposition, and see whether it satisfies the question before us; that free will, naturally assigned by the Creator to our rational soul, is such a neutral (media vis) power, as can either incline towards faith, or turn towards unbelief. Consequently a man cannot be said to have even that will with which he believes in God, without having received it; since this rises at the call of God out of the free will which he received naturally when he was created. 

Commentary:

a. Faith, for St. Augustine, is something which lies “in the middle” it is part of a process leading to some end. In this, he anticipates the doctrine of St. Maximus, the subject of an examination in Part One.

Let this discussion suffice, if it satisfactorily meets the question we had to solve. It may be, however, objected in reply, that we must take heed lest some one should suppose that the sin would have to be imputed to God

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which is committed by free will, if in the passage where it is asked, 'What hast thou which thou didst not receive?' (1 Cor 4:7) the very will by which we believe is reckoned as a gift of God, because it arises out of the free will which we received at our creation...God acts upon us by the incentives of our perceptions, to will and to believe, either externally by evangelical exhortations, where even the commands of the law also do something, if they so far admonish a man of his infirmity that he betakes himself to the grace that justifies by believing; or internally, where no man has in his own control what shall enter into his thoughts, although it appertains to his own will to consent or to dissent. Since God, therefore, in such ways acts upon the reasonable soul in order that it may believe in him (and certainly there is no ability whatever in free will to believe, unless there be persuasion or summons towards some one in whom to believe), it surely follows that it is God who both works in man the willing to believe, and in all things prevents us with His mercy. To yield our consent, indeed, to God's summons, or to withhold it, is (as I have said) the function of our own will.⁹

Commentary:

a. Augustine echoes here the teaching of the desert fathers, who maintain that a man is no more able to control sinful thoughts from entering his mind that he is of inhaling and catching the wind. For the desert fathers, what makes such thoughts sinful is if the will attempts to hold and contemplate them.

3. The Capacity to Sin

In order, however, to escape from the odium wherewith Christians guard their salvation, he parries their question when they ask him, 'Why do you affirm that man without the help of God's grace is able to avoid sin?' by

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saying, The actual capacity of not sinning lies not so much in the power of will as in the necessity of nature. Whatever is placed in the necessity of nature undoubtedly appertains to the Author of nature, that is, God. How then,’ says he, ‘can that be regarded as spoken without the grace of God which is shown to belong in an especial manner to God?’ Here the opinion is expressed which all along was kept in the background; there is, in fact, no way of permanently concealing such a doctrine. The reason why he attributes to the grace of God the capacity of not sinning is, that God is the Author of nature, in which, he declares, this capacity of avoiding sin is inseparably implanted…For I suppose a blind man would like to see, but is unable; but whenever a man wishes to do a thing and cannot, there is present to him the will, but he has lost the capacity.

Commentary:

a. One notes now a peculiar paradox. Pelagius is now affirming what he set out to refute: neither sinning, nor not sinning, is a matter of will; not sinning is now for Pelagius a matter of necessity of nature. Ergo, the free will must be capable sinning, and nothing else, otherwise it is not, for Pelagius genuinely free. This very “Augustinian” sounding proposition indicates yet another twist to the dialectical nature of the conflict between the two, for the will itself is being defined dialectically, as the ability either to sin or not to sin. The two seem locked into an acceptance of each other’s paradigm, though each opposes one pole of that dialectic to the other. Both men have now thus almost inadvertently come to the other’s position, Pelagius having moved from free will to the natural capacity and ergo natural necessity, and Augustine from the natural necessity to the will.

Now, however, since he anathematizes those persons who hold that 'God's grace and assistance is not given for single actions, but is imparted in the freedom of the will, or in the law and in doctrine,' it is quiet evident that he really means the grace which is preached in the Church of Christ, and is conferred by the ministration of the Holy Ghost for the purpose of helping us in our single actions, whence it is that we pray for needful and suitable grace that we enter not into any temptation. Nor, again, have I any longer a fear that, when he said, 'No man can be without sin unless he has acquired a knowledge of the law,' and added this explanation of this words, that 'he posited in the knowledge of the law, help towards the avoidance of sin', he at all meant the said knowledge to be considered as tantamount to the grace of God' for, observe, he anathematizes such as hold this opinion. See, too, how he refuses to hold our natural free will, or the law and doctrine, as equivalent to that grace of God which helps us through our single actions. 

For that grace and help of God, by which we are assisted in avoiding sin, he places either in nature and free will, or else in the gift of the law and teaching, the result of which of course is this, that whenever God helps a man, He must be supposed to help him to turn away from evil and do good, by revealing to him and teaching him what he ought to do, but now with the additional assistance of His co-operation and inspiration of love, that he may accomplish that which he had discovered it to be his duty to do.

In his system, he posits and distinguishes three faculties, by which, he says, God's commandments are fulfilled, - capacity, volition, and action (possibilitas, voluntas actio): meaning by “capacity” that by which a man is able to be righteous; by “volition” that by which he wills to be righteous; by “action” that by which he actually is righteous...In short, according to his view, God's grace has nothing to do with assisting those

\(^a\) St. Augustine, \textit{On the Proceeding of Pelagius}, p. 197.

two faculties which he will have to be altogether our own, the volition and the action, but that only which is not in our own power and comes to us from God, namely the capacity; as if the faculties which are our own, that is, the volition and the action, have such avail for declining evil and doing good, that they require no divine help, whereas that faculty which we have of God, that is to say, the capacity, is so weak, that it is always assisted by the aid of grace. 

**Commentary:**

a. Augustine very clearly and correctly teaches that the will is a property of nature. But this will produce problematical results when the human will, dialectically locked in antithesis to God, is considered in relation to Christ.

5. **The “Mode of Use”**

Lest, however, it should chance to be said that we either do not correctly understand what he advances or malevolently pervert to another meaning what he never means to bear such a sense, I beg of you to consider his own actual words: ‘We distinguish,’ says he, ‘three things, arranging them in a certain graduated order. We put in the first place ‘ability; in the second, ‘volition;’ and in the third, ‘actuality.’ (posse, velle, esse.) The ‘ability’ we place in our nature, the ‘coalition’ in our will, and the ‘actuality’ in the effect. The first, that is, the ‘ability’, properly belongs to God, who has bestowed it on His creature; the other two, that is, the ‘volition’ and the ‘actuality’ must be referred to man, because they flow forth from the fountain of the will. For his willing, therefore, and doing a good work, the praise belongs to man; or rather both to man, and to God who has bestowed it on His creature; the other two, that is, the ‘volition’ and the ‘actuality’ must be referred to man, because they flow forth from the fountain of the will. For this willing, therefore, and doing a good work, the praise belongs to man; or rather both to man, and to God who has
bestowed on him the ‘capacity’ for his will and work, and who evermore by the help of His grace assists even this capacity. That a man is able to will and effect any good work, comes from God alone. So that this one faculty can exist, even when the other two have no being; but these latter cannot exist without that former one. I am therefore free not to have either a good volition or action; but I am by no means able not to have the capacity of good. This capacity is inherent in me, whether I will or no: nor does nature at any time receive in this point freedom for itself. Now the meaning of all this will be rendered clearer by an example or two. That we are able to see without eyes is not of us; but it is our own that we make a good or a bad use of our eyes.'

Commentary:

a. The discussion now clearly implies the underlying categories of nature and person, and even the Cappadocian usage of existence (υπαρζις) or nature, and “mode of existence or use” (τροπος υπαρζεως). or person.

6. The Opposition of Grace and Free Will and the Transmission of Sin

The bishop Aurelius (Agustine) said: ‘Let what follows be recited.’ It was accordingly recited, ‘That the sin of Adam was injurious to him alone, and not to the human race.’ Then, after the recital, Coelestius said: ‘I said that I was in doubt about the transmission of sin…’

Coelestius answered: ‘As touching the transmission of sin, I have already asserted, that I have heard many persons of acknowledged position in the Catholic Church deny it altogether; and on the other hand, others affirm it; it may be fairly deemed a matter for inquiry, but not a heresy. I have always maintained that infants require baptism and ought

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to be baptized.'

Inasmuch, however, as the discussion about free will and God’s Grace has such difficulty in its distinctions, that when free will is maintained, God’s grace is apparently denied; whilst when God’s grace is asserted, free will is supposed to be done away with… if he consents to hold with us, that even the volition and the action are assisted by God, and so assisted that we can neither will nor do any good thing without such help; if too, he believes that this is that very grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ which makes us righteous through His righteousness, and not our own, so that our true righteousness is that which we have of Him, - then, so far as I can judge, there will remain no further controversy between us concerning the assistance we have from the grace of God.

7. Man’s Two Wills

Was then the Lord speaking of this question in these words, and not rather of men’s two wills, the good and the evil, calling one of these the good tree, and the other the corrupt tree, inasmuch as good works spring out of a good will, and evil ones out of an evil will…If, however, we were to suppose marriage to be the good tree, according to the Gospel simile which he had mentioned, then, of course, we must on the other hand assume fornication to be the corrupt tree, then undoubtedly a human being could never have been born in fornication.

Commentary:

a. But now the Manichaean flavor of Augustine’s argument manifests

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α St. Augustine, On Original Sin 3, NPNF 1, Vol. 5, pp. 237-238
β St. Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 43, p.300.
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itself: good wills produce good results, and bad wills produce bad ones. He does not consider the good or ill use of the natural will, but good or ill natural wills.

8. Posse Pecarre, Non Posse Non Pecarre, Posse non Pecarre, Non Posse Pecarre

Let Pelagius, therefore, cease at last to deceive both himself and others by his disputations against the grace of God. It is not on account of only one of these three – that is to say, of the ‘Capacity’ of a good will and work – that the grace of God towards us ought to be proclaimed; but also on account of the good ‘will’ and ‘work’ themselves...For God has not only given us the ability and aids it, but He further works in us ‘to will and to do.’(Philippians 2:13)⁷

...to be able not to sin, and not to be able to sin; to be able not to die, and not to be able to die; to be able not to forsake good. For the first man was able not to sin, was able not to die, was able not to forsake good. Are we to say that he who had such a free will could not sin?... Therefore the first liberty of the will was to be able not to sin, the last will be much greater, not to be able to sin; the first immortality was to be able not to die, the last will be much greater, not to be able to die; the first was the power of perseverance, to be able not to forsake good – the last will be the felicity of perseverance, not to be able to forsake good. ⁸

Commentary:

a. Augustine has now formulated part of his four-fold exposition of the states of will in which man passes. These are:

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⁸ St. Augustine, On Rebuke and Grace, 33, p. 485.
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(1) Before the Fall:
Man’s will is able to choose between good and evil, it is possible for man not to sin: thus the possibility of choosing is equal to the possibility of not sinning:

*Posse elgere = posse pecarre.*

(2) After the Fall and Before Conversion:
By the inheritance of death and sin, man is no longer able not to sin. The possibility of choice is now defined by sin:

*Posse elegere = non posse non pecarre.*

(3) After the Fall, After Conversion, and Before Glory:
Man’s choice is now able, with the aid of grace, not to sin. It is possible not to sin:

*Posse eligere = posse non peccare*

(4) Glory
In the presence of God’s absolute simplicity, there are no multiple goods from which to choose, and no possibility of evil. It is not possible to sin, but likewise, not possible to choose.

*Non posse peccare = non posse eligere.*

b. Thus, throughout the consideration of the will, choice is defined in terms of a dialectical opposition between good and evil.

D. Predestination and Foreknowledge

1. The Coterminality of the Elect and Reprobate:
   Augustine’s Exegesis

‘But,’ says he, ‘not as the offense so also is the free gift. For if, through the offence of one, many be dead, much more the grace of God,
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and the gift by grace, which is by One Man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many.' (Romans 5:15) Not many more, that is many more men, for there are not more persons justified than condemned; but it runs, much more hath abounded; inasmuch as, while Adam produced sinners from his one sin, Christ has by His grace procured free forgiveness even for the sins which men have of their own accord added by actual transgression to the original sin in which they were born…

But observe more attentively what he says, that ‘through the offence of one, many are dead.’ For why should it be on account of the sin of one, and not rather on account of their own sins, if this passage is to be understood of imitation, and not of propagation? But mark what follows: ‘And not as it was by one that sinned, so is the gift: for the judgment was by one to condemnation, but the grace is of many offences unto justification.’ (Romans 5:16) Now let them tell us, where there is room in these words for imitation. ‘By one,’ says he, ‘to condemnation.’ By one what except one sin? 

Commentary:

a. Augustine’s exegesis now begins to show its indebtedness to his overall theory, for the “one” he refers to as sin is not borne out by the Greek; “one” if the Greek referred to “sin” would be μιας, and not ενος as it actually is αµαπτια, or sin in Greek is feminine in gender. However, in the Latin, this exegesis is possible: unum peccatum. Of course, Augustine’s knowledge of Greek was very sketchy, so his error here is pardonable, but that only makes the persistence of this reading of the text on the part of the Second Europe’s scholars who do know the Greek more mystifying…unless of course one understands it as the deliberate application of the Gnostic tactic of changing the meaning of terms.

α St. Augustine, On Forgiveness of sins, and Baptism 15, p. 20.
2. Pharisee: Synergism and Some Questions

Let us drive away from our ears and minds those who say that we ought to accept the determination of our own free will and not pray to God to help us not to sin. By such darkness as this even the Pharisee was not blinded…He wished indeed for no addition to his own righteousness; but yet, by giving thanks to God, he confessed that all he had he had received from Him. Notwithstanding, he was approved, both because he asked for no further food of righteousness, as if he were already filled, and because he arrogantly preferred himself to the publican, who was hungering and thirsting after righteousness… And yet this is not a question about prayers alone, as if the energy of our will also should not be strenuously added. God is said to be ‘our helper: (Ps 11:17, 70:5) but nobody can be helped who does not make some effort of his own accord. For God does not work our salvation in us as if he were working in insensate stones, or in creatures in whom nature has placed neither reason nor will. Why, however, He helps one man, but not another; or why one man so much, and another so much; or why one man in one way, and another in another, - He reserves to Himself according to the method of His own most secret justice, and to the excellency of His power.’

3. The Relationship of the Attributes of Predestination and Foreknowledge

This being the case, ever since the time when by one man sin thus entered into this world, and death by sin, and so it passed through to all men, up to the end of this carnal generation and perishing world, the children of which beget and are begotten, there never has existed, nor ever will exist, a human being of whom, placed in this life or ours, it could be said that he had no sin at all, with the exception of the one Mediator, who reconciles us to our Maker through the forgiveness of sins. Now this same Lord ours has never yet refused, at any period of the human race,
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nor to the last judgment will He ever refuse, this His healing to those whom, in His most sure foreknowledge and future loving-kindness, He has predestinated to reign with Himself to life eternal. α

…and that they are not helped by (the grace of God), has its cause likewise in themselves, not in God, whether they be predestinated to condemnation, on account of the iniquity of their pride…β

Commentary:

a. Once the divine simplicity is admitted, consequences inevitably follow in the relationship of the attributes to each other, as we saw in the previous lecture. All attributes are metaphysically identical, they are the same thing.

b. But with this fact established, the question in the narrower issue of divine grace and election then becomes one of the proper ordo theologiae by which to consider the relationship of two attributes in particular: foreknowledge and predestination: which comes first in the scheme of God’s relationship with the world, foreknowledge, or predestination? Does God predestinate on the basis of His foreknowledge, or foreknow on the basis of whom He predestines? This question will now begin to plague Western theology, and it is important to note that it arises out of the doctrine of God in Augustine’s theology. His own answer is that predestination is dependent on foreknowledge, though logically, and ultimately, the reverse must be true: if all, as Augustine affirms, who are first called by God actually convert to Christ, then foreknowledge depends upon predestination.

4. The Ordo Theologiae: Christology Subordinate to the

α St. Augustine, On Forgiveness of Sins, and Baptism, 47, p. 63.

β St. Augustine, On Forgiveness of Sins, and Baptism 26, p. 55.
You cannot therefore attribute to God the cause of any human fault. For of all human offences, the cause is pride. For the conviction and removal of this a great remedy comes from heaven. God in mercy humbles Himself, descends from above, and displays to man, lifted up by pride, pure and manifest grace in very manhood, which He took upon Himself out of vast love for those who partake of it. For, not even did even this One, so conjoined to the Word of God that by that conjunction he became at once the one Son of God and the same One the one Son of man, act by the antecedent merits of His own will. It behooved Him, without doubt, to be one; had there been two or three or more, if this could have been done, it would not have come from the pure and simple gift of God, but from man's free will and choice.

Unless, therefore, we obtain not simply determination of will, which is freely turned in this direction and that, and has its place amongst those natural goods which a bad man may use badly; but also a good will, which has its place among those goods of which it is impossible to make a bad use…It would indeed be a strange thing if the will could so stand in some mean as to be neither good nor bad; for we either love righteousness, and it is good, and if we love it more, more good…who can hesitate to affirm that when the will loves not righteousness in any way at all, it is not only a bad, but even a wholly depraved will? Since therefore the will is either good or bad, and since of course we have not the bad will from God, it remains that we have of God a good will…Forasmuch then as our turning away from God is our own act, and this is evil will…

In these terms, then, the argument is stated: 'But they who deny the transmission of sin endeavor to impugn it thus: If (say they) Adam's sin injured even those who do not sin, therefore Christ's righteousness also profits even those who do not believe; because, 'In like manner, nay,
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much more,' he says, are men saved by one, than they had previously perished by one.®

**Commentary:**

a. The full Christological implications of the debate are now squarely stated, and the debate revealed for what is really is, a dispute over person and nature. It is clear that Pelagius is now arguing exclusively on the side of person: since not all persons are in Christ, not all persons can be in Adam either. Note also his use of the Nestorian language of conjunction.

b. One may put the dilemma even more forcefully. Pelagius is unable to envision any kind of natural participation in Adam, and is therefore unwilling to admit any natural participation in Christ. The participation in each is wholly at the personal, and volitional, level. Therefore, the will is ultimately something personal for Pelagius, and not natural, since it is not vitiated nor effected in any way by Adam’s sin; it is not, therefore, ultimately a natural will for Pelagius, all his protestations notwithstanding.

c. Conversely, Augustine is likewise not able to envision any type of natural participation in Christ. He seems not to have noticed what was obvious for an Origen or a St. Gregory of Nyssa: the mere fact of Christ’s human nature and its consubstantiality with all men gave a certain irresistibility to His Resurrection: all men will be raised by Christ whether or not they wish to be so.

It appeared to you absurd to say that anything was possible of which no example ever occurred, - although I suppose you would not hesitate to admit that no camel ever passed through a needle’s eye, and yet He said

® Ibid., III.2,p.69.
that even this was possible with God; you may read too that twelve thousand legions of angels could possibly have fought for Christ and rescued Him from suffering, but in fact did not; you may read that it was possible for the nations to be exterminated at once out of the land which was given to the children of Israel, and yet that God willed it to be gradually effected. And one may meet with a thousand other incidents, the past or the future possibility of which we might readily admit, and yet be unable to produce any proofs of their having ever really happened.

“God is a substance, yea, the height of substance and only true substance of the reasonable creature.

Likewise did He undergo death of His own power, and this is our price which He paid to redeem us from death. Now, this truth their contention labours hard to make of none effect; for human nature is maintained by them to be such, that with free will it wants no such ransom in order to be translated from the power of darkness and of him who has the power of death, into the kingdom of Christ the Lord. And yet, when the Lord drew near His passion, He said, ‘Behold, the prince of this world cometh and shall find nothing in me,’ (St. John 14:3) – and therefore no sin, of course, on account of which he might exercise dominion over Him, so as to destroy Him, “But,' added He, ‘that the world may know that I do the will of my Father arise, let us go hence,’ (St. John 14:31) as much as to say, I am going to die, not through the necessity of sin, but in voluntariness of obedience.

Commentary:

a. Here St. Augustine gives the strongest indication, prior to St. Maximus, that Christ in His human will voluntarily willed the Passion and

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ᵃ On the Spirit and the Letter 1.; pp. 83-84
ᶜ Ibid., 26, p.130.
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His own death. Clearly, then St. Augustine perceives the resolution of the difficulty with Pelagius might in fact be Christological. Unfortunately, his dialectical commitments prevent him from taking full advantage of this insight.

Such good then as this, seeking after God, there was not a man found who pursued it, no, not one; but this was in that class of men which predestinated to destruction. It was upon such that God looked down in His foreknowledge, and passed sentence...

Your author, however, does not explain to us how they are good, whilst yet ‘there is none good save one, that is, God.’ Accordingly, the man who asked ‘what good thing he was to do.’ (St. Matt 19:16) was admonished to seek Him by whose grace he might be good; to whom also to be good is nothing else than to be Himself, because He is unchangeably good, and cannot be evil at all. β

Commentary:

a. Here is the other pole of St. Augustine’s thought, its Neoplatonic pole. We note now how the ordo theologiae is beginning to effect the exposition of his doctrine of predestination, for when he speaks of God, it is in terms either of the simplicity, or of the Father himself; he seems not to notice that if one were to be fully Trinitarian, one would have to expound the doctrine in terms of the predestinating activity of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

b. Thus, the ordo theologiae of his doctrine of God – Essence, attributes, and persons – is now showing other problematical ramifications: since attributes are considered before the persons, the doctrine of predestination is considered before Christological considerations, and Christology will be expounded from the standpoint of predestination and the underlying dialectic which accompanies his doctrine of the divine

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essence.

For it is not to be supposed, however greatly the apostle Paul excelled others as a members of Christ’s body, that the very Head itself of the entire body did not receive more and ampler graces still, whether in His flesh or His soul as man; for such a created nature did the Word of God assume as His own into the unity of His Person, that He might be our Head and we His body.\(^a\)

**Commentary:**

a. The effect of the above considerations now begin to take hold: for in His human nature, Christ is the recipient of graces, just as any other man; His human nature is not the source of those graces to other men.

Pelagius, pretending to expound the Apostle Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, argues in these words: ‘If Adam’s sin injured those who have not sinned, then also Christ’s righteousness profits those who do not believe.’\(^b\)

5. **Commentary:**

a. The dialectical nature of the debate is now made clear with this quotation of the argument of Pelagius. This dialectical pole may be stated in terms of a Universal *apokatastasis*, as in Origen, or a Limited Atonement, as with Pelagius: *either* Christ’s work extends to all men in the manner, since all men are of one nature; *or* Christ’s work extends only to

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\(^a\) St. Augustine, *On the Proceedings of Pelagius* 32, p.198

\(^b\) St. Augustine, *On Original Sin* 24, p. 245.
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the persons who either will to be righteous and follow Christ, as in Pelagius, or the persons predestinated to Christ, as with the final Augustinian position. The opposition, in short, is between persons and nature, or even more dramatically, between the Many and the One.

For it was in no wise to be feared that the human nature taken up by God the Word in that ineffable manner into a unity of person, would sin by free choice of will, since that taking up itself was such that the nature of man so taken up by God would admit into itself no movement of an evil will. Through this Mediator God makes known that He makes those whom He redeemed by His blood from evil, everlasting good; and Him He in such wise assumed that He never would be evil, and not being made out of evil, would always be good.

“The first man had not that grace by which he should never will to be evil; but assuredly he had that in which if he willed to abide he would never be evil; and without which, moreover, he could not by free will be good, but which nevertheless, by free will he could forsake…Because such was the nature of the aid, that he could forsake it when he would, and that he could continue in it if he would; but not such that it could be brought about that he would. The first is the grace which was given to the first Adam; but more powerful than this is that in the second Adam…the second, therefore, can do more than this, since by it it is even effected that he will, and will so much, and love with such ardour, that by the will of the Spirit he overcomes the will of the flesh, that lusteth in opposition to it. a

Moreover, the most illustrious Light of predestination and grace is the Saviour Himself, the Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus. And, pray, by what preceding merits of its own, whether of works or of faith, did the human nature which is in Him procure for itself that it should be this? Let this have an answer, I beg. That man, whence did He deserve this, - to be assumed by the word co-eternal with the Father into

a St. Augustine, On Rebuke and Grace, 31, p. 484.
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unity of person, and be the only-begotten Son of God?..

Therefore in Him who is our Head, let there appear to be the very fountain of grace, whence, according to the measure of every man, He diffuses Himself through all His members. It is by grace that every man from the beginning of his faith becomes a Christian, by which grace that one man from His beginning became Christ...God certainly foreknew that He would do these things. This, therefore, is that same predestination of the saints which shone forth in the Saint of saints; and who is there of those who rightly understand the declarations of the truth that can deny this predestination? For we have learned that the Lord of glory Himself was predestinated in so far as the man that was made the Son of God. The teacher of the Gentiles exclaims, in the beginning of his epistles, 'Paul, a servant of Jesus Christ, called to be an apostle, separated unto the gospel of God (which He had promised afore by His prophets in the Holy Scriptures) concerning His Son, which was made of the seed of David according to the flesh, who was predestinated the Son of God in power, according to the Spirit of sanctification by the resurrection of the dead.' (Romans 1:1) Therefore Jesus was predestinated, so that he who was to be the Son of David according to the flesh should yet be in power the Son of God, according to the flesh should yet be in power the Son of God, according to the Spirit of sanctification, because He was born of the Holy Spirit and of the Virgin Mary.  

There is no more eminent instance, I say, of predestination than the Mediator Himself. If any believer wishes thoroughly to understand this doctrine, let him consider Him, and in Him he will find himself also...Therefore He predestinated both Him and us, because both in Him that He might be our head, and in us that we should be His body, He

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β Ibid., 67, p. 552.
α St. Gregory the Theologian, Fourth Theological Oration, PG 108C-109B.
foreknew that our merits would not precede, but that His doings should.\textsuperscript{8}

These very suggestive passages highlight the final end to which Augustine’s exposition of Christology in terms of the predestinational doctrine have come. First, Christ’s human will is now being defined in exactly the same categories as Adam’s fallen will, i.e., in terms of an opposition of the human will to the divine. And as in individual men. God’s will overcomes the human will. Christ is thus the most “illustrative example”, one example among many examples, of a general phenomenon. In other words, predestination is not considered from the standpoint of Christology, but Christology form the standpoint of Predestination: Essence, attributes, and finally, persons, in this case, Christ.

One must also note that Augustine, however, has of all the fathers to date the clearest conception of two wills in Christ. Let us recall that for St. Gregory of Nazianzus, the principle of opposition of wills in Christ was not acceptable, for Christ would not “oppose will to will.”\textsuperscript{6} For St. Augustine, Christ is the best example of our own will’s opposition to God; thus, the internal dialectical of opposition of divine and human wills would seem to be the precise point he wishes to establish. And thus, Christ’s predestination is also illustrative, the most illustrative example of our predestination, because He, in His humanity, is predestined and by grace Son of God.

6. The Ordo Theologiae: Ecclesiology Subordinate to the Theory

...he prefers disputing all things rather than to pray, and say: ‘Give me understanding, that I may learn Thy commandments.’ (Ps. 119:73)…

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He confesses that ‘sins which have been committed do notwithstanding require to be divinely expiated, and that the Lord must be entreated because of them,’ – that is, for the purpose of course of obtaining pardon; ‘because that which has been done cannot,’ it is his own admission, ‘be undone,’ by that ‘power of nature and will of man’ which he talks about so much. From this necessity, therefore, it follows that a man must pray to be forgiven. That a man, however, requires to be helped not to sin, he had nowhere admitted; I read no such admission in this passage; he keeps a strange silence on this subject altogether; although the Lord’s Prayer enjoins upon us the necessity of praying both that our debts may be remitted to us, and that we may not be led into temptation, - the one petition entreating that past offences may be atoned for; the other, that future ones may be avoided. Now, although this is never done unless our will be assistant, yet our will alone is not enough to secure its being done…

He then enumerates those ‘who not only lived without sin, but are described as having led holy lives, - Abel, Enoch, Melchizidek, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joshua the son of Nun, Phineas, Semauel, Nathan, Elijah, Joseph, Elisha, Micaiah, Daniel, Hananiad, Azariah, Mishael, Mordecai, Simeon, Joseph to whom the Virgin Mary was espoused, John.’ And he adds the names of some women, - ‘Deborah, Anna the mother of Samuel, Judith, Esther, the other Anna, daughter of Panuel, Elisabeth, and also the mother of our Lord and Saviour, for of her,’ he says, ‘we must needs allow that her piety had no sin in it.’ We must accept the holy virgin Mary, concerning whom I wish to raise no question when it touches the subject of sins, out of honour to the Lord; for from Him we know what abundance of grace for overcoming sin in every particular was conferred upon her who had the merit to conceive and beat Him who undoubtedly had no sin.

Let us see what he makes out of it. ‘whatever,’ says he, ‘is fettered by natural necessity is deprived of determination of will and deliberation.’

\(^a\) St. Augustine On Nature and Grace 19-20, p.127.

\(^b\) Ibid, 42, p. 135.
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Well, now, here lies a question: for it is the height of absurdity for us to say that it does not belong to our will that we wish to be happy, on the ground that it is absolutely impossible for us to be unwilling to be happy, by reason of some indescribable but amiable coercion of our nature: nor dare we maintain that God has not the will but the necessity of righteousness, because He cannot will to sin.ý

‘Now, if we acknowledge that this Saviour, and that healing remedy of His by which the Word was made flesh in order to dwell among us, are required by small and great, - by the crying infant and the hoary-minded man alike, - then, in fact, the whole controversy of the point between us is settled.δ

...the holy Church shall arrive at last at that condition of most immaculate purity which all holy men desire; and that it may in the world to come, and in a state unmixed with anything of evil men, and undisturbed by any law of sin resisting the law of the mind, lead the purest life in a divine eternity.

As for what they say, that some men, by the use of their reason, have lived, and do live, in this world without sin, we should wish that it were true, we should strive to make it true, we should pray that it be true; but, at the same time, we should confess that it is not yet true.

Forasmuch, however, as there is owing to the defects that have entered our nature, not to the constitution of our nature, a certain tendency to sin, a man should listen, and in order that the said necessity may cease to exist, learn to say to God, ‘Bring Thou me out of my necessities.’ (Ps 25:17)α

Pelagius was charged with having said: ‘That the Church here is without spot or wrinkle.’ It was on this point that the Donatists also were constantly at conflict with us in our conference. We used, in their case, to lay especial stress on the mixture of bad men with good, like that of the chaff with the wheat; and we were led to this idea by the similitude of the

ý Ibid., 53, p. 139.
δ Ibid., p. 142.
α Ibid., respectively pp. 148; 78-79,149.
threshing floor. We might apply the same illustration in answer to our present opponents, unless indeed they would have the Church consist only of good men, whom they assert to be without spot or wrinkle. If this be their meaning, then I repeat the same words as I quoted just now; for how can they be members of the Church, of whom the voice of a truthful humility declares, ‘If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us?’ (1 St. John 1:8) or how could the Church offer up that prayer which the Lord taught her to use, ‘Forgive us our debts,’ if in this world the Church is without spot or blemish? In short, they must themselves submit to be strictly catechized respecting themselves; do they really allow that they have any sins of their own? If their answer is in the negative, then they must be plainly told that they are deceiving themselves, and the truth is not in them. If, however, they shall acknowledge that they do commit sin, what is this but a confession of their own wrinkle and spot? They therefore are not members of the Church; because the church is without spot and wrinkle, while they have both spot and wrinkle…

...in very deed God is now in His mercy and truth bringing it about that His Holy Church should be conducted to that perfect state in which she is to remain without spot or wrinkle for evermore. But between the laver, where all past stains and deformities are removed, and the kingdom, where the Church will remain for ever without any spot or wrinkle, there is this present intermediate time of prayer, during which her cry must or necessity be: ‘Forgive us our debts.’...The holy Church, which is now in process of cleansing, shall continue in a sinless state for ever; this is clear from the evidence, so far as I can from an opinion.ɑ

The Calvinist Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield has this to say about Augustine’s theory of grace:

Thus, although Augustine’s theology had a very strong churchly element within it, it was, on the side that is presented in the controversy against

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Pelagianism, distinctly anti-ecclesiastical.β

Commentary:

a. As in Christ, so in the Church. The ordo theologiae forced upon him in his doctrine of God by the borrowing of the Neoplatonic conception of simplicity also requires that ecclesiology take a subservient position to predestination, since the Church is One with Christ.

b. This, however, means the Church is subject to all the structures regarding human nature in general since the fall. More particularly, as man in this life is incapable of sinning, so the Church in this life has its holiness compromised by the sinfulness of some of her individual members.

c. Thus, there is yet another confusion of person and nature, for now the individual personal sinfulness of members of the Church can detract from and mitigate the Holiness of the Church. One is not made holy by the Church, but more by predestination to the ultimate goal of glory.

d. One may therefore also view the extended polemic against Pelagianism as an extended meditation also on the second note of the Church: holiness, just as the polemic with Donatism is an extended meditation upon the first note.

7. Irresistable Grace

Now as touching this kind of teaching, the Lord also says: ‘every man that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father, cometh unto me.’ (St. John 6:45) Of the man, therefore, who has not come, it cannot be

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correctly said: “He has heard and has learned that it is his duty to come to
Him, but he is not willing to do what he has learned.” It is indeed
absolutely improper to apply such a statement to that method of teaching,
whereby God teaches by grace. For if, as the Truth says, ‘every man that
hath learned cometh,’ it follows, of course, that whoever does not come
has not learned. But who can fail to see that a man’s coming is by the
determination of his will? This determination, however, may stand alone,
if the man does not come; but if he does come, it cannot be without
assistance...By this mode, therefore, of divine instruction, volition itself,
and performance itself, are assisted, and not merely the natural ‘capacity’
of willing and performing. For if nothing but this ‘capacity’ of ours were
assisted by this grace, the Lord would rather have said, ‘Every an that
hath heard and hath learned of the Father may possibly come unto me.’
…But every one who has learned of the Father not only has the possibility
of coming, but comes; and in this result are already included the motion
of the capacity, the affection of the will, and the effect of the action.\footnote{St. Augustine, On the Grace of Christ 15, p. 223.}

E. A Final Note on the Relationship of the Augustinian Ordo
Theologiae and Predestination:

We are now in a position to expand the outline of the Augustinian
doctrine of God given in main to encompass these new implications
manifest in his exposition of the doctrine of grace and predestination:

1. The Divine Essence:

   a. The divine essence is simple by definition.

   b. If the divine essence is simple by definition, then several
      things follows:

      1) The essence is equivalent to the attributes both
         severally and individually.
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2) The divine essence is equivalent to the persons, both severally and individually.

Like the Neoplatonic One, the simplicity of the divine essence transcends the multiplicity of the divine essence transcends the multiplicity of the divine pluralities, the attributes and persons, as unity transcends multiplicity. Several things follow:

2. The Attributes:

a. Structurally, the attributes are subordinated to the divine essence, but

b. The attributes have the same ontological status and are in fact identical with the divine essence and therefore,

c. The divine attributes are identical with each other and are therefore wholly indistinguishable. From this, four results obtain:

1) The will of God is the Essence of God.
2) To predestine is the same as to foreknow.
3) The spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son because the Father and the Son share the common attribute of life, and the Father's personal feature of causality has been given to the Son on that basis.
4) There is no distinction of God's acts in eternity and in economy: what he does in Economy is a direct and faithful mirror of His eternal disposition.

3. The Persons:

a. At first final level of discourse, the persons are subordinated to the attributes because:

1) Christ is subordinate to an overarching theory and dialectic which concentrates on the divine attribute of
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predestination, and

2) The spirit’s procession from the Father has been given to the Son because the Father and the Son share common attributes. And within this level of discourse, and effective subordinated of the Spirit to the Son to the Father occurs,

a) The father having no distinctions;

b) The son having one distinction, that of being caused;

c) And of the Spirit having two distinctions, those of being caused by two different classes of causes.

b. The Holy Spirit, because He proceeds from the Father and the Son, becomes the new personal seat of unity in the Trinity in Hegelian fashion, because

1) The name “holy spirit” defines the divine essence by two of its attributes, holiness and spirituality, and

2) Is thus capable of signifying the entire Trinity.

His theory of predestination owes as much to his peculiar triadology and to its inversions of the ordo theologiae as it does to anything else: to accept the filioque therefore is to accept this theory and its own inherent dialectical inevitabilities.

The “primary” attributes are those such as omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, asyiet, and so on. The “secondary” attributes are those such as goodness, justice, mercy, wisdom, etc.

EXCURSUS ON DONATISM

We will begin the examination of Augustine’s dispute with Donatism by a brief reprise of ecclesiological issues already addressed previously in the course of these lectures.
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A. St. Cyprian

As was seen in the examination of the ecclesiology of St. Cyprian of Carthage, the necessary locus for the performance and efficacy of any sacrament was the unity of the Church. That is, *no* sacrament possessed any efficacy outside of the Church, since properly sacraments belong to the Church. Thus, there is no question, on St. Cyprian’s view, of the “validity” or “efficacy” of heretical baptism, since such categories are not applicable to the unity of the Church.

B. Pope Stephen 1

At the other end of the spectrum, it will be recalled that St. Cyprian’s opponent, Pope Stephen 1, maintained that heretics were not to be rebaptized, but received into the communion of the Church by the laying on of hands. However, it should be stressed that Pope Stephen himself was not tying this view to a general statement of the efficacy or non-efficacy, to the validity or non-validity of sacraments performed outside the unity of the Church. His contention merely was that this had been the traditional practice of the Church at Rome; he does not delve deeply into the reasons for that practice.

C. The Peculiarity of the post-Nicene Semi-Arian Schism

Yet a third difficulty was encountered with the semi-Arian schism during the period in the aftermath of the First Ecumenical Council of Nicea. Here the problematical nature of St. Cyprian’s ecclesiology begin to manifest itself in a particularly acute form, for granted that the Nicene party was orthodox and therefore within the unity of the Catholic Church at
that time, did this mean the Semi-Arians were not? Does this mean that the Cappadocian Fathers, or for that matter, any right-believing orthodox Christian who nevertheless did not accept the Nicene formula initially – does all this mean that they were outside the Church until later reconciled? If so, why were many, if not most, reconciled not by rebaptism, but by laying on of hands, etc? Is this act to be explained as an act of "economy" on the part of the orthodox? Or does the explanation lie in the fact that there was a schism, but that it was not from the Church but within it? This approach too is fraught with difficulties, since to maintain it one would come perilously close to saying that no schism can ever be genuine schism, a genuine severing from the Church.

D. St. Cyril and St. John Chrysostom: Out of Communion with Each Other

Yet another peculiarity has been encountered, and that is the fact that for some twenty years, during the height of the Nestorian controversy, Sts. Cyril of Alexandria and John Chrysostom are out of communion with one another, Cyril having been at the Synod of the oak which deposed Chrysostom. And it was only in 438 that Cyril restored Chrysostom's name to the diptychs. Was one or the other outside the Church?

E. St. Augustine’s Doctrine of Validity and Efficacy: A Search for Canonical Uniformity rather than a Theory about Grace Outside the Church?

In all the above it should be apparent that there is a search for a universal criterion of Catholic unity. This search, while by no means completed by him, was nevertheless most comprehensively undertaken by
The Apparatus

St. Augustine. Therefore, his terminology of “Validity” and “efficacy” and so on should be read not only as attempts to formulate the doctrine of the objective efficacy of sacraments, but also as an attempt to resolve an ecclesiological question which Donatism was posing: can the moral unworthiness of individual ministers corrupt and vitiate the objective holiness of the sacraments? As will be seen, Augustine’s answer here is at odds with the ecclesiology manifest in his dispute with Pelagianism.

So far from Cyprian’s authority being in their favour, it tends directly to their refutation and discomfiture.⁹

…it has already been said that the grace of baptism can be conferred outside the Catholic communion, just as it can be also there retained. But no one of the Donatists themselves denies that even apostates retain the grace of baptism; for when they return within the pale of the Church, and are converted through repentance, it is never given to them a second time, and so it is ruled that it never could have been lost. So those, too, who in the sacrilege of schism depart from the communion of the Church, certainly retain the grace of baptism, which they received before their departure, seeing that, in the case of their return, it is not again conferred on them; whence it is proved, that what they had received while within the unity of the Church, they could not have lost in their separation. But if it can be retained outside, why may it not also be given there? If you say, ‘It is not rightly given without the pale,’ we answer, ‘As it is not rightly retained, and yet is in some sense retained, so it is not indeed rightly given, but yet it is given.’ But as, by reconciliation to unity, given, but yet it is given.⁹ But as, by reconciliation to unity, that begins to be profitably possessed which was possessed to no profit in exclusion from unity, so, by the same reconciliation, that begins to be profitable which without it was given to no profit…And as the baptized person, if he depart from the unity of the Church, does not thereby lose the sacrament of baptism, so also he who is ordained, if he depart from the unity of the Church, does

⁹ St. Augustine, On Baptism Against the Donatists, p. 411.
not lose the sacrament of conferring baptism. For neither sacrament may be wronged. If a sacrament necessarily becomes void in the case of the wicked, both must become void; if it remain valid with the wicked, this must be so with both...For as those who return to the Church, if they had been baptized before their secession, are not rebaptized, so those who return, having been ordained before their secession, are certainly not ordained again; but either they again exercise their former ministry, if the interests of the Church require it, or if they do not exercise it, at any rate they retain the sacrament of their ordination.α

We do not therefore say to them, ‘Abstain from giving baptism,’ but ‘Abstain from giving it in schism.’ Nor do we say to those whom we see them on the point of baptizing, ‘Do not receive the baptism,’ but ‘Do not receive it in schism.’ For if any one were compelled by urgent necessity, being unable to find a Catholic from whom to receive baptism, and so, while preserving Catholic peace in his heart, should receive from one without the pale of Catholic unity the sacrament which he was intending to receive within its pale, this man, should he forthwith depart this life, we deem to be none other than a Catholic...

There are two propositions, moreover, which we affirm, - that baptism exists in the Catholic Church, and that in it alone can it be rightly received, - both of which the Donatists deny. Likewise there are two other propositions which we affirm, - that baptism exists among the Donatists, but that with them it is not rightly received, - of which two they strenuously confirm the former, that baptism exists with them; but they are unwilling to allow the latter, that in their Church it cannot be rightly received."β

He would commit a grievous sin, in matters concerning the salvation of his soul, in the mere fact of preferring uncertainty to certainty."β

...not that they should receive that which they did not as yet possess, but that what they had received to no advantage in schism, and were already in possession of, should be of profit to them, this God really

α St. Augustine, On Baptism Against the Donatists, 1.:p. 412.
αβ Ibid., p.412
β Ibid., p. 414.
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confers and bestows through the catholic communion on those who come from any heresy or schism in which they received the baptism of Christ; viz, not that they should begin to receive the sacrament of baptism as not possessing it before, but that what already possessed should now begin to profit them...

How much more, then, are we bound to consider it, when we find that this same party to Donatus is split up into many most minute fractions, all which small sections of the body blame the one much larger portion which has Primianus for its head, because they receive the baptism of the followers of Maximianus; while each endeavours to maintain that it is the sole receptacle of true baptism, which exists nowhere else, neither in the whole of the world where the Catholic Church extends itself, nor in that larger main body of the Donatists, nor even in the other minute sections, but only in itself.y

What will it profit a man that he has sound faith, or perhaps only soundness in the sacrament of faith, when the soundness of his charity is done away with by the fatal wound of schism, so that by the overthrow of it the other points, which were in themselves sound, are brought into the infection of death? To prevent which, the mercy of God, through the unity of His holy Church, does not cease striving that they may come and be healed by the medicine of reconciliation, through the bond of peace...

They think within themselves that they show very great subtlety in asking whether the baptism of Christ in the party of the Donatus makes men sons or not; so that, if we allow that it does make them sons, they may assert that theirs is the Church, the mother which could give birth to sons in the baptism of Christ; and since the Church must be one, they may allege that ours is no Church.a

For neither is it their separation that generates, but what they have retained of the essence of the Church; and if they were to go on to abandon this, they would lose the power of generation. The generation, then in each case proceeds from the Church...

y Ibid., 6-8. p. 415.
a Ibid., p. 417.
They then ask also, ‘Whether sins are remitted in baptism in the party of Donatus:’ so that, if we say that they are remitted, they may answer, then the Holy Spirit is there: for when by the wreathing of our Lord the holy Spirit was given to the disciples, He then went on to say, and of the Holy Ghost.’ Whosesoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whosesoever sins ye retain, they are retained.’ And if it is so, they say, then our communion is the Church of Christ; for the Holy Spirit does not work the remission of sins except in the Church. And if our communion is the Church of Christ, then your communion is not the Church of Christ.⁷

Can it be that schism does not involve hatred of one’s brethren? Who will maintain this, when both the origin of, and perseverance in, schism consist in nothing else save hatred of the brethren?⁸

For we reply, We do not acknowledge any baptism of yours; for it is not the baptism of schismatics or heretics, but of God and of the Church, wheresoever it may be found, and whithersoever it may be transferred…

For it is the Church that gives birth to all, either within her pale, of her own womb; or beyond it, of the seed of her bridegroom, - either of herself, or of her handmaid). But Esau, even though born of the lawful wife, was separated from the people of God because he quarreled with his brother, And Asher, born indeed by the authority of a wife, but yet of a handmaid, was admitted to the land of promise on account of his brotherly good-will. Whence also it was not the being born of a handmaid, but his quarreling with his brother, that stood in the way of Ishmael, to cause his separation from the people of God; and he received no benefit from the power of the wife, whose son he rather was, inasmuch as it was in virtue of her conjugal rights that he was both conceived in and born of the womb of the handmaid.⁹

For at that time, before the consent of the whole Church had declared authoritatively, by the decree of a plenary Council, what practice should

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⁷ Ibid, p. 418.
⁸ Ibid, p. 419.
⁹ Ibid., p. 421
be followed in this matter, it seemed to him (St. Cyprian) in common with about eighty of his fellow bishops of the African churches, that every man who had been baptized outside the communion of the Catholic Church should, on joining the Church, be baptized anew. And I take it, that the reason why the Lord did not reveal the error in this to a man of such eminence was, that his pious humility and charity in guarding the peace and health of the Church might be made manifest...For when a bishop of so important a Church, himself a man of so great merit and virtue endowed with such excellence of heart and power of eloquence, entertained an opinion about baptism different from that which was to be confirmed by a more diligent searching into the truth; though many of his colleagues held what was not yet made manifest by authority, but was sanctioned by the past custom of the Church, and afterwards embraced by the whole Catholic world; yet under these circumstances he did not sever himself, by refusal of communion, from the others who though differently, and indeed never ceased to urge on the others that they should 'forbear one another in love, endeavoring to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace.'

“Cyprian,’ they say, ‘whose great merits and vast learning we all know, decreed in a Council (Carthage, 256) with many of his fellow-bishops contributing their several opinions, that all heretics and schismatics, that is, all who are severed from the communion of the one Church, are without baptism; and therefore, whosoever has joined the communion of the Church after being baptized by them must be baptized in the Church.’

Who can fail to be aware that the sacred canon of scripture, both of the Old and New Testament, is confined within its own limits, and that it stands so absolutely in a superior position to all later letters of the bishops, that about it we can hold no manner of doubt or disputation whether what is confessedly contained in it is right and true; but that all

† Ibid., p. 425.
‡ Ibid., p. 427.
the letters of bishops which have been written or are being written, since the closing of the canon, are liable to be refuted if there by anything contained in them which strays from the truth, either by the discourse of some one who happens to be wiser in the matter than themselves, or by the weightier authority and more learned experience of other bishops, or by the authority of councils; and further, that the Councils themselves, which are held in the several districts and provinces, must yield, beyond all possibility of doubt, to the authority of plenary Councils which are formed for the whole Christian world...

But if yours is the true opinion about baptism, Cyprian and the others, in conjunction with whom ye set forth that he held such a Council, remained in unity with those who thought otherwise; why, therefore, have ye broken the bond of peace?...All of these catholic unity embraces in her motherly breast, bearing each other’s burdens by turns, and endeavoring to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace, till God should reveal to one or other or them any error in their views. If the one party held the truth, were they infected by the others, or no? If the others held the truth, were they infected by the first, or no? Choose which ye will. If there was contamination, the Church even then ceased to exist; answer me, therefore, whence came ye forth hither? But if the Church remained, the good are in no wise contaminated by the bad in such communion; answer me, therefore, why did ye break the bond?

Wherefore let the Donatists consider this on point, which surely none can fail to see, that if the authority of Cyprian is to be followed, it is to be followed rather in maintaining unity than in altering the custom of the Church.

The remarks are cited at length because they all have one thing in common: St. Augustine is searching for a universal standard by which all sacramental acts outside the Church may be comprehended, and that standard he finds in charity, which is found in the unity of the Church, as

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α Ibid. p. 429.
β Ibid., p. 432.
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opposed to the extreme moralism of Donatism. In this regard, it is instructive to note how the Donatists have themselves split into several factions, each denying the sacramental grace of each others’ factions. In other words, the Donatist approach ends in a complete collapse of the Church altogether, since one is never certain that any sacraments are being celebrated by a worthy celebrant.

F. An Eastern Orthodox Exposition of St. Augustine: Fr. Georges Florovsky.

The difficulty of Augustine’s formulation is in part due to the very nature of the Church herself. The eminent Fr. Georges Florovsky put the difficulty of St. Cyprian’s ecclesiology very succinctly in terms of a comparison with current existing Eastern Orthodox practice:

In many cases the Church receives adherents even without chrism and sometimes even clerics in their existing orders, which must all the more be understood and explained as recognizing the validity or reality of the corresponding rites performed over them ‘outside the Church.’ But, if sacraments are performed, it can only be by virtue of the Holy Spirit. Canonical rules establish or reveal a certain mystical paradox. In the form of her activity the Church bears witness to the extension of her mystical territory even beyond the canonical threshold; the ‘outside world’ does not begin immediately, St. Cyprian was right; the sacraments are accomplished only in The Church. But he defined this too hastily and narrowly. Must we not come to rather the opposite conclusion? Where the sacraments are accomplished there is the Church. St. Cyprian started from the silent supposition that the canonical and charismatic limits of the Church invariably coincide.⁹

⁹ Georges Florovsky, “The Boundaries of the Church”, Vol XIII, The Collected works of Georges Florovsky, p. 37,
This leads to him to an appreciation of the questions which St. Augustine poses in his confrontation with Donatism:

Are these canonical rules and acts subject to theological generalization? Is it possible to impute to them theological or dogmatic motives and grounds? Or do they rather represent only pastoral discretion and forebearance? Must we not understand the canonical mode of action rather as a forbearing silence concerning gracelessness than as a recognition of the reality of validity of schismatic rites? Is it then quite prudent to cite or introduce canonical facts into a theological argument?[^b]

This, in short, is the nature of Augustine’s approach, for rather than defining theological arguments by canonical practice, he seeks to standardize canonical practice by theological considerations of the nature of sacraments in general, and of their relationship to the Church. In short, the question is one of *ordo theologiae*: does the Church take precedence to the sacraments to the extent that no sacrament exists outside the Church, or do sacraments take precedence such that they give rise to, and to that extent, constitute the Church, or is the relationship reciprocal?

Thus, far from constituting a departure from Orthodox ecclesiology, as is often touted, St. Augustine’s formulation presents rather the opposite picture: not one of detachment of the sacraments from the Church, but of the “organic relation between the question of the validity of sacraments and the general doctrine concerning the Church.”[^gamma]

For Augustine, the sacramental mysteries as such belong *objectively* to the Church, quite apart from the worthiness of the celebrant, provided that their objective character – all those things proper to the *liturgical context* denoted by the proper “intention, form matter, and words”

[^b]: Ibid., pp. 37-38.
[^gamma]: Ibid., p. 41.
[^alpha]: Ibid.
[^beta]: ef. p. 42.
The Apparatus

of the sacrament – is retained. Thus, even in schismatic celebrations, it is Christ through His Spirit; it is indeed the *Church* which is active. “Thus, schismatic sacraments are valid because they are performed by the *Church*, not by the schism. In schism, it is the bond of peace which is broken and torn apart, not the unity of the sacraments in the Spirit.”

“Validity” thus connotes “actuality”, that is, the sacraments of schismatics are indeed really sacraments but they lack efficacy because of the fact of the schism itself. And here one detects the contradiction between his understanding of the Church and the grace of the sacraments and that of his understanding of free will, for in schism, the will is such that the reconciliation brought by the sacraments is rendered null and void by the will to schism itself. Validity is thus conjoined to Augustine’s understanding of sacramental “character”, that indelible sign or seal imprinted on the individual depart from the faith. Thus, Augustine’s sacramental understanding is far more capable of reconciling some the disturbing facts of church history enumerated in the main text than is the ecclesiology of St. Cyprian, for in the end. Cyprian’s ecclesiology reduces to an ecclesiology of “mutual recognition.”

VII. A SUMMARY OF AUGUSTINISM

These considerations of St. Augustine’s Trinitarian theology, his polemic with Pelagianism, and his equally determined denunciation of Donatism allow a perspective from which the whole of his theology may be approached. In what follows, an overview of that theology is offered by way of anticipating developments that will occupy our attention in subsequent texts.

A. Christology

In Augustine’s Trinitarian theology, it was demonstrated that the
persons are actually nothing more than attributes. As attributes, they are both identical with, yet opposed to, the divine essence. Thus, inspite of his intentions to the contrary, subsequent Latin theology conceives of the Incarnation in many instances as the incarnation of a divine attribute, not of the Second Person of the Trinity Himself. Thus, in art, Christ comes to be portrayed as a man with a halo, like any other saint. Artistically, the tendency is to view Christ as the “most illustrative example” of a general phenomenon. Ultimately, of course, Friederich Schleiermarcher will maintain that Christ is simply a man among other men who is uniquely psychologically receptive to the voice of the Father.

B. The Neoplatonic Pattern of the One-Many:

There is a recurring pattern in which one actually appears from many possibilities. It may be said that this pattern derives ultimately from those divine attributes and the several ways in which they are manifest in the world. For example, one aspect of Augustine’s doctrine which has not been touched upon at length is his conception of “pure futuribles”. These, in brief, are future events that do not take place, though they could or might have occurred. Portalie calls them “conditional futures.” In any case, since everything in God is an attribute, a pure futurible is likewise an attribute.

This affords a rather different perspective altogether from which to approach Augustine’s views on the Incarnation:

It is not enough so to refute them as to assert that this way, whereby God designed to liberate us through the mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, was both good and befitting the divine dignity, but we must also show that other possible means were not lacking on God’s part,

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* Eugene Portalie, op. cit., pp. 128-129.
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to whose power all things are equally subordinate, and yet that there was no other way more fitting, and no other needed for healing our misery. α

The nineteenth century Russian theologian Alexander Lisenko observes the following about this very passage:

Augustine not only does not place the teaching on God’s incarnation at the center of his system, but even seems not to recognize the absolute necessity of this fact for human salvation, presuming it possible that God has another means for saving people. β

In terms of the pure futuribles, then, it seems that, had conditions not been as they were in the fullness of time (Gal 4:4), some other attribute – one which is now a pure futurible – might have become incarnate instead of that attribute now called the Son. Thus, “other possible means were not lacking on God’s part.” Out of many possibilities available to God at the time, one was actualized. Thus, the pattern of the One-Many is a general pattern for Augustine’s conception of the way God works in the world.

C. Essential Deity

One comes round again to the conception of essential deity as simplicity. Recalling that the attributes define and are identical with the divine essence, at the level of essential deity, the pattern operates to make an arbitrary selection of one actuality from among many possibilities in the divine essence. A diagram would look like this:

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D. Revelation

The pattern of the One-Many is consequently at the heart of Augustine’s conception of revelation. In its essentials his doctrine of revelation distinguishes between General and Special revelation.α General revelation is given to all men everywhere—the Many—and special revelation is given “through the prophetic history of Israel and its culmination in Christ”β (Ibid., p. 295)—the One. The diagram may now be redrawn:

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\begin{array}{c}
\text{GENERAL} -- \text{Through MANY} \\
\downarrow \\
\text{SPECIAL} -- \text{Through ONE}
\end{array}
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The Neoplatonic structure of the One and the Many now operates to cause special revelation to be a focus of the more diffuse general Revelation.

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α cf. Alan Richardson, “Revelation”, *A Dictionary of Christian Theology*, ed. Alan Richardson (Westminster, 1959), p. 295); cf also “Augustinism”, pp. 26-27, where Richardson comments that the terms “general and special revelation” were not used by Augustine himself.

β Ibid., p. 25.
The Apparatus

E. Grace and Illumination

According to Portalie, Augustine “takes psychology... as a point of departure for arriving at the objectivity of our knowledge”. It is therefore necessary when treating Augustine’s teaching on the Grace and the light of God to bear in mind the fact that the role of illumination and that grace closely resemble each other because of their common psychological reference. The Grace of God acts upon the will in order for it to attain to virtue; the light of God acts on the understanding, or mind, so that it can attain to truth. Moreover, as Bourke states, when Augustine speaks of the will or of the mind, he is referring to the whole soul in each case.

Portalie cites a text in De Trinitate in which “the light which illumines the soul is compared to justifying grace, both being created forms in the soul.” He maintains that illumination is to the understanding or mind as grace is to the will. Both, in other words, appear in the soul as things that are created by God. Both grace and illumination act in the soul to produce a real response. Thus, when speaking of illumination, but coupling his remarks about illumination to grace as well, Portalie concludes with a telling remark: “Plato and Plotinus by their theories laid the foundation of the system of the doctor of Hippo.”

Accordingly, as Neoplatonism is a projection of the psyche to cosmic proportions and status, so Augustine’s teaching on grace and illumination, being psychologically based, may be ultimately construed as man-centered and independent, to that extent, of the life of the Church.

α Eugene Portalie, op. cit., p. 105.
β Ibid., p. 109.
γ Vernon J. Bourke, The Essential Augustine, p. 258.
δ Portalie, op. cit., p. 114; De Trinitate 14:12:15, PL 42:1048.
ε Ibid., p. 114.
αα Ibid.
To that same extent, Augustine’s teaching regarding grace and illumination stands apart from the liturgical experience of the Christian believer in the Church. Even when he speaks of grace, therefore, he is ultimately referring to the psychological dynamic which grounds his understanding of it; this may be referred to as “the soul as will”. When he refers to illumination, he is conversely referring to the soul as mind.

Portalie takes as his starting point Augustine’s doctrine of illumination as the point of departure, and seen in this light, as a paradigm for his understanding of grace, Augustine’s doctrine of grace is even more problematical.

Bourke’s index of Augustine links his teaching on illumination to the Platonic doctrine of the recollection\(^\beta\) of the world of forms. This doctrine was found in the public religion of the classical world. The philosophical form of this doctrine, in the hands of the Platonists, holds that “the deity” acts upon men through their divine and God-given reason. Augustine’s doctrine is capable of being restated in precisely these pagan terms, and indeed, that should not surprise us, since his doctrine of God is a recasting of essentially Neoplatonic structures of thought. This fact, initially so arresting, is made more understandable in the light of Portalie’s own caution about the theological method employed by Augustine. This method, in his understanding, is perilous, because “seeking as he did of set purpose for the common ground between the two doctrines, he could come to believe, without basis for it, that he found Christianity in Plato, or Platonism in the Gospels.”\(^\alpha\) Thus, one may say that Augustine thought he found the Platonic doctrine of Recollection -- minus the theories of the preexistence and transmigration of souls-- in the text that Christ “was the true light who lightens all men who come into the world.” (St. John 1:9).

Certainly it was only Christ who brought light of any sort into the


\(\alpha\) Portalie, op. cit., p. 97
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world or to men. However, the way that this light functioned in this theology was described both by Augustine and subsequent Augustinians, without regard for the worship and witness of the Church, which is the fullness of Christ (Ephesians 1:23).

This centrality of illumination of the thought and doctrine of St. Augustine is not a mere fanciful projection of Plato into him. Etienne Gilson states categorically that "His doctrine of the divine illumination… always remained for him the decisive moment in his own liberation from skepticism."\(^\beta\)

The pure and certain truth given in this illumination gave Augustine proof of the existence of God. All minds, therefore, must be illuminated in the same manner, since truth is the same truth wheresoever and howsoever discovered. Everyone to quote Gilson yet again, "sees the same truth in the same way."\(^\gamma\)

1. The Manner in which Illumination Operates:

Caroline Eva Scheutzinger, in a very masterful study of the Illumination doctrine of Augustine, *The German Controversy on Saint Augustine’s Illumination Theory* (New York: Pageant Press, Inc. (LC 59-14472)1960), arrives at precisely this description of the doctrine as Portalie and Gilson, only in more detailed fashion. The illumination theory makes a distinction between the awareness, of cognition, of God and the acknowledgement, or agnatio of God. The movement from cognition to agnition is precisely a movement of the will. This movement is in turn itself a conversion. But--and this is the crucial point-Scheutzinger is able

\(^\beta\) Etienne Gilson, *History of Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, p. 76.

\(^\gamma\) Gilson, op. cit., p. 76.
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to describe this movement in psychological terms exclusively. Consequently, the soul is described in very Neoplatonic fashion as turning from exterior to interior awareness, to the law written in the heart of men (cf. Romans 2:15). In this turning, the soul experiences the vision of divine light, and with this version, knowledge and light are given with absolute certainty. But this light is open to both Christian and pagan alike, through the universal character of the illumination and by dint of will.

2. The Rationees Aeternae.

These “eternal reasons: are what the soul sees and knows. They correspond more or less to the universal Forms or Ideas of Plato, having a separate existence outside the visible material world. Augustine also teaches, with the Apologists, that there are rationes seminales, (λογοι σπέρματικοι), or “seedlike principles” in all created things which are in living creatures the principles of life. These are created in and with creatures. The soul is thus not ever in direct contact with the eternal reasons, though the divine illumination radiates them over the created universe like the sun shines upon the earth. Through its affinity with them, the human mind is united with them.α

There are two facts to Augustine’s understanding of the eternal reasons. The first is the content of the eternal reasons, and the second is the manner in which they are apprehended. The eternal reasons are present in the rational structure of astronomy, geometry, poetry, music, and rhetoric, indeed, in all the human arts and sciences. Moreover, they are present in the virtues of “charity, joy, peace, longanimity, kindness, goodness, faith, meekness, continency, and the rest, by which we draw


α Cf. Scheutzinger, p. 22.
near to God".\(^\beta\) This type of knowledge is sapientia, or wisdom, which is distinguished from scientia, or “science”, i.e., knowledge about the corporeal things of the world.\(^\gamma\)

The content of this sapientia ranges the whole from the arts and sciences to the fruit of the Spirit in Galatians 5:22, without any qualitative interval, uniformly and consistently. *Consequently, on the basis of the theory of illumination, the grace-filled life is theoretically available to the unconverted pagan.* This is not to say that Augustine would have or even could have taken his theory this far. It is simply being stated to exhibit the logical conclusions to which his formulation of doctrine tends.

That this is so is exhibited rather dramatically by Augustine’s distinction of admonition and teaching, for the soul does not find the eternal reasons embodied in the things of the material universe, but gazes upon them in the divine light within the soul: “*veritas foris admonet, intus docet.*” “Outside the truth admonishes, inside it teaches.” This, of course, is the Platonic theory of knowledge exactly stated. To know reality as it really is the individual must go inward where the truth is capable of being known; conversely, in direct contradiction to the sacramental principle of the Church, the material world is incapable of conveying the direct spiritual knowledge. Thus, as Gilson observes, “All the Augustinian itineraries of the soul are substantially the same: they go from the exterior to the interior, and from the inferior to the superior, *ab exterioribus ad interiora, ab inferioribus ad superiora.*”\(^\alpha\) And this is ultimately so because in the neoplatonic casting of his doctrine of God, the world of matter is ultimately logically evil.

This inward turning is thus itself an act of the will reminiscent of Plato’s myth of the cave and the περιαγωγη from the world of matter to the full sunlight of the world of forms. Notably, however, for Augustine, this

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\(^\alpha\) Gilson, op. cit., p. 77.
\(^\gamma\) ibid., p. 78.
turning, as an act of the will, is a “decision”. Thus, one may state the Many-One paradigm yet again:

THE MANY: THE WORLD OF MATTER
\[\downarrow\]
THE ONE: THE INTERIOR SOUL

It is now possible to see the exact parallel between this doctrine and his developed doctrine of predestination and grace:

THE MANY (THE PREDESTINED ELECT, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE)
\[\downarrow\]
THE ONE: (THE MOST ILLUSTRIOUS EXAMPLE)

Thus, the doctrines of God, of illumination, and of grace are all cast within the broadly Neoplatonic dynamic of the One and the Many.

3. The Created One:

There is a further parallel between these two doctrines in that the light which enlightens the soul is, like grace, a “created form in the soul.” This position, too, derives from the doctrine of God. Its logical structure is not difficult:

The simple deity is uncreate. As defined as simple, god is perforce intelligible as well as simple. But if God is simple, then, as was seen, God’s will and essence are the same thing. Therefore, God cannot act

\* Portalie, op. cit., p. 114.
outside himself except in created forms, since otherwise the simplicity, in its Neoplatonic sense, would be compromised. Thus, grace is created.

4. **Inherited Doctrines:**

Viewed in this way, one may understand the peculiarities of Augustine’s formulations of doctrines which he inherits from the tradition of the Church. We shall concentrate on the ecclesiological ramifications of this Neoplatonic recasting of the doctrine of the Church:

a. St. Cyprian: “Outside the Church there is no salvation.”

b. Pope Stephen: the baptism of heretics is not to be repeated upon their reception into the Church.

5. **Subjective Interpretation**

The key to the way St. Augustine brings these inherited doctrines together is the disposition of the subject at the level of efficacy and of the doctrine of the imprinted sacramental character.\(^a\) Disposition is a matter of the will, but the character is a matter of a spiritual mark on the soul, and is thus directly analogous to the efficacious work of the divine illumination as it imprints cognition upon all human souls.

6. **The Consensus Patrum**

Augustine, while formulating things in a peculiar way, may be thus seen either (1) as ultimately teaching within the *consensus partum*, since

\(^a\) cf. Portalie, op. cit., pp. 245-246.
he holds that there is no salvation outside the Church, Heretics who return to the Church consequently receive the effects of the baptism received outside the Church, but what remains peculiar is the subjective basis on which it is possible to construe Western interpreters of Augustine: it is the disposition of the subject which is the key to the efficacy, or lack thereof, of the sacrament, that disposition being one toward unity with or schism from the Church. Augustine states it this way:

The Donatist Church can have everything without the Catholic Church; it can have dignities,... sacraments,... songs of alleluia,... faith and the preaching of faith. But salvation--that can be found nowhere outside the Catholic Church.α

or (2) he may be read in an “extreme Augustinian” manner as eclipsing the doctrine of the Church by his theory of predestination on the one hand or of illumination on the other.

7. Invisible Sanctification

On the second reading, Augustine is able to speak of an invisible sanctification outside the Church: “An invisible sanctification has been offered to some and used to advantage without visible sacrament... Not on that account, however, is the visible sacrament to be scorned, for one who scorns it can in no way be sanctified invisibly.β What Augustine is referring to is the thinking of St. Cornelius the Centurion, “who had received the Holy Ghost before being baptized,” according to Portalie.γ There is a genuine tension at this point: the Holy Spirit acts outside the

α Portalie, op. cit., p. 232; Serms. ad Caesareaensis ecclesiae plebem 6, PL 43:695.
β Ibid., p. 233, Quaestiones In Heptateuchum III, 84, PL 34:713.
γ Ibid., p. 233, Contra epistolam Parmeniam II, 15, 34; PL 43:76.


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Church in such a manner as to bring salvation outside the Church.

This tension is again characterized by a reference to the subjective basis of his response to Donatism, since the point of departure for the doctrine which Augustine formulates is the subjective disposition of the person baptized; it is the crux interpretum of the anti-Donatist formulations, for whether the baptizand received anything from God depends, on this Neoplatonic analysis, on what he knows and how he responds to it. The movement from knowledge (cognitio) to willful association with the Church (cognition) may thus be described in terms of his doctrine of illumination, and thus, this doctrine is revealed, on the basis of the analysis of Western scholars of Augustine themselves, to be the real basis of his doctrine of the Church. (One may note in passing that this doctrine of the disposition of the soul is the basis for the “faith teaching” so prevalent in evangelical and charismatic circles today, for a sacrament, like the new teaching, will not have efficacy without sufficient faith, or what Augustine would have called agnition).

8. The Subjective Exploration

Jaroslav Pelikan sees the exploration of subjectivity as “a constituent part of the Augustinian tradition.”\[a\] We are now in a position to explore a rather different interpretation of Augustine’s doctrine of the sacraments in general and of Baptism in particular from this point of view. As the act of conversion may be interpreted on a Neoplatonic basis, as the turning away from the exterior and material world to the interior psychological world where one perceives the light of the rationes seminales, Augustine is able to see the character given in the sacrament in these terms. This character corresponds to the illumination given to all men, both inside and outside the canonical boundaries of the Church.

\[a\] Jaroslav Pelikan, The Growth of Medieval Theology, p. 304.
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The sacramental character thus imprinted in baptism administered outside the Church thus “seals” as it were, this illumination. Conversion to the Church completed the sacrament.

F. Sacramental Dualism

In what now follows, we again utilize Western scholars of Augustine, in order to explore yet another ambiguity and tension in his doctrine, that between the inherited ecclesiastical doctrine of the sacraments and the Neoplatonic framework in which Augustine couches them.

Fr. Portalie approaches Augustine’s teaching from the developed Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation as elucidated at the Council of Trent in 1551. In order to understand Portalie’s discussion, it is helpful to recall the basic dialectic of oppositions between spirit and matter, good and evil, which is built into the Neoplatonic structure on which Augustine ultimately rests. Let us be careful of what is being here and what is not being said. Augustine used this philosophical system in good faith to treat of the various aspects of Church doctrine and life which were forced upon him by the course of events of his episcopate. In many ways it served him very well, and, in his hands and those of his immediate followers it is also a fairly stable system, able to deal more or less adequately with the living faith of the Western Church.

However, this system becomes unstable when it is confused, as increasingly becomes the case, with the Faith itself, and elevated to the status of revealed dogmas (as is the case with the filioque). Augustine himself is not responsible for any of this development: it lies with his followers to accomplish this change in status of Augustine’s system.

In one sense, then, the doctrine of transubstantiation which Portalie follows in his exposition of Augustine is one such product of this
underlying dualistic Neoplatonic framework. Its presence in the history of doctrine in the West is impossible to account for apart from the direct influence of the underlying dialectic of opposition between spirit as good and matter as evil. This dialectical category accounts for the development of the doctrine of transubstantiation, though that doctrine is not, as we shall see, formulated without stiff opposition from within the West itself.

A diagram may now be of aid in exploring the categorical tensions in Augustine’s system of the sacraments:

1. Primary category: Uncreate vs. created
2. Secondary category: Uncreate vs. created
   a. Aristotelean philosophy
      (1) Essence-accidents
      (2) created-created
      (3) Transubstantiation:
         (a) Essence-accidents
         (b) Uncreate-created
   b. Actual discourse regarding Transubstantiation takes place not on the level of Uncreate-Created, the secondary category, but on the level of the spirit-matter dualism, the primary category.
      1) Spirit-Matter
         a. \textit{res} \hspace{1cm} \textit{figura}
         reality \hspace{1cm} symbol
         power \hspace{1cm} sacrament
         virtue \hspace{1cm} benefit

The backdrop for the ultimate emergence of the doctrine is now established in Augustine’s categories themselves, for bread is made up
both of the substance of bread, a metaphysical quality that can be perceived only mentally, and the accidents, perceivable physically, such as whiteness, texture, doughy taste and so on. All of these things are created. At the moment of consecration, the Uncreate spiritual substance of Christ’s body become that which the bread is changed into. Only the accidents remains (the physical part). Strictly speaking, if one now presses the patristic method of testing sacramental doctrine by its christological consequences, this doctrine is Doketic, for it would make the Incarnation itself the transubstantiation of the humanity of Christ into the deity, leaving behind only the “accidents”, the outward appearances, of humanity. The similarities of this doctrine with classical Monophysite christology were apparent in our essay on that subject in Part One. Here again, one may read Augustine’s language in terms of the consensus patrum, such that when he speaks in “realist” or “symbolist” terms, he is utilizing no different language nor intending anything different by it than what other fathers likewise intend. Or one may read Augustine from the standpoint of the developed dualisms inherent in the “Augustinian” dialectic itself.

G. A Return to the Doctrine of the Church

One is now in a position to ascertain that what constitutes the sacramental reality or res is one and the same thing as what ultimately constitutes the Church, if seen from the standpoint of the illumination theory. The following chart will be helpful in measuring the effect of this doctrine on ecclesiology:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATHOLIC TEACHING</th>
<th>THEOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What constitutes the Church?</td>
<td>Consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>God</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who is a member of the Church?</th>
<th>Human will</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grace and synergy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who is to be saved?</th>
<th>The elect, some inside, some outside</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Church</td>
<td>the Church</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sanctification: visible</th>
<th>Cornelius: invisible membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sacramental membership</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Holiness of the Church:</th>
<th>Holiness of the Church</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>perfects sinful members</td>
<td>comprised by sinful members</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the last point one detects the inversion between the relationship of individual believers and the Church, since the Church’s holiness is compromised by individual believers, this can only be if in some sense the Church be understood to be nothing more than the sum total of all believers, rather than as the Very Body of Christ, the perfect Humanity of the Incarnate Son of God, which, far from being compromised by sinful members, rather becomes the instrument and means of their sanctification. For the “Augustinian development”, the Pure Church is in fact that Church which will exist only in heaven, *she does not now exist on earth*. One detects here again the functioning of the Neoplatonic paradigm, for the dialectical in this case is that of Eternity and time (Uncreate and created). This doctrine bears a striking resemblance to the Princeton theology of the late nineteenth century concerning the authority and infallibility of the Holy Scriptures. According to that doctrine, the Scriptures and infallible and authoritative only in the original *autographs*, not in any of the actual texts *available*, and particularly not in any one textual tradition (i.e., the Traditional text). Thus, the Church which has insufficient holiness to be a source of sanctification to her members also lacks sufficient inspiration to maintain and preserve accurate copies of
Scripture and thus of the source of Christian truth (apographa). What both the Church and Scripture are are approximations to the eternal varieties they represent.

H. The Saga of the Soul as Will: The Cosmic Drama of Salvation and the Underlying Orphic Categories:

If for one more brief excursion we be permitted to pursue our examination of Augustine’s doctrine from the standpoint of its “Augustinian interpretation” of its psychological basis, it can be demonstrated that even his doctrine of predestination rests upon that basis, for it will be seen that it is but a projection of the human psyche upon the cosmos.

As the psyche or soul is simple, so the Source and Origin of the cosmos is simple. There is thus no distinction in the Being or the Will of the Psyche or of the Source of the Cosmos. Without such a distinction, however, every act of Will is predetermined by Being. Hence, the cosmos, and the soul, are locked in an iron fate and necessity. This is of course the Greek pagan doctrine of heimarmene, or fate, which is ruled by the goddess ananke, or Necessity. Its exact counterpart in Hindu thought is the doctrine of karma.

In the following diagram, the human will is on “probation” after the non-entity, the evil will, has been transformed in its base “through the inbreathing of a good will.” On probation and as regenerate, the will is able to sin, posse peccare. Only the saints in heaven are endowed with a will that is unable to sin, non posse peccare. But notably, this state corresponds to Plotinus’ doctrine of freedom as freedom from free choice, since choices are always between distinct things, and distinction is composition, and composition is opposition. Augustine’s doctrine of the

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Seelesgeschichte, or Saga of the Soul, is in fact a Saga of the Soul-as-will. Since it is analyzable in Neoplatonic terms, it may also be seen as the attempt to recast the Biblical History of Redemption in terms of the Orphic Mythology.

Thus, what the philosophers did in de-mythologizing the Orphic myth is re-mythologized by Augustine in almost Gnostic fashion in biblical terms.

These remarks, all too brief as they are, bring our examination of St. Augustine to a close. Much more could have been said, and admittedly much could have been said much better. The interpretations offered above are indeed not the only interpretations that can be offered. Indeed, we have discovered an almost unforeseen interpretive tension between the Eastern Orthodox approach of Fr. Georges Florovsky, who appears ready to read Augustine’s ecclesiology in an Orthodox patristic sense, and the interpretations of Augustine’s western heirs, who paradoxically appear much more ready to read him in a thoroughly philosophical and Neoplatonic sense, and this, in short, is all the ambiguity of Augustinism in a nutshell. His faith is catholic, but his formulations of that faith, beginning from the Neoplatonic treatment of the doctrine of God, fan out from there to cast everything he says in that light, whether or not he himself intended it to be so understood. It is therefore of crucial importance to note, once again, that when the Eastern Church reacted so severely to the filioque when it became known to it, it was doing so out of a practised regard for the correct formulation of Christian doctrine, shorn of Hellenization of the Gospel; it had seen such Hellenizations before.

500b Cf. above discussions.
501 This is the doctrine of the Synod of Dordt and of classical scholastic Calvinism.
502 Cf. note 505, section D, below.
503 Cf. note 505, section D, below, and note 498 above, regarding the discussion of “all” and “many”
EXCURSUS ON THE RECEPTION OF AUGUSTINE IN THE SECOND EUROPE

A. The Opposition

- Again, James Orr is the best and most succinct statement of the problem: Augustine’s theology, says Orr,

has, in fact, two sides—the one, a *Churchly*, or *Old Catholic* side, in which he stands tenaciously on Cyprianic ground in his views of the nature of the Church, of its unity, its episcopate, its authority, its sacraments, the necessity of connection with it for salvation; the other, a *doctrinal* side, in which Protestants may more lawfully claim inheritance in him, in his doctrines of sin and grace, with which are connected his views of the fall and corruption of human nature, on the one hand, and of predestination, on the other. These two sides of Augustine’s theology are never fully reconciled—could not, indeed, be.α

This opposition poses a problem of interpretation for Orr (and indeed, and for Orthodox, Roman Catholics and Protestants in general):

First, Augustine differs from the ordinary Protestant view in extending, with Catholicism generally, the meaning of ‘justification’ to include, not merely the free forgiveness of sins, and acceptance of the sinner of Christ’s sake, but the inward change, or impartation of a new nature or

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life, which he supposes to take place in baptism.β

1. Pelagianism

Pelikan, citing Niebuhr on page 279, notes this of the Pelagian controversy:

‘The Christian doctrine of sin in its classical form,’ Reinhold Niebuhr has written, ‘offends both rationalists and moralists by maintaining the seemingly absurd position that man sins inevitably and by a fateful necessity but that he is nevertheless to be held responsible for actions which are prompted by an ineluctable fate.’α Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition, p. 279).

Orr states it with his customary succinctness: “It was in the Pelagian controversy that the principles laid down by Augustine were tested by being confronted with their logical opposites.”β

And as Pelikan notes throughout his discussion on pages 281-283, the nature of the conflict between Christianity and classical pagan culture was marked throughout by the emphasis on the glorious liberty and freedom brought by the Gospel, and not by fatal necessity. (cf. especially, p. 281)

When the West turned to consider Christian anthropology, it was, notes Pelikan, upon

the confession of the Virgin Birth of Christ and the practice of infant baptism (that western theology drew) inferring from them a more complete explanation of the relation between the inevitability of sin and

β Ibid., p. 143.
α Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition, p. 279.
And so, says Augustine, “That one sin... was itself so great that by it, in one man, the whole human race was originally, and, so to say, radically condemned. It cannot be pardoned and washed away except through the one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus,’ who alone could be born in such a way as not to need to be reborn.”

One may obviously interpret Augustine here as an “Augustinian,” as teaching the moral condemnation of sinful human nature by the wrathful and just God who punishes sin with death. Yet, note carefully Augustine’s own qualification: “so to say” he says. Are we under the curse of death according to St. John Chrysostom? Yes. Are we therefore, in that sense, children of wrath? Well, yes, of course. Is there, at this point in Augustine, anything radically different than with St. John Chrysostom, or with St. Cyril of Alexandria? No.

A. Infant Baptism:

Throughout the discussion on pages 290-292, Pelikan refers to the fact, well known to us by now, that the Fathers of the Church often argue from established liturgical practice to the formulation of doctrine. This, because infants are baptized, there must already be present in them something which needed grace, a proposition which Pelagius denied, and which Augustine along with other fathers, affirmed. Infants were exorcised because they were in the clutches of the devil.

At this point, Pelikan cites Augustine’s defender, Prosper of Aquitaine, and here the problem of interpretation emerges. Are infants exorcised? Yes. Are they therefore in the power of the devil? Yes. But

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7 Pelikan, o. cit., p. 286.
8 Ibid., p. 290, citing the Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love 14:48.
α Pelikan, op. cit., p. 292.
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the explanation of this is the *crux interpretum* of how Augustinian Augustine really was. Are infants born mortal, in the kingdom of death and the power of the devil? Yes. On this point Augustine and rest of the Fathers are agreed. Does Augustine go on to say, in addition to this, that if they die, they therefore go to Hell if unbaptized, because of their moral culpability? Yes, he does. And at this point Augustine becomes "Augustinian." But by the time of Prosper, it is almost exclusively this latter moral aspect which is in view. What Augustine himself has to say about death has begun to fade. Thus, the *interpretation* of the liturgical act has begun to change.

B. The Doctrine of Grace and Platonism:

On pages 293-296, Pelikan discusses the fact that throughout all of Augustine’s writings the theme or primacy is placed on God’s initiation of grace in man, and only secondarily on man’s response to God.

‘Man was made upright in such a way that he could not have remained in that uprightness without the divine help.’ For the Creator, there could not be a distinction between his being and his life, nor between either of these and his understanding, nor between any of these and his state of blessedness; ‘but for him to live, to understand, to be blessed—these are to be,’ as the Platonic philosophers had already understood.”

Such references, notes Pelikan, “as these to the Platonic tradition suggest the possibility that ‘Augustine’s doctrine of grace is merely a consequence of his Neoplatonism and of the concept of God that emerged form this…” and more especially “in his early writings Augustine seemed to identify the biblical doctrine of God as creator with ‘what Plato and Plotinus have said about God.’” But there is the biblical tradition too, as Pelikan notes, of the

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Pelikan, op. cit., p. 295.
Sovereign creator God disposing all things in and through His Word and Spirit. Thus, the problem is, notes Pelikan “whether this doctrine of the Creator was determined in its fundamental content by the christocentric perspective which Augustine espoused in principle.”

The problem, in other words, is whether Augustinism simply means the failure to press out fully and consistently the same ordo theologiae and understanding of recapitulation both in theological presuppositions, methods of dealing with specific problems, and theological conclusions. This fact would seem to account for the Augustinian inheritance may be interpreted in either an Augustinian fashion, or a fashion consistent with the consensus patrum.

Is Augustine therefore, in the passages cited above, referring to the doctrine of Neoplatonic simplicity in its philosophical explicitness, or merely taking an insight of Platonism -- that God is simultaneously being, light and life, without any admixture or distinction -- and utilizing it in a Christian manner that is not to be pressed? The context of the passage cited, which Pelikan does not cite, provides the answer. Man, being a compound essence of body and soul, does not possess being and life simultaneously. The conclusion he draws form this would have been unthinkable to a Platonist: man can truly die (not have life) and yet continue to exist.

C. The Trinitarian Theology

Pelikan at last arrives at the heart of the matter: “The dogma of the Trinity and the drama of redemption must be interpreted in a manner that would be consistent with the a priori definition of the deity of God.” In other words, the one point where Augustine does assume the Neoplatonic definition of the essence of God comes more and more to be the

\[\text{Ibid., p. 296.}\]
\[\text{Pelikan, op. cit., pp. 296-297.}\]
interpretive key of other ambiguous passages in Augustine’s work, and is an interpretive key utilized even by Augustine himself, though let it be clearly stated that he himself often arrives at conclusions which he himself confesses some discomfort with.

And so we arrive once again at one of the fundamental difficulties in his response to Pelagius: in order to preserve the grace of God, the following steps are taken:

(1) God’s foreknowledge is identical to his predestination: What God sees is what he Predestines.

(2) God sees some men not being saved.

(3) Thus, God predestines some men not to be saved.

(4) There is thus a fundamental opposition between humanity and God;

(5) Thus, the “will of the spirit overcomes the will of his flesh, which lusts in opposition to it.”

(6) Thus, Christ, is the perfect example of our predestination for two reasons: there is between His divine will and His human will the same opposition which exists between God’s will and our own; and because in His humanity, He is son of God, not by any inherent merits of His humanity, but by the grace of God.

(7) Thus, when Adam sinned, all men sinned. α

(8) Thus, human personality and its mode of willing is defined in a relation of opposition to God, much as the divine persons are defined by their mutual relations.

(9) and thus, “man” and human nature are narrowed in scope, and refer not to his body, but to the “possession of a rational mind by which to know God.” β

α Ibid., p. 299.
β Ibid., p. 301.
(10) and thus, “there was a fault in [human] nature, yet nature was not itself a fault”\(^7\)

(11) and thus,

> if the grace of God was sovereign in its predestinating efficacy, God could not be said to be absolutely bound by the church and the sacraments; but he was bound to them. The mystery of grace was not resolved by simply determining who belonged to the external fellowship of the church or who had been baptized. It was necessary to ‘distinguish the visible holy sacrament, which can exist both in the good and in the bad… from the invisible unction of charity, which is the peculiar property of the good.’ Yet the same mystery that precluded empirical judgments about who was or was not predestined also obliged the believer to wait upon the ordinances of the church; for prescience and the predestination of God extended not only to the end he had in view, the salvation of the elect, but also to the means whose bestowal made possible a righteous life. Therefore the doctrine of predestination, even of double predestination, did not undercut the sacramental doctrine of Augustine, as it has that of some theologians. His doctrine of the church was more seriously affected by his view of predestination than was his doctrine of the sacraments.\(^\alpha\)

(a) At this point, let us stop and observe what is true and what is not true about Pelikan’s observations. On the one hand, we have seen that repeatedly in the East, and especially during the Christological controversies surrounding Monophysitism and Monotheletism, the doctrine of the apokatastasis is an inevitable consequence of the humanity of Christ, that is, there is a connection between Christ’s humanity, and salvation.

We also observed in St. Maximus himself the teaching that there are ecclesiological, sacramental, and ascetic correctives to the doctrine of

\(^7\) Ibid. One notes that we are still a great distance from the idea of a “sin nature”!
\(^\alpha\) Ibid., p. 302.
apokatastasis: one is effected, that is, by Christ’s incarnation and resurrection irresistibly and ineluctably. But one must be in the Church, partaking of her sacraments, and living the life of virtue and love, in order for this to produce well-being and ever-well-being. So, Pelikan’s remarks are applicable as well to St. Maximus: “the prescience and the predestination of God extended not only to the end he had in view, the salvation of the elect, but also to the means whose bestowal made possible a righteous life.” At this point, then, we must acknowledge that the fundamental insight of St. Augustine, if interpreted within the consensus patrum, is correct. Moreover, there is nothing specifically un-Orthodox about the notion that some in the Church, partaking of her sacraments and all outward expressions of her life nevertheless by their characters or lives do not exemplify Christian living. There are, so to speak, both saints and sinners in the Church. On this point, too, there is nothing untoward.

Now, let us resume where Pelikan continues:

For ‘in the ineffable prescience of God, many who seem to be on the outside are in fact on the inside, and many who seem to be on the inside are nevertheless in fact on the outside’; therefore the true church consisted of ‘the fixed number of the saints predestined before the foundation of the world,’ event though some of them were now wallowing in heresy or vice... When the Church was defined this way, it was valid to say that God had none who were outside the communion of the church.”

(b) At this point, let us pause again to observe that, while the insight is correct, and everything up to this point is correct, let us observe that it is only the ordo theologiae which is false, and thus, the conclusion which is drawn from it is false. Augustine has restricted predestination to a number

\[\beta\] Ibid.

\[\alpha\] Ibid., p. 302.
of individuals which is less than the sum total of human persons throughout all times and places. On the one hand, the Origenistic apokatastasis errs by concentrating only on the human nature, and ignoring the human person. Augustine, getting everything correct up to this point, errs by concentrating only on the virtuous and righteous persons, and ignoring the human nature, in which those persons exist. So it remains to be seen if, in the Second Europe, this Christological point was ever (1) noticed and (2) addressed. The bad news is, (1) it was, and (2) it was. A point which we shall return to in due time.

(c) Note also, that the effect of this premise is once again to destroy the consensus patrum, the very idea of the Church itself.

B. Peculiarities of Augustine’s Response to Pelagianism not Assimilated by the Second Europe

The above considerations now permit us to see that Augustine’s very Maximian insights, namely, that the predestination of God is not exclusive of, but inclusive of the Church, and the sacramental life of the Church, is one of the things that gets “lost” eventually, due to the triumph of his premise concerning the limited number of elected individuals, in other words, due to the triumph of his triadology and its concurrent ordo theologiae. For example, in his anti-Pelagian writings, Augustine not only argues from infant baptism, but infant communion:

Will however, any man be so bold as to say that this statement has no relation to infants, and that they can have life in them without partaking of his body and blood--on the ground that He does not say, Except one eat, but “except ye eat;” as if He were addressing those who were able to hear and understand, which of course, infants cannot do. But he who says this is inattentive; because, unless all are embraced in the statement, that
without the body and the blood of the Son of man men cannot have life, it is to no purpose that even the elder age is solicitous of it... For it is according to this statement, that we find that the sacrament pertains also to us, who were not in existence at the time the Lord spoke these words... From all this it follows, that even for the life of infants was His flesh given, which He gave for the life of the world; and that even they will not have life if they eat not the flesh of the Son of man."

C. Peculiarities of Augustine’s Response to Pelagianism
Assimilated by the West: Spanish Adoptionism

The above considerations also allow us to see that certain features are assimilated by the West. Augustine’s assertion that our Lord’s humanity is “Son of God by Grace” leads to the next stage of the breakdown, Spanish Adoptionism, which asserted that Christ, in His humanity, was Son of God by grace and adoption. This appeared to the Orthodox in Spain as entailing not only Nestorianism, but Arianism, and Sabellianism as well, since it seemed to make Sonship a property of nature. The solution, and we know it well, was to find a means with which to confess both the Unity of Christ’s person, deny that Sonship is a property of nature but of His person, and to deny any Arianism which would result. The solution, of course, was the filioque.

Note, then, that with the Spanish Adoptionist phase of the growing Augustinizing of the Second Europe, the consensus patrum is on the way to becoming the consensus of one father.

The opposition to this was swift and immediate.

St. Vincent of Lerins proposes his formula “quod simper quod ubique quod omnibus” not as a denial of Augustine’s authority as a father,

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\( \alpha \) St. Augustine, *On Forgiveness of Sins, and Baptism*, 27, p. 25, NPNF.
but only as a denial of the growing tendency to isolate him from the rest of the *consensus patrum*, i.e., he opposes precisely the tendency to take as dogma what Augustine himself only takes as speculation.

**D. Peculiarities of Augustine’s Response to Pelagianism
Animadverted by the West: St. John Cassian, Orange, and “Semi-Pelagianism”:**

Pelikan discusses the so-called semi-Pelagians, Vincent of Lerins, Faustus of Riez, and John Cassian, beginning at p. 319. The response of St. John Cassian to the limited predestinational doctrine of St. Augustine is well-known. St. John merely utilizes the insight of Augustine himself to reduce its premise to absurd conclusions: If some individuals are not predestined to be found in Christ, the Christ does not die for them. Therefore, if Christ does not die for all men, all men are not in Adam. If all men are not in Adam, they have no need of Christ, and this is Pelagianism.

It will not do, however, simply to point out that this is another case of East versus West since St. John Cassian was trained in the east, for while he implies the corrective of Nature to Augustine’s predicament, he does not spell this out *explicitly*.

The opposition of Prosper of Aquitaine and the extreme Augustinians to the so-called semi-Pelagians illumines another difficulty:

‘Do they intend to hold none of the things that were condemned and nevertheless to reject some aspects of what was defended?’ This is precisely what they intended. Identifying as catholic not only what had been affirmed by church councils but also the individual theories of Augustine, Prosper of Aquitaine found that such a position was ‘in harmony neither with the heretics nor with the catholics,’ but was a
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tertium quid that disagreed with both.α

There are two things to notice here: first, the redefinition of the *consensus patrum* in terms of an Augustinian reading, and secondly, the inability of even the semi-Pelagians to articulate the mystery they were seeking to hold adequately. That is, there is a tendency on the part of both of the Second Europe at *that* time, on the part of the Semi-Pelagians themselves, and of the First Europe at *this* time, on the part of modern Orthodox interpreters of this period, to see even the Semi-Pelagians themselves as a separate entity within the *consensus patrum*. Thus, the mystery of God’s predestination comes to be stated in a merely dialectical fashion, with the affirmation that “both poles must be defended.”β Without the integration of such insights from the East, from fathers such as St. Maximus and the Cappadocians, with the insights and fathers of the west, such as Augustine, and the semi-Pelagians, distortions both in the theology and in the proper interpretation of the West occur. The semi-Pelagians point the way by saying that Augustine’s understanding of predestination was a way of “reintroducing pagan fatal necessity,”γ but, in their isolation from the East, they are unable to pursue this insight. Thus, the way of Fr. Seraphim Rose itself is doomed to failure. The Semi-Pelagians know something is wrong, but do not know what. We, on the other hand, from the standpoint of the *whole* consensus patrum, are in precisely the position to do so.

Finally, the Council of Orange, if one reads Pelikan carefully, answers the extreme form of Augustinism with Augustine himself. In it and the work of St. Vincent of Lerins, the first Augustinian crisis passes. Augustine is received in a quasi-orthodox manner of interpretation, and his peculiar theories are rejected as not being found in antiquity nor taught by

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α Pelikan, op. cit., p. 319.
β Ibid., p. 320.
γ Ibid.
the whole universal church. We are now in the position of drawing some preliminary conclusions and implications:

III. The Theology of the Commonitorium and the “Vincentian Canon”

A. Scripture

“We must, the Lord helping, fortify our own belief in two ways, first, by the authority of the Divine Law, and then by the Tradition of the Catholic Church.

“But here some one perhaps will ask, Since the canon of Scripture is complete, and sufficient of itself for everything, and more than sufficient, what need is there to join with it the authority of the Church’s interpretation? For this reason,--because, owing to the depth of Holy Scripture, all do not accept it in one and the same sense, but one understands its words in one way, another in another; so that it seems to be capable of as many interpretations as there are interpreters. For Novatioan expounds it one way, Sabellius another, Donatus another, Arius, Eunomius, Macedonius another, Photinus, Apollinaris, Priscillian, another, Iovinian, Pelagius, Celestius, another. Lastly, Nestoriues another. Therefore, it is very necessary, on account of so great intricacies of such various error, that the rule for the right understanding of the prophets and apostles should be framed in accordance with the standard of ecclesiastical and Catholic interpretation.

“Moreover, in the Catholic Church itself, all possible care must be taken, that we hold that faith which has been believed everywhere, always, by all, for that is truly and in the strictest sense ‘Catholic,’ which, as the name itself and the reason of the thing declare, comprehends all universally. This rule we shall observe if we follow universality, antiquity, consent.” (Commonitory II:4-5, p. 132).
“In these ways then do these rabid dogs, Nestorius, Apollinaris, and Photinus, bark against the Catholic faith: Photinus, by denying the trinity; Apollinaris, by teaching that the nature of the word is mutable, and refusing to acknowledge that there are two substances in Christ, denying moreover, either that Christ had a soul at all, or, at all events, that he had a rational soul, and asserting that the Word of God supplied the place of the rational soul; Nestorius, by affirming that there were always or at any rate that once there were two Christs. But the Catholic Church, holding the right faith both concerning God and concerning our Saviour, is guilty of blasphemy neither in the mystery of the Trinity, nor in that of the Incarnation of Christ. For she worships both one Godhead in the plenitude of the Trinity, and the quality of the Trinity in one and the same majesty, and she confesses one Christ Jesus, not two; the same both God and man, the one as truly as the other. One Person indeed she believes in Him, but two substances; two substances but one Person: Two substances, because the word of God is not mutable, so as to be convertible into flesh; one Person, lest by acknowledging two sons she should seem to worship not a Trinity, but a Quaternity.

“But it will be well to unfold this same doctrine more distinctly and explicitly again and again.

“In God there is one substance, but three Persons; in Christ two substances, but one Person. In the Trinity, another and another Person, not another and another substance (distinct Persons, not distinct substances); in the Saviour another and another substance, not another and another person, (distinct substances, not distinct Persons). How in the Trinity another and another Person (distinct Persons) not another and another substance (distinct substances)? Because there is one Person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost; but yet there is
not another and another nature (distinct natures) but one and the same nature. How in the Saviour another and another substance, not another and another person (two distinct substances, not two distinct Persons)? Because there is one substance of the Godhead, another of the manhood. But yet the Godhead and the manhood are not another and another person (two distinct Persons), but one and the same Christ, one and the same Son of god, and one and the same Person of one and the same Christ and Son of God, in like manner as in man the flesh is one thing and the soul another, but one and the same man, both soul and flesh... Thus, then, in one and the same Christ there are two substances, one divine, the other human, one of (ex) God the Father, the other of (ex) the Virgin Mother; one co-eternal with and co-equal with the Father, the other temporal and inferior to the Father; one consubstantial with his Mother, but one and the same Christ in both substances... one and the same Christ, God and man, the same uncreated (sic.) and created, the same unchangeable and incapable of suffering, the same acquainted by experience with both change and suffering, the same equal to the Father and inferior to the Father, the same begotten of the father before time, ("in the world"), perfect God, perfect man... Perfect humanity, I say, forasmuch as it hat both soul and flesh... One, not by I know not what corruptible confusion of Godhead and manhood, but by a certain entire and singular unity of Person... there abides eternally withal the characteristic property of each nature, ever begin to be body, nor doth the body ever cease to be body.” (Ibid, XIII:36-37, pp. 140-141).

**C. On Origen**

"An important fact truly, useful to be learnt, and necessary to be remembered, and to be illustrated and enforced again and again, by example upon example, in order that all true Catholics may understand
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that it behooves them with the Church to receive Teachers, not with Teachers to desert the faith of the Christ.

“My belief is, that among many instances of this sort of trial which might be produced, there is not one to be compared with that of Origen, in whom there were many things so excellent, so unique, so admirable, that antecedently any one would readily deem that implicit faith was to be placed in all his assertions.

“What shall I say more? The result was that very many were led astray from the integrity of the faith, not by any human excellencies of this so great man, this so great doctor, this so great prophet, but, as the event showed, by the too perilous trial which he proved to be. Hence it came to pass, that this Origen, such and so great as he was, wantonly abusing the grace of God, rashly following the bent of his own genius, and placing overmuch confidence in himself, making light account of the ancient simplicity of the Christian religion, presuming that he knew more than all the world besides, despising the traditions of the Church and the determinations of the ancient, and interpreting certain passages of Scripture in a novel way, deserved for himself the warning given to the Church of God, as applicable in his case as in that of others, ‘If there arise a prophet in the midst of thee,’... ‘thou shalt not hearken to the words of that prophet,’... “because the lord your God doth make trial of you, whether you love Him or not.” (XVII:43, 44, citing Deuteronomy 13:1, pp. 143-145).

D. On Pelagius

“In sooth, what heresy ever burst forth save under a definite name, at a definite place, at a definite time? who ever originated a heresy that did not first discover himself from the consentient agreement of the universality and antiquity of the Catholic Church? That this is so is
demonstrated in the clearest way by examples. For who ever before that profane Pelagius attributed so much antecedent strength to Free-will, as to deny the necessity of God's grace to aid it towards good in every single act? Whoever before his monstrous disciple Coelestius denied that the whole human race is involved in the guilt of Adam's sin?"

E. The Rule

“How are (Catholics) to distinguish truth from falsehood in the sacred scriptures? They must be very careful to pursue that course which, in the beginning of this Commonitory, we said that holy and learned men had commended to us, that is to say, they must interpret the sacred Canon according to the traditions of the Universal Church and in keeping with the rules of Catholic doctrine, in which Catholic and Universal Church, moreover, they must follow universality, antiquity, consent. And if at any time a part opposes itself to the whole, novelty to antiquity, the dissent of one or a few who are in error to the consent of all or at all events of the great majority of Catholics, then they must prefer the soundness of the whole to the corruption of a part; in which same whole they must prefer the religion of antiquity to the profaneness of novelty; and in antiquity itself in like manner, to the temerity of one or of a very few they must prefer, first of all, the general decrees, if such there be, of a Universal Council, or if there be no such, then, what is next best, they must follow the consentient belief of many and great masters.” (Ibid., XXVIII:70, p. 152)

1. Commentary:

It is to be noted that St. Vincent throughout the Commonitory has omitted the name of St. Augustine from the list of teachers of the Faith, and his entire exposition of the rule by which catholic theology is to be
done is consonant with the perspective from which Augustine’s Gallic opponents wished to receive his authority. The rule “that which has everywhere been believed…” etc is directed against those who would exalt the authority of Augustine, and the treatise is a detailed exposition of that rule in practice. It is to be noted that in St. Vincent’s view, the views of no one father take precedence over the definitions of ecumenical councils.

IV. St. John Cassian

A. Life

1. His status as a Saint

St. John Cassian is venerated as a saint on the Eastern Calendar, and on the Western Calendar. However, it is common in the West to refer to him as the “blessed” John Cassian, indicating a degree of doubt about his teaching, as Augustine is referred to in the East for the same reason.

2. Ordination by St. John Chrysostom

The reader is directed to Quasten for a discussion of the difficulties in assigning with any certainty the country of origin of St. John Cassian. He seems, at best, to be of Eastern stock, but not much more can be said with any certainty. Born ca. 360, he was received into a monastery in Bethlehem, and subsequently spent time in Egypt deepening his monastic life. He was ordained by St. John Chrysostom to the diaconate ca. 399-400, and subsequently was entrusted by the clergy of Constantinople to bear letters to pope Innocent in the year 404 in favour of their exiled...
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bishop. While in Tome he made the acquaintance of the future pope St. Leo the Great. He settles in Marseilles ca. 415, and becomes involved in the controversy between St. Augustine and Pelagius.

The eastern origins of Cassian are significant to a proper understanding of his reaction to the developed predestinarian theories of St. Augustine, for as will be observed, he follows the patristic practice and method of viewing isolated doctrines for their implications for Christology. Cassian’s work is consequently an “Eastern” response to Augustinism, the first on record, and it is significant that in the West itself it was received with some popularity. Augustinian theology, in other words, must struggle before it becomes the foundation of Latin theology.

St. John Cassian dies ca. 435.

B. Writings

We shall mention St. John’s writings only briefly and in passing. The two most important works are Seven Books on the Incarnation of the Lord against Nestorius and his various monastic conferences, which form the largest genre of his written corpus.

1. General Remarks regarding Cassian’s View of Augustine:

Cassian’s theological work was directed against two opponents: Nestorius and St. Augustine. It is in fact St. John who first pointed out the connection between a Nestorian Christology and a Pelagian soteriology: heresy in one entailed heresy in the other. It is, however, in his controversy with Augustine that his name has been inseparably
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associated as a “semi-Pelagian”.

As we have seen, from 410-420 St. Augustine’s views against Pelagianism harden into theories of the irresistibility and indefectibility of grace. The Semi-Pelagians’ position may perhaps be summarized by Canon Bright: “They said, in effect, to treat predestination as irrespective of foreseen conduct, and to limit the Divine good-will to a fixed number of persons thus selected, who, as such, are assured of perseverance, is not only to depart from the older theology, and from the earlier teaching of the Bishop of Hippo himself, but to cut at the root of religious effort, and to encourage either negligence or despair. They insisted that whatever theories might be devised concerning this mystery, which was not a fit subject for popular discussion, the door of salvation should be regarded as open to all, because the Savior ‘died for all’. To explain away the scriptural assurance was, they maintained, to falsify the Divine promise and to nullify human responsibility. They believed in the doctrine of the Fall; they acknowledged the necessity of real grace in order to man’s restoration; they even admitted that this grace must be ‘prevenient’ to such acts of will as resulted in Christian good works: but some of them thought -- and herein consisted the error called semi-Pelagian--that nature, unaided, could take the first step towards its recovery, by desiring to be healed through faith in Christ.” (NPNF, S2 Vol XI, p. 191)

Augustine’s last two treatises, On the Predestination of the Saints and On the Gift of Perseverance are addressed to the semi-Pelagians. It is to be noted that, while Augustine does not modify or mitigate his position in these works, he nevertheless acknowledges their provisional character, and addresses the Semi-Pelagians as “some of the brethren”, indicating that he discerned the difference between them and the heresy of Pelagianism.
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2. His Theological Method in Response to Augustinism

St. John Cassian’s method is twofold: on the one hand, he utilizes the patristic method of tracing doctrines not directly having to do with Christology back to their christological consequences. On this test, the final development of Augustine’s doctrine of predestination is revealed to have Pelagian(!) implications. His second method is to expose the dialectic of oppositions as an insufficient exegetical tool, unable to handle certain statements of Scripture and to reconcile them with the developed Augustinian system.

V. The Christological Response to the Augustinian Dialectical Formulation of Nature and Grace: A Clash of the Patristic and Augustinian orderings of theology

A. Grace and Prevenient Grace

“CHAEREMON: By this very instance which you bring forward we can still more clearly prove that the exertions of the worker can do nothing without God’s aid… from which we infer that the initiative not only of our actions but also of good thoughts comes from God, who inspires us with a good will to begin with, and supplies us with the opportunity of carrying out what we rightly desire: for ‘every good gift and every perfect gift cometh down from above, from the Father of lights’ (St. James 1:17) who both begins what is good, and continues it and completes it in us, as the apostle says: ‘But he who giveth seed to the sower will both provide bread to eat and will multiply your seed and make the fruits of your righteousness to increase.’ (II Cor 9:10)” (Third Conference of the abbot Chaeremon III, NPNF S2 Vol XI, p. 423)

“Whence human reason cannot easily decide how the Lord gives to those that ask, is found by those that seek, and opens to those that knock,
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and on the other hand is found by those that sought Him not, appears openly among those who asked not for Him, and all the day long stretches forth His hands to an unbelieving and gainsaying people, calls those who resist and stand afar off, draws men against their will to salvation, takes away from those who want to sin the faculty of carrying out their desire, in His goodness stands in the way of those who are rushing into wickedness. (Ibid., IX, p. 426)

1. Commentary:

While St. John is somewhat remiss in not clearly attributing prevenient grace to the operation of Christ’s perfect human nature which is consubstantial to all men, he nevertheless indicates one weakness with the Augustinian theology, and that is the weakness of the unaided human reason to plumb the depths of the calling of God to the individual soul and its inability to universalize that experience. This is indeed one extremely important weakness in Augustine, for in spite of the latter’s insistence on the necessity of grace for the will, his illumination theory is completely informed by the paradigm of an almost autonomous human reason. St. John implies that the Fall effected not only the human will, but its reason as well, and thus the reliance upon pagan philosophy in theological formulation is suspect for that reason.

B. Augustine’s Dialectic and the Rule of Faith

“We hear in the gospel the Lord summoning us to come speedily to Him by our free will: ‘Come unto Me all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will refresh you,’ but the same Lord testifies to its weakness by saying: ‘No man can come unto Me except the Father which sent Me draw him.’ The Apostle indicates our free will by saying: ‘So run that ye may obtain:’ but to its weakness John Baptist bears witness where he
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says: 'No man can receive anything of himself, except it be given him from above.'

"And so these are somehow mixed up and indiscriminately confused, so that among many persons, which depends on the other is involved in great questionings, i.e., does God have compassion upon us because we have shown the beginning of a good will, or does the beginning of a good will follow because God has had compassion upon us? For many believing each of these and asserting them more widely than is right are entangled in all kinds of opposite errors. For if we say that the beginning of free will is in our own power, what about Paul the persecutor, what about Matthew the Publican... But if we say that the beginning of our free will is always due to the inspiration of the grace of God, what about the faith of Zaccheus, or what are we to say of the goodness of the thief on the cross...

"These two, then, viz, the grace of God and free will seem opposed to each other, but really are in harmony, and we gather from the system of goodness that we ought to have both alike, lest if we withdraw one of them from man, we may seem to have broken the rule of the Church's faith."

(Ibid., XI, pp. 427-428)

"Wherefore we must take care not to refer all the merits of the saints to the Lord in such a way as to ascribe nothing but what is evil and perverse to human nature: in doing which we are confuted by the evidence of the most wise Solomon, or rather of the lord Himself, Whose words these are: for when the building of the Temple was finished and he was praying, he spoke as follows: 'And David my father would have built a house to the name of the Lord God of Israel: and the Lord said to David my father 'Whereas thou has thought in thine heart to build a house to My name, thou hast well done in having this same thing in thy mind. Nevertheless thou shalt not build a house to My name.' (I Kings 8:17-19) This thought then and this purpose of king David, are we to call it good and from god or bad and from man? For if that thought was good and
from God, why did He by whom it was inspired refuse that it should be carried into effect? But if it is bad and from man, why is it praised by the Lord?” (Ibid., XII, p. 429)

1. Commentary:

St. John is here addressing directly the dialectic of oppositions as an adequate tool by which to comprehend not only the relationship of the human will to divine grace, but also the statements of Scripture. For St. John, the clear implication is that this dialectic is insufficient to clear understanding of Scripture, since what God wills must, on the developed Augustinian view, surely be brought to pass, given the indefectibility and irresistibility of grace. As I have noted elsewhere in my published work:

Some would, of course, be tempted to dismiss this with an a priori dogmatism as being simply another example of ‘semi-Pelagianism,’ but it cannot be so glibly dismissed, for St. John is confronting a hardened Augustinian position with its own dialectical rigour, and that rigour is precisely the rigour of a dialectical of oppositions: either one should say that all good works come (solely) from God as the Augustinian position maintained, and not from man, in this case David, as the Scripture clearly implied, or else one should say that a fallen human and therefore evil (reprobate) work found favour with God.\textsuperscript{α}

It is this constellation of moral and dialectical difficulties which the Semi-Pelagians have difficulty with, for the Augustinian position must then explain certain passages of Scripture in accordance with the prior assumptions of the theory, and not adjust the theory to the Scripture.

C. The Limitations of Augustine’s Dialectic vis-à-vis

\textsuperscript{α} Joseph P. Farrell, \textit{Free Choices in St. Maximus the Confessor}, St. Tikhon’s Seminary Press, pp. 196-197.
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Christology

“For if he willeth not the one of His little ones should perish, how can we imagine without grievous blasphemy that He does not generally will all men, but only some instead of all to be saved?... The grace of Christ then is at hand every day, which, while it ‘willeth all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth,’ calleth all without any exception, saying: ‘Come unto Me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will refresh you.’ But if He calls not all generally but only some, it follows that not all are heavy laden with original or actual sin, and that this saying is not a true one: ‘For all have sinned and come short of the glory of God;’ nor can we believe that ‘death passed on all men.’” (Ibid., p. 425)

1. Commentary:

This is the crux of the christological difficulty of the developed Augustinian position, and in order to understand what St. John is implying, one must unpack his statement. Again, I will cite from previous remarks in my Free Choice in St. Maximus the Confessor:

Christ, being truly consubstantial (in His humanity) with all men, truly died for all men, and thus His atoning Passion, Death, and Resurrection are in no way limited (but affect all men irresistibly).

In turn, the doctrine of the limited atonement may be reversed to show its hidden and heretical implications: If not all men rise with the second Adam then not all die with the first Adam. There would consequently be some men who, not being affected by the consubstantiality of Christ’s human nature, would not be consubstantial with Him. Therefore, they would not be in Adam either. Not being in Adam, they would have no need of Christ. This is a denial of the inheritance of ancestral sin, and is therefore Pelagianism.

Furthermore, if Christ’s human nature is efficacious in salvation only for a limited number of elected individuals, then it would appear that...
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Christ’s humanity, insofar as it is efficacious for those individuals, is united with them not naturally but only by the object of their wills (i.e., salvation), since His human nature itself is not united with them. This union in object of will between God and man in Christ is Nestorianism. (N.B. One might also notice again the effect of Augustine’s theory of illumination on his Christology and predestinarian doctrine).

It would also appear that, on this view, the human nature of the elected individuals gives nothing to election, and Christ’s human nature certainly does not, as it effects only the elected individuals. Human nature therefore either has no will, which is a kind of ‘anthropological’ Apollinarianism, or it is merely ineffectual in salvation (‘soteriological’ Apollinarianism). Christ’s human decision of salvation at Gethsemane is therefore illusory, and this is Doketism.α

Throughout Augustine’s predestinarian doctrine and its christological consequences then St. John is really saying that there are other factors at work than the exposition of Christian doctrine.

VI. Conclusions and Implications following upon the close of the First Period of the Reception of Augustine (to the Council of Aachen):

A. Dogmatic and Ecclesiological

1. Augustine is a father of the church;

2. But he, like all fathers, must be read within the whole consensus of the fathers;

3. The conception of the consensus of the fathers as a formal theological principle is largely a development which arose in the West, through

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St. Vincent of Lerins, precisely as a response to the tendency to divide Augustine from that consensus in order to make his own personal speculations the dogma of the church;

4. By the same token, even the Semi-Pelagians, while sensing difficulties in Augustine’s theology, do not articulate or develop the dogmatic critique of these difficulties. Thus, while a consensus is established, the work of critique has yet to be done, and in the absence of the critique, the consensus can be broken and the peculiarities of Augustinism developed.

5. The elaboration of the consensus patrum by the Semi-Pelagians implied that where possible, the insights of Augustine are to be interpreted in the light of that consensus, and ambiguous statements resolved accordingly.

B. Interpretive

1. The Platonic element in Augustine’s theology, while a strong undercurrent in most of his work, is only explicit in the Trinitarian works, and the dialectic element strongly present in his anti-Pelagian element. This would seem to imply that ambiguous statements are capable of two interpretations: one, in accordance with the consensus, the other, by the application of the peculiar developments of his triadology and anti-Pelagian dialectic method to the formulation and resolution of all other problems, to the extent that the Christian West is Augustinian, it is so in this latter sense.

2. But the “Azkoul School” is unacceptable, since, if one rejects Augustine, as a Father one to that extent rejects a portion of the Church and of the acknowledged consensus patrum. But the “do not investigate too deeply” approach of Fr. Seraphim Rose will likewise be shown to be insufficient, for the failure to undertake a through-going critique was precisely the problem the Semi-Pelagians bequeathed to the West, as well as that which Fr.
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Seraphim would bequeath to the East. It is in fact to ignore what the Semi-Pelagians themselves were calling for but unable to provide, and it is to leave the West wallowing by itself, in isolation, trying to resolve things it cannot resolve.

This brings us to the next stage of the controversy: the Carolingian period, where the focus turns, once again, not only to predestination, but to the Trinity, and to the proper theological understanding of the sacraments.

506 Cf. note 600 above for the discussion of original guilt.


509 Ibid., IV: 2: 5: p. 41.

509a The dialectical harmonization of texts is of course the favored method of Peter Lombard, and the canonist Gratian.

510 The Russian Orthodox priest Michael Azkoul exemplifies the extreme rationalist approach to Augustine, choosing to see in him noting but a heresiarch. Fr. Seraphim Rose did much to revive Augustine’s status as an Orthodox Father, but did not go into any analysis of his theology, problematical or otherwise. He did, however, point out Augustine’s often-overlooked spiritual writings, his homilies and commentaries, which contain gems of spiritual insight and rhetorical turns of phrase as brilliant in many cases as St. Chrysostom’s. This is the most neglected aspect of St. Augustine’s piety.

511 For Jewish and Islamic citations concerning the simplicity, cf. Avicenna, The Healing, Metaphysics, Treatise One, Chapter 7: “That that Whose Existence is Necessary is One,” pp. 243-246; Solomon Ibn Gabriel, The Fountain of Life, p. 352, where he states, “Whence the
manifest difference among existing things comes to be only through manifest forms and, likewise, the hidden difference among existing things comes only through the hidden forms. Thus diversity comes to be only through the forms of existing things. But the hidden essence which receives the forms is the one first universal matter which has no diversity [in itself],” making the prime matter the simplicity. Moses Maimonides defines simplicity as “the impossibility of composition in respect to the deity,” in *The Guide for the Perplexed*, Bk I: Ch. 52, p. 367. Page numbers refer to Arthur Hyman and James J. Walsh, *Philosophy in the Middle ages: The Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Traditions*, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1978.

Notably, Hyman and Walsh’s book title itself is reflective of the assumed canon of philosophy of the Second Europe, since it contains not one single reference to the Byzantine disputes between St. Gregory Palamas and the Byzantine humanists Akindynos and Barlaam.

Cf. note 495a.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII: THE INCEPTION OF THE TWO EUROPES

513 Norman Cantor, *Inventing the Middle Ages*, p. 375.

514 There is a complex ritual of consecration for a Byzantine Roman Emperor, one which would have played an enormous role, and demanded great preparations, on the part of both Leo III and Charlemagne, if the intention was to make him emperor in view of the constitutional difficulty obtaining in Constantinople with the “Emperor” Irene. For a good discussion of the complexity of this ritual and its pre-ninth century origins, cf. Milton Anastos, “Vox Populi Voluntas Dei”, in *Studies in Byzantine Intellectual History* (Variorum Reprints, 1979), pp. 181-207, and especially pp. 200-202, for comparison with Einhard’s comment and those of Anastasius Bibliothecarius. The Byzantine ritual required coronation in the presence not only of the Patriarch (in this case, Leo III) and the Roman people, but also in the presence of the Senate.


516 Cf. the discussion, from a standard second European perspective, of Pope Leo’s motivations in J.M. Wallace-Hadrill, *The Frankish Church* (Oxford, 1983), pp. 186-189, especially p. 186: “…the fact remained that (Leo III) was simply Charlemagne’s man.”

517 Pope St. Zacharias (741-752) began the Papacy’s involvement with the Frankish Carolingians through his confirmation of the deposition of the last of the Merovingians, Childeric III, on the basis of moral unworthiness. This “political Donatism” would eventually become a major factor in the policies of the Reform Papacy.

518 Pope Hadrian I was a constant thorn in the side of Charlemagne’s geopolitical-ecclesiastical ambitions. Hadrian sent copies of the acts of the Seventh Oecumenical Council, which prompted
Charlemagne to request his theologians to compile a list of objections to them. Of the fact that Charlemagne was personally involved in this there can be no doubt, for the response is delivered to Pope Hadrian by Charlemagne’s son-in-law Angilbert. In these Carolingian responses (the capitulare), objection is made to the fact that the Spirit is said to proceed from the Father through the Son, a Patriarch Tarasios (Photios’ uncle), is accused of not being correct in his profession of the Nicene Creed. 

Hadrian’s response is worth noting, for he states that “We have already shown that the divine dogmas of this council are irreprehensible... For should anyone say he differs from the Creed of the above-mentioned Council, he risks differing with the Creed of the Six Holy Councils.”

Haugh’s commentary then notes that Hadrian “stressed that this doctrine was taught by both the Latin and the Greek Fathers, quoting brief selections from Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, Hilary, Basil, Ambrose, Gregory of Nazianzus, Cyril of Alexandria, Pope Leo, Pope Gregory, Sophronius, and Augustine.” This is significant, for Hadrian is reading Augustine from the consensus of the rest of the Fathers, and not reading the rest of the Fathers through the filter of Augustinism. Thinking this sufficient, he does not realize he has provided one of the principal weapons in the arsenal of “anticipations” of the fully-fledged Augustinian filioque.

Leo III made his escape through a water aqueduct after his attackers nearly succeeded in blinding him. They were partially successful in trying to cut out his tongue.

Cf. J.M. Wallace-Hadrill, op. cit., p. 188: “If any man stood to gain by Charlemagne’s promotion to the imperial title it was the pope himself, whose position in Rome against his enemies would be immensely strengthened; for an emperor enjoyed legal powers that a patrician did


Ibid., p. 47, emphasis added.
not. King and pope undoubtedly discussed this at Paderborn before the latter was sent back home with a suitably prestigious escort.” Wallace-Hadrill does not mention who first probably proposed the bargain. In my opinion, this was Charlemagne, and not Leo.

521 One might even refer to a “German captivity” of the Roman Church, a struggle which Leo unwittingly unleashes and against which he himself would have to fight, for the consistent policy of his papacy after the coronation belies, not a pro-Frankish policy of a pope who is “Charlemagne’s man”, but of a very traditional Roman, i.e., one who sees the Church in terms of the East Roman oikoumene.

522 Leo III was “tried” by Bishop Theodulf in the presence of the synod of Roman clergy. Naturally, a debate occurred over whether or not one could, indeed, try a pope. Eventually the compromise was reached that Leo would swear an oath to prove his innocence of the charges against him. (Indeed, the nature of the charges is never made very explicit in the literature).

523 J.M. Wallice-Hadrill, op. cit., p. 188.

524 cf. Hoyt and Chodorow, Europe in the Middle Ages, pp. 159-161.

525 Einhardt, op. cit., p. 18.

525a cf. pp. 352-353. The religious art of the West at this time was very ikonographical, particularly in Rome, Ravenna, and southern Italy, i.e., it was an integral component of liturgical worship. The Council of Frankfurt thus constitutes the first “official” reduction of the theological and sacramental significance of religious art, and opens the way toward the application of secular artistic principles into religious art, reducing it to decoration.

526 The relevant part of the Seventh Oecumenical Council’s Definition of faith is as follows:

We therefore, following the royal pathway and the divinely inspired authority of our Holy Fathers and the traditions of the Catholic Church
(for, as we all know, the Holy Spirit indwells her), define with all certitude and accuracy that just as the figure of the precious and life-giving Cross, so also the venerable and holy images, as well in painting and mosaic as of other fit materials, should be set forth in the holy churches of God, and on the sacred vessels and on the vestments and hanging and in pictures both in houses and by the wayside, to wit, the figure of our Lord God and Saviour Jesus Christ, of our spotless lady, the Mother of God, of the honourable Angels, of all Saints and of all pious people... and to these should be given due salutation and honourable reverence (ασπασµον και τιµηκην προσκυνηςιν), not indeed that true worship of faith (λατρειαν) which pertains alone to the divine nature; but to these, as to the figure of the precious and life-giving Cross and the Book of the Gospels and to the other holy objects, incense and lights may be offered according to ancient pious custom... Anathema to them who presume to apply to the venerable images the things said in Holy Scripture about idols. Anathema to those who do not salute the holy and venerable images. Anathema to those who call the sacred images idols. Anathema to those who say that Christians resort to the sacred images as to gods...α

The argument is now often heard that the First Europe only contrived the filioque as a major cause of concern after the fact, and that the two halves of Europe remained in communion with each other when the filioque was in use in the West. It is alleged that the East only made it an issue when it became fully aware of it during the patriarchate of Photius.

Unfortunately, this is not true. Both East and West were aware of the filioque as a problem long before the ninth century. Cletic monasteries resisted its inclusion in the Creed until the eighth century. More importantly, Byzantine diplomatic contact with the Franks initiated something of a controversy at the Council of Gentilly in 767. Records of

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this council are not extant, and one knows of it only through Einhard, Ado of Vienne, and abbot Regino.\(^a\) It is not clear who first raised the topic, but for political reasons it is unlikely that it was the Byzantine envoys.\(^7\) The presence of the Celtic resistance to the \textit{filioque} in the West belies the notion that the issue was merely seized upon both by the Franks and the East Romans as a political issue, for the Celts had little to gain, politically, by their opposition of it. That it was for the Franks and the East Romans, however, a political issue as well as a theological one cannot be gainsaid.

\(^{528}\) It is significant that in most popular understandings of the diptychs or lists of saints canonically commemorated by the Eastern Orthodox Catholic Church, the normal “cut-off” line for those Western Saints acknowledged to be such in 1054. The same understanding, typically, holds for the papal church of the Second Europe. However, both St. Photius and Pope Nicholas I constitute the significant pre-schism exceptions to the rule, since Nicholas I is, obviously, a saint to the papal church, principally for his active promotion of the papal supremacy even to the point of creating a rupture with the East. This likewise implies that the papacy, from being what it claims, the “chair of unity”, was the principal cause of division at that time. Conversely, Photius is a Saint to the Orthodox Church, principally for his role in combating the heresy of the \textit{filioque} and its corollary of incipient papal supremacy and infallibility. He is known to the First Europe’s hagiography as one of three of the “Pillars of Orthodoxy”, champions of its Faith against encroachments or Western modifications or alterations, the other two being St. (Archbishop) Gregory Palamas, who resisted the attempts of the Byzantine humanists in the fourteenth century to impale Orthodox theology on the doctrines of Hellenistic philosophy.

\(^{529}\) For a complete translation of the relevant context, cf. Richard

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\(^a\) Haugh, op. cit., p. 42.

\(^7\) Ibid., pp. 42-43.
Haugh’s *Photius and the Carolingians*, Belmont, Massachusetts.

E.g., Arianism, Donatism, Saellianism, Nestorianism, etc.

cf. the *Synodikon of Orthodoxy*, the anathemata against ikonoclasm read:

To all the heretics:

R: Anathema, fiat! fiat! fiat!!

V: To whosoever confess the Incarnation in words alone and who allow not the depiction of that Faith in the holy ikons, and who in fact deign to confess in speech what they deny in reality and thus repudiate our salvation:

R: Anathema, fiat! fiat! fiat!!

V: To whosoever refuse to depict Christ our true God in the holy ikons as having a portion with us of flesh and blood, out of a perverse attachment to the term “uncircumscribable”, and who thus confess phantasms:

R: Anathema, fiat! fiat! fiat!!

V: To whosoever doth confess, whether they will or not, the visions of the prophets but reject the things which they have foreseen, that wonder, even the Incarnation of the Word, or who maintain that it was the inaccessible and invisible essence of God which appeared to their sight, or that these marvels and wonders were manifest unto them in images, figures, or outlines of the truth, and who allow not that one may depict in an ikon the Word Incarnate or the Passion which He hath endured for us:

R: Anathema, fiat! fiat! fiat!!

V: To whosoever heareth the words of the Saviour, “If ye believe Moses, believe me also,” and the saying of Moses when he spoke to those with understanding: “The Lord They God will raise up unto thee a Prophet from the midst of thee, of thy brethren, like unto me; unto Him shall ye hearken,”¹ and even after this say that they acknowledge that prophet, but allow not the depiction in ikons the grace of that Prophet and Saviour of the world, Who

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¹ Deuteronomy 18:15
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hath been seen and in which He may be seen, having a portion in the life of men, having warred against our infirmities and cured our incurable malady, in which he hath been crucified, entombed, resurrected, in which He hath endured and accomplished all things for our sake -- to all those whosoever allow not that in the ikons the very, real, true and concrete salvation of the world is depicted and seen, and allow not their veneration nor ascribe any honour unto them:

R: Anathema, fiat! fiat! fiat!!

V: To all who persevered in that ikon-smashing heresy, or rather, in the Christ-denying apostasy that is truly is, who refuse to allow their salvation by a pretended and false following of the Mosaic Law, who neither consent to reunite with the light of the Faith according to apostolic precepts, nor to place any confidence in the exhortations and judgments of the fathers given for the restoration of their aberrant and wandering ways, nor have any regard for the universal consent of the Church spread throughout the whole heart, but who, on the contrary, have aligned themselves with the factions of the Jews and Greeks -- for the blasphemies which they do not direct to the Original, they have the insolence to direct to His ikon, which is the same thing as to direct it to the original, for it is he Who is depicted -- to all those whosoever would be despairing prisoners of this aberration, who would shut their ears to every divine and spiritual precept, who, as rotten and putrid members who have severed themselves from the common body of the Church, we say:

R: Anathema, fiat! fiat! fiat!!

V: To Anastasius, Constantine, and Nicetas, who presided over the heresy of the Isaurian Emperors as infamous priests and guides of perdition:

R: Anathema, fiat! fiat! fiat!!

V: To Theodotus, Antony, and John, who transmitted this evil and succeeded them in faithfulness:

R: Anathema, fiat! fiat! fiat!!

V: To Paul, who reverted to being a Saul, and to Theodore surnamed Gastes and to Stephen Molites, and again, to Theodore Kritinos and to Leon Laloudius, and to all who would have a portion in the impieties of the
aforementioned men, whether in the rank of the clergy of whatever dignity or function, who would persevered in their impiety:

   R: Anathema, fiat! fiat! fiat!!
   V: To the Conciliabulum, which rose up in insolence against the sacred ikons:

   R: Anathema, fiat! fiat! fiat!!
   V: To those who maintain that the august ikons of Christ our God and of the saints are implied by the prohibitions of the divine Scripture against idols:

   R: Anathema, fiat! fiat! fiat!!
   V: To those who say that Christian take recourse to ikons as to gods:

   R: Anathema, fiat! fiat! fiat!!
   V: To those who say that in addition to Christ our God (the sacred ikons have) delivered us to another worship and to the error of idolatry:

   R: Anathema, fiat! fiat! fiat!!
   V: To those who say that the Catholic Church hath for ever surrendered to idols and overturned the entire Mystery (of the Incarnation) and hath defiled the Christian Faith:

   R: Anathema, fiat! fiat! fiat!!
   V: And if anyone takes a defense any heresy of the detractors of Christians, whether living or dead:

   R: Anathema, fiat! fiat! fiat!!
   V: And if anyone doth not venerate Our Lord Jesus Christ circumscribed in the ikon as regards His humanity:

   R: Anathema, fiat! fiat! fiat!!

532 cf. St. Maximus the Confessor, Opuscula Theologica et Polemica 3, PG 91: 45-56, where he refers to the Monophysites as “Severans”, after Severus of Antioch. St. John of Damascus also refers to the Monophysites as “Severans”. The important point is that for the Orthodox of that time, Monophysitism was never exclusively referred to as a “national” heresy. It could still be, and was, considered a party following
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of an individual theologian, Severus of Antioch, even though the political reality was that the majority of Egypt’s and Syria’s Christian population was irrevocably no longer a part of the Roman-Constantinopolitan oikoumene.

533 The term oikoumene (οικούμενη) denoted for the Byzantine Romans precisely the sphere, not only of Byzantine political dominance, but of Orthodox Christian culture. It thus tended to denote the Christian civilization of the Mediterranean basin and its satellites.

534 Cf. pp. 268-269 for the discussion of previous Byzantine rejections of papal claims to supremacy.

535 Personally, I do believe that Charlemagne took an active hand in orchestrating and preparing the crisis. There is a certain amount of indirect evidence to this effect: (1) Charlemagne and his advisers were certainly familiar with the earlier “false starts” to the controversy at the Council of Gentilly in 737; (2) the extent of his dominions permitted him to ascertain easily that the filioque was in use throughout most of the Western Church except in Rome and its suburban dioceses, thus, he would have known that he could easily present the papacy with a fait accompli; (3) he would also have known that the previous “false starts” to the controversy -- again notably at Gentilly -- were the occasions of incipient Graeco-Byzantine hostility to the doctrine. Cf. note 528 above.

536 Charlemagne was acknowledged as the “Christian protector” of the holy sites in Palestine by, among others, the great Caliph of Bagdad Harun Al-Raschid, for he had exchanged embassies on occasion with the Caliph. From these alone he could have gained some knowledge of Graeco-Byzantine liturgical practice and belief.

537 Cf. note 528 above.

538 It is worth recalling here an obvious fact: the dogmatic core which both Europes formally acknowledge and therefore have in common are precisely the first Seven Oecumenical Councils, and these, let it be noted, are the products largely of the Byzantine Roman ecclesiological
“world-view”. Milton V. Anastos, with whom we have had occasion to take serious issue, puts this point accurately “…the basic doctrine of the Christian Church at large was drafted by Byzantine theologians. It was approved by the Roman Church, and some Roman theological ideas were incorporated into the Oecumenical Creeds, which, however, were written originally in Greek and are Byzantine in both (sic.)
St. Gregory the Theologian

1. The Procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father alone is the guarantee of aphophaticism and of a non-dialectical Trinity, i.e., God cannot be construed dialectically or in analogy to the world. There is One Source, the Father, and the Holy Ghost is neither a grandson nor a brother, because the manner of His origin from the Father is unique to Himself, and inexpressibly different from the Son's. This excludes conceptions of an anthropomorphizing “sexuality” in the Holy Trinity: procession consecrates a Person wholly outside of worldly categories, neither Son, grandson, nor brother. (The point about “grandson” is not without its own significance for our subsequent discussion of the filioque, for St. Augustine will ask the question why the Spirit is not a grandson since He proceeds from the Son as well as the Father. This means that St. Augustine conceives of the procession in some sense as being similar to generation and begetting.):

“Either He is altogether Unbegotten, or else He is Begotten. If He is Unbegotten, there are two Unoriginates. If He is begotten, you must make a further subdivision. He is so either by the Father or by the Son. And if by the Father, there are two Sons, and they are brothers. And you may make them twins if you like, or the one older and the other younger, since you are so very fond of the bodily conceptions. But if by the Son, then such a one will say, we het a glimpse of a Grandson God, then which nothing could be more absurd... For it does not follow that because the son is the Son in some higher relation... it would be necessary to think that all the names of this lower world and of our kindred should be transferred to the Godhead. Or may be you would consider our God to be a male, according to the same arguments,
because He is called God and Father, and that Deity is feminine, from the gender of the word, and Spirit is neuter, because it has nothing to do with generation...

“But since we do not admit your first division, which declares that there is no mean between Begotten and Unbegotten, at once, along with your magnificent division, away go brothers and your Grandsons, as when the first link of an intricate chain is broken they are broken with it, and disappear from your system of divinity. For tell me, what position will you assign to that which proceeds, which has started up between the two terms of your division, and is introduced by a better Theologian than you, Our Savior Himself?... The Holy Ghost, which proceedeth from the Father, Who, inasmuch as He is not begotten is no Son; and inasmuch as He is between the Unbegotten and the Begotten is God.” (NPNF, Fifth Oration, the Holy Spirit, VII-VIII, pp. 319-320)

We draw attention to footnote gamma by the Anglican editors at the bottom of the page:

It did not fall within this Father’s province to develop the doctrine of the procession. He is content to shew that the Spirit was not generated, seeing that according to Christ’s own teaching He proceeds from the Father. The question of His relation to the son is alien to St. Gregory Nazianzen’s purpose...

Thus, we may conclude from our editor’s remarks that the notion of doctrinal development and the filioque are intimately related.

On the contrary, if one recalls that St. Gregory specifically animadverts the doctrine of polyarchy, or many-sourceness, as leading to anarchy (no source, disorder), the very thing which is also implied in Eunomianism in the Spirit’s case, his doctrine is already a developed basis from which to challenge any notion of double procession, because it is not needed, and indeed implies polyarchy and anarchy. We shall discover that St. Augustine will ask the same question: Why is the Spirit...
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not a grandson. As we shall see, Augustine admits this is an absurdity, but, unlike Gregory, having accepted polyarchy, the question is not rhetorical in his case. Augustine, as we shall see, may have “solved” the question of the relation of the Spirit to the Son, but his solution implies that the Spirit has no direct relation with the Father.

In St. Gregory’s exposition: it is precisely because there is a third kind of hypostatic feature (υποστατικη ἰδιοτητις) and relation of origin in the Trinity that the Trinity is precisely, immediately, and at once, without any step of dialectic or of twoness, both One and Three. This is what Gregory means in the above quotation by the word “between”. There is no necessity of a second step of positing a duality of sources to explain the Spirit relation. The Trinity is immediately One and Three, there is no step of Two.

Thus, the Holy Spirit is consubstantial with the Father and the Son. In this, St. Gregory presses St. Basil’s own statements to the conclusion that St. Basil did not expressly state: “Well then, is He consubstantial? Yes, if He is God.”

St. Gregory of Nyssa’s Apparent Filioquism, and Quasten’s Explication

A. The Non-Transferability of the Hypostatike Idiotetai

St. Gregory of Nyssa makes several points that doom any attempt to find in him an anticipation of the filioque:

1. The hypostatike idiotetai of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are not transferable to the other hypostases:

“The characteristic of the Father’s Person cannot be transferred to the Son or to the Spirit, nor, on the other hand, can that of the Son be accommodated to one of the others, or the property of the Spirit be attributed to the Father and the Son.” (III Quasten, p. 267)

2. However, both the Son and the Spirit are in the category of “being not ungenerated.” Therefore, how does one distinguish between the two? Gregory’s answer is the basis for his alleged anticipation of the *filioque* doctrine:

So again the being caused, which is the property of the Son and of the Spirit, cannot by its very nature, be considered in the Father. On the other hand, the being not ungenerated is common to the Son and to the Spirit, hence in order to avoid confusion in the subject, one must again search for the pure difference in the properties, so that what is common be safeguarded, yet what is proper be not mixed. For He is called the only-begotten of the Father by the Holy Scripture; and this term establishes His property. But the Holy Spirit is also said to be from the Father, and is testified to be the Son’s... Hence the Spirit that is from God is also Christ’s Spirit; but the Son, Who is from God, neither is nor is said to be from the Spirit; and this relative sequence is permanent and incontrovertible. Hence the sequence cannot properly be resolved and reversed in its meaning so that as we say the Spirit to be Christ’s, we might also call Christ the Spirit’s.α

3. Quasten observes that the passage just cited is of doubtful authenticity, and that K. Holl said it was a forgery made in the interest of the *filioque*. He observes that the authenticity is not in question.β One is therefore constrained to inquire, assuming, for the sake of argument, the genuineness of the passage, the following question: Are there any factors in favour of interpreting St. Gregory as advocating a nascent *filioque*?

α Cited in III Quasten, p. 267.
β III Quasten, p. 268.
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The following points would seem to suggest themselves:

(1) One factor is the general overall character of St. Gregory’s Neoplatonism itself.

(2) There is also present in it the conception of an eternal *taxis* (ταξιζ) in the Trinity which is reflective somehow of the manner of the relations of origin. In this conception, the Son appears as a middle term and a second cause of the Spirit along with the Father:

In support of this contention, the following passage is adduced:

Again in that which is of the Cause we recognize yet another distinction. For one is directly from the first Cause, and another only mediately and through that which is directly form the first Cause; so that the character of being Only-Begotten abides without doubt in the Son, and the mediation of the Son, while it guards His character of being Only-Begotten, does not exclude the Spirit from His natural relation to the Father.

b. If St. Gregory of Nyssa is to be interpreted in a *filioquist* sense, is it correct to say that we cannot speak of Christ as being “of the Spirit”? Should we not look in him for some form of the following dilemma: If Christ sends the Spirit in Economy, and is this act be symbolic of an eternal procession of the Spirit from the Son in Theology, i.e., in eternity, then what about the fact that Christ is “incarnate of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary”? Is there an eternal generation of the Son by the Father and the Spirit because the Spirit sends the Son into the world?

c. At this juncture, Quasten then states,

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*Ill Quasten, p. 287.*
From these words it appears that Gregory with the other Greek Fathers conceives the Holy Spirit as proceeding from the father through the Son, i.e., immediately from the Son and mediately from the Father. He expresses exactly the same idea in his treatise *On the Holy Spirit*. There he compare the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost to three torches, the first of which imparts its light to the second, and through the second it imparts its light to the third. However, in the passage of the *De oratione* which we quoted above he goes further stating: "The Holy Spirit is also said to be from the Father and is testified to be from the Son." (ἐκ τοῦ ζιου)

d. Are there factors arguing against a filioquist interpretation of St. Gregory of Nyssa?

(1) The presence of the phrase ἐκ τοῦ ζιου argues against the authenticity of the passage, for this language is *never* used in the Greek fathers in passages of undisputed authenticity to indicate the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit. It is quite different in force and meaning from the phrase διὰ τοῦ ζιου. However, should one simply reject the passage because it is apparently susceptible of Roman Catholic Church interpretations to justify the interpolation? Are there sufficient theological grounds elsewhere in St. Gregory’s writings to reject a filioquist interpretation?

(2) St. Gregory has nowhere *explicitly* used the expression of procession, which in the Greek is from the Son, but speaks merely of a “projection” or “going forth” (προοδοζ) which has not the same force or connotation of the Augustinian filioque.

(3) Quasten has therefore distorted the evidence, for in no Greek Father, and particularly not in St. Basil or in St. Gregory of

\[\text{Ibid.}\]

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Nazianzus, have we encountered expressions which can bear a filioquist interpretation. Indeed, we have encountered the opposite. St. Gregory of Nazianzus, may it be recalled, took particular pains to establish the point that there is no middle step of two in between the Father and the Spirit, but rather that the Holy Spirit’s relation of origin to the Father was an altogether unique relation, a tertium quid. These facts are significant, for Sts. Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus are the major patristic influences on Gregory of Nyssa.

4. One may safely conclude, however, at the stage of the evidence presented thus far in Quasten, that there is an ambiguity in St. Gregory’s teaching, and that it seems quite possible that he is teaching a filioque doctrine. Other evidence from the Contra Eunomius, however, is, as has been seen in the main text, overwhelmingly against Quasten’s interpretation.

Let us recall the main points St. Gregory made:

It is Blasphemy to call the Holy Ghost Subject both to the Father and the Son:

“On the subject of the Holy Spirit the blasphemy is plain and unconcealed: he says that He is not to be ranked with the Father or the Son, but is subject to both. I will therefore examine as closely as possible this statement.”

There is, in other words, a clear structural problem inherent in Eunomianism, as we saw when examining St. Basil’s response to the doctrine. It is this structure which St. Gregory of Nyssa objects to. What comprises this structure?

α St. Gregory of Nyssa, Against Eunomius, I: 15, NPNF, p. 53.
1. First, St. Gregory states that the order in which the Spirit is named in the Trinity -- Father, Son, and Holy Ghost -- does not indicate anything about their respective ranking in Theologia, i.e., in their relations of origin, or in their essence. Thus, one blow would already seem to be struck against that interpretation which would imply St. Gregory as teaching a filioque:

Does he (Eunomius) lay down that we must rank Him as inferior and not as equal, because He was given by Our Lord to His disciples third in order? By the same reasoning he should make the Father inferior to the Son, since the Scripture often plaves the name of our Lord first, and the Father Almighty second… However we have never yet heart of a philosophy such as this, which relegates to the category of the inferior and the dependent that which is mentioned second or third only for some particular reason of sequence: yet that is what our author wants to do… In fact he rules that sequence in point of order is indicative of unlikeness of nature. (Ibid., 16, Col I, p. 54)

2. The specific arrangement which St. Gregory objects to is that the Holy Spirit is made to derive not only from the Father, but from the Son as well:

He opposes the arrangement of Scripture. He separates off that equality with the Father and the son of His proper and natural rank and connexion which our Lord Himself pronounces, and numbers Him with ‘subjects’: he declares Him to be a work of both persons, of the Father, as supplying the cause of His constitution, of the Only-Begotten, as of the artificer of His subsistence and defines this as the ground of His ‘subjection,’ without as yet unfolding the meaning of ‘subjection.’

a. At this point there is a footnote in the text by a very alarmed translator which indicates an exposed nerve has been touched:

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α Ibid., 16, p. 54.
β Ibid.
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With regard to Gregory's own belief as to the procession of the Holy Spirit, it may be said once for all that there is hardly anything clear about it to be found in his writings. The question, in fact, remained undecided until the 9th century, the time of the schism of the East and West. But here, as in other points, Origen had approached the nearest to the teaching of the West.7

But Gregory is clear on the procession of the Spirit from the Father. It would therefore seem justified to conclude that in other passages cited by Quasten that St. Gregory is not speaking of a procession of the Spirit from the Son in eternity, but of the sending of the Spirit by the Son in Economy.

Thus, St. Gregory of Nyssa is more subtle in his analysis of Eunomianism than are the other two Cappadocians, for he perceives two structures which exist within the heresy simultaneously: the broad structure, wherein the Holy Spirit derives from the Father and the Son, and a more elaborate structure, where energies intervene between each of the three subordinated Persons.

St. Hilary of Poitiers

The doctrine of the Holy Trinity is the crux both of St. Hilary's exposition of theology, and the beginning of the attempt to see anticipations of the *filioque* in the most important of the pre-Augustinian Latin Fathers. A word is therefore necessary about our methodology in approaching this subject before the examination of it is actually begun.

In our exposition of the Trinitarian theological formulations of the Cappadocians, we took deliberate pains to show that St. Gregory of Nyssa in particular did have expressions which might be used to support such a doctrine. we also took deliberate care, however, to show that they were capable of a very different, non-filioquist interpretation. Howsoever one

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7 Ibid., note 9, p. 54.
interpret the evidence in St. Gregory's case (and I cannot see that one can interpret it in any other way than that the preponderance of evidence weighs against any attempt to see in his formulations an anticipation of the *filioque*), the Second Oecumenical Council deemed the conservative formulations of St. Gregory of Nazianzus, who remains the closest to the Scriptural confession of a procession from the Father, a sufficient formulation of the Holy Ghost's personal uniqueness and origination.

The approach to St. Hilary will therefore be similar: since the *filioque* doctrine has not received explicit formulation, and indeed does not until St. Augustine, we will interpret St. Hilary in a manner very different from the treatment he is usually given in Western patrologies: we will interpret him as belonging, not to the post-Augustinian "consensus", but to the pre-, or even better, the non-Augustinian consensus. Thus, for the moment, we shall leave aside the question of why St. Hilary should subsequently have been understood as teaching the *filioque*. Thus, we must seek to interpret in a different way what is usually taken as evidence for the *filioque*.

As the fist component of the argument, we remind the reader of St. Hilary's crucial remarks regarding the dispute between the Nicene orthodox partisans of the *homoousios* and the orthodox "semi-Arians" who contended for the word *homoiousios*.

The term *homoousios* (of one substance) may express a grasp of the true faith; but it lends itself to deception. If we apply it to a combination of distinction and likeness of nature, to insist that the 'likeness' asserts not a likeness in mere externals (*speciem*) but in underlying reality (*genus*), then our teaching accords with the truth of our religion: providing that we take 'one substance' as meaning a likeness of distinct entities, so that unity means not numerical singularity but equality... If 'Father and Son or one substance' is taken as implying a single entity, though signified by two names, we may confess the Son in name, but we do not acknowledge him in thought, if by confessing 'one substance' we are
asserting that one single being is himself both Father and Son. Again, there is a foothold for the error which supposes the Father to have divided himself, to have cut off a part of himself to be his Son... There is also a third error, which takes ‘Father and Son of one substance’ to indicate a prior substance, which the two share quality. The orthodox will assert ‘one substance of Father and son’; but he must not start from that: nor must he hold this as the chief truth, as if there could be not true faith without it. HE will assert ‘one substance’ without danger, when he has first said, ‘The Father is ingenerate; the Son has his origin and existence from the Father; he is like the Father in goodness, honour, and nature.’ He is subject to his Father, as the origin of his being... He does not come from nothing; he is generate. He is not unborn; but he shares in timelessness. He is not the Father, but the Son derived from him. He is not a portion, he is a whole: not the Creator himself, but his image; the image of God, born of God, from God: he is not a creature; he is God. But he is not another God in underlying substance, but one God through essence of undiffering substance. God is one, not in person, but in nature.α

I know, dearest brethren, that some acknowledge the likeness, while denying equality... If they say that there is a difference between likeness and equality, I ask what is the basis of equality. For if the Son is like the Father in essence and goodness and glory and time, I ask in what way does he appear not to be equal... If the Father has given to the son, whom he has generated impassibly, a nature that was not other than his own, nor different from his own, it must have been his own nature that he gave. Thus ‘like’ means ‘his own'; and that entails equality, the absence of difference. Things which show no difference are one; not by unity of person, but by equality of nature.β

From these two passages one may adduce the following:

(1) First, it is necessary to note quite plainly that St. Hilary specifically

β Ibid., 74, cited in Bettenson, pp. 48-49.
objects to any *ordo theologiae* which would make the consubstantial divine essence itself the *starting* point for theology, i.e., which would place it first in the order of concepts to be explicated. This is crucial, for it is precisely this step which will emerge in the Augustinian exposition of Trinitarian doctrine.

(2) Second, in this regard it is to be recalled that St. Basil himself specifically warned against such an *ordo*. Thus, St. Hilary and the Cappadocians are not doing “Eastern” vs. “Western” theology, but *Catholic, Apostolic, and Patristic* theology.

(3) Thus, for St. Hilary, as for the Cappadocians and all the other fathers examined to this point, the starting point for Trinitarian theology is the Monarchy of the Father.

(4) This adherence to tradition is manifest in Hilary in other ways, most notably by what his remarks imply for the relationship between philosophy and theology.

(5) Hence, to restate what St. Hilary has said about *homoousios* and *homoiousios* in a way which this relationship will be clearer, we derive the following: ‘*homoousios*’ is understood by the orthodox Niceans as meaning simply ‘equality in essence of two individual entities’, which is the meaning assigned by both St. Athanasius and St. Basil. Thus, *used as a specifically defined theological symbol and not with its philosophical connotation, the term is acceptable*. The problem which the “orthodox Semi-Arians” have with it is precisely because they understand the word in its *philosophical sense, which was not intended by the First Ecumenical Council*. In this sense, the term ‘*homoousios*’ may be broken down to mean “same (homo) entity (ousios), in which case the word would mean that the Father and the Son were the same entity, or person.” The *homoiousions* thus objected to the term because they rightly concluded that it could be understood in a Sabellian sense. Their error was only that they
understood a theological symbol in a philosophical manner. Conversely, the initial rejection of homoiousios by the orthodox Niceans was likewise based upon reading what the orthodox “Semi-Arians” understood as a theological symbol in a philosophical sense. The so-called Semi-Arians meant by the term entities which were “like” each other, or the “same” in essence, but they chose the term to protect their unique Personhood. But, since the term ousios means not only “entity” but essence, confession of “likeness” seemed to the Orthodox Niceans as falling short of “identity”, and hence even an Arian could use the term (as they did, thus making it difficult to distinguish between the genuinely orthodox and the genuinely Arian factions within the “Semi-Arian” party). Thus, the orthodox Niceans committed the same mistake with their opponents, by understanding their term not as a theological symbol, but in a philosophical manner.

(6) St. Hilary’s solution is therefore a brilliant though obvious one: the term homoousios is not a philosophical symbol, which insight, when coupled with the Cappadocians’ use of the equally strong hypostasis to designate the Three Persons, makes a reconciliation of the orthodox Semi-Arians to the Nicene formula possible.

(7) Consequently, St. Hilary stands entirely outside any notion of a “Hellenization” of doctrine, and in fact, along with the Cappadocians, may be understood as the first father to reflect explicitly on the nature of theological language and vocabulary. For this reason, and for the fact that he disallows any beginning of theology at the consubstantial divine essence, he simply cannot be construed as a proto-Augustinian.

2. The Relationship of the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son in St. Hilary:

We have arrived then at St. Hilary’s exposition of the Holy Spirit, and His relationship to the Father and to the Son. The passages of his De
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Trinitate which are often adduced to support the doctrine of the filioque are 2:29; 8:20; 9:73; 8:19 and 25, and 12:55. We will cite each of these without commentary, and then offer some explanations. We begin with the first and strongest passage:

Concerning the Holy Spirit I ought not to be silent, and yet I have no need to speak; still, for the sake of those who are in ignorance, I cannot refrain. There is no need to speak, because we are bound to confess Him proceeding, as He does, for, the Father and Son. For my own part, I think it wrong to discuss the question of His existence. He does exist, inasmuch as He is given, received, retained. He is joined with Father and Son in our confession of the faith, and cannot be excluded from a true confession of the faith, and cannot be excluded from a true confession of Father and Son; take away a part, and the whole faith is marred. If any man demand what meaning we attach to this conclusion, he, as well as we, has read the words of the apostle, ‘Because ye are sons of God, God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into our hearts, crying, Abba, Father,’ and ‘Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God, in Whom ye have been sealed,’ and again, “But we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit which is of God, that we may know the things that are given unto us by God,’ and also ‘But ye are not in the flesh but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God is in you… Wherefore, since He is, and is given, and is possessed, and is of God, let His traducers take refuge in silence. When they ask, Through Whom is He? To what end does he exist? of what nature is He? We answer that He it is through Whom all things exist, and from Whom are all things, and that he is the Spirit of God, God’s gift to the faithful. If our answers displease them, their displeasure must also fall upon the apostles and the prophets, who spoke of Him exactly as we have spoken. And furthermore, Father and Son must incur the same displeasure.α

α St. Hilary of Poitiers, On the Trinity, II:19, NPNF S2, p. 60.
The Advocate will come, and the son will send him from the Father, and he is the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father... How are we to understand that which the son sends from the Father? As received, or sent out, or begotten? For he must mean one of these modes of sending that which he is to send from the Father, receiving is ruled out, since proceeding is clearly indicated. It remains to make sure of our decision on the question whether we are to think of the coming forth of a coexisting being, or the proceeding of one begotten. He receives form the Son, since he is both sent by the Son and also proceeds from the Father. I ask whether to receive from the son is one and the same thing as to receive from the Father. For the Lord Himself says: ‘Since he will receive of what is mine and will announce it to you. All the Father has is mine...’

But further on in the passage cited by Bettenson, we read:

Dissever if thou canst the unity of the nature, and introduce some necessary unlikeness through which the Son may not exist in unity of nature. For the Spirit of Truth proceedeth from the Father and is sent from the Father by the Son. All things that the Father hath are the Son’s; and for this cause whatever He Who is to be sent shall receive, He shall receive form the Son, because all things that the Father hath are the Son’s.α

Christ dwells in us: and when Christ thus dwells, God dwells. And the spirit of Christ dwells; and it is not another Spirit than the Spirit of God who dwells. But if Christ is understood to be in us through the Holy Spirit, we must recognize this as both the Spirit of God and the spirit of Christ.β

He declares the unity of His nature, as the only-begotten, with the Father, by the unmistakable words ‘all things whatsoever the Father hath, are Mine.’ There is no mention here of coming into possession... When he says, therefore, that all things which the Father has, are His, He alludes to the divine nature, and not to a joint ownership of gifts.

α Ibid., VIII:20, NPNF S2, p. 143.
β Ibid., 8:26, cited in Bettenson, p. 55.
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bestowed. For referring to His words that the Holy Spirit should take of His, He says, ‘All things whatsoever the Father hath are mine, therefore said I, He shall take of Mine’: that is, the Holy Spirit takes of His, but takes also of the Father’s: and if He receives of the Father’s He receives also of His.’

For my part I cannot be satisfied with denying… that Christ Jesus is a creature. I cannot allow that this name of creature can be attached to thy Holy Spirit… And, because I know that thou alone are ingenerate, and that the Only-begotten is born of thee, I would not refuse to say that the Holy Spirit is begotten; I will never assert that he was ever created… As in the case of the generation of the Only-begotten before everlasting time, when our ambiguous speech fails and the struggles of our understanding find their limit, there remains only the fact that he is generated; so I hold fast to the consciousness that thy Holy Spirit is from thee, through him, though I cannot perceive it with my intellect… I will not venture beyond the grasp of my intelligence; nor will I say anything else about the Only-Begotten but that he is generate: similarly, I will not venture beyond the reach of human thought; I will make no statement about the Holy Spirit, except that he is thy Spirit. Let me not engage on the fruitless strife of words, but let me hold to the constant profession of unwavering faith.”

There is one Author of all things. For God the Father is one, from whom are all things; and our Lord Jesus Christ is one, through whom are all things; and the Spirit is one, who is God’s gift in all things. All things therefore are set in order with their own powers and excellencies. There is one power, from whom are all things; one offspring, through whom are all things; one gift of perfect hope. Nothing can be found lacking to that unity of perfection, which comprises, in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, infirmity in the Eternal, his likeness in his Image, his availability in the Gift.”

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Ibid., 2:1, cited Bettenson, pp. 56-57.
Now let us examine what we have:

(1) In all the passages just cited, every reference to the Spirit is spoken in the context of the Spirit’s relationship to the world, i.e., is said of Economy. The one exception to this is apparently the first passage, II:29, where Hilary says of the Spirit “proceeding, as He does, from Father and Son.” This would lead us to conclude that even here, Hilary is speaking Economically, as indeed, the subsequent context of the passage indicates with the ample scriptural citations regarding the Spirit’s indwelling of believers. However, even with this most explicit passage, there is a problem, which the Anglican translators are honest enough to note in footnote number eight at the bottom of the page: “qui Patre et Filio auctoribus confitendus est; a comparison with dum et usum et auctorem eius ignorant in (section 4) make this appear the probable translation. It might, of course, mean confess Him on the evidence of Father and Son.” In any case, therefore, the strongest passage appears to have a transitional ambiguity. This in turn might indicate that it has been so translated in the main text because dogmatic factors external to the text are at work.

(2) In any case, one must conclude that there is no clear statement of St. Hilary of a double procession of the spirit from Father and Son in eternity, which is the doctrine of the filioque. Indeed, St. Hilary’s normal mode of expression is elsewhere always to remain faithful to the Scriptural formula of “from the Father through the Son in the Spirit”, and formula we saw also in St. Basil. This formula, as was explained previously, was economic in its focus, not theological.

(3) The verses of St. John 16:12-15, “All that the Father hath is Mine” is explicitly stated by St. Hilary to indicate the consubstantial essence which the Three have in common, and nothing more. He does not, as he does Augustine, understand that the Father has communicated to the Son His (the Father’s) property of originating the Spirit. In other words, what St. Augustine will construe as being indicated by
these verses is something which refers to Person; what S. Hilary understands as being referred to is the consubstantial essence.

(4) Therefore, we conclude that St. Hilary is not teaching the filioque, since his preoccupation in any case is with Economy, and not Theology. Insofar as he refers to theology in St. John 16:12-15, he takes the verse, as would all fathers following the ordo theologiae of Persons, operations, essence, as referring to something common to all three persons, and therefore, as referring to Their consubstantial essence. Thus, the words of Simonetti in the Fourth Volume of Quasten’s Patrology assume some significance:

Hilary seems to identify the accipere and procedure, the origin of the Holy Spirit and his mission in the world at the behest of the Son, and has the Holy Spirit derive his origin from the unique nature of the Father and the son. In this way, he anticipates the Augustinian doctrine of the dual procession of the Holy Spirit. It must be taken into account, however, that Hilary conceived of the Holy Spirit, who procedit and accipit, not as a divine persona, but only as gift, as res of the divine nature. Tertullian had already defined the Holy Spirit as a person, so that Hilary’s silence in this regard is significant.α

Thus one may deduce from Simonetti’s remarks:

(1) That he acknowledges the doctrine of the double procession in a peculiarly Augustinian doctrine;

(2) That in order to justify the doctrine, one must view any statements in earlier fathers as anticipating it;

(3) Thus, the doctrine must be justified by a theory of doctrinal development, and that this theory must distort the picture of the consensus patrum in order to make Augustine the final exposition of something only implicit in other fathers, and thus read other fathers

α IV Quasten, p. 60.
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through Augustinian lenses:

(4) That Hilary (or is it really Augustine?) has no clear delineation of Theology and Economy, but takes events in the latter as indicating eternal relationships in the former, a conception which Simonetti also says “anticipates the Augustinian doctrine”;

(5) And finally: That Hilary is really a Binitarian, not a Trinitarian, at which observation the professor advises the audience and readership are advised to go back and re-read Hilary! It frankly boggles the mind to think that after three centuries of Trinitarian theology, Hilary takes a massive step into absurdity!

These points must be held, at this point, as hypotheses. We draw attention to them to test them in the light of future events and controversies. We therefore conclude that:

(1) Augustine teaches as no one before him has done a doctrine of double procession;

(2) that at some point, that doctrine must in turn be coupled with a theory of dogmatic development by the nature of the case, since it was not formulated or authorized by any oecumenical council;

(3) that Augustine himself will increasingly and perforce become the interpretive lens through which all other fathers are interpreted, specifically in regard to any statements which “anticipate” the filioque;

(4) that Augustine may not have a clear delineation between Theology and Economy, such that events in the one reveal relationships in the other, as in the related doctrine of predestination; and,

(5) that there may, or may not be, an element of “Binitarianism” in Augustine which would compel those like Simonetti to see it elsewhere, and to view the doctrine of the Trinity itself as a development -- One God, then the Son, then the Spirit -- and not as a revelation, giving credence to the theory of the Jehovah’s Witnesses
and other sects that the doctrine of the Trinity was a development of philosophical theology.

St. Ambrose of Milan

Given his close relationship to St. Augustine of Hippo, Ambrose of Milan is obviously the crucial father in case for “anticipations” of the *filioque*. St. Ambrose is a favorite of defenders of the *filioque* clause and doctrine, since he is the only other church Father other than St. Augustine to use the explicit formula “from the Father and the Son” in reference to the Spirit’s procession. The question of course is whether Ambrose meant by such a formulation what St. Augustine’s *filioque* doctrine, the doctrine actually added to the creed, meant.

First, it should be noted that in St. Ambrose, the phrase “of God” is used as a designation of the unity and identity of essence (p. 102, 103):

> And so if God be good, how shall he who is the Spirit of His mouth not be good, Who searcheth even the deep things of God? Can the infection of evil enter into the deep things of God? And from this it is seen how foolish they are who deny that the Son of God is good, when they cannot deny that the Spirit of Christ is good, of Whom the son of God says: ‘Therefore said I that He shall receive of Mine.’

> “Good then, is the Spirit, but good, not as though acquiring but as imparting goodness. For the Holy spirit does not receive from creatures but is received; as also He is not sanctified but sanctifies; for the creature is sanctified, but the Holy Spirit sanctifies…

> … for where the sanctification is one the nature is one.

From these quotations it is apparent that Ambrose is doing theology

\[\alpha\]

\[\beta\]
Ibid., l:74, p. 103.

\[\gamma\]
Ibid., l:75, p. 103.
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is the traditional method: observing distinct Persons performing the same operations in the economy, the persons must therefore be Consubstantial.

But Ambrose’s language quite closely approximates that of St. Augustine in another respect, in his statement that “the Father is Spirit, and the Son is Spirit”: (p. 107)

... let them read that both the Father is called spirit, as the Lord said in the Gospel, ‘for God is Spirit’; (St. John 4:24) a Christ is called Spirit, for Jeremiah said; ‘The Spirit before our face, Christ the Lord.’ (Lam 4:20)

So, then, both the Father is spirit and Christ is spirit, for that which is not a created body is spirit, but the Holy Spirit is not commingled with the Father and the Son, but is distinct from the Father and from the Son.α

We have cited this passage, since a similar passage will occur in St. Augustine, though as will be seen, Augustine deduces the exact opposite from the initial premise than Ambrose deduces. Ambrose deduces the distinction of the Spirit; Augustine, however, deduced the fact that the Holy Spirit is also an appropriate name for the entire Trinity!

Ambrose, however, as we have said, does explicitly state that the Spirit Proceeds from the Father and the Son. But unfortunately, he makes clear that he is speaking not of Theology, but of Economy.β

The Spirit is not, then, sent as it were from a place, nor does He proceed as from a place, when He proceeds from the Son, as the Son Himself, when He says, ‘I came forth from the Father, and am come into the world,’ destroys all fancies, which can be reckoned as from place to place. In like manner, also, when we read that God is within or without, we certainly do not either enclose God within anybody or separate Him from anybody, but weighing these things in a deep and ineffable estimation, we comprehend the hiddenness of the divine nature.

α Ibid., I:105, 106, p. 107.
β Richard Haugh, op. cit., p. 196.
Lastly, Wisdom so says that she came forth from the mouth of the Most High (Eccles 24:5), as not to be external to the Father, but with the Father; for ‘the Word was with God;’ and not only with God, but also in God; for He says: ‘I am in the father and the Father is in Me.’ But neither when He goes forth from the father does He retire from a place, nor is he separated as a body from a body; nor when He is in the Father is He as if a body enclosed as it were in a body. The Holy Spirit also, when He proceeds from the father and the Son, is not separated from the father nor separated from the Son. For how could He be separated from the Father Who is the Spirit of His mouth? Which is certainly both a proof of His eternity and expresses the Unity of this Godhead.

(1) Swete points out that this expression here, *procedure ex* (a) *Filio* “is used with direct reference to an eternal.”

The Spirit then, so comes as does the Father, for where the Father is there is also the Son, and where the Son is there is the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit therefore is not to be supposed to come separately. But He comes not form place to place, but from the disposition of the order to the safety of redemption, from the grace of giving life to that of sanctification, to translate us from earth to heaven, from wretchedness to glory, from slavery to a kingdom.

In the entire context we have cited, it is very clear that the context of St. Ambrose’s remarks is to the temporal mission of the Spirit, to Economy.

Thus, to conclude our examination of fathers on this subject before turning to St. Augustine, we are bound by the evidence to state clearly and categorically:

(1) that nowhere have we found any father who clearly and explicitly and

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\[\text{(1)}\] St. Ambrose, I:119, 120, 122, p. 109.
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categorically teaches the filioque doctrine as an eternal procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son. To this we must add the following:

(2) the only father who does use the expression “proceeds from the Father and the Son” prior to Augustine is Ambrose, and it is clear that he is talking in the context of Economy: of the temporal mission of the Spirit. Thus:

(3) Whether or not Ambrose would have supported the Augustinian-Carolingian doctrine is a moot point, for we can never know, but in the case of this type of ambiguity, our decision must lie with the consensus patrum, and therefore we conclude that Ambrose did not teach the filioque;

(4) Finally, we are forced to examine such passages by the presence in the Western creed of the filioque itself, since these and other such passages are used by the defenders of the doctrine to justify it by pointing to such assumed antecedents. In short: the question is begged.

“Of” does not equal “from” in St. Ambrose:

Therefore, they who think that the Holy Spirit ought to be numbered amongst all things, because they read that all thing were made by the Son, must needs also think that the Son is to be numbered amongst all things, because they read: ‘All things are of God.’ But, consequently, they also do not separate the father from all things, who do not separate the son from all creatures, since as all things are of the Father, so, too, all things are by the Son.α

There are two points to be made here:

(1) Since the argument will ultimately be advanced that the Spirit is the

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Spirit proceeding “from the Son” since He the Spirit “of the Son”, one must apply the same exegetical rule in cases where a similar “ablative from genitive” construction can be used. This is not an idle point, but indeed the keystone in the Scriptural arguments for the filioque doctrine. It must therefore be applied to those fathers and those constructions where they occur. It is clear, therefore, that to apply such argumentation to this crucial passage in Ambrose would result in heresy, for if all things are “of God” in the sense of “deriving from Him” in the same sense as the Son is, then there is no distinction of creatures and the Son’s generation, and we are back at the Origenist problematic.

(2) Conversely, since Ambrose explicitly says the Father is the Father “of all things”, then He certainly is not the Father “from all things”. The argument collapses since it results in an absurdity. Therefore, the consubstantiality of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is all that Ambrose means to express by the phrase “of God.” He does not intend the phrase to indicate something more, i.e., the Relations of Origin of the Divine Persons.


543 Haugh, op. cit., pp. 86-87. In the exchange with the Frankish envoys, Leo III states:

... if by chance (one) strives to make the good better, let him in the first place take care and exert great effort lest by rashly presuming beyond what he ought and by corrupting what was good in itself, he renders it harmful... This perhaps touches you, if you do not disdain to listen... not even a wise man can sing without going wrong or by singing teach anyone as you wish... This defense of yours, or if it may be said, this refusal, does not look this way or that way because the same Fathers in their decision neither decreed nor sanctioned that someone well-disposed
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might presume it [i.e., to add, subtract, or alter the Creed], or someone not ill-disposed, but they decreed simply that no one might...

I gave permission for the singing of the Creed but not for the adding, subtracting or altering of the Creed while it is sung... For we do not sing it [in Rome] but read the Creed in reading it we teach. Nor do we presume in our reading or teaching to add anything to the Creed by insertion... If I had been asked before, I would have replied definitely that it [i.e., the Filioque] should not be inserted. (Emphasis Haugh's)

543a Illyricum will figure prominently in the subsequent exchanges between St. Photius and Popes Nicholas I and John VIII.


545 St. Photius, Mystagogy 5.

545a [author numbered for a note, but never added it to the manuscript]

546 Ibid., 85.

547 Implying that such statements as may be capable of such treatment are first sought out and then “reinterpreted” according to the new paradigm. Cf. note 541.

548 St. Photius, Mystagogy 75.

549 Ibid., 71.

550 Ibid., 80.

551 Ibid., 81: “You should consider,” says Photius, “the equally renowned Vigilius who... affirmed the unbending rule [of faith, a technical phrase designating the Oecumenical Creed] with similar true dogmas, and sent this to other like-minded men. This same father, with equal zeal, proclaimed that the Holy and consubstantial Spirit proceeds from the Father, also saying that if anyone introduced another doctrine contrary to the agreed and common doctrine of devout faith, then he should be delivered to an equally binding anathema.” The practice to which Photius refers when he states that Vigilius “sent this to other like-minded men” is that practice which bishops, and especially patriarchs or popes, composed
a personal confession of faith upon their election and consecration, and sent this to other patriarchs as a testimony and assurance to them of their Orthodoxy. Thus, pope Vigilius sent such an Ωροζ (Horos) or “definition” to his counterparts in Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem on his election.

552 Ibid., 82: “Behold the fair and good Agatho, who was present at the Sixth Oecumenical Council…” Agatho was not physically present, but sent legates to that council. He, along with Zacharias and some other popes during this period, was actually Greek.

553 Gregory I, Bishop of Rome from 590-604.

554 Ibid., 83, 84: “And why do you pass over Gregory and Zacharias? …if Gregory and Zacharias, so many years distant from each other, did not have the knowledge about the procession of the Most Holy Spirit that you do, and if the ones who came between them on the succession list of Roman bishops enjoined the same doctrines without novelty, being warmed by faith, but rather advocated the same dogmas, then not only these two poles, but those men between them kept, established, and proclaimed the same faith. If those who follow these men anticipate and discover an alien doctrine not readily apparent in their writings, he is indeed torn from the faith, because the chorus of the bishops of the Episcopal throne of Rome hold fast to this faith.”

555 Ibid. 87: “The praiseworthy Benedict, successor to that archepiscopal throne, agreed with and corroborated them.”

556 Ibid., 88: “Now this man, my John… hath a courageous mind… this man, favoured among the Roman Archbishops by his more-than-illustrious and God-fearing legates Paul, Eugene, and Peter, bishops and priests of God who were with Us in the Council of the Catholic Church [the Constantinopolitan Council of 880-881 which prohibited the addition to the Creed] confirmed and subscribed to that Symbol of the Faith… Yea, and after that, the holy Hadrian wrote to Us according to the prescription of the ancient custom, sending Us the same doctrine, testifying to the same
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theology, namely, that the Spirit proceeds from the Father. Now which of these bishops of Rome, by life, or teaching, altered the profession of immortal life by subscribing to that heretical and diseased word?"

557 Ibid. 86.

558 The Second Europe’s “growing Estrangement” argument takes many subtle variations, one of the most ingenious being that of the popular college level Mediaeval History textbook by Hoyt and Chodorow, Europe in the Middle Ages, p. 312, where it is asserted that Photius’ schism (!) with Nicholas was due only to the fact that “Photius’ or any other patriarch’s attitude toward papal claims depended on the Byzantine emperor’s relations with Rome,” an ingenious, if totally erroneous, twist on the “Byzantine Caesaropapism” view of the Second Europe.


560 cf. note 541 for the detailed treatment of the “anticipations” of the filioque doctrine in the revisionist historiography of the Second Europe.

561 “Paul was imperfect”, i.e., that he did not explicitly teach the doctrine, but only alluded to it, and therefore, that the doctrine itself developed and was a genuine novelty.

562 St. Photius, Mystagogy, 55.

563 Ibid., 56.

564 In the English biblical translations of the Second Europe, the Greek phrase έκ του έμου in St. John 16: 14-15 is normally translated by the ambiguous “from that which is mine” or “from mine”. But as Photius points out, the Greek is equally capable of meaning “from Him Who is mine”, which is how he and other Greek fathers understood it. This implies that translations themselves are subject to the same Gnostic tactic of changing the terms in order to serve the new Augustinian ordo theologiae and its doctrinal agenda.

565 St. Photius, Mystagogy 21.

565a Alan Richardson, Creeds in the Making, p. 122, states another typical Second European response to the filioque; it was, he says, “mainly
a matter of words and terminology, no vital theological issue being involved.” Indeed, it is a matter of words and terminology, but not in the sense he means it, for it is a vital theological issue, as well as an issue of what words and terminology mean.

566 St. Photius, Mystagogy 10.
567 Ibid., 12.
568 Ibid., 11.
569 That is, the Father’s ingenerateness, the Son’s generation, and the Spirit’s procession.
570 Cf. note 552 above.
571 St. Photius, Mystagogy, 18.
572 Ibid., 34.
573 Ibid., 33. The “Macedonian insanity” is a reference to the heresy of Macedonius, a third century bishop who taught that the Father and the Son were fully God, but that the Spirit was not, but rather, a creature. Thus, for Photius, any doctrine that the Spirit is something less than the Father and the Son, either essentially or personally, is Macedonian.
574 Ibid., 9.
575 Ibid., 37.
576 Ibid., 39.
577 Ibid., 14.
578 Ibid., 91. In the teaching of Augustine and the Augustinian mind, the breathing of Christ on the disciples was understood, first, to be a breathing of the Holy Spirit into them in a kind of “proto-Pentecost”, and secondly, this act in economy was then understood to be a sign of a theological, or eternal, relation of origin of the Spirit from the Son.
579 Ibid., 91.
580 Ibid., 92.
581 In this regard, the Origenistic implications of Stephen Bar-Sudhaile’s “final consubstantiality of the saints with God” should also be
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recalled.


582a Cf. note 541.

583 Restoring the ancient Roman imperial practice of creating co-emperors, inaugurated by Diocletian.

584 This relates to the 28th Canon of the Council of Chalcedon, which makes it clear that the primacy of Rome was due to its being at one time the imperial seat, i.e., the patriarchate was conceived in part as an imperial office as well as an ecclesiastical one.

585 The election of laymen to the episcopate was not unknown to the West either, indeed, one of its most famous saints, and the mentor of St. Augustine himself, St. Ambrose of Milan, was so elected in the fourth century.


585b Ibid., 100.


585d Ibid., pp. 20-23.

586 Nicholas I, *Letter to Hincmar of Rheims*, 23 October 867. It should be noted that in the Constantinopolitan Synod of 867 that excommunicated Nicholas, three bishops from the West were present, protesting Nicholas’ tyranny, among them the Archbishops of Treves and Cologne, who responded to their depositions by Nicholas with an equally unambiguous statement:

Without a council, without canonical inquiry, without accuser, without witnesses, without convincing us by arguments or authorities, without our consent, in the absence of the metropolitans and of our suffrages, bishops, you have chosen to condemn us, or your own caprice, with tyrannical fury; but we do not accept your accursed sentence, so repugnant to a father’s or a brother’s love; we despise it as mere insulting
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language; we expel you yourself from our communion, since you commune with the excommunicate; we are satisfied with the communion of the whole Church and with the society of our brethren whom you despise and of whom you make yourself unworthy by your pride and arrogance. You condemn yourself when you condemn those who do not observe the apostolic precepts which you yourself the first violate, annulling as far as in you lies the divine laws and the sacred canons, AND NOT FOLLOWING IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF THE POPES YOU PREDECESSORS.α

587 Thus, in the historiography of the Second Europe, the schism is known as the “Photian schism”, even in secular works, while, predictably, Pope Nicholas I’s actions are remembered -- with more accuracy -- as schismatic by the First Europe.

588 In his first epistle to Photius, Nicholas I simply addresses him as “the very wise man Photius.”

589 Whatever the canonical nature of his election and consecration, the fact that Photius was consecrated by valid bishops made his consecration valid, according to the Augustinian understanding of the sacraments widely held by the Latin Church. Thus, Nicholas is presuming to set aside his own Church’s theology, and to judge the validity of bishops solely on the basis of papal will and pleasure.

590 It was St. Photius who commissioned the missionary effort of the two “Apostles of the Slavs”, whose work laid the basis for the subsequent conversion of Russia.

591 Francis Dvornik says of Nicholas’ letter to Boris-Michael that “the Pope bluntly stated that the Patriarch of Constantinople had in reality no right to call himself a Patriarch, since his see was not of apostolic origin.”α When Boris-Michael again sought Frankish and Roman help,

α Cited in Abbe Guettee, The Papacy (Minos Publishing co., No Date), p. 305
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Dvornik notes that Nicholas decided to *by-pass* the involvement of the Frankish Church altogether, sending bishops Paul of Populonia and Formosus of Porto to Bulgaria. This is interesting, and damming, for it means that Nicholas himself tacitly authorized the use of the *filioque* in Bulgaria.

In his letter to Boris-Michael, Nicholas again refers to Photius as being merely a layman. Again, this overturns his own church’s ecclesiological and sacramental understanding.

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592 In his letter to Boris-Michael, Nicholas again refers to Photius as being merely a layman. Again, this overturns his own church’s ecclesiological and sacramental understanding.

593 PL 119: 1016.

594 PL 119: 1089.

595 PL 119: 1089: The letter to the Senate is implicitly a letter to the citizens of Constantinople.


597 PL 119: 1110-1111.

598 Ibid.


600 Ibid., p. 48.

601 Ibid., p. 110.


604 Ernest Kantorowicz, *The King’s Two Bodies*, p. 72, citing St. Augustine’s *Enarrationes in Psalmos* XC: 5, PL 37: 1163: “Tabernaculum Dei caro est. In carne inhabitavit Verbum, et caro facta est tabernaculum

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Deo: *in ipso tabernaculo Imperator militavit pro nobis...* Kantorowicz observes that the “title *Imperator* for Christ is found less frequently than *rex*, though of course it is well known...”

607 The term “corpus mysticum”, which will become problematical in the high Middle Ages (cf. pp. 413-414, 484-507, 513-514), is not in and of itself objectionable. It has, essentially, two uses, one of which is “acceptable” to the First Europe, and one of which is “unacceptable”. The “acceptable” use of the phrase is that which designates the *mystery of the continuity* of the Church and of the Eucharist as Christ’s real body; the unacceptable use, however, would understand by “mystical body” an *opposition* to His “real” body.

609 Ibid., pp. 71, 46.
610 Cf. note 505, section C, p. 1028, concerning Spanish Adoptionism. It is worth noting that St. Photius probably knew little, if anything, of this controversy. His ability to deduce the dialectical implications of the *filioque* is thus the more remarkable, since the texts of which he was unaware themselves bear this out.

611 Ibid.
614 Ibid., p. 96.
615 Ibid., p. 77-78.
617 Ibid., pp. 61-62.
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618 Ibid., p. 90.

619 Cf. Karl Rahner, “Pluralism in Theology and the Unity of the Creed in the Church,” Theological Investigations, Volume XI: Confrontations 1, trans. David Bourke (Crossroad: 1982), pp. 3-23. The remarks on pp. 4-5 are especially significant of the predicament of the modern(ist) Roman Church, for having once assumed that philosophical conceptions were adequate tools in the formulation of Christian doctrine, the unity of the Roman Church’s confession breaks down proportional to the degree to which philosophical pluralism reigns in the world:

For if it precisely the specialist theologian who is aware that all along in the history of theology there have been different schools… and that the Church has tolerated, or even made necessary, the differences between the schools… Philosophy itself, as the instrument which the theologian employs of necessity in pursuing his discipline, has itself become so pluralistic that no theologian has any longer any overall mastery of philosophy as a whole. (Italicized emphasis mine, underlined emphasis Rahner’s).

620 St. Photius, Mystagogy 16. This section of the Mystagogy also detects the latent “binitarianism” of the filioque. Cf. also Mystagogy, 12.

PART THREE: HISTORY: A THEOLOGICAL PATHOLOGY OF THE SECOND EUROPE

NOTES TO CHAPTER IX: THE VISION OF THE CHAMELEON GODHEAD

621 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theological: pt. 1, Q. 13, Art 11. This important passage is worth citing in full. The italicized portions are original to the text, the underlined portions following the parenthetical enumeration are my own emphases, made for the purpose of the textual
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analysis which follows the main quotation.

Eleventh Article:

Whether this Name, He Who is, is the Most Proper Name of God?

We Proceed thus to the Eleventh Article:--

Objection 1. It seems that this name He Who Is is not the most proper name of God. For this name of God is an incommunicable name. But this name HE WHO IS is not an incommunicable name. therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God.

Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that the name of good excellent manifests all the processions of God. But this especially belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things. Therefore this name good is supremely proper to God, and not this name HE WHO IS.

Obj. 3. Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to creatures, for God is known to us only through creatures. But this name HE WHO IS imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most applicable to God.

On the contrary, it is written that when Moses asked, if they should say to me. What is His name? what shall I say to them? the Lord answered him, Thus shall thou say the them HE WHO IS hath sent me to you (Exod. iii. 13, 14). Therefore this name HE WHO IS most properly belongs to God.

I answer that, This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God, for three reasons:--

First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form. But simply (1) existence itself. Hence, (2) since the existence of God is his essence itself, which can be said of no other (Q 3. A 4), it is clear that among other names this is one specially denominates God, for
everything is denominated by its form.

Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or if convertible with it, add something above it or least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the essence of God itself I that life, as it is in itself, but whatever made it applies in determining what it understands about god, it falls short of the mode of what God is in himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they applied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fid. Orth. I) that, **HE WHO IS is the principal of all names applied to God: for comprehending all in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and determinate sea of substance.**

Now by any other name some mode of substance is determinate, whereas this names **HE WHO IS** (3)determines no mode of being, but it indeterminate to all; and therefore it dominates the **infinite ocean of substance.**

Thirdly, from its consignification, for it is signifies present existence; and this above all properly applies to god, whose existence knows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Thrin. V.)

**Reply Obj. 1.** This name **HE WHO IS** is the name of God more properly than this name **God,** as regards its source, namely, existence; and as regards the mode of signification and consignification, as said above. But as regards the object intended by the name, this name **God** is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature; and still more proper is (4) the Tetragrammaton, impose to signify the substance of God itself, incummicable and, (5)if one may so speak, singular.

**Reply Obj. 2.** This name **good** is the principal name of God is so far as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered absolutely comes before the idea of cause.

**Reply Obj. 3.** It is not necessary that all divine names should import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed from some perfections flowing from God to creatures. (6) **Among these the first is existence,** from which comes this name, **HE WHO IS.**

Notably, Aquinas prefaces his explication of this conception by a lengthy exploration of whether or not theology is a “science”, a kind of
“prolegomenon” repeated, in Protest and evangelical systematic theologies, by considerations of the doctrine of Scripture (as a propositional revelation) prior to consideration of the “being” of God (cf. Lewis Sperry Chafer, Systematic Theology Vol. I: Bibliog).

Analysis

Aquinas echoes all of the major themes of the neoplatonically based Augustinian *ordo theologiae*.

(1) existence itself

First, the existence of God is primarily impersonal: God is an It, rather than He.

(2) since the existence of God is His essence itself

Secondly, Aquinas indicates that the understanding that he has of the divine simplicity is that of Neoplatonism, i.e., of the identity of the various attributes, in this case, “existence”, with the essence.

(3) determines no mode of being

This is the most important of Aquinas statements, for it reveals the fundamental departure of the Second Europe from the First Europe’s understanding of things. We discovered in Chapter One that the Church understood the name “I AM WHO I AM’ or simply “I AM” as being the name especially of Christ, or to use Cappadocian language, of the *mode of being* peculiar of the Son. But in Aquinas, the Name does not signify any particular one of the Three Divine “modes of being”, but rather, seems to indicate “personhood-in-general”. To paraphrase Eugene Portalie cited elsewhere, the primary notion of the Godhead remained “personal”, but not as any one of the Three Persons in particular.
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(4) The tetragrammaton, imposed to signify the substance of God itself, incommunicable

The analysis of (3) is confirmed by the fact that Aquinas has now come to complete the Gnostic transformation of the meaning of the tetragrammaton as referring to Christ in the First European tradition, to being a symbol of the divine essence itself.

(5) If one may so speak, singular

Thus, the tetragrammaton signifies or is a revelation of the “singularity” of the divine essence, i.e., of its simplicity and all of its attendant dialectical characteristics.

(6) Among these the first is existence

Completing the cycle, he conducts where he began, with an affirmation that the most important of the divine attributes is existence itself, or simply, Being. Note that in making this attribute the primary one to be considered, another ramification of the Augustinian ordo theologiae is now beginning to make itself felt, i.e., the problem of defining, within the ordo, which attributes are primary (i.e., to be considered before other attributes), and which are secondary.

John Duns Scotus

John Duns Scotus, A Treatise on God as First Principle, begins with the same assertion of the identity of being and essence in God:

1.1 May the First Principle of things grant me to believe, to understand and to reveal what may please his majesty and may raise our minds to contemplate him.

1.2 O Lord our God, true teacher that you are, when Moses your
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servant asked you for your name that he might proclaim it to the children of Israel, you, nowing what the mind of mortals could grasp of you, replied: “I am who am,” thus disclosing your blessed name. you are truly what it means to be, you are the whole of what it means to exist. Help me then, O Lord, as I investigate how much our natural reason can learn about that true being which you are if we begin with the being which you have predicated of yourself.”

Analysis

One might begin any analysis of Duns Scotus by asking; “To Whom is he praying?” The answer is not to the “I AM” that the First Europe took to be revealed, namely, Christ. Nor is the recapitulational principle in view, since that would imply a treatise, not on metaphysics, but on typology in Scripture and sacred Tradition. Rather, the “I AM” here is a nondescript “Thiu-in-general” who revealed certain metaphysical principles in the name itself.

One notes even more clearly in Duns Scotus the effects of the Augustinian ordo, for piety itself is being transformed. The Gnostic assignation of new meanings to the takes the form of a kind of metaphysical leger demain, since the focus is on the Name Itself, i.e., the metaphysical proposition, and not on what, for the fathers, was the principle element: the burning bush that was not consumed, understood not as a revelation of divine simplicity, but of the divine ecstasy of the incarnation.

One could, indeed, go on and on in the multiplication of such texts. They are only common to the theological textbooks of the Second Europe, but they are altogether monotonously so.

622 Cf. note 511, p. 1044. Cf. also the outline in the main text, p. 333.

In the Augustinian theory of divine illumination, the illumination itself stands, as regards the human mind, in the same relationship as the divine grace and predestination stands regards the human will. This indicates the ecclesiological nature of the problem, and as such, Augustine’s illumination theory should always be approached from this dogmatic perspective. In his fight against the Donatist heresy, Augustine was clear in his affirmation of Orthodox ecclesiology: “The Donatist Church can have everything whithout the Catholic Church; it can have dignities…..sacraments….songs of alleluia….faith and the preaching of faith. But salvation – that can be found nowhere outside the Catholic Church”α That is to say, grace extended as far as the boundaries of the church, and no farther. In this regard, St. Augustine follows his mentor in ecclesiology, St. Cyprian.

However, when the illumination theory and pedestrian speculations are added to the mixture, the image blurs, for the operation of grace is one with the dispositions of the human will, that is, the center of attention shifts to the human psyche. As regards the mind, the theory of illumination provides the key: the light of grace which illumines the mind is

a created form in the soul, and as such is comparable to justifying grace, which is itself but an interior created form within the soul. Unlike grace, however, which is operative for Augustine only within the boundaries of the visible Church, and then only within the sphere of the predetermined number of elect, illumination is given to all men. Everyone sees the truth in his own soul, wherein he can also apprehend grace.

It is therefore, within the bounds of the illumination theory, logically possible to extend the boundaries of grace to the point where they become coterminous with the boundaries of illumination, which, it should be noted, has no relationship to the Church’s Baptism. Precisely this process occurs within the ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council, where the boundaries of grace are extended simply to all who have been baptized. Since elements of truth are found outside the Church, sanctification can also be found outside the Church. While this is indeed a logical inference from the illumination theory, it is nevertheless an influence which St. Augustine himself, during his despite with the Donatists, would have had every opportunity to make, yet did not. The aim of the extension of the boundaries of the Church by the Second Vatican Council, however, is quite clear: the result will be that, little by little, as the obstacles to perfect ecclesiastical communion are overcome, all Christians will be gathered, in a common celebration of the Eucharist, into the unity of the one and only Church. This unity, we believe, subsists in the Catholic Church.

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α ibid, p. 14.
β of. Bonaventura, The Mind’s Road to God (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1977), p. 25: “Therefore you can see the truth through yourself, the truth that taches you.”
δ Ibid, p. 357.
η Ibid., p. 457.
Further evidence of this psychological grounding of ecclesiological in Vatican II are shown by the attempt to base the doctrine of the Church on the Trinitarian processions, known as traces in the operations of the individual soul, as Memory, Understanding, and Will. It is therefore conceivable that the Christian West might come to a common ecumenical understanding since its ultimate object of faith and the doctrine of of that object, the *filioque*, are common to all Second European Christian denominations. An ecclesiology based upon “the three define Persons” and “their mutual opposition” could logically define itself by opposing Roman Catholicism and Protestantism as complementary, and therefore, necessary opposites.

Through the “traces of the truth”, not the least of which is the shared Augustinian *filioquism* which illumes both Protestant “schismatic” and the (Pepal “church”, it could be argued (to expropriate the language which Vatican Two actually uses of the Orthodox!), that the Protestants “acknowledge the Creator and the trinity... these profess to hold the faith of the Church, and together with us they above the one merciful god, father, Son, and Holy Spirit.”

At a different level, however, it should appear that this itself is an improper evaluation of the post-Vatican II Second Europe. Really, grace is not outside the boundaries of the Church, it is the boundaries of the church which have been redefined to include the widest possible sphere of operation of the divine illumination. in other words, grace is being defined in terms of illumination, and the latter exists, of course, apart from Baptism. The Church thus becomes nothing more than the “foremost recipient” of

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α It need hardly be observed that this is likewise the ecclesiology of many modernist and “traditionalist” Orthodox jurisdictions, as well as that the World Council of Churches’s *Does Chalcedon Divine or Unite? And the Consultation on Church Union’s COCU Consensus and Churches in Covenant Communion*.

β Dulles, op. cit, p. 137.

γ Flamery, op. cit., p. 357
The common ground is not only the “presence of the Logos beyond the boundaries of the Church” but indeed the presence of the entire Trinity itself beyond the boundaries of the Church! This means that everything is common property both to Christian and pagan alike, songs of alleluia, dignities, illumination, grace, faith, and the preaching of faith.

As the Second Vatican Council itself put it: “many elements of sanctification and truth are found outside its (the papal church’s) visible confines. Since these are gifts belonging to the Church of Christ, they are forces compelling towards Catholic unity.” “Catholic unity” is of course, nothing other than submission to the papal tyranny.

Thus, even the Moslems have some elements of this sanctification, for according to the Council’s illumination ecclesiology, the plan of salvation now, includes those who acknowledge the Creator, in the first place amongst whom are the Moslems.” One would have thought that those in the first place would be the Jews. Nevertheless, in the weird and wonderful Gnostic utopia of Vatican II, the Moslems are acknowledge as “(professing) to hold the faith of Abraham” and adoring “the one merciful God” along with Roman Catholics, without, as a Moslem might put it, the confounded Persons dividing the substance! For papal modernist Avery Dulles, the only savoury thing about papal Rome’s pre-Vatican II “Dark Ages” was that it provided a link with “an esteemed religious past.” So, having done away with the consensus of the Church at Vatican I, joined the ranks of the Moslems, shortened the skirts of nuns, butchered the oldest canon of the Christian liturgy in continuous use since the fourth century, abolished Latin and blurred the boundaries of the “old

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η Dulles, op. cit., p. 187.
γ The Meaning of the Glorious Koran, Surah IV: 71; V: 72-73, 75, trans. Mohammed Marmaduke Pickhall (Mentor Books: No. Date), pp. 94, 103
institutionalism”, what is left to content Rome to its “esteemed religious past”? One thing, and one thing only, and it looms larger and more voracious than at any previous time in Christian history, and that is the institution and claims of the papacy itself. Discarding the banal and chattery ecumenical euphemisms so prevalent in the other sections of *Lumen Gentium*, the Second Vatican Council defines the papacy in the familiar language of “power”, “authority”, “infallibility”, “primacy”, and, of course, as the “sole basis of unity and communion with Christ.” The papacy must therefore resort to constant criticism of all other rival claims to ecclesiastical authority, by emphasizing their internal contradictions and attempting to proffer itself as the only possible means of escape from despair of a stable faith.

626One may go so far as to say that Immanuel Kant’s critical philosophy would not have caused either the degree or the extent of theological convulsions in Byzantium as it did in the Second Europe. Indeed, the Byzantium as it did in the Second Europe. Indeed, the Byzantine response to Kant would most likely have been rather bland, since he was telling them what they already knew: the truths of theology were not the doctrines of metaphysics, and were not capable of “scientific”, i.e., dialectical and rational demonstration. Cf. St. Gregory Palamas, *Triads* I:i19: “If one says that philosophy, insofar as it is natural, is a gift of God, then one says true, without contradiction, and without incurring the accusation that falls on those who abuse philosophy and pervert it to an unnatural end.” The translator’s note is also worth citing:

...Palamas...here explicitly accepts the legitimacy of philosophy and the natural sciences *within their proper limits*. He is not an abscurantist, and has no wish to prevent Christmas from using their God-given intellects to explore and understand the created order. His quarrel is with those who

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make inflated claims for the scope of the human mind and who arrogantly
deny the authenticity of contemplative experience. The gift of reason is an
endowment itself good, but eminently capable of perversion (as in the
case of demons, some pagan philosophers, and heretics.)

627 Gaunilion, *In Behalf of the Fool*, 6, trans. S.N. Deane(Open


629 Richard Haugh puts the real object of the dialectics at work in
the *filioque* this way:

Although Augustine’s dialectic takes many forms, there are always
four basic elements:

1.) *essentia* – about which the dialectic is.
2.) *essential* – manifesting itself (the Father).
3.) *essential* – as manifested (the Son).
4.) *Essential* – uniting that which manifests itself with that which is
manifested (the Holy Spirit), or the expression of the unity of that which
manifests itself with that is manifested.

The relationship between the filioquist and the Hegelian version of the
dialectic of Absolute Being should no be apparent, but if it is not, this
subject is explored in the main text. Pp. 554-583.

Prespective in the Trinitarian theology of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Analecta

631 Ibid, p. 3.
632 Ibid., pp. 3-4.

α ibid., pp. 119-120, n. 27.
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633 Ibid., p. 15.
634 Ibid., p. 18
635 Ibid., p. 31.
636 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles I: 73 and 74, pp. 244-245.
637 Richards, op. cit., p. 64.
638 Ibid., p. 68.
639 Ibid., p. 69.
640 Ibid. p. 70.
641 Ibid.
642 Summa Contra Gentiles IV 2:5 p. 41
643 Richards, op. cit., p. 70.
643a Thomas Aquinas, In Sententiae d. 2 q 1a4.
644 St. Gregory of Nyssa, Against Eunomius, I: NPNF, p. 5.
645 Joachim is not departing significantly from the scholastic method with this assertion.
646 Richards, op. cit., p. 98
647 c.f n. 714.
648 Sabellius’ “Son-Father” is echoed by St. Photios’ remarks that the filioque issues, logically, in a “Father-Spirit”.
649 There is further connection between the implication of the Augustinian ordo and the scholastic method, and that is the Trinity is abstracted into generalized question on whether or not there is a plurality of persons in the “godhead”. cf. Summa theologica I;30 a 1c.
650 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, IV: 26, p. 145.
651 St. Augustine of Hippo, on the Trinity, 5: 11: 12; 15: 27: 50. These two crucial passage are worth citing again:

For we cannot say that the Holy Spirit is not life, while the Father is life, and the Son is life; and hence as the Father... has life in Himself; so He has given to Him that life should proceed from Him, as it also proceeds from Himself.
Because both the Father is a spirit and the Son is a spirit, and because the Father, the Son and the Holy, therefore... since the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God, and certainly God is Holy, and God is a spirit, the Trinity can be called also the holy Spirit.

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, IV: 4-6, pp. 114:

Of course, that in the name of the Holy Spirit the essence of the Father and Son is designated so as to be personally distinguished from neither of them conflicts with that divine Scripture hands on to us about the Holy Spirit. It says that the holy Spirit proceedeth from the Father” and that He receives from from the Son (John 15:26; 16:14). And this cannot be understood of the divine essence, since the divine essence neither proceeds from the Father our receives from the Son. One must, then, say that the Holly Spirit is subsisting Person.

This quotation is significant for, without mentioning St. Augustine by name, Aquinas very clearly has in mind Augustine’s massive confusion on this point. It is a remarkable statement, and a revealing one, for it indicates the degree to which the Second Europe realizes, here and there, the inherent problems of *filioque*, yet does nothing to correct the fundamental problem itself.


In terms of this survey, it should again be reiterated that the Realist-Nominalist controversy arises out of the application of the doctrine of divine simplicity, in its Neoplatonic sense, to the doctrine of God. On
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the one hand, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity insists upon absolute irreducible concrete distinctions of the Hypostases from each other and from the divine essence; as well as the distinction of the energies from the divine essence and from each other. On the other hand, the simplicity must reduce all pluralities to mere appearance and underlying metaphysical identity. Thus, its adoption makes inevitable the dispute over the status of universals within the Second Europe.

The Divine name “I Am” was so often on Christ’s lips that it is difficult indeed to see how the Second Europe could have strayed so far from the proper patristic understanding of the Burning Bush theophany. There is even a deliberate punning by Christ in the account of His walking on water and coming to the disciples in the boat: Be of good cheer; I am; fear not! (cf. St. mark 6: 50: “θαρσείτε ἔγω γείμι: μὴ βοβείσθε.”) The Emphatic form of the verb here is crucial in the typological context of Christ walking on water. “Be of good cheer! I am; fear not!” The point of all this densely context-specific and very Hebrew punning is hardly to make points about metaphysical universals, at least, not in the sense the scholastics of the Second Europe understood it.


… this one formative pattern should be one pattern made out of opposites, since it is opposites of this kind which gives it is structive, and, we might say, its existence…exteree distinction is opposition…so by making one thing different from another in the highest degree it will necessarily make the opposites, and will be complete of it makes itself not only into different things but into opposite things…the more differentiated
the more opposed...

660 Ibid,
661 Ibid., p. 637.
662 Robert Richards notes that for Aquinas,

yje relation distinguishing one Person from another, is really identical with the divine essence, and only rationally distinct from it....The relation may be compared to the divine essence; in this case, it is merely ratio. Or it may be compared to its immediate opposite; and in this case, in virtue of the proper ratio of a relation, the particular relation in question is really distinct from its opposite.α

That is, the Three Divine Persons are real only insofar as they are Oppositions to each other.

663 St. Augustine, On the Trinity 8: 1 : 2.
664 Ibid., 7:6:11.
666 Vladimir Lossky, The Vision of God, p. 137.
667 Ibid.
668 Ibid., p. 126.
669 Ibid., p. 127.
670 Ibid., pp. 128-129, citing PG 929 BC.
671 Ibid., p. 127: Lossky is very clear in what the term simplicity means in the patristic tradition of the First Europe: “As with the dogma of the Trinity, this dogma of of divine energies in no way detracts from the

simplicity of God, as long as simplicity does not become a philosophical notion which claims to determine indeterminable.”

672 AQUINAS SCG III: 51, 57, ST I:q12.
674 Ibid., p. 10.

That after the Resurrection there will not be One Will of the Saints with Each Other and with God, and One Act of Willing in All, according to a Mode of Willing proper to All, as some say:

So, free choice presupposes an origin in those things which are within our power, and (it) exists as the end of the motion proper to that intellectual appetite within us. For that which is intellectual by nature has a natural, intellectual power, or appetite. This power they call a faculty of will of the intellectual soul. It infers and draws conclusions; and after drawing conclusions it wishes. For a wish, they say, is not simply natural, but (also) a type of will, that is to say, it is a faculty of will “about” something. For after intending it inquires, and after inquiring it examines (the alternatives), and after examining it deliberates, and after deliberating it judges or decides, and after deciding it freely chooses, and freely choosing it initiates an action, and initiating, it employs (something), and in the employment (of something) the appetitive motion ceases. For no one makes use of something without first initiating (the act), and no one initiates (an act) without first freely choosing (it), and no one freely chooses (something) without first deciding, and no one decides without first deliberating, and no one deliberates without first examining (the alternatives), and no one examines (the alternatives) without first inquiring, and no one inquires without first intending, and no one intends without first concluding, and no one concludes without first inferring, and no one intelligently infers that does not exist in a rational nature.
Therefore, man, existing in a living and rational nature, is appetitive, rational, capable of intending, inquiring, examining, freely choosing, initiating (an act), and employing (something).

If man by nature is a living and freely choosing (creature), along with all the rest (that this implies), and if free choice (concerns) those things which are within our power, and which we can bring to pass by means of our own abilities, and which have an unknown outcome, then the rational principle of the virtues which are within our power is a law of the activity of the powers (of nature) which exist proper to nature. And the mode of misuse of those very same powers are passions which are contrary to nature. Consequently, everything which is by nature capable to nature. Consequently, everything which is by nature capable of free choice, is also able to judge between opposites. And if capable of judging between opposites, then doubtless it is also able to choose freely. And if it is able to choose freely, as being able to establish within itself a motion toward either of two (alternatives), it stands (to reason) that it is not immutable by nature. So then, since counsel, or judgement, or free choice are (directed toward) uncertain things that are within our power, then what it is not (so directed toward) uncertain things, but rather toward that Self-Subsistent Truth which has been clearly manifest to all, then free choice will not be moved by any of (those processes) in the middle, not (by) any courses of action which are within our power, not even by a judgement (or decision) between opposites, (by which) we frame the more desirable (course of action) before the worse. But then, if free choice is in this case not a sustaining law of nature, and has no part in any of (the) uncertainty of beings, then it will be only an active and intellectual appetite, and it will thus (be occasioned) by those appetites which are proper to nature. (Thus,) it will only fix upon that mystical enjoyment of the object of its appetite, which is proper to nature, toward which object it has tended by a non-cyclic motion. This then is the satiety (of appetite): the straining of appetite itself towards the infinity of the things which are enjoyed, each one supernaturally partaking to howsoever great an extent that one drinks (of it); and a union without any intermediary to that which is desired by nature. But to whatever extent one drinks, to that extent one partakes of
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the object of one’s desire. On the one hand, the faculty of will has been shown to be one with the rational principle of the nature of all (men), but on the other hand, (it has been shown that) there is a distinction (in each person’s) mode of action.

But if the faculty of will is not the same as the mode of motion proper to all men, then there can never be one faculty of will of God and of those who are saved (by means of a mode of use) proper to all of them, as some thought. The salvation of those who are saved is (rather) in the one object of the will (which is willed) both by God and by the saints. This is the divine goal which exists at the end of all ages, around which a communion of each to the other, (that is), of God Who Saves and of those who are saved, will be brought about by the faculty of will (which is) in each one entirely and generically. But the filling by God of each righteous member happens to each one individually, according to the degree of faith in each one and (his) capacity for grace. For if the will of God on the one hand is, by nature, to save, and (the will) of man on the other is, by nature, to be saved, (then there is not one will of God and the saints), because the one is by nature to save and the other is nature to be saved. It is rather the goal of both (natural wills) which is one: the salvation of all is effected by being produced by God on the one hand and having been chosen freely by the saints on the other.

And is the divine and human will as they say, will be numerically one, and since God subsists before the ages, then the will of the Creator and the chorus of the saints will be the (very) same will; whether (that will be understand to be) natural or gnomic (matters not), for, (to put it) simply, they have made it identical with the divine (will). (This is) beyond being outrageous! It is only, the work of an unbalanced mind. For all men are not just craftsmen, or just apostles, or just prophets, and if these in their turn are not just Peter, or just Moses, then there are not just one but many saints with God the Father. And (if) the human act of moving to it by imitation if that good will which is proper to (human) nature, then for the natural quality and quantity to be the same is beyond being impossible [for if something is capable of participating (in something else) by nature, what in (its) natures enables it to do this?] (It is therefore) impossible for
there to be one gnomic will proper to every mode of being God and of the choir of the saints, if, as has been said, the salvation of all is one object of will (being willed) both by (God and by the saints), then the union of wills is (precisely) around that object (of wills). But then, if that be so, the sort of reasoning that those ignorant people advance is absurd.

678 Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being*, (Harvard: 1964) p. 91: “Cardinal Bellamino’s (1542-1621) treatise *De ascensione mentis in Deum per scalas creaturarum* is perhaps the most celebrated modern elaboration of this conception, and it shows plainly the usual incongruity between the importance given to the principle of plenitude in the doctrine of the attributes of deity and the exclusion of it from the theory of the chief good of man.” (emphasis added)
679 Daniel Boorstin, *The Discoverers: A History of Man’s Search to Know His Works and Himself* (New York: Vintage Paperbacks, 1985), p. 91: “It was not only in Saint Hildegar’s visions but in many others that hell’s vivid chambers of horrors became so much more interesting than the bland delights of heaven.”
683 Ibid., pp. 16-17
684 Umberto Eco, *Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages*, p. 4.
685 Ibid., p. 19.
686 Ibid., pp. 34-35.
687 Ibid., cf. p. 53.
688 Ibid., p. 56
690 cf. Eco, op. cit., p. 86.
NOTES TO CHAPTER X: THE LAW OF THE CHAMELEON GODHEAD


692 Ernst Kantorowicz, *The King’s Two Bodies*, pp. 19, 312. The same is equally applicable to the migration of “Jerusalem.” That is, the conception of a *cultural and not a geographically fixed* basis of such topographical references is basic to Christianity.

693 Ibid., pp. 348-349.

694 Philip Sherrard, *Church, Papacy, Schism: A Theological Enquiry*, p. 110. Sherrard calls the Augustinian Triadology by the less accurate nomenclature “Latin”. While it is true that Augustine’s triadology becomes the official doctrine of the Church(es) of the Second Europe, and hence is Latin in that sense, it was not the traditional doctrine of the Church espoused by the Latin fathers prior to Augustine.

695 cf. Kantorowicz, op. cit., p. 352: “Bernard of Parma, who composed the *Giossa ordinaria* on the *Liber Extra* around 1245, remarked on the decretal of Celestine III: “Every bishop who is *immediately under the Pope*, swears to him that he will not alienate the property of the Church, nor give it anew in tenure…. The group of bishops bound by that eighth clause were designed as *exempli* or *immediate sub papa*. Now, those who were *nullo medio* directly under the pope were, in the first place, the papal suffrages of the pope’s own ecclesiastical province: second, the archbishops of Ravenna, Milan, and Aquileia heading the three North-Italian ecclesiastical provinces – within the *pomerium* of papal power, as it were; third, certain exempt bishoprics such as Bamberg, Puy, the Corsican sees, and many others which, for one reason or another,
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depended *nullo medio* on the Holy See." The inalienability of papal property evidences more than merely a desire for financial security of the papacy's part; it evidences the papacy's own vision of itself as a separate estate.

696 cf. for example, Thomas Quinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Part Four, *Salvation*, ch. 25, where the Byzantine Romans are referred to as “pertinacious” for not adhering to the Augustinian *filoque* had become, in other words, *The* measure of whether or not one belonged to Christendom and to its civilization.

697 cf. Ernst Breisach, Historiography: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern, p. 177:

While certain bothersome chronological problems were amenable to technical solutions, the discovery of the global world and its many peoples was another matter. Christian historians had mastered similar problems when they had helped integrate the Germans into the Roman world and during the Middle ages had played a significant role in interpreting the enlargement of Latin Christendom eastwards. Yet the global world posed problems of greater scope and profundity. Those who decided simply to separate sacred from mundane history experienced even more severe difficulties in finding a proper way to write universal history. Searching for the principle of unity, they tried geography, cycles, comparative analysis of nations, and even unity as an ideal for the future…. Christian universal historiography would have to continue to search.”

But in my opinions, the collapse is deeper than Professor Breisach seems to suggest. The divine simplicity, which was inadequate as a means of preserving the distinctions of Persons in theology, and, as we shall see, in law, politics, and ethics, could hardly serve as a means of interrogation of diverse national or ethnic cultures without destroying their respective diversities and particularities. Professor Breisach also represents another inherent problem, in that he himself subconsciously accepts the
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historiographical “perspective” of the Second Europe as evidence by his identification of “the Church” with the religious traditions of schismatic Roman Catholicism. In the sense, he continues to view its historiography as the “canonical” Christian historiography, leaving unanalyzed the derivative nature of the theological basis of that historiographical tradition.

698 Pope Boniface, *Unam Santam* (1302), Corpus Iuris Canonici II: 1245, cited in Henry Bettenson, *Documents of the Christian Church*, Second Edition (Oxford University Press: 1977), p. 116. “thus, concerning the Church and her power, is the prophecy of Jeremiah fulfilled, “See, I have this day set thee over the nations and over the kingdoms,’ etc… Whoever therefore Resists this power thus ordained of God, resists the ordinance of God… Furthermore we declare, state, define and pronounce that it is altogether necessary to salvation for ever human creature to be the subject to the Roman pontiff.”

699 Investiture comes about, in part, because of the early Merovinigian and Carolingian reliance upon the diocesan bishop for civil administration. Thus, in terms of the feudal structure of Frankish society, the bishop had a dual allegiance: (1) to the kings as their civil lords, and (2) to the Bishops of Rome as the Patriarchs of the West. In terms of the Investiture controversy, the point in contention may be restated in terms of feudal law: who was the local bishop’s liege lord, in case of a conflict arising between his two lords (king and pope)? But Investiture cannot be explained simply as the result of the inherent difficulties of the feudal contract as applied to ecclesiastical affairs. It also arises out of the dialectical nature which gives rise to the problem and in terms of which a solution was sought.

700 Cf. Pope Leo III’s silver shields with the plaque he had inscribed and placed between them, described on pp. in Chapter of the main text.

701 Kantorowicz, op. cit., pp. 57-58.

702 Ibid., p. 59.

703 Ibid., pp. 88-89.
Cf. Theodore Balsamon, PG 137:1156. Balsamon maintained that “the emperor’s consecration had the same effects as baptism (sic.), so that in the case of the Emperor John Tzimisces (969-967) that act did away with all the crimes and sins of his former life.” (Kantorowicz, op. cit., p. n. 9.)

The designation of Harald as an Orthodox monarch and England as Orthodox may seem unusual to the historian brought up in the historiography of the Second Europe, but such is the manner in which he is commemorated in the Orthodox Church. It should also be noted that the lingering influence of the Celtic Christianity can be detected in the English Church as late as the eight century with the continued resistance to the filioque on the part of isolated monasteries.


The subject of Ernst Kantowicz’s magisterial study of the same name, from which I have drawn most of the legal material for this work. However, equally important for the study of medieval English law is Sir Frederick Pollock’s and Frederic William Maitland’s massively detailed The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I.

Kantorowicz, op. cit., p. 12. On page 14, Kantorowicz makes an intriguing additional observation regarding the English jurists: “In other words, whereas the manhood of the individual incarnation appeared as negligible and as a matter of indifferent importance, the eternal essence of “godhead” of the monarch was all that counted before the tribunal of these ‘monophysite’ judges.”

Ibid., p. 47.

Ibid., pp. 58-59.

Ibid., p. 96.


Kantorowicz, op. cit., p. 162.

At the Council of Lyons (1274) approved the “new formula”
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tanquam ab uno principio, a new-new formula to give response to one of the difficulties of the old-new formula. Unfortunately, the formula that the Holy Spirit proceeds “from both as from one principle” is even more problematic than the original filioque itself, and is in fact one of the dialectical predictions made by St. Photios when he observed that the doctrine “hammered together” the Father and the Son. The resulting Sabellian “Son-Father” is thus what really being spoken of in the tanquan ab uno principio formula.

715 cf. Kantorowicz, p.7: “…the King has in him two bodies, viz., a Body natural, and a Body politic. His Body natural (if it be considered in itself) is a Body mortal, subject to all Infirmities that come by Nature or Accident, to be the Imbecility of Infancy or old Age, and to the like Defects that happen to the natural Bodies of other People. But his Body politic is a Body that cannot be seen or handled, consisting of Policy and Government, and constituted for the Direction of the People, and the management of the public weal, and this Body is utterly void of Infancy, and old age, and other natural Defects and Imbecilities, which the Body natural is subject to, and for this Cause, what King does in his Body politic, cannot be invalidated or frustrated by any Disability in his natural Body.”

Moreover, “to this natural Body is conjoined his Body politic, which contains his royal Estate and Dignity; and the Body politic includes the Body natural, but the Body natural is the lesser, and with this the Body politic is consolidated. So that he has a Body natural, adorned and invested with the Estate and Dignity royal; and he has not a Body natural distinct and divided by itself from the Office and Dignity royal, but a Body natural and a Body politic together indivisible; and these two Bodies are incorporated in one Person, and make one Body and not divers, that is the Body corporate in the Body natural, et e contra the Body natural in the Body corporate.”(p.9)


717 This feature is one of the distinguishing characteristics of the
change from feudal to modern society.

718 Kantorowicz, op. cit., pp. 77, 87.

719 Ibid,

720 that is, Marxism, Socialism, or even the American federal constitution of 1789.

721 Cf. Stalin’s celebrated maxim that the death of one man is a tragedy, and the deaths of millions a statistic.

722 The “Baptist hermeneutic”, which might be more accurately called the “anti-baptist” hermeneutic, emerges from the medieval Second European attempts to quantify and identify those sacramental actions that are bound to confer grace with certainty. Naturally, a juridical solution was found to a theological and spiritual problem: sacraments were those things where an explicit institution of them could be detected by Christ or in the universal tradition of the Church. With the Reformation’s sola Scriptura, this was reduced to explicit institution by Christ, requiring an example of something in order to be “biblical”. Since there was no explicit example of it, one had to reject infant baptism on the “strict view”. On the Lutheran view, whatever was not specifically prohibited by Scripture was therefore permitted.

723 Kantorowicz, op. cit., p. 329

724 Pashasius is known, appropriately, as the doctor missae (doctor of the mass) in the papal church. In what follows, I am offering my own interpretation of Radbertus, which will conflict enormously with that of fellow Eastern Orthodox theologian Fr. Alexander Schmemann, whose interpretation is too ready to read the contest in too neatly dialectical terms – Radbertus representing one pole and Ratrammus another – rather than as a contest between a theologian who is not dialectical in Schemann’s sense (Paschasius Radbertus), and one who is (Ratrammus). The dialectical opposition is within Ratrammus himself, not between the two men. This is a view which not all or most Eastern Orthodox clergy or laymen, who have been influenced by Fr. Alexander or St. Vladimir’s
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Orthodox Theological Seminary in Crestwood, New York, will accept, but the fact remains that Radbertus is defending Orthodox Eucharistic doctrine in terms at times remarkably similar to St. Cyril of Alexandria.

725 Cf. Ratramnus’ intensely dialectical exposition of the filioque doctrine in his Contra Graecorum Opposita Romanam Ecclesiam Infamantium Libri Quatuor (Against the Greeks Impiously Opposing the Roman Church, In Four Books), PL 121: 223-346. It is this work which, more than any other, crystallizes and hardens the Augustinian ordo theologiae and the various arguments in defense of the filioque.


729 Very Rev. Aechpriest Alexander Schmemann, “Worship in a Secular Age,” For the Life of the World: Sacraments and Orthodoxy (Crestwood: St. Valdimir’s Seminary Press, ), pp. 128-130: “What is truly decisive here is precisely the disconnection and opposition of the two terms verum (reality) and mystice (mystical), the acceptance on Both (Radbertus’s and Ratramnus’s parts) that they are mutually exclusive.” Radbertus, of course, accepts no such dialectical and mutual exclusivity; it is Ratramnus who construes the two as being in fundamental opposition.

730 The traditional scholastic Latin and Second European doctrine of the change of the elements in the Mass is that the change is effected by the priest’s utterance of the words of Institution, “This is My Body” and “This is My Blood of the New and Everlasting Covenant, which is shed for you and for many for the remission of sins.” The traditional doctrine of the First Europe as well as that of the Fathers of the undivided Church is that if one must seek a “moment of change”, that this is effected by the calling
down (epiklesis) of the Holy Spirit upon the gifts. Thus, Radbertus discloses the basis of his formulation by his reference to the role of the Spirit in effecting the change. This in turn indicates the degree to which, contra Schmemann, the actual acts and text of the liturgy of the Mass still forms the basis of his theologizing.


Cf. Dugmore, op. cit., 32-33. At this point, Dugmore falls prey to the very dialectical constructions he wishes to offset: “Both Paschasius (Radbertus) and Ratramn use the word corporaliter in a sense entirely different from the usage of the early Fathers. For the latter the eucharist is the source of life, the ‘medicine of immortality’ (citing St. Ignatius of Antioch, ed.) for the body as well as the soul. It is the pledge of their future resurrection. Thus Cyril of Alexandria…asserts: ‘Why does it come into us? Is it not that it may make Christ to dwell in us even corporeally (οφωμοτικος) by participation and communion of his holy flesh?’ When Christ declared that ‘He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood abideth in me and I in him’ he meant that we should be united to him not only by a disposition of the soul but also by a physical participation (καταμεθέξιν ψυχειν)…”

“When Paschasius and Ratramn use the word corporaliter they use it in opposition to spiritualiter and they are discussing only the question of Christ’s presence corporaliter under the sacramental species…”

A re-reading of the quotation of Cyril of Alexandria to which Dugmore appeals, however, proves the exact opposite of the point Dugmore is trying to make, namely, that Cyril, speaks of the Most Holy Eucharist – as do all of the Fathers – in as realistic terms as the Greek language is capable of speaking. Yet, they understood there to be no opposition between this reality and the fact that is was also a symbol, i.e., remained bread as well. The realist and symbolic language thus is used by the fathers to convey two simultaneous truths: bread and wine remain bread and wine while becoming identical and one with the very Body and
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Blood of Christ in the whole of His Incarnate Economy.

734 It should be obvious that such a method of objecting to the doctrine is Aristotelian.
735 Pelikan, op. cit., p. 137.
736 Cited in Pelikan, op. cit., p. 36.
737 Notably, Sts. Cyril of Alexandria, Cyril of Jerusalem, Athanasius, Ambrose, Gregory of Nyssa, etc.
738 Said by the Bishop or Priest in the Divine Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom while separating the Lamb on the diskos.
739 Dugmore, op. cit., p. 38.
740 Ibid., p. 53.
741 Ibid., p. 50.
742 Ibid., pp. 50, 52.
744 St. Augustine, Ibid., Tractate XXVI: 11, p. 171.
745 Paul Tillich, A History of Christian Thought (New York, Simon and Schuster:1968), p. 220. Tillich is also quick to perceive the ultimate redutio of this conception: “The means that the pope is the interpreter of every text. If the pope says that is what the text means, no philological defense in the face of that is possible.”(p. 222)
747 John Scotus Erigena, Concerning Predestination, 1, PL 122:358. The problem with all such remarks is, once again, the cultural matrix in which they would be interpreted. In the first Europe, it would be possible to see in such remarks merely the reiteration of the position of the Apologists: that whatever is true in philosophy comes from God. In the Second Europe, philosophy can come to take on the character of revelation, and as we saw with the reinterpretation of the name “I AM” in Aquinas and Duns Scotus, revelation becomes the revelation of certain
propositions philosophical metaphysics in the broadly Neoplatonic tradition.

Kantorowicz, op. cit., pp. 201-202

Ibid., pp. 282-283.

Ibid., pp. 4-5.

Ibid., p. 11.

It might be averred that the American founding fathers sis theorize on the role of morality in the political constitution of their new nation. In this sense, they did. But it should be observed that they did so by rejecting the Second European and First European solutions of an “official” or “royal-imperial” church, and by reintroducing the policy of official agnosticism and “toleration” first practiced by the pre-Christian Roman Empire. The theory is fine on paper, through like the Roman, the American Republic finds itself assuming an increasingly imperial posture both internationally and domestically, and adopting policies increasingly and ever more directly opposed to the moral principles of any revealed “monotheistic” religion on such “obvious” and visible issues as the “right” to murder the unborn on demand (Roe vs. Wade, 1973), to obscure issues such as the implications of genetic or molecular manipulation of a “virtual immortality” for mankind.α

Like Rome, a new kind of theokrasy is already manifesting itself in the creation of “secular religious days” celebrating “religious diversity”; a diversity that conveniently ignores the “diversity” of the atheist or agnostic may soon be a diversity in which those are officially imperiled. At some point, both for the Church and the State, crucial decisions will have to be made as to when that line has been crossed, and when one cannot or (conversely) must insist upon burning incense to Caesar. In this author’s

opinion, we are perilously close to reaching that historical moment when the institutions of the carnivorous American federal republic and its media organs will decide that blood must be spilt on a large scale in order to enforce official “toleration” on religious communities already frustrated in their attempts to seek political redress of their grievances within a system constitutionally contrived ab initio to ignore them. The European experiments “official” churches may have been a failure, and were often guilty of moral consequences of great magnitude, but in my opinion, I cannot see how America’s constitutional arrangement is any better in its own moral consequences. In my opinion it will, in the longer run, prove much more significant a catalyst in the moral and social decay of the twentieth century than did the official Atheism of the Soviet Union. Twentieth century America and its satellites have forgotten one crucial component of government of which the founding Fathers were crucially aware: religious institutions, while not part of the constitutional machinery of government were nevertheless part of the constitutional estate of government as much as the free press. When either fail to fulfill their moral obligations either in support or opposition to the government’s policies, republican institutions become tyrannical in order to preserve the decaying moral and social order. Thus, much of the blame for America’s moral dissipation must be laid at the door of those churches busily and happily engaged in compromise of fundamental doctrines and morality, for why act morality, if the doctrines are perceived, and indeed taught from the pulpits of apostates “churches”, to be untrue?

753 Kantorowicz, op. cit., p. 107.
754 Ibid., pp. 110-111.
755 Ibid., p. 158.
756 Ibid., p. 159.
757 St. Photios, Mystagogy 22, cf. also 9, 12, 15.
758 Kantorowicz, op. cit., pp. 206-207.
759 Ibid., p. 279.
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Ibid., p. 97.

Ibid., pp. 88-89


Kantorowicz, op. cit., pp. 98-90.

Ibid., p. 155.

Ibid., 103.

Ibid., 190-191.

Ibid., p. 440.


Ibid., p. 386. The legal fiction of the identity of the persons of the predecessor and successor had been formulated in those very same years by Pope Innocent IV in his *Apparatus* on the Decretals, and it remained the stock phrase of the glossators and post-glossators for generations to come.

Ibid., p., 387. “Once the principle was established that a Dignity never dies, the jurists could not fail to notice that certain similarities prevailed between the *Dignitas quae non moritur* and a corporation, an *universitas quae non moritur*. By maintaining the fictitious oneness of the predecessors with potential successors, all of whom were present and incorporated in the actual incumbent of the Dignity, the jurists constructed a fictitious person, a ‘corporation by succession’ composed of all those vested successively with that particular Dignity – a fiction which makes us think of the witches in Shakespeare’s *Macbet* (IV, I, 12 ff.), who conjure up that uncanny ghostly procession of macbeth’s predecessor king whose last one nears the ‘glass’ showing the long life successors. By this fiction, at any rate, the plurality of persons necessary to make up a corporation was achieved – a plurality, that is, which did not expand within a given
Space, but was determined exclusively by Time.”

773 Ibid., p. 312.
774 Ibid., p. 105.
775 Ibid., pp. 106-107.
776 Ibid.
778 Ibid., p. 316.
779 Ibid., p. 317.
780 Ibid.

781 When the King died, the virtue of Kingship did not die with him. In this conception, one finds the beginning of the Calvinist understanding of sacramental grace, i.e., that the sacraments confer no given natures, but only the virtues or operations associated with them.
782 Kantorowicz, op., p. 319.
783 On the definition of seven sacraments and the rise of the Baptist hermeneutic, cf. n. 772, p. 1106.
784 Ibid., pp. 320-321.
785 Ibid., 321.
786 Ibid., 322.
787 Ibid., 323.
788 Ibid., 337.
790 cf. the lucid discussion in Kantorowicz, op. cit., pp. 378-381. Cf. also Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles* Part IV: *Salavation*, 50:3, p. 212. Kantorowicz makes clear that, once the idea of kingship, represented by “the Crown”, became an immutable and immortal corporation, discussions of the legal problems of minority disappeared, for the reason that the Crown was always in perpetual guardianship or “regency”.
791 Ibid., p. 467.
792 Ibid., p. 474, emphasis added.
Ibid., p. 478. Kantorowicz has identified it exactly, for in its Augustinian form this doctrine is indeed not orthodox, depending as it does on the same category error as that which underlies all heresies, including the *filioque*. It is ironic that Photius, the first to have confronted the theological implications of the full-blown doctrine is also the one who stated that “The idea that there is a sin of nature is a heresy.” (Photius, *Bibliotheka*, PG)

Ibid., p. 450.

Ibid., 469.

Ibid., p. 55. This point may be lost unless one recall what is being depicted in the standard traditional iconography. There what is being depicted is the Son of God Himself in His human form, hence the traditional form of the ikon of Christ always has a Cross in the nimbus, with the Name “He Who Is” written in it. In other words, it is not an abstract “divinity” or “God principle” represented by a halo without the Cross. This is likewise very significant, for in the religious painting that comes to dominate the Second Europe after the schism, and during this period of increasingly dualistic thinking, however, Christ is portrayed with ever greater frequency only with a halo, i.e., *in the same fashion as any other saint, as someone indwelt with divinity*. Such a doctrine is exactly that of classical Nestorianism, and has therefore been so characterized here.

Ibid., p. 56. Such theorizing seems to have forgotten that “king” was applied to Christ in His humanity as King of the Jews, and that conversely, His High priesthood was, as per Radbertus, exercised by elevating humanity itself to Heaven and seating it at the right hand of the Father, a seat which obviously implies divine authority. What was forgotten was the περιχωρησις and the result that “King” was meant of Christ primarily in reference to His Eternal Person, and the corresponding implications that had for both natures.

Ibid., p. 47.

One may envision some “future Philippe le Bel” explaining the
disappearance of Christians in his realm by the “Rapture”, while his seneschals have secretly and covertly reaided their homes and temples, and carted them off to places unknown! He would then be able to point to any number of dispensationalist charts – which look ever more and more like the arcane charts of the serious occultist – for proof of his assertions. If he be a real adept and illuminatus of the Joachimist tradition, he will have orchestrated all of this occur on Friday the 13th so as to take full advantages of all “the resonance of the cosmic harmony”.

PART THREE: HISTORY:

A THEOLOGICAL PATHOLOGY OF THE SECOND EUROPE

NOTES TO CHAPTER XI: THE HISTORY OF THE CHAMELEON GODHEAD

801 West, op. cit/. p. xi.
802 Ibid., p. xii.
803 Ibid., p. 68, emphasis mine.
804 For the idea of “binitarianism” of “Semi-Sabellianism” as being a dialectical consequence of the filioque, cf. St. Photios, Mystagogy 9, 12, 15, 22. Cf. also n/ 541, pp. 1068-1075.
806 Ibid.
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807 D. West, , p. 17, citing St. Augustine’s The City of God, II.
808 West, Ibid.
809 Ibid., p. 30.
810 Ibid., pp. 67-68.
811 For the many types of concordance, cf. the excellent expositions and diagrams of D. West, op. cit., pp. 14, 15, 20, 21, 26, 27, 50, 69-77.
812 West, op. cit., pp. 44-45.
813 Ibid., p. 45.
815 St. Photios, Mystagogy 9, 12, 15, 22.
817 West, op. cit., p. 7.
818 Ibid.
820 Ibid., pp. 17-18.
821 West, op. cit., p. 18.
822 Reeves, op. cit., p. 18.
823 Ibid., p. 19.
824 Ibid.
825 Ibid., p. 20.
826 cf. note 541, St. Photius, Mystagogy 9, 12, 15, 22.
827 West, op. cit., p. 15, emphasis mine.
828 Ibid., p. 29.
829 Reeves, op. cit., p. 29. Professor Reeves makes the very astute observation that Joachim’s works are conceived and written in the exact order of the dialectical unfolding of the Persons in the Augustinian ordo theologiae.
830 West, op. cit., p. 60.
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832 Reeves, op. cit., p. 30
833 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
834 Ibid., p. 44.
835 Ibid., p. 203.
836 Ibid.
837 Ibid., p. 248.
838 Ibid., p. 249.
839 Ibid.
840 Ibid., p. 250.
841 Ibid., p. 274.
842 Ibid.
843 Ibid., p. 299.
844 Ibid., pp. 299-301.
845 Ibid., p. 301.
846 Ibid., pp. 302-303.
847 Ibid., p. 304
850 Reeves, op. cit., p. 305.
852 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles IV Salvation*: 26:6, p. 145; St. Photius, *Bibliotheka* 177, cited in John Meyendorff, *Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes* (New York: 1974), p. 143. Aquinas’s language cannot be improved upon as an exact exposition of the doctrine that not just natural corruption, but the fault, and culpability of Adam’s sin itself was transmitted: “one must, then say that death and the necessity of dying is a penalty, inflicted on man for sin. But a penalty is not justly inflicted except for a fault. Therefore, in every single one of those in whom one finds this penalty one must of necessity find a fault. But this penalty is found in all men.. for since that day man is born handed over to
the necessity of death.” This is quite different from the doctrine of ancestral sin as expounded by its premier Greek Patristic expositor, St. John Chrysostom, for whom death is the natural, inheritable consequence of separation from God as well as the means that evil. Death has, for Chrysostoms and most of the fathers, not only a “penalizing” function in Adam’s case, but a “therapeutic” function for all man kind.


854 Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics*, p. 112, emphasis added. Orthodox are frequently asked about the sanctity of Francis of Assisi, and why he is not accorded the status of a saint in the Orthodox Church, since so much of his spirituality superficially – and only superficially – resembles that of St. Seraphim of Sarov. The answer usually given, that Francis is post-schism saint is likewise superficial and inaccurate. Francis is not recognize as a saint for the very obvious though often overlooked fact that the movement to canonize him was itself suffused with Joachimist principles, for which movement Francis was the perfect embodiment both of “apostolic,” and of the end-time, poverty and simplicity. On this view, FGrancis himself personally espoused, to some extent, some of the same Joachimist principles that, in the hands of some of his more unbalanced followers led to similar conclusions as joachimism: the disappearance of the hierarchical Church, the influence of Joachamimism on the development of Franciscan piety in particular, and the overtly forms the backdrop of much of the popular film *The Name of the Rose*, based upon Umberto Eco’s novel of the same name.

855 Ibid., pp. 112-113.

856 Cf. Also James Billinton, *Fire in the Minds of Men: The Origins of the Revolutionary Faith*, (Basic Books, 1980) Chapter 4, “The Occult Origins of Organization,” pp. 86-123. Billington’s is the best, and certainly the most scholarly, work on the subject to which one can reliably turn without wading through a quagmire of conspiracy literature that is, at best,
downright fabulous and fantastic a thing to behold. Billington’s work handles the evidence very carefully and its conclusions are drawn closely to it without the verly exercised passionate imaginations of the conspiracy theorist.

857 Cf. Adam Weishaupt, et. al., Nachtrage der Originalschriften des Bayrischen Illuminatenordens, 1787, 2tn Abteilung, pp. 44, where the great 18th century “magus” himself wrote: “men originally led a patriarchal life, in which every father of a family was the sole lord of his house and his property, while he himself possessed general freedom and equality. But they suffered themselves to be oppressed – gave themselves up to civil societies, and formed states. Even by this they fell; and this is the fall of man, by which they were thrust into unspeakable misery. To get out of this state… there is no other mean then… to dispense with all political supports, and particularly with rulers…. 4… to recover our first simplicity, and get back to this honorable uniformity.” The object of Weishaupt’s Bavarian Illuminati was, as he explained, “the checking of the tyranny of princes, nobles, and priests, and establishing an universal equality of condition and religion.” One notes that Weishaupt’s sequential order of the derivation of the state from original simplicity, to the family, to civil society, is exactly the same order in which it will later appear in Hegel. Cf. note 883a.

858 Kantorowicz, op. cit., p. 3.
859 Reeves, op. cit., p. 198.
860 Ibid., p. 208.
861 W.T. Stace, The Philosophy of Hegel (Dover, 1995), pp. 1-2, remarks” “...it will be found that the fundamental philosophical basis of Hegel is the same as the historical basis…. ‘What Hegel proposes to give... is no novel or special doctrine, but the universal philosophy which has passed on from age to age, here narrowed and there widened, but still essentially the same. It is conscious of its continuity and proud of its identity with the teachings of Plato and Aristotle.’ What, then, is this one
universal philosophy? Evidently it is not simply the philosophy of Plato, nor yet simply the philosophy of Aristotle. The systems of these men are but special presentations of the one universal philosophy, special forms which it assumed in their hands..." (citing Wallace, *The Philosophy of Mind*, p. 9) What one has in Hegel is again a “phenomenology of a general cultural principle”, in this case, a principle of its philosophical roots. As shall be seen, this prevents Hegel from genuinely appreciating or understanding the First Europe’s rejection of the whole *filioque* and its attendant Hellenization of the Gospel, for as Hegel quite clearly saw, this rejection meant that it stood outside of the general philosophical culture of the Second Europe and its “universal philosophy.”


863 Stace, op. cit., p. 6, emphasis in the original.

864 Ibid., p. 7.

865 [author numbered for a note, but never added it to the manuscript]

866 [author numbered for a note, but never added it to the manuscript]

867 [author numbered for a note, but never added it to the manuscript]

868 Ibid., p. 8.

869 Ibid., p. 11. Stace continues with an excellent summary of what this analysis, for Hegel, implies: “This conclusion throws a great deal of light upon the seeming paradox to which Eleaticism led us, -- that the real does not exist. For the real is now the universal. And the universal cannot be said to exist. White things exist, but not ‘whiteness’ itself. There are in existence chestnut horses, white horses, black horses, race horses, cart horses. But where is the universal ‘horse,’ the *horse in general*?.... And not by ransacking all time shall we find the universal horse that is neither chestnut nor white nor black, neither a racehorse nor a cart horse, but
simply ‘horse.’ The universal, then, is neither in place nor in time. It is nowhere and no when.” (p. 11, emphasis mine.)

Stace, op. cit., p.21.

Ibid., p. 22, emphasis in the original.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 26

Ibid., pp. 32-33.

Ibid., p. 33.

Ibid., pp. 43-44, italicized emphasis mine, italicized and bold face emphasis in the original.

Ibid., p. 45.


Ibid., p. 79.

Ibid., p. 82.

Ibid., p. 84.

Ibid., p. 91. Stace also makes an interesting point about the ultimate reduction of Hegel’s system. “Such being has in it no determinations whatever, for we have abstracted from all determinations. It is therefore absolutely indeterminate and featureless, completely empty and vacant, a pure vacuum. It has no content, for content of any kind would be a specific determination….. But such absence of everything is simply nothing. Emptiness, vacancy, is the same as nothing. Being, therefore, is the same thing as nothing. And the pure concept of being is thus seen contain the idea of nothing….. hence we have deduced the category of nothing from the category of being….. Pure “is”, therefore, mere “is” without any further determination, is the same as “is not.” Being is identical with not-being or nothing.” (pp. 90-91)

The apophaticism of Orthodox theology goes far beyond this by breaking the univocal connection of dialectical categories to God and the world. In this, and understanding of the theological formulations of St. Gregory Palamas are crucial.
The derivation of the category of the “State” in Hegelian dialectical terms may be traced as follows.

In the Stage one, the Movement from the idea, or the Absolute in and for itself (the center circle, or Deus) is to (1) the Thesis, the Idea itself, which contains its opposite or (2) the Antithesis of the Idea outside of itself. But this cannot stand as a stable point of repose.

Hence, in Stage Two, the Synthesis become its own new thesis (3), to which is opposed (4) the new Antithesis, the Subjective Spirit, yielding its (5) new Synthesis in Absolute Spirit as Becoming. But this, too, cannot stand as a stable point of repose.

Hence, in the Stage Three, the Synthesis (5) becomes a new Thesis (5) of the Absolute Spirit as the Objective Spirit of Abstract Right, which is opposed to (6) its Antithesis which is the objective Spirit of Morality, from which arises (7) the new Synthesis of Social “Ethics”. But this, too, cannot stand as a stable point of repose. Opposed to its (8) Antithesis, Spirit as Civil Society, from Which arise (9) the Synthesis of both called the State:
884 ibid., p. 93.
886 Stace, op. cit., p. 374.
887 Ibid., p. 377.
888 Ibid., p. 375. Recall the words of Aquinas that “the principal object of the divine will is the divine essence.” With this, it is clear that
Hegel’s entire system of the World and Institutions as the manifestation of the Spirit is but the Origenist Problematic on speed; the Problematic has gone mad to the extent that everything becomes the manifestation of Spirit, including, obviously, acts of “negotiation” or nihilism. We have maintained throughout this work that the fundamental distinguishing property of the Neoplatonic way: “…for God the qualities of goodness and beauty are the same, or the realities, the good and beauty.” II 6: 6, p. 251.

From this resulted that confusion of opposition and distinction which has been present throughout the intellectual history of the Second Europe. One need only consult Aquinas’ *Summa Theologica*, Pl. 1, Q 29, Art 2-5, to see this crucial effect working itself out. But in Hegel, it takes on even more significance. As R. G. Collingwood put it,

“This retort, I think, applies even to the most serious of all hegel’s critics, namely, Croce. He maintains that hegel’s whole philosophy of history is a gigantic blunder, produced by confusing two quite different things: namely opposition and distinction. Concepts, Croce says, are related by opposition: good and bad, true and false, freedom and necessity, and so forth; and the theory of their relation, he admits, has been well expounded by hegel in his theory of dialectic, which describes the way in which any concept stands in a necessary relation to its own opposite, generating it at first and then negating it, so that the way in which the concept lives is by creating and overcoming oppositions. But the individual things which are the instances of concepts are never related to each other by way of opposition, only by way of distinction; consequently the relations history between them are not dialectical, and in history, which is the history of individual actions and person and civilization, there is consequently no dialectic, whereas Hegel’s whole philosophy of history turns on the principle that every historical process is a dialectical process in which one form of life, for example, Greece, generates its own opposite, in this case Rome, and out of this thesis and antithesis there arises a synthesis, in
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this case the Christian world."

889 Ibid., p.511.
891 Ibid., p. 116.
892 Ibid., p. 119.
893 Ibid., pp. 274-275, n. 67 by Peter Hodgson.
894 Recall in this regard Sabellius’s “Son-Father” referred to in Part One, and St. Photius’s contention in the ninth century that the filioque provided no clear basis for distinguishing between the Father and the Son, since the Father’s monarchy was now a common property both of the Father and of the Son.
895 Which reproduces the whole Origenist Problematic in a new guise. It does so by treating of the Logos in exactly the same fashion as the apologists, for a distinction is made between the Transcendent Logos in, or as, the Mind of God (λογοςενδιαθετος) and the Logos as emanating from Him into the world of sensibility (λογοςπροφορικος).
896 reproducing exactly the original Augustinian category error of the confusion of Person and Nature.
897 Note well the redefinition of the Person of the incarnate Son in terms of the incarnation of the abstraction called “the divine.”
899 Hegel, p. 362.
900 Ibid., note 8, pp. 362-363, again by Peter Hodgson.
901 Dumitru Staniloae, Theology and the Church (Crestwood: St.

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Hegel, op. cit., p. 135. It is worth noting that the quotation, as it reads in Mr. Hodgson's otherwise skillful editing of the text, reads in exactly the opposite sense in than it does in the original German: “...the kigsom of the Spirit... [involves] knowing oneself as having within oneself, as this individual, infinite worth, absolute freedom, and the infinite power to maintain oneself in this other pure and simple. Love equalizes all things, [but not] in the sense [that] people nowadays want to love and live in love [implying] that others ought to give themselves up to the same commonality...” The words in brackets, as Hodgson indicates in the critical apparatus, have been editorially inserted. But in this case, the insertions obscure the point which Hegel is making: love, as dialectically actualized within the “Trinity”, equalizes, i.e., “simplifies” all things precisely by reducing them to the “same commonality.”

Ibid., p. 85.
Ibid., p. 85, note 73.
cf. pp. 378-381.
cf. p. 337, and note 508, p. 1043
Ibid., p. 29.
Ibid., p. 30.
Ibid., p. 31.
Ibid., p. 32.
Ibid., p. 34.


St. Photius, Mystagogy 18.
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918 Eric Voegelin, Science, Politics, and Gnosticism, p. 69.


920 Eric Voegelin, op. cit., p. 73.

921 Ibid.

922 Ibid.

CHAPTER XII: THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE CHAMELEON GODHEAD

923 As has been seen previously, the “virtualist” position is a dialectical counterpart to that posed by transubstantiation in its more radical scholastic forms, the latter holding that the substance of Body and Blood are present, the other that the operations are present, but without the underlying natures.

924 Patrology, or Patristics, found a congenial home in the North European Humanism, thought it had not become a part of the formal academic curriculum in the modern sense. After the Reformation, however, it is given is current academic shape in the study of the history of doctrines by the Lutherans and Anglicans.


This massive study was in part an attempt to justify the Lutheran understanding of the περιχωρησις and “ubiquity of Christ’s human nature”.

“Deuterocanonical”: i.e., those books in the Greek and Latin Bible but not in the modern Hebrew or Protestant canons.

The argument is still widely used in American “evangelical” circles, though no one seems to have noticed the problem inherent in it: if the Jewish people could not recognize their own Messiah (on the Christian view), then why should they recognize their own Scriptures? That is, the authority of the Church in recognizing or canonizing the New Testament (or any books whatever) is really at stake. The issue is complicated by the textual critical considerations peculiar to the Old Testament. When the argument, in its simplest form, was originally advanced, there were essentially two textual options available: the manuscript tradition of the Septuagint and that of the Masoretic text. At points, the former differs significantly from the latter. It was a common assumption of Protestant criticism that only the Masoretic text represented an authentic preservation of the text (the Septuagint being only a translation, in many cases, very different from the Masoretic). More recently, however, scholars believe that there may have been some Hebrew textual exemplar of certain books and textual traditions detectable in the Septuagint.

The emphasis on ancient texts was part of the reason that contributed to the rise both of Patrology and textual criticism in Northern Europe in the Late Middle Ages and Renaissance. What distinguished this “north European” from the “south European” Humanism was the difference in emphasis. The south European Humanism was primarily interested in a recovery of classical pagan antiquity. The north European emphasis was more exclusively Christian. In any case, it should be evident that the Second Europe’s culture again split, within each segmented ecclesiastical division, of an essentially humanist approach both to pagan and Christian “antiquity.” In using the latter term, we designate also the fact that for the
Second Europe, the patristic culture is something with which it is no longer in living contact.

930 There are some notable exceptions to this rule, scholars who, because of their faithfulness to their confessional and Christian faith, were essentially ostracized by the “academic” community, namely, Dean John Burgon, and in the twentieth century, Edward Freer Hills. More recently, the ecclesiastical text and its underlying theological basis in the true Protestant sola Scriptura(not that sola Scriptura which is so often parodied) have been ably defended and expounded in the various publications of Theodore P. Letis.

Some common on the sola Scriptura and its relationship to the Patristic understanding of the “sufficiency of Scripture” is called for, since I believe that what the Protestants were trying to do was restore the Patristic conception, and that this effort was undermined by the larger problem of the Augustinian ordo itself. Briefly, in the Fathers, there is no separation of the “sufficiency of Scripture” and its meaning in tradition, or “scope”. There is, however, a distinction. While the meaning of Scripture, or “Tradition” in the fullest sense – not only of the course of performance of the Church’s understanding of it in the abstract, but also in the practical working out of it in liturgy, iconography, hymnography, and so on – depended upon Scripture and was derived from it. Scripture in turn could not be understood apart from it, nor, therefore, apart from the Church. It is to be observed that this relationship of Text, Interpretation, and Community is not a dialectical one, since the three elements involved are not opposed.

Perhaps one way to view this relationship, or to clarify it, is to rely upon the distinctions of Theology and Economy by way of an analogy. The Son and Word of God subsistec from all eternity(theology) along with the Father and the Holy Spirit. But He took His human conception and form from the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary(Economy). So too the verbal icon of the Word(the Scriptures), are, in a certain sense, “preexistent”, because
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their Subject is preexistent theology, and thus, all that can be known or said about God derive from them. However, they take on their human form and shape by the Holy Spirit in the ancient and new Israel economy, and thus, are only rightly understood in that interpretive tradition and community in which they took shape.

The danger of such a view, of course, are obvious, in that it would tend to elevate the Scriptures to the status of a kind of Koranic revelation, with the Book itself replacing the eternal Son and Word to Whom they testify and witness. Hence, one must always remember that the Scriptures are the icon of Christ par excellence, the word inscripturate, not the Word Incarnate.

With this caveat in hand, the problems inherent in the Protestant sola Scriptura (as well as in the Roman Catholic, as well as much modernist Orthodox, formulation of the relationship of Tradition and Scripture) are more apparent. In the Augustinian ordo, one must distinguish the Three Persons of the Trinity by their mutual opposition, and the fact that the Spirit proceeds from the Son means either that more: “divine persons” must proceed from the Spirit (if He is to be fully God within the constraints of the system), or He is somehow less than God. The parallel to the first alternative is, as we have seen, the idea of genuine doctrinal development, or novelty, i.e., the invention or definition of new doctrines or dogmas unconnected with the previous tradition or Scripture. This, of course, was the Romanist alternative, and has a contemporary manifestation in the words of revelation of the modern Charismatic and Pentecostal movement. Tradition becomes something opposed to Scripture, or at best, is a juridical elaboration or deduction of various prepositions from it. On the other hand, the Tradition becomes denoted, and never has any final or determinative validity as to the orthodoxy of an individual or confession. This is the dilemma which suffuses all Protestant confessional orthodoxies, howsoever sincerely held or maintained. Ultimately, it is an artificial construction, giving rise to the higher critical
quest for the “original Scriptures in the original autographs with their original meaning,” or the “quest for the historical Jesus.” In both cases, each is working from an initial assumption that the Augustinian ordo theologiae is the correct theological formulation.

931 This led to a curious paradox within the theological formulations of the First Europe at this period. The theologians under the influence of Constantinople, or involved with contact with the influence of Constantinople, or involved with contact with the Second Europe, often resorted to peculiarities of dialectical treatment, using Roman Catholic arguments against the Protestants, and Protestant arguments against the Roman Catholics. Often this was done within the same work. There was little understanding, therefore, on the part of the First Europe during this period, of the contradictory and dialectical nature of this problem, nor of the way in which the Augustinian ordo contributed to it; for the moment the prescient dialectical observations of St. Photius or St. Gregory Palamas were forgotten. Historical circumstances certainly contributed mightily to this state of affairs. The Greek Partriarchetes and Balkan Churches were struggling for their very survival under the Ottoman Turks, and the Russian Church and Empire were devoting their energies to the “collection of the Russian lands” under Muscovy and the drive through Siberia.

For the most thorough treatment of the “westernization” of Orthodox theology during this period, cf. the immensely valuable and scholarly study of Fr. Georges Florovsky, The Ways of Russian Theology. To simplify what happened in Russia, it could be states that the genuinely Orthodox presentation of theology was maintained in the monasteries. Here however, it suffered a kind of reduction to a “monastic spirituality” that was not altogether conscious of its roots in Orthodox doctrines, and if conscious, sometimes unable to articulate those connections in a formal way.

In more extreme cases, it manifested itself (and, unfortunately, often still does) in an opposition to “dogmatic” theology, by which was meant the
increasingly Latinized and Augustinized theological ordo found in the seminaries, which was perceived, and rightly so, as a compromise to the errors of the West, and something more or less a departure from the spiritual core of Orthodoxy.

These attitudes may still be found in contemporary Orthodoxy, particularly in Western Europe (which I understand now to include Greece) and manifest themselves in essentially three “outlooks”: (1) the academic theology of the Orthodox seminaries, predominantly modernist in outlook and theological methods, evident in the movement to publish monographs and “reassessments” of Orthodox theology largely in terms of an academic agenda drawn from the Second Europe; (2) the more classical “Augustinized” academic theology of pre-Revolutionary Russia, evident in the publication of older monographs without much room for a genuine critique of them; and finally (3) the “monastic” or “spiritual” theology, evident in the movement to publish hagiographa and a certain tendency to avoid academic exposition.

This is the doctrine which, for many evangelical Protestants in America and Canada, become the “test of orthodoxy” and commitment to “biblical Christianity”. It is, of course, an absurdity, since no one has had, now has, or is ever likely to have, the original autographs of Scripture. Of course, implicit in this definition fidei is the almost subliminal evangelical apprehension of dealing with history. After all, that would lead in a “Catholic” direction. When, of course, the only cultural icon of “The Catholic Faith Church” is the deviation of the papacy, one can readily appreciate the reaction and to that degree, sympathize with it. But that is the point, that crypto-Roman Catholicism inherent within the Second Europe is not the orginal, nor the genuine, Catholic Church.

This was more or less the original understanding of the doctrine by the Reformers and particularly by the Lutherans. Cf. note 930.

The perpetual virginy was not, at first, contested by the Reformation. The doctrine was, for example, certainly found in Cranmer’s
first prayer book of 1549. The decay in Protestant teaching, and the
departure from this doctrine, would themselves be an extremely important
study for the exposition of theological and critical attitudes to Scripture and
Tradition.


936 Archer, op. cit., pp. 77-78; Harrison, op. cit., p. 17.

937 This may be seen by a consultation of some modern translations of the Scripture, e.g., *The Jerusalem Bible* or the Roman Catholic *New American Bible*.


939 Such a confusion is metaphysical in nature, and recalls the statement of St. John of Damasus, that the underlying error common to all heresies lies in identifying person and nature.

940 Ibid., pp. 7-8.

941 Ibid., p. 19.

942 Ibid., p. 24.

943 Harisson, op. cit. p. 14


945 Archer, p. 77.

946 Ibid., p. 78.

946a The assumption of “integrity” was provided to lend the aura of “verifiability” to the theory. But in assuming it and the “bungling hand of R”, Hupfeld assumed two mutually contradictory notions, and the subsequent dialectical chaos of criticism is in part the result of this.
It cannot be put any better than Wellhausen himself actually put it: “...in the course of a casual visit in Gottingen in the summer of 1867, I learned through Ritschl that Karl Heinrich Graf placed the Law later than the Prophets, and, almost without knowing his reasons for the hypothesis, I was prepared to accept it; I readily acknowledged to myself the possibility of understanding Hebrew antiquity without the book of the Torah.”

The Hegelian nature of the Graf-Wellhausen Hypothesis may not be readily apparent for anyone unfamiliar with the actual literature of Old Testament Introduction of this period. But this may be succinctly put if one remembers that the theory began as a literary hypothesis. Thus the transition from the literary and dialectical relationship of the documents reveals the Hegelian cast, for “by attempting to assign dates to the proposed documents, the various writers transcended the bounds of literary criticism as such and moved into the area of historical criticism,” that is, the dialectical relationship of documents was understood as a key to their historical relationship and chronology, and with that statement, the Hegelian nature of the theory is revealed.

The dialectical nature of the theoretical structure itself may be appreciated in the fact that any two assumed “documents” (J and E, or E and P) give rise to a third through the mediating principle of the Redaktor, as follows:

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α Julius Wellhausen, Prolegomena to the History of Ancient Israel (Gloucester, Massachusetts; Peter Smith, 1973), pp. 3-4.

β Harrison, op., cit., p. 19.
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950 Indeed, during the 19th century, it was a common theme among certain critics that the ancient Hebrews were not literate at all.

951 Cf. note 937.


953 Ibid.

954 Ibid., p. 148

955 Ibid., pp. 149-150. Voegelin mentions that the dialectical partition continues even in this new form, that of the emergence within “P” (the Priestly Document/School) of a “holiness school”, or H! One would wish, with all this Boolean notation, for a Boolean clarity!

956 Ibid., p. 150.

957 The fact of the philological unity of the Old Testament highlights, rather boldly, the difference between a “critical” and a liturgical-ecclesiastical approach, which would see in the continuity of philological data the continuity of a liturgically-used and quoted text. This point will be
reiterated by John Burgon in connection with the Wescott-Hort hypothesis.

958 Voegelin, op. cit., p. 151.
959 Ibid., p. 152.
960 Ibid., p. 152, note 6.
961 Ibid., p. 153.
962 Ibid.
963 Ibid., p. 154
964 Ibid., p. 157.
965 Ibid., pp. 157-158. Voegelin states:

Particularly felicitous is Engnell's deliberate abachronism when he speaks of the P-circle as an Israaelite Academy of Literature, History, and antiquities, though of course, with its root and keen interest in the cult. “I wonder whether the analogy is really so very anachronistic; for the concern with the past as the apardigmatic record of God's way with man, extending over a period of more than a thousand years, could hardly translate itself into practice without a considerable apparatus of both (sic.) personnel and material installations, for preserving this enormous body of traditions not only mechanically but with the necessary intelligence and erudition.”

966 That the “modern” period is not really modern but in fact as ancient as the second century should be apparent. Perhaps the only significant difference between the two is that the “modern-modern” period, as distinguished from the “old-modern” period, is that it seems to be characterized by a much more intensely wilfull rejection on the part of modern Gnostics even to consider the arguments of any Christian orthodoxy, and by a timid capitulation on the part of confessionally orthodox Christians to the current fads and fashions of the “scientific” academy.

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Ibid., pp. 57, 59.
Ibid., p. 76.
Ibid., p. 117.
Ibid., p. 123.
Ibid., p. 76.
Ibid., p. 188.
Ibid., p. 190.

The formulation was first used by St. Cyril of Alexandria and thus is not specifically Anglican.


Ibid., pp. 314-325: the identification of Stoicism with this position is readily apparent.

Ibid., p. 337.

The subservience to "Platonic" dogma will be explored in connection to the Newtonian understanding of the "extension" of God.


Ibid., I: LXXXIX, p. 88.

Ibid., The Great Instauration, p. 25.


Wescott and Hort, p. 3.

Ibid., p. 2. It is to be noted that the principles systematized and put in place by Wescott and Hort and modified since that time have resulted in an endless series of "critical texts", each with slight variations which reflect the textual critical and translational prejudices of the critical committees themselves. With this collapse into modern textual-critical "eclecticism" the mask is off, and the enterprise revealed for what it was at the outset, an assault, by whatever means lies to hand, against Christian orthodoxy of whatever type.
Ibid., pp. 8-9. This bears comparison to St. Irenaeus’s statements regarding the Gnostic alteration of texts. Clearly, the early Fathers were aware of intentional corruptions.

There are approximately 5,255 known MSS, or manuscripts, which contain all, or a portion, of the Greek New Testament. Of these, the Manuscripts may be classified according to various schemes.

The earliest manuscripts are papyri (a material made from the fibers of the papyrus plant), or p, followed in textual critical nomenclature with a superscripted number identifying a specific papyrus, e.g., p73. Approximately 80 of these have been discovered so far. Papyri often contain only minute portions of the New Testament, often less than a verse.

All other New Testament MSS are vellum, or quite simply leather MSS. The oldest of these are the Codex Vaticanus, or “B”, the Codex Siniaticus, or Aleph, often simply written as the Hebrew character א, and Codex Alexandrinus, or simply “A”. These three belong to a type or family of manuscript known as Uncials, since they are written entirely in capital letters, without spaces between words, and with a comparatively small amount of punctuation and other orthographical and diacritical marks which we take for granted. Of these three, Codex Siniaticus (א) is the earliest, ca. 250 A.D., and with the other two, B and A, constitutes one of the three pillars of the Wescott Hort theory and text and its subsequent
Another class of manuscripts are the miniscules, i.e., those manuscripts written in lower case letters, with spacing between words and other diacritical marks. These manuscripts date between the 9th and the 16th centuries. There are over 2,700 miniscule manuscripts, and thus, as a category or group, they constitute the overwhelming numerical majority of extant New Testament manuscripts.

Another important category of data are the Greek lectionaries, that is, liturgical books with portions of Scripture arranged in the sequence and order in which they are read in the liturgy of the Eastern Church. There are two types of these lectionaries, the synaxaria, beginning the liturgical year at Pascha, or Easter, and the menologia, beginning with September 1. There are over 2,100 of these manuscripts.

In addition to the above original language documents, there are the versions, which are simply translations of Scripture into other ancient languages, the most important of which are the Latin versions. These fall into two basic groups. The first is the Old Latin, composed in North Africa during the last portion of the 2nd century. The first is the Old Latin, composed in North Africa during the last portion of the 2nd century. The second is the Vulgate(with its more than 8,000 manuscripts), Jerome’s critical revision of the Old Latin which he undertook on the basis of a comparison with the original Greek MSS available to him during his sojourn in Palestine.

Next in importance is the Peshitta, or the Syriac version of the Bible, of which more than 350 MSS are extant. The Peshitta was in widespread use in all portions of the Syriac Church in the 5th century, in both the Monophysite and Nestorian churches, and thus predates the 5th century by some years. A revision of the Peshitta, called the Philoxenic, was made for Philoxenus of Mabbug ca. 508 A.D.

Another important version is the Coptic, dating from approximately the beginning of the 3rd century.
Finally, there are the *patristic quotations* of Scripture, the most important being those of St. Irenaeus, Tertullian, Cyprian, Clement, Origen, Chrysostom, and Athansius.

All these manuscripts are in turn divided into various families or pedigrees of text: the *Western*, the *Alexandrian*, and of course the *Byzantine* (also called the *Koine Text*, the *Majority Text*, or the *Traditional Text*). It is this Byzantine text type which constitutes the *overwhelming numerical majority of extant MSS*.

The Byzantine or Traditional text includes miniscules, lectionaries, most of the Peshitta and Gothic versions, the quotations of Chrysostom, and various Fathers of Cappadocia.

The Alexandrian family consists of texts cited by Origen and others associated with Alexandria. The Alexandrian text is important to the historiography of New Testament textual criticism since Wescott and Hort assumed its priority in their theoretical reconstruction of the history of the text. It, along with the Western omissions and Codex Sinaiticus, or N, were “the sure basis” on which they constructed their critical text for the Revised Standard Version of 1881. The difficulty is that their view dismisses Patristic evidence not in accordance with their theory. Clement of Alexandria never used the Alexandrian text and Origen used it only intermittently, a peculiar omission for a text assumed to be the paradigm of the earliest and most authentic manuscript of the New Testament. More importantly, during the height of the Arian crisis, Arius constantly referred to the Alexandrian version of St. John 1:18, “only begotten God”, since in his cosmology, “only begotten God” meant something else that “God”, i.e., meant precisely that Christ was not fully God. Athanasius conversely constantly cites the verse in its Byzantine text from, “only-begotten Son”, and then goes on to argue that sons are always of the same nature as their fathers.

The Western family is often found cited in Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Cyprian. The *Diatesseron* of Tatian and the Old Latin versions also belong
More must be said regarding the Western text at this point, if subsequent pages are to make any sense. The Western text is known for two peculiarities: 1) additions, and 2) omissions.

Additions: The Western Text contains readings not found either in the Byzantine or the Alexandrian families. The more significant additions occur at St. Matt 3:15; 20-28; St. Luke 3:22, where, at Christ’s baptism, the words “thou art my son, this day have I begotten thee”, are added. Other additions occur at St. Luke 6:4; and later at 23:53 where D, c, and Sahidic add “And when he was laid there, he placed before the tomb a stone, which twenty men could scarcely roll”; St John 6:56, where after the eucharistic statement are added the words “according as the Father is in me and I in the Father. Verily I say unto you, except ye take the body of the Son of Man as the bread of life, ye have not life in him”, and finally there are additions of Acts 15:20; and 23:24.

Omissions: From the doctrinal and historical standpoint of this essay, the Omissions in the Western text are far more significant, since they regain, via Wescott and Hort and subsequent textual critics, currency in many modern versions of Scripture, and English versions in particular. These deserve extended enumeration, since they bear directly on our thesis that modern textual criticism is but a highly developed and subtle species of that ancient form of Gnosticism which attempted to engraft its own cosmology into the Christian tradition by outright modification of minute portions of Scripture.

In the last portion of Luke there are eight readings which the Revised Standard Version and The new English Bible remove from the text and consign to the footnotes. These readings are usually called Western omission because “with two exceptions they are omitted only by a few manuscripts of the Western group, namely D, certain Old Latin Manuscripts, and one or two old Syriac manuscripts.” The Modernist critics, operating under Wescott and Horts dictum that Western omissions
are to be given priority simply because they come from manuscripts of early date, have thus, in certain versions of their endless revisions, consigned the traditional readings to footnotes. These omissions are as follows:

Luke 22:19-20, from “which is given for you” to “is shed for you” is omitted by the Old Latin version.

Luke 24:3, referring to the Body “of the Lord Jesus” is omitted by the Old Latin.

Luke 24:6, the angelic announcement “He is not here but is risen” is omitted by the Old Latin, the old Syriac, and some MSS of the Armenian version.

Luke 24:12: the whole verse is omitted by the Old Latin.

Luke 24:36, the risen Lord’s salutation “and saith unto them, peace be with unto you” is omitted by the Old Latin and Old Syriac.

Luke 24:40: The Lord’s proof to Thomas, “And when he had thus spoken, He shewed them His hands and His feet” is omitted by the Old Latin and Old Syriac.

Luke 24:51: The Ascension, “and was carried up into Heaven” is omitted by Codex Sinaiticus(\(\aleph\)), Bezae, and the Siniatic Syriac MSS.

Luke 25:52, the words “worshipped Him, and” are omitted by the Old Latin and Siniatic Syriac MSS.\(^2\)

\(^2\) E.F. Hills, *the King James Version Defended*, pp. 115-124. The citation here is meant to refer to the summary of textual critical data which proceed the quotation. Such summaries are common in textbooks of introduction, but the conclusions which Hills infers from them, needless to say, remain “blithely ignored” by most “scholars”.

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These facts alone should make it abundantly clear that New Testament textual criticism differs from that of any other ancient literature not only in kind but in degree, for in no other body of literature is the quantity and type of evidence so vast.

997 Wescott and Hort, op. cit., p. 124.
998 Ibid., p. 19.
999 Ibid., p. 20
1000 Ibid.
1001 Ibid., p. 21.
1002 But if this is so, then Wescott and Hort’s “unscientific” transcribers in the early church, with their lack of care for the “purity” of the text, have become the very examples which they maintain the modern critic must follow. In other words, their theory is erected on the same sort of mutually contradictory and dialectically opposed principles as that of “Redaktor” and the “integrity of the documents” in the Old Testament criticism of Hupfeld.

1003 This, of course, was the process we already discovered to be at work in the early Gnostics and Marcion.
1004 Wescott and Hort, op. cit., p. 22.
1005 Ibid.
1007 Ibid., pp. 49-50, citing John Owen, Of the Integrity and Purity of the Hebrew and Greek Text of the Scriptures, in Works, Vol 16, pp. 349-350. It is not accidental that Owen’s propositions are as much ecclesiological as textual critical, for if the “Romish Synagogue” alone is singled out as having been detrimental to the preservation of the scriptural text, then this forces the Reformers to rely rather curiously on the Rabbincical Masoretic Text and the Greek Orthodox New Testament. The ecclesiological implications shouls not be lost upon the modernist Orthodox scholars busily engaged in utilizing the presuppositions and
methods of the Wescott-Hort-Wellhausen era and after, for these raise the
fundamental question of the compatibility of those presuppositions and
methods with Orthodox tradition and doctrine.

\[1008\] Ibid to above, pp. 26-27.

\[1009\] Such was the state of affairs before the “uncomfortable”
discovery of papyrus p\(^{75}\), containing readings of the majority or Byzantine
text type, and which dates from the middle of the second century. This
inconvenient fact remains for the most part an ignored puzzle for the
ascendant modernist faculties in the academy. One is reminded of the
account of the student who challenged Hegel on his philosophy of history,
on the grounds that certain historical facts contradicted it. Hegel is reputed
to have retorted, “Then so much the worse for the facts!”

\[1010\] Wescott and Hort, op. cit., p. 31, emphasis in the original.

\[1011\] Ibid., p. 32.

\[1012\] Ibid., p. 36.

\[1013\] Ibid., p. 38.

\[1014\] Ibid.

\[1015\] Ibid., p. 39.

\[1016\] Ibid., p. 40, emphasis added.

\[1017\] Ibid., p. emphasis in the original.

\[1018\] Ibid., pp. 43-44.

\[1019\] Ibid., p. 45.

\[1020\] Ibid., pp. 48-49.

\[1021\] Ibid., p. 57.

\[1022\] Ibid., p. 71.

\[1022a\] [author numbered for a note, but never added it to the
manuscript]

\[1023\] Hills, p. 67.

\[1024\] Cf, Theodore P. Letis, “Edward Freer Hills’ Contribution to the
23. Letis has this telling observation to make concerning Unitarian view of textual variants:

As a Unitarian, Curcellaeus was not interested in re-establishing aposyologic Christianity in opposition to the harlot of Rome, rather, he was interested in establishing reason in opposition to any repressive religion that would employ dogma in resisting ‘truth’. This Baconian attitude – that every variation to the accepted and established Protestant text should be viewed with the same importance as that established text, in order to fulfill an abstract ideal of truth – was not the motivation of the Reformation communities.”

It will suffice to add only two things: first, it was not the motivation of any Christian community; and second, it should be noted that Burgon was almost the sole voice that took exception to the presence of Unitarians on the committee which composed the Revised Version of 1881.

\[\text{Letis, op. cit., p. 35.}\]

\[\text{Ibid., p. 81.}\]

\[\text{I mention the Episcopal Church in this connection intentionally, though there may seem at first glance to be little connection between it and the Princeton fundamentalism of Warfield. However, by this time Bishop Gore had adopted essentially the same position in England in the celebrated collection of essays he edited, \textit{Lux Mundi}, in which the thesis is proposed that confessional – by which Gore meant primarily patristic – orthodoxy and the need scientific criticism could and should coexist, since the latter was not directly an assault on the former. In the United States, the Presbyterian Charles Augustus Briggs, influenced by Gore, sought to enact this basic thesis when teaching dogmatics in the Presbyterian Church. He was promptly summoned before his presbytery, tried for heresy, found guilty, and defrocked and excommunicated. He then sought admission into the Episcopal Church, which had already widely accepted Bishop Gore’s views, though done little to implement them. He was}\]

1081
ordained, and began teaching the higher criticism of the Old Testament in General Theological Seminary in New York.


1029 In language which even an Eastern Orthodox modernist will understand, this means that any claim to be ‘doing Patristic theology” or “remaining faithful to the Orthodox Tradition” while simultaneously embracing the method and products of the neutralist criticism is utter nonsense.

1030 John W. Burgon, The Traditional Text, pp. 11-12.

1031 John W. Burgon, The Revision Revised, p. 6.

1032 John W. Burgon, The Traditional Text, p. 4.

1033 Ibid., pp. 4-5. It might be contented that Burgon’s remark about “universal acceptance” has since been proven untrue by events. But it is important to distinguish between the universal acceptance of neutralist criticism in the academy, and the fact that no single critical text, nor any modern English language translation of the Bible based upon such critical texts, has won anything like the universal acceptance or recognition of the Authorized Version.

1034 Ibid., pp. 5-6.

1035 Ibid., p. 7.

1036 Ibid., pp. 8-9.

1037 Ibid., p. 8.

1038 And with this, one must observe that European has touched upon an issue of major ecclesiological importance, for his appeal, as an Anglican, is to the preservation of the textual tradition in and by the Greek Orthodox Church. With this step, he inadvertently, transforms the whole Protestant-Roman Catholic conflict into a rather different one: it is now a Protestant and Roman Catholic versus a Greek Orthodox one. The implications are profound and disquieting, for it means that at some point, prior to the Protestant rift, there were in place certain theological
structures which compelled the Western culture to regard its reception of
the texts of Scripture and Tradition in a certain way.


Ibid., p. 42.

Ibid., p. 9.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 16.

Ibid., pp. 16-17.

Ibid., p. 16.


Letis, op. cit., p. 89. Of course, the Vincentian nature of
Burgon's appeal throws more light on the ecclesiological nature of the
problem. The Vincentian canon was, as we have been seen, a formulated
response to what was understood to be an uncatholic expression of the
doctrine of predestination in the works of St. Augustine of Hippo.


Ibid., pp. 22-23, emphasis added.

Ibid., pp. 17-18.

Ibid., p. 18.

Ibid., p. 100.


Ibid.

Ibid., p. B-5.

Ibid., p. B-89.

Ibid.

Burgon, *The Traditional Text*, p. 118. In his essay,
Used to Negate Inerrancy"(*The Majority Text: Essays and Reviews in the
makes the following observation: It is instructive to remember that practically the entire corpus of the (New Testament) autographs was sent originally to Asia Minor and Europe – Rome, Corinth, Thessalonica, Philippi, Ephesus, Colossae, Crete, Asia, Cappadocia, Pontus, Ghalatia, etc. The earliest generations of copies would have been made in those same areas. Fortunately, the great majority of our extant (manuscripts) come to us from those very areas.

1060 Ibid., p. 119.

1061 A Critique of the Dialectical Evolution of “The Sypnotic Problem”

The “Sypnotic Problem and the Integral Calculus of the Originality of Scholarship

Wescott and Hort’s genealogical method often surfaces in a different guise in attempts to resolve the “problem” posed by the fact that three Gospels – those of Sts. Matthew, Mark, and Luke – resemble each other so closely. An exemplar is sought in criticism, and the tendency is to locates the exemplar either in Mark’s Gospel, Matthews’, or a longer-extant source Gospel known in the critical calculus as “Q”, from the German word for “source”, Quelle. In this, the critical enterprise follows an opposite dialectical tack from that which it followed in its “recovery” of sources in the case of the Old Testament Petateuch. There the tendency was to split one book into several underlying sources. Here the tendency is to seek an underlying source for three similar extant books.

In a study remarkable for both for its employment of propositional calculus to set limits on this enterprise, Humphrey Palmer analyzes all possible combination of such derivation and reaches a remarkable conclusion:

after two centuries of hard work, critics are still divided between the solutions of Augustine, Griesbach, and Holtzmann(M-K-L; M-L-K; K-M,
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L).... The pedigree of the gospels remains unsettled because the arguments and evidence available are insufficient to settle it. Some directional arguments is more reliable, but quite inadequate, for it proves only mediation, leaving the main choices open still.³

What then is the status of the critical attempt to resolve the problem? Palmer points out in his logical analysis of all possible types of relationship that there is only a finite number of possible solutions to the relationship of the three synoptic Gospels, but that the available data is insufficient to answer the question. What, then, does this imply for the status of the "scholarship" which arrives at one or another of these possible answer? First, there is the infinite empowerment of critical scholarship to go on looking, or what Palmer calls the “doubtful regress from the partly unknown to the unkownable”.⁴ The various critical methods are required “only to add a spice of scholarship and variety” to a question which is logically and philosophically unresolvable, provided “we are ready to believe next to nothing about Jesus, but almost anything about the early Church,”⁵ The critical method, in short, is simply a very elaborate disguise for a process of unbelief.

The Tactics of New Testament Higher Criticism

1. Leasing and the Presumption of Literary Dependency as a Presumption Against the Text and Historicity

The modern critical skeptical presumption against the text is the


⁴ Ibid., p. 176.

⁵ Ibid., p. 185.
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legacy of the German poet and critic, Gotthold Lessing. The focus of attention is upon the similarities and differences between the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke. It is assumed that the similarities are the result of the authors having copied from each other. The perceived order of this copying – the priority of one Gospel to the other two is a hypothetical construction of their relationships – constitutes the “Synoptic Problem”. A great deal of the similarities between these Gospels is the result of the fact that the words of Christ are very often identical, or close to identical, in each Gospel. This fact is taken as evidence of the liturgy relationship and dependence between the Gospels.

It is at this point that one encounters the Gnostic Prohibition of Questions, for seldom does the student hear that “there are more likely and plausible explanations for these agreements than the assumption of literary dependence.” Here Lessing’s role in the construction of the Synoptic Problem cannot be overestimated, for

Since his formulation of the hypothesis of literary dependence, the view that the Gospels are eyewitness reports or based upon such reports has been ruled out of question. Nor was Lessing without his own personal motivations for positing a literary, as opposed to an historical, basis for the existence of Synoptic similarities, for he consciously set for himself “the goal of destroying ‘this hateful edifice of nonsense… on the pretense of furnishing new bases for it’” the “new bases” in this case being precisely the supposition of literary dependence.

But, as has been demonstrated, there are only so many possible solutions to such a problem, which means that if several proposed “solutions” are all equally justifiable, then no particular solution can ever be claimed to be the solution to the problem. This feature of the Synoptic

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7 Ibid.
8 Ibid, p. 12.
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Problem also represents a serious difficulty: do the available textual data of the Synoptic Gospels require the supposition of literary relationship, or is such data explained more plausibly as the result of the natural differences of several eyewitnesses? Criticism has never dealt adequately with this problem; again, to do so would be to admit the prohibited question.

The prohibition of the question of historical relationships for the first three Gospels is easily explained, however, by a summary of the implications of the assumption of literary dependency, for the whole goal of the assumption of literary dependency is to inculcate the attitude of skepticism against the text. First, the idea that the similarities between these Gospels is evidence of literary borrowing has the effect of placing the borrowed Gospel at a temporal distance from the events it purports to relate, in other words, a blow is struck against the historical reliability of the text. The second effect is this: if two of the three Gospels are borrowed from or reliant upon another, then the number of witnesses is effectively reduced from three to one. Third, if one thus assumes a given Gospel's dependence upon a literary exemplar, then each passage becomes more or less a falsification of what was originally said. This has a fourth consequence: if what is a literary dependence and borrowing is necessarily a falsification, then the process of textual transmission is itself necessarily compromised from the beginning, there are no reliable texts of the Gospels, and therefore, all textual transmissions are to be regarded as initially of equal value. Fifth, this in turn empowers to the critic to make his own modifications of the text in accordance with the dictates of whatever theory of literary dependency and textual transmission he assumes.

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10 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., p. 15.
14 cf. Linnemann, op. cit., p. 15.
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Linnemann summarizes the implications of these assumptions as follows:

1. The original Gospel is no longer extant.
3. The extant Gospels furnish imprecise, inept, arbitrary translations of the original. Thus they give us no reliable tradition.
4. Inasmuch as they are only the literary remains of the original gospel, they are not to be regarded as independently valid tradition.
5. The relationship between the Gospels is literary. The writers are not eyewitnesses and hearers of what Jesus said and did.
6. The Synoptic problem is established as a literary problem.15

These remarks also contain a significance for the purely textual-critical enterprise, for if the Synoptic problem means that the original literary exemplar of the Synoptic Gospels is lost, then the attempts of Griesbach, Tischendorff and other textual critics to recover the “original autographs” is doomed to failure. This is because the presumption against the accurate transmission of the Gospels is implicit in the theoretical structure from the outset. This presumption is the presumption against the accurate transmission of the Gospel, as regards history, content, and text. As we have seen, this allows textual criticism to make another deduction: since there has been no accurate preservation, various manuscript families only represent “perspectives” on a literary or theological tradition about the Gospel, leaving the textual critic free to make “emendations” as he pleases.

All of these considerations, however, demonstrate just how shaky the critical edifice is, for if it is demonstrated that the grounds for the assumption of literary dependence among the Gospels is questionable, then one key – some would say the key – in the arch of critical hypostheses collapses, and those disciplines founded on the assumption

15 Ibid., p. 27.
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of literary dependency likewise collapse.\(^{16}\) By the same token, those professorships in universities and seminaries established precisely in order to investigate the problem thus have a vested interest in insuring that no challenge to the assumption of literary dependency is ever allowed to surface. Arguments that Gospel agreements may be the result not only of literary dependence but of varying eyewitness accounts of the same thing,\(^ {17}\) or that the similarity of the ordering of events among the three Gospels may be the result not of literary dependence but of the natural historical sequence of the events described,\(^ {18}\) or that the sequential ordering of the events of the Passion have objective grounds, and therefore that such passages are not relevant to the discussion of literary dependence,\(^ {19}\) or that there are difficulties for the assumption of Marcan, or Lucan, or Matthean priority,\(^ {20}\) must be suppressed.

The reason is evident: the assumption of literacy dependency is the dialectical opposite of the historical trustworthiness of the Gospels, for the Gospels no longer are in direct contact with Christ’s words and deeds, but in contact only with various traditions about them. There is thus present in the assumption not only a presumption against the text, but an assumption about “tradition” per se: that it always constitutes an inaccurate preservation of the original deposit. Consequently, historical-critical method behind the Synoptic problem is to the textual critical assumptions of Wescott/Hort and their successors what the infallibility of the autographs of Scripture are to the modern fundamentalist evangelical, for all parties are agreed upon the assumption of an inaccurate preservation of tradition, either before its inscripturation, as in the Synoptic Problem, or after it, as in the transmission of accurate manuscripts. This fact allows for

\(^{16}\) Ibid., pp. 68-69.
\(^{17}\) Ibid., p. 70.
\(^{18}\) Ibid., p. 83.
\(^{19}\) Ibid.
\(^{20}\) Ibid., p. 84.
the critic – be he “liberal” or “fundamentalist” – to speak of individual “theologies” or “perspectives”: there can now be whole “theologies” of Paul, of Pseudo-Paul(!), or of “Q”, or even a “Theology of Codex Sinaiticus”. In this critical hothouse one must always be suspicious, one must construct a “hermeneutics of suspicion” which allows one to read the text free from the text’s own assumed biases. One must, in short, learn a technique of reading against the text.  

This assault on the transmission of tradition, either as text or as content, is typically elucidated in the context of the alleged *Sitz-im-Leben* of a given writer. It is alleged that the Gospels, Epistles, and so on emerge as the *Church’s* response to various situations-in-life in which she found herself. Thus, both Scripture and Tradition are merely the creations of the Church, and therefore they do not transmit or preserve anything (which is exactly the function of tradition). With this, one notices the return to the presuppositions of Gnosticism: the critic is his own disciple, the tradition is the academic tradition in which he finds himself; the Scriptures are the creations of man and in no sense act as a revelation or a check on the Church of Academia. The Gospels must all be dated late, far from the events they purport to transmit, since they are the result of this gradual literary formation (the Synoptic Problem) or the product of gradual conflations of variant readings (Wescott and Hort).

### 2. The Synoptic Problem as a Hellenization of the Gospel

Since the Gospels are the product of the Church and emerge out of her *Sitz-im-Leben* only gradually over time, the Gospels show evidence – so the theory runs – of a response to the philosophical currents of the day. A hidden assumption is at work here: “theology” is the result of the

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21 That this bears a striking resemblance to the secular counterpart known as “deconstruction” is all too obvious. What is not known to most are the theological assumptions of deconstruction.
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Church’s situation in the world, and is a response, not to revelation, but to the world. Theology and philosophy must therefore always go hand in hand. Thus, “scientific theology” must purge away these mythical, philosophical elements from a bygone age in order to reach the inner and pure essence of what the Gospels are trying to communicate. And herein lies a second assumption, for the view that such elements are in fact derived from worldly philosophy is itself a view, not of theology, but of philosophy, and specifically of philosophers such as Spinoza, Bacon, Hume, and Kant. Post-Enlightenment criticism becomes an opus tremendum designed to “work out in intricate detail the philosophical mold into which Scripture must be shaped”²² Why is this necessary? If Scripture is the product initially of the Sitz-im-Leben of the Church, and if the philosophical currents of the world have changed, then it follows inevitably that the frame of reference into which they must be put has changed. “Criticism” as such is therefore not at all a literary enterprise; it is a philosophical one. It is not really about texts, or manuscripts at all; it is about initial presuppositions.

3. The Critical Paradigm as a “Secret” Tradition

The “critical” enterprise thus being philosophical in nature, it assumes its own dynamics of “tradition”. Various hypotheses are handed down from teacher to student which are then in turn interwoven with other views of other colleagues and given a wider basis. “A process of reciprocal corroboration sets in, and a coalition forms, composed of those who support the basic idea with their own thoughts. At the outset there was the intuition, at the end the conception, and then the tradition follows; students must learn the conception by heart as a ‘scientific result’.”²³

²² Ibid., p. 12.
²³ Ibid., p. 22.
4. The Consequences of Synoptic Hypotheses

The scientific results thus learned largely fall into two broad categories, depending upon which Gospel is assumed to be the earliest.

1. Early church tradition, which mediates information to us regarding the origin of the Gospels, was groundlessly discriminated against because tradition got in the way of the modern intellectual games of so-called science.

2. Similarities among the Gospels were explained only purely literary means, while differences were chalked up to redactional activity. Therefore, Matthew and Luke, the ‘secondary witnesses’ (as they were now regardless), lost the historical value they were once thought to possess. At best they were merely theologically interesting.

3. Differences between the Marcan vorlage (the version of Mark supposedly used by Matthew and Luke) and its parallels are considerable – not in what was reported so much as in the wording of the reports. So those who embraced the two-source theory were constrained to conclude that Matthew and Luke made very free use of Mark. Only a portion of the differences are explicable; the rest must be attributed to personal theological biases of the gospel writers.

4. As a result, Mark’s Gospel was charged with the same ‘free use of tradition’. Every attempt to derive information about what actually happened from the wording or order of the tradition was therefore discredited as illegitimate historicizing. In the judgement of this ‘science’ the Gospel writers did not pass on what they saw or heard, or what they heard from eyewitnesses and first hand hearers of the original gospel events. In the eyes of past researchers those writers are merely collectors who use primitive literary means to make arrangements of traditions from various origins…

5. Since Mark, the one Gospel not attributed directly to an eyewitness by the early church, is declared to be the oldest, it is seen as the foundation for the others. This robs Mark of confirmation from the
other Gospels, since they are literary dependent on Mark. At the same time the genealogies and birth narratives are pushed aside as later formations. We should be acutely aware, however, that the entire dating of New Testament science, insofar as it relates to the Gospels, is strictly a permutation of the two-source theory. If this theory fails, so do all the dates associated with it.  

Linneman is correct in her appeal to the early tradition of the Church as valuable historical testimony regarding the subject matter and the authors of the Gospels. However, her citation is evidence of a much deeper problem regarding Criticism. Why appeal to early Church tradition to buttress the historicity of the Gospels, and not appeal to early Church tradition when it speaks of the polity of the Church, its sacramentalism, and its hierarchy? Seen in this light, criticism is not only a philosophical enterprise, but an ecclesiological one as well; it may very well represent the last attempt to create a “pure Christianity” shorn not only of “myths” but of “mysteries”: of tradition, hierarchy, and sacred ritual, for such a Christianity never existed.

5. The Dialectical Development of the Synoptic Problem

The formation of critical hypotheses proceeds dialectically: “one takes up the hypothesis of one’s predecessor, partially in agreement, and partially in disagreement.”

Thus, throughout the history of the Synoptic Problem, one encounters “solutions” of two general natures, and it is illuminating to observe that they follow the ancient philosophical pattern of all dialectical models of reality and/or of history; they either tend to multiply underlying “sources”(as in the “solutions” of Griesbach, Eichhorn, Schleiemacher, Weisse, Baur and Holtzman) or they tend to reduce the

24 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
three extant sources to only one source, in most cases Mark (as in the "solutions" of Lessing, Storr, Herder, Hugh, Giesler, Wilke, Ritschl, Hilgenfeld, and Weiss). "Virtuality every imagineable solution to the Synoptic Problem, no matter how marginal its merits, currently finds advocates. Traditions and multiple-source hypotheses have advocates, and so do theories of "Ur-Gospels" (lost original Gospels) in various forms: an Ur-Matthew, Ur-Mark, Ur-Luke preceeding all the Synoptics, or an Ur-Matthew preceeding at least Matthew and Mark."26

A CRITIQUE OF MODERNIST TRANSLATIONS OF SCRIPTURE

We arrive at last at the final component of the critical assault on Scripture, that where the whole process is translated into the vernacular and made practically accessible to the average layman. It is here that its most visible effect for it is here that its results are actually communicated to the laity.

Of all the principles examined in the preceeding pages, one stands out as motivating a host of seemingly varied enterprises, "meaning": for the Documentary Critics of the Graf-Wellhausen school, one divine name indicated one underlying source document, or one set of vocabulary and diction indicated one corresponding reality. For the Wescott-Hort school, a particular reading indicated a particular documentary pedigree. For the synoptic critics, parallel passages indicated one underlying source. When all this is transformed into a philosophy of translation, it implies that the text means, or was intended to mean primarily one thing, one level of reality. This whole philosophy, it was suggested, implies a view of God as both intelligible and simple. How this doctrine of God translated into the critical enterprise has already been alluded to. How it translates into a philosophy of translation is another matter.

26 Ibid., p. 39.
This opens up a Pandora’s box of difficulties, and it is best to begin simply. If God be simple and intelligible, then so must His word must also be simple and intelligible. If His word be such, then ambiguities in the original text are inadvertent, and to be overcome by the process of translation itself. This explains the “notable feature” of modern English: its “intolerance of ambiguity.” This in turn leads to a question replete with philosophical implications:

How far is it possible, in the words of the Good News Bible’s Preface, ‘to use language that is natural, clear, simple, and unambiguous’. when the Bible is not about things that are natural, clear, simple, and unambiguous? or for the linguistically-enfeebled modern theologians struggling on the New English Bible to ‘write out the meaning plainly’ of what to the taut and concise translators of the seventeenth century was essentially taut and concise? Citing the example of Elijah’s experience of God on mount Horeb, and its rendering of the Hebrew’s “voice of thin silence” as “a still small voice”, and “bearing in mind that in Elizabethan English ‘small’ could still mean ‘thin’”, Prickett concludes that the King James is “a remarkably accurate translation. In sofar as it is obscure and ambiguous, it is an obscurity and ambiguity that is at least faithful to the original.” What unites the modern English translations is the consistent naturalistic philosophy which underwrites the choice of words to render only one meaning:

In the Good News Bible what Elijah hears is no more than ‘the soft whisper of a voice’. The New English Bible hopefully tries reducing ‘voice’ to a metaphor, translating it as ‘a low murmuring sound’, while the Catholic Jerusalem Bible outdoes the nascent naturalism of its Protestant

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28 Ibid., p. 10.
29 Ibid., p. 7.
rivals by eliminating all suggestion of speech with its ‘sound of a gentle breeze’ – which is a fair translation of the Vulgate ‘Et post ignem sibilis aurae tenuis’ (‘and after the fire, a thin whistling sound of the air’).…. It is interesting to speculate, therefore, why both the translators of the New English Bible and the Bible Society, supposedly unhindered by the mistranslation of the Latin tradition, should have been almost as eager as their Catholic peers to produce an implicitly naturalistic reading rather than follow the mysteriously suggestive Hebrew, an impressively accurate translation of which already existed in English.  

The answer lies in the reduction of meaning and historicity to one level of experience, the exclusively naturalistic. Since the text cannot indicate or mean more than one level of reality, “we can only be ‘modern’ by treating the whole story at one level: it must be made either miraculous or natural.” Burgon pounces on one such example in the Revised Version of 1881:

Every bit as offensive is the attempted insertion of epileptic as the rendering of σεληνιαξεται in S. Matt. 17:15. The miracle performed on “the lunatic child” may never more come aboard under a different name. In a manner like this, 500 years of occupation (or rather, 1700 years, for lunaticus is the reading of all the Latin copies) constitute a title which may not be disputed. Epileptic is a sorry gloss, it is not a translation. Even where it demonstrate that epilepsy exclusively exhibits every feature related in connection with the present case, and that sufferers of epilepsy are specially affected by the moon’s changes – certainly neither of which things are true – even so the Revisionists would be wholly unwarranted in doing violence to the Evangelist’s language, in order to bring into prominence their own private opinion that which is called lunacy here.

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30 Ibid., p. 8.
31 David Hume’s “Universal, uniform experience against miracle” hovers in the background here as the favorite philosophical paradigm of most modernists. Suffice it to say, such a uniform, universal experience is never available to mere humans.
32 Ibid., p.9.
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(and in S. Matt. 4:24) is to be identified with the ordinary malady called epilepsy.33

And what of other uses of the tactic of supplying new terms for old?

But what then? Because αγγέλος in strictness means a messenger; γραφή a writing; υποκριτής an actor; εκκλησία an assembly; ευαγγέλιον good tidings; επίσκοπος an overseer; βαπτιστὴς one that dips; παραδείγματα a garden; μαθήτης a learner; χάρις, favor; etc., are we to forego the established English equivalents for these words? Are we never more to hear of grace, disciple, Paradise, Baptist, Bishop, Gospel, Church, hypocrit, Scripture, Angel? Is it then desired to revolutionize our sacred terminology? Are we to sever with the past and now begin to translates the Scriptures into English on etymological principles?34

Hence, the guiding principle of modern translations is, almost without exception, to translate polysemeic passages by a translations which conveys only one meaning, and that meaning the meaning most acceptable to the brave new secular world.

Allied with this now all too familiar strategy of inventing new terms for one meaning is the strategy of shifting the search for meaning to the original intention of the author as the key to the meaning of ambiguous passages.35 It is crucial to understand the devastation that thus engenders. Recall that the effect of the whole critical enterprise examined thus far has been 1) in the case of the Old Testament to maintain that Moses is not the author of the Pentateuch, whose real authors are only recoverable on the basis or a recovery of source documents reconstructed by extraordinarily tenuous methods; and 2) that in the case of the New Testament there has been a similar denial of the traditions surrounding

33 Burgon, The Revision Revised, p. D42.
34 Ibid. Many of Burgon’s critiques of the original Revised Version of 1881 are still applicable to The New Revised Standard Version today.
35 Ibid., p. 22.
authorship and textual transmission by similar methods. Now, to crown the work of doubt, these unknown authors of no-longer extant texts are to be inquired into as to the state of their internal psychological intention, and all of this process will then be translated. The whole process has been one of a constant turning from fixed and established texts with a more or less constant set of levels of meanings, to presumed real historical circumstances or events or texts which lay behind them. This having failed, the search then turns to the even more ephemeral and elusive “intention of the original author”.

This principle “that words correspond to an underlying substratum of ‘ideas’ (either things or concepts), and that therefore translation should not seek to match what might, by analogy, be called the ‘secondary qualities’ of individual words, which in any particular language or culture may be subject to irrelevant associative idiosyncrasies, but should, as it were, look for the basic ‘primary qualities’ of individual words, which in any particular language or culture may be subject to irrelevant associative idiosyncrasies, but should, as it were, look for the basic ‘primary qualities of the ideas themselves’ means in practice that modern translations tend to paraphrase only one level of meanings where the ambiguity of a passage in the original indicates several simultaneous possibilities. This leads to a paradoxical observation of the comparative translational philosophies of the Authorized Version and various modern bibles:

It has been in precisely those cases where there was no appropriate equivalent that the greatest impact on the host language has resulted.

The first major biblical translation, that of the Septuagint, probably in the third century B.C., revealed its ‘non-native source’ in a way that was to have a profound effect on the subsequent development of Greek….
Jerome's translation of the Bible was to have a similar modifying effect upon the development of Latin. The subsequent ingestion of these Hebrew, Greek, and Latin sources into English sensibility was to give scripture a more important role in the development of the language than in that of any other European community – an effect, Steiner notes, that ‘would not have occurred had the scholars and editors of 1604-1622 labored to be ‘modern’”. In short, translation, where there is no effective equivalent, is one of the major sources of change and enrichment in a living language. A language develops in range and subtlety of expression not by means of receptivity to translation, but through its resistance to new words and concepts. It is not equivalences, but dissimilarities that force the modification and change necessary to accommodate new associative patterns of thought.38

Thus, the language of the Authorized Version was consciously “archaic” even in its time. More precisely,

The English of the King James Version is not the English of the 17th century. To be exact, it is not a type of English that was ever spoken anywhere, It is biblical English, which was not used on ordinary occasions even by the translators who produced the King James Version. As H. Wheeler Robinson (1940) pointed out, one need only compare the preface written by the translators with the text of their translation to feel the different in style. And the observations of W.A Irwin (1952) are to the same purport. The King James Version, he reminds us, owes its merit not to 17th century English – which was very different – but to its faithful translation of the original. Its style is that of the Hebrew and of the New Testament Greek. Even in their use of thee and thou the translators were not following 17th century English usage but biblical usage, for at the time these translators were doing their work these singular forms had already

38 Ibid., pp. 31-32.
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been replaced by the plural you in polite conversation.\textsuperscript{39}

It is no accident, therefore, that the process of naturalistic modern English bible translations should coincide with the collapse of typology as the standard method of exegesis and its subsequent replacement by the philosophical tools of historical and textual criticism. It is no accident that revisions of Scripture along these lines require a commensurate revision of every other doctrinal stand. One of the great "revisers" of the Westminster Confession, Philip Schaff, himself admitted as much: "The two movements are parallel, and look to the same end."\textsuperscript{40} In order to make this rather elusive hermeneutical and doctrinal point more clear, a detailed examination of select passages of the King James and The New Revised Standard Version is necessary.

Genesis 1:1-2: The Spirit of God and Water

The NRSV translates this verse: "In the beginning when God created the heavens and the earth, \textsuperscript{2} earth was a formless void and darkness coveres the face of the deep, while a wind from God\textsuperscript{b} swept over the face of the waters." Note a reads "Or when God began to create or In the beginning God created" Note b reads "Or while the spirit of God or while a mighty wind".

Passing by the fact that the NRSV implies that God has broken wind over His creation, and thus passing by the fact that the NRSV

\textsuperscript{39} Edward F.Hills, \textit{The King James Version Defended}, p. 215. Prickett is even more unsparing in his criticism of the vacuous arguments used to justify modern English bibles. "The language of Shakespeare and the Authorized Version of the Bible is not a dead language in the late twentieth century, either in Britain, America, or Australia – and certainly not in the English speaking areas of Africa or Asia. It is archaic, but still present to us at a current linguistic idiom: in use every day in churches and theatres, taught and discussed in schools, seminaries, and universities, broadcast in some form almost every day on radio on television. It is not the language of ordinary colloquial speech, but then, it never was. Shakespeare wrote mostly in blank verse of in a highly elaborated, artificial, and densely punning prose – both of which were the products of a complex and stylized literary convention; his vocabulary is full of neologisms, and is greater in size than that of any other English-speaking person there has ever been. Similarly, the King James Bible was always consciously archaic, and is written by deliberate intent in an English that was never that of ordinary speech." Prickett, op. cit. p. 236

\textsuperscript{40} Philip Schaff, \textit{Creed Revisions in the Presbyterian Churches} (New York: Charles Scriber's Sons, 1890), p. vi.
committee either has no poetic sense of dictions (or worse, that it does, and its diction is intentional), and concentrating on the fact that the NRSV has taken but one possible rendering of the Hebrew, the dogmatic point of God's sovereignty is obscured by translating the initial clause as a subordinate clause. We are not informed that God created the world, but simply what condition that world was already in when God began to create. Thus, in the guise of translation, the NRSV merely introduces a not too modern Platonic demiurge into the chaos of the world. Furthermore, it is to be noted that until very recently, no translation in a Western language translated it this way.\footnote{R. J. Rushdoony, “Translation and Subversion,” \textit{Journal of Christian Reconstruction}, p. 15. It should be noted that the \textit{Approved Version}, \textit{Jewish Publication Society}, 1917, translates the Hebrew in questions as “In the beginning God created the heaven and earth.” Either Hebrew grammar has changed since 1917, or translators predilections when translating ambiguities have changed.}

On page 16, Rushdoony notes there is a strong resemblance between the god of the new “translation” and that of illuminism and Masonry. The relationship between the rise of criticism in Germany during the 18th century and the rise of illuminism in the same period has never been adequately researched and explored. There do exist, however, serious grounds for such an undertaking. First, Illuminated Freemasonry, such as came into existence in Bavaria in the eighteenth century, and the then current Higher Old Testament Criticism, both had in common the presupposition that the early history of man as recorded in the Pentateuch is at best merely an allegory with “symbolic meaning for Israel” and at worst the compilation of a story from several other “traditions”. Both therefore attack the historicity of events, and cast the long shadow of skeptical doubt on the text. Second, Freemasonry is itself a form of “ritual mockery” of the sort described in chapter one. Once the text is attacked and ritually mocked, the way is open to radical reconstruction. Thus, the difference between the Masonry of the time and the criticism of the time is not one of method but of the application of method. Third, it was the expressed goal of Adam Weishaupt, founder of the sect of illuminists, to “acquire the direction of education – of church management – of the professional chair, and of the pulpit” and to “gain over the reviewers and journalists” in order to spread illuminist opinions, it would seem likely that biblical studies would have offered itself as a necessary target for the illuminist agenda. Fourth, Wieshaupt refers once in the writings captured by the Bavarian government to his own “\textit{history of the lives of the Patriarchs}” which, though apparently no longer extant, does indicate his own personal interest in the subject. Fifthly, the captured illuminist writings list as members of the order one “Baader, professor,” a “Bahrdt, clergyman” and “Danzer, canon,” who most likely are Franz Xavier von Baader(1765-1841), Karl Friederich Barhdt(1741-1792) and professor or moral and pastoral theology at Salzburg, a haven of illuminist activity.

Sixth, and finally, Weishaupt boasts “Who would have thought that a Professor at Ingolstadt was to become the teacher of the professor of Goettingen, and of the greatest men in Germany?” Goettingen at the time
Two results obtain from this, both devastating to one who wishes to do traditional exegesis by utilizing the NRSV. First, the parallel which many fathers drew between Genesis 1:1 and St. John 1:1 is rendered impossible. The typological correspondence between the beginning of creation and the beginning of redemption is sundered. Second, by rendering the Hebrew *ruah* by the most naturalistic English “wind” and confining its other meaning, that which had typological significance, “spirit” to a footnote, the NRSV signals its intention to depart from received ecclesiastical interpretation and translation at the outset. The entire liturgical tradition of the early church in its baptismal liturgies is thus swept away.

*Genesis 1:26-27: The Making of Adam*

The NRSV reads: “So God created humankind* in his image, in the image of God he created them;* male and female he created them.” Note * reads: “He him.” The NRSV has at least done the reader the favor of noting its outright deliberate modification of the original text, and in its introduction, stated that the reasons for doing so stem from modern considerations of feminism and gender-inclusiveness. But one must observe that by so doing, the NRSV has admitted the fact that the Bible itself is the source of the generic usage of the masculine singular pronoun to mean in certain contexts simply the common human nature. Why this is so calls for some comment.

St. Paul explains that woman comes from man. Man is her “head” or source. Consequently, while woman is consubstantial with man, she is so by virtue of her origin from him. She cannot, by virtue of that origin, be

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was home to Michelle and his more celebrated pupil, Eichhom.

The point is, the connections are more than just doctrinal or methodological. There are probable personal connections in at least three instances, and a possible connection in two others.

42 If St. Timothy 2:12-15
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less than human. But by the same token, she can never be the “head” or source of the race. The analogy to the position of the Father and the Son in the doctrine of the Trinity is obvious. This in turn implies that deep behind the NRSV’s translational philosophy at this point there must lie some other doctrine of God. The root of this is to be sought in the effects of the *filioque* on Western theology. Confusing the relations of origin as it does, and constructing an order of theology where the principle of the deity is located primarily in the essence rather than the Father, the Western Trinity ceases to be *patriarchal* (literally, “Father-source”) in its outlines and becomes “gender neutral” and impersonal, i.e., as capable of bearing feminine imagery as it is masculine.

But the NRSV’s rendering even misses a *literary* point, and that is the Hebrew pun: woman(Hebrew *isha*) comes from man(*ish*).

*Genesis 3:15, St. Luke 1:55: The Curse of Eve and Typological Reversal*

The NRSV reads “I will put enmity between you and the woman, and between your offspring and hers; he will strike your head, and you will strike his heel.” The Authorized Version reads “And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel.”

The NRSV’s rendering is deliberately ambiguous as to the grammatical number of Eve’s offspring. In English, the word “offspring” may connote a group of individuals, or simply an individual. But the Hebrew at this point is less ambiguous; the word “seed” is clearly singular, and in its basal significance indicates *one* thing, a “seed.” As an extended metaphor, it can of course mean issue, or progeny. The point is, the NRSV has opted for the metaphorical meaning, but in the process, lost the metaphor by substituting the metaphor for the root meaning. It would be rather like changing Shakespeare’s “Juliet is the sun” to “Juliet is...
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sunshine”.

The point is not a small one in the history of exegesis, as it turns out. For it was precisely over the root meaning that Christians and Jews argued. St. Luke 1:55 illustrates the point. The NRSV reads “…according to the promise he made to our ancestors to Abraham and to his descendants forever.” Here “seed”, translated only as “descendants” actually follows a standard rabbinical exegetical device employed to deny Christ’s fulfillment of the Old Testament. “Seed” in this exegetical tradition simply means “Israel” or, to employ an even vaguer device, “the people of God”. The NRSV, following the rabbinical tradition, obscures the Messianic character of the Abrahamic promise, which was universally interpreted by the Fathers as referring to Christ precisely because the word itself was singular, and referred to an individual seed. This change is therefore subversive of the entire Christian tradition, East and West.

And on and on the litany could go, from the NRSV’s rendering of the original Greek’s requirement at I St. Timothy 3:1-5 that bishops be “husbands of one’s wife”, and therefore male, by “married ony once”, and therefore not necessarily male. But the most outstanding example of King James accuracy and NRSV inaccuracy concerns those passages which touch on the doctrine of Original Sin.

Psalm 51:5, Romans 5:12, and Original Sin: The alleged “Calvinistic” Bias of the King James

In order for this point to become clear, it is necessary for a little background. The King James is often accused of having a “Calvinistic” bias. One would expect that in passages relating to original sin this bias would be most evident. But in fact, the exact opposite is the case. Calvinism is simply the Augustinian doctrine of original guilt, which is common to all the Western Christian traditions in one form or another. This doctrine teaches that what mankind inherits from Adam after his fall is
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a moral responsibility, i.e., the actual guilt, of Adam’s sin. One would expect that this doctrine would be reflected in the Authorized Version, particularly since there was ample precedent in the Vulgate’s rendering of Roman 5:12: *In quo omnes peccaverunt*, “in whom (i.e. Adam) all have sinned.”

But in fact, it is the NRSV which, surprisingly, renders such passages in a “Calvinistic” sense. For example, at Psalms 51:5, it reads “Indeed, I was born guilty, a sinner when my mother conceived me.” The King James reads “Behold I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me” a considerably more ambiguous rendering, and one much closer to the original, and therefore more accurate.

Even more problematical, however, is the NRSV (and every other modern English bible’s rendering) of Romans 5:12: “Therefore, just as sin came into the world through one man, and death came through sin, and so death spread to all because all have sinned”. The King James has “Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned.”

Fr. John Meyendorff explains the significance of the last phrase of the verse εφ ϖπαντες ημερων, “for that all have sinned” in his Byzantine Theology:

As sin come into the world through one man, and through sin, death, so death spread to all men because all have sinned. In this passage there is a major issue of translation. The last four Greek words were translated in Latin as *in quo omnes peccaverunt* (“in whom [i.e. in Adam] all men have sinned”) and this translation was used in the West to justify the doctrine of guilt inherited from Adam and spread to his descendants. But such a meaning cannot be drawn from the original Greek – the text read, of course, by the Byzantines. The form *eph ho* – a contraction of *epi* with the relative pronoun *ho* can be translated as “because”, a meaning accepted by most modern scholars of all confessional backgrounds.

But there is also the consensus of the majority of Eastern Fathers,
who interpret Romans 5:12 in close connection with I Corinthians 15:22 – between Adam and his descendants there is a solidity in death just as there is a solidity in life between the risen Lord and the Baptized.

This interpretation comes, obviously, from the literal, grammatical meaning of Romans 5:12, *eph ho*, if it means “because”, is a neuter pronoun, but it can also be masculine, referring to the immediately preceding substantive *thanatos* (“death”). The sentence then may have a meaning which seems improbable to a reader trained in Augustine, but which is indeed the meaning which most Greek Fathers accepted: “As sin came into the world through one man and death through sin, so death spread to all men; and because of death, all men have sinned…”

Note that the Greek of the majority text is capable of no less than three alternative meanings: 1) *εφ ϖ* can be understood idiomatically as meaning simply “because”. This, the crucial last phrase would be translated “because all have sinned.” But 2) *εφ ϖ* can also be analyzed into its constituent grammatical parts. In this case, the relative pronoun *ϖ* must refer to a singular masculine antecedent in the preceding clause, of which there are only two: Adam, and Death. If Adam be taken as the antecedent, as St. John of Damascus and St. Photios of Constantinople understood it, then the last phrase of the sentence reads “for that reason (i.e., Adam’s fall) all have sinned.” 3) But if Death be taken as the antecedent, as is more likely, since it is the nearest antecedent, then the last phrase reads “for that reason (death) all have sinned.” All three exegetical traditions are followed by the Greek Fathers, and none of them are close to a conception of understanding the inheritance from Adam in an “Augustinian” and “Calvinistic” sense as an inheritance of guilt.

This is what makes both Fr. Meyendoff’s comment on the passage and the NRSV’s(and all other modern versions of the English Bible, bar none) so puzzling, for as any consultation of the *Oxford English Dictionary*

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will reveal, the phrase “for that” in the Biblical English of the Authorized Version means at once both “because” and “because of some antecedent reason”! Thus, not only does Father Meyendoff cite a translation based apparently on some earlier Revised Standard Version, he also cites a version which makes the very opposite point which he is trying to establish. Even more puzzling is the fact that the NRSV’s translators, most of whom doubtless disbelieve in a literal Adam, are compelled by the logic of their position to translate such passages in the most extremely Augustinian sense, for if there was no real Adam, there was no real Fall. The Fall is therefore understood to be an allegory or metaphor of the condition of human nature itself; mankind is therefore, as with Augustine, sinful by nature, and unlike even Augustine, was so from the very beginning. One notes that this liberal doctrine of “original sin” stems from the fact that, by liberal dogma, there was no one source of the human race: the person of Adam, and thus his fall and sin, dissipate themselves into human nature itself, there being no origin of sin.44

But even more noticeable is the fact that it is the allegedly Calvinistic King James Version which is the only version of the English Bible which does not reproduce any distinctively “Western” or “Augustinian” translation of the passage, and is moreover the only English version to reproduce faithfully all the ambiguities present in the original Greek. In short, at this one crucial point, at least, the King James is the only version which preserves the Eastern Orthodox understanding of original sin!

44 Again, there is a deep and profound relationship to the doctrine of the filioque evident in this; the doctrine is imposing a whole different way of seeing relations of origin, in this case, origin of sin. In this it imposes a different interpretative tradition. The filioque emerges simply because it completely obscures the distinction of nature and person. Once this distinction has been occurred in God’s case, is becomes impossible to maintain it in man’s The effect is to change profoundly the understand of original sin, and therewith the interpretation of those biblical passages which treat it. Translation in this case, which the sole exception of the King James, is itself the product of a very different dogmatic tradition than that of the Greek East.
Money, Scholarship, Translation, and The New Consensus

There is a final motive which must be explored which is implicated in the moral commitments and consequences of skeptical criticism, that of greed. We have seen that there is a certain lust for power implicated in the process of critical scholarship, power not only over the interpretation of Scripture, but over who gets to translate it. There is also a lust for financial profit to be made from the process. There is therefore a serious drawback to the King James when viewed from this vantage point:

(It) is not subject to copyright. Any publisher can print it and enter into a highly competitive field where the margin of profit must be kept very low for competitive reasons. The handicaps are thus very real, although several publishers have regularly counted on their Bible sales for assured profits. Is it any wonder, therefore, that publishers, among others, have come to recognize the tremendous potentialities of a copyrighted Bible?45

The critical process which, by its own parameters must perpetually spin off ever newer critical texts and translations of those texts, is thus impelled not only by the process itself, but by an external consideration of potential profits and academic advancement. In the case of the most celebrated revision, the Revised Standard Version itself, its copyright owner, the ecumenically minded National Council of Churches, “has thus a source of income now entirely apart from any donations by member churches. It has a vested interest in a particular Bible. The use of this Bible is thus promoted in a variety of circles”, including, of course, its member churches! The ecumenical agenda thus feeds the biblical-critical, and the biblical-critical agenda feeds the ecumenical, and somewhere between the two, is a pipeline, if not of profits, then at least of money. Thus, the Bible publishing industry itself functions to disseminate the most recent critical offerings in the form of an artificial, mass-marketed

CHAPTER XIII:

THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE CHAMELEON GODHEAD’S VICAR

1062 It will be recalled from previous remarks concerning the doctrine of ancestral sin that, for St. John Chrysostom particularly, but for all the Fathers generally, the daemonic will, being precisely a perverted angelic will, was set in the sinful and perverse use of its natural powers due to the incorporeality of the angelic nature.

1063 One remarkable tendency that has emerged recently are the conversions of many Protestants and Evangelicals to Roman Catholicism. Some Charismatic Protestants already infused with the principles of new revelation, seem particularly tempted by the safety and security that Rome seems to provide. The quest is then on to gather catenae of quotations from councils and fathers in the endless search to defend papal authority and infallibility down to the last detail, with a zeal that a sixteenth century Jesuit would envy.


1065 Ibid., pp. 45-46. St. Photios’ remarks about the Bishops of Rome in connection with the filioque, and their opposition to it, should also be recalled, particularly his careful mention of Leo III’s prohibition of the addition.

1066 Ibid., p. 47.

1067 Unfortunately, it is actually necessary to reiterate the most significant difficulty with the whole infallibility doctrine, and that is the most obvious fact of Church history: why would the Church have gone to the trouble and expense of holding all the Oecumenical Councils to resolve all
the difficulties of heresies and dogmatic definition, if a pronouncement from the Pope would have solved it? A standard reply to this is that Rome's supremacy is demonstrated in the subsequent Papal confirmation of these Councils, and that without it, they have no authority.

Unfortunately, this too makes no sense. The papal claims rest, so it is asserted, on the Petrine passages of Scripture, “Thou art Peter…” and so on. But what does one make of the Church of Antioch and its Patriarche, which likewise has Peter as its founder and first bishop? Antioch makes no claim to supremacy or infallibility on this basis, nor to a right to confirm Oecumenical Councils. If it be argued, on the other hand, that the Papacy was “transferred” to Rome with Peter’s sojourn there, then this only establishes what was said in the main text, namely, that the office of the papacy and that of episcopacy are two different things. Here too, Antioch has never known such distinctions nor made any claims on that basis, so the distinction has no basis in established Church polity or doctrine.

1068 Dollinger, op. cit., p. 48.
1069 Ibid., p. 49.
1070 Ibid., pp. 49-50.
1071 Ibid., p. 50.
1072 Ibid., p. 59.
1073 Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviari lodged a significant protest against the New Order of the Mass (Novus Ordo Missae) with Pope Paul VI in an effort to stem at least some of the tide of modernism rapidly overtaking the Roman Church after Vatican II.

1075 Ibid., p. 68.
1077 Ibid., p. 37.
1078 Ibid., p. 39. Of course, these are explained away as the excesses of a radical element. They are no such thing, however. They
were the consistent policy and practice of the nineteenth century Jesuit
defenders and advocates of the infallibility doctrine. In short, they are
certainly radical statements, and certainly blasphemous. They are also the
logical implications of the doctrine itself. One cannot help but recall the
words of St. Mark of Ephesus, the defender of Orthodoxy against the
false union of the Council of Florence: “I perceive the testimonies of the
Westerners are corrupted. There can be no compromise in matters of the
Orthodox Faith.”

(Baronius’) treatment of Bishop Dionysius of Paris is still more
audacious. The oldest accounts, which were well known to him,
represented Dionysius as first preaching in Gaul after the middle of the
third century, but Baronius relates that he was first consecrated bishop of
Athens by the Apostle Paul, and afterwards sent from Rome by Pope
Clement as bishop to Gaul. And thus two points were gained for Rome:
first it was proved that the Pope could remove a bishop appointed even
by the apostle Paul; and, secondly, that Paris was the immediate spiritual
daughter of Rome. And as with interpolations and inventions, so it fared
with criticism at Rome. Baronius and Bellarmine pronounced all
documents concerning the Sixth Council fabricated or falsified which
mentioned the condemnation of Pope Honorius.

Dollinger’s treatment of Baronius and his handling
of Dionysius of Paris is also illuminating:

Baronius, op. cit., p. 60.

Ibid., pp. 60-61.
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Dollinger, op. cit., pp. 322-325.

Ibid., p. 76.

Ibid., pp. 94-95.

Dollinger, pp. 97-99, 123, 125, 142.


Ibid., p. 277. Hassler calls it a “meta-ideology.”

C.B. Moss, op. cit., p. 219. Moss also notes that, while papal infallibility is a doctrine that developed, the doctrine itself did not permit itself to be understood as a development, for if it were, “this would have cut the ground from under the feet of the opposition (to the infallibility), but it was too dangerous a weapon to employ. For if the papal claims have increased, they may hereafter decrease… the Vatican Council laid down explicitly that the infallibility and universal ordinary jurisdiction of the Pope had been held by the whole Church ever since St. Peter.”(p. 217)

“Attrition” was the doctrine of penance espoused by the Jesuits and rejected by the Janenists.


Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, ii. 2. Q 1 Art. 10; Q xi Art. 2, 3.

The term “Ultra-Montanism” is highly ironic. It originally meant simply ultra montanes, or “over the mountains”. It was thus used by proponents of papal infallibility prior to Vatican I as a reference both to their party and to Pope Pius IX. Of course, Montanism was the third century “Pentacostalist” who claimed to be the oracle of the Holy Spirit and to be able to give “new revelations” and new prophecy. In the person
of Giovanni Mastai-Ferreti (Pius LX) both tendencies united.

CHAPTER XIV: THE REVOLUTION POLITICS OF THE CHAMELEON GODHEAD

1101 Ernst Kantorowicz, op. cit., p. 23.
1102 The word “religion” commonly translates the Greek εὐσεβία in the Authorized Version. Other connotations include “piety”, “devotion”, etc.
1105 Ibid., p. 24.
1106 Ibid., p. 22. This in itself exemplifies the revolutionary use of traditional symbols in a kind of ritual mockery, discussed in the last chapter. But as a Gnostic tactic its purpose is clear: it is a redefinition of old terms in new meanings.
1110 This process is most easily traced among the Lutherans.
1111 This poses certain limitations on Scripture, and indeed, much modern American evangelical practice. The issue of “non comprehension” indicates the underlying rationalist basis of the “evangelical Christian”
version of the American Civil Religion, and discloses the fact that it assumes the underlying correctness of its inherited Augustinian doctrine of the intelligibility of God. One is constrained to ask, on what basis St. Paul attributed a knowledge of Scripture to the infant Timothy who had known (οἰδας) the Scriptures “from infancy”. (αποβρεφους) Cf. 3:15.


Kevin Craig, op. cit., p. 45.

Ibid., p. 178.

Ibid., p. 183.

Cf. St. John 3:5-10; Romans 6:1-3, I Cor. 15:22-48. Of course, these attempts to understand Scripture correctly on this point were thwarted by the lack of the presence of the doctrine of the recapitulatory economy of Christ.


Orthodox histories of the Council are, of course, almost totally ignored in the “objective” histories of even the secular historiography of the Second Europe, or at most, passing reference is made to them. The two most easily available in the English language are Ivan N. Ostroumoff’s The History of the Council of Florence and Basil Popoff’s An Orthodox History of the Unjust Union of the Council of Florence.

Russian feudalism came in essentially two forms, the obrok and the barchina. Obrok serfs paid a “rent” or payment in kind to the landholders. Barchina serfs owed actual labour to the existence of two different forms of serfdom within Russia made the eventual emancipation much more difficult.
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1122 The “misdeeds” of the imperial family are a perennial favorite with western historians. Seldom is any genuine time or credit given to their many acts of charity to peasants, monks, and an almost endless stream of people seeking some form of relief.

1123 St. Symeon the New Theologian, for example, is a favorite among charismatic Roman Catholics for his superficial resemblances to their own spirituality. But once again, one simply cannot approach any genuine understanding of Orthodox spirituality within the theological paradigms appropriate to the post-Augustinian West. This coexistence of the very refined dogmatic precision of a St. Photios of a Gregory the Theologian with the asceticism and mysticism of a St. Symeon or a St. Makarios are one of the hall-marks of Orthodoxy, best exemplified, perhaps, in the works and person of St. Maximus the Confessor.

1124 Peter’s Ukase presents a serious canonical difficulty for those Orthodox jurisdiction which would wish to complain of the Soviet Union’s subjugation of the Russian Church to the civil authority in the Sergian – Stalinist “compromise”, for Peter’s subjugation was no less secularly motivated, and no less deleterious in its effects.

1125 Fr. Georges Florovsky put the problems of Russian historiography with his characteristics lucidity and succinctness when he stated that “There was, in the Russian historiography of the last century, an established pattern of interpretation, and, to, some extent, it is still commonly used. It was traditional to divide the history of Russia into two parts, and to divide it sharply and rigidly; the Old and the New, Ancient and Modern. The time of Peter the Great was regarded as the Great Divide, as the decisive turning point in the total process. Of course, it was much more than a chronological demarcation. Passionate value judgements were implied therein.”

1126 Both in the obrok and barchina systems of serfdom in Russia,

the central institution was the village mir, a kind of cooperative which was the only institution within the serv found, so to speak, “status in law”, since the mir was, if one presses the analogy to the snapping point, the “corporate person” representing the local community of serfs. Initially, the emancipation therefore dealt with the problem of financing the purchase of land by the serfs from their landlords through the mir, though the designs of the reform eventually included the complete abolition of the mir and the enfranchisement of the serfs as individuals. The Bolshevik Revolution and subsequent collectivization is, from this standpoint, a massive step backward into the mir, returning the agricultural class to the status, essentially, of obrok serfs. Eventually, the plan was of course to reduce them even more, to barchina servitude to the State.


1128 The *Roe Vs. Wade* decision made a half-hearted attempt to ground its decisions in the “cultural tradition” of the West, citing Aquinas’s belief that the foetus was not a person immediately upon conception. This betrays an almost subliminal Second European preoccupation and perspective, as if there were nothing in the pre-schismatic period that would be of assistance. Then again, the Brotherhood may very well have ignored it because they knew good and well what they would have found.


1130 Ibid.

1131 Ibid., p. 4.

1132 Ibid.

1133 Ibid., pp. 5, 8-9, 14.


1135 Ibid.

1136 Ibid., p. 197.
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THE SCIENCE OF THE CHAMELEON GODHEAD

1137 Cf. Psalm 19, where the orderly nature of creation prompts the moral cry for repentance, “cleanse thou me from my secret faults.”

1138 St. John Chrysostom, Homily of Romans 5:12, NPNF, Vol. XI, SI, p. 404. Chrysostom puts it very succinctly: “…we are the gainers even by having become mortal, first, because it is not an immortal body in which we sin…”


1140 Ecclus. 3:21-24.


1142 St. Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua 7, PG 91:1068-1101, refers to St. Dionysius’s teaching. Cf. note 1143 below.

1143 Ibid.

1144 Ibid., p. 6., emphasis added.

1145 Ibid., p. 7.

1146 Ibid., p. 6.

1147 Ibid., p. 6.

1148 Ibid., p. 127.


1150 Ibid., 86, p. 159.

1151 This has been the burden of our attention to the distinction between the patristic doctrine of ancestral sin and the Second European and Augustinian distortion of that doctrine into “original guilt”.

1152 Cf. chapter one.

1153 St. Maximus the Confessor, Theopol 1: PG 91: 21-25.
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1154 Kaiser, op. cit., p. 8, emphasis added.


1157 Ibid., p. 16.

1158 Ibid., p. 19.

1159 Ibid., p. 21.

1160 Emphasis mine.

1161 Ibid., p. 22, emphasis mine.

1162 St. Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua 7: PG 91:1077.

1163 St. Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua 22: PG 91:1257.

1164 On the contrary, as we have seen, it was the most essential component.

1165 Kaiser, op. cit., p. 34.

1166 Ibid., p. 58.

1167 Ibid., p. 71, citing Oresme, Commentary on Aristotle’s “On the Heavens” (1377).

1168 Ibid., p. 30.

1169 Ibid., p. 31.

1170 Ibid., p. 33.

1171 Ibid., p. 86.

1172 cf. pp.

1173 Kaiser, op. cit., p. 163.

1174 Ibid., pp. 62-64.

1175 Ibid., p. 125.

1176 Ibid., p. 65.

1177 Ibid., p. 179, citing Sir Isaac Newton, On the Gravity and Equilibrium of Fluids.

Plotinus also admits that matter is the opposite kind of simplicity from the One in its utter evilness: “And matter must not be composite, but simple and one thing in its own nature; for so it will ne destitute of all qualities.” (II:4:8, P. 123.)

1180 Ibid., p. 184.
1181 Ibid., p. 194.
1182 Ibid., p. 236.
1183 Ibid., p. 237.
1184 Ibid., p. 238.
1187 Of course, for the Mathusian globalist cognoscenti, there are simply “too many people” already, and a vastly increased average life-expectancy would only complicate the problem.


1188 Harold O.J. Brown wrote in the Preface to his 1969 study The Protest of a Troubled Protestant, “There is personal invective in this book, more perhaps than there should be. Yet in a sense that ought to be understandable, even if not commendable. Treachery within one’s own ranks always produces bitterer antagonism than honest opposition from outside, and what Christendom is facing is treachery on a grand
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scale.”

1189. Hermann Sasse, “Holy Church or Holy Writ? The meaning of the Sola Scriptura of the Reformation.” Interchange, Supplementary paper (Sydney, 1967), p. 4, cited in Harold O.J. Brown, The Protest of a Troubled Protestant, p. 143. Italics are Dr. Brown’s. Dr. Brown comments on p. 128 of his book that he is skeptical of Roman Catholic-Protestant dialogue in the wake of Vatican Council II: “Roman Catholicism must beware of too free a contact with Protestantism because it is not in a position to survive it. If Catholicism were immune to the spiritual and moral problems of the mid-twentieth-century world, the dialogue might not be so dangerous. But Catholics have not built up the same immunities as Protestants. Suddenly to expose them to all the Protestant viruses may produce a theological epidemic of unparalleled dimensions.”


1191. Ibid., p.

1192. Ibid., p. 14

1193. cf. the statement attributed to Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre, the recently excommunicated leader of the Roman Catholic traditionalists, on page 17 of The Desolate City. “The master stroke achieved by Satan is to have thrown everyone into disobedience by virtue of obedience…” The process of dogmatic and liturgical revolution has an inevitable moral component, which will be explored in the second essay on biblical criticism. Harold O.J. Brown had this observation: “There are many theological ‘liberals’ who are really true Christians, because Christianity in the individual depends on the attitude of the heart towards Jesus Christ, and this is not always consistent with one’s theology or one’s morals. There are Christians who offer bad examples of theology, just as there are Christians who offer bad examples of morality. God will deal with both classes, but he will deal with them as
a father (sic.) with his children. Liberal theology, by contrast, is not a
defective kind of theology, in the same way that a “liberal” Protestant or
a ‘liberal’ Catholic may be a defective but nevertheless genuine
Christian. It is another religion. The so-called ‘new morality’ of Bishop
Robinson and Joseph Fletcher is not a defective variety of Christian
morality, but a masked rebellion against God.” op.cit. p, 134.
1194. cf. William Oddie, The Crockford’s File: Gareth Bennet and the
Death of the Anglican Mind, where a similar situation is noted in the
Church of England with its Book of Alternative Services: “But the
‘Alternative Service Book’ soon became, not an alternative, but the
only option.” (p.9)
1195. Michael Davies, Liturgical revolution, Volume II: Pope Paul’s New
Mass (Devon, England: Augustine Publishing Co.), p. 55
1197. Ibid., pp. 16-17
1198. It is worth citing Dr. Brown’s remarks at this point. Though the
remarks are somewhat dated now, the principle beneath them remains
the same:

The United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, by
adopting the so-called Confession of 1967, has confronted its
conservative members and ministers with a difficult situation. The new
confession is not per se wrong or false; it does not deny historic Christian
convictions. But it expresses some of them in an ambiguous or guarded
way, which is precisely what a confession is not supposed to do. If a new
denomination were being formed, and it produced the Presbyterian
Confession of 1967, we could not well accuse it of false doctrine because
its confession is vague. But when the Presbyterian church, which formerly
subscribed to a much clearer set of articles, namely the Westminster
Confession, adopts a watered-down version, it inevitably suggests to us
that it intends to dissociate itself from some of its historic convictions. This
puts a conservative Presbyterian minister in a more difficult situation than that of a minister in the Evangelical Church in Germany. On the one hand, there is doubtless a larger percentage of conservative evangelicals in the United Presbyterian Church than in the German one, but the American Presbyterian minister is tied to a denomination which officially seems to be veering away from the historic faith, whereas his German fellow-minister is in a church which is still formally orthodox, however bad the actual situation may be. The Roman Catholic Church, long regarded as doctrinally monolithic, now too confronts its priests and members with a similar problem. If a church in which doctrinal purity has been stressed to the point of the Inquisition suddenly begins to tolerate views which clearly contradict the historic faith, is it not necessary for someone who really believes it, for the sake of his own consistency, to separate from a church which is falsifying its faith? α

The effect is, according to Dr. Brown, tragic for

As a result, some of the most sensitive, most deeply committed, most orthodox Christians attend no church. These are not people of the type who say, “I can worship God just as well on the golf links as in some stuffy church.” They are people who realize that according to God’s commandments, they should be worshipping him with a congregation and who are deeply pained by their inability to find a serious, consistent, and living congregation...This is a terrible thing for the churches. It means that the very people who are most deeply committed to the calling of being disciples of Christ exclude themselves – or are excluded – from the congregations which need them most. β

α Harold O. J. Brown, op. cit., p. 245.
β Ibid., pp. 116, 117.

A peculiar feature of this assault, as we saw in the examination of the Gnostic assault on Scripture, is the assault on the King James Version of Scripture in the English-speaking world. There are two
peculiar things to be noted in respect of this peculiar feature of modern “English-speaking” Gnosticism. First, the King James, in spite of its alleged Calvinistic theological biases, crossed denominational boundaries in the English Protestant-speaking world, and thus exerted a widespread influence on the liturgical and confessional traditions of non-Anglican Churches. Second, the converse is now true, the push for allegedly more accurate “modern translations” now crosses the very same denominational boundaries, with the effect that the King James, the “ecclesiastical text” of so many Christians, is under assault. This is merely to say that the debate on biblical translations is not a debate on archaic language, or aesthetics. It is part of a general pattern, and must be approached from more comprehensive theological and ecclesiastical perspectives.

1200. Proverbs 22:28: “remove not the ancient landmark, which thy fathers have set.” Proverbs 23:10: “Remove not the old landmark; and enter not into the fields of the fatherless.”

1201. This adherence to a “linguistic agenda” as a sign of higher Gnosis reaches, as we saw, its most concentrated expression in the feminist movement’s demands for changing the name of God, and its manner of dealing with the generic usage of “man” by substituting the word “person” in its place. It is not, as we shall suggested in chapter 2 a matter of de-sexing language, it is more a manner of detaching one notion of person, the Christian and theological, from the word “man” and substituting another notion of personality altogether.


1203. cf. the discussion of the two underlying and competing understandings of truth and “church” on pp.

1204. Dr. Brown minces no words:
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A more or less effective system to safeguard the purity of doctrine existed within Catholicism for centuries. (Probably it is breaking down today, but that is a different question.) With all its advantages for the perpetuation of the Catholic church and faith as that church understands it, this very effectiveness has its detrimental side. First, many radically-inclined teachers have dissimulated and failed to show their true colors, in order not to lose their appointments. Thus Roman Catholic theology could be hollowed out from the inside, without its being apparent. Only this can explain the rapid collapse of Catholic theology in several important areas. The ranks of apparent orthodoxy have long contained a repressed fifth column, which is now beginning to emerge. α

1206. Oddie, op. cit., p. 10.
1207. Muggeridge, op. cit., p. 36
1209. Muggeridge, op. cit., p. 236
1210. cf. the “Agreed Statements” of the Eastern and Oriental Orthodox Churches in the World Council of Churches publication, Does Chalcedon Divine or Unite?, p. 12:

Special efforts should be made now to encourage more students from the Eastern Orthodox Churches to study in Oriental Orthodox institutions. There should be more exchange at the level of theological professors and church dignitaries.

1211. Ibid., p. 16:

Another important element of such education is the re-writing of Church history, text-books, theological manuals and catechetical materials.

α Brown, op. cit., p. 127
Especially in Church history, there has been a temptation on both sides to interpret the sources on a partisan basis. Common study of the sources with fresh objectivity and an eirenic attitude can produce common texts for the use of both families. Since this is a difficult and time-consuming process, we need not to await its completion for the lifting of anathemas or even for the restoration of Communion.

1212. Ibid., p. 13:

...explore the possibilities of and to carry out the preliminary steps for the establishment of one or more common research centers where theological and historical studies in relation to the universal orthodox tradition can be further developed.

1213. Davies, p.

1214. Davies, Liturgical Revolution, Volume II: Popo John’s Council, p. 41:

...Cardinal Heenan warned the Fathers to scrutinize these texts with great care before voting upon them because of the danger that ‘the mind of the Council will have to be interpreted to the world by the periti [experts] who helped the Fathers of the commission to draw up the documents. God forbid that this should happen! I fear periti when they are left to explain what the bishops meant...It is of no avail to talk about a College of Bishops if periti in articles, books, and speeches contradict and pour scorn on what a body of bishops teaches.

Emphasis added.


1216. Ibid., p.

1217. Ibid., p. Fr. Hankey then elucidates at some length the destructive effects of this paradigm of thought and its relationship to the liberal
biblical criticism:

In an important piece by one of the major English liturgists, A. H. Couratin, the deification of the Church and the reduction of Scripture at the hands of Biblical Criticism go together...In the shift from grounding the sacraments in the command of God heard in Scripture to grounding them in the self-expression of the liturgical community as itself the locus of the divine subjectivity, Fr. Couratin draws biblical criticism into the logic.

“For him, ‘The institution of the sacraments by Christ Himself was self-evident in the days before Biblical Criticism.’ But St. Paul was not present at the Supper, the gospel accounts differ; Luke makes no mention of the ‘Do this in remembrance of me.’ So, ‘The critical scholar nowadays would probably base the sacraments, not upon Christ’s command, but rather upon his example.’ Two problems arise at this point. What prevents the example from going the way of commands? On what principle can we be certain that we know what Jesus did as opposed to what our Lord said? We may recollect what criticism has done with the resurrection and the miracles. The second problem is that the example does not communicate the intention of our Lord; his purpose is lost to us.

“The second point is, in some way, the whole point of this paper. Namely, the higher than high view of the Church and its union with Christ expressed in the Liturgy may be true doctrine. But it is dangerous and destructive truth for an institution which cannot hear the voice of God apart from its own life and self-expression in the liturgy. If the Church be Christ’s body, so that the Christ himself appears in and acts in this institution, what totalitarian self-idolaters we shall become if we cannot, through the objective Word of God written in Scripture, also hear him speak against us.

“This (the Eucharist) is an offering which must always be for us and never simply ours...to receive the benefits of the unique obedience and the unique offering, Scripture must be much more than the repository of our symbols...Otherwise, in our presumption, laying hands on the body of
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the Son of God, we are guilty of ‘not discerning the Lord’s body.’”\(^\text{a}\)

1218. Muggeridge, op. cit., p. 27
1219. Ibid., p. 115.
1220. Robert C. Harvey, *A House Divided*, p. 31. Notably, the title of this work also reflects the principle of creating two churches within one institution.
1221. Muggeridge, op. cit., p. 147.
1222. Malachi Martin observes of Jesuit theologian Karl Rahner that “As he travelled in Europe and the Americas dressed in his correct business suits, he was untiring in his biting and sarcastic criticism of the papacy and Roman authority.”\(^\text{a}\)
1223. Ibid., p. 23
1224. Muggeridge, op. cit., pp. 115-116
1225. i.e., the bread and the wine which, by Catholic, and for that matter, all Christina law, must be used in the Holy Communion in order for it to be a legitimate communion.
1226. Muggeridge, op. cit., p. 128.
1227. Oddie, op. cit., p. 9.
1228. This question has recurred frequently throughout the history of the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches, and was a major point of contention among the Protestant reformers themselves. The distinction has entered modernist Eastern Orthodox theology in the guise of the so-called distinction between “Tradition” and “traditions”, or “Big T little t tradition”.
1229. Davies, *Pope Paul's New Mass*, p. 236. The very criterion of “intelligibility” disguises yet another, far more theological implication

\(^\text{a}\) Hankey, op. cit., pp.
\(^\text{a}\) op. cit., p. 23.
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and inevitably of the Augustinian Hellenization, that God is Himself intelligible, that is, that His essence is capable of definition and circumscription. In yet another inevitability, this a assumption cannot but have had a profound impact on the language and style of worship. If God’s essence is not intelligible, one will seek to enshrine this, not only in specific formulae, but also in a style of language designed to convey mystery and to elevate the worshipper. If, on the other hand, God is intelligible, this too will be reflected in the style of language, in which case He is to be worshipped in as simple, un taxing, and mundane manner possible. Hence the poetic flatness of many of the modern man-centered liturgies.

1230. Ibid., p. 110.
1231. Ibid., p. 111
1232. This begs the question as to when a repetition becomes meaningless. The mere fact of repetition itself is often assumed to render it meaningless by the liturgical subversive, when in fact, it was one of the precise intentions of such repetitions -- best illustrated in the Divine Liturgy of the Eastern Orthodox Churches and its seemingly endless repetition of litanies -- to convey the timelessness of God and the constant standing of man before God as a supplicant in need of God’s saving mercy.

1233. The Consultation on Church Union, The COCU Consensus, p. 9.
1234. Periagoge (περιαγωγή): the turning from shadows to the true forms of things in Plato’s myth of the cave.
1237. Ibid., pp. 36-37
1238. Ibid., p. 37.
1239. Muggeridge, op. cit., p. 14:
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Intense propaganda is directed at making the old ideas and disciplines seem outdated and ridiculous and the new ones inevitable and irresistible.

1240. Ibid., pp. 55-56:

The others were described as ‘pastoral’, a distinction upon which both the radicals and conservatives seized, the radicals ‘in order to obtain the passage of certain formulations with a modern tendency,’ as Edward Schillerbeeckx, a leading radical theologian at the Council, admits...

It is clear that there were in effect two councils, the ‘conservative’ Council, which is now realized to have been a brilliantly clever doctrinal holding-operation, and the radical Council, the enormous media event.


1242. Ibid., p. 11. Emphasis added.

1243. Ibid., p. 45.


1247. The Consultation on Church Union, The COCU Consensus, p.

1248. The World Council of Churches, Does Chalcedon Divide or Unite?, p.

1249. Ibid., p.

1250. Ibid., p.


1252. Once this point is reached, then one is left with an ecclesiology
based on mutual recognition, as has already been seen. This mutual recognition is coupled to a redefinition of the Eucharist, and is often called “eucharistic ecclesiology”. Basically, the essence of this ecclesiology is that the community of faith is gathered around the eucharist celebrated by the local bishop, a view which is grounded in part on the writings of St. Ignatius of Antioch. This kind of “Congregationalism with bishops” supposedly was what the early Church practiced when each local church gathered around its Eucharist and bishop recognized other local churches as having the same faith. However, like all such academic fads of theological modernist, the “eucharistic ecclesiology” can only be derived by elevating one period of patristic doctrinal formulation, in this case the second century, above other equally important developments, in an artificial isolation from them those developments being, namely, the elaborated doctrine of apostolic succession and authority which obtained in the struggle against Gnosticism. The moral and doctrinal tendencies of this position are readily apparent:

“As soon as this kind of thing is established, it means ultimately that both sides are cutting themselves off from Christ, and will have only each other, in a kind of Christian togetherness -- without Christ…To the extent that ecumenism minimizes the importance of doctrine and the content of religious ceremonies, as is currently being done in ecumenical worship, it is laying the necessary groundwork for inter-faith worship, which is religion without doctrine, without meaning, and ultimately without God.” Brown, op. cit., p. 36. Brown continues: “The chief area of syncretism is not amalgamation of Reformed and Roman Catholic doctrines, nor of Christian and non-Christian, but of theology and non-theology, doctrine and none-doctrine, belief and non-belief…Christians are properly alarmed by the abandonment of certain historic Christian doctrines by their churches…They should be more alarmed by the fact that doctrine itself is being abandoned…The fusion of doctrine and non-doctrine takes place when a service of worship involves the pronouncing of certain words
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which are negated by the actions surrounding them."  

With the collapse of the idea of truth and doctrine goes a sweeping cultural and moral uncertainty:

Only a few years ago the expressions ‘Christian’ and ‘Christianity’ caused no confusion when they were used. They may have evoked a sympathetic or hostile response; they may have aroused loyalty or resentment, but no one was in doubt as to what they meant…Today the word ‘Christian’ is mysterious, no one knows what it really means. ‘Christian theology’ is a free-floating kind of thing, which seems to include everything, including what used to be called blasphemy. ‘Christian morality,’ on which both ‘orthodox’ and ‘liberal’ Christians, both Protestants and Catholics, used to be in more or less general agreement, is completely adrift.  

Brown, op. cit., p. 100. Thus:

Is Roman Catholicism ‘on the move’ because it has finally caught some of the insights of the Reformers? Or is it in retreat and seeking allies wherever it can find them, even among its former enemies? Does it feel that Protestantism no longer threatens it and that it can afford to be magnanimous? Or is it giving up its rivalry with Protestantism because that rivalry taxes its dwindling strength? Is it turning a friendly ear to the other side because it recognizes Christian truth in Protestantism, or because it is no longer very concerned for truth at all? In other words, is it a sign of health or sickness that Catholicism is willing to listen to Protestants? 

One need only recall Vatican II’s statement in Lumen Gentium, “Many elements of sanctification and truth are found outside (the

α Ibid., pp. 36-37.  
β Ibid., p. 89.  
α Ibid., p. 121.
Roman Catholic Church’s) visible confines.” There is nothing here that was not previously Roman Catholic doctrine. But then comes the ecumenical and political deduction from the premiss: “Since these are gifts belonging to the Church of Christ, they are forces compelling towards Catholic unity.” *Lumen Gentium* 2:16. In an era when ecclesiastical boundaries are both collapsing and being intentionally redrawn, one end perhaps only with Teilhard de Chardin’s definition of the Church as the “consciously Christified portion of the world.” Christianity itself thus receives definition in terms of Gnostic consciousness, as the possession of a certain king of knowledge. The implication is that all humanity possesses the potential for this consciousness. Notably, in the Vatican II document, there is no mention of grace within the quotation cited.

1255. The Consultation on Church Union, *The COCU Consensus*, p. 12


1257. Ibid., p. 277.


1259. Hankey, op. cit., p. 68, and cf. the entire penetrating discussion on pp. 60-68.

1260. Ibid., pp. 31-32.

1261. The sole significant exception is, of course, Dr. Albert Schweitzer, who came to embrace opinions contrary to Christian faith, on conclusion of his *The Quest for the Historical Jesus*, had the decency to leave Christianity to begin humanitarian and charitable work.


1265. Martin, op. cit., p. 57.
World Council of Churches, *Does Chalcedon Divide or Unite?*, p. 15, citing the Addis Abbaba “Agreed Statement.” One may easily discern the state of two Churches within one institution emerging here. In COCU’s case, perhaps of several churches emerging within one institution.

The Consultation on Church Union, *The COCU Consensus*, p. 39.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 47.

Oddie, op. cit., p. 10: “Patristic in its structure the new liturgy may be, but as a safeguard for sound doctrine and as an aid for teaching it was a non-starter.”

Davies, Pope John’s Council, p. 59.

The phrase “forms already existing” was used in the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy to direct the subsequent liturgical reform. Doubtless the Vatican II Fathers had in mind prior Christian forms of prayer. Unfortunately, in the environment where two churches inhabit the same institution, one can take nothing for granted.

The reference is from Davies’ *Pope John’s Council*, p. 244. The *Concilium* was the body of experts which, in part, interpreted the Council to the world and who subsequently directed the work of liturgical revolution in the Roman Church.

Davis, Pope John’s Council, p. 235.

Martin, op. cit., p. 245.

Ibid., p. 289.

The Consultation on Church Union, *The COCU Consensus*, p. 3.


Ibid., p. 31. Note the absence, in the second paragraph, of any role for tradition in guiding these “fresh interpretations.” It cannot, for the
received confessions of the members’ churches have already jettisoned and demoted to the status of mere historical curiosities.


1280. The Consultation on Church Union, The COCU Consensus, p. 1.

1281. cf. Davies, Pope Paul’s New Mass, pp. 25, 37, 57, 62; and Muggeridge, op. cit., p. 67.

1282. Consultation on Church Union, The COCU Consensus, p. 2.

1283. Ibid., p. 7, #2, P. 1, #1, respectively.

1284. It should be noted that the dialectical principle itself here takes precedence over the Holy Trinity, which is reduced to but one particular example of the general phenomenon of “unity in diversity”. The Trinity, however, is not revealed as “unity in diversity” but as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. As such, the Trinity exists prior to the dialectical principle, not vice versa. That this dialectical ecclesiology bears an intimate relationship to the filioque is a subject for further inquiry.

1285. This is the burden, not only of mediaeval Roman Catholic theology, but the underlying theme of most modernist “models of theology”, regardless of confessional position.

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