APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: MAY 2007 Tor Secret - DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE | Intelligence Report ‘The Sino-Soviet Struggle in the World Communist Movement Since Khrushchev’s Fall | (Part 1) _ Reférence Title: ESAU XXXIV ToSecret 45 Septembér 1967 TS No. 190151/67 THE SINO-SOVIET STRUGGLE IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT SINCE KHRUSHCHEV'S FALL This working pape: of the DD/I Research Staff examines in detail the evolving relationship of the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties to the world Communist movement from the time of Khrushchev's fall in October 1964 through the end of May 1967. The paper attempts to describe the principal public and private dealings between the CPSU and the CCP through- out this period; the dealings of each of the two antagonists with the most important parties of the world movement; the dealings of many of those other parties with each other, and the effect of their interests on the policies of the Soviet and Chinese parties; the role played by the evolution of Soviet policy toward the United States in the Sino-Soviet struggle for influence over the Communist movement; and the role played by the internal life of the Soviet and Chinese parties ‘on the course the Sino- Soviet struggle has followed since Khrushchev's fall. The paper is béganiced: in three parts,. published separately as ESAU XXXIV, XXXV, and XXXVI. Part I describes the shift in the emphasis of CPSU policy in the first six months after Khrushchev's fall to-— ward a more vigorous appeal to the interests of all those parties--such as the North Vietnamese--hitherto inclined toward the Chinese and having a special, private vested interest in militant struggle against the United States. Part II traces the growing CPSU success in 1965 and early 1966 in neutralizing these militant former supporters of the Chinese by ad- vocating “unity of action” in support of North Viet- nam against the United: States and by capitalizing on Mao Tse-tung's refusal to cooperate and Mao's ar- rogant attitude toward all.who would not obey him completely. Part III discusses the flow of events beginning with Mao's refusal to attend the 23rd CPSU Congress in the spring of 1966 and his simul- _ taneous surfacing of the gigantic purge known as the "great cultural revolution," describes the sub- sequent rapid decay of Sino-Soviet state relations and the resumption of direct Soviet attacks on Mao to take advantage of China's increasing isolation, ET and concludes with an appraisal of the policy lines toward the Communist militants, toward the United States, and toward the Chinese Communist regime which the dominant majority in the CPSU leadership may be expected to follow in. the future, — A chronological list of secret Sino-Soviet correspondence since Khrushchev's fall precedés Part I. An index follows each of Parts I and II and a cumulative index of all three parts follows Part IIIf. ‘This paper presents a working thesis against which other analysts may'test their own theses and conclusions; it does not, therefore, reflect an official position of the Directorate of Intelligence. It has benefited from the advice and comments of of the ice’ 6 ? of the Office of Economic Research, and 6 the Clandestine Services, The conclusions expressed-- . some of which are controversial--are solely those of the author, Harry Gelman. Comments on any aspect of the paper are solicited and may be addressed to ‘the author or the Chief and Deputy Chief of the DDI Special Research fy) ae THE SINO-SOVIET STRUGGLE IN THE-WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT SINCE KHRUSHCHEV'S FALL CONTENTS — Page Summary and ConGlusions..cccceqeecccesvoccscccsnseeee ek Sino-Soviet Secret Correspondence ‘and Conversations Since Khrushchev's Fall... .cceccccccccccscccveeccLVii Table of Illustrations... . ccc cece ce ee cece cane nee e etKLid PART I I. The Shift in the Emphasis of CPSU Policy........1 A. The Anti-U.S. Vested Interests in the Communist World... cc ceccercc wenn sascnceseedh B. The Opposition to Khrushchev's Tactics Toward Peking. ..ccccavccccccsnnsecensesveed 1. The Far Eastern Parties..crccsevcscsveced 2. Castro and the Latin American : RAAT Gall Siu iei0 ace oleio ocala oe’ eoe ene ever ee “ele cece ececech” 3. The European Opposition. ....ccececereeekl II, The New Soviet Line: The First Six Months....19. A. ‘The CPSU's November 1964 Bargain With CASELOs reece wccrncrcooenncecsensesscccseeLe B. The Congo Episode, November~December Ly ere ree eerie ee eee ee ee ee OES Cc. The CPSU Reversal of Line on North E VL OEM AM o o-'o: 16 sae seca. o 5-5) iia eae teh b 6 BLS te arg! 8 esate cee ety eee D. Initial Soviet Efforts to Neutralize , North KoreanS..ccceccerensencesccccerser 30 E. Soviet Temporizing With the Japanese, ‘ Indonesians, INGLANS. .cssevvccacccccseree dd F. The CPSU Problems With the 01d Pro-SOViet CaMP..cceserccnecenenesceceses dd 1. The Khrushchev Ouster....cccacennne ene DID 2. The World Conference and the Line Toward China aia wed vee ee eee eee 60260 Page 3. The Shift.in Line Toward the United States cin Sage eee bol eid wage ee wees OF 4. The Fear of a Return to Stalinism......69 G. Power in the CPSU and Policy Toward PRE US ieee ise awe led ow BO ee bad Cate EEF 1. The Soviet Dilemma... ccc ccc ee ee cect ene M4 2. Khrushchev and the Communist Radicals... ccescccncescavevcsccccecsell 3. Effects of the 1964 CPSU Power SRIL CS ccgisee ees tie ee wis bole eee eee ewe 6 BO 4. Hedges to Reduce Military Risk........101 III. Soviet Dealings with Peking From the Fall Of Khrushchev to the March Meeting.......-..105 A. The Chou En-lai Visit... ccc ccsneceev cece ee LO5 B. Subsequent Jockeying for Position.........108 C. The Mao-Kosygin Interview.......ceeceeeee.L16 | D. The March Meeting... ..ceccccsceeecscsssce so lLlB Index to Part Dee re re ae ere ree er ree Err en ee od! © PART If IV. March~September 1965: Expansion of COMPECLLCUON. ccc cc wees ensnernncnvcanesseseresced A. The Chinese Open Firer.rccsccccsrccerestceved ‘1. The Demonstration at the U.S. EMDaSSYVccvseccccvcccacecsesecccseed 2. Denunciation of the March Meeting.......3 3. Chinese Briefings to AdherentsS.....6..009 B. Soviets Carry New Policies Porward........+.6 1. The Unity of Action Line on Vietnam.....6 a. The April CPSU-CCP Letters..........8 b. Growth of Soviet Presence in DRV...11 Military Aid to North Korea........+...13 Continued Soviet Stalemate With JCP....17 . Final Soviet Dealings With PKI.........22 he OW ee V. Fall-Winter 1965-1966: Mao Draws Lines of DeMarGation.s ..crcscevecccnneasestenteseacseensad A. The Disastrous Fall of 1965...ecceeesere ee odd 1. The Lin Piao Article on "People's War".29 2.. Soviet-Chinese-American Interaction During The India~Pakistan War........3l tii Page a. The Peculiar Soviet Dilemma........31 b. The Chinese Ultimatum and Its CONSEQUENCES . eee rerccceencesen edd c. The Secret Soviet Warning to China.35 d. The Chinese Ultimatum Withers BWA 52a 6 Sia Suis Wal Siac oS eres aie eee a al OO: 3. The Indonesian Catastrophe.......50004+40 a. Consequences of the 30 September . DiSaSteL. ceweccvscvececesnsree ee e 40 b. The Question of the Chinese Role...42 c. .Subsequent Chinese and Soviet REAction. .escsessevensacsesscseeedh 4. The Bandung II Fiasco... .scrverereceaeedd 5. Abortive Revival of Effort to Block . Soviet Aid to DRV..v.ce ccc cee eee ee 5D 6. The Internal Chinese Background, Fall 1965 cise ase duels Oeideie 0 ale ore se selene OO Soviet-Sponsored Overtures for Unity Of Action Meeting... .ceccanssenvccevereec OD 1. The Soviets Resume the Offensive.......65 2. The Soviets Probe for a Conference.....66 .3. The Chinese 11 November Editorial......69 4. The Polish "November Initiative” and Its QUEL COME 65 os cee See ae eee eee meresnta 5. The Chinese and Soviet January TiGCEGT Ss ois beh dw wud ov eew ee wk ckev KNGR TD a. The 7 January CCP Letter to Che CPSU... cece cnn envcevesccesveeld b. The January CPSU Circular Letter...80 VI.. Spring-Fall 1966: Mao Completes Self- A. TSOLACLON. ..ccccccncnccccevenescesscesacvereead ‘The Alienation and Defection of the Japanese CoOmMMUNiStS...ecseccveresevreere edd 1. The Japanese Party Shifts Course.......85 2. Resumption of JCP Contacts with CPSU...89 3. Miyamoto's Plan. wc ccscccccencrvnceee e90 4. Miyamoto's Odyssey. ..ccccevecresccceceeD2 5. Aftermath: The JCP-CCP Split.........-96 Mao's Clashes With Cuba and North Korea....99 l. The Outbreak of Public Polemics With Castro... cccssccnesvcccsssscenneedd a. The 1965 Decay in Relations........99 b. Castro's September. 1965 Private WarningS.ccccccccncccensoeeseese LOO Vv Page c. Castro's January Attack...........101 d. Castro Has the Last Word..........103 e. The Departure of Robert Williams..104 2. The Growing North Korean Attack on the CCP. oc ee cece ccser ccc ccvcs erence nc LOG a. The May Directive..........+-2..2-.106 b. The July Directive... .eecn evens ee L08 ec. Kim's October 1966 Report.........111 ad. North Korea‘and the International BLONEGs csc wace aww ays bce weew ee e. The Red Guard Attacks on Kim......114 3. The North Vietnamese-North Korean- Japanese-Cuban AKL eos 08o 00 ce eee we Lb. Pndex: £6) Bare Tilston wicanaradesaeasonetsioes ae rad kod PART III VII. The Multiple Chinese Quarrels With North | VL SEMA sos os ou sieeve oes S50 leisw: tw ie peepee, aca -e Te Yelle. wee ave a A. The Dispute Over "Unity of Action".........-1L B. The Dispute Over the Authority of Mao's ‘€ DiC Ra iiatcteccd chee hbcc cha eo bo. Ow Rowe eho bel ale be eee C. The Dispute on Strategy and Tactics in CO WATS site ete: egiece lh 0. 9 5b 8a. ee waters we bce aie eveneia t 1. The Change in the Chinese Position......7° 2. The Issue of Duration of the Struggle...8 3. The Issue of the Ratio of Strength LN: Battles vcccvc ces Oeee woe Owen eee eee 4. The Issue of Holding Territory.........14 .D. Whe Dispute Over Negotiations.......eeedeee 16 E. Possible Causes of CCP Fears About DRV Negotiations... ccc cccsercenasessvescaveseal VIII. The New Soviet Offensive... sesccccsccsseeveeee25 A. The "Great Cultural Revolution": Soviets Leave the High Road... cece cee n acer enna td The 23rd CPSU Congress. ...eveneceeeeees 2d The “Great Cultural Revolution”........31 The CPSU OpenS Fire... ccc rscenacvcceveeeddé The Extended CPSU Briefings......e00ee-4l. The Decay of State Relations....e..000242 The Siege of the Soviet Embassy........44 The Transit of Aid to Vietnam..........47 The Anti-Chinese, Anti-American Line...55 Dissension in the Remaining Chinese CAMP verea le Siee 0 ater eetdue wae ava eia wa eee ereuts OL 10. The Chinese Departure from-the PLONES. cs ccc veces vcenereaecanseseseesO5 WOWHU WN e e s * e » a s vii IX. Cumulative Index to Parts I-III... cc cece ee eee eee ee et llel TOP"SECRET The l. 2. 3. 4, Page World Conference Revisited............68 Resumption of Soviet Pressure.........68 The Time and Place of the Conference..76 The Remaining Opposition.......200600.78 The Nature of the Conference..........83 ‘ Current Status and ProSpects....ccencccaneeo cdl A Tour of the World Movement.....cseeseee 9k A. me 8 0 © © & @ - NE GUWNRPNHAHAMN &wWnNP Eastern EULTOp@. sce e nee c ces e access nee GL Western EULODG ch wtaiswauserevn vee eeu ek North America... ..ccec ec eanes stele ret araee D2 Latin BMS rE Ca i us cae w ewe anced ones eae Oe Asia and the Far East........... ieee ee OS Africa and the Middle East.....+5+00+.96 The Overall Tren... cccseneccevesesnceedB CaStLO QUeEStLON wc cesccedvesresesener es 9D The Challenge in Latin America........99 The Challenge in the Fronts.........110° The Challenge Over Vietnam...........-113 une 1967: The Soviet-Chinese-American TELANGLO sos sree saree e ela ree a wa ele.e eee ei eiecee LLG . The Soviet-American Relationship.....117 Soviet Calculations Regarding The (CHINESE... eee e eee eee cece eee e eee ol 26 ix. a ee THE SINO-SOVIET STRUGGLE IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT SINCE KHRUSHCHEV'S FALL Summary and Conclusions - In the two and a half years from Khrushchev's fall in October 1964 to May 1967 the men who. overthrew and replaced Khrushchev in the CPSU leadership have witnessed an astonishing change. in the contest be- tween the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China for predominant influence over the world Communist movement. The Communist Chinese in 1964 were still gaining strength at the expense of the CPSU's following in many parts of the. world and had gathered around them a solid phalanx of important Far Eastern parties--including North Viet-- nam and North Korea--whose relations with the Soviets were all becoming increasingly hostile. In 1967, the CCP's offensive within the Communist movement has been halted almost: everywhere, the leading Far Eastern parties have all been neutralized by the CPSU, and it is the Chinese whose relations with ‘most of those parties have become hostile. In more than a decade of Sino-Soviet struggle, never have Chinese Communist political fortunes sunk so low. This momentous reversal of the tide has. been caused by the interaction of Soviet and Chinese policy, each of which has been equally important. On the Soviet side, the decisive factor has. been the inclination of a: majority of the new Soviet leadership to reverse Khrushchev's order of priori- ties and to cultivate the most militant, anti- American parties of the world Communist movement--— particularly those of the Far East--eventually Bccepes: ing as a necessary and tolerable price for this effort a worsening of the atmosphere of Soviet rela- tions with the United States all along the. line. This reorientation of Soviet policy began in con- fused fashion well before the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam started in February 1965, but was greatly accelerated thereafter. Along with this change went a temporary shelving of Khrushchev's project of a world Communist conference without the Chinese, a Xi | stops project which in practice had been leading to- ward a formal Soviet rupture not only with the Chinese but also: with the Far Eastern and other militant parties whom Khrushchev's successors wished to conciliate. The principal Soviet endeavor henceforth was to demonstrate support for the North Vietnamese against the United States and on this : . basis seek both to win back the respect and sym- pathy.of hard~line Communist militants everywhere ‘and to enforce a greater degree of conformity with Soviet policy among the Communists of Europe. The-success of this main thrust of Soviet policy was enormously facilitated by Mao Tse-tung's violent rejection of the Soviet calls for “unity of action" against the United States, Mao's in- creasingly far-fetched insistence that the USSR was colluding with the United States against Hanoi, and Mao's incredible arrogance toward all the parties formerly on good terms with him that would not fol- low him down the road to a break with the CPSU. The - Same arrogance was simultaneously contributing to successive Chinese defeats in relations with the non-Communist world and to a general growth in Chi- nese Communist isolation. Added to all this has been the hostile foreign reaction. engendered by the events of Mao's "great cultural revolution," by the’ un- precedented lengths to which Mao's cult has been . carried, and by the attempts made by the CCP to ex- port cultural revolution propaganda to other coun- tries. The events since ‘the fall of 1964 have confirmed again and again the power of nationalism in the world and the continued growth in the relative im- portance of parochial national interest as one of the motives for the actions of an increasing number of Communist parties. Mao Tse-tung has lost ground almost everywhere, among Communists and non-Communists alike, because of his repeated displays of contempt for the national interests and national pride of others. The CPSU has regained a measure of the in- fluence Khrushchev had lost in an important section of the world Communist movement--the most militant xii parties of the Par East and elsewhere--by deliber- ately modifying Soviet policy to appeal to the ‘interests of those parties in a manner that Khru- shchev had felt to be undesirable for Soviet na- tional interests. At the same time, the present ideologically inclined majority of the Soviet leadership continues to yearn nostalgically for its lost universal ‘he-~- gemony over the Communist movement, and continues to strive as best it can to maximize CPSU authority over as many Communist parties and states as possible. In Europe, this effort brings the Soviets into con- tinuing conflict with the interests of several im- portant Communist parties, and in-Latin America, it has ‘brought the Soviets into a direct clash with Castro over .the question of who is to lead there. Yet over~all, the Soviets continue to be aided by the fact that for a majority of the Communist par- ties of the world, the virus of nationalism for the time being still remains less important. than the traditional ties of those parties with the CPsu and their continued heavy dependence on Soviet financial subsidies. Kili - Part I Khrushchev and the Anti~US Communist Militants When Khrushchev fell in October 1964, the bal- ance of opinion in the Soviet leadership shifted to- .ward the views of those of his former colleagues and subordinates who had long wanted a higher priority to- be given to the promotion of Soviet influence at Chi-~ nese expense in the most militant and vehemently anti- - American’ sections of the world Communist movement. At the moment of Khrushchev's fall, important Com- munist parties and other radical movements with a pri- vate vested interest in hostility.toward the United States~-and a long-standing desire for a tougher So- viet posture toward the U.S.--existed in several parts of the world. In the Faz East, these included most notably the ruling parties of North Vietnam and North Korea and the Communist parties of Indonesia and Japan, These four key parties were not obedient retainers of the Chinese but rather their voluntary allies, whose anti-Khrushchev position had derived in large part from what they regarded as his soft line toward the United States. A considerable modification of Soviet policy toward the United States was therefore one of the ob- vious prerequisites (there were others) for the improve- ment of CPSU relations with these parties. Much of the militant, pro-Chinese wing of the large Indian Communist party could also be reasonably expected to be more susceptible to CPSU influence after such a change in the Soviet posture toward the United States. In Latin America, a vehement hostility to the United States remained central to the policy of the ’ Cuban regime, which believed that its power at home could be secure only after it had helped to establish other Communist regimes to the south. From the point of view of a majority of the men who replaced Khru- shchev, a toughening of the Soviet Line toward the United States offered the promise of rewards for So- viet relations with Castro, and might well be used as a bargaining counter to extract concessions from him in other matters, such as the question of his re- lations with pro-Chinese forces in Latin America, xv Even among the Communist parties of. Western ‘Europe, there were surprisingly few ardent defenders of good relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, and growing pressure from some for more vigorous Soviet efforts to outbid the Chinese for the support of the anti-U.S. radicals of: the underdeveloped world. It was noteworthy that such Western European: Communist pressure for a harder So- viet line toward the United States came particularly from some of the parties which were most "revisionist" in domestic politics, most persistent in resisting Soviet authority and criticizing.Stalinist aspects of Soviet life’, and most obstinate in obstructing : Khrushchev's plans to coerce the Chinese. The Italian Communist party (PCI) was the leader in this regard, and a striking feature of the "Togliatti Memorandum" published by the Italian party a month before Khru- shchev's fall was its outspoken demand for a reap- praisal of Soviet policy toward the United States. In short, on the eve of Khrushchev's fall, the vested interests of many Communists and radicals in different parts of the world held out a strong incen- tive for a toughening of Soviet policy toward the United States to those of the Soviet leaders who as- signed a higher priority than had Khrushchev to. the value of enhancing Soviet influence among such Com- munists as opposed to the value to the Soviet erace of good relations with the United States. The other side of the coin.was the question of the tactics ‘to be used by the CPSU in the struggle against Peking. Without. exception, every Communist party that had been demanding a harsher Soviet line toward the United States was also adamantly opposed to Khrushchev's efforts in 1963 and 1964 to bring about a showdown with the Chinese party. The two questions, for most Communist leaders, were com- pletely interwoven. Thus the North Vietnamese, North Koreans, Indo- nesians and’ Japanese Communists had been opposed to Khrushchev's attempts in his last two years to con- vene a world Communist conference without the Chi- nese, both because they feared the consequences for themsélves of a formal schism and because they saw xvi the motivation for Khrushchev's campaign as closely connected with his policy toward the United States, These parties were inclined to agree with Chinese charges that Khrushchev's restrained posture toward the United States was discouraging revolutionary strug-- gles throughout the world, and they were convinced in particular that this aspect of Khrushchev's foreign policy was harmful to their own national interests. They.were thus all the less inclined to agree’ to CPSU claims to an authority which was to be used for such purposes, or to participate in an international Com- munist’ conference which Khrushchev evidently intended to use to try to strengthen CPSU authority in support of ‘his policies. This view of Khrushchev's real in- tentions received apparent confirmation from the in- creasingly intransigent Soviet posture toward the North Vietnamese, North Koreans, Indonesians and Jap- anese parties in 1963 and 1964, and from Khrushchev's increased willingness to accept public estrangement from all these anti-American militant parties as a necessary consequence of his effort to force a defi- nite break with the Chinese. Fidel Castro, who agreed with the Far Eastern radical Communists regarding Soviet dealings with the United States, also shared their disapproval of Khru- shchev's moves to bring about a formal split with ‘the Chinese. Unlike the Asians, Castro was not dis- posed to align himself with Peking in direct opposi- tion with Moscow, and tried to maintain a neutral posture; but Castro's attitude toward Khrushchev's project of a world Communist conference without the Chinese was bound to cause anxiety for the CPSU. [If ‘Cuba were to join the Far Eastern parties in declining to attend such a conference, this would be a severe blow to the Soviets, with grave repercussions in many quarters. ; In addition to the general question of Cuban par- ticipation in a hypothetical world Communist conference as yet unscheduled, there was a more pressing issue: whether the Cubans would agree to take part in the smaller, 26-party preparatory meeting which Khrushchev had called to meet in Moscow on 15 December to organize a world conference, By demanding Cuban attendance at a specific gathering on a specific date, Khrushchev xvii had placed unwelcome pressure on Castro to commit an overt act that would violate his neutrality. Castro had still not committed himself: when Khrushchev fell in mid-October. The men who replaced Khrushchev un- derstood that if it became necessary after all to hold the preparatory meeting in some form, a price would have to be paid for Castro's participation. Here again, some modification of :the Soviet line toward the United States would pay dividends. Finally, Khrushchev's plan for a world Communist conference without the Chinese, and his immediate project:of a 15 December 26-party preparatory meeting in Moscow, had encountered: stubborn opposition from certain of the most important parties in both Western and Eastern Europe. In Western Europe, the leader in opposing Khrushchev's plans, once again, was the Italian Communist party. This party's overriding motive for opposing Khrushchev's tactics toward the Chinese and in seeking to stave off as long as pos- sible a formalization of the split in the movement was neither concern for the.fate of the movement nor fear of an allegedly growing threat to peace from the United States--the reasons the PCI publicly ad- duced--but rather determination to prevent the CPSU from using a formal schism as the occasion for the restoration of. stronger Soviet control over the PCI. The British Communist party took a similar stand. In Eastern Europe, the Rumanian and Yugoslav parties were adamantly opposed to Khrushchev's plans, and the Poles and Hungarians were less than completely enthusiastic. From the point of view of most of the men who succeeded Khrushchev, therefore, his enterprise ap- peared more and more foolhardy. On the one hand, he was in effect writing off CPSU influence in the Far East, abandoning to the Chinese parties and regimes for which the CPSU had long competed with Peking and which under other circumstances--with fundamental changes in Soviet tactics toward both Peking and Washington--might take a more forthcoming attitude toward the CPSU. On the other hand, in view of the attitude of important parties in the Soviet camp it seemed increasingly unlikely that Khrushchev would succeed in extracting sufficient advantages in the XVLIL T RET remainder of the Communist world to compensate for the surrender of the Communist Far East. The Post-Khrushchev Balance While the new Soviet leadership was probably united from the outset on the need to slow down Khru-~ shchev's drive for a world Communist conference, it was divided into majority and minority tendencies on the other, related forergn policy issues. In the first weeks after Khrushchev's removal Soviet policy frequently gave the appearance of trying to ride off “in several directions at once, as the USSR strove to promote goals simultaneously which obviously were incompatible: to advance trade ‘and improve contacts with the United States, and also to try to improve relations with the Chinese; to claim publicly that money was being saved.through cuts in the military . budget reciprocal with U.S. cuts, and also to appeal to the interests of militant Communists in physical conflict with the United States; to reassure the Yugoslavs, and also to conciliate the Cubans and the radical parties of the Far East who all detested everything the Yugoslavs stood for. The unusually great contradictions in Soviet behavior in the first three months of the post- Khrushchev regime resulted from the simultaneous pursuit of separate lines of policy especially favored by different members of the new leadership both because of personal inclination and functional responsibility. As time went on--by December and January--the proportions of "soft" and “hard" ele- ments in the Soviet foreign policy "mix" began gradually to shift, with the harsher view of pol- icy toward the United States slowly gaining as the inevitable consequence of decisions and actions al- ready taken by an ideologically-oriented majority of the CPSU presidium. The most economically-oriented members of the new Soviet leadership, represented by Kosygin and Mikoyan, believed the reduction of tensions and a reasonably calm Soviet~American relationship essen- tial to the interests of the Soviet state, both be-- cause they valued the possibility of expanded xix ee a economic ties with the United States for their own sake, and, more important, because they resented the strains placed upon the Soviet economy and the limitations on a rise in the Standard of living im- posed by the demands of the arms race and by the pressures for still greater military and heavy in- dustry expenditures generated whenever the cold war was intensified. ‘A policy of seeking a relaxed public atmosphere in relations with the United States, however, .was at direct loggerheads with a policy of aggressively courting radical regimes and parties in underdeveloped areas which were violently hostile to the United States. Decisive in this respect were the massive reallocations of power within the new Soviet leader- ship as the result of Khrushchev's removal, which greatly strengthened the relative position of thase elements in the leadership who had long been unim- pressed by the necessity for or the desirability of an atmosphere of detente with the United States gov- ernment. These leaders were particularly sensitive to the reception given the long-reiterated Chinese : charges of Soviet-U.S. collusion, and were from the i first prepared--for the sake of the new Soviet drive among the anti-U.S. radicals--to take actions likely to impair relations with the United States. Thus of the three leading economically-oriented figures in the CPSU presidium in October 1964, the first (Khrushchev) was swept away, the second (Mi- koyan) suffered a.decisive setback in political power leading inevitably to his removal a year later, and the third (Kosygin) was promoted to be Premier but was forced to conform to the decisions of a presidium majority whose foreign policy leanings ran counter to his own. On the other hand, the strengthening of the ideologically-oriented trend in the presidium was demonstrated by the effect of the Khrushchev ouster | upon the position of three other leaders: Suslov, Shelepin, and Brezhnev. The super-ideologue Suslov, overseer of CPSU relations with the foreign Commu- nist world, now received vindication after years of. struggle with Khrushchev over the emphasis of CPSU foreign policies and the direction of CPSU XxX euros ieee eee tactics. Khrushchev's fall also catapulted Shelepin into full membership in the presidium, rewarding him for the important role he played in the coup itself, Since then Shelepin has-displayed savage hostility toward the United States, publicly and privately, more consistently than any other member of the lead- ership, including even Suslov. It is fairly likely that Shelepin was one of that "part" of the Soviet leadership to which the militant Japanese and Indo- nesian Communists kept referring in late 1964 and early 1965 as favoring their foreign policy views, and there is evidence that the. Chinese Communists thought this was the case. Finally, Khrushchev's fall brought Brezhnev the post of party first secretary, inherently the most important position in the Soviet Union, which Brezhnev has since used gradually to expand his power. There is evidence suggesting that during Khrushchev's last year Brezhnev had used his position and-his relations. with the secret police to seek to obstruct first Khrushchev's policy toward the United States and then his policy toward West Germany. These same relations with the KGB were used in October 1964 to guarantee Khrushchev's removal. Since then, Brezhnev has taken a line toward the United States Government which, while varying from one period to another, has gen- erally been considerably more harsh than Kosygin’s, although not quite as harsh as that of Shelepin or Suslov. He has shown a consistent desire to culti- vate and avoid offense to the militant wing of the world Communist movement, He appears to be the lead- ing force behind the steady push to halt Khrushchev's process of deStalinization and to restore a "balanced," fairly favorable picture of Stalin. Brezhnev has from the first gone far out of his way to court the Soviet military and to champion their interests; his consistent stress on the long-term and world-wide dangers of "U.S. imperialist aggression" and on the general rise in international tension has thus served to justify a greater share of the pie for military expenditures than Kosygin favored, just as it has also justified the conciliation of foreign militants, the Soviet posture of public hostility toward the United States, and sporadic efforts to cow heretical. writers at home. “XxKL Despite important differences within the ideo- logically-oriented majority wing of the Soviet leader- ship itself-~notably between Brezhnev and the ambi- tious extremist Shelepin-~the over-all shift in the balance of opinion within the leadership regarding the prierities of Soviet foreign policy was the key fact, and this change eventually became widely noted . in the world Communist movement. An important North Vietnamese. official in. April 1966 was to tell assembled Viet Cong leaders that the new Soviet leadership was on balance not 'as revisionist as the leadership under Khrushchev had been. He added that the Soviet lead- ership::"still contains some revisionists, some in- decisive eleménts, and also some active elements.” At about the same time on the other side of the world, a Hungarian party. official was to state pri- vately that “previously (i.e., under Khrushchev) the main. Line and principal stress" of his party had been centered.on peaceful coexistence, but that this "for- mer position" of the Hungarian party had been too "one-sided" and that peaceful coexistence was "not now central” to. Hungarian policy. Instead, it was now essential to place "a new stress" on aid to "liberation movements" around the world. This Hun-~ garian change in emphasis reflected the basic shift in Soviet policy which began when Khrushchev was re- moved. “ However, the change in the balance of forces in ‘the Soviet leadership and the consequent shift in the emphasis of policy toward the United States did not mean a greater willingness to run a Serious risk of direct military conflict with the United States. On the contrary, there is every indication that there has been little difference on this life-or-death mat~ ter between the minority of Soviet leaders that has wanted good relations with the United States and the Majority that has been willing to-.sacrifice such re- lations to other Soviet interests. All of the Soviet leaders (with the possible exception of Shelepin) appear to remain deeply impressed by the outcome of the Caribbean crisis of 1962. The Cuban lesson has been. clearly reflected in what. the Soviets have . not done with regard to North Vietnam. Despite Chi-- nese private and public taunts, they have apparently. not yet risked shipping sophisticated weapons or ammunition to the DRV by sea. The Soviets have also XXLi rejyected-~as designed to provoke a war between the USSR and the United States--repeated Chinese demands that the Soviet Union do. something in Europe to di- vert United States strength from Vietnam. The Soviet Bargain with Castro Meanwhile, in the six months following the fall of Khrushchev, the outline of a new set of Soviet policies toward the most militant anti-American forces of the Communist world took shape. First, the CPSU attempted to reach a modus vivéndi with Castro. After negotiations between the Soviets and Cubans in Moscow in.early November, a secret conference was held later in the month in Havana between the Cubans and representatives of virtually all the pro- Soviet Latin American Communist parties. In return for a-Cuban promise to limit Cuban support inthe future to revolutionary groups in Latin America approved by the pro-Soviet Communist party concerned, the CPSU | apparently promised the Cubans-~both directly in Moscow and indirectly through Soviet adherents at the Havana meeting--a more positive Soviet attitude toward the role of armed struggle in Latin America generally, and gave the Cubans to understand that in certain specified countries armed struggle would be supported as the dominant -line by the local Communist party and the Soviet Union. This agreement helped isolate pro~Chinese groups in Latin America from Castro's followers. ‘In some countries such as Guatemala the Havana agreement gave encouragement to the advocates of armed violence in their internal arguments with more cautious comrades. The CPSU's November 1964 deal with Castro on Latin America was eventually to break down when both sides reneged on some of their commitments. The point for the moment, however, was that the new So- viet leadership soon after taking power did make a strong effort to conciliate Castro, and that in re- turn for favors received it went further toward meet~ ing his militant views than Khrushchev had ever beeh willing to go. Almost simultaneously, the Soviet Union sought to take advantage of the events in the Leopoldville xxiii Congo in the last two months of 1964 to strengthen the Soviet position among radical African leaders in competition with the Chinese but at the direct ex- pense of the United States. Soviet measures in sup- port of an airlift aiding Congo rebels in this period. were supplemented by other gestures intended to im- press a radical audience. Most notable was a demon- stration staged before the United States Embassy in Moscow on 28 November. A TASS account the same day duly recorded with approval the hurling of ink bot- tles at the U.S. Embassy building. The decision of the new Soviet leadership to organize this demonstra- tion was particularly striking in that this was the first such demonstration td be held at the U.S. Em- : bassy since the Cuban crisis of October 1962. - Through-' out: the last two years of Khrushchev's tenure in office he had refrained from such hostile actions against the United States, even following the Gulf of Tonkin in- cidents of August and September 1964 involving a mem- ber of the "socialist camp." The Decision to Court Ho Chi Minh Of all the objectives sought’ by the new Soviet leadership through a shift in the emphasis of Khru- shchev's foreign policy, the recovery of a signifi- cant degree of influence over the North Vietnamese party was probably the single most important, Throughout the first nine months of 1964, Soviet-. DRV relations had continued slowly. to deteriorate as. the result of the great caution and coolness displayed by Khrushchev in matters considered by the North Viet- ye th namese to be vital to their national interests. The ; t absolute nadir was reached in September when TASS made the first and only explicit criticism of the conduct of a DRV representative ever published by Soviet propaganda. This steady decay of relations between the two parties came to a halt with Khru- shchev's fall, and matters began gradually to im- prove thereafter. During a visit to Moscow in Novem- -ber 1964 DRV Premier Pham Van Dong received suffi- cient indications of an evolution in CPSU policy toward both the DRV and the United States to en- courage Hanoi to maintain a conciliatory posture toward the USSR over the next two months despite increasing Chinese pressure to abandon it. xxiv T EY. The decisive watershed in Soviet-North Vietnamese relations was the visit of a Soviet delegation led by Premier Kosygin to Hanoi in early February 1965. Kosygin, offered the DRV an important package of eco- nomic and military assistance, including most notably MIG fighter planes ard SA-2 missiles for air defense. In return the Soviets expected and the North Vietnam- ese were prepared to offer certain minimal political concessions. One of these was’ a DRV promise to abstain--regardless of what the Chinese did--from all | criticism of the forthcoming Moscow preparatory meet~ ing for‘’a world Communist.conference,:a meeting which the Soviets had by now postponed from December until March. In addition, the North Vietnamese accepted a Kosygin suggestion to urge upon the Chinese a joint statement by North Vietnam, Communist China, and the Soviet Union to serve as a "warning" to the United States. When in late February Hanoi prepared and forwarded a draft proposal to this effect, the So- viets of course accepted it, while the Chinese pre- dictably rejected it, since acceptance would tend to undermine the effort they were by then engaged in throughout the world to depict the USSR as a perfidi- ous lackey of imperialism. Gratified by the success .of this ploy in exposing Chinese recalcitrance to the North Vietnamese, the Soviets were to repeat it and expand it in the’ future. The Soviet Union meanwhile made two concrete military proposals to Communist China soon after Ko- sygin's return from Hanoi. On 25 February, the USSR requested the CPR to grant it an "air corridor" ‘to North Vietnam--that. is, blanket authorization for large numbers of Soviet transport aircraft to over- fly China back and forth over a given route ferrying military equipment to the DRV. Shortly thereafter, the USSR asked for the use of one or more air bases in South China, near the Vietnamese border, to be manned by Soviet personnel and apparently to be used for the assembly of MIG fighter planes shipped by rail from the Soviet Union. Both requests were adamantly refused by the Chinese, and these refusals were prob- ably helpful to the CPSU in its political struggle .with the CCP for Hanoi's sympathies. Also of some xXXV j TP-SECREP Psi, help to the Soviets in this regard was Mao’s obstinacy in temporarily obstructing and delaying rail transit through China, from March until June 1965, of Soviet SAM technicians and SAM components for North Vietnam— ese air defense. : On another subject, however, the Soviets simul- taneously lost a point to the Chinese in Vietnamese eyes. Immediately after Kosygin's return to Moscow, the Soviet Government formally proposed to Hanoi and Peking the convening of an international conference — on Vietnam, and meanwhile made contacts with the French toward this end. The Soviets apparently took this action because the North Vietnamese had previ- ously been toying with the notion that the United States might be willing to use such a conference as -a face-saving device to cover a U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam and the establishment of some..mechan~ ism which would assure the gradual advent to power there of the National Liberation Front. The DRV had evidently not yet completely abandoned this notion when Kosygin left Hanoi. By March, however, the DRV leadership had concluded from the U.S. bombings of North Vietnam and other U.S. actions that the United States had no intention of capitulating to their. wishes, either openly or tacitly. Without such a prior U.S. intention, the North Vietnamese saw no purpose in any conference, and moreover came to agree with the Chinese that Soviet soundings for a conference were themselves positively harmful as tending to create political pressures on the DRV itself for con- cessions. Chastened by DRV criticism, the Soviet Union ever since this experience has been at pains to remain within the bounds of North Vietnamese pol- icy on this issue. a : In sum, in their first six months in power the new Soviet leaders had made considerable progress in their dealings with the North Vietnamese. The worsen- ing of party relations had been halted, high-level contacts had taken place, and a. foothold for Soviet influence had been obtained. On the other hand, the USSR had had two unpleasant surprises in February and March: first, the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam--~ which suggested that a long and possibly dangerous war rather than an imminent victory was in prospect; XXVL second, the hostile DRV reaction to Soviet initia- _ tives.on negotiations--which warned the Soviets that they would henceforth be prisoners of DRV policy on this issue. Never before had the Soviet Union en- gaged its prestige so far in support of a belligerent over whose decisions the. USSR had so little control, Since February 1965, although the Soviets may well have preferred (on balance) that the war and its associated military risks be ended, they have taken no serious political risks to try to make it end. Moscow has concentrated primarily on a very successful effort to utilize the war and Soviet pro- fessions of support for the North Vietnamese to reduce the influence of both the Chinese Communists and. the United States throughout the world: Ever since the Soviets burned their fingers in February 1965, there has been no credible evidence that the Soviets have at any time been willing to endanger their credit in Hanoi by seeking through pressure to compel the North Vietnamese to do something they did not wish to do regarding negotiations. On the other hand, there .is abundant evidence that the CPSU has several times sought to draw on the credit thus preserved to get Hanoi to take part in Communist anti~U.S. gatherings boycotted by the Chinese. ; , Soviet Conciliation of North Korea During the same six-month period: following Khrushchev's fall the CPSU took its first steps to improve relations with the North Koreans, who had previously gone considerably further than the North Vietnamese in outspoken support of the Chinese posi-~ tion and in waging open polemics with Khrushchev. The Korean Communists were delighted at Khrushchev's removal and were privately hopeful of an evolution of Soviet policy in the militant, anti-United States direction they favored. Kosygin's visit to North. Ko- rea in Pebruary 1965, like his visit to North Viet- nam on the same journey, marked a turning point for ‘the CPSU. One outcome of Kosygin's talks with Kim Il-sung was a mutual understanding that there would be no further ‘public attacks exchanged between the two parties. Kosygin also apparently discussed with Kim the resumption of both Soviet economic aid and xXVii the Soviet deliveries of advanced weapons to North: Korea which Khrushchev had halted in December 1962, al- though no concrete agreement was yet reached. Subse- quent North Korean private statements confirmed that Pyongyang had already shifted its position a consider- able distance away from the obdurate Chinese attitude toward the USSR. The North Korean party was subse- quently to move much further as the Soviet aid program to North Korea was indeed restored and as Chinese ob- struction of unity of action over Vietnam was further illuminated - xe events. In the: same initial six-month period, the CPSU began efforts to neutralize the three leading non-bloc supporters of the CCP in Asia: the Japanese and Indo- nesian Communist parties and the schismatic left wing of the Indian Communist party. Leaders of all three parties showed awareness and appreciation of some im- provement in (i.e., some toughening of) the Soviet atti- tude toward the United States. But immediate CPSU progress in these three cases was hindered because in each case, at the moment of Khrushchev's fall, the Soviets. were engaged in organizational activities hostile to the party concerned which the CPSU subse- _ quently was reluctant or unable to give up completely. In the case of the Japanese party, this was CPSU support for dissident Japanese “revisionist” leaders expelled from the JCP. In the case of the Indonesian party, it was covert Soviet.financial support of Indo- nesian moderate leftists hostile to the PKI. And in the case of the pro-Chinese left wing of the Indian party, it was CPSU identification with the Dange right- wing leadership of the party at a time when the left wing. was in the-process of formally seceding to form ‘a separate party. The Soviets initially made the least progress with the oa a ae the most progress with the Indians, The Chou Visit.and the Mao-Kosygin Talks As for relations between the Soviets and the Chi- nese themselves, it would appear that both major an- tagonists were temporarily misled by false hopes as to the other party's intentions following the ouster xxviii of Khrushchev. Judging by the conduct of Chou En-lar during the talks he held with the new Soviet leaders in Moscow in November 1964, the CCP seems really to have. thought that the-new CPSU leaders might’ be so desperate for a relaxation of‘Chinese pressure against them as to be willing to buy Peking off with humili- ating public concessions of a fundamental nature~-con- cessions which would in effect acknowledge that the Chinese had been right all along and the Soviets wrong, and’ would thus constitute a long step toward abdication of leadership of the Communist movement to Peking. ‘At least some of the new Soviet leaders, for their part, seem to have overestimated the relative importance of Mao's personal hatred of Khrushchev as a factor in Chi- nese conduct (intense though that hatred was),. and underestimated the relative importance and permanence of Mao's pretensions to lead the revolutionary world and his ambition to be universally recognized as that leader.’ When in the Moscow November talks the Soviets re- fused to make the fundamental concessions Chou demanded, Chou reportedly was taken aback, asked why the CPSU had then purged Khrushchev, and refused to consider Brezhnev's request for discussion of a permanent ces- Sation of polemics and a halt to "factional activities" ‘in the world Communist movement.’ The Soviets later . said that they offered Chou "concrete suggestions on _ the expansion of Soviet-Chinese trade" and on "scien- tific-technical and cultural cooperation" which the Chinese leadership subsequently rejected. Despite this offer, and despite indications from, the Soviets that they (unlike Khrushchev) were now prepared to make concessions regarding the agenda, timing, and “participation in a preparatory meeting for a world Communist conference, Chou refused to discuss Chinese participation in any such gathering, and warned the Soviets not to hold the meeting. Chou lectured the Soviets on their iniquities at some length, and warned the new leaders that they faced the same fate as that of Khrushchev. After Chou had returned home, the CCP resumed the polemical attacks on Moscow that it had temporarily suspended after Khrushchev's ouster. The final evidence of Chinese intransigence was provided by the talks Kosygin had in Peking with Mao Tse-tung in February 1965. It is clear from the. xxix sg ess ey reliable and detailed accounts of these talks which have becomé available that Mao was supremely arrogant, sarcastic, and absolutely implacable. Kosygin, for i. ee | the record, repeatedly asked, as in November, that . i differences be put aside, polemics halted, and unity ; | against "imperialism" established. Kosygin asked the . 4 Chinese to discuss conditions for a world Communist | conference, and offered to open up the Soviet-con- trolled international journal Problems of Peace and Socialism to both sides. _ oe Mao's response to.all Kosygin's efforts was to announce that "we are now raising the price," and that the polemic would continue for.10,000 years, He re- fused to discuss a world meeting. He ignored the sug- gestion regarding Problems of Peace and Socialism. He asserted that "you must state that everything was a mistake;" and in short, he would accept nothing léss. than complete self-abasement by the CPSU. Mao predicted that within 10 to.15 years tension would further increase, the United States would attack the USSR and the CPR, and only then would the Soviets and Chinese possibly unite. Mao also implied that a | change in the world balance of ‘power would occur within : , this period as the result of coming Chinese progress in advanced weapons technology, and that these Chinese ad- vances would help to bring about a showdown with the United States. ; The February Mao-Kosygin interview played an ‘ important. role in clearing the way for the meéting of Communist parties in Moscow, which the CPSU had postponed from 15 December to 1 March. The record of the interview served as evidence to show wavering for-. eign Communists at the Moscow meeting, to bolster the CPSU leadership's contention that it was being more conciliatory than Khrushchev had been while Mao was not. ; ‘ The March 1965 Moscow Meeting “ Throughout the 1-5 March meeting. attended by 19 parties, the main point at issue was whether anything. concrete should be done to bring closer an all-party world conference: specificially, whether or not to -XXKX Pe ee ee 2 A Ne a a ad send out to all the 81 parties a draft letter the CPSU had prepared for this purpose. The private speeches at the March meeting show that the Italian and British parties were adamantly opposed to sending the letter, that the Cubans were completely noncommittal, and that all others favored the letter; After a considerable struggle, the CPSU had to yield to the Italian and BEieset recalcitrants, and the letter was scrapped, , The outcome’ of the Moscow meeting showed the CPSU clearly that a world Communist conference for the time being remained, as it had been for Khrushchev, impos- sible to organize without unacceptable defections and political losses. For the next few months the CPSU. therefore. desisted. from further efforts to promote a 1957 or 1960-type. conference to lay down general guide- _ lines for the world Communist movement. — XXX1 Part If The March Moscow Demonstration Meanwhile, early in March, while the 19-party meeting was still going on in Moscow, the Chinese regime organized an unprecedented provocation against _the Soviet Union, designed to-create a dramatic im- pression of Soviet.perfidy upon the radical anti- U.S. Communists, and particularly upon the Vietnamese. The CCP. decided, in effect, to call the CPSU bluff on the question of hostile demonstrations at the U.S. embassy in Moscow. On 4 March 1965, the Soviet government, after momentary hesitation, appears to have authorized an- other demonstration at the U.S. embassy to protest the resumption of bombing of North Vietnam the day before. The Chinese embassy usurped control of this demonstration, which was carried out by some 2,000 Asian students, chiefly Chinese and Vietnamese..Al- though the Soviets had reluctantly authorized the demonstration (apparently to appease the North Viet- namese), they had anticipated the possibility of un- authorized actions. In fact, after the. demonstrators had pelted the embassy building with ink and stones, they broke through the barriers in an effort to get at the building, and were then repulsed by the Soviet police, with considerable difficulty, in a wild melee in which there were a number of injured on. : both sides and in which Soviet troops were eventually brought on the scene. Several demonstrators were arrested. ’ F A comic-opera propaganda battle ensued over the next few weeks. The Chinese emphasized the con- trast between Soviet professions of support for North. Vietnam against the United States and Soviet sup- pression of this demonstration. The whole affair was on balance a CCP tactical political victory over the CPSU, albeit a minor and temporary one. Both sides were playing to an audience, the radical Asian Communists, particularly the North Vietnamese--and the Chinese were on the offensive and the Soviets on the defensive throughout. xXxKili However, the most lasting effect of the episode was to bring home to the Soviet leaders the realiza- tion that Soviet anti-U.S. demagoguery, while still immensely useful. and necessary to Soviet policy, must have more sharply defined limits to prevent unforeseen and possibly dangerous consequences. The CPSU leadership discovered that Khrushchev's ban against demonstrations at the U.S. embassy in recent years had’ not been such a bad idea after all. Since March 1965, there have been no more such demonstra- tions before the embassy, although there have been plenty of "spontaneous" meetings elsewhere in Moscow to protest U.S. policies. ~ . The key to the entire Soviet effort to isolate the Chinese from now on was the issue of “unity of action” in support of North Vietnam against the United States. This issue.gradually became the most im~ portant single vehicle for the restoration of CPSU influence and diminution of CCP influence among all the radical anti-U.S. forces of the Communist world. At the same time, in Eastern Europe, the issue of unity of action was to be a bludgeon in the hands of the CPSU with which the Soviets sought to impose a greater uniformity of line, to shore up Soviet au- thority, and in particular, to force a reduction in East European.contacts with the United States. The 1965 Sino-~Soviet Correspondence In an exchange of secret party letters between the Soviets and the Chinese in the spring and summer of 1965, the CPSU twice revived the North Vietnamese proposal for a tripartite statement to warn the - United States, demanded a tripartite meeting to dis- cuss aid to the DRV, and charged the Chinese with responsibility for the delay of deliveries of Soviet weapons to Vietnam. The Chinese replied with a violent denunciation of the Soviet diplomatic activities in - February intended to bring about negotiations on Viet~ nam, and charged the USSR with continuing collusion with the United States "to find a way out for the American aggressors." The CCP concluded by reiterating that any Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese meeting would only be harmful, and by insisting that "united action" of : § XXXiV es any kind with the Soviets would be impossible un- til the CPSU formally abandoned all its innumerable treacherous activities as well as all the revisionist conclusions of its party program and party congresses. of the last, decade, The Chinese were subsequently to distribute . copies of this letter to other parties around the world and then to repeat’ most of its details in .editorials published in the fall. In so doing, the .CCP was obstinately entrenching itself in a weak ~ position: the Chinese charges of Soviet collusion with the United States, the belittling of Soviet aid to North Vietnam, and the excuse given for refusing a tripartite meeting all were to appear less and less credible to Communists everywhere as time went on, The over-all“Chinese position was of great help to the CPSU . and was. harmful to the CCP in the struggle between the two for influence in North Vietnam and among radical Communists elsewhere, Evidence of this fact, however, did not prevent the Chinese party under Mao from taking a more and more extreme position -in condemnation of both unity of action with the Soviets and of all who favored such unity. : The Disastrous Chinese Autumn of 1965 ‘In July 1965, at the Ninth Rumanian party con- gress, Brezhnev and Teng Hsiao-ping are reported to have held private talks, marked by violent disagree- ment; and these were the last personal contacts be- tween leaders of the Soviet and Chinese parties to date. It is probable that these will be the last such contacts ever to be held between the two par- ties while Mao lives, for in the fall of 1965 Mao -began to accelerate a process which was to lead to a virtual rupture of party relations with the CPSU the following spring. In the same period Mao began to draw ever firmer lines of demarcation between himself and all of erring humanity, and the Chinese party became increasingly estranged from all its former Communist allies and all the Communist neutrals who insisted on maintaining or improving relations with the CPSU and who thereby refused to ‘demonstrate obedience to Mao's will. At the same time, Mao began to turn on the Chinese Communist party itself, and slowly unfolded an unprecedented campaign--still expanding 18 months later--to XXXV terrorize and purge in stages all CCP leaders at every level similarly suspected of being insuf- ficiently obedient to his will. A steady succession of major Chinese disasters in dealings with the outside world appear to have not discouraged, but to have confirmed Mao in this increasingly paranoid approach’ to the universe. The three most important of these defeats in the fall of 1965 were the deflation of Chinese threats to intervene in the.India-Pakistan war in September, the disastrous 30 September coup attempt in Indonesia and the subsequent decimation of the PKI, and the abandonment of the Second Bandung Conference in November as. the result of Chinese inability to secure the exclusion of the USSR from participation... In ; each case,. the Soviets exploited the Chinese setback ‘to further isolate Mao. In the case of the India-Pakistan war, after the Chinese sought to intervene by sending the Indians an ultimatum demanding withdrawal from al- leged fortifications on the Sino~Indian border, the Soviets sent Peking an urgent secret party letter deploring the Chinese action and (according to the Chinese reply) “attempting to make us afraid with a threat about the United States." The Chinese . thereupon first extended their ultimatum deadline and then--when Pakistan to their dismay accepted a ceasefire--were obliged to allow the ultimatum to fade away ingloriously, attempting to cover their discomfiture with a-dubious claim that the Indians had stealthily complied with their demands. The net effect was to make Peking look somewhat ridic- ulous, and the widespread impression was created that the Chinese had been forced to back down. Hard on the heels of this misadventure came the greatest disaster ever to befall Chinese Commu- nist foreign policy and the greatest single loss ever suffered by the CCP in the Sino-Soviet struggle. ' This was the failure of the 30 September coup in Djakarta and all its eventual consequences. These included the undermining and destruction of Sukarno's power by the Indonesian military leaders, the virtual liquidation of the central apparatus of the Indonesian Communist party and much of the party's membership, and the eradication of the PKI's overt XXXVL influence on Indonesian political life. The largest non~bloc party in the world--and the most important such party to have sided with the CCP against the CPSU--was thus driven deep underground, its voice in international Communist councils silenced, and many of its surviving cadres now increasingly sus- ceptible to Soviet anti-CCP propaganda. The Peking- Djakarta axis was destroyed and Indonesian foreign policy totally reoriented, transforming this nation of one hundred million--thé: CPR's most valuable ‘ally--into another member of the ring of hostile states surrounding Communist China. Indonesia was lost as the most valuable base for Chinese-run in- ternational front organizations, The Chinese Commu~ nist crusade against the United Nations lost its most important recruit, and the Indonesian campaign to “crush" Malaysia was ended. From the Soviet point of view, the most help- ful side-effect of all was the fact that many Commu- nist leaders, in Asia and elsewhere, needed no So- viet urging to leap to the conclusion that the Chi~ nese had instigated the PKI's attempted coup. The Soviets did their best in their private comments around the world to encourage this view of the PKI’s disaster and to point the moral that this was .a fate which could envelop any party that listened to the Chinese. —. ; The third great Chinese defeat in the fall. of 1965 was the total collapse of Chinese efforts to promote the isolation of the Soviet Union and the ‘condemnation of the United States through the vehicle of a Second Bandung Conference, a second general summit meeting of Asian and African heads ’ of state from which the USSR would be excluded. When the Algerian leader Ben Bella was overthrown on the eve of the scheduled opening of this conference in Algiers in June 1965,. the Chinese offended many states by applying heavy pressure and insults in a vain effort to prevent the conference from being postponed until November. By the fall of 1965, however, when the Chinesé discovered that they would be unable to keep the USSR from attending the con- ference, they reversed their position completely. The insults that Chinese representatives had heaped on those who in June had opposed holding the con- ference at that time were far exceeded by the private vituperation, threats, and boycott warnings used in XXXViL October against those who wished to hold it. In the end, the conference was cancelled, and the Chi- nese thus saved from the final disaster.of a Second Bandung. meeting held without them and with the So- viets. Meanwhile, in September and October 1965, while all these unprecedented foreign defeats were being suffered, a high-level meeting of Chinese Communist leaders was taking place in which CPR Chairman Liu Shao~chi and party general secretary Teng Hsiao- ping evidently took positions on Mao's plans for a domestic “cultural revolution" that were unsatis- rer factory, ‘to Mao. Foreign events may conceivably have be played ‘an indirect role at this meeting by reinforcing of the domestic views of Lo Jui-ching, the PLA Chief ‘of Staff and central committee secretariat member who was to be the first great purge victim in late November. Subsequent charges have implied that Lo, among other things, had sought to minimize the dis- ruption of army combat training caused by lengthy. political indoctrination in Mao's writings and by productive labor. The danger of direct confronta- tion with the United States created by the Vietnam war could easily have made differences over this domestic policy question more acute. And if the foreign policy setbacks played. any role at all in generating opposition to Mao's wishes at the Sep~ tember~October meetings, it is most likely to have done so indirectly by intensifying Lo's views on PLA training. However, despite subsequent Chinese Red Guard: insinuations and Soviet and Chinese Nationalist fabrications, no credible evidence has yet been re- ceived to indicate that Lo or any other top Chinese: leader since Peng Te~huai in 1959 has intrigued with ‘the Soviets against Mao's power or policies or had unauthorized or unreported dealings with the Soviet Union. Moreover, there are as yet no solid grounds for concluding that any leaders at the September- October meeting, with or without Soviet encouragement, directly raised the issue of the massive foreign policy reverses that were being fostered by Mao's policies. Yet those foreign setbacks may well have played another role at this time: that of aggravating Mao's paranoid tendencies, and of increasing his al- ready growing suspicion and anger at real or fancied xXXXVLLL domestic recalcitrance. External frustrations and humiliations may have helped impel an aging Mao to decide finally to take drastic action, while time was still left to him, in the internal field where he could make his'will felt--that is, to remake China and the Chinese Communist party in the image being rejected ‘by an Ungeeterul world. The Chinese Editorial and the Abortive Soviet Conference In a landmark editorial published on 11 November 1965, the Chinese for the first time publicly refused to attend any joint meeting with the Soviets and North Vietnamese, told the Soviets that "there are things that divide us and nothing that unites us;" and an- nounced that a "clear line of demarcation both polit- ically and organizationally" must be drawn between — themselves and their friends on the one hand, and the Soviets and their friends on the other hand. The Soviets reacted to this by attempting to ex- ploit Chinese self-isolation to organize an aid-~to- Vietnam conference without the Chinese. Using the Poles as intermediaries, the CPSU had secret. invita- tions sent to all bloc countries (including Albania and the CPR) requesting attendance at a meeting to coordinate Vietnam aid which the CPSU planned to hold immediately following the 23rd CPSU Congress in Mos- cow in April 1966. A number of important non-bloc parties--including the Italians and Japanese~-were also to be invited to this conference. The North Vietnamese decision was crucial in determining whether this meeting could be held in the face of the ex~- pected Chinese refusal to’attend. Although Shelepin apparently lobbied hard for North Vietnamese accept- ance of the invitation during his visit to Hanoi in January 1966, thé DRV felt obliged to decline rather than affront the Chinese so directly. This effectively killed the conference for. the time being. Shelepin ‘received a consolation prize, however, when the North Vietnamese in a joint communiqué with the Soviets publicly announced their intention to attend the 23rd CPSU Congress itself despite signs that Mao was contemplating a boycott of the congress. Meanwhile, the CPSU had sent a secret letter to the Chinese party protesting the statements made in XXXLX OPS the 11 November Chinese editorial, and Mao responded in early January with a secret letter mocking the Soviets, and offering the most authoritative state- Ment to date of the Chinese view of the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance: the view that this treaty would ie be of no value to Communist China in the event of a Sino-U.S. war. At just about the same time, in January 1966, the Soviets disseminated to many parties throughout the world--and then internally throughout the CPSU-- a long letter setting forth in detail Soviet grievances accumulated against the..Chinese since the new Soviet leadership succeeded Khrushchev. This letter. read ; as if its drafters had decided that Chinese progressive estrangement from the Communist movement because of Mao's obstinacy had now gone sufficiently far to make it politically safe for the CPSU to resume through private channels the sort of direct, across-the- board attacks ‘on the CCP that had characterized most of Khrushchev's last 18 months. The one important difference remaining at this point was that Soviet ublic propaganda had not yet resumed the vitupera- tive denunciations of the Chinese heard in 1963 and 1964. In the coming year Mao was to make this possible and profitable, too. Mao Draws Some Lines In the first months of 1966, Mao Tse-tung (a). clashed personally and dramatically with the lead- ers of the Japanese Communist party, converting the CCP-JCP relationship from one of growing friction to one of open hostility almost overnight; (b) thereby greatly worsened the already cool Chinese relation~ ship to the Korean party; (c) entered into public polemics with the Cubans for the first time; (d) forced Chou En~lai to pick a fight.with the neutral Rumanians; (e) publicly refused to send a CCP rep- resentative to the 23rd CPSU congress despite the fact that the North Vietnamese ‘and North Koreans were attending, thus breaking the chief remaining strand of Sino-Soviet party relations at a time when former Chinese allies were maintaining or im- proving their relations with the CPSU; and (f) " xl i arrested Péking first secretary Peng Chen amidst a mammoth press campaign, and. thus brought into the open the long-drawn-out purge of the Chinese Communist leadership and apparatus which was still in .progress.a year later. Having threat- _ ened the universe in November 1965, Mao now began to implement his threat. The Alliance of Independent Communist Militants Throughout’ 1966, as the North Korean,’ Japanese, and. Cuban parties each became more and more estranged from the Chinese, an.informal political alliance among these three leading radicals became more and | more overt. A fourth member of this radical group~~ the North Vietnamese party--shared fully the views of the other three, but differed in one important respect: it was unable to speak out publicly as unequivocally as the others on most issues because. of its dependence upon the Soviet Union and Communist China for assistance in the war. The North Koreans, Japanese, and Cubans have more than made up for the North Vietnamese reticence. These three independent radicals (and their relatively silent partner, the North Vietnamese) have a common outlook on these two basic points: 1) Uncompromising opposition to pretensions by either the CPSU or the CCP to have the right to give orders or guidance to the world movement, and particularly to them. 2) Uncompromising hostility to the United States, deriving primarily from a direct clash of . the private interests of each.of these parties with those of the United States. A corollary has been a constant clamor against any actions of either omission or commission, by either the Soviet Union or Communist China, which appeared to injure the cause of the struggle against "U.S. imperialism." Because Communist China has virtually written off all of them but the North Vietnamese as parties with which the CCP wishes to have anything like friendly dealings, and because the Soviets, on the contrary, have actively courted them all, the leverage xli of these parties on CPSU policy is now much greater a than their leverage on Chinese policy. Because of ‘the direction in which this leverage is exerted, the independence of these parties is not a factor helpful to the United States. x1lii Part TIr The North Vietnamese Quarrels With Mao For the North Vietnamese, constrained by their continuing dependence on Chinese support for their war effort,.1966 saw an aggravation of several specific grievances against the Cccp. . The first of these was Mao's hostile attitude toward the "unity of action" line. To the unwelcome Chinese action in 1965~-the obstruction of Soviet aid to Vietnam, the refusals to sign a tripartite statement or attend a tripartite or bloc conference on aid to Vietnam-~worse actions were now added. These included the Chinese virtual break in party. relations with the CPSU and its friends, public and private pressure on Hanoi to do likewise, and re- peated threats to the continuation of. Sino-Soviet state relations which must have alarmed Hanoi con~ siderably because of the implied menace to the So-~, viet military aid supply line through China. A second continuing grievance was the Chinese ‘claim to have furnished precept and model--in Mao's writings and Chinese Communist experience--for the North Vietnamese struggle against the United States. Despite Chinese awareness of North Vietnamese sensi- tivity on this issue--which goes to the heart of the cherished autonomy of the North Vietnamese party-~ Mao's arrogance has continued to create friction. — The ever~-mounting claims made for Mao and the con- tinued expansion of Mao’s cult in connection with the "great cultural revolution" in the fall and win- | ter of 1966 brought the Chinese into further conflict with the North Vietnamese, as with virtually everyone else, and a Chinese attempt to export cultural revolu-- tion propaganda to North Vietnam appears to have been one of the offenses that evoked a thinly-veiled per- sonal attack on Mao Py a North Vietnamese party journal in May 1967. Furthermore, the Chinese have not hesitated to ‘give the North Vietnamese repeated unwelcome advice on how to run their war, and to change that advice when they felt it necessary. There is evidence that in 1966 there were differences of view between Peking and Hanoi xliii = on several issues of tactics and strategy. The Chi- nese, whose territory was not being bombed, were less in a hurry than the DRV, and viewed with greater equanimity the prospect of North Vietnam fighting ; indefinitely on the strategic defensive to "bog down" the United States in South Vietnam for many years. The Chinese wished the Viet Cong main forces to take fewer risks than some North Vietnamese leaders wished to take in accepting large-scale direct encounters — with U.S. units under unfavorable circumstances. And the Chinese wished the Viet.Cong when confronted with superior force to abandon temporarily strongholds which in some cases the DRV felt it necessary to de- ‘fend. “” A further major grievance was the Chinese pre- sumption in attempting to dictate to Hanoi what tac- tical stand to take or not to take on the question of negotiations. The North Vietnamese, increasingly in- fluenced by the damage wraught’ by U.S. bombing, had become increasingly sympathetic to Soviet efforts through diplomacy and propaganda to secure termina- tion of the bombing by merely holding out the prospect of peace talks. In early 1967, the DRV removed some - of its earlier ambiguity to indicate more strongly than ever before that a permanent bombing halt could bring talks. This reduction of ambiguity alarmed and infuriated the Chinese, despite the fact that the cen- tral DRV position had not changed nor was likely to, change: while by now quite eager, even anxious to ob- tain a cessation of bombing without significant cost, the North Vietnamese remained completely unwilling to halt their effort to conquer South Vietnam as the price of such a cessation; and they were determined, if they entered talks in exchange for a bombing halt, to con- tinue their war effort simultaneous with long, pro- tracted negotiations, while the United States remained | bound to continue to abstain from bombing. : Mao's persisting fears about a North Vietnamese entry into talks with the United States even on these terms appear to be based partly on indications that the North Vietnamese, after fighting while talking for a certain period, might sign an agreement halting the fighting at leasc temporarily in exchange for something less than immediate total U.S. withdrawal. Mao appears to harbor unwarranted suspicions that Hanoi might then xliv in fact acquiesce in the presence of Americans and U.S. bases in Vietnam indefinitely. The "Cultural Revolution" and the Renewed Soviet Offensive : Meanwhile, on 23 March 1966, the CCP released a letter they had just sent to the CPSU refusing to at- tend the 23rd CPSU Congress, and thus breaking the principal remaining strand of Sino-Soviet party re- lations. Since that time, there has been no intel- ligence evidence whatever of personal contacts be- tween representatives of the two parties (as distin- guished from govermental diplomatic contacts) or of letters exchanged between ‘the two parties (as distin- guished from the many fiery Foreign Ministry notes - soon to fly back and forth). While it. is conceivable that secret meetings have been held or letters sent which have gone totally unreported, the picture pre- ‘sented by the evidence to date is one of a total break in party relations since March 1966--the organizational "clear line of demarcation" that Mao Ahad prophesied in November. At the same time, Mao began in the spring his long-drawn-out purge of the party apparatus. Then, at the Eleventh Plenum of the Chinese party's central com- mittee in early August, Mao cast down as unsatisfactory the two chief managers of the party machine: his heir apparent, the senior vice chairman Liu Shao-chi, and the party secretary general Teng Hsiao-ping. In the violent ordeal which has gone on in many waves since then, most other central and provincial leaders have been subjected to unprecedented public pressure from student fanatics organized as Red Guards. Again and again, the apparatus of the party and government has been subjected to public humiliation, has been tested, and purged. These events offered too good an Sapeevoniey for exploitation against the Chinese for the Soviets to pass up, and gradually in the fall of 1966 the CPSU re- sumed and expanded the direct public attacks on the Chi- nese regime whica the Soviet leadership had muffled ever since Khrushchev was overthrown. The Soviets wept copi- ous crocodile tears for the central figures under attack {naming Liu as one of them in late September), and for xlv Ss the provincial party organizations beleaguered by the Red Guards, and depicted the resistance to the Red Guards organized by some of the party functionaries as a spontaneous outpouring of popular support for the noble Chinese party against Mao's "hooligans." The Soviets soon began to stress that only naked military force--the PLA--was behind the Red Guards in their con- flict with the wisely anti-Maoist Chinese party and people. This line was transparently designed to appeal to the sympathies of foreign party functionaries. Thus the Soviets had begun once more, after a two- year halt, to attack Mao publicly by name, and within a. few weeks added Mao's new heir Lin Piao as well. In addition to the public propaganda attacks, one closely guarded CPSU letter on the cultural revolution was dis- patched to bloc parties in December, and another to.many non-bloc.- parties. After a CPSU Central Committee plenum was held in mid-December to discuss the China question, unprecedented briefings of the Soviet party and army were conducted by the entire Soviet leadership in Janu- ary 1967, and the rank-and-file was warned of the pos- sibility that Chinese provocations might force a rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The Siege of the Soviet Embassy . These Soviet measures were taken after state rela- tions between the Soviet Union and Communist China had grown steadily worse throughout the fall, with worse yet to come. In August and again in early November the Chi- nese conducted noisy demonstrations: before the Soviet Embassy in Peking, each time rejecting Soviet government protests. Then, in late January 1967, the Chinese ini- tiated the most serious threat they had ever made to the continued existence of Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations-- and to the Soviet overland supply route to Hanoi. ‘An - incident involving Chinese students in Moscow was used - as a pretext for the imposition of a violent two-and-a- half week siege of the Soviet Embassy in Peking. There is evidence suggesting that the initial incident and the siege and demonstrations that followed were deliberately planned, provoked and coordinated. The Soviet reaction to all this was to resolve to hold on in Peking as long as they could. The Soviets were well aware why the Chi- nese might wish to force them out, and the Chinese were xlvi well aware why the Soviets were determined to stay. A formal break in diplomatic relations would serve as a legal pretext to sever permanently the Soviet land and air transportation routes across China, and thereby present the USSR with the dilemma of either accepting an end to their military aid to North Viet- nam--a political disaster--or of shipping their sen- sitive military equipment to the DRV by sea and run-~ ning a serious risk of confrontation with the United States, ; : There is some evidence to suggest that Chinese obstruction of the passage of Soviet aid to North Vietnam through China may have been temporarily re- imposed in January shortly before the siege of the. Soviet embassy was.begun, It is possible that one purpose of the Chinese pressures against the Soviet . presence in China in late January and early February. - was to suggest forcibly to the Vietnamese that the Chinese might cut'off the Soviet supply line perma- nently if the DRV agreed to enter into peace negoti- ations with the United States. The siege of the So- viet embassy was halted when a North Vietnamese dele- gation flew to Peking immediately after receipt of a letter from President Johnson to Ho Chi Minh pro- posing peace talks on terms which -Ho subsequently re- jected. 5 Separate agreements were apparently subsequently reached between the North Vietnamese and Chinese and the Chinese and Soviets on the question of Soviet aid transit; these agreements may have involved renewal of a 30 March 1965 two-year Sino-Soviet rail trans- portation agreement on aid to Vietnam. The new agree- ments evidently ratified the practice of having the North Vietnamese accept the Soviet military aid ship- ments at the Sino-Soviet border and ride with them through China to North Vietnam; but contrary to some Soviet reports, there is reason to believe that this practice was begun not in 1967 but months before, in the fall of 1966. There is no reason to believe that . the new agreements will in themselves prevent Mao from reimposing obstacles to the passage of Soviet. - aid at any time, in the future when he may feel it politically desirable to do so. xlviL The cessation of the siege of the Soviet embassy and the relaxation of pressure on the Soviet supply line to,Vietnam removed for the time being the threat of a complete break in Sino~Soviet state relations, but did not halt the continued deterioration of those relations, the build-up: of Soviet. military defenses along the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia, or the steady outpouring of mutual vituperation. By now Mao was depicted in Soviet propaganda as a madman, a racist, a Hitler, a militarist, a friend of Chinese capitalists and enemy of Chinese Communists, an ally of American -"imperialism,” and a would-be conqueror of all neigh-~ ‘boring peoples, including the Vietnamese. A salient feature of the CPSU's anti-Mao. propa- ganda has been the thorough way in which it has been combined with the anti-American theme. Soviet propa- ganda has depicted two terrible extremes--U.S. “im- perialism” and the Chinese renegades--in tacit al- liance at the expense of the suffering Vietnamese and in opposition to the forces of peace and freedom the world over led by the Soviet Union. This Soviet line entailed a remarkable change from the Soviet posture in Khrushchev's time toward forces in the United States desirous of improving U.S.. relations with Mao's regime. Whereas in earlier years the Soviets had welcomed statements made by such Amer- icans (because any improvement in Sino-U.S. relations might bring a relaxation of Chinese pressures on Khru- shchev's policies), now they cited them as sinister evidence of Sino-U.S. collaboration. And whereas in the Khrushchev era the Soviets had eagerly greeted any U.S. voices urging Chinese Communist admission to the U.N., now some Soviet commentaries actually reacted to such suggestions with heavy suspicion as to the motives with which they were offered. : Meanwhile, throughout the fall of 1966 and early: 1967, while the Chinese cultural revolution was pro- ceeding, while Sino-Soviet state relations were de-~ teriorating, while the relations of the Communist - neutrals with the CCP were growing increasingly bad and the closest remaining friends of the CCP were be- Coming increasingly worried, the Chinese presence in the Soviet-run international front organizations, Xlviiri [aaa aon where so many past battles had taken place, was being gradually thinned out.” As a result of a combination. of voluntary Chinese withdrawals and Soviet evictions, there was an over-all trend toward Chinese departure from most of the fronts in which they still partici-. pated. The New Soviet Push for a World Conference Finally, the CPSU in the fall of 1966 took ad- vantage of all the multiple phenomena working toward Chinese isolation to. press again for a world Commu- nist conference. The CPSU was again eager for a ‘ . conference because it considered that the low state of Chinese fortunes--a possible temporary circum- stance--might have rendered feasible for the time be- ing the convocation of a meeting with an agenda and participants that would permit an expansion of Soviet authority and influence in the world movement. When the Soviets began to press for a conference once more late in 1966, they were pointing toward an event: which they hoped to be able to bring off--or bring a step closer--a year later, at the October Revolution's fiftieth anniversary celebrations in Moscow in Novem- ber 1967. The Soviets were well aware of the extent of the opposition they had to face, and they intended to use the interval to reduce that opposition, bring- ing pressure on those parties susceptible to pressure and cajoling the others. And indeed, two key parties that had consistently opposed the Soviet will regard- ing the conference began finally to retreat under CPSU pressure early in'1967. These were the Italians and the British, the two chief recalcitrants at ‘the March 1965 Moscow meeting, , In contemplating a conference, the Soviets have two extreme alternatives. The "minimal program" for which they might settle is a-world Communist confer- ence Organized and run by the CPSU in Moscow but pegged and limited to the question of aid to Vietnam alone. This is the lowest common denominator, the kind of meeting the maximum number of parties ‘would attend without the Chinese. This is the only sort of world meeting tue British party has endorsed yet, and the. only one the North Koreans, Japanese, Cubans, and North Vietnamese might attend (the North Vietnamese xLix being unlikely even so). This is also the sort of meeting most absentees would be least likely to at- tack apeeEwar ds At the cehey extreme 1s the "maximal program": a world Communist conference to prepare a detailed "general line," to write a 1960-type statement minus the ambiguities and self-contradictions imposed on that statement by Chinese participation, to hand down both generalizations.and specific guidelines for Com- munist parties in every region of the world, to im- pose on the movement a universal viewpoint conforming - in detail to all the exigencies. of Soviet foreign policy, and to endorse CPSU authority as well. It seems likely that what the Soviets hope to do is to choose a suitable approach from a point on a spectrum between these two extremes. The CPSU may wish to use the aid-to-Vietnam, anti-American issue as the central theme around which to build the conference and attract participants, while at- tempting at the same time to preserve the broader features of the conference to which Brezhnev and his friends have publicly referred--the evaluation of the past and the setting of a generat line for the future, | If absolutely necessary, the Soviets may settle for using the November 1967 ceremonies merely for . some preliminary step to bring about a conference in 1968. At all events, however, the November cere- monies present a fortuitous and unique opportunity to the CPSU: an accidental circumstance providing the CPSU, at just the moment when the Chinese have virtually withdrawn from the movement, with a legiti- mate occasion for an impressive display of the CPSU's historic credentials to lead the movement and a com- plete roster of parties obliged to be present. The CPSU may never again have quite such an occasion. It is unlikely that the CPSU will let this opportunity pass without some major -organizational move to enhance CPSU influence and authority. 1964-1967: The Chinase World Challenge to Moscow In the period since Khrushchev's fall, the Chi- nese organizational challenge to the CPSU and its 1 i 1 t followers has not been destroyed, but for the time being it has been either held or beaten back in all parts of the world. Over-all, there has been a con- siderable retreat from. the Chinese high tide:-of 1963- 1964~-the years when most of the CCP-backed splinter parties now in existence were formed, and when a . strong Chinese alliance with the anti-Khrushchev inde- pendent radical Communists became overt. The great change has of course been in Asia, be- cause of the defection (or destruction) of the most important of the independent Asian parties. In. Europe, . despite the addition of:one or two splinter parties to the roster, very small beginnings have remained very small, with no progress made. In the Communist movement of Africa and the Middle East, Chinese as- sets have from the start been even weaker in compari- son with those of the CPSU, and this has not changed. On the other hand, in Latin America the Chinese of- fensive of 1963-1964 had made considerable progress, but here again the tide has either halted or some- what receded: the most important pro-CCP parties have either barely held on to what they had originally achieved (as in Peru) or have lost some of their origi- nal gains (as in Ecuador and Colombia). In most parts of the world, at the..time of Khrushchev's fall Chinese organizational efforts had presented.a real danger of - further subversion of cadres of many important 'pro- CPSU parties, and although a potential for this still exists in some cases (three notable cases being Italy, Brazil, and Chile), the over-all trend for the time being is not running in this direction. And through- out the world, wherever pro-Chinese splinter groups exist, the CCP and its agents are plagued by inces- sant internal bickering among rival leaders of these splinters. The New Cuban Challenge Thus, the most serious threat to the authority and influence of the CPSU in the international move- ment (authority over some parties, influence over others) today comes not from the Chinese Communist party, but from the independent militant Far Eastern parties with which the CPSU has resumed relations and from disruptive forces within the Soviet-oriented — li movement itself: from the Rumanians, from the Yugo-~ slavs, and above all, from Pidel Castro's Cuba. The November 1964 Havana deal between the CPSU and Castro could not and did not last, if only because of the ultimate incompatibility of two competing cen- ters of authority for the Latin America Communist movement, neither of which was really reconciled to deferring even partially to the other. . Today,‘ Castro is ._presenting a direct organizational challenge to CPSU authority among Latin American Communists, is openly polemicizing with the pro-Soviet leaders of the Venezuelan Communist party, and has openly avowed his intention of splitting all those parties where-- as in Venezuela--thée party leadership is unwilling to follow his dictates on the question of armed revolu- tion. At the same time, Castro has taken the place of the disappearing Chinese as the chief recalcitrant at meetings of international front organizations, and has continued--in alliance with the Far Eastern par- ties--to bring pressure on the Soviets to take what the Soviets consider undesirable risks in Vietnam and elsewhere. This was most recently demonstrated . by the thinly-veiled Cuban criticism of Soviet caution during the Middle East crisis of June 1967. - Soviet Policy Toward the United States As the result of that crisis, the Soviet leadership was sharply reminded once more of the real dangers of direct’ conflict with the United States latent in Soviet demagogic appeals to-the interests of radical anti-U.S.. forces inside and outside of the Communist movement. — There is reason to believe that the CPSU leaders during and after the crisis week were particularly sobered by the implications of the radical Arab attempt (supported by the radical Communists such as Castro) to draw the Soviet Union into a direct clash with the United States by manufacturing a claim of U.S.-British air attacks on the Arab states. Thereafter the Soviets soon showed that they had no intention of abandoning their policy ofcultivation of the radical Arabs; but they are probably wel] aware that the potential risk to themselves has not completely disappeared. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of a change in the over-all Soviet public posture of hostility lii ao eee toward the United States. The Soviet: posture of de- nunciation of the United States serves purposes which. the present politburo majority centering around Brezhnev evidently continues to consider deeply grounded in So- viet national interests. A tough, vituperative Soviet anti-American line is still absolutely indispensable for Soviet attempts to deal with the Communist radicals, particularly to offset the adverse effect of any nego- .tiations involving the United States into which the USSR may feel it advantageous to its national interests to enter. Even with this offsetting’ vituperation the Soviets have been highly defensive about such negotia- tions in the face of direct attacks on them by such parties: as the North Koreans and Cubans. Moreover, thé tough Soviet public line toward the United States is an es-~ sential’ part of the continuing CPSU efforts te use the aid-to-Vietnam issue as the focus of attempts to con~ vene some form of world Communist gathering that would strengthen CPSU influence and authority. With- out the issue of united action over Vietnam, Soviet chances of enticing such parties as the North Koreans, . Japanese, North Vietnamese and Cubans to such a meet~ — ing would be much poorer even than they are at present. Soviet Calculations Regarding the Chinese Regarding their other great rival, Communist China, the Soviet attitude now appears to be one of satisfaction mingled with slight apprehension. The present over-all military disparity between the two powers is so great that the Soviets are. reasonably confident that near-term Chinese aggression against | ‘them is quite unlikely. The Soviets are likely, however, to be planning now against the contingency that a real Chinese danger to their security will have been created within the next decade. The So- viets are likely to be at least as well informed about Chinese advanced weapons developments as is the United States, and there are reasons why they may well be considerably better informed. The Soviets appear to recognize that there is nothing at all that they can do about the Chinese © leadership at present, and they are not overly hope- ful about the future, Contrary to what Soviet propa~ ganda has sometimes suggested, CPSU and East European confidential documents leave little doubt that the Liii Soviets and their friends have from the first regarded the "cultural revolution" as a purge instigated and directed by Mao. And contrary to the hopes Soviet . propaganda has sometimes held out for Mao's "opposi- tion," the confidential documents have been quite pessimistic about the prospects for Chinese opponents of Mao's policies. Moreover, Soviet representatives -have privately admitted that Liu Shao-chi has al- ways been.as anti-Soviet as Mao. - . : , | i The Soviets-have always had hopes for Chou En~lai, whom they regard-as the chief moderate in the Chinese leadership. If Mao were to die at this moment, Chou might become an important factor working for some moderation in Chinese extreme hostility toward the Soviet Union. ‘The Soviets, however, cannot even be sure that Chou would try to do this, they cannot be sure that he will not fall victim to a purge by Mao, and they cannot be sure that he will survive a pés- sible struggle for power after Mao's death. From the point of view of Soviet calculations, Chou is there- fore only an outside possibility as a factor for a future improvement in CCP policy toward the CPSU. And the Soviets probably have little hope that Lin Piao--Mao's heir-apparent who will probably become the single most important leader in China on Mao's death~-will then disappoint Mao's. hopes and seek such a change in Chinese policy. During the last year the Soviets have frequently attacked Lin publicly. For the foreseeable future, the CPSU has burnt its bridges with the present Chinese regime and with most of the persons likely to be dominant immediately ‘ after Mao's death. The CPSU must calculate, however, | that once Mao is gone any successor regime, even if it retains a considerable degree of hostility to the ‘USSR (as is likely, because of fundamental conflict- . ing national interests), is also likely quickly to modify some of Mao's more paranoid tactics toward the Communist world which have been recognized by everyone but Mao to be counterproductive for the Chi-~ nese competition with the CPSU: Mao's hostile atti- tude toward the Japanese Communist Party, to take . one example, The present situation of virtually com- plete CCP isolation even from the radical Communist neutrals is not likely to survive.Mao's death, liv - therefore. This is an additional reason for the CPSU to make every effort to exploit its current fragile advantage while it lasts and take some tan- - gible organizational step in November 1967 which can afterward be used to shore up CPSU influence and authority. lv Sino-Soviet Secret Correspondence and Conversations Date Late Oct.: 1964 Late Oct. 1964 November 1964 “Late Nov. 1964 February 1965 16 Feb. 1965 27 Feb. 1965 Since Khrushchev's Fall Sender and Recipient CCP letter to CPSU. CPSU letter .to CCP. (Chou talks with CPSU in ‘Moscow. ) CPSU letter to CCP (also sent to many other parties through .- early December.) (Mao-Kosygin. talks in Peking.) CPsu (or possibly Soviet government, er both) letter to (Similar Chinese. letter simultaneously . sent to DRV.) Chinese reply to Soviets. TO Llvii ET Gist Said CCP would welcome CPSU invitation to send delegation to Moscow for’ October Revo- lution anniversary; such delegation would be led by Chou En-lai. Extended the invitation. Stalemate because of CCP obstinate insistence on CPSU public rejection of all past positions. "Proposed" postponement of 15 December Moscow meeting to 1 March; gave rundown on ‘latest stand of 26 prospec~ _tive participants in meeting. Stalemate; Mao supremely arrogant, rejected minor CPSU concessions, demanded CPSU self-humiliation. Sent immediately after Kosygin return from Far East; proposed "new international conference" for negotiations on Vietnam. Rejected this proposal. (Date and exact nature of DRV reply uncertain.) 10. Li. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. Date 22 Feb. 1965 Late Feb. 1965 Late Feb. 1965 25 Feb. 1965. 28 Feb. 1965 March 1965 March 1965 7 March 1965 30 March 1965 Sender and Recipient North Vietnamese letter to CPSU ane CCP. CPSU reply to North Vietnam. CCP reply to North Vietnam. CPSU letter to CCP. CCP reply to CPSU. CPsu (or Soviet . government) message to Chinese. CCP (or Chinese government) reply to Soviets. Communiqué of 1-5 March Moscow 19~ party "consultative meeting” sent to CCP (and many other parties) with short covering note, prior to publication. Two-year Sino-Soviet rail transportation agreement on Soviet _ aid to DRV signed. lviii ‘Soviet SAM components and Gist Sent at Kosygin suggestion; proposed tripartite. public statement on Vietnam to warn United States, and furnished draft. Accepted this proposal. Rejected this proposal. Requested air corridor across China for military airlift to DRV. Rejected this request. Requested use of air bases in south China (to assemble MIGs shipped by rail from USSR for DRV). Rejected this request. Professed desire for unity, took no concrete step toward - world Communist conference. CCP privately indicated scorn, later publicly at~ tacked communiqué and meeting. Chinese nevertheless continue to obstruct shipment of personnel to DRV from March until June 1965. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. Date 3° April 1965 11 April 1965 17 April 1965 14 July 1965 July’ 1965 18 Sept. -1965 18 Oct. 1965 Sender and Recipient CPSU letter to CCP. * CCP reply to CPSU. CPSU letter to CCP, CCP reply to CPSU. (Brezhnev-Teng Hsiao-ping talks at Ninth Rumanian party congress.) . CPSU letter to CCP. CCP reply to CPSU. Gist Proposed tripartite Sino- Soviet-North Vietnamese meeting on measures "to defend security" of DRV. Rejected. this proposal as unnecessary; attacked Soviet aid as insignificant. Renewed demand for tri- partite meeting and for tripartite public statement; attacked CCP for obstruction of Soviet aid and for rejec~ tion of unity. Draft of this letter probably shown to Le Duan, visiting in Moscow, before being sent. Denounced Soviet past diplo- matic activities regarding Vietnam negotiations; charged USSR with continuing collu~ sion with United States; insisted tripartite meeting therefore could only harm DRV; rejected united action of any kind with Soviets. | { | Violent mutual accusations *. ending in complete disagree- _ ment. Rebuked Chinese for their | inflammatory stand on India- - Pakistan war and for their ultimatum to India. Rebuked Soviets in turn for siding with India and for trying to frighten Chinese with threat of U.S. action. Termed CPSU letter's demand for united action against United States hypocritical. Date 24. 23 Oct. . 1965 25. 5 Nov. 1965 26. 28 Nov. . 1965 27. 7 Jan. 1966 28. 28 Dec 1965 (received 4 January) 29. 7 Feb. 1966 30. January- February 1966 Sender and Recipient CPSU letter to CCP. CCP letter to CPSU. CPSU letter to CCP. CCP reply to CPSU. Polish party letter to CCP. (Similar letters sent to all other bloc parties.) CCP reply to Poles. CPSU letter circulated to many parties, one version circulated within CPSU. Portions deliberately leaked to Western press. 1x Gist Complained of new Chinese obstruction. of a Soviet military rail shipment to DRV. In effect admitted refusal to pass this shipment; blamed it on Soviet delay in signing new documentation CCP considered necessary... Attacked 11 November Chinese editorial that had publicly ruled out any joint meeting or unity of action with Soviets, : Scornfully reiterated 11 November statements, and added that Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance was ' ' worthless; USSR would be a "negative factor" in a Sino-U.S. war. Sent at Soviet instigation; invited. CCP to bloc confer- ence on aid to Vietnam; Soviets were hoping to hold conference at conclusion of 23rd CPSU Congress in Moscow. ' Sarcastic rejection of invitation. Conference had already been scuttled be- _ cause DRV declined. Reviewed at length and assailed record of Chinese actions since Khrushchev's fall; attacked Mao by name. aac 3 | Date Sender and Recipient . - Gist 31. 24 Feb. CPSU letter to CCP. Terse invitation to 23rd. 1966 ~ - CPSU Congress opening in late March. 32. 22 March CCP reply to CPSU. - Refused invitation; 1966 _, published by Chinese : ms together with CPSU invitation. NOTE: This ts the last item of Sino-Soviet secret party correspondence (or party contacts of any kind) of which we-have had any information as of late May 1967. Government correspondence, . tneluding many Foreign. Mintstry protest notea on . both sides, has continued; and all such notes of ._ which we have any knowledge have been published by the Sovtets or Chinese. However, there have apparently been CPSU and CCP letters dtatrtbuted to other parties coneerning the opponent; versions ‘of one such CPSU letter dealing with the Chinese "cultural revolution" were ehown to representatives of bloe and non-bloe parties in December 1966. lxi TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS Illustration Part I Figure A: The 7. November 1964 Kremlin reception Figure B: Economics versus ideology--the shifting : balance of the fall of 1964. Figure C: ‘Chou En-lai in Moscow, November 1964, Figure D: The Mao-Kosygin interview. , Part II Figure E: The clash before the U.S. embassy in Moscow-~-4 March 1965. Pigure F: Robert Williams moves from Cuba to China. Part III Figure G: A cartoon parade of Mao's victims. Figure H: Public humiliation of fallen Chinese leaders. Figure I: (A) The incident at the Lenin Mausoleum-- : ; 25 January 1967. (B) The siege of the Soviet embassy in Peking, February 1967. _(C) The Soviet reaction. Figure J: The last Albanian meeting with some old Chinese friends. Lxiii Following ; Page . 76 84° 106 116 106 34 38° 44 64 - Dr. .ance of opinion in the Soviet leadership shifted to- ward the views of those of his former cclleagues and THE SINO-SOVIET STRUGGLE IN THE WJRLU COMMUNIST MOVEMENT SINCE KHRUSHCHEV'S PALL . 6 PART I The Shift in the Emphasis of CPSU Policy A. The Anti-U.S. Vested Interests in the Communist World : ; When Khrushchev fell in October 1964, the bal- subordinates who had long wanted a higher priority to be given te the promotion of Soviet influence at Chinese expense in the most militant and vehemently anti-Americen sections of the world Communist movement. This change from the start implied beth acceptance of the likeiihood of a worsening of relations with the United States and a revision of Khrushchev's tactics in the strugcle with the Chinese. . 7 At the moment of Khrushchev's fall, Communist parties and cther radical movements with a special : vested interest in hostility toward the United States-- : | and a long-standing desire for a tougher Soviet pos- ; : ture toward the U.S.--existed in several parts of the : world: ‘ In the Far East, these included most notably the ruling parties of North Vietnam and North Korea, whose desire to dominate all of Vietnam and all of Korea had been or was being blocked by the United States; the Communist party of Indonesia which was apparently consolidating its influence at home as that: of the United States was being eliminated; and the Com- munist Party of Japan, which wished to do the same. These four key parties were not obedient retainers of the Chinese but rather their voluntary allies, whose anti-Khrushchev position had derived in large part from what they regarded as his soft line toward the United States. A considerable modification of Soviet policy toward the United States was therefore one of the obvious prerequisites (there were others) for the . improvement of CPSU relations with these parties. Much of the militant, pro-Chinese wing of the Indian Communist party could also be reasonably expected to be more susceptible to CPSU influence after such a change in the Soviet posture toward the United States. ‘ In Latin America, a vehement hostility to the United States remained central-to the policy of the Cuban regime, which believed that its power at home could be secure only after it had helped to establish other Communist regimes to the south. A Castroite following throughout Latin America shared this hostil-~ ity toward the U.S., and had. long been encouraged by Cuba to put unwelcome pressure upon local Communist parties to adopt militant tactics against governments friendly to or supported by the United States, whether . or not such tactics were thought appropriate by the Communists or Moscow. Castro had embarrassed Khru-. shchev by refusing to sign the Soviet-U.S. partial test-ban agreement in the summer of 1963, and had then publicly called attention to the discrepancy between his policy toward the United States and Khru- shchev's, insisting that peaceful coexistence with the U.S. was not possible for him. From the point of. view of the men who replaced Khrushchev, therefore, a toughening of the Soviet line toward the United States offered the. promise of rewards for Soviet relations | with Castro, and might well be used as a bargaining counter to extract concessions from him in other mat- ters, such as the question of his relations with pro- Chinese forces in Latin America. In Africa, a potential reward had similarly been created for more vigorous Soviet gestures of opposi- ‘tion to the United States, because of the hostile radi- cal African reaction to U.S. support for the Tshombe regime in the Congo (Leopoldville), which was employ-. ing white South African mercenaries. Ever since 1960, the Soviets had been embarrassed by Chinese propaganda exploitation of the original Soviet position of support for the 1960 UN resolution on the Congo. The new So- viet leadership could only welcome an Opportunity to do something, at reasonably low risk, to counter Chi- nese use of this issue as an example of Soviet "betrayal." By coincidence an opportunity was soon forthcoming, in ose with the Stanleyville airlift of. November Finally, it had become apparent to the So- ‘viets that even among the Communist’ parties of Western Europe, there were few ardent defenders of good rela- tions between the Soviet Union and the United States, and growing pressure from some for more vigorous So- viet efforts to outbid the Chinese for the support ‘of the anti-U.S. radicals of the underdeveloped world. It was noteworthy that such Western European Communist . pressure for.a harder Soviet line toward the United States came chiefly from some of the parties which were most "revisionist" in domestic politics, most per~ |. sistent in resisting Soviet authority and criticizing Stalinist aspects of Soviet life, and most obstinate in obstructing: Khrushchev's plans to coerce the Chinese. The Italian Communist Party was the leader in this re- gard, and a striking feature of the "Togliatti Memo- candum" published by the Italian party a month before Khrushchev's fall was its outspoken demand for a reap- praisal of Soviet policy toward the United States. Later Italian party statements were even more explicit. | (In contrast, Khrushchev's' moderate stand regarding ; the United States was defended, and the Italian posi- tion explicitly rebutted, by relatively "conservative" parties anxious to uphold Soviet authority and to out~~ law the Chinese, such as the Communist party of the United States.)* To sum up: on the eve of Khrushchev's fall, the vested interests of many Communists and radicals in different parts of the world posed a strong incentive for a toughening of Soviet policy toward the United States for those Soviet leaders who assigned a higher priority than had Khrushchev to the value of enhanc- ing Soviet influence among such Communists as opposed to the value to the Soviet state of good relations with the United States. : B. The Opposition to Khrushchev's ‘Tactics Toward Peking ; The other side of the coin was the question of the tactics to be used by the CPSU in the struggle *The Italtan party stand and its mottvatton are examined in detatl on pages 11-14; the violent CPUSA attack on the Italtans is recounted on pages 65-66. against Peking. Without exception, every Communist . _party that. had been demanding a harsher Soviet line toward the United States was also adamantly opposed to Khrushchev's efforts in 1963 and 1964 to bring about ‘a showdown with the Chinese party. The two questions, for most Communist leaders were completely interwoven. 1. The Far Eastern Parties : In the Far East, where CCP influence because of factors of geography, race, and culture was par- ticularly strong, the four most important Communist parties (North Vietnam, North Korea, Indonesia and Japan) had steadfastly refused to assist Soviet ef~ forts to coerce Peking since the Moscow conference of November 1960. At that conference, and consistently - thereafter, these four Far Eastern parties had in ef- fect sided with Peking on the key question of authority by refusing to accept the. Soviet contention that the will of the Soviet-dominated majority of the inter- national movement should prevail. These parties in- stead agreed with the Chinese that decisions of the Communist movement must be unanimous. The North Viet- namese party in particular sought to mediate between ‘the CPSU and the CCP on occasions (notably November . 1960 and January 1962) when the Soviets were cam- paigning to have the world movement condemn Peking, and on each occasion helped to induce the Soviets to halt their campaign temporarily. Each such mediation effort thus dealt another blow to Soviet pretense tone to supreme authority. In rejecting hat were in essence Soviet at- tempts to reassert the CPSU's right to formulate pol- icy for the international movement unilaterally (as Stalin had done), the North Vietnamese, North Koreans, Indonesians and Japanese were strongly influenced by the content of Soviet policy. These parties were in- clined to agree with Chinese charges that Soviet deal- ings with.the United States were discouraging revo- lutionary struggles throughout the world, and they were convinced in particular that these aspects of Khrushchev's foreign policy were harmful to their own national interests. They were thus all the less inclined to agree to CPSU claims to an authority which was to be used for such purposes. Conversely, in advocating “unanimity” rather than "majority rule" sh. these parties were in fact also demanding that the Soviets and their followers join with the Chinese and ‘themselves in unanimous and consistent struggle against the United States.* | The North Vietnamese, North Koreans, Indo- nesians and Japanese therefore were opposed to.Khru- shchev's attempts in 1963 and 1964 to convene a world Communist conference without the Chinese, both because they feared the consequences for them.of a formal schism and because they saw the motivation for Khru- shchev'’s campaign as closely connected with his cur- rent policy toward the’ United States. Following his July 1963 signing of the test-ban treaty with the U.S.-~which flouted the opinions of the Far Eastern: parties-~Khrushchev seemed to have adopted more clearly than before a “better fewer but better" line toward. the Communist movement. Despite all his protestations to the contrary, it appeared that Khrushchev was striv- ing to organize a conference that would formalize a split in the world movement, in the hope that those parties which kept their ties with the CPSU after such a conference would be more vulnerable to Soviet pres- sure and less capable or inclined to make trouble for . Soviet policy, including Soviet dealings with the United States. The truly incorrigible troublemakers, according to this scheme, would be cast off with the -Chinese. i *It should be added that in the background, in ad- ditton to opposttton to Sovtet policies toward the . United States and Communist China, moet of the radi- cal Communist parttes had a third reason to oppose Khrushchev's plans: resentment at past or present _Sovtet interference in thetr internal affairs. This was true, to one degree or another, of the North Koreans, the Japanese, the left wing of the Indiuns, the Indonesians, and even the Cubane. As will be seen, this grievance against the Suviets in some eases assumed greater: relative importance when the other grievances against Soviet policy were partially satisfied by the post-Khrushchev CPSU: Leadership. O P™SFERE This view of Khrushchev's aims received ap- parent confirmation from the.increasingly intransi- gent Soviet posture toward the North Vietnamese, North Koreans, Indonesians and Japanese parties in 1963 and 1964. Following the punitive cutoff of Soviet mili- tary aid to North Korea late in 1962, the first public Soviet criticism of the North Korean party was made at an East German party congress in January 1963, and other attacks followed, together with direct replies from Pyongyang. Increasing Soviet support for Japanese ue party dissidents was discussed in an angry exchange of : z* private correspondence between the CPSU and the JCP in 1963, and this became a savage public polemic in 1964, ffatocet teen reports in 1961 and 1962 E-% had indi oviet leadership retained at o: ey the time considerable hopes for the North Vietnamese and Indonesian parties, and significant concessions were made to appease them;** but this came to an end in 1963. As for Indonesia, relations between the CPSU and the PKI grew steadily more icy, and Khrushchev is.. . ‘ credibly reported to have attacked the PKI during tie conversations with Sukarno and Nasution in Moscow. : As for North Vietnam, the signing of the test-ban treaty with the United States--and the CPSU campaign for a world Communist conference without the Chinese-- together induced Hanoi to take a position much more openly sympathetic to the Chinese then before. This North Vietnamese tendency was reinforced by Khru- ' shchev's emphatic refusal to become involved in sup- . port of the DRV's enterprise in South Vietnam. Khru~ ; : to have reneged in an Garlier promise to sup~ : - ply the DRV with fighter aircraft. Soviet conduct ee . following the Gulf of Tonkin incidents of August and September 1964--in implicitly accepting the U.S. ac- count of the events, and in agreeing to the suggestion that the matter be brought before the United Nations, contrary to DRV wishes--is reported to have brought a protest from Hanoi to Moscow. Finally, in September, *One such concession has already been noted: the Sovtet agreement, in February 1962, to halt the world- wide polemical campaign the CPSU was then conducting against the Chinese and Albanians, in response to a North Vietnamese request. - . -6- a month before Khrushchev's fall, Soviet propaganda published the first explicit Soviet criticism ever made of the North Vietnamese, in connection with the DRV representative's support of the Chinese at a meeting in Moscow. . Thus the single most important new character- istic of Khrushchev's line toward the international Communist movement in the last two years of his power were his increased willingness to accept public estrangement from the leading Far Eastern parties as | a necessary consequence of his effort to force a de-~ finitive break with the Chinese. Khrushchev was re- placed before he could carry his campaign to its logical culmination, and the majority of his succes~ sors did not share his view of the priorities of So- viet interests, on this as on other matters. 2. Castro and the Latin American Radicals ——— ee naccals Fidel Castro, who agreed with the Far Eastern radical Communists regarding Soviet dealings with the . United States, also shared their disapproval of Khru~ shchev's moves to bring about a formal split with the ~ Chinese; but unlike the Asians, Castro was not dis~ posed therefore to align himself with Peking in op~ position to Moscow. Castro made his position public for the first time in January 1963, at a moment when he was disillusioned and angry with both the Soviets: and the Chinese--the former for their "betrayal" in the Cuban missile crisis, and the latter for what Castro regarded (mistakenly) as their opportunistic and selfish seizure of the occasion for an invasion of India rather than for some tangible assistance to him.* Castro declared, and later reiterated, his *Castro wae wrong in attributing the timing of the Chinese attack on Indian border positions to oppor- tuntetic use of the Cuban missile ertstis, inagsmuch as Indian provocation in early Oetober 1962 had been sufficient cause for PLA retaltation in tate October. See POLO. XVI-64 of 5 May 1964, "The Sino-Indtian Border Dispute, Section 3: 1961-62," =, Pe perfect neutrality; he deplored and condemned mutual polemical attacks (such as both the Soviets and the Chinese were then engaged in), and appealed for unity in militant opposition to the United States. Thenceforth, until Khrushchev fell in October 1964, different aspects of Castro's policy continued to offend both the Chinese and the Soviets. After Castro's visit to the Soviet Union in April 1963 and a television address he subsequently gave lauding Khrushchev in extravagant terms, the Chinese grew very cool toward Fidel personally, and avoided men- tioning his name (although this was not true of their attitude toward Che Guevara). The Soviets, on the other hand, had their own reasons for dissatisfaction. As already noted, Castro refused to sign the test- ban treaty, and publicly called attention to the dis- crepancy between his national interests and those of the Soviet Union regarding dealings with the United States. Moreover, despite the Chinese disenchantment with Castro personally, the line he continued to press for Latin America (and indeed, for other parts of the world) remained far more harmonious with Chinese world strategy than with that of the CPSU.* (This fact was dramatized when the Chinese eagerly seized upon a Guevara article on Latin America printed: in Cuba Socialista in the fall of 1963 for wide dissem- ination in their own propaganda.) Despite attempts made in the spring of 1963, during Castro's visit to the USSR, to induce him to reconcile his differences with the pro-Soviet Latin *Indeed, this statement remains true even today, despite the fact that vtolent polemics have now oe- curred between Havana and Peking, despite the per- sonal. inaults which Castro has heaped on Mao and which the Chinese camp has returned to Castro, de- spite the disappearance of Guevara and despite the hardening of the Soviet line toward the United States. See Part III, pages 99-116, for a discussion of the many aspects of Cuban poliey which continue, willy-nilly, to run parallel with Chinese policy and counter to Sovtet desires. -8- American Communist parties, Castro's subsequent con- duct continued to embarrass the CPSU and its adherents . in several countries. Most pernicious of all, from Khrushchev's point of view, was Castro's influence on the Venezuelan CP, which at the East German party con- gress in January 1963 had been the only Latin Ameri- can party to follow the Cuban example in refusing to sign a joint Latin American statement endorsing So- viet policy aims. By the summer and fall of 1964, a public tug-of-war had developed between the CPSU and Castro for predominant influence over the policy of the Venezuelan party, with Pravda publishing material - .attacking the violent tactics which Castro continued to demand. * Against this background, Castro's attitude toward Khrushchev's project of a world Communist con- ference without the Chinese was bound to cause anxiety for the CPSU. If Cuba were to join the Far Eastern parties in declining to attend such a conference, this would be a severe blow to the Soviets: the Venezuelan CP (and other waverers elsewhere in the world) might be led to imitate the Cubans, and Castro would appear to the world to be siding with the Chinese rather than with the Soviets at the decisive showdown Khru- shchev himself had created. This in turn would in- evitably have a harmful effect upon Soviet influence and authority among Many of the radicals of Latin a3 _ 4 America. In addition to the general question of Cuban participation in a hypothetical world Communist con- ference as yet unscheduled, there was a more press- ing ‘issue: whether the Cubans would agree to take part in the smaller, 26-party preparatory meeting which Khrushchev had called to meet in Moscow on 15 December to organize a world conference. The Chi- nese and several of their friends had made it known that they would not participate in this preparatory influence went so far as to attempt to punish the Venezuelan party member who had written the Pravda *¥Venezuelan party leaders susceptible to Castro's | ] articles in question., : meeting, and opposition to the project was known to .@xist among several of the European invitees. Cuban presence was therefore all the more essential, but Castro had still not committed himself when Khrushchev fell in mid-October, only two months before the sche- duled meeting. By demanding Cuban attendance at a specific gathering on a specific date, Khrushchev had placed unwelcome pressure on Castro to commit an overt act that would violate his professed neutrality in the - Sino~Soviet conflict--that would in effect force him to become a Soviet agent in the struggle with the Chi- ‘nese rather than a lofty onlooker scolding both sides. Castro was thus being asked to give up a measure of - his independence and freedom of maneuver, for no tan-- gible reward. . The men who replaced Khrushchev understood that if it became necessary after all to hold the pre- paratory meeting in some form, a price would have to be paid for Castro's participation. Here again, some modification of the Soviet line toward the United States would pay dividends. A compromise involving selected concessions to Castro regarding revolutionary policy toward Latin America might also be necessary. ‘On both counts, the price to be paid could be held within acceptable limits if what was being asked of Castro were also reduced--that is, if overt Soviet polemical propaganda against the Chinese were halted, if gestures professing a desire for reconciliation with Peking were made, if active pressure for a world Communist conference were discontinued, and if thé scheduled preparatory meeting were thus transformed from a mechanism for. securing organizational action against the Chinese into a forum for the profession of unity against the United States. To sum up: As in the Far East, so'also with Cuba and Latin America, there were powerful incen- tives for the new Soviet leadership to revise radi- cally Khrushchev's tactics in the continuing struggle with the Chinese. Once again, the revision of these tactics was intricately bound up with and clearly implied a deliberate worsening of Soviet relations with the United States. =: pe no a aE a peer Lesh a Oa Oe Se re ee ‘ference without the Chinese, and his immediate project ‘to conduct vituperative polemics in reply to the Chi- 3. The European Opposition Khrushchev's plan for a world Communist con- of a 15 December 26~-party preparatory meeting in Mos- cow, had encountered stubborn opposition from certain of the most important parties in both Western and Eastern Europe. This recalcitrance in Europe--the very heartland of CPSU influence in the world Commu- mist movement--was probably the single most important factor impelling Khrushchev's successors to abandon his tactics. a. In Western Europe, the leader in opposing Khrushchev's plans, once again, was the Italian Com-. Munist Party. This was the largest and most important | pro-Soviet party outside the bloc, with influence over ; Many other parties, and as such exercised (and still exercises) considerable leverage on Soviet policy. The PCI in 1963 had opposed both Khrushchev's decision nese and his plan to organize a world conference with- out Peking's participation. When after a winter hi- atus both aspects of Khrushchev's policy were revived by the CPSU in the spring of 1964, PCI opposition was reiterated. In August 1964, PCI Secretary General Togliatti, visiting the Soviet Union, composed a con- ‘fidential memorandum to the CPSU setting forth the views of his party in response to a CPSU invitation to the 15 December preparatory meeting. Togliatti recalled his past opposition to CPSU tactics, and expressed regret that his advice had not been fol- lowed. While he agreed to attend the 15 December meeting, he made it clear that the PCI at that meet- ing would continue to fight tooth and nail against efforts to organize a world Communist conference. Twice in his memorandum he expressed the PCI's dis- may at the split which had already occurred in the world Communist movement and the organizational ef- forts of the Chinese to create their own parallel Communist parties in many countries around the world. Although he did not say so explicitly, Togliatti clearly implied that erroneous CPSU tactics were partly responsible for these Chinese actions. AS already noted, Togliatti now retroactively invoked the bogey of a new "imperialist" threat from -li- the United States to justify the line he had already been urging upon Moscow. He professed to have dis- covered the basis for this threat in a ‘massive swing. to the right’ in the entire U.S. political spectrum in 1964 as a result of the Goldwater candidacy.* (Iron- ically, the PCI was to the left of the Chinese on this ‘point: Chou En-lai, talking to a Japanese Socialist delegation one month before, said that Goldwater's platform would have some effect on U.S. policy but that most public opinion arid even much of U.S. “monop~ oly capital" did. not approve his views, and that there- fore the possibility was "small" that the U.S. would become adventurous.) Togliatti held up this alleged new international threat as an overriding reason for the abandonment of Khrushchev's tactics toward the Chinese and for CPSU, adoption of a “unity of action" ‘line to enlist all Communists, including the Chinese, against the common danger. Togliatti professed to believe that the Chi- nese might respond te such an appeal, and that: the Chinese might then desist from formalizing their "fractionist efforts" throughout the world with the creation of a new Chinese "International" with “sections in all countries." In any case, Togliatti thought that better "collaboration" between the pro- Soviet camp and the "liberation movements" of former colonial areas struggling against "“imperialism"-- i.e., a more activist Soviet policy toward anti-U.s. radicals around the world--was essential to take the wind out of the Chinese sails. In much of this argument, Togliatti was being less than frank. The PCI's overriding motive for opposing Khrushchev's tactics toward the Chinese and in seeking to stave off as long as possible a formalization of the split in the movement was neither concern for the fate of the movement nor . *Pogliatti did not explain how this supposed re- cent radical change in U.S. politieal life justified simtlar earlier PCI opposition to Khrushchev's plans in 1963, before the alleged swing.to the right in the United States had taken place and before the death of President Kennedy. : -12- fear of the alleged U.S. threat, but rather determina- tion to prevent the CPSU from using a formal schism — as the occasion for the restoration of stronger So- viet control over the PCI.* It was for this reason that Togliatti-in his memorandum explicitly warned the Soviets that "we would be against any proposal to create once again a centralized international or- ganization." Togliatti was apparently reluctant to accept at face value public assurances by. Soviet spokesmen. that the CPSU -had no such intention. Togliatti, nowaeee:. apparently did not intend his memorandum to'be published, and thought he was communicating privately with the CPSU rather than | attacking it publicly. When Togliatti died in the Soviet Union in August 1964, his heirs in the PCI leadership seized upon the occasion to publish the memorandum, and thereby used Togliatti's name and _influence for a purpose Togliatti had been unwilling to sanction himself.** The attacks in the memorandum *The PCI was aleéo, of course, concerned, then and subsequently, to demonstrate publicly opposition to Soviet wishes on the subject of international party ; meetings in order to enhance the PCI's reputation at home as an autonomous party unresponsive to Sovtet H control. This was not, however, one of Togliatti's motives in composing hits memorandum, whitch he did not intend to be published, although tt was probably one of the important reasons why Togliatti's heirs pub- lished the memorandum after his death, In any case, the CPSU was all too well aware that the Italtan party was indeed being obstructtonist, and was not merely pretending to be ‘so. Phe CPSU, then and nou, has had strong reasons to wish to exert greater con- trol over PCI acttons, even tf this cost the PCI something in terms of tte image in Italy; and the PCI knows thts and has good reason to resist. ‘“*4#Togltatti's death at this moment was thus a stroke of bad tuck for the CPSU; but this did not prevent some foreign Commiuntst leaders--ineluding the North Vietnamese party leadership for one--from sus- peeting the Soviets of having had a hand in his death, ~13- ; nna nae Ru upon Khrushchev's line toward the Chinese, upon So- viet policy toward the international front organiza- tions, and upon Stalinist tendencies in the Soviet Un- ion met with a widespread response among the Communist parties of Western Europe and dealt a considerable blow. to Khrushchev's authority there. As will be seen, after Khrushchev's fall the new Soviet leadership adopted in its entirety Togliatti's prescription for tactics toward the Chinese--eventually including also the harsher line he was urging toward the United States-- ‘ but completely rejected the liberal anti-Stalin line he had urged for Soviet domestic life. In consequence, the new PCI leaders were kept busy for a long time denying that they had helped pull Khrushchev down to the benefit of Stalinist forces in the Soviet Union. The PCI's opposition to Khrushchev's plans was shared by'one other West.European party invited to the 15 December preparatory meeting, the British CP. This small party, of some importance chiefly because . of its influence on radical movements in former British colonial areas, was preoccupied with a considerable pro-Chinese minority within its ranks, and had still not indicated whether or not it would attend the 15 De- cember meeting when Khrushchev fell in October. In addition, several other West European par- ties not invited to the 15 December meeting agreed in whole or in part with the PCI arguments against Khru- shechev's tactics toward the Chinese. The most out- spoken in this regard were the Swedish and Dutch CPs-~ ‘at the extreme right and extreme left of the West Euro- pean Communist movement, respectively--both of which had indicated for different reasons that they would not.attend any world Communist conference without the _ Chinese. The Swedish party, under its new revisionist chairman Hermansson, was concerned above all with strengthening its domestic position in Sweden through public demonstration of its supposed total independence of ‘the CPSU. The Dutch party, under its old Stalinist chairman De Groot, had carried on a feud with Khru- shchev for several years because of Khrushchev's anti- Stalinist domestic policy and revisionist foreign pol- icy, and by 1964 had broken virtually all communica- tions with the CPSU. —-214- b. In Eastern Europe, Khrushchev had to deal with four troublemakers on the conference issue, two of which (Poland and Hungary) were amenable to per- suasion and two of which (Yugoslavia and Rumania)’ were not. : ; The Yugoslav party, while not endorsing the Italian party's call for CPSU unity of action with the Chinese against the United.States threat, neverthe- less shared the PCI's opposition to Khrushchev's plans. The Yugoslavs had long-standing objections to any So- viet ploy designed to tighten CPSU authority over the European Communist movement, and like the Italians, they viewed the projected world conference without the Chinese as such a Soviet effort. While the League’ of Yugoslav Communists was not one of the invitees to the 15 December preparatory meeting, it vigorously exerted such influence as it had upon those who were invited-~particularly in Eastern Europe~-to frustrate the CPSU's intentions. It was an open question whether the Yugoslavs would be invited to any subsequent world _ Communist conference (a matter which had been a sub~ ject of Sino~Soviet controversy in 1962 and 1963), and, it was now also an open question whether they would accept if invited. © 4 The Rumanian party was asked to attend the 26- party December preparatory meeting, and by the eve of Khrushchev's fall it was clear that the Rumanians would. refuse. This regime in 1963 and 1964 had taken in- -creasing advantage of the damage done to Soviet au- thority by the Sino-Soviet dispute in order to as- sert its economic and political independence of the Soviet Union. To this end, the Rumanians had formally announced their neutrality in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Yet on most of the larger substantive issues, Such as the question of the line to be taken toward the United States, the Rumanians were not in fact neutral, but continued generally to agree with Khrushchev and dis- agree with Mao. Their neutrality was primarily a "Albania ts of course totally removed from the discusston in this context; tt was taken for granted by the CPSU that Hoxzha would boycott any party meet- ing organized by the Soviets. — -15- wey Pend? refusal to take part in polemics or coercive actions of one side against the other. This stand enhanced their international position and their capacity to resist Soviet bilateral pressures. Tt was therefore contrary to Rumanian national interests ‘to affront the Chinese by attending the December meeting, par- ticularly if, as they suspected, this meeting was in- tended to enhance. Soviet ap eEaey. over such dissi- dents as chenseives's The Polish and Hungarian parties were another matter. Both had a history of opposition to: Soviet desires to create some new organizational framework to enhance CPSU international authority, and the Poles particularly had helped to block such a Soviet endeavor in 1957 and 1958. In the fall of 1963, probably for this reason, the Polish and Hungarian: regimes had.displayed great.coolness to Khrushchev's project of an international Communist conference. By the spring of 1964, however,: when Khrushchev renewed this project, the Polish party was induced to go along with it; and although the Hungarian party had not yet committed itself publicly by the fall of 1964, it: would probably also have yielded to the CPSU, "despite Tito'’s efforts to dissuade Kadar. Both the Poles and Hungarians, however, could be counted on to resist strongly any Soviet attempt to use a world conference for the creation of some new international party mechanism in which the Chinese and their friends would not pactle spaces To sum up: Of the Saronean invitees from the CPSU camp to the 15 December preparatory meeting, the _Rumanians would probably: not attend, the Italians and British would fight to prevent the preparatory meet~ ing from convening a world conference, and the Poles and Hungarians would fight to prevent a world con- ference from conferring additional authority on the CPSU, and thus from achieving Khrushchev's ultimate purpose. Of the Latin American invitees, the Cubans were doubtful as to the December preparatory meeting, Still more doubtful as to a world conference, and likely to side with the Poles and Hungarians in ob- structing Soviet purposes even if they attended such a conference. Several other vaguely. "pro-Soviet" parties--including the Venezuelans in Latin America, and the YugoSlavs, Dutch, Swedes and Norwegians in ~16- Europe~-would either be absent from‘a world confer- ence or would oppose Soviet. desires there.” From the point of view of the men who succeeded Khrushchev, therefore, his enterprise appeared more and more foolhardy. .On the one hand, he was in effect writing off CPSU influence in the Far East, abandoning to the Chinese parties for which the CPSU had long competed with Peking and which under other circumstances-- with a fundamental change in Soviet tactics toward Pe- king and Washington--might take a more forthcoming at- titude toward the CPSU. On the other hand, in view of . the attitude of important parties in the Soviet camp ‘it seemed increasingly unlikely that Khrushchev would succeed in extracting sufficient advantages for the CPSU in the remainder of the Communist world to compensate for. the surrender of the Communist Far East. -17~ It. The New Soviet Line: The First Six Months In the six months between the fall of, Khrushchev in mid-October 1964 and the holding of the Moscow “con- sultative" conference of Communist parties in early March 1965 the outline of a new set of Soviet policies toward the Communist world--and consequently, toward the United States-~gradually took shape.. As a first step, almost immediately after Khrushchev's ouster, the new leadership began to take actions intended to improve the CPSU position with Communist anti-U.S. "radicals" _around’ the world. A. The CPSU's November 1964 Bargain with Castro In the last week of November, representatives of virtually all the orthodox, pro-Soviet Communist parties of Latin America assembled in Havana for a confrontation with the Cubans. Although it had been reported that such a meeting was being considered as early as 10 October--i.e., shortly before Khrushchev's ouster--active preparations were made for the meet- ing during the first three weeks of November during conversations in Moscow between CPSU officials (chiefly Suslov and Ponomarev), Che Guevara, on behalf of the Cubans, and the leaders of certain key Latin American parties. The commitments entered into by the CPSU in these preliminary talks thus reflected the policy . views of the new post-Khrushchev leadership. In the Havana talks which followed, the Cubans are reported by several Latin American parties to have made one substantial private concession to the CPSU and its Latin American followers: a promise to limit Cuban support in.the future to revolutionary groups approved by the pro-Soviet Communist party of the country concerned. In addition, the Cubans agreed to a statement in the conference communique eventually published condemning "factional activities, no matter what their source or nature"~-a statement extremely useful to the CPSU in combatting Chinese factional activities both in the Latin American Communist move- ment and elsewhere in the world. : In return, the CPSU apparently promised the Cubans--~- both directly in Moscow and indirectly through Soviet -19~ adherents at the Havana meeting~-a more positive So- viet attitude toward. the role of armed struggle in. Latin America generally, and gave the Cubans to un- derstand that in certain specified countries armed struggle would be supported as the dominant line by the local Communist party and the Soviet Union. ‘Cas- tro was evidently expected to reciprocate by relax- ing his pressure upon the Communist parties of other countries where, contrary to the Cuban view, armed struggle was not considered desirable. In the next few months, the Soviets took certain conerete steps in the direction desired by Castro. Late in December, Moscow radio for the first time be- gan broadcasts in Quechua to the Indian peasant pop- ulations of Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador, urging armed . revolt in crude and unambiguous terms. Early the next year, a CPSU central committee official told leaders of a European party privately that armed struggle, while not possible in Europe, was still. likely to be necessary in some situations in Latin America. When the Havana conference communique was finally published in Pravda on 14 January 1965, an . accompanying’ Pravda editorial took an unusually ex- plicit position in praise of the "just struggle of patriots, arms in hand, in Venezuela, Guatemala, and a number of other countries," and pledged Soviet sup- ‘port for such "patriots." ; In at least one Latin American Communist party, these CPSU concessions to Castro had a drastic effect. As a direct consequence of the shift in emphasis of the CPSU line, a.militant Castroite faction of the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) party allied with the guerrilla leader Luis Turcios Lima, which had long been struggling against the reluctance of more mod- erate party leaders to commit the party entirely to armed struggle, made significant gains in the factional struggle. By.the late gpringof 1965 this Communist. party was involved not only in guerrilla warfare in the hills but also terrorism in the cities, and an attempt was presently made to assassinate the head of | the local U.S. military mission. In much of all this, the Castroite faction both inside and closely allied to the Guatemalan Communist organization was imitating the practice of Castroites who in past years had simi- larly gained predominant influence in the Venezuelan -20- : i Communist party at the expense of older leaders long responsive to the CPSU. One paradoxical result was that in Guatemala as in Venezuela previously, the en- couragement of violent tactics by the CPSU was pro- ducing a tendency toward weakening CPSU authority over the Communists of the country and toward strengthening Castro's influence over them. As will be seen later, the CPSU's November 1964 deal with Castro on Latin America eventually broke down as both sides began to renege on some of their commitments. The point for the Moment, however, is that the new Soviét leadership soon after taking power did make a strong effort to conciliate Castro, that in return for favors received it went further toward meeting his views than Khrushchev had ever been will- ing to go, and that the stronger public and private Soviet endorsements of violence as one appropriate means of ."anti~imperialist struggle" in Latin America were bound, over the long term, to lead to actions likely to complicate or exacerbate Soviet relations with the United States. The CPSU was here not respond~ ‘ing to anything the United States had done-~~certainly not to the U.S. air offensive against North Vietnam, which did not begin until three months later. The CPSU leadership was rather taking the initiative, and making a choice which Khrushchev over the last two years had been unwilling to make, choosing to ap- pease an important anti-U.S. “radical” in the Commu- nist movement and to accept the consequences. B. The Congo Episode, November-December :1964 At about the same time, the Soviet Union took the opportunity offered by the events in the Leopold- ville Congo in the last two months of 1964 to attempt to strengthen the Soviet position among radical Af- rican leaders, in competition with the Chinese but at the direct expense of the United States. Follow- ing the 24 November U.S. airlift of Belgian para-~ troops to the rebel-held city of Stanleyville, aL ES East Europeans began privately to leak--and the Cairo press to publish--reports that the Soviets would replace arms and equipment supplied to the rebels and would also pay part of the costs of an airlift. Meanwhile, flights of Soviet-built Al- gerian and UAR transports~-many reportedly manned by Soviet crews--were begun in early December and continued for several weeks ferrying arms to the Sudan for Congolese rebel use. Such use of Soviet personnel to assist even to this extent the rebel side of a foreign.civil war was most unusual for the Soviet Union, and was evi- dently undertaken by the new CPSU leadership in recognition of a heaven-sent opportunity to dis- associate themselves--at virtually no risk--from an unfortunate episode in Khrushchev's past Congo pol- icy. For several years, the Chinese had been every- where exploiting against the CPSU, to considerable effect, the Soviet mistake in having voted for the original 1960 United Nations resolution on the Congo and having supplied aircraft to transport UN forces at that time. The Chinese berated Khrushchev as bearing partial responsibility for Lumumba's death at Tshombe's hands, and recalled this Congo "Munich" at the time of Khrushchev's Cuban crisis retreat. Now, four years after the original visit of Soviet transports to the Congo, transports and pilots fur~ nished by the Soviet Union were being used to help the side opposing Tshombe. The Soviets: followed this up in December by expelling Tshombe's diplomatic ee resentative in Mosocw. Regardless of whether the rebels prospered or failed, the USSR hoped through its actions to gain at U.S. expense in the eyes of the many African leaders, radical and moderate, who disliked Tshombe, disapproved of U.S. support for him, and were angered at the U.S. airlift to Stanleyville. The Soviets also hoped to. -22- ' impress radicals elsewhere in the Communist world.*. At the same time, the risk of a direct military con- frontation with the United States in the Congo could be-kept minimal by ensuring that the Soviet assistance was not mentioned in Soviet overt propaganda, that the transport flights were conducted under African auspices, and that no Soviet personnel actually set foot in the Congo. . é ‘ ‘While avoiding military danger, however, the new Soviet leadership was entirely. willing to jeopardize Soviet-U.S. political relations to impress its radi- cal audience-~1n connection with the Congo as on other matters. On 28 November, the Soviets stagéd a demon- stration, protesting. the Stanleyville airdrop of 24 November, by foreign students before the U.S. Embassy ‘in Moscow (and then the Belgian; Congolese, and Brit- ish Embassies as well). A TASS account the same day duly recorded with approval the hurling of ink bottles _at the U.S. Embassy: building. The decision of the new Soviet leadership to organize this demonstration was particularly striking in that this was the first such demonstration to be held at the U.S. Embassy since the Cuban crisis of October 1962. Throughout the last two years of Khrushchev's tenure in office he had refrained. from such gestures against the United States, even following the Guif of Tonkin incidents of August and September 1964 involving a member of the "socialist camp." Ce “ *In February 1965, in the course of Kosygin's talks in Peking with the Chinese leaders, he engaged tn @ héated private debate with Chou En-lat in Mao's presence over these transport flights to atd the Congo's rebels, with each side claiming the credit and denying that the other had done anything. The Sovtets furnished accounts of these talks to many of their foreign supporters. -23- C. The CPSU Reversal of Line on North Vietnam RE eS OF bine on Nortn vietnam Of all the objectives sought by the new Soviet leadership through a shift in the emphasis of Khru- shchev's foreign policy, the. recovery of a signifi- cant degree of influence over the North Vietnamese party was probably the single most: important. The progress the CPSU has made in this effort is impres- sive in view of the degree to which its relations with the Lao Dong party had deteriorated in 1963 and 1964, in large part because of continued Soviet ad- herence to policies of caution and limited detente toward the United States at a time when the DRV in- tended’ to expand its struggle against the United States in South Vietnam. : North Vietnamese agreement with Chinese poli- cies toward the U.S. and objections to the Soviet attitude were given their most formal expression in a communique issued by the Ninth Session of. the central committee of the North Vietnamese party, held in December 1963. This communique took quite a strong position in denunciation of the forces of “revision- ism" .in the world Communist movement, although it also specified that the Vietnamese party’ drew a “clear political distinction" between Tito--a lackey of imperialism--and unnamed others (the Soviets) who had merely committed the "error of revisionism.” The North Vietnamese thus declined to follow the Chinese the last mile in associating the CPSU with the Yugoslavs as traitors to the world Communist movement; instead, they announced that they would "struggle for the sake of unity” with these "mis- taken people," and reiterated a plea for further bilateral negotiations between the Chinese and the Soviets. Lr ere was provided details of a training ' cours @ Sino-Soviet dispute given in-Hanoi for party cadres, also in December 1963, which ex- pressed a similar attitude more frankly: .after an extensive review and condemnation of Khrushchev's .actions and endorsement of the Chinese position, it was nevertheless asserted that the Vietnamese party would formally support neither the Soviet Un- ion nor China; would regard both as "intimate broth- ers," and would await the reunification of the -24- ‘Moscow early in 1964 to explain the central committee ‘Vietnamese party were publicly attacked. by party - that aggression Was being carrie - world movement following the coming collapse of "the revisionist clique of Khrushchev and Tito." Ten months before Khrushchev's ouster, the North Vietnam- ‘ ese party was thus privately intimating that his fall, if it occurred, would bring both a change in Soviet foreign policy and an improvement in Soviet relations with the DRV. ; Despite these qualifications attached by the North Vietnamese to their public and private con- demnations of Soviet policy at the end of 1963, and despite the dispatch of a Vietnamese party mission to decisions to ‘the CPSU, North Vietnamese relations with the Soviets continued slowly to deteriorate dur- ing the remainder of the Khrushchev regime. The De-~ cember training course had alluded to "preventive measures" which were being taken against any party - members who might have "reactionary sentiments"; and has stated that the December central committee plenum saw two alternate members of the central committee censured for the expression of anti-Chinese or excessively pro-Soviet views at the plenum.* "Rightist" tendencies within the North spokesmen both at the plenum and subsequently. Throughout the first nine months.of 1964, So- viet relations with North: Vietnam continued to be embittered by the great caution and coolness dis- played by the Soviets in matters considered by the North Vietnamese to be vital to their national in- terests. In April, the on the Vietnamese Internationa ontro Ce) mn pri- vately admitted nam by the North; a eee cence ted re- cent relations betweén members OF the Polish ICC delegation and North Vietnamese officials as "cold," iy Oe ecient also claimed that: some- time in a colonel in the North Vietnamese Army and @ second secretary of the Hanoi city party com- mittee defected to.the Soviet Union while students at a party school in Moscow. This claim has not been confirmed by any other source. -25- and noted that within the ICC, the Poles had not been pressing complaints presented by the North Viet- namese Army. This Polish attitude almost certainly reflected the current Soviet posture toward the DRV.- In August the cautious Soviet reaction to the first Tonkin Gulf incident caused further difficulties, when TASS carried an account of the event at vari~ ance with the DRV (and Chinese) version, and when the USSR agreed to carry the matter to the UN con- _ trary to. DRV wishes and without consulting Hanoi. ‘ported ‘that Soviet néwspapers and periodicals, ex-~ cept for scientific and technological journals, had ‘been withdrawn from general circulation there--in Contrast to the increase in circulation of Chinese Communist publications--and that North Vietnamese students returning from Moscow were being given po- litical re-education courses. Ata September ex~ hibit at the Marx-Lenin museum in Moscow to cele- brate the centenary of the First International, Ho Chi Minh's portrait was not among those of the lead- ers of the world movement displayed, while Tito's was. The absolute nadir of CPSU-Lao Dong relations came on 18 September, when--according to a Chinese account-~a DRV: delegate to a World Youth Forum in Moscow protested the "undemocratic" way in which the Soviets were running the sessions and defended the Chinese against Soviet-sponsored attack. A TASS account of this incident the same day asserted that “despite the protest of the chairman...the representative of the DRV occupied the speaker's platform and wasted a lot of time of the assembly ‘with procedural questions." This was the first {and only) explicit criticism of the DRV or its representatives ever published by Soviet propa-~ ganda. Effect of Khrushchev Ouster: This steady ‘decay of relations between the two parties came to a halt with Khrushchev’s fall, and matters began gradually to improve thereafter. A few days after Khrushchev's overthrow, the chief. of the DRV com- mercial mission in Paris, equivocated when aSked where Hanoi stood in @ Sino-Soviet dispute, asserted that North -26- a a a a ee ess Vietnam was close "geographically" to China, and added that Moscow had been leaving the field open to the Chinese in Southeast Asia. It would appear that the North Vietnamese were now fervently hoping for a change in Soviet policies toward the United States favorable to Hanoi's interests; the DRV had, in fact, a more pressing need for such a Soviet change than any other member of the old anti-Khrushchev Chinese coalition, in view of the military dangers demon- strated by the U.S. Gulf of Tonkin attacks. One aspect of the revised DRV strategy to fit the "new situation” was the suppression of North Vietnamese propaganda directly critical of the So-~ ‘viet Union. On 3 November, a North Vietnamese ‘party and government delegation led by Premier Pham Van Dong left Hanoi for Moscow to attend the Soviet revo- lutionary anniversary and sound out the new CPSU leadership. Immediately after Pham Van Dong's re- turn from Moscow, the party journal'Hoc Tap recalled copies of the November issue which had already been distributed in order to replace an article highly offensive to the CPSU with a nonpolemical article. Along the same line, the North Vietnamese are said to have compelled the Chinese to agree to revision of the original list of invitees to a Vietnam Solidarity Conference in Hanoi in November to add Soviet and East European representatives to an overwhelmingly prorCasness gathering. The North Vietnamese attitude toward the USSR at the end of November, after Pham's return home, was reflected in comments at the time by a DRV Deputy Foreign Minister The DRV official stated that a oug 1s gove t had “areas of agreement” with. the Chinese, it also "cer- tainly had differences" with them, and that North Vietnam wanted to cultivate good relations with the -27- Soviet Union.* (The Chinese by. then had made it clear Ts that they did not.) The deputy minister added, how- ever, that even after Pham's visit the Soviet position was Still not clear to the DRV, and that "further ob- servations" were needed badly. He expressed puzzle- ment.at claims by Brezhnev and Kosygin that there would be no change in Soviet policy, and hypothesized that such statements were a "domestic political move for the transition period, since Khrushchev's poli- ae cies have taken root for ten years, and it is difficult to make’ radical changes quickly."** As will be noted, *The North Vietnamese were probably all the more anztous for a rapprochement with the USSR because of - the degree to which their past isolation from the So- vtets had made-them vulnerable to uncompensated Chi- nese pressures. In August and September 1964 DRV rep- resentatives were: concerned to assert the independence and originality of North Vietnamese theory and practice (implicitly, independence from Maotst doctrine), and tn December the Chinese were to reassert Mao's claim to exclusive ortginality in revolutionary theory. This dispute over CCP pretensions to have provided the dectsive guidelines and insptratton for the Lao Dong party--as for everyone else~-has gone on ever since. (See DD/I Intelligence Memorandum, "Peiping-Hanot Differences over Doctrine and Strategy for the Viet Cong," RSS No. 0006/65, 2 Aprti 1965.) *4Seventeen months later, in April 1966, an im~ portant DRV official told a high-level Viet Cong gathering that "we do not hold the view"--which he explicettly attrtbuted to the Chinese--"that the So- vtet leadership ts as revisionist as the Leadership under Khrushchev, or that tt ts somewhat more danger- ous than Khrushehev." It was the North Vietnamese view, instead, "that the Soviet léadershtp still contains some revistonists, some indecisive elements, and also active elements." : ~28- TO very similar surmises were voiced privately by the North Koreans and publicly by Indonesian and Japanese ‘party leaders in late 1964 and early 1965, raising the possibility that some CPSU representatives had been passing private assurances to this effect. In any event, Pham Van Dong evidently received sufficient indication in Moscow of an evolution in CPSU policy. toward both the.DRV and the United States ‘to encourage Hanoi to maintain a conciliatory posture toward the USSR over. the next two months despite in-. ‘ creasing Chinese’ pressure to abandon it. (On 10, 1ll- and 12 January 1965, for example, Radio’ Peking re- broadcast in Vietnamese the text of the CCP's No- vember Red Flag editorial "Why Khrushchev Fell" which contained Peking's’ first great attack on "Khru- shchevism without Khrushchev.") By that time, the new Soviet leadership had gratified Hanoi by announc- | ing that a permanent office of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam would be opened in the USSR in early 1965. In January, the first con- crete evidence of new Soviet military aid was forth-~ coming, when photography revealed the presence of Soviet self-propelled antiaircraft guns in North Vietnam for the first time. These weapons may have been delivered by a Soviet cargo ship which arrived in Haiphong on 22 December. Soviet: propaganda mean- while reminded Hanoi that it was "the allied forces of the socialist community" which "assure with cer~ tainty the security of each socialist country in the face of the plots of the imperialist reactionaries," as a Moscow broadcast in Vietnamese put it on-5 Janu- ary. : To recapitulate: the change in the Soviet pos-~ ture toward the DRV which was well under way by the turn of the year appears to have had two basic causes. First, a consensus of the new Soviet leadership~-per- haps not all the new Soviet leaders, but surely a dominant majority among them--had a view of the- value to the Soviet state of the good will of the , DRV--and of all the Communist "radicals" who could be impressed by Soviet support for the DRV--which was fundamentally different from that held by Khru- shchev, particularly in his last two years. The point is not that Khrushchev was stupid and his successors were intelligent, but rather that different sets of -29~ values and priorities were involved. A majority of the new Soviet leaders wished to regain influence in Hanoi and elsewhere among the anti-U.S. radicals in general because they regarded the recapture of such influence as an intrinsic good sufficiently valuable in itself to be worth the modifications of ' Soviet posture toward the United States--and the as- sociated risks, which they hoped would be minimal-- that this might entail. Khrushchev had not felt this to be so. One of the reasons why he was re- ‘moved was precisely because he did not think so. .The decision to cultivate Ho Chi Minh--with all the . consequences that have followed--thus rested at bot- tom on a difference of world-view: it was an ideo- logical decision. Secondly, it seems likely that this decision was made more easily because its consequences were not fully foreseen. It is probable that the Soviet Union at the end of 1964 estimated that the North Vietnamese enterprise in'South Vietnam was enter- ing its final phase leading to complete victory, and the USSR may well have hoped that the United States would not increase its commitment to seek to reverse this trend (as it in fact was to do), but instead would reconcile itself to the prospect of eventual Communist domination of the south and seek a graceful’ way out. It is possible that there was a minority in the Soviet leadership (including Kosygin, for ex- ample) who nevertheless retained something of Khru- shchev's reluctance to become involved in Vietnam at all~-because of the possible risks, because of the possible long-term effect on relations with the United States, and because of the possible eventual effect on the Soviet allocation of resources.* If so, those ‘in the leadership majority who in any case took a more complacent view of a deterioration of Soviet- American relations (such as Brezhnev and Shelepin) , *Some of the contrasting views of Kosygin, Brezhnev, and some of the other Soviet leaders are discussed be- Low, pages 80-101, A forthcoming CAESAR study will ex- amine in greater detail differences between Kosygin and Brezhnev on Vietnam, relations with the United States, and other matters. -30- and who were particularly eager tc win North Vietnam- ese favor, would have been able to argue to waverers that the USSR could gain credit cheaply in Vietnam and among all the Communist radicals without military or political risk of any kind because the U.S. was about to accede to a DRV victory. Once the Soviet Union was’ indeed: involved, and thé United States refused to withdraw but on the contrary began bomb- ing the north and multiplying its forces in the ‘south, the relative weight within the Soviet leader- ship of those who wished to cultivate the Communist anti-U.S. radicals at the expense of Soviet-Ameri-~- can relations became more and more predominant. From now on it seemed impossible to draw back, and _in any case the rewards for going on, as will be seen, were to become more and more enticing. The Kosygin February Visit: The decisive watershed in Soviet - North Vietnamese relations was the visit of a Soviet delegation led by. Premier Kosygin to Hanoi in early February 1965. Kosygin ‘came prepared to offer the DRV an important package _Of economic and military assistance, including most notably MIG fighter planes and SA-2 missiles for air defense. In return, the Soviets expected and the North Vietnamese were prepared cas offer certain minimal political concessions. : The first of these pertained to Khrushchev's scheduled 26-party Moscow preparatory meeting for = a world Communist conference, a meeting which the Soviets by now had postponed from December until March. Unlike other parties in the. anti-Khrushchev alliance, the North Vietnamese had never committed themselves publicly to boycott this meeting, and after its postponement, in December and January, they apparently gave some Soviet supporters grounds to hope that they might agree to attend. Kosygin was informed in Hanoi, however, that the Lao Dong party could not go that far in offending the Chinese, but that it would promise to abstain from all criti- cism of the March meeting, regardless of Chinese behavior. ‘This was probably as much of a concession as the CPSU had expected to obtain, The ‘First "Unity of Action" Pro seek: A second immediate concession to Soviet desires--which also coincided with DRV interests--was North Vietnamese agreement to join in urging upon the Chinese a plan -31- for a joint statement by North Vietnam, Communist China, and the Soviet Union, to serve as a “warning” to the United States. According to subsequent Soviet ‘private statements, the North Vietnamese welcomed this idea when it was put forward by Kosygin in Hanoi, and on 22 February themselves prepared and forwarded a draft statement to Moscow and Peking. The Soviets of course accepted the statement, while the Chinese predictably. rejected it, since acceptance would tend .to undermine the effort they were by then engaged in throughout | the world to. depict the USSR as a perfidi-. ous lackéy of imperialism.. Gratified by the success of this ploy. in.exposing Chinese recalcitrance to: the North Vietnamese, the Soviets were tc revive it ‘in April--with similar results. By the fall of -1965, the CPSU had expanded on this proposal, and was floating a suggestion for a meeting of all bloc coun- tries to coordinate aid for North Vietnam. The So- viets publicly and privately exploited the Chinese refusal of all such proposals to weaken the Chinese position and strengthen that of the CPSU in the eyes of all the Communist "radicals" with a vested interest ‘in unity of action against the United States: most notably, North Vietnam, North Korea, the Communist Party of Japan, the pro-Chinese Communist Party of India (Leftist), and Cuba. Abortive Soviet Military Proposais: In addi- tion, the Soviet Union made two concrete military proposals to Communist China soon after. Kosygin's return from Hanoi. On 25 February, the USSR requested the CPR to grant it an "air corridor" to North Viet- nam-~that is, blanket authorization for large num- bers of Soviet transport aircraft to overfly China back and forth over a given route ferrying military equipment to the DRV. Shortly thereafter, the USSR asked for the use of one or more air bases in South China, near the Vietnamese border, to be manned by Soviet personnel and apparently to be used for the assembly of MIG fighters shipped by rail from the Soviet Union. Both requests were adamantly refused by the Chinese, and these refusals were probably helpful to the CPSU in its political struggle with the CCP for Hanoi's sympathies. Also of some help to the Soviets in this regard was Chinese obstinacy in temporarily obstructing and delaying rail transit through China, from March through June 1965, of -32~ TOP SECRET Soviet SAM technicians and SAM components for North Vietnamese air defense. On the other side of the ; ledger, however, the Chinese’soon drew DRV attention ’ to the Soviet reluctance to ship weapons to North - Vietnam by sea’ because of Moscow's desire to avoid a confrontation with the United States. Soviets Burn Fingers on Negotiations: On the whole, the Soviets clearly had the better of the Chinese in the mutual recriminations over Soviet military assistance to Hanoi in the spring of 1965. On another subject, however, the Soviets simultane- ously lost:a point to the Chinese in Vietnamese eyes. _ According to Chinese assertions which the Soviets have not denied, immediately after Kosygin's: return to Moscow the Soviet Government formally proposed to the DRV and CPR the convening of an international conference on Vietnam, and meanwhile made contacts with the French toward this end. The Soviets appar- ently took this action because the North Vietnamese had previously been toying with the notion that the United States might be willing to use such a confer- ence as a face-saving device to cover a U.S. with- drawal from South Vietnam and the establishment of some mechanism which would assure the gradual advent to power there of the National Liberation Front. The North Vietnamese had evidently not yet completely abandoned this notion by the time Kosygin left Hanoi, since the USSR would not have taken the position it did in the face of unambiguous DRV opposition, at a time when it was ardently courting the Lao Dong party in other ways. By March, however, the DRV leadership had concluded from the U.S. bombings of North Vietnam and other U.S. actions that the United States had no intention of capitulating to their wishes, either openly or tacitly. Without such a prior U.S. inten- tion, the North Vietnamese saw no purpose in any con- ference, and moreover came to agree with the Chinese that Soviet soundings for a conference were themselves -33- positively harmful as tending to create political pressures on the DRV itself for concessions. In March, Vietnamese Communist representatives there- fore criticized the Soviet initiatives for a Vietnam settlement. Chastened by this experience, the Soviet Union has ever since been at pains to remain within the bounds of North Vietnamese policy on this issue and to take no independent initiatives on Vietnam negotiations in contacts with the West. To sum up: In their first six months in power the new Soviet leaders had made considerable progress in their dealings with the North Vietnamese. The worsening of party relations had been halted, high- level contacts had taken place in Moscow and Hanoi, and a foothold for Soviet influence had been obtained which might be improved as the promised Soviet mili- tary equipment and technicians arrived and as the North Vietnamese became dependent upon the continued flow of such help. The DRV would not attend the Moscow preparatory meeting of Communist parties. in March, but it had promised not to criticize it. The CPSU had scored off the Chinese by exposing CCP un- willingness to cooperate with Soviet political and military proposals ostensibly intended to aid the DRV, and the reiteration of such "unity of action" proposals promised to be a useful avenue for the expansion of Soviet influence among Communist anti-~ U.S. radicals in aeveray countries. On the other hana’. the USSR had had two un- pleasant surprises in February and March: first, the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam--which suggested that a long and possibly dangerous war rather than an imminent victory. was in prospect; second,.the hostile DRV reaction to Soviet initiatives on ne- gotiations--which warned the Soviets that they would -34- henceforth be prisoners: of DRV: policy on this issue. Never before had the Soviet Union engaged its pres- tige so far in support of a. belligerent over whose decisions the USSR had. so, little control. Ever since February 1965, although the Soviets may well have preferred: .(on balance) that the war and its associated military,.risks be ended, they have taken no serious political risks to try to make it end (particularly since they have had no assurance that they would succeed if they did try), and have therefore concentrated primarily on a very successful effort to utilize the war to.reduce the influence of © both the Chinese Communists and the United States throughout the world.* D. Initial Soviet Efforts to Neutralize North Koreans During the same six-month period between Khru~ shchev's fall and the March meeting the CPSU took ‘However, even the degree of support for the tdea of negottattons which the USSR has periodically at- towed ttself cauttously to display (notably in Feb- ruary 1965, January 1966, and January 1967) has en- couraged some scepticism among the Lao Dong lead- ership about the sincerity of CPSU devotion to the . North Vietnamese cause. This Worth Vietnamese at- titude persisted despite the fact that the DRV it- self eventually became more forthcoming in holding out the posstbility of megortaricns in exchange for - aU.&. bombing cessatton. -35- its first steps to improve relations with the North Koreans, who had gone considerably further than the North Vietnamese in outspoken support of the Chinese position and in waging open polemics with Moscow. The Korean Communists were delighted at Khrushchev's removal, and according to one report, Kim Il~sung is said to have summoned the Soviet Ambassador shortly thereafter to urge that the CPSU seize the occasion to repudiate publicly the errors of Khru- . Shchev's policies and to seek agreement with the Chi- ‘nese. While the North Koreans may well have urged this, they did not expect such drastic action; they were instead privately hopeful of an eventual evolu- tion of Soviet policy in the direction they favored. On 2 November, the leaders of the Chosen Soren-- - the Korean Communist organization in Japan directly controlled by the North Korean central committee-- adopted a private policy decision reflecting judgments apparently passed to them by Pyongyang the week be- fore. The Chosen Soren held that Khrushchev's ouster "may" bring better Soviet relations with the Chinese, but.that a drastic change in the Soviet stand should not be expected "for there is the problem of Soviet prestige and the attitudes of the European Communist Parties." Nevertheless, the Chosen Soren did expect eventual change, which probably would be a "gradual . process leading to correction of revisionist errors." This view thus agreed.with that expressed by the DRV Deputy Foreign Minister a few weeks later. In early November, a North Korean party delega- tion went to Moscow for talks with the CPSU during the Soviet anniversary celebrations. North Korean public statements during this period made it clear that they were holding fast to the two principal demands they had been making of the CPSU for several -36- years: a fundamental revision of Soviet policies toward the United States to expedite a world-wide “anti-imperialist struggle," and an end to all So- viet attempts to dictate to the North Korean party. or to interfere in its internal affairs. A Nodon Sinmun editorial on 7 November thus asserted that "the objective situation demands that the anti-im- perialist revolutionary forces unite close and wage a stauncher struggle against the U.S. imperialists’ schemes of aggression and war provocation." At the same time, Nodong Sinmun emphasized "noninter- ference in each other's internal affairs" as a principle which must be observed by Communists as a prerequisite for bloc unity. The same points were made in a 6 November Soviet anniversary speech in Pyongyang by a vice chairman of the North Korean party, in which an audience including the Soviet. Ambassador was told of the need for a "more resolute” fight and for "heavier" blows against the United States. ‘ ; On 3 December, after the North Korean delega- tion had returned from Moscow, another Nodong Sinmun editorial indicated some dissatisfaction wiEE what it apparently considered the continuing ambiguity of the CPSU position, warning that "the indiscrete act of clinging to the old line which has gone bankrupt in life and egging on others to follow it must be reso-: — lutely rejected." The North Korean party organ in- sisted that "we cannot talk about the victory of the cause of all peoples for peace, national independence, and social progress apart from the struggle against imperialism led by U.S. imperialism," and demanded that the bloc and all revolutionary forces "put. pres- sure on and deal blows to the imperialists from all directions." ~37- a Pome, : a nr tS GL ere Other North Korean editorials in December 1964 praised the Japanese Communist party's expulsion of “revisionist” leaders (who in fact were being backed. by the CPSU), praised Stalin, and denounced revision- ism repeatedly; but Khrushchev-era direct attacks on the CPSU were not resumed, and Pyongyang continued to hold the door open for a "strengthening of ‘the unity of the socialist camp" upon further. improvement . Of CPSU behavior. In late December, a North Korean. trade official told a visiting Japanese businessman that North Korea and China did not necessarily agree ‘on all matters, and added that the North Korean party leadership, though sympathetic toward China's "gen- eral position" in the Sino-Soviet dispute,.was criti- cal of the fact that the Chinese had helped expand a the dispute into the sphere of state relations. : a Soviet Premier Kosygin's visit to North Korea in February 1965, like his visit to North Vietnam on the same journey, marked a turning point for the ’ CPSU. One outcome of Kosygin's talks with Kim Il-sung , Was a mutual understanding that there would be no fur- ther public attacks exchanged between the two parties. Specifically, the North Koreans promised not. to crit- icize the 26-party Moscow March meeting, .although they, like the North Vietnamese, would not attend. Bloc diplomats in Pyongyang later asserted that : Kosygin discussed with Kim the resumption of both Soviet economic aid and the Soviet deliveries of ad- vanced weapons to North Korea which Khrushchev had halted in December 1962, and it seems likely that. Kosygin did hold out the prospect of some such mili- tary aid, although no concrete agreement was yet reached. North Korean editorials during the visit discovered once again the “moral and material sup- port" the Soviets had given North Korea in the past. Soon after the visit, on 19 February, Han Tok-su, the =38— chairman of the Chosen Soren, addressing a meeting ‘ of his central committee in Tokyo, strongly called ; for renewed solidarity between North Korea and the Soviet Union, termed the USSR "North Korea's brother," and added that the Soviet Union, as well as Communist China, had common objectives with North Korea. A few weeks later, Han remarked privately that North Korea would follow a policy independent from that of China. Han's statements represented a consider- able advance from the cautious position the Chosen Soren had taken in November 1964, and almost cer- . tainly reflected the modification in opinion in Pyong- yang in the interval. The North Korean party by March 1965 had thus already shifted its position a great deal, although it was subsequently to move much further. : E, Soviet Temporizing with the Ja anese, Indonesians, Indians In the same initial six-month period, the CPSU found the going slower in its efforts to neutralize the three leading non-bloc supporters of the CCP in Asia: the Japanese and Indonesian Communist parties and the schismatic left wing of the Indian Communist party. CPSU progress was hindered in these three cases largely because in each case, at the moment of Khru- shchev's fall, the Soviets were engaged in organi- zational activities hostile to the party concerned which the CPSU subsequently was reluctant or unable to give up completely. In the case of the Japanese party, this was CPSU support for dissident Japanese "revisionist" leaders expelled from the JCP; in the case of the Indonesian party, it was covert Soviet financial support of Indonesian moderate leftists hostile to the PKI; and in the case of the pro-Chi- : nese left wing of the Indian party, it- was CPSU identi- fication with the Dange right-wing leadership of the party at a time when the left wing was in the process of formally seceding to form a separate party. As | ~39~ will be seen, the Soviets initially made the least progress with the Japanese and the most progress with the Indians. 1. . The Japanese Communists from the moment of . Khrushchev's ouster began to make repeated public’ statements presenting their demands upon the new CPSU leadership: a fundamental change in the CPSU , international line and a cessation of Soviet inter-~ ference in Japanese Communist affairs. At the same timé, they made a number of statements referring to divisions within the Soviet leadership and sug- gesting--at times fairly explicitly--that some of the new CPSU leaders were more sympathetic: to their viewpoint than others. On 16 October, party secretary general Miya- moto (whom the Soviets had attacked personally in August) announced that the: CPSU leaders must now “fundamentally review their attitude not only toward our party but also toward other questions both at home and abroad," and demanded an “over-all re- vision of Khrushchev's course," including "a basic change in the Soviet attitude toward the United States and Britain." On 25 October,.in apparent reaction to the initial CPSU blanket public as- sertions that previous Soviet policies would not be abandoned,.the JCP organ Akahata published statements by its chief editor, Doki, to the effect that the CPSU would not "all at once turn its re- visionist course over to the correct one," since "some of the Soviet leaders led by Khrushchev" agreed with his line. (Emphasis added.) Neverthe- less, he expressed hope that the CPSU would now re- examine its revisionist line, and would cease it intervention in the affairs of the JCP. : On S November, JCP Chairman Sanzo Nosaka made an unusual statement alluding to a difference of opinion within the Chinese camp--and probably, within the JCP itself--over the new Soviet leader- ; ship. .Praising Khrushchev's removal and denouncing his policies, Nosaka "hoped that new leaders of © the CPSU would learn from Khrushchev's failure and return to the road of genuine Marxism-Leninism," and urged his audience "to wait and see which road the new leaders of the Soviet Union will follow." Nosaka also stated: ~40- Both extremist views were wrong--the one considering that Khrushchev's stepping down would have no effect on the current revisionist trend, the other considering that the struggle against revisionism. _ was over and there would be plain sail- - ing in the future. — e Nosaka's description of the first "extremist view" corresponded to.the position taken by Albania, which had already explicitly denied that the hold of revisionism on the CPSU leadership had been shaken by Khrushchev's fall andi had made'clear its great dis- ‘pleasure at the momentary Chinese halt in attacks on the CPSU and the Chou En-lai’ exploratory visit to Moscow for talks from which the Albanians would be excluded. ; It is also likely, however, that Nosaka was alluding to forces within his own party which were opposed to a rapprochement with the CPSU on any terms. Such extremist forces--which emerged into the open when the JCP changed its position dramatically in 1966--were mentioned ee ese 1964 and 1965 as being strongly represente fe) in the cen- tral party apparatus and in certain of the party provincial committees. In particular, the Yamaguchi Prefectural Committee--which was to be purged in 1966-- appears to have sought unsuccessfully at the Ninth JCP Congress, in late November 1964, to push the party line further to the left than the party leader- ship was willing to permit. By December, however, even less extreme JCP leaders such as Nosaka and Miyamoto appeared to be ' losing hope that the CPSU would make important con- cessions to the JCP, and Japanese Communist state- ments implied that persons in the CPSU leadership upon whom the JCP was counting had not been able to influence CPSU policy sufficiently. On 18 December, Miyamoto declared, according to NCNA, that "there are some people" in the CPSU “who, as time goes on, have come out to say that they attach importance to our party's proposal for prompt concerted action against imperialism,” but added that continued CPSU insistence on participation contradicted these pro- fessions. On 28 December, an Akahata article cited -41- post-Khrushchev Soviet press attacks on the JCP as reflecting the views of "the new CPSU leadership, or at least part of it," and repeatedly attacked . the Soviets by criticizing the position taken by “certain members of the CPSU" or "a part of the lead- “ership of the CPSU." .(Emphasis added.) a ' The major disappointment for the JCP was ap- parently the decision of the post-Khrushchev CPSU .leadership not to abandon the Japanese Communist dis-. . sident movement outright to appease the JCP. Not _.only the JCP, but the dissidents themselves had - , thought the CPSU might do this, and dissident leader . Yoshio’ Shiga in early November went to the Soviet Un- ion to attempt to forestall such action. On the day H Shiga departed, Akahata took public and angry notice | of the Shiga mission, terming it a “desperate. at- : { tempt to show off the existence of their antiparty , renegade group and to gain continued support from ‘abroad." Akahata threatened the CPSU: "If any . foreigner thinks that there is still some use for these wretched party-selling revisionists, he will also be subjected.to severe historical censure." This threat was published five days after the Soviet trade union newspaper Trud on 30 October had published explicit praise for "the Communists Shiga . and Suzuki" as well as an open attack upon "the pres- ent leadership" of the JCP. Although such direct at- i tacks on the JCP were.not repeated by Moscow, the : Soviet radio continued to praise the Japanese dis~ i sident leaders--who had already been expelled from ! the party--as Communists in good standing. Mean- while, the Soviets through their local friends be- F . gan organization of a new Japanese ‘bookstore and a : new Japan-Soviet Friendship Society to substitute : 4 for corresponding propaganda organizations con- | trolled by the JCP. ; , : : The JCP responded by excluding the CPSU-- and even Soviet correspondents--from the Ninth JCP Congress in late November, which duly ratified the expulsion from the party of Shiga and other pro- CPSU dissidents. Although Shiga and other dissi- dents thereupon wished to. form a rival Communist party, the Soviets apparently sought to dissuade them; rather than commit itself formally to a splinter ~42- TOP"S! aT party, the CPSU reportedly wished the dissidents to unify on an informal basis, acquire strength, and build up the maximum possible pressure on the JCP leadership to force concessions to the CPSU. When the Shiga group nevertheless gave itself the title of a Communist party,* the CPSU and its friends aid not recognize it.as such, although the Soviets continued to finance Shiga. At the same time,. the ’ CPSU greatly increased its cultivation of the Japa- nese Socialist party and the Socialist-controlled trade union federation Sohyo, hoping: both to in- crease Soviet influence within the Japanese left gen- erally and to exert pressure on the JCP from a sec- ond direction. By the time of the Haven 1965 Communist pre- paratory meeting in Moscow, the JCP was making fre- quent, direct attacks on the CPSU for its subversive activity, and was even seeking covertly to influence the Korean Chosen Soren organization in Japan against taking a'softer line toward the CPSU in response to the evolution of the North Korean policy. In con- trast to CPSU practice under Khrushchev, however, the Soviets were not attacking the JCP in kind, and instead had begun to appeal for JCP unity with the CPSU in support of the North Vietnamese war effort.** Meanwhile, one of the Japanese dissident leaders, Shigeo Kamiyama, was nominated in March to-oppose JCP Chairman Sanzo Nosaka iin the June elections to the Japanese Diet. This election contest was in- tended to frighten and impress the JcPp. Its out~ come was just the opposite, and was to have an im- portant effect upon CPSU tactics toward the Japanese pens *The "Communtst Party of Japan (Voice of Jasant. Shiga! s publication was entitled Votce of Japan. **Sinee the CPSU would not respond directly, the JCP in the spring of 1965 began to print polemical responses to old Soviet antt-JCP articles published during the Khrushchev regime. ~43- 2. The Indonesian Communist party (PKI) was a much more serious problem for the CPSU, both before and after Khrushchev's ouster, because it was far More important in its own country and much closer "te total power than was the JCP. By the time Khru- .shchev fell, the Soviets had long since begun to re- gard the advance of.the PKI toward power as a real danger to Soviet interests, and the CPSU was seeking, rather futilely, | to prevent the PKI from Surrhee ‘in- . G@xeasing its influence over Sukarno. “petove sikanke eee home for his last talks "with Khrushchev in late September 1964, the PKI re- portedly "made-it clear" to him that the CPSU was intensely hostile to the PKI and meant to do it harm. This prophecy was well borne out during Khru- shchev's conversations with Sukarno, when, according to several sources,.the Soviet leader vigorously protested PKI influence on Indonesian foreign policy and charged that the PKI was now putting "lies" into the mouths of some Indonesian government leaders. In short, at the moment of Khrushchev's fall Sukarno and the Indonesian regime, in part because of PKI influence, were moving increasingly closer to Communist China and away from the Soviet Union, de- spite the huge Soviet military investment in Indo- nesia. The Soviets were seeking, thus far vainly, to halt this trend through attacks on the main source of PKI power, its alliance with Sukarno; and the PKI knew this. Since Sukarno was unpredictable, the PKI could never be certain that ‘continued Soviet pressure of this kind might not eventually win con- cessions harmful to its interests. After Khrushchev fell, the Indonesian Communists therefore had good objective reasons to desire that Sino-Soviet rela~ tions improve, that Soviet foreign policy be modi- fied to coincide with the violently anti-American, Chinese and PKI line, and that PKI-CPSU interests be harmonized. For these reasons, the PKI mixed joy at Khru- shchev's removal with insistence that the CPSU re- verse its policies, and also initially showed Slightly greater optimism than did the Japanese party that real concessions might be forthcoming. On 16 October, PKI Chairman Aidit ‘briefly expressed -~44~ pleasure at Khrushchev's removal, and on 25 October, followed this up with a complaint that "difficult barriers hindering a fresh approach between the So- viet Union and the Chinese" still existed "because the CPSU still adhered to the principles adopted at the 20th, 21st, and 22nd congresses"--that is, still said it did. Aidit immediately added, however, that the Soviet reaffirmation of the decisions of these congresses:could be explained by the fact that a new, party congress would be needed to repeal them formally. Here he took the same line as that used privately by the North Vietnamese and North Koreans, and appeared to be hinting that the old symbols could be retained for the time being, if the CPSU wished to save face, provided that the reality of policy was changed. On 3 November, Aidit held a discussion with the Chinese Ambassador to Indonesia, Yao Chung-ming, in which Yao is reported to have told Aidit that there was still doubt that relations between the USSR and China would improve. As a result of this conversation, the PKI is said to have instructed its cadres soon afterward to withhold any pronounce~ ments of faith in the new Soviet leadership until its policies were made known--and were known to be in agreement with PKI policies. Aidit, however, appears to have had diffi-~ culty holding his own public pronouncements within these guidelines, and continued frequently to dis- play more optimism regarding the Soviets than the Chinese would have wished. It is likely that he was given private assurances by the CPSU in this period to whet his expectations. A Soviet “friend- ship" delegation arrived in Indonesia in early - November for contacts with "political leaders and executives of mass and youth organizations," and hard on its heels came a Soviet trade union dele- gation for talks with SOBSI, the PKI's trade union federation. On 11 November, Aidit received Soviet Ambassador Mikhaylov, who had just returned from the USSR, and who presumably conveyed to hima message from the CPSU. The PKI released a public version of statements said to have been made by Aidit to Mikhaylov, in which Aidit again praised the CPSU's removal of Khrushchev from office, called -45- for a "new approach" between Communist parties, de- manded the postponement of the December ‘1964 pre- paratory conference, and expressed the "conviction" that the change in Soviet leadership would help Indo- nesian-Soviet relations. ' On the following day, Aidit made a public speech in which he attempted to put further pressure upon the CPSU. Aidit said that his party warmly wel- comed the “praiseworthy action" of the CPSU in re- moving Khrushchev; that obviously this had been done not because of Khrushchev’s age or sickness but be- cause of "the bankruptcy of his domestic and foreign policies"; that the PKI had not yet received "suf- . ficient materials regarding Khrushchev's mistakes," but that obviously these included his cult of ‘the individual,, his befriending of the imperialists, and his quarreling "with the socialist states and Marxist-Leninist parties." Aidit now made an unusual attempt to counter _publicly the pressure then being placed upon the CPSU by the European parties of the Soviet camp. He declared that "revisionist leaders in various Communist parties are attempting to blame the CPSU for removing Khrushchev in an undemocratic and im-~ proper manner by its central committee." He stated - that "we hope that revisionist leaders will cease blaming the CPSU," and warned that those leaders would experience the same fate as Khrushchev unless they made "self-criticism regarding their past mis~ takes" and followed "the revolutionary Marxist- Leninist way.” He also indicated that such self- criticism was "expected from the CPSU." He then declared that the removal of Khrushchev constituted merely "a thirty percent victory" over modern re- visionism, that the struggle to crush revisionism would have to be continued, and that he hoped "that this struggle will be carried out together with the Cpsu." On the day after this, 13 November, Aidit made still another statement reiterating pressure upon the CPSU and expressing Hope in the rehabili- tation of the Soviet party. In an address on the anniversary of the Soviet revolution, he emphasized that "there are 13 socialist states,...not 14, because ~46- Yugoslavia is not a socialist state"--contradicting a point which the Soviets had. reiterated since Khru- shchev's fall. Aidit insisted that the end of the Khru- shchev era had brought about a “new situation" for which Indonesian Communists "must swiftly adjust their thoughts” by preparing to take advantage of "new opportunities in the Communist movement.".. Finally, he hinted strongly that these "opportunities" would develop as the result of further upheavals within the CPSU it- self: only the. CPSU, he said, could amend the reso- lutions of. the 20th, 21st, and 22nd CPSU congresses, yet the world revolutionary movement was "demanding changes," “ and they feel that the praiseworthy step ‘" taken by the Central Committee of the CPSU in removing Khrushchev is the start of larger and better changes, which cer- tainly will take place.* . The “larger and better changes" by the CPSU which Aidit had in mind were both policy and personnel had changes. In late October, *The original verston of this passage in Atdit’s speech, altered in the official text as subsequently released by the PKI, expressed considerably more im- pattence with the CPsu for fatling thus far to de- liver these changes. In this version, as reported by NCNA back to Peking, Atdtt noted that "the new Leadership" of the CPSU had declared "that they would perstst in the line laid down at the 20th, 2lst, and 22nd congresses," added that the world's revolutionaries. "demand that the line should be changed," and then asked plaintively: "Otherwise, why was tt necessary to remove Khrushchev?" This verston, which betrayed Atdit's uneasiness at the ‘ posstbtlity that the Soviet line in faet would not _be changed, was apparently subsequently replaced for public release by one expressing revolutionary optt- mtam in the tnevttability of changes by the CPSU or within the CPSU. -47— TO ET reported that it was anticipated within the PKI cen- ‘tral committee that there would be a gradual shift by the CPSU, carefully timed in stages so as to avert strong reaction, away from Khrushchev's line and back toward Stalinist policies. In the final stage the re- versal of the decisions of the 22nd CPSU Congress was expected. The PKI was also said to see a "strong possi-~ bility" that in the process both Brezhnev and Kosygin would be replaced by "a single’ stronger leader." Who this Soviet leader was, on whom the PKI--like, the Jap- _anese party--was counting, was not spelled out. In late November, however, when Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi visited Indonesia, he is.reported to have: told Sukarno that the Soviet leadership was weak because of differences between Brezhnev and Kosygin, and that’ the strongest man on the scene was the "youngest man in the leadership group." Ten days before Chen Yi said this, Shelepin was elevated to full membership in the CPSU Presidium, bypassing the customary stage of candidate membership, and indeed became the young- est full member of the Presidium. It seems quite pos- sible, in the light of other evidence to be discussed later, that Shelepin was one of the Soviet leaders upon ‘whom the PKI and other Far Eastern radical Com- Munist parties were relying to bring about an eventual | veturn to Stalinist policies and a hard line toward the United States. If so, the PKI was from the start much more Sanguine about Shelepin and those who shared his views than were the Chinese--naturally so, since the PKI was primarily interested in a change in the sub- stance of Soviet policies toward the United States, while the CCP was at least as interested also in ob- taining humiliating Soviet concessions to Chinese aspirations to lead the world Communist movement which no Soviet leader was likely to grant. On 10 November--two days after Pravda had published the decisions of the Céntral Committee plenum including Shelepin's elevation--the PKI carried optimism re~- garding future CPSU policy to its most extraordinary length in the party organ Harian Rakjat, which pub- lished an article by a second-level PKI leader re- _ cently returned from Moscow that portrayed the CPSU as on the verge of (and even in the process of) re- nouncing Khrushchev's revisionist policies. -Harian Rakjat claimed that the changes "at the top" had -48- TOrseeR EI . been accompanied by “immediately tangible" changes in Soviet life, changes demanded by "the Soviet people themselves,” who opposed Khrushchev's “trend of re- versing the Great October Revolution." The article made the almost certainly false assertion that "twist and similar music" imported from the West and from Yugoslavia’ had been eradicated from “the Moscow air” since Khrushchev's fall. ‘Harian Rakjat interpreted editorials published in the Soviet press since the ouster dealing with “the need. for ideological educa- tion...and the mastery of revolutionary-theories" as a "significant sign that promises new developments in Soviet life." The article emphasized that "since 19 October" the Soviet and Chinese parties had pub- lished no criticisms of each other (literally true in the sense of an absence of attacks by name, but mis- leading in failing to recognize the restatements of opposing positions by the two sides). All these "optimistic impressions,” said the PKI writer, "strengthened my confidence in the creation of a new atmosphere in the interest of a glorious future." The. tone of this article was in remarkable contrast to that of the Chinese Red Flag editorial "Why Khru- shchev Fell" published two days later. “At. about this time--on 17 and 18 November-- the PKI leadership held policy discussions at which it was reportedly decided, among other things, that a new international Communist meeting was now "think- able” but that it would have to await the completion of the "rehabilitation" of the Soviet party follow- ing changes in leadership. On 2 December, the CPSU formally invited the PKI to attend the Moscow pre- paratory conference rescheduled from 15 December to 1 March. On 18 December, Aidit handed Soviet Am- bassador Mikhaylov a reply dated the 14th declining. the invitation on the grounds that adequate prepara-~ tions had not been made and that not all bloc coun- tries would be present at the conference, but ab- staining from further criticism. At the same time, Aidit accepted an invitation to visit the USSR for talks with the CPSU at a later date. In ‘mid-January, Aidit publicly repeated his party's position on the March meeting word for word, going no further. On 19 February, the CPSU sent another secret letter to the PKI renewing the appeal -49- to attend the meeting; this the PKI rejected in simi- lar fashion five days later. When in March the meet- ing was actually convened, Harian Rakjat ran two re- ; iT | 1 1 i markably mild editorials while it was in progress (declaring on 5 March that "real unity is best, and since real unity is not yet possible, formal unity must be maintained to the extent possible"). on 13 March, Harian Rakjat criticized the meeting's communique for not having attacked President Johnson. ' by name, warned that relations with Albania must be : "normalized" and: those with Yugoslavia discontinued, and::insisted that.no subsequent world Communist. con- ference could be held "without the assurance that everybody will attend." Even here, however, the PKI reaction was much more restrained than that of the Chinese party. On one point, Harian Rakjat specif- ically contradicted the Chinese position, by implying that an open Sino-Soviet polemic, while still essen- tial, should nevertheless be "friendly and unhumili- ating." ‘Meanwhile, the PKI did not resist CPSU ef- forts to increase contacts at many levels;: particu- larly notable was a Harian Rakjat 6 March item de- scribing the visit of another Soviet trade union delegation to SOBSI headquarters, discussing, as Harian Rakjat put it, "the effort to strengthen unity in WFTU within the framework of the common struggle against the imperialists." The Soviets at the Moscow March meeting encouraged the pro-CPSU Australian Communist Party to increase its own ties with the PKI; for unlike the Chinese, the Indonesian ‘Communists. had all along maintained relations with both Australian Communist organizations, the orthodox Fro-CPSU one as well as the splinter party affili- ated with Peking. ‘ Finally, the Soviet propaganda now began to appeal to PKI interests by depicting the United States as becoming directly involved in Malaysia. Whereas previously Moscow had pictured Malaysia as a British neocolonialist project to which the U.S. gave only moral support, on 14 January Pravda charged "American politicians" with a desire to "turn Malaysia into a base for their venture in South Vietnam.” On 11 March, the Soviet radio charged that the U.S. was “openly intervening with -50- its armed’ forces in the conflict between Malaysia and . ! Indonesia" (after U.S. fighter planes had participated in exercises over Malaysian territory), and three days later claimed that "the Pentagon is doing everything to turn Malaysia into a stepping stone for aggression" in hopes of “intimidating Indonesia, which firmly de- nounces ‘the U.S. aggression against the Vietnamese people." . j ‘Despite all-the.CPSU's efforts to propitiate the PKI, however, and despite the PKI's remarkably cautious and restrained posture toward the new CPSU leadership, all through this period there remained no doubt of the PKI's continued alliance with the Chi- nese party. PKI-controlled representatives at inter- national Communist front meetings supported the Chi- nese and voted against the Soviets as before and Aidit and other PKI leaders continued to demand the prosecution of the international struggle against “modern revisionism” until complete victory. Aidit is.said to have upbraided the Soviet ambassador on 31 December 1964 for the Soviet failure to prevent - Malaysia from being chosen a UN Security Council member, and the PKI, like the Chinese, strongly sup- ported Sukarno's subsequent withdrawal from the UN, which caused great Soviet unhappiness. PKI members | in the fall of 1964 were required to submit written. reports on all contacts with “revisionists"--i.e., Soviet bloc: citizens-~and "modern: revisionism" was one of the "evils" PKI front organizations were pri- vately instructed to fight early in 1965. The PKI maintained outspoken hostility to the Indian govern- ment~-which the Soviets continued to cultivate-~to the CPSU-backed Dange wing of the Indian Communist move- ment, and to the Yugoslavs, with whom the Soviets re- mained on fairly good terms. As already noted, the PKI publicly demanded that the CPSU conciliate Al- bania, and privately PKI leaders. asserted, like the Chinese, that the CPSU should apologize to Hoxha. Against this background, the CPSU had an ex- tremely difficult task in seeking to conciliate the PKI, and in the months following the Moscow March meeting the Soviets were to lose some ground again. In part this reflected the influence of the harsher Chinese attacks upon the CPSU, to which the PKI was -51- ET . iaeeeia emer ne | | Sensitive. Such incidents as the Soviet police sup- pression of the Chinese-led March demonstration at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow also evoked a hostile re- sponse from Aidit and the PKI, since Indonesian Comnu- nist students in Moscow were involved in this demonstra- tion. Sukarno"s continued personal. drift toward the ‘Chinese and away from the Soviets was also an important Consideration for the PKI. Probably most important of all, however, was Indonesian Communist receipt, by the spring of 1965, of documentary evidence of past CPSU duplicity toward the PKI. For the Soviets in the fall of 1964, while . Making overtures to the PKI, had simultaneously been furnishing covert financial support to Adam Malik and . other leaders of the leftist Murba Party who at the time were conducting a violent public campaign against the PKI, using an anti-Communist front known as the . Committee for the Support of Sukarnoism (BPS).* This Soviet activity was initiated under Khrushchev, but: was continued under the new Soviet leadership. By November and early December 1964.the PKI was very much on the defensive against this anti-Communist campaign, . and was considerably alarmed. The PKI was rescued in mid-December by Sukarno, who banned the BPS; it has been reported without confirmation that Chen yi, during his visit to Djakarta in late November, at PKI request urged Sukarno to do this. While the PKI was aware all along of past Murba Party ties with the Sovi nion, the Indonesian party leadership is reported] to have received documentary proof 6 ovie reachery only many weeks after the event. It is conceivable that this evidence was given the PKI by the Chinese Communists. The charge that the CPSU had been intriguing with Indonesian "Trotskyites" (the usual PKI way of referring to the Murba Party) against the PKI was publicly mentioned for the first time by the Albanians in late February, was surfaced in a Chinese major editorial on 24 March, and was to be reiterated many times thereafter. *The PKI may wetl have belteved that the United States was also covertly eupporting this movement, ‘and may conceivably have gone on from this assumption to draw the erroneous concluston that here was a case of direct Sovtet-U.S. collusion against the PKI. , -52- 3. The Indian Communists offered the CPSU a prob- lem of a totally different nature, and here the So- viets made considerable progress. At the moment Khru- shchev fell, the two warring halves of the Indian Com- . munist Party (CPI) were in the final stages of a long- drawn-out process of formal separation. The left wing of the party, long close to the Chinese and vehemently anti-Khrushchev, held a congress in Calcutta two weeks after the fall of. the CPSU first secretary to formal- ize its organization as a separate party and to assert its claim to the party name. Because Khrushchev had just been ousted, and because many of the most extreme leaders of the CPI left: wing were arrested by the In~ dian Government immediately before the Calcutta congress convened and were therefore unable to control the con- gress decisions, the new CPI/Leftist (CPI/L)* from ° the start took a much more cautious and moderate line toward the CPSU than might otherwise have been expected. ‘The CPI/L leaders were jubilant at Khrushchev's fall, and some privately predicted that sooner or later . Khrushchev's successors would themselves be replaced by men upholding the "correct Marxist~Leninist line.” Immediately after the congress, the new CPI/L Central Committee dispatched a message to the CPSU appealing. for recognition as the official Indian Communist © party and demanding the CPI seat at any world Commu- nist meeting that might be arranged.’ The CPI/L fol- lowed this up by sending politburo members to visit the Soviet: and East European-embassies in New Delhi. While the Soviets could not grant the CPI/L the for-. Mal recognition it craved, the Soviet and Chinese attitudes were both affected by the conciliatory CPI/L approach to the CPSU. If the CPI leftists were overjoyed at Khru- shchev's removal, the right wing of the party, led by CPI Chairman Dange, was alarmed and infuriated, and soon began peppering the CPSU with public state- ments begging the Soviets to prove that Khrushchev's *After their split was formalized, the leftist and rightist Communist organizations each called themselves: the Communtst Party of India. To avoid confuston, Weatern observers began referring to them as the CPI/Leftist and CPI/Rightist, titles not used by the Communists themselves. =53- Sh .hUmDDLLlUD ouster was not a "concession to the dogmatic, adven- turist and chauvinist line of the Chinese Government” and warning the CPSU that “it would be a serious error Silent about his achievements. The right-wing lead- ership of the CPI had committed itself inextricably, in the eyes of both the Indian public and the rank- and-file of the party, to Khrushchev personally, to ~ Khrushchev's policies, and to a line of relentless “hostility to the Chinese party. The Dange leadership - of the CPI/R had isolated itself completely from all ‘the radical Communist parties of the Far East whom — ‘. the CPSU now seemed to wish to conciliate; the North . Vietnamese, North Koreans, Indonesians, and Japanese ' .to underline only [Khrushchev's] mistakes and keep - were all at one with the’ Chinese in publicly excori- ating "the Dange clique" as a group of traitors who were forever beyond the pale. The Dange leadership, like that of other seriously split pro-Soviet parties j sy elsewhere in the world, had a vested interest in : the formal world. schism toward which Khrushchev had . been heading, which would have separated the CPSU ‘ permanently from the foreign and domestic Communist enemies of the CPI rightists and would thus have assured the latter of continued unwavering CPSU back- ing. Instead, it gradually became evident that the new Soviet leadership was anxious to appease most of Dange's enemies, and to that end would gladly get ‘xid of Dange himself if this were to become feasible. On 30 October, Dange had a talk about Khrushchev's fall with CPSU Secretary Ponomarev in Moscow, and the brief TASS account of this discussion spoke of "frank- ness" and "mutual understanding," in this case euphem- isms for sharp and unresolved disagreement. 5S. G. Sardosai, a Dange henchman, meanwhile. circulated within the Indian party a secret document highly Critical of the Khrushchev ouster. Two weeks later, there were heated arguments between Soviet and CPI/R representatives behind the scenes at an international conference on peace in New Delhi; CPSU interests re- quired that there be no criticism of the Chinese by the conference, particularly since Chou En-lai was at that moment in Moscow, while CPI/R interests re- quired exactly the opposite. Throughout the fall and winter of 1964, CPI/R party organs continued to ye | attack Peking directly, in marked contrast to the new CPSU line. In December, references to the Chi- nese were excised from the Pravda account of a reso- lution adopted by the CPI/R Seventh Party Congress. : This Congress, however, was organized by the Dange leadership as the CPI/R counterpart of the CPI/L Congress held the month before, and the Right-. ee ist Communists were anxious that it receive the maxi- mum international recognition as the meeting of the legitimate Communist. Party of India; consequently, . Dange was obliged -to conciliate the CPSU by suppress-~- ing all further attacks on the Khrushchev ouster. In return, the Congress was attended by Ponomarev and delegates from many pro-Soviet European parties; but the pro~Soviet Ceylonese party (itself the prod- uct of a major split and therefore in a similar po-~- sition to the CPI/R) was the only Far Eastern party willing to attend. At the Congress, the Soviets made it clear that they wished the CPI/R to.adopt a conciliatory posture toward the Indian "parallel party," and that they wanted a somewhat harsher line .toward the Indian bourgeoisie than the one Khru- shchev had sanctioned for the Indian Communists. From the Soviet point of view, Dange re- mained an impediment in every way, and his tenure in office a continued advantage for the Chinese. He .was anathema to parties like the North Vietnamese;* he was utterly unacceptable to leaders of the CPI/L now otherwise more favorably disposed to the CPSU; - he was disliked by several other leaders of the CPI/R eager to conciliate the CPI/L; he was under a cloud because of allegations of treachery in his youth; and even now; his close ties with the Indian Government made it questionable how faithfully he would apply the harder domestic line being urged upon the CPI/R by the CPSU. Dange went to Moscow 4There ts evidence that at some time prior to May 1965--perhaps etther during Kosygin's February vtstt to Hanot or during Le Duan's April vistt to Moscow--North Vietnamese party leaders in private econversattons. with the CPSU attacked both the CPI/R and the conciltatory Soviet policy toward the In- dian Government. =55- again after his party's December Congress, and re- turned in January despondent at his cool reception. Soviet diplomats in India in mid-Canuary made several scathing remarks about him in private. Despite all this, the Soviets could not get rid of him against his will without precipitating another major,split in the Indian party, particularly inasmuch as Dange personally controlled the major | ‘Communist asset in India, the All-India Trade Union "Confederation. (AITUC). ‘They could, however, put him on short ‘rations, ‘and this they did: the World a Federation of, Trade Unions in 1966 sharply reduced its regular subsidy ‘to Dange's AITUC, claiming a me need to retrench because of the Chinese failure to _ pay dues to WFTU. In fact, the Chinese had ceased paying WFTU since 1962, but it was not until after Khrushchev's fall that the Soviets discovered a need therefore to restrict the flow of funds into Dange’s hands. ( Meanwhile, in the spring of 1965 Soviet and East European personnel in India greatly expanded their covert contacts with representatives of the CPI/L. . Although it is likely that a majority of the rank-and-file of the Left Communists remained. more sympathetic to the Chinese than to the Soviets, the widespread arrest of CPI/L leaders left day- to-day control of the party in the hands of men like E.M.S. Namboodiripad and Jyoti Basu who were inclined to.be responsive to the harsher ‘Soviet line toward the United States, the Soviet "nonpolemical" pose toward the Chinese, and the Soviet public de- mands for "unity of action" against the United ‘States. This view was shared even by some of the imprisoned Left Communist leaders. The central CPI /L leadership therefore did not follow the Chinese in attacking Moscow, although this caused dissension and protest in provinces such as West Bengal, where pro-Chinese sentiment was strong among local Communists. Soviet progress in neutralizing the CPI/L was apparently facilitated by the peculiar Chinese attitude toward it. The CCP sent neither represen- tatives nor a message of greeting to the founding CPI/L Congress in early November 1964, and indeed -56- : Seren eee aed made no propaganda mention whatever of this event un- til mid-January, when a brief account of it was pub- - lished together with a description of Ponomarev's visit to the-CPI/R Congress of the "Dange clique" in December. This belated Chinese dual account was ap- parently intended to demonstrate to the North Viet- namese and North Koreans, on the eve of Kosygin's visit to Hanoi and Pyongyang, that it.was the CPSU and not the CCP which was conducting factional ac- . tivities among the Indian Communists, and at that, was backing the Indian revisionists. Mao made this point to Kosygin during their February talks in Pe~ king. . : Aside from this Chinese ploy, however, there ‘is every reason to Suspect that the Chinese were an-~ noyed at the overtures of the CPI/L- to the CPSU, and it is conceivable--although there is no firm evidence--that Chinese financial Support of the CPI/L - was reduced in consequence in the spring of 1965. Previously, the left wing of the Indian Communist Party had received money from the Chinese through a variety of channels (the Bank of China, the North Korean and North Vietnamese embassies, and Chinese facilities in Pakistan). Throughout the spring of 1965, reflected a dire shortage of funds in € , the original first issue of the new central organ of the CPI/L was not pub- lished because of the failure of expected funds to. arrive "from outside." There is also evidence that Left Communist General Secretary Sundaraya early in 1965 wrote a letter to the Chinese party, although the contents of the latter are not known. When a year later Sundaraya himself visited the Soviet Union for talks with Suslov he returned with a somewhat ‘more friendly attitude toward the CPSU. Meanwhile, the East German Embassy in New Delhi was reported to have offered funds to the CPI/L: While cultivating the Left Communists and pressing CPI/R leaders to renew contacts with them, the CPSU continued to recognize the CPI/R publicly as the Communist Party of India. Dange duly attended the March meeting of Communist parties in Moscow as leader of the CPI delegation, and there predictably took a stand with those who pressed--unsuccessfully-- for concrete action to hasten a world Communist -57- ac iT conference with or without the Chinese. While in Mos- cow, Dange received bad news from home: early March elections in the Indian state of Kerala resulted in. the bulk of the Communist vote going to the CPI/L rather than the CPI/R. This was the first direct elec- toral test between the two parties since the formal schism, and the CPSU--which had poured a good deal of money into the CPI/R electoral campaign in Kerala-- ‘could not help drawing conclusions unwelcome to Dange. The Kerala result was loudly trumpeted by the Chinese, and was also hailed by radical Communists less hostile to the CPSU. The PKI organ Harian Rakjat, for ex- ample, stated that: j It is not yet too late for the revision- ists, who have found fallow land in Asia, to draw a lesson from the experience in Kerala if they wish to learn. The CPSU was thus reinforced in its impression of the strength of the radical wing of the Indian Com~ munist movement, ‘and in its determination to maintain contact with those radicals and to seek. to reestablish CPSU influence among them. 2 To sum up: in the initial six months after _ Khrushchev's ouster, the new Soviet leadership, faced with the hostility of the Japanese, Indonesian, and left-wing Indian Communists inherited from the Khru- ‘shchev era, had made varying progress in each case in neutralizing that hostility--considerable in the case of the Indians, moderate in the case of the Indonesians and very slight in the case of the Japanese. In each case--as with the North Vietnamese, North Koreans and Cubans--the CPSU had found the appeal for unity of action of all Communists against the United States to be the essential starting point in attempting to draw these radical Communists away from the Chinese. F. The CPSU Problems With the Old Pro-Soviet Camp The CPSU faced a totally different set of. ptob- lems .in the same period in dealing with the more or less revisionist parties of Europe and North America-- the "basket of crabs," as the Albanians had put it. In attempting to maintain Soviet influence with these parties while simultaneously appealing to the interests -58- of the radical Communists of the Par East, the CPSU was in some respects seeking incompatible goals, and actions likely to be helpful with parties of one area were also likely to be harmful with some of the others. Four sets of interrelated CPSU problems will be mentioned: the effect of the ouster of Khrushchev itself; the effect of the new CPSU attitude toward Khrushchev,'s world Communist conference; the effect of the evolution of a harsher Soviet line toward the _,United States; and the effect of the threat of a re-: turn to Stalinist practices: in the Soviet Union. 1.. -The Khrushchev Ouster Tf the radical Far Eastern parties were gen-: erally delighted at Khrushchev's removal and inclined to be hopeful about the CPSU, the Western Communist “parties reacted in the opposite direction. [In the general uproar which followed, different European parties had several differing motives for express~ ing their dismay publicly, but there was.at least one common denominator. The CPSU had done it again: as with destalinization in 1956 and the suppression of the Hungarian revolution later that year, the So- viets had taken a major unilateral action affecting ‘ everyone for which the leaderships of pro-Soviet for- eign parties were unprepared. To the degree that each European Communist party was identified with the Soviet Union and the Khrushchev regime, it was embarrassed by the crude nature of the Soviet coup, and a new problem was suddenly created for each party leadership in dealing both with its own rank-and-file and with other political forces in its own country. , In the past few years, a number of the Euro- pean parties had taken increasing advantage of the gradual dilution of CPSU authority resulting from™ the Sino-Soviet dispute and other. factors to assert varying degrees of independence from the CPSU in working out both their domestic and international lines, and thus to improve, at the expense of the CPSU, their ability to compete in their own en- vironments. This tendency had been particularly noticeable in certain of the parties competing. with and seeking to influence strong Socialist par- ties, such as the Communist party of Italy. Upon Khrushchev's fall, the Italian party now loudly ~59- led the chorus of complaint, and was joined, to one degree or another, not merely by other parties with autonomous tendencies such as the Swedish and British parties, but by a multitude of others, including even such pillars of CPSU authority as the French and United States Communist parties. To one degree or another, ; each protesting party leadership sought to demonstrate’ - agreement with rank-and-file indignation at the way Khrushchev was treated. In’ addition, those parties : Pp ‘which had previously had differences with the CPSU ‘seized the occasion to dissociate themselves publicly: ‘from the Soviet action and thus to reinforce for the. . ‘benefit of the non-Communist world their claims to ° be independent of Soviet control. Having done this, delegations from the Euro- pean parties visited Moscow, registered their formal complaints, and in virtually all cases allowed them~ selves to be mollified. Central committees there- ‘upon adopted resolutions accepting the CPSU "explana- ' tions" with greater or fewer reservations, and the public furor gradually died down. Although the CPSU thus weathered this storm with no difficulty, foreign Communist leaders had been given another demonstration of the political hazards of too close identification with the current CPSU leadership. They were all the more likely to remember this since, like the Far Eastern Communists, many of the Euro- peans had little confidence in the stability of the new Soviet leadership (and in some cases reportedly told the Soviets so to their faces). Over the long run, therefore, the Khrushchev ouster made another contribution to the slow erosion of CPSU authority among the parties closest to the CPSU. 2. The World Conference and the Line Toward China. Moreover, after the public clamor had died down, substantive differences between some Western parties and the new CPSU leadership remained. One of these concerned the new Soviet attitude toward Khrushchev's project of a world Communist conference without the Chinese. . ; As already noted, at the moment of Khru- shchev's fall the pro-Soviet Communist world was ~60- ae A a A ee divided between those parties which strongly oppused Khrushchev's scheme, those which had a vested i.nter- est in it and were pressing strongly ror it, and a third, larger group which had no strong views but were willing to go along with the CPSU's wishes. -The line gradually adopted by the new CPSU leadership regarding the worid meeting and policy toward the Chinese was a victory for the views of the first group, the "“autonomists" led by the Italian - Communist party. ‘The Soviets made overtures to the pro-Chinese radicals of the Communist world and to the Chinese themselves, muted their polemical re- plies even when the Chinese resumed violent anti- - CPSU propaganda, postponed the Moscow preparatory meeting from December to March and then finally, in the face of adamant Italian and British party opposition, deferred indefinitely the world Commu~ nist conference, In short, bit by bit the CPSU adopted the foreign policy advice (although not the domestic policy sayiee) set forth in the Togliatti Memorandum, advice which Togliatti said had been offered to Khrushchev in 1963 and spurned. (See pages 11-14.) The Italian party was naturally gratified, and Baeere? in its propaganda for more of the same. Others were less happy. The Czechoslovak party, the leading advocate of the Khrushchev line toward the Chinese in Eastern Europe, and the French party, the strongest proponent of the “better fewer but better" thesis in Western Europe, did not cease pressing for an international conference without the Chinese when the new Soviet leadership vacillated and retreated on this issue. On the contrary, both _ kept making sporadic public allusions to the desira~ bility of such a conference, and behind the scenes exerted pressure on the CPSU to counteract the pres~ sure of the Italians and the enticement of the Par Eastern parties, the two forces working in tandem to induce the CPSU to abandon Khrushchev's scheme. The tug-of-war between the French and Italian par- ties on this issue of a conference was particularly fierce at the’ Moscow March meeting itself, where the French representative was sarcastic in his references to the attitude of the Italians and in alluding to the concessions the CPSU was making to the Italians. =61= The views of the French and Czech parties were shared by a considerable group of Western par- ties which felt that they had a pressing need for a formal Soviet break with the Chinese. Two of these parties were the Communist Party of Canada and the CPUSA, both of which saw a future danger to them- selves from Chinese organizational efforts. in their countries, saw no likelihood that the Chinese could be persuaded to desist, and thought ‘the Soviets were . playing into CCP. hands by hesitating to convene a world conference.': os ; In ‘September..1964, a month before Khrushchev's fall, Chairman Gus :Hall of the CPUSA delivered a speech* which was -essentially a rebuttal to the Tog- liatti memorandum and a philippic against the Italian party, unnamed but clearly indicated. Hall denounced as opportunists people who had been suggesting that the struggle against the Chinese "somehow is a per- sonal feud between Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung,“ who wanted to muffle their criticism of the Chinese "so that the Chinese leaders will keep focusing their attacks on the Soviet Union," and who in effect "apologize for the Chinese position" by attributing the split to the "diversity of circumstances” be- tween the USSR and the CPR. Hall attacked certain of the “larger, older parties," which because of — "an over-emphasis on autonomy" wanted to stay aloof from the struggle against the Chinese while parties with a "smaller, weaker, working-class base" suffered from Chinese efforts to build "a world organizational structure consisting of groups “indifferent countries." Hall made it clear that his party was one of the *Published tn teeue #27, 1964 of Information Bulletin, the sertal annex containing "Documents of the Communist and Workers Parties' Artteles and Speeches" issued separately by the staff of the international journal Problems of Peace and So- ‘etalism tn Prague. -62- small sufferers, and said that the Chinese had at- tempted "to invade our autonomy by setting up and supporting “antiparty cliques" in the CPUSA. The Chinese, he said,.were the only "real threat" to anybody's autonomy, and therefore an international conference was urgently needed, to find some way of "establishing better coordination...within the world movement," CPUSA views had not changed by the time of the Moscow March 1965 meeting, where the CPUSA repre- sentative's speech, again alluded to the Ttalian party's position in rather. Violent fashion, this time explicitly. Finally, most of the’ split parties of the Soviet camp-~the parties already contending with sizable pro-Chinese counterparts in their own coun- tries~-found the new conciliatory, "nonpolemical" CPSU pose regarding the Chinese most inconvenient and awkward to imitate. In many cases, such parties had been engaged in furious struggles with their local pro-Chinese rivals for the allegiance of their own cadres, front organizations, and leftist allies. Such desperate organizational battles did not end because the CPSU wished to use new tactics, and the party leaderships engaged in these local struggles felt they could not cease attacking their pro-Chinese enemies and their Sponsors in Peking — without weakening their own position. As already noted, this was initially the case with Dange's version of the Communist Party of India; it-.was also applicable to such pro-Soviet Communist parties as those of Ceylon, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, split parties facing especially serious challenges from pro-Chinese counterparts. All such. parties had a vested interest in a formalization of the world- wide Soviet split with the Chinese, which they hoped would weaken the position of their own competitors. By the time of the March 1965 meeting the CPSU was evolving a formula to answer partly the ob- jections and the needs of such parties; and by the time of the 23rd CPSU Congress, a year later, this had become a stock Soviet reply to all complaints. In brief, if pro-CPSU Communist parties desired for | -63- reasons of their own to attack the Chinese, in most cases (with a few exceptions) the Soviets would not seek to prevent this, but such parties should not ex- pect polemical support from the CPSU. The Soviets found, through trial and error, that they could get away with this compromise without paying an exorbi- tant price in terms of loss of influence with the North Vietnamese, North Koreans; or Japanese; and the whole problem, of course, became much simpler for the Soviets as each of the latter parties them- selves eventually came to have increasing difficul- ties with the Chinese. ; After the March meeting the pressure on the CPSU from the "Communist royalists" for an early convocation of a world conference also eased some~ what, as it gradually became clear to everyone that the Soviet "unity of action” line was in fact paying off, so that because of this line (and because of Chinese intransigence) Chinese influence was being effectively whittled down all around the world. Thus the dangers to many parties arising from Chinese or- ganizational efforts throughout. the world--which Gus Hall had cited in September 1964 as the most press- ing reason for holding a world conference soon-~ seemed less imposing. Moreover, with Thorez and Togliatti dead, relations between even the French and Italian Communist parties gradually improved, al- though wide differences remained on the question of a world conference. Finally, advocates of a conference were dis- armed when the CPSU in the fall and winter of 1965~ 66 had proposals floated for a more limited, bloc conference on aid to Vietnam, was apparently willing to hold this conference without the Chinese, but : 7 evidently abandoned the idea when the North Vietnam~ ese declined to participate on those terms. With the Vietnamese war’ in progress, the CPSU could eas- ily defend the necessity of deferring to DRV views on any large-scale conference, 3. The Shift in Line Toward the United States The CPSU had far less difficulty in inducing its supporters in-the international movement to fol- low it in hardening the line,toward the United States. ~64- a Se Such resistance as the CPSU encountered. on this is-~ sue came chiefly from Eastern Europe, particularly at first, and particularly from Yugoslavia and Ru- mania; and even this’ resistance was gradually re- duced as time (and the war in’Vietnam) went on. For the majority of the parties not in power, a more vigorous Soviet anti-American line-could only be welcomed; rarely could it hurt their domestic posi- tion, an often it could help. : One. orsetie most striking developments of the post~Khrushchev period was its demonstration of how few of even the most "revisionist" of the pro-Soviet parties had reasons of their own to desire good So- viet-U.S, relations. ‘This is not to say that any of those parties--any more than the USSR itself--wished Soviet~-U.S. tensions to rise to the point of threat- ening to bring on a general war, but rather that many parties found a thoroughgoing anti-U.S. line useful in advancing their own interests in their own coun- tries, had been inhibited to some degree in using such a line by aspects of Khrushchev's policy, and now were glad to be freed from such restraints. Most Western Communist parties had little difficulty with reconciling a vituperative line toward the United States Government with occasional continued lip-service to the 20th CPSU Congress and the gen- eral principle of peaceful coexistence, particularly since the Soviet Union, while hardening its line toward the United States, simultaneously intensified its cultivation of many other Western governments in an effort to isolate the United States. The last strong defense of the Khrushchev policy toward the United States by a foreign Commu- nist leader was made a month before Khrushchev fell by CPUSA chairman Gus Hall, in the September 1964 speech already cited. Hall attacked point-blank the contention in the Togliatti memorandum that "the entire American political front" was being moved "increasingly to the right” by the Goldwater candidacy, that U.S. policy was therefore becoming increasingly "aggressive," that the general situa- tion was therefore becoming "somewhat dangerous," ‘and that a more vigorous anti-U.S. line calculated to appeal to Communist radicals and to conciliate the Chinese was therefore justified. Hall flatly -65- denied that such a general "shift to the right" was inevitable "or even probable,” and asserted that "to make policy on the basis of an inevitable or already existing shift to the right is wrong and uncalled for. Hall was here alluding to Soviet policy-~-and the change in that policy for which the Italian CP was presetng. Hall declared that "related to this errone- ous conception" about trends in the United States “is the idea that the crisis of US imperialism can lead, American ruling circles in only one direction-- reaction and war. If so, said Hall, "then war is . inevitable." He asked the Italians rather plaintively: What has happened to the positive ‘estimates of the balance of world forces in the minds of people who now make these negative estimates of world development? Are they only operative as phrases in public resolutions, or are they factual estimates of present reality? At an Italian party central committee ait held a few days before Khrushchev's fall, party . secretary Berlinguer's report alluded to comments on the Togliatti memorandum which. held that Togli- atti had been "a little too pessimistic in his analysis,” and brushed such objections aside. Berlinguer insisted that Togliatti had made a "very correct and precise evaluation,” and emphasized that for the Communist movement "the external front, the... struggle against imperialism, must be the primary fighting front.” The United States, not Communist China, was the primary enemy. After Khrushchev's ouster, with thie: gradual shift in the Soviet position, forces in the Italian party long hostile to Khrushchev's actions grew much bolder. At a central committee meeting in February — 1965, Berlinguer is reported to have called for the views of those who in past years had silently dis- approved of Khrushchev's foreign policies, and at least one party leader responded with attacks on Khrushchev's restrained reaction to the Gulf of Tonkin crisis of August 1964. In March, Achille Occhetto, the general secretary of the Italian Com- Munist Youth Federation, published an article in the -66- youth organ La Citta Futura which brought everything out in the open. Occhetto declared that "the strategy of peaceful coexistence...has in the long run deterio- rated and been made sterile," and attacked "the Khru- shchevian...unilateral view of the East-West dialogue, which stressed as an obsession the summit meeting he- tween the United States and the Soviet Union,” and which was responsible for "a series of errors,” in- cluding failure to reach agreement with the Chinese. ‘The Soviets under Khrushchev were said to have lost ‘sight of the fact that "it was not sufficient to live . - on the income from 'the spirit of Camp David,'” and that "coexistence is a process of conquests, agree- ments and ruptures, in which the front of anti-impe- rialist struggle in its various forms must determine everything." Occhetto recommended the Leninist method,...the capability of denouncing agreements when they ap- pear to be antiquated with regard to the development of events, and especially never to discourage, even in the frame- ‘work of international agreements be- tween states, the revolutionary move- ment... While Occhetto represented the extreme left of the Italian party, and his views thus did not represent a consensus of party opinion or the of- icial party line, the fact that he now dared to express himself publicly in.this way was indicative of a change in the climate of opinion in the PCI, Although party leaders subsequently took steps to prevent the publication of further direct attacks on the USSR by Occhetto and his friends, the foreign policy line of the party as a whole had shifted several degrees to the left. “A PCI delegation (including Occhetto) visited Hanoi in early May to cultivate the Lao Dong party, and in private talks there made a rather halfhearted response to attacks by Le Duan on Khrushchev's be~ lief in the "Camp David spirit” and-.in the preserva- tion of peace through conversations "between heads of state, and the same, two heads of state." While the PCI defended most aspects of the 20th CPSU Congress ~67- , against Le Duan's criticism, it admitted Soviet "Op portunistic mistakes" in having implied that Soviet economic development would suffice to defeat imperi- alism, and in misreading "the relationship between coexistence and...the problem.of the liberation move- ment." When this delegation returned home, the dele- gation leader Pajetta told a Rome press conference of North Vietnamese approval .of the Indonesian "example" in confiscating U.S. property and in contemplating a boycott of American goods "and even the possibility of breaking off diplomatic relations with Washington." Another PCI delegation the next month made its first formal visit to another of the Communist "radicals," the Communist Party of Cuba, and signed a joint: com- munique notable for its aggressive and militant "anti- imperialist" tone. The leader of this delegation, party secretary Alicata, in July delivered a report to the party central committee which for the first time openly stated that Khrushchev had "committed se- rious errors" not only in domestic policy, but also in foreign policy. ‘By the end of the year, the PCI had published "theses" in preparation for a coming party congress that warned against reducing coex- istence to a matter of a dialogue between the USSR and the United States. , | | i | | All this time, the PCI endeavored to use the issue of U.S. involvement in the Vietnamese war as a vehicle for the extension of PCI influence and anti- U.S. sentiment among both the Socialists and the left wing of the Christian Democratic party. Other pro- Soviet Western Communist parties made similar ef- forts, with greatly varying degrees of success. One of the parties which has been most adept at using for its own ends anti-U.S. sentiment resulting from the Vietnam war has been the most revisionist party in Europe, the Communist Party of Sweden under its chair- man Hermansson.* The Swedish Communists have played *The Suedish Communist Party was one of the very few Communist parties in the world that gave all-out enthustastte support to the Trotskyite-dominated Bertrand Russell "tribunal" on Vietnam when it finally convened in Stockholm in the spring of 1967. (The other two chief enthusiasts were the Lao Dong party-- naturally--and the Cubans.) : -68- in particular upon hostility to U.S. policy within : the left wing of the Swedish Social Democratic party, ; while simultaneously seeking to emphasize their own independence from Soviet control through sporadic - criticism of aspects of Soviet policy and calculated public slights to the CPSU and other European Commu- nist parties. The combination has considerably en- hanced the position of the Swedish Communists as a "respectable" political party and has increased pres- sures among: the leftist Social Democrats for better party relations with the Communists. Even the CPUSA--despite Gus Hall's vehement repudiation in September 1964 of Togliatti’s "“pessi- mistic" appraisal of the trend in the United States-~ adjusted with little difficulty to the harsher post- Khrushchev Soviet line toward the U.S. which seemed to justify that appraisal. By 1966, Hall was able to boast during a lengthy tour of Eastern Europe of the gains his party had allegedly made through par- ticipation in the "mass struggle" against administra- tion Vietnam policies, and went so far as to claim that the CPUSA was the leading force in that struggle.’ Unlike the Swede Hermansson--whose party was using very similar tactids and issues to improve its po-= sition~-Hall remained a "Communist royalist" ‘aqgres- sively loyal to the CPSU, and there is good evidence that unlike Hermansson, Hall continued high in the esteem of the new CPSU leadership. Thus the Soviet. anti~American "unity of action" line on Vietnam. was usable domestically both by those parties of the So- viet camp desirous of retaining and expanding CPSU authority and by those parties determined to Limit or reject it. 4. The Fear of a Return to Stalinism A different sort of problem for the new So- viet leaders was the very strong concern among the parties of both Eastern and Western Europe about an eventual return to Stalinist practices by the post- Khrushchev leadership, and the continuing pressures on Soviet policy--foreign and domestic--generated as a result. As we have seen, it was the hopeful es- timate of the pro-Chinese Indonesian party leader- ship immediately after Khrushchev's ouster that such a return to Stalinism would now slowly come about, .- -69~ by stages. Only one European Communist party--the Dutch CP under de Groot--is known to have shared the Indonesian view of this prospect. Among all others, Khrushchev's fall occasioned various de- grees of alarm, and much of the Soviet activity in ‘the first few weeks thereafter--such as the re- i peated private messages of reassurance to individual parties and the repeated blanket assertions of fi- delity to policy decisions of the past decade--was intended in large part to assuage this anxiety within. the pro-Soviet camp. As we have seen, these pious Soviet profes- sions of renewed faith in all the policies of the 20th, 2lst, and 22nd CPSU Congresses did not prevent the CPSU from beginning. almost immediately to shift the practical emphasis of those policies as they ap- plied to foreign affairs to suit the interests of radical Communists whom the new Soviet leadership wished to court. Yet the very Soviet public reaf- firmations of policy necessary to protect the Soviet position among the European Communists (and in the West generally), caused perplexity and annoyance among all the radical Far Eastern Communists, and as we have noted, in November 1964 Aidit was moved to protest publicly the pressures which the European "revisionists" were bringing upon the CPSU. ; There is good evidence that one point upon which many of the European parties united their ef~- forts was to induce the new Soviet leadership to fore-~ bear attacking Khrushchev publicly by name. These ef- forts succeeded. During the first few days after Khrushchev's fall Western correspondents in Moscow were quoting "informed" Soviet sources to the effect that the CPSU intended to publish a formal condemna- tion of Khrushchev--apparently, either Suslov's re~ port to the central committee on behalf of the pre- sidium attacking Khrushchev, the secret resolution — adopted by the central committee, or an article draw- ing on these sources. By early November, these in- formed Soviet sources were denying such an intention, and on 3 November the Soviets gave good evidence of their sensitivity on the subject by issuing a formal TASS denial of an Italian newspaper summary of what TASS termed "some kind of 'Suslov report.'" Direct criticism of Khrushchev by name was thereafter -70~- Eee ane Pesce eT confined to the private explanations of the ouster given foreign parties by the CPSU, while public So- viet criticism of Khrushchev was perforce always in- direct, however unmistakable. The restraint thus enforced upon the CPSU was in contrast not merely with Stalinist practice but also with previous post-Stalin practice in the cases of Beria and the Molotov~Malenkov-Kaganovich "antiparty group." The immediate practical effects ‘Of this small victory of the European parties was.to save their leaders from the further embarrassment which Khrushchev's public humiliation would have ° meant for them. In the long run, it brought home to the competing factions in the CPSU leadership the intensity of feeling among the European Communists opposing any Soviet retreat from the policies of de- stalinization which Khrushchev symbolized for the Europeans. This realization in turn added a factor of national interest to the arguments of those So- viets who opposed the plans of CPSU conservatives a) to bring about a gradual: rehabilitation of Stalin and b) to return to the use of some of his police methods. , : The leverage exerted by the European parties on Soviet behavior in these matters was to be dra- matically demonstrated in February and March 1966 in connection with the trial of the writers Sinyavsky and Daniel and the 23rd CPSU Congress six weeks later.. ‘In the period between the two events, a great many leading members of the Soviet scientific and artis- tic intelligentsia signed individual or joint let- ters to Brezhnev, the CPSU central committee or the 23rd Congress either protesting the trial as a re- turn to Stalinist methods or warning against the ap- parent intention of the Soviet leadership to use the Congress as an occasion for the partial rehabilita- tion of Stalin. On both subjects the protesting Soviet intellectuals made explicit use of the strong public protests already registered by a considerable number of Western Communist parties, and were able to argue that the dogmatic forces they were opposing were indifferent to the interests of the "world revolutionary movement." The most important of | these letters, one addressed to the 23rd Congress | ; Py Ae and signed by twenty five leaders of Soviet intel- lectual life, asserted that the question of the rehabilitation of Stalin is not only an internal political question but also an international one. Any step whatever in the direction of his rehabilitation would undoubtedly create a threat of a new split in the ranks of the world Communist movement, this time between us and the Communists of the West. Such a step would be evaluated by them above all as our capit- ulation to the Chinese, a step which the Communists of the West will in no case follow. This is a factor of exceptional significance which we cannot leave out of our calculations. At a time when we are being threatened on the one hand by the American imperialists and West German revanchists, who are growing more active, _and on the other hand by the leaders of the CCP, to take the risk of a split or even of complications with the fra- ternal parties of the West would be criminally irrational. . Besides being an unprecedented insult to the estimative prowess of the two international sections of the central committee apparatus supervised by Suslov, Ponomarev, and Andropov, and an unprecedented intrusion upon the policy-making authority of the CPSU politburo, this statement exaggerated the danger of a "split" with the parties of the West as the re- sult of a cautious, partial rehabilitation of Stalin. This is demonstrated by the fact that when later, beginning in the fall and winter of 1966, the So- viet leadership took a series of very careful, slow, quiet steps in this direction, there was no general outcry. Yet there is good reason to believe--as the Soviet intellectuals contended--that the CPSU was contemplating some more formal action regarding Stalin at the 23rd party congress, and such action was indeed apparently averted by strong pressure from abroad re- inforcing the domestic protests. Such pressure was evidently brought to bear on the CPSU by the Italian party, the Yugoslavs, and a number of others, but above all by the Poles, whom the post-Khrushchev leadership has many times gone .to great lengths to placate, The Polish party in Pebruary 1966 made its feelings quite plain by pub- ' lishing in the party organ Tribuna Ludu, on the oc- casion of the tenth anniversary Of the 20th CPSU Con- gress (which the CPSU virtually ignored), a fervent endorsement of the congress decisions and a thinly~ : veiled warning not to tamper with them. It is credibly “ reported that Gomulka followed this up with personal ; remonstrances in Moscow on the eve of the 23rd con- gress. During the party congress itself, the writer Mihail Sholokhov and several subordinate CPSU lead- ers voiced the venemous resentment of party conserva- tives at the pressures brought by liberal writers and foreigners over the Sinyavsky-Daniel case. The press of several leading European Communist parties--includ= ing the French, the Italians, the Czechs and the Yugo- slavs--made explicit hostile comments about Sholokhov and the viewpoint in the CPSU he represented. More- over, several of these foreign Communist commentaries on the 23rd congress went so far as to single out _Podgornyy's speech at the congress for special praise and to state or suggest an invidious compari- son between his speech and that of other CPSU leaders--~ the distinction being that Podgornyy had indeed taken a far more liberal stand on the issues related to de-' stalinization and the 20th CPSU congress than any other speaker. ‘ Thus since Khrushchev's ouster the course of internal Soviet developments has continued to influ- ence and be influenced by the complex pattern of CPSU relationships with the foreign Communist world. Euro- pean parties have not hesitated .to voice opinions, ‘ sometimes strenuously, on domestic Soviet issues with sensitive implications for themselves, and on at least two occasions their united efforts have succeeded in exerting some leverage on Soviet domestic decisions. (They have long exerted much greater leverage on So- viet foreign policy maneuvers.) On the other hand, Asian Communist leaders typified by North Korea's Kim Il-sung and North Vietnam's Le Duan-have con- tinued to make private scathing remarks on Soviet "revisionist" domestic practices and to hope for for- mal Soviet changes in the 20th CPSU Congress doc- trines. To the degree that opposition from the Euro- pean parties has. helped to minimize changes the CPSU would otherwise have made, it has thus also helped ; to preserve areas of Soviet friction in the other- : . wise improving CPSU relationship-with Stalinist- -minded Asian. Communists. ; : : G. Power in the CPSU and Policy Toward the U.S.- 1. The Soviet Dilemma Khrushchev was overthrown by a coalition of leaders who had different grievances against him and who disagreed among themselves on the emphasis of the policies they wished the Soviet Union to adopt. One .Of the most important areas of subsequent contention was the question of the appropriate Soviet posture toward the United States. In the first weeks after Khrushchev's removal Soviet policy very frequently gave the appearance of trying to ride off in several directions at once, as the USSR strove with strange vigor to promote goals simultaneously which obviously were incompatible: to advance trade and improve con- tacts with the United States, and also to improve re- lations with the Chinese; to announce that money was being saved through cuts in the military budget re- ciprocal with U.S. cuts, and also to appeal to the interests of militant Communists in physical conflict with the United States; to reassure the Yugoslavs and other European "revisionists," and also to con- ciliate the Cubans and the radical parties of the Far East who all detested everything the Yugoslavs stood for. , The unusually great contradictions in Soviet behavior in the first three months of the post-Khru- , shchev regime resulted from the simultaneous pursuit of separate lines of policy especially favored by different members of the new leadership both because of personal inclination and functional responsibility. -74- . ; As time went on--by December and January-~-the pro- portions of "soft" and “hard" elements in the So- viet foreign policy “mix” began gradually to shift, with the harsher view of policy toward the United States slowly gaining as the inevitable consequence of other actions already taken by the presidium ma- jority. It seems clear that from.the outset the new head of the government, the technocrat Kosygin, was the member of the new leadership who gave the high-~ est priority to the maintenance of good relations with the United States, largely for economic reasons, and that his principal: supporter in this regard was -Mikoyan, who had similar interests and who had taken ‘a Similar position under Khrushchev. Soon after Khrushchev's fall, Kosygin and Mikoyan took a highly cordial line toward a group of visiting U.S. business- men, going so far as to raise hopes of a settlement of U.S. Lend-Lease claims against the Soviet Union, | and even suggesting that new negotiations to that end could be begun early in 1965. ; During a 7 November anniversary Kremlin dip- lomatic reception, after Defense Minister Malinovsky (at Brezhnev's suggestion) had delivered a violent toast extremely offensive to the United States, it -was Kosygin who hastened over to the U.S. ambassa~ dor to counteract the impression left by his speech. This in turn led to the first dramatic demonstration of the fundamental contradiction between the desires of those members of the new regime (the dominant ma- jority). who wished to conciliate the Chinese if pos--. sible and the anti-U.S. radicals in any case, and the wishes of those other leaders (the minority) who gave greater emphasis toward conciliation of the United States. . Chou En-lai, who was in Moscow for talks with the CPSU, was at the reception. (See Figure A.) Chou saw Kosygin chatting amiably and clinking glasses with the U.S. ambassador, and is reported to have hastened over to Mikoyan, angrily pointing first to ‘Kosygin and then to some African and Asian diplomats-- evidently asking if the new Soviet regime intended to convey to the "anti-imperialist” world an -75- impression of Soviet cordiality with "U.S. imperial- ism."* Mikoyan, who had earlier delivered a toast to peaceful coexistence for which Chou showed no enthu~ siasm, was seen responding. at length to Chou in a Manner which was quite agitated. A Chinese "“ideo- logical expert" in Chou's entourage--perhaps Kang Sheng or Wu Hsiu-~chuan--joined the group and the argument, which now began to attract onlookers from among the foreign diplomats. Brezhnev therefore now hurried over to break up the discussion with a smil~ ing word to Chou. Mikoyan then drew Brezhnev aside to make some emphatic remarks, and Brezhnev made a - wry face. ; This vignette illustrated and symbolized the central dilemma of Soviet foreign policy. The most economically-oriented members of the Soviet leader- ship, represented by Kosygin and Mikoyan,** believed the reduction of tensions and a reasonably calm So- viet-American relationship essential to the interests of the Soviet state, both because they valued the possibility of expanded economic ties with the U.S. *In Ate private talks with the CPSU leaders, Chou was to complain again about Kosygin's display of an overly friendly attitude toward the American Ambassa- ‘dor at the reception. . *4The terms "economtiecally-ortented" and "ideoto- gteally-oriented" are used in this paper to cate- gorize leaders such as Khrushchev, Kosygin and Mi- koyan, on the one hand, and Suslov and Shelepin, on the other hand. Obviously, only a few Soviet leaders tend toward one extreme or the other, with many tak- ing positions at some point along a spectrum in be- tween. Mr. Carl Linden has suggested a similar distinction between those Soviet leaders who are prt- marily “internally-oriented" and those who are "ex- ternally-oriented;" but this may be less useful, sinee some hard-line Soviet leaders, because of thetr parochial responsibilities, have not had much occasion to express foreign policy views (e.g., the Georgian Nzhavanadze). . ~76~ CONFIDENTIAL cian ag Chou En-lai and Ho Lung talking with Marshal Malinovskiy at the 7 November 1964 Kremlin reception, shortly before Chou’s argument with Mikoyan. 56673 6-67 CIA CONFI TIAL es ns for their own sake and, more important, because they i resented the strains. placed upon the Soviet, economy and the limitations on a rise in the standard of liv- ing imposed by the demands of the arms race and by | the pressures for still greater military and heavy industry expenditures generated whenever the cola war was intensified. | | t { This policy emphasis obviously clashed head-on with Chinese wishes, as Chou demonstrated anew: a fact which in itself was not too serious, since no So- . viet leader was willing to make important modifications of policy merely to appease the Chinese themselves. More important, a policy of: seeking a relaxed public atmosphere in relations with the United States was not consistent with a policy of aggressively courting radical -regimes and parties in underdevel-~ oped areas which were violently hostile to the United States. It was to this fact that Chou En-lai was im- plicitly alluding when he gestured first to Kosygin and Ambassador Kohler and then to the Africans and Asians watching. And the past Chinese pressures upon Soviet policy symbolized by Chou's gesture have in- deed exerted leverage upon that policy-=-to some ex- tent even under Khrushchev, and much more so Since his fall. For while no CPSU leader wished to alter Soviet policy solely to Satisfy the Chinese, a ma-_ ‘ jority of the new CPSU leadership was indeed sensi- . tive to the reception given the long-reiterated Chi- - nese charges of Soviet-U.S. collusion and was from the first prepared-~for the sake of the new Soviet drive among the anti-U.S. radicals--to take actions (symbolized by the December demonstrations at the U.S. embassy in Moscow) likely to impair relations with the United States. 2. Khrushchev and the Communist Radicals a ommunist Radicals Khrushchev had also been sensitive to those charges--or rather, sensitive to the political danger to him of the concern of certain of his colleagues at the effect of these charges around the world. Khrushchev had reacted defensively over the years in ‘a variety of ways. In May 1960, a month after the initial great Chinese onslaught against Soviet policy in the "Long Live Leninism" articles, the CPSU decided ~7V7J- that it would be too costly politically in view of this challenge within the world Communist movement, . and in view of the Powers U-2 incident, for Khru- shchev to attend the scheduled summit meeting with Western leaders--particularly since that conference evidently would produce no demonstrable concessions to the Soviet Union that might have served in the . eyes of the radical Communists to excuse Khrushchev's attendance. Accordingly, after a vain effort to in- duce Mao Tse-tung to come to Moscow for talks which would take the pressure off the CPSU, Khrushchev used the U-2 incident as a device with which to tor- pedo the summit conference and also to destroy the relations with the Eisenhower Administration he had been at such pains to establish the previous year. Next, in October 1960, while the 1960 Moscow world Communist conference was being organized and the’ : CPSU was vainly trying to line up certain militant ic Asian parties for the coming confrontation with the , Chinese, Khrushchev was pounding his shoe in the U.N. General Assembly, using braggadocio as an inexpen- sive substitute for action in an effort to convince the radicals of the underdeveloped world of his fero- cious militancy. At the conference itself in No- vember, Khrushchev delivered a speech (repeated and published in edited form.in January 1961) which took a step forward in the conciliation of those Commu- nists with a vested interest in "national libera- tion wars," praising the legitimacy of such wars and admitting that some of them must inevitably continue to occur. : ; However, at the same time and through the fol- lowing years it was the task of Soviet propaganda to defend and seek to justify to the radicals of the un- derdeveloped world the Khrushchev "peaceful coex- istence" line in all its ramifications: the stress. on the unspeakable horrors of nuclear war and the consequent absolute necessity of preventing local direct clashes between the United States and the Soviet Union which would inevitably spread; the stress. on the allegedly growing opportunities for a "peace- ful" advent of Communists to power, and even in many cases for "peaceful" acquisition of independence by - colonies; the stress on economics as the prime field ~78- a ae a . ‘Ty a . of battle against imperialism, and the consequent necessity to concentrate above all on building up the economic potential of the Soviet Union; the assertion that there were both "madmen" and “sober circles" in the leaderships of the West in general and of the United States in particular, with the "sober circles" prevailing; and. the associated claim that sober-minded “imperialism" could be prevented or "paralyzed" by Soviet nuclear might from attacking other countries. . In 1961 and 1962, it became increasingly: difficult for Khrushchev to persuade radical Com- munist leaders in direct conflict with the United States~~such as Ho Chi Minh~-that these tenets were helpful to or even compatible with their interests. One of the major apparent purposes of the Soviet introduction of missiles into Cuba in 1962 was to try to close part of the gap between Soviet pre- tensions and reality, and to demonstrate to various sceptics that Soviet nuclear power could win signifi- cant political concessions from the United States (e.g., in Beriin). The humiliating failure of this effort was followed, in 1963 and 1964, (1) by a violent escalation of the Sino-Soviet conflict, (2) by an improvement in the atmosphere of Soviet- U.S. relations, and (3)--as‘we have seen--by a. steady worsening of CPSU relations with all the radical Communist parties of the Far East as Khru-. shchev pushed toward a final break not only with the Chinese, but more important, with all who supported and agreed with them. In essence, Khrushchev was attempting to escape from the pressures which the Chinese had been exerting on him for five years through the leverage of the radical Communist states and parties whose good will some of Khrushchev's colleagues continued to covet. But the CPSU in 1964 was not strong. enough to accomplish Khrushchev's purpose without enormous losses, and Khrushchev's position.within the: CPSU .was not strong enough to withstand the prospect of such losses. While domestic issues were undoubtedly more important than foreign policy as precipitat~ ing causes of the anti-Khrushchev coup, the fact that foreign policy nevertheless played a vital role -79- is demonstrated by the alacrity with which the new’ presidium majority reversed Khrushchev's line toward the pro-Chinese Communist radicals.* Despite all the Soviet public assurances that no change whatever was being made, this was in fact a major shift in the emphasis of Soviet foreign policy, -and one which be- fore long necessitated corresponding modifications in the Soviet posture toward the United States. This shift reflected a choice of different priori- ties df Soviet national interest from those Khrushchev had chosen, and this different choice was made, in the last analysis, for ideological reasons. 3. Effects. of the 1964 CPSU Power Shifts Decisive in this respect were the massive re- allocations of power within the leadership resulting from Khrushchev's disappearance. ‘For Soviet foreign policy, these were the relevant changes of personal fortune among the senior figures in the CPSU presid- ium that accompanied or shortly followed Khrushchev's fall: : : 4In addition, there ts good evidence that a second | | foretgn policy disagreement existed between Khrushchev and some of hts sentor colleagues over Khrushchev's 1963-1964 German policy. See DD/I Intelligenee Memo- .randum, "Strains in Seviet-East German Relations: 1962-1967," RSS No. 0019, 24 February 1967 (Reference Title: CAESAR XXIX). ; : There has also been some speculation in the West that one of Khrushchev's "hare-brained schemes" op- a posed by other Soviet leaders may have been some plan to attack ov sabotage the Chinese nuclear weapone : program. At a September 1964 Pugwash meeting a month before Khrushchev's fall, the Soviet military theoretictan. General Talenskiy--one of the most.au- thoritative exponente of Khrushehev's views--is al- leged to have stated privately that the major Soviet problem was Communist China and that the USSR "ts ‘eager to have the Chinese Communist nuclear poten- tial smashed." There is no other shred of evidence, however, to support the speculation on this matter. ! I -80- : a) The vanishing of Khrushchev himself, which removed from the Soviet political equation be the strongest and ablest force opposed to the ideo- ; logues in the leadership. b) The consequent immediate drastic weaken- ing of the political position of Anastas Mikoyan. : Mikoyan over the past decade on most issues had been , the most liberal member of the Soviet leadership. It was he who had led the attack on Stalin at the 20th CPSU Congress, forcing the issue and paving the way for Khrushchev's secret speech, and who contributed another very strong assault on Stalin at the 22nd CPSU Congress. It was Mikoyan who had made the exploratory visit to the United States in January 1959, helping to pave the way for Khru- shchev's subsequent visit later that year, and who - indicated in his speech to the. 2lst cPpsu Congress ‘that his visit had been a matter of controversy in the CPSU. Mikoyan was a strong advocate of expanded Soviet contacts with the United States and with the West generally, and of patient Soviet cultivation of the national bourgeoisie of underdeveloped newly- independent countries. Mikoyan was also a strong advocate of consumer. goods production in domestic ; battles over allocation of resources. Finally, it . om, Ye was he who in 1956 had defended and recommended to Khrushchev Dudintsev's heretical novel Not B Bread Alone; and Yevtushenko, at least, has de- scribed Mikoyan as the Soviet leader most sympa- thetic to the liberal writers. Although in recent ‘years Mikoyan did not support Khrushchev in every~- thing (e.g., he apparently opposed Khrushchev's - long effort to have the defeated "“anti~party group" expelled from the party and brought to trial), he was nevertheless Khrushchev's closest friend and ally within the leadership. Lacking an important power base of his own, he derived his importance in later years chiefly from his relationship with Khrushchev and the special responsibilities given him by Khrushchev. For this very reason, it ap- pears that Mikoyan was not consulted by the anti- Khrushchev conspirators until the very last moment, -81- Se a a a eK and with Khrushchev's removal Mikoyan necessarily lost most of his influence in the Presidium. It was now only a matter of time until Brezhnev would succeed in easing him out, using his age and health as a convenient excuse. The Chinese ambassador in April 1965 began prematurely to spread the story-- doubtless with satisfaction, for Mikoyan had long been anathema to the CCP--that Mikoyan would soon be replaced as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet. This actually came to pass by the end of that year. c) The elevation of Mikoyan's former close colleague Kosygin to the embattled position of premier. Regarding internal economic policy, Ko- sygin had apparently differed with Khrushchev not on the goal of increasing the relative share of consumer goods production (for which Kosygin con- tinued to fight in his new post), but rather over what Kosygin regarded as the economic irrationality and irresponsibility of some of Khrushchev's measures and plans. As already noted, the new Premier clearly desired good relations with the United States for economic reasons; and for similar reasons--in ap- parent contrast to the new first secretary Brezhnev-- wished to reduce the weight of military expenditures. © On 7 November 1964, Kosygin told the U.S. Ambassador that the Soviet government would be very ; happy to see its armed forces’ reduced to ten percent of present strength and eventually eliminated-~a bit of hyperbole that Malinovskiy (and Brezhnev) would have found in bad taste. In December, Kosygin was able to announce at a Supreme Soviet session a small reduction in the overt defense budget to be recipro- cal with a reduction promised him by the United States. During Kosygin's February 1965 talks with Mao in Peking, Mao criticized the Soviets vigorously regarding this purported budget cut, with Kosygin protesting defensively (and rather feebly) that "we are doing everything to arm ourselves" and that "the share of our budget for the armed forces is great." Mao was here again applying pressure against the CPSU on an issue over which the Soviets (and Kosygin in particular) were now to become increasingly vul- nerable: since regardless of whether or not the cut in the overt defense budget reflected the ac- ‘tual trend of Soviet defense expenditures (which -82- may, in fact, have increased), for the Soviets to sa that arms expenses were. being reduced in agreement with the United States was to make a political ges- ture toward the U.S. that could only affront radical Communist states. The subsequent evolution of the Soviet public posture on this issue was therefore symbolic of the fate of Kosygin's foreign policy preference - for good relations with the United States. Under the dual pressure of external events (the Vietnam war) and the leaning of the ideologically-oriented presid- ium majority, the Soviets in December 1965 were to announce restoration of the alleged arms budget cut, and a year later were to announce a further increase, Similarly, in late January 1965, on the eve of Ko- sygin's visit to the Far East, the presidium was persuaded to hold open Soviet lines to the United States by modifying a previously hostile press re- action to President Johnson's State of the Union mes- sage: but the Vietnam war was subsequently to offer the presidium majority overwhelming pressures--and, more importantly, rewards--for establishment and in- ‘definite retention of a public posture of loud hos~ tility toward the United States government. Thus of the three leading economically- oriented figures in the CPSU presidium, the first (Khrushchev) had been swept away, the second (Mi- koyan) had suffered a decisive setback in political power leading to his removal a year later, and the third (Kosygin) had been promoted to be Premier but was forced to conform to the decisions of a presidium Majority whose foreign policy leanings ran counter. to his own. on the other hand, the strengthening of the ideologically~oriented forces in the presidium was demonstrated by the effect of the Khrushchev * ouster upon the position of three other leaders: Suslov, Shelepin, and Brezhnev. (See Figure B.) -83~ a) The super-ideologue Suslov, overseer of CPSU relations with the foreign Communist world, * now received vindication after years of struggle with Khrushchev over the emphasis of CPSU foreign policies and the direction of CPSU tactics. In terms of function, experience, and habits of thought, Sus-~ lov was at the opposite pole from Mikoyan. Mikoyan's career was wholly on the government side, Suslov's wholly within the party apparatus. Mikoyan under Stalin had dealt with matters of industry, trade . and supply; Suslov, to’ take one example, after World War II had supervised the Soviet reabsorption of the Baltic republics and the arrest and exiling to Siberia of thousands of Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians. In the years after Stalin's death Mikoyan had favored some of the Soviet liberal writers; Suslov emphatically did not, and in 1957 publicly called them "right opportunists." Mikoyan had supported the cause of consumer goods; Suslov had sided with Kozlov in opposing Khrushchev on this issue and insisting on continued priority for heavy industry and especially the steel industry. In the last decade, both Mikoyan and Suslov had con- centrated more and more on foreign affairs, but — from opposite angles: Mikoyan dealt primarily with the bourgeois governmental and commercial leaders of the capitalist and underdeveloped world, while Suslov dealt almost exclusively with Communists, both bloc and nonbloc, and indeed from one year to another hardly ever even talked with a non-Communist. From the Soviet point of view, there was nothing strange or Sinister about this sharp dichotomy of functions; "This phrase ts not intended to suggest that Suslov today creates CPSU policy toward the foretgn Communist world (tt ts ereated by the CPSU politburo-as a whole, ted by Brezhnev) or that other senior politburo mem- bers do not deal extensively with senior foreign Com- -muntete, (nearly all of them do, and Brezhnev parttcu- larly has been quite active in this field). Suslov ts the sentor secretary and politburo member, however, who specializes, spending nearly full time in this work, and directly supervising Ponomarev and Andropov, the next-ranking specialists. -84- co UTIAL ; ECONOMICS VERSUS IDEOLOGY THE SHIFTING BALANCE OF THE FALL OF 1964 Mikoyan: Going Suslov: Vin Kosygin: Minority Premier 30G74 5-67 CIA a. dicated Figure B yet in fact it further encouraged a dichotomy of viewpoint between these two men which had long been well developed. In recent years, Suslov's primary responsi-~ bility as a senior secretary of the CPSU was to guide the chief "vestiges of the Comintern,"* that is, the two large CPSU central committee sections for bloc. and nonbloc affairs supervised by Andropov and Pono- Marev respectively.** To appreciate Suslov's world- view, and because these sections will reappear many times in this paper, a few words about them May be helpful. Each of the two sections was (and is) a Sizable bureaucratic apparatus, geographically or- . ganized, and with sub-sections and sub-sub-sections, engaged in daily receipt and collation of informa- tion; in political analysis (apparently involving intramural give-and-take with KGB analysis, as in the U.S. intelligence community) ***;-also in directing, advising, cajoling, and arguing with foreign Commu- nist leaders (as the case may be); probably, in *Khrushchev once deseribed Ponomarev thus to a foretgner. *4A third international section--the Information Seetion under Shevlyagin--was established in 2986, and presumably also reports to Suslov. Little ts yet known of tt, but tt appears to have taken over from the other two secttons' dealings with other par- ttes on "problems of ideological work and propaganda." | i ! **4Classtfied research is evidently performed and expertise provided for the two central committee in- ternattonal sections by the Academy of Seience'’s In- stitute for World Economics and International Re- | lations, and presumably also by the newly-formed Institute for Study of the International Workers Movement. Moderate, pragmatic, economically-ori- ented and less fanatical people, sympathetic to the _vtewpoints of Mikoyan and Kosygin, have long been | strongly represented in the former Institute, and could coneetvably exert some slight leavening in- | fluence through this channel on the views of the | - tdeologues in the central committee apparatus. | | -85-— _ _1JP SECRET making policy recommendations concerning individual parties; possibly, in supervising the covert train- ing of foreign Communists in CPSU schools; certainly, in receiving secret letters from foreign parties and drafting the many CPSU letters constantly being sent abroad; and in guidance of Soviet-run international front organizations. : Ponomarev's nonbloc section, in particular, obviously also has kept tabs on the clandestine po- litical and military activities of underground par- ties around the world (work which necessarily would require coordination and liaison with the KGB); and in order to watch and help foreign parties has at times even stationed its own officers abroad tem- porarily under diplomatic or TASS cover, entirely separate from and additional to RIS officers. Finally, it is probably Ponomarev's section which budgets the allocation of vital subsidies to (and withholds sub- sidies from) different nonbloc Communist parties, using, in part, money from the so-called International Solidarity Fund to which other pro-Soviet bloc states are compelled to contribute. Both central committee sections are much more important, much closer to the center of power, than the USSR Foreign Ministry;. and it has been credibly alleged that these sections have estimative responsibility--senior to that of the Foreign Ministry or the KGB--for all matters pertain~ ing to Soviet foreign policy. Among other things, the dual empire presided over by Suslov thus supervises and coordinates that important part of the Soviet cold war against the United States and its world-wide interests waged through the medium of those Communist parties and states amenable to Soviet direction or sensitive: to Soviet pressures: and years continually. spent in _ this fashion are not likely to have mellowed Suslov's See dogmatic convictions.* At the same time, Suslov, through Ponomarev and Andropov, has been directly responsible for the world-wide CPSU struggle against the Chinese party for primacy in the world Communist movement. There is no doubt that Suslov has been as. unwilling as Khrushchev or any other Soviet leader to make concessions to Peking on this central issue of CPSU authority and influence. Yet there is also good reason to believe that Suslov had many times differed,from Khrushchev both on the tactics to he used against the Chinese and on the closely related matter. of the content of Soviet foreign policy affect- ange CPSU fortunes in the.contest with the CCP. To be specific: eae it seems likely that Suslov was, never happy with the extremely soft line toward the United States taken by Khrushchev in the fall of 1959--particularly because of the vulnera- bilities this created for the CPSU-~and that he was one of the Soviet leaders who combined in May 1960 after the U-2 incident to force Khrushchev to break *There ts no evidence of stgnifieant differences - between Suslov and the apparatchtks he supervises in the matter of fanatical hostility toward the United States. There has been some evidence since Khrushchev ‘a ° fall, however, of differences between Suslov and Péno- marev--and even more, between Suslov and some of Pono- marev's underlings--over the question of encouraging forces tin West European Communist parties that wish to improve their postition in their own countries and ' thetr relations with loeal Soetalist parttes by clatm- ing publicly to have renounced some traditional Lenin- tet dogmas (such as the necessity for a dtetatorship of the proletariat). Perhaps because of justified misgivings about the ultimate effect of such public concesstons upon CPSU authority within the parties concerned, Sustov has seemed slower and more reluctant to encourage this trend than have Ponomarev and his deputtes, who seem to have relted upon support from above-~i.e., from a potitburo majority on this .tasue posstbly led by Brezhnev--for authorizatton to execute this Line. -87- violently and publicly with the Eisenhower Administra- tion in order to protect the CPSU flank in the coming confrontation with the Chinese.* 4It should never be forgotten that the Powers U-~2 flight was publicized into a significant incident by the Soviet Union, not the United States, and that the | Sovtets broke their own precedents in doing so. Pre- vious suecessful overflights were of course never pub- Licized. by the USSR; more important, they did not sertously affect the Soviet public posture toward the United States--as demonstrated by the fact that they did not prevent Khrushehev from having his love-feast with the United States Government in the fall of 1959. ; The fatlure of the Powers mission on May 1, 1960 was thus the new political event, rather than the mis- ston titeelf; and Khrushcheu's political position would tronteally have been considerably better had Powers not been shot down at all. In view of the Chinese at- tacks on Sovtet policy toward the United States the month before, to whieh Suslov and Kozlov were particu- larly sensitive, and in view of the related dissension going on simultaneously in the Soviet military and po-~ lttteal leadership over Khrushchev's January 1960 troop cut, the Powers shoot-down came at the worst possible moment for Khrushchev, and provided a fortu- ttous opportunity for forces led by Kozlov and Suslov to press for a hardening of line toward the United States Government. Khrushehev would probably have been foreed to move in thie direction in any case, but the sequence of . events set in motion by the Powers inetdent undoubtedly compelled him to go much further than he would have otherwise had to do. In early May Khrushehev's pubtie statements made tt clear that he was desperately hop- ing that the U.S. would not now make matters worse, but President Etsenhower's dectston to announce pub- lie responsibility for the U-2 flights provided the coup-de~grace.- Mao Tse-tung soon thereaften tssued a personal publie statement mocking the credulity of those who had naively trusted the imperialists. Thanks partly to thts unwitting Stino-U.&. collabora- tion, Chinese Communist pressures against the detente line had gained their inttial victory. -88- | srepessseaer _ Secondly, it seems likely that Suslov was never happy with the extreme to which Khrushchev carried the theme of the "peaceful" or "parlia- mentary" path for the advent of Communists to power, and the degree to which the use of armed struggle was downgraded. While Suslov undoubtedly agreed that armed uprising was not a realistic alternative in Europe for the foreseeable future, he apparently was uncomfortable at the extraordinary emphasis placed by many Western parties upon "parliamentary struggle," particularly after the 20th CPSU Con~ gress, and the unmilitant, "revisionist" tendencies promoted by this emphasis. . There is evidence that the Italian party, in particular, for years found him and Ponomarev hidebound and dogmatic on this score; and since Khrushchey's ouster, the leader of the right wing of the PCI (Amendola) has once been openly attacked by Kommunist, while a leader of the Italian party's extreme left wing (Occhetto) in 1965 came back from Moscow privately claiming the support of Suslov and Ponomarev in denunciation of the "revisionism" fostered both by Khrushchev and by the Italian party leadership.* ; Elsewhere in the world, Suslov has apparently tried to insist that pro-Soviet parties hold open armed struggle as a viable alternative. There is evidence, for example, that throughout the 1950s Suslov personally attempted repeatedly to compel the Communist party of India to construct a clan- destine paramilitary apparatus against a future day of reckoning in India; but despite ali his badger- ing comparatively little was done because of the monumental revisionist sloth and bitter squabbling of the Indian party leaders. It is possible that Suslov was responsible for the sharp Yudin article rebutting Nehru on the subject of Communist violence in the December 1958 World Marxist Review, which *There ts little doubt that Oechetto was exag~ gerating what he had been told in Moscow for his own purposes; but it aleo seems likely that there was a germ of truth in hie account of Sustov'sa views. : contrasted notably with the line taken toward Nehru by Khrushchev and Mukhitdinov the next month at the 2lst CPSU Congress. : In short, it is likely that Suslov was un- comfortable at the CHinese private and public at- tacks upon Khrushchev's emphasis on the "peaceful path," and was quite ready to retreat on this issue. Suslov was the chief CPSU negotiator haggling with the Chinese over the ‘drafts of the joint documents eventually adopted by the Moscow world Communist meetings both in 1957 and in 1960. We have been told by Chinese editorials that the CPSU delegation made important concessions to Mao in November 1957 on this very subject of the "peaceful" versus "“non- peaceful" path. We have also been told by the Chi- nese press that the CPSU negotiators (headed by Sus-" lov) in October 1960 made unspecified concessions to the Chinese viewpoint in compiling the 1960 draft statement-~-while Khrushchev was absent from the So- viet Union~-which Khrushchev was unwilling to ratify when he returned. : Thirdly, and closely related to the second point, there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that Suslov and the Yugoslavs detest each other. It is an astonishing fact that as far as is known, Suslov has never been to Yugoslavia, although he has visited every other East European country, some many times. Suslov's special coolness toward the Yugoslavs apparently stems: (a) from their various revisionist practices and tenets (particularly the one holding that is is possible for some countries to build socialism without a Communist party being in power); (b) from the pernicious influence (from the point of view of doctrine or CPSU authority or both) their views have had on several European par- ties, notably the Rumanians, Italians and Swedes; and (c) most of all in recent years, from the fact that Soviet relations with Yugoslavia have been harm- ful to the preservation of CPSU influence with the anti-American radical Communist parties of the world {e.g., those of Cuba, North Vietnam, North Korea, Japan and Indonesia), all of whom have publicly clashed with Belgrade’ primarily because of the "soft" Yugoslav attitude toward the United States and toward armed struggle and because of their fears of Yugoslav -90- influence on Soviet policy. Although Khrushchev had originally shared certain of these objections with Suslav and voiced some of them vigorously as late as the 2lst CPSU Congress in January 1959--they seemed to grow less important in his mind in subsequent years, and the growing divergence between the two men on this. subject became a logical corollary to their apparent divergence on the precise line to be taken toward the United States and toward the parliamentary road to power. ‘ Furthermore, by 1962 and 1963 the Yugoslav _ question became the focal point of alternative CPSU courses in combatting the Chinese. The CCP in its letters to the CPSU in those years, sparring over conditions for the convocation of a new world con- ference made the ostracizing of the Yugoslavs a cen~ tral issue. For. their part, the Yugoslavs and vari- ous Western parties sympathetic to.them made it plain that they expected any document drawn up by a new world conference to eliminate, among other things, the harsh strictures against Yugoslavia and against the "revisionist" danger in general retained in both the 1957 and 1960 documents. A CPSU promise to make these and other liberalizing changes might reduce the reluctance of many Western parties to support a con- ference showdown with the Chinese; on the other hand, such a promise would inevitably further alienate: thé radical, anti-U.S., anti-Yugoslav parties of the Far East. Thus the CPSU choice of tactics in this mat- ter was intimately bound up with the question of the © Soviet attitude toward detente with the United States and toward the armed struggles of the anti-U.S. radi- cals, There is some evidence to suggest that in the Spring of 1963, as the Chinese for the first time hbe- gan to attack the CPSU publicly by name, differences between Suslov and Kozlov on one hand and Khrushchev on the other became particularly acute over this cen- tral symbolic issue of Yugoslavia. A Pravda editorial of 10 February 1963, defending the CPSU against Chi- nese attacks over the Yugoslav issué and condéescend- ingly claiming that Belgrade was repenting its errors, took a line on Yugoslav "mistakes" which was consider~ ably harsher, more explicit, and more offensive to Belgrade than Khrushchev's Supreme Soviet remarks on -9l- this subject two months before.* In April 1963, there occurred the dramatic episode of the unprecedented public replacement of a CPSU May Day slogan concerning Yugoslavia--which did not credit Yugoslavia with build- ing socialism, and which evidently was approved by Sus- lov and Kozlov in Moscow in the absence of Khrushchev-- with another slogan which mirrored Khrushchev's posi- tion that Yugoslavia was indeed building socialism. Fourth, and finally, all these differences ap- parently grew in 1963 and 1964 into a major schism be- tween Khrushchev. and Suslov on the tactical line to be pursued in fighting the Chinese. By the summer of 1963, Khrushchev had evidently become convinced that the only solution to his multiple problems in the Communist world was an all-out anti-Chinese campaign, like those in 1960 and the winter of 1961-1962, but culminating this time in a world meeting which would break not’ only with the Chinese but with all who supported them.** Suslov was opposed to such action not because he was unwilling to. break with the CCP if this ever became - profitable for the CPSU, but because in his .view it would be grossly unprofitable: Suslov was flatly un- willing to write off forever to the Chinese the other radical Far Eastern parties and states, when they might conceivably be won back by modifications in for- eign policies which Suslov himself desired anyway. It is evident that Kozlov (before his incapacitation) agreed with Suslov, and it appears likely from later * In November 1962, a few weeks before Khrushchev welezomed Tito to the Soviet Union, Sustlov's lieutenant Ponomarev had written an article which reemphasized that revistoniem was the movement's "main danger" and whiuh ertticeized Yugoslavia as the main bulwark of reviatontem--both statements highly unusual in. the context of the time. : **4 memorable passage in one of Teng Hsiao-ping's speeches at the November 1960 Moscow meeting had exz- plicitly dared the CPSU to consummate a break with the CCP; and the- CPSU had backed down from.the chat- lenge, tn large part because of the unacéeptable lasses this would have ineurred among the Asian par- ties. events that Brezhnev, and probably others, did as_ well. This sensitivity of an important part of the CPSU presidium to the opposition of the Far Eastern {and some European) parties to Khrushchev's plans for a showdown conference is probably the explanation for the curiously erratic, hesitant, indecisive CPSU course in 1963-1964, in which the CPSU several times marched up the hill to administer a "decisive rebuff" to Mso Tse-tung, only fo-march down again. _ There are ‘various items of Nagi danee to support | this interpretation of events. One, already men- tioned, was the apparent conflict within the presidium in the spring of 1963 over Yugoslavia. Khrushchev's victory on this matter in April, coupled with Kozlov's simultaneous incapacitation with a stroke, strengthened Khrushchev's position momentarily and apparently en- abled him to win approval at a June central committee plenum for the July CPSU Open Letter assailing the Chinese and for the associated anti-Chinese moves to follow, and probably also for the Soviet reversal of position on the test-ban treaty, which similarly in- furiated the Far Eastern anti-U.S. radicals. This did not end Khrushchev's problems, however... In July, Khrushchev made highly. emotional references in one speech to the efforts of the Chinese to unseat him in his own party. stated in a report to his governien a that a majority of Soviet party officials in Moscow be- lieved that the Sino-Soviet conflict had become un- controllable, and were concerned about the final out~ come; he added that a growing anti-Khrushchev faction existed in the Soviet party and that its attacks were becoming more critical. Khrushchev in.August report- edly told the Yugoslavs that it was only two weeks before that he had been able to secure support for his policies toward the Chinese from the CPSU eenenat committee--i.e., from the presidium. In the fall, Suslov fell ill, and Khrushchev apparently seized the occasion to try to bring pres- sure against him: during the November anniversary . celebrations in Moscow, Suslov's picture was down- graded in position in certain of the displays of leaders' portraits, and in December articles were published in the Soviet press on Voznesenskiy which -93- T ET O Jie . seemed implicitly harmful to Suslov.* In the same period Ilya Ehrenburg--a man with good contacts in the Soviet leadership--privately remarked that Suslov did not see eye to eye with Khrushchev regarding the ‘dispute with China, and added that Khrushchev was _. “quite nervous" at the moment because of strong op- position to his "soft" policies within the deadenship? In January 1964, Suslov's. health was improved, : and he was charged with preparing a report on rela- tions with the Chinese for presentation to a central , committee plenum in February. The: draft report was’ first circulated within the presidium and is alleged, by one subsequent account, to have come back from Khrushchev drastically toughened up. Suslov is then said to have taken the report to Kozlov in the hospital’ and asked for his views. Kozlov is said to have re- plied that this was to be expected from Khrushchev, and that intelligent leadership would never be ob- tained as long as he was there. The two men are ‘said to have agreed that Khrushchev would have to go, but that the time was not yet ripe.** After Suslov had duly delivered the report . at the February plenum, it was withheld from publi-. cation -for the time being but apparently circulated within the CPSU and to certain bloc states. In April,’ the report was published; and six months later, at the showdown which ousted Khrushchev in October, Sus- lov is said to have charged that it had been Khrush- chev who had obstinately insisted on the publication of the February report over the opposition of other *See the FBIS Radio Propaganda Report CD.238 of 6 December 1963, "Sovtet Prees Articles on Voznesen- skiy Appear Aimed at Sustlov." t4After Khrushchev's fall, Suelov attempted to have this account carried to the Chinese through in-~ direct channels, in an effort to remove himself from the odtum the Chinese attached to hts February Plenum report. This effort by Suslov was ttself revealing of Suslov's personal view during 1964 of anurouriane CPSU tacties toward the CCP. His account of the _. genesis of the February report, although self-serv- tng, ts eredible, -94- (eae aaa ee presidium members. Suslov in fact had every reason to have opposed publication of this violently polemi- cal document bearing his name; not only did publica- tion further. antagonize various Communist parties and states other than the Chinese whom Suslov wished to. ‘ conciliate, ‘but he himself became irreparably branded because of the grievously insulting personal attacks on Mao in the report. Pama ee AESEE evidence show a special Chinese detestation of Suslov after this; he was the "main theoretician of revision- ism." It seems likely that here had been one of Khru- .shchev's purposes in forcing Suslov to deliver the report and in then insisting on publication of the report thus identified with Suslov. So far did Sus- lov become persona non grata with Mao that he could not even be included as usual in the CPSU delegation which held talks with Chou En-lai in Moscow in No- vember 1964, after Khrushchev’s ouster. The creation of such extraordinary CCP rancor toward Suslov in - particular was ironical, since he was (and remains). that senior member of the CPSU leadership whose views on most substantive issues are the least far from those of the CCP. b) Shelepin: Khrushchev's fall, which termi- nated his dispute with Suslov, also catapulted Alex- ander Shelepin into full membership in the CPSU presi- dium, bypassing the customary stage of candidate mem- bership. Shelepin was thus rewarded for the important role he is known to have played in the coup itself. In the two years since then, Shelepin has displayed savage hostility toward the United States Government, publicly and privately, more consistently than any ‘other member of the leadership, including even Suslov. Typical was his performance at a Cairo press conference in late December: 1964, which was in sharp contrast to Kosygin's remarks before the Supreme Soviet two weeks before. Asked about "obstacles" to peaceful coexist- ence between the USSR and the United States, he: re- plied that there were "many obstacles," but that the most significant one was "U.S. imperialism's in- terference in the affairs of other peoples," includ- ing those of Vietnam, Cuba, and the Congo. He gratu- itously added that the United States "believes that we are afraid of war," and that "this is not true... we do not fear war, and this...the United States should understand also." Shelepin may have consciously -95- intended to contradict Khrushchev's well-known 1959 polemical statement that “in our days only a fool does not fear war.". In May 1965, attacking President John-~ son in private conversation with a Western ambassador after the outbreak of the Dominican Republic crisis, Shelepin said that it was possible that the President had in mind some"babbling" (unspecified) by Khru- shchev but that the present Soviet leadership was not bound by:this.. A few minutes later, he repeated this to another ambassador, adding that the Soviets would answer, the President's words and deeds, speci- fying, however, that he was- talking personally and "not for the government. These "personal" attitudes of Shelepin toward the United States and Khrushchev were probably solidi- . fied during his earlier assignments in command first of the Komsomol and then of the KGB--both breeding~ grounds for dogmatic ideologues. Khrushchev's ad- vancement of Shelepin up the party ladder was an egregious example of Khrushchev's many mistakes in cadre selection, and proved in the end both personally disastrous for Khrushchev and harmful to the policies he favored. .It also once again demonstrated the dan- ger of assuming that. all of the people beholden to Khrushchev were therefore Khrushchevites. As already noted, Chen Yi while visiting In- donesia in late November 1964 alluded to Shelepin (without directly naming him) as the "most able" mem- ber of ‘the Soviet leadership; and it is barely con- ceivable that the CCP in the immediate aftermath of the Khrushchev ouster and Shelepin's spectacular sub- sequent promotion-~two obviously connected events-- had harbored some vague hopes regarding him. I£ so, these were soon disappointed, for Shelepin no more than any other CPSU leader could even consider the public CPSU abasement before the CCP and public. dis- avowal of previous Soviet policies which Mao was de- Manding. The other Far Eastern radicals, however, were another matter: it is fairly likely that Shelepin was one of that "part" of the Soviet lead- ership to which the Japanese Communists and the In- donesian Aidit kept alluding in late 1964 and early . ~96- ste eee 1965 as favoring their foreign policy views.* She- lepin's favorable reputation among the Asian mili-~ tants--which his public speeches certainly did noth- ing to destroy--may well have had something to do with his selection for delicate missions to Pyongyang in the summer of 1965 and to Hanoi in January 1966. He is known to have retained a close connection with Soviet dealings with North Vietnam and North Korea up to the present time. -¢) Brezhnev: Finally, Khrushchev's fall brought Brezhnev~-who was probably the central figure in the coup plotting-~the post of party first secretary, in- herently the most important position in the Soviet Un- ion, which Brezhnev has since used gradually to ex- pand his power. Although Brezhnev, a former member : of Khrushchev's Ukrainian apparatus elevated by Khru- Shchev, had previously been assumed by many, on the basis of past public statements, to have remained a faithful supporter both of Khrushchev and his policies, .it has turned out otherwise: not only did ‘he betray Khrushchev, but he set out, as soon as Khrushchev was out of the way, to reverse some of Khrushchev's policies and to greatly modify the emphasis of most others. — . *In December 1965--a year after Chen Yt made the remark etited above~-NCNA correspondent EO that the Chinese : @ new Sovtée aette of gtving prtority to an attempt to influence the Japanese Communist Party -- from within was inspired largely by Shelepin. -97- . Khrushchev's greatest single cadre mistake appears to have been his decision (or agreement) to return Brezhnev to the secretariat in July 1963, fol- lowing Kozlov's incapacitation. There is good evidence to indicate that one of Brezhnev's tasks in: the secretariat involved responsibility for super- vision of the KGB; and at least two celebrated for- eign policy incidents involving the KGB in the fif- teen months ensuing until Khrushchev's ouster shed some light on the criteria Brezhnev used in exercis-~- ing this responsibility. In both cases Khrushchev was afterward concerned with attempting to eliminate |. consequences harmful to his foreign policy objectives flowing from KGB actions taken under Brezhnev's aegis. The first case was that of the KGB provocation against a1 3 and arrest of Professor Barghorn in the fall of 1963. While KGB interests may have required an operation against some U.S. citizen to secure a hostage to force the exchange of an arrested Soviet agent, the | crude action taken against Professor Barghorn ran { directly counter to the moderate line toward the United States being pursued:by Khrushchev in the wake of the test-ban treaty, evoked public clamor and direct public intervention by President Kennedy and necessitated'a public retreat on the issue by Khru- shchev himself. It would be strange indeed if Brezh- nev had not foreseen, if not the President's action, at least the public reaction in the United States to this provocation, and the consequent injury to the policy Khrushchev wished to follow. . The second case was that of the KGB mustard gas attack on a West German technician on 6 September 1964, which occasioned a West German protest, a Soviet denial,. and then a Soviet semi-apology. This action, too, had as ostensible intelligence objective, yet was bound also to greatly embarrass a Khrushchev policy line--in this case, the approach to West. Germany which he ~98~ RET (and especially his son-in-law Adzhubey) had been conducting since the summer, looking toward an even- tual Khrushchev visit to Bonn. There is ample evi-- dence that this line--and Adzhubey’s activities in particular--were highly controversial in the Soviet leadership, and there is good reason to-suppose that Brezhnev sanctioned the-KGB action in order to un~- dermine a-policy which was to be cited by some re- ports as one of the reasons geeredeas RnEUshenew s Syanenree a month Tenens - In short, there ‘is: evidence suggesting that during Khrushchev's last year Brezhnev used his po- sition and his relations with the secret police to ‘seek to obstruct first Khrushchev's policy toward the United States and: then his policy toward West Germany. These same relations with the KGB were used in October 1964 to guarantee Khrushchev's re- moval. Since then, Brezhnev has taken a line toward the United States Government which, while varying from one period to another, has generally been con- siderably more harsh than that of Kesygin, although not quite as harsh as that of Shelepin or Suslov.** *For a detatled diacussion cf the evolution of Khrushchev's, German poltey in 1963 and 1964 and the attitude shown toward that policy by other members of the Soviet leadership, see DD/I Intelligence Memorandum, "Straine in Scoviet-Eaet German Relations:. 1962-1967," RSS No. 0019, 24 February 1967 (Refer- ence Title: CAESAR XXIXi. **Brezhnev was very probably respenatble for-- or at least gave direct approval for--~the KGB op- eratton tn 1966 tn which .the U.S. atttaen Kazan: was kidnaped on an Aeroflot flight from Moscow and ‘ delivered to the Czech pelice, a ahert time after . an Aeroflot agreement had been signed wtth the United States. fhe scperation wae primarily designed | to--and indeed did--greatly embarrass U.S.-Czechoaslovak relations. If the United States had cancelled the . reontinued on nexut pags? -99- He has shown a consistent desire to cultivate and avoid offense to the militant wing of the world Communist movement. He appears to be the leading force behind the steady push to halt Khrushchev's ‘process of destalinization and to-restore a "bal- anced," fairly favorable picture of Stalin; this process has advanced directly 1n proportion to Brezhnev's increase in power. The final decision to proceed with the crude, quasi-Stalinist trial of the writers Daniel and Sinyavsky~--and then to de- fend it against European Communist attack--was al- most certainly Brezhnev's although it is likely that Suslov and Shelepin had vigorously concurred. Brezhnev has from the first gone far out of his way to court the Soviet military and to champion their interests; his consistent stress on the long-term and world-wide dangers of "U.S. im- perialist aggression" and on the general rise in international tension has thus served to justify a greater share of the pie for military expendi- tures than Kosygin favored, just as it has. also justified the conciliation of foreign militants, the Soviet posture of public hostility toward the United States, and sporadic efforts to cow heret~ ical writers. at home. For similar reasons, Brezh- nev appears to have supported the cause of heavy industry in a running debate with Kosygin over how. far to improve the allocation of resources to con- sumer goods industries. Sec! : To sum up: The Khrushchev removal consid- erably strengthened the relative weight of ideolog~ ically-oriented members of the presidium in rela- tion to economically-oriented members, as exempli- -fied by the cases of Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Kosygin, Suslov, Shelepin, and Brezhnev. There are other personal factors, not. dealt with here, which have Aeroflot agreement as a result, thre would have been: accepted cheerfully by Brezhnev, inasmuch ag the | signing of the agreement at U.S. initiative had al- ready aceomplished the main Soviet objective in pro- posing it years before--to break down resistance by Latin Amertean, African, and Scandinayian governments to the signing of similar agreements with Aeroflot. -100- also been highly relevant to thé evolution of the Soviet foreign-policy mix: for example, the changes in Podgorny's position, the different views of the junior presidium members, and the conflicts which appear to have occurred within the ideologically-ori- ented wing itself (between. Brezhnev and Shelepin, between Suslov and Shelepin, and even perhaps between Brezhnev and Suslov.) . The conclusion, however, re- mains that elements in the Soviet leadership who had long been unimpressed by the necessity for of the desirability of an atmosphere of detente with the .United States Government were rendered much stronger by Khrushchev's ouster, and that this change occurred independent of any U.S. actions and prior to the in- itiation of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, although that bombing did indeed subsequently further strengthen | the hand of the CPSU ideologues.* 4, Hedges to Reduce Military Risk It must be added, however, that the change in the balance of forces in the Soviet leadership and the consequent shift in the emphasis of policy toward the United States did not mean a’ greater willingness . to run a serious risk of direct military conflict . with the United States. On the contrary, there is- every indication that the new leadership has thus far been more cautious than was Khrushchev in engag- ing the prestige of the Soviet Union in actions or *Ae menttoned earlier, an important DRV offictal tn April 1966 told assembled Viet Cong leaders that the new Soviet teadership was on balance not as -re- : | vistontet as the leadership under Khrushchev had been, and he added that "we hotd.that the Soviet. . leadership atill contains some revistoniate, some in- ; decisive elements, and ateo some active elementa." ‘ We may tentatively fill in the blanks with Kosygin, Podgorny, and the by then retired Mtkoyan in the first eategory; Sualov and Shelepin in the third category; and Brezhnev in the middle leaning toward the ‘latter group. fhe North Vietnamese undoubtedly have firsthand information to make a more concrete appraisal, : - -101- ventures which might produce such a military encoun- ter: that is, actions which, in the face of a vig- orous U.S. response, would leave the USSR little choice between humiliating retreat or acceptance of’ a clash.* In this connection, the leadership appears to have been deeply impressed by the outcome of Khru-~ shchev's ."harebrained eeneue” in Cuba in 1962. ; The Cuban taassns has been clearly’ reflected in what the Soviets have not done with regard to North Vietnam. Despite ‘Chinese private and public taunts, they. have apparently not yet risked shipping weapons or ammunition to"“the DRV by sea. Kosygin in his Pebruary 1965 talk with Mao alluded to "fast patrol boats" as one ofthe items of military aid the USSR was going to give the DRV; but the Soviet Union does not seem to have done so, apparently be-- cause of the dangers involved in delivery to Haiphong. The boats rashly promised could have been Komar mis- sile boats, which the USSR has given to a number. of bloc and-nonbloc recipients around the world. A CCP letter to the CPSU on 5 November 1965 chal- lenged the Soviets to say why they had "not yet sent the naval vessels they promised to the Vietnamese comrades," and added that they "could have sent these direct to the ports of Vietnam but instead want to transfer them to the VASEnaNese comrades by Chinese ports." The Soviets have also rejected~-as designed to provoke a war between the USSR and the U.S.-~re- peated public and private Chinese demands that the Soviet Union do something in Europe to divert United States strength from Vietnam. In this connection, *We should note -in this connection, however,: that we agree with the view expressed by some other ob- servers that once having tnadvertently gotten into such a postttion, the present Soviet leadership would find tt more difficult to accept a humiliating re- treat than did Khrushchev, and the danger of a direct elash with the United States would be correspondingly greater. -102- ee a area their failure to renew serious pressures on Berlin is all the more noteworthy. * ; Private statements by Soviet officials have also been used to reduce the level of risk created by the Soviet public posture and by certain Soviet ac- tions such as the furnishing of surface-to-air. mis-~- siles to North Vietnam. - Thus, after the missiles were first used in 1965, high-ranking Soviet officers for a time attempted to persuade U.S. and Western attaches that Soviet personnel either were not responsible for the missile firings or would soon be leaving; and other Soviet officials made clear official Soviet ‘disassociation from the fate of Soviet SAM personnel engaged in combat against U.S. aircraft in North Vietnam. Even more striking, along the same line, . was Defense Minister Malinovskiy's private toast to the U.S. military attache in Moscow in the fall of 1965: "To your victory in Vietnam" as well as Mali- novskiy's follow-up remark. to the U.S. attache a ‘year later that he had not been feeling well recently because the United States had not been doing well in ‘ Vietnam. These remarks, coming from such a source, were evidently intended to convey to the U.S. Gov- ernment, in facetious form, a serious message regard- ing the Soviet attitude toward Vietnam capable of lowering tensions created by Soviet public statements. *We consider without merit the speculation of some Western observers that the Sovtet attitude in the Mid- dte East ertets which began in May 1967 was prompted by. such a destre to relieve United Statés pressure on North Vietnam. Sovtet' policy in the Middle East, like that regarding Vietnam, has been governed by a dema- gogte destre to make political gains for the USSR wtth a spectfic audience by demonstrating support for the interests of that audtence and opposition to the United States, without running sertous military risk of dtrect | confrontation wtth the United States. In the case of — the Middle East crisis, against the background of years of Soviet cultivation of radical Arab forces and government, at least until the active Israeli-Arab hosttlittes began the leeal political gains thought to be tn prospect for the Soviet Union at American expense provided ample motivation for the uncooperative attitude toward the U.S. shown by the Soviet leadership, without reference to American actions elsewhere in the world. -103- OP SEGRE] ‘IIL. Soviet Dealings With Peking From the aes of Khru- ‘shchey to the March Meeting A. The Chou En-lai Visit It would appear that both the Soviets and the Chinese were temporarily misled by false hopes as to the. other party's intentions following the ouster of Khrushchev. Judging from Chou En-lai's conduct in Moscow, the CCP seems really to have thought it possible that the new CPSU leaders were so desperate for a relaxation of Chinese pressures against them as to be willing to buy Peking off with humiliating public concessions of a fundamental nature--conces~ | sions which would in effect acknowledge that the Chi- nese had been right all along and the Soviets wrong, and would thus constitute a long step toward abdica- tion of leadership of the Communist movement to Pe~ king. At least some of the new Soviet leaders, for their part, seem to have overestimated the relative importance of Mao's personal hatred of Khrushchev as a factor in Chinese conduct (intense though that hatred was), and underestimated the relative importance and permanence of Mao's pretensions to lead the revolu-~- tionary world and his ambition to be universally recognized as that leader. The Soviets therefore ap- parently hoped that with Khrushchev gone, the Chinese would be willing to call off the anti-Soviet strug- gle on terms Khrushchev himself had on occasion in the past vainly offered Peking--the restoration of some Soviet economic (and possibly military) aid to China and an end to public polemics without humili-~ ating public self~criticism by either side. Both the CPSU and the CCP were mistaken about their opponent. After Khrushchev's ouster, the CCP sent a con- ciliatory telegram of congratulations to Brezhnev and Kosygin on their new appointments, suspended | overt polemics, and then privately informed the CPsu that the Chinese party would be receptive to an in- vitation to send a delegation to Moscow for talks during the October Revolution anniversary celebra- tions. (Chou En-lai later publicly boasted that "we took the initiative" in bringing about the talks.) Reports deriving from both Soviet and Chinese sources Make it clear that in those conversations Chou demanded, “<105- ‘as a price for even discussing the matters the CPSU wanted to discuss (a permanent end to polemics and Chinese participation in a world meeting), that the ‘CPSU commit itself to repudiate publicly the policy lines established by the 20th, 21st and 22nd CPSU Congresses so long attacked by the Chinese. The CPSU representatives refused, and disingenuously told Chou that even if they were willing to do this, pressure from East European leaders would not permit it. (In fact, while Kadar and. Gomulka may indeed have warned the CPSU against concessions of this kind to the Chinese, CPSU self~interest alone would prohibit such self-abasement before Mao.) The Chinese later publicly stated that the new Soviet leaders also said.on this occasion that -they had no quarrel with Khrushchev regarding policy toward China, and the CCP has also privately claimed (somewhat inconsist- ently) that the Soviets told Chou that now that Khru- shchev had been ousted, it was Chou's turn to get rid of Mao.* (See Pigure C.) When the Soviets refused to make the fundamental concessions Chou demarided,. Chou reportedly was taken aback, asked why the CPSU had then purged Khrushchev, and refused to consider Brezhnev's request for dis- cussion of.a permanent cessation of polemics and a halt to “factional activities" in the world Commu- nist movement. The Soviets later said that they of- fered Chou "concrete suggestions on the expansion of. Soviet-Chinese trade" and on "scientific-technical and cultural cooperation." These guarded phrases may well cover another Soviet effort to buy Chinese po~ litical cooperation by holding out the prospect of renewed Soviet economic assistance--like the similar attempts made by Khrushchev in October 1962 and. No- vember 1963. It is barely conceivable that some ‘limited military assistance was also included in the “4Thits episode has been confirmed from the Soviet stde. vately a @ oscow that when Chou and his delegation were attending a banquet during thetr November 1964 Moscow visit, Marshal Malinovskiy made this remark to Chou: whereupon the Chinese dele- gation reportedly walked out of the banquet. -106-_ TO RET CONPINENTIAL _ : ‘4 » + Figure C ‘CHOU EN-LAI IN MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 1964 Peres oy Kd A e bf wet ee . Chou listening to a Brezhnev address at the Kremlin Palace of Soviets on November. On Chou’s right are Maurer and Zhivkov; on his left are Kosygin and Ulbricht. . ; . , 36675 6-67 CIA : CON TIAL Figure C (Continued) ? » Chou with Mikoyan and Podgormyy on the Lenin Mausoleum viewing the 7 November parade. Chou’s clash with Mikoyan at the Kremlin reception occurred o few hours later. Chou is welcomed home by Mao on his return to Peking. Mac had not seen Chou off on his departure for Moscow. $6676 6-37 CIA 3 CONFID TIAL Fe ae ee offer, although almost certainly not- nuclear weapons. In any case, once again, this bait proved useless, for while Chou apparently carried the proposal back to Mao, the Soviets have claimed that the’ Chinese leadership subsequently not only “did not agree to an expansion of economic, technical, and cultural coop- eration, but actually undertook additional steps toward their limitations." ‘“wMeanwhile, despite this offer, and despite in- dications from the Soviets that they (unlike Khru- ; shchév) were now prepared to make concessions regard- es _ ing the’agenda, timing, and participants in a prepara- “"F torysmeeting for a world Communist conference, Chou ee refused to discuss Chinese participation in’ any such gathéring, and warned the Soviets not to hold the meeting scheduled for 15 December. Chou lectured ‘ : the Soviets on their iniquities at some length, and fas warned the new leaders that they faced the same fate as that of Khrushchev. He agreed, however, to trans- mit to Peking a request for a Brezhnev meeting with ‘Mao. But even this eventually came to nothing, for the CPSU subsequently privately lamented that the Chinese central committee "completely ignored the proposals on bilateral meetings at the highest level." It was not the CPSU first secretary but the Soviet Premier--as the Chinese publicly emphasized-~who was allowed to see Mao in February.* .-bater, some Soviet sources spread reports that Chou ‘had also. (a) made enormous territorial demands . upon the USSR for the return of the "Siberian terri-'' _ | tories" acquired by Russia one or two centuries be- ; fore,.or (b) vainly demanded nuclear weapons from the Soviets. Neither of these assertions is supported by the most authoritative Soviet and Chinese versions *On both stops in Peking, Kosygin was met and seen off by government offtetals but no Chinese party ap- paratus offictals (despite the presence of CPSU sec- retary Andropov in his delegation}, and Kosygin's party rank was never mentioned by Chinese propagan.a. of the talks, and both appear improbable. While Chinese propaganda (and Mao himself) has in the past publicly attacked old "unjust treaties” by which the Tsars took huge areas now comprising much of Soviet Siberia from China, there. is no evidence that the Chinese ever for- mally presented a claim of this kind to the Soviet Un- ion even when Khrushchev was in power; and the more concrete issue has appeared to be that of the compara- tively small areas where local Sino-Soviet boundaries (as shown on conflicting maps) are in dispute. While the Chinese are likely to keep the more general ques- tion of their pretensions to the whole Soviet Far East and other Siberian territories alive vaguely in the background ‘as long as the Sino-Soviet political strug- gle continues, it would have been obviously counter- productive to Chinese purposes for Chou at this time formally and seriously to present:a fantastic claim of this nature. The Soviets, however, have many times sought to exploit covertly the general subject of | Chinese territorial claims and border BaGE Renton to win foreign sympathies. : It is also, in our view, unlikely that Mao's regime in late 1964 would have requested again from the Soviets the nuclear weapons Mao -had been so en- raged to be denied five or six years before. The humiliating nature of such a request, given the like- ‘ lihood of Soviet refusal; the long distance relations between the two powers had travelled since the de- finitive Soviet refusal in 1959; the heavy stress Mao had placed ever since on Chinese military self- reliance; the battles Mao had fought with Chinese military leaders willing to conciliate the USSR for the sake of Soviet advanced weapons; the progress the Chinese had made toward developing their own weapons, including the first Chinese nuclear explo- sion only a month before Chou came to Moscow; and most important, Mao's colossal arrogance--all make such a request improbable. B. Subsequent Jockeying for Position Within a week of Chou's return to Peking and after high-level cahedi tations among the Chinese lead- ers, the Chinese party returned to the attack against the CPSU, to the great relief of the Albanians and certain of the pro- ~Chinese splinter parties abroad -108- which had evidenced alarm before and during the Sino- Soviet conversations. On 21 November, the CCP journal- Red Flag published an article entitled "Why Khrushchev Feil" which set forth in public the diatribe Chou had delivered in private, listing Khrushchev's alleged errors and crimes in systematic detail and warning the: new Soviet leaders-~clearly indicated although not yet directly named--that they would suffer Khru- shchev's fate unless they surrendered to Mao's demands all along the line. The Chinese now resumed their _ usual obstreperous conduct at international front meetings, resumed lobbying against Soviet participa- tion in the projected Second Bandung Conference (as already noted, Chen Yi made a hasty visit to Indonesia in late November for this purpose), began passing pes- simistic appraisals of the new Soviet leadership to their friends in the Communist movement, and began _ publishing news accounts designed to demonstrate-- for the benefit of such parties as the North Viet- namese and North Koreans--that the: Soviets had them- selves hypocritically violated the ban on polemics the CPSU had been demanding. After late October, however, the Soviets in fact confined themselves in foreign propaganda to restatements of those of their old substantive posi-. tions which they felt it still appropriate to en~ dorse, and avoided direct attacks on Peking. (This was not the case-with internal party education courses, which continued to use Khrushchev-era docu- ments denouncing the CCP.} ; Meanwhile, after digesting the results of their. talks with Chou and sounding the views of other party representatives in Moscow through mid-November, the CPSU in late November and early December began to send letters out to various parties "proposing"-- that is, announcing-~postponement of the 15 December Moscow preparatory meeting until 1 March. These letters were sent to the 25 parties which had origi- nally been invited to participate with the CPSU, ask- ing their views; but they were also apparently sent to a great many other parties as well, including some whose views the CPSU had not concerned itself with for a long time. -109- ; SREIC RET The CPSU in these missives gave the recipient its version of the current stand of the 26 parties re- garding the Moscow meeting. Ninéteen parties--the CPSU plus the parties of Australia, Argentina, Bulgaria, Brazil, Britain, Hungary, the GDR, West Germany, India, Italy, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland, Syria, the USA, Finland, France, and Czechoslovakia--were said to be "in favor of the meeting." The CPSU was being rather optimistic regarding Cuba and Britain, who as of late November were by no means firmly committed to attend; but in the end, these 19 were the parties which actually did meet in Moscow. Three partieés--China, Korea, and Viet- nam-~had. "let it be known that they do not wish to participate," presumably all reaffirming this in their recent ‘talks with the CPSU.in Moscow. Two par- ties~-Indonesia and Japan-~had, according to the CPSU, "requested additional information on the subject." Presumably, this meant that both (in mid-November) had - wanted to know what Chou's visit to Moscow would bring and what the subsequent Chinese stand would be. And one party--the Rumanians--had said that they would not participate unless all 26 parties were present. (The reaction of the twenty sixth party, Albania, was tactfully not mentioned by the CPSU.) Shortly before the 15 December deadline, the CPSU duly issued a short public announcement of the postponement until 1 March, and set about using the interval--as several clandestine reports indicated-- to try to persuade recalcitrants to attend. In the meantime, Soviet propaganda remained rather reticent about the meeting, to preserve.CPSU freedom of maneu- ver. , : The Japanese: As already related, and as the Soviets undoubtedly anticipated, the Japanese and Indonesian Communists each formally refused the new 1 March invitation in December, after the Chinese at- titude had become clear. The Japanese party's first refusal, on 10 December, was: followed by a more de- tailed reply on 16 January, in which the JCP acknowl- edged: that the CPSU was "partially, on: the install- ment plan, accepting out party's proposal regarding the content of an international meeting" (i.e., that - any such general conference should only be. concerned with uniting Communist efforts against the United States, and not with Soviet covert attempts to exert -110- authority over other parties or to write rules for the world movement), and that the: Soviets were there- fore “beginning to advocate agreement in deciding upon concrete unified action in the common struggle against imperialism with America at its head.” These acknowl-- edgements again demonstrated that a discernible gap between the Chinese and Japanese positions had already been opened up by January 1965. The JCP letter ve- hemently insisted, however, that the Soviets must give up completely their efforts to convene the pre- - paratoery meeting unilaterally (i.e., without Chinese consent). The JCP objected especially to continued Soviet efforts to use the unilaterally-summoned 1 March meeting as a "drafting committee" to write basic documents for a subsequent world conference. The CPSU did not answer this 16 January JCP letter, but at the last minute~-on 26 February--informed the JCP “orally" that the March gathering would not con-~. stitute the proceedings of. a "drafting committee" but only of a "consultative meeting."* In other words, the CPSU in effect surrendered to the second Japanese objection, but not to the first. It will be seen that subsequent JCP comment on the March meeting took note of this concession,and that while the Japanese party was still harshly critical of the Soviets (for other reasons), its position remained different from that of the Chinese. ‘ The Indonesians: The CPSU evidently thought (as we have already suggested) that its relationship with the PKI was slightly less cool than that with the JCP, and the Soviets tried a bit harder to in- duce the Indonesians to come to the March meeting. After the PKI on 24 December had laconically re- jected the CPSU letter of invitation, the Soviets waited two months, and then on 19 -Pebruary sent the Indonesians another letter pleading for PKI partici- pation, and specifying as an inducement (apparently for the first time to anyone) that the meeting would *On the same day, a New Zealand party representa- tive was summoned to the Soviet Legatton in Welling- ton, New Zealand to recetve a similar oral message from the CPSU. -111- a RR ee | 1 not be a "drafting committee" session to prepare docu- : | ments for a-future conference. Instead, the CPSU said that the‘ March meeting (1) should merely serve to ap- peal to all 81 parties that had met in 1960 to meet again as a "consultative conference" (2) which in turn would discuss the time, methods, participants, and agenda of a subsequent, "new international conference" proper. Even this concession, however, did not,satisfy. the PKI, which on 24 February. replied to the CPSU re- ! iterating its refusal to participate in the March meet- ing since the Chinese would not take part. North Vietnam and North Korea: The position “taken by these two Asian bloc regimes tipped the bal- ance regarding the holding of the March meeting. The CPSU by February 1965 probably had little real hope that the North Vietnamese and North Koreans could be persuaded to reverse their positions and attend, de-.. spite the Chinese boycott, although Kosygin meant to try when he visited them. At any rate, Kosygin hoped to persuade Hanoi and Pyongyang not to attack the meeting if it were held. When, as noted, he did ‘in fact win this promise from the two most important former allies of the Chinese against Khrushchev, the biggest single reason for the CPSU to abandon the meeting had been removed. The Cubans: ‘At the same time, the CPSU took steps to nail down Cuban participation in the March meeting, and the Chinese leadership was of great assistance in this endeavor. In the first stage, a delegation was sent to China from the November 1964 Havana Confer-~ ence of Latin American Communist parties, ostensibly intended to inform the Chinese of the conferences's pious endorsement of unity and of a cessation of po- _lemiecs and "fractionalism" in the world Communist movement and to ask the CCP to.adhere to these noble principles. This delegation was composed of repre- sentatives of certain of the pro-Soviet parties that had attended the conference, and was headed by the veteran Cuban Communist Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. When the delegation arrived in Peking in early De- cember, it was received by Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi with open hostility, contempt, and arrogance, as the Soviets had probably anticipated. Mao told Rodriguez that his delegation came as emissaries from the revisionists, said that the Havana Conference had -112- been organized by the Soviets to isolate the "Marxist- Leninists" and the Chinese in Latin America, inti-. mated that Castro had sold out to the CPSU, berated Castro for refusing to disseminate Chinese peSendanea in Cuba, mocked and belittled the importance of the 22 pro-Soviet Latin American parties which had par- ticipated in the Havana Conference, and defended the splitting of Communist parties by "true revolution- aries" aligned with the Chinese. This: episode was probably of decisive importance in getting.Castro to agree to send a representative to the March meeting, and from this point on Cuban relations with the Chinese, already fairly strained, became worse and worse. In January, Castro report- edly received a letter from the CCP expressing bitter . disappointment over Cuban concessions to the CPSU, and in early February, Castro made a last try to do business with the Chinese party, sending to Peking Che Guevara, whose views on many subjects were not far from those of the Chinese and who might have been thought to be better suited than any other Cuban leader to conciliate them. Guevara, however, received much the same treatment as Rodriguez, and found the CCP adamant. . Shortly thereafter, in mid- -February, another meeting was held in Havana between the Cubans and an undetermined number of pro-Soviet Latin American ; parties, to coordinate policy in preparation for the . i March meeting in Moscow. The February Havana gather- ing--which unlike the one in November was never pub- licized in any form--reportedly heard Castro declare that he could never agree with the Chinese’ because they wanted everyone to subordinate himself to them. . Next month, the Argentinian party delegate to the Moscow March meeting told the assembled delegates including Cuba's Raul Castro that the Latin American parties' position had been recently coordinated with the Cubans. ~113- ; The Rumanians: The CPSU also tried very hard to persuade the Rumanian party to attend, but was re- buffed each time. On 4 January, Bucharest sent a letter to the Soviets in response to the CPSU letter re- scheduling the meeting until March. The Rumanians set forth their reasons for continuing to refuse, re~ viewing in detail the difficulties they had had with Khrushchev in the past and implying that the new So- viet leaders had not greatly improved on his over- bearing conduct. The Rumanian party letter reportedly asked the Soviets why they still insisted on calling ‘the March meeting, and warned the CPSU’ that "no sin- gle party” was entitled to advance a claim to supe- riority in the movement. Asin the case of the PKI, in the third week of February the Soviets tried again with another letter to Bucharest pleading for Rumanian participation. The CPSU now declared that the meeting would be only "consultative," that there would be no “ideological discussions" and that no party would be condemned, and that the character of the meeting thus had been changed (an implicit admission that previous Soviet public statements under Khrushchev about the innocuous nature of Khrushchev's projected meeting had been false). The Rumanian party responded that the meeting was still.being convoked illegally, . and that the only proper solution for the CPSU would be to cancel it. The Rumanians also charged, inter alia, that the CPSU had given a cold reception to the Chinese delegation to Moscow in November, despite the allegedly conciliatory intentions with which the’ Chinese had come. The Rumanians were to elaborate on this charge later in 1965. The Italians and British: .The two remaining problems for the CPSU were the Italian and British parties. The Italian party had already committed it- self (in.the Togliatti memorandum and elsewhere) to attend the originally-scheduled December preparatory meeting, although not necessarily the world confer- : ence this meeting was intended to arrange. After the Soviets postponed the preparatory meeting until March, the Italian party wrote to the CPSU proposing another postponement, and followed up this helpful suggestion with exhortations to this effect in per- sonal contacts with Soviet leaders. The CPSU ulti- mately refused, however, and succeeded in holding -114-- ‘the PCI to its commitment. The British party, which had not committed itself at all, was more difficult. It has been reported that in initial meetings in No- vember between British CP representatives and the new CPSU. leadership, the British refused to take part in any meeting at which it was planned to discuss the international situation without Chinese presence. In January, the British party publicly went on record in favor of another postponement of the scheduled March meeting, and in late January British Communist leaders again held talks with the CPSU in Moscow which were described in the Soviet press as "“frank"-~that is, acrimonious. In the end, the Soviets finally ob- tained British Communist presence at the March meet- ing after changing the designation of the meeting from "preparatory" to "“consultative"--i.e., after eliminating the suggestion that it was presupposed that the meeting would produce a subsequent world Com- munist conference. , : : ‘To sum up: Thus the Soviets, who to avoid a humiliating loss of face wanted to hold the March meet~ ing in some form if this could possibly be done with-- out unacceptable political losses, had achieved at least the minimum necessary for this purpose in the maneuvering between November and March. Nineteen ; parties-~-including the doubtful and recalcitrant Cu- bans, Italians and British--had been lined up to at- -tend. The North Vietnamese and North Koreans would not attend, but would not attack the meeting; and the CPSU could be reasonably confident that the neutral Rumanians, who would not attend either, would also refrain from public condemnation of the meeting. The absent Indonesians and Japanese would be critical to some degree; but the CPSU could hope that Indonesian criticism would be tempered because of recent Soviet. overtures to the PKI (as we have seen, this is what , happened), and the CPSU sought to appease the JCP to some extent (with less success) by failing to invite the Shiga group to participate in its stead, as Khru- shchev may have originally wished to do.. Of the 26 invitees, only the Chinese and Albanians could be counted on for all-out, violent denunciation of the March meeting. This was a considerable initial - achievement for the new CPSU leadership, and demon- strates the degree to which the Soviets had already succeeded in introducing fissures in the old anti- Khrushchev coalition. 74 -115- '. the Soviets ‘would not call the 1 March meeting, but - Part of the price the Soviets paid for this achievement’ was the abandonment of the original CPSU hope to‘have the. March meeting directly organ- ize a world Communist conference and prepare policy documents for it. Before the March meeting began, the Soviets’ had already committed themselves to in- ‘terpose at least one additional stage on the road to a world conference--namely, an 8l-party "“consulta- tive meeting" which would make all decisions about _ the hypothetical future world conference. Since the CPSU had made this concession in advance, the major issue before the March meeting inevitably became whether or ‘hot to do anything concrete to bring about this 81- -party consultative meeting. As will be seen, the’ ‘Soviets were forced to yieie on this issue as well. : C. The Mao-Kosygin Interview In the meantime, Premier Kosygin in the second week of February 1965 held conversations with Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, and Chou En-lai. (Figure D.) It is clear from the accounts of these talks which have become availablé that Mao Tse- tung was supremely arrogant, sarcastic, and absolutely implacable. Chou and Liu vied with each other in arguing with Kosygin and contradicting him, and Mao amused himself by egging them on. Mao told Kosygin that Chou ahd Foreign Minister Chen Yi (whom Mao sardonically called "your supporters”"-~an allusion to past Soviet hopes for Chou) had predicted that that he (Mao) had said they would, and he sarcastic- ally urged them to do so. Mao went so far as to | chide the CPSU ironically for faulty tactics in cop- ing with him, Mao, and implied that he himself would have played the Soviet hand against Mao better: the Soviets‘should not have postponed the 15 December meeting, he said, since this was detrimental to their prestige. : Kosygin, for the record (which was subsequently used by the Soviets for the edification of many Com- Munist parties) repeatedly asked, as in November, that differences be put aside, polemics halted, and unity against "imperialism" established. Kosygin asked the ~116- Figure D Mao and Kosygin meet-in Peking, February 1965. 56677 6-67 oe , ! co TIAL [ass Rigen] Chinese to discuss conditions for a world Communist conference, and offered to open up the Soviet-con- trolled international journal Problems of Peace ‘and Socialism to both sides. (This suggestion waS taken up by the Poles at the March meeting in Moscow.) | Kosygin also claimed that the Soviets had made over- tures to the Albanians which had been unreasonably rebuffed; and for many months afterward Albanian edi- torials contained angry allusions to somebody's Claims that they were being’ unreasonable. Mao's response to all Kosygin's efforts was to announce that "we are now raising the price.” He reminded Kosygin that he had told the Rumanians (in early 1964) that the polemic might end in 15 years; but now he felt that it would have to go on for 10,000 years. He refused to discuss a world meeting. He ignored the suggestion regarding Prob- lems of Peace and Socialism. He asserted that "you must state that everything was a mistake," including specifically the CPSU open letter of 14 July 1963, the Suslov report at the February 1964 CPSU Central Committee plenum, and the program approved by the 22nd CPSU Congress. In short, he would accept noth- ing less than complete self-abasement by the CPSU. Mao attacked the Soviets for having announced a reduction in the military budget in December 1964 and he and Liu insisted that the Soviets were doing little to help the Vietnamese because they were “afraid” of the United States. Kosygin asked in turn why the Chinese did not help the North Vietnam-. ese "with aviation,” and Mao evasively responded that the North Vietnamese were suffering only "a few victims" (from U.S. bombing), and that this was "nothing serious." In a more general context, Mao - declared that "a situation of. revolutionary war must be created,” and in response to Kosygin's rejoinder | that this was for each country and party to determine, Mao insisted: "We must stimulate." : Mao predicted that within 10 to 15 years ten- i sion would further increase, the United States would attack the USSR and the CPR, and only then could the : Soviets and Chinese unite. The reasoning behind . | Mao's suggestion that tension would radically increase and war become likely after a decade was illuminated ‘ Tie when Kosygin remarked that the United States and the Soviet Union “decide the destiny of the peace," and Mao responded that "in. ten years it will not be so." Mao's implication was that a change in the world bal- ance of power would occur within 10 to 15 years as a result of ‘coming Chinese progress in advanced weap- ons technology, and that these Chinese advances would help bring about — a showdown with the United States. Mao's assertion that Sino- ~Soviet unity would only become possible as the result of a third world war was to be alluded to subsequently and attacked in many public statements by Soviet and East European leaders. Even Mao's suggestion that the USSR would then fight.on the side of the Chinese, however, was later. to be’ retracted and denied in several ‘CCP pub- lic and private statements beginning in thé fall of 1965, as the. Chinese came increasingly to maintain that the real U.S. threat was directed at them, not. at all at the Soviet Union, and that the USSR could not be counted on to support them when the final Chi- nese clash came with. the United States. D. The March Meeting The Mao-Kosygin interview played an important - role in clearing the way for the March meeting in Mos- cow. It served to clarify matters for any members of the Soviet leadership who may still have had illusions about the degree of Chinese intransigence, and who may have throught (a) .that the CCP could be cajoled into participation in this meeting (or some later vari- ation) through limited Soviet concessions, or (b) that the CCP could itself be induced to offer concessions in return for Soviet abandonment of the meeting. At the same time, the record of the interview could and .did serve as evidence to show wavering foreign Commu~ nists at the Moscow meeting, to bolster the CPSU leadership's contention that it was being more con- ciliatory than Khrushchev had been while Mao was not. The CCP's sabotage of Communist unity was also demon- strated to visiting Communists in Moscow by showing them documentation regarding Chinese obstruction of Soviet military assistance to North Vietnam. The Communist leaders who were shown these. ex- hibits included not only the delegates of the 18 parties -118- oy visiting the Soviet Union to attend the March meeting proper, but representatives of a good many other par- ties--particularly from Latin America--who were in Moscow concurrently to take part in private discus- sions and receive briefings. Many of these parties-- _ including some of the invitees to the March meeting--~ came to Moscow as much as a week before 1 March for preliminary negotiations with the Soviets~--and with each other--over what was to be done at the meeting. By the time the.meeting formally opened on 1 March, Suslov, Ponomarev, and the CPSU central com- mittee’s two international sections had put together three draft documents for consideration: a communi- que, a letter to be sent to the 81 parties that had participated in the 1960 conference, and a statement on Vietnam. The. statement on Vietnam--which condemned the United States without committing anybody to any specific action--caused comparatively little diffi- culty, before or during the meeting. The only oppo- sition to this statement appears to have come from the Polish delegation, which stated during the con- ference that "we at first experienced certain doubts as to whether it would be in order" but. that they were talked out of these doubts by the Cubans in private conversations on 28 February. Although the Polish representative claimed that his doubts arose solely because Vietnam was not a matter listed on the conference agenda, in fact the Polish party seems at this time to have been reluctant to deal with Vietnam (an attitude which later changed), and the Polish delegate's speech was much more cursory on this subject than were the speeches of most of the other delegates. - In contrast, Raul Castro's speech was particularly vehement about Vietnam,.and as will be seen, the Cuban attitude later was to grow more and more harsh and outspoken in criticism of both Chinese and Soviet caution in opposing the United States in Vietnam. The draft communique and draft letter by 1 March had already incorporated the views of many parties, notably the Cubans and Poles, and had been the object of much haggling between those.parties in the Soviet camp, led by the French CP, which wanted a tougher -119- ‘ line toward the Chinese and a firmer commitment for a new general international Communist conference, and those others in the Soviet camp, led by the Italian CP, which wanted neither. The CPSU was apparently in the middle, attempting to deal with both sides. Throughout the formal 1-5 March meeting, the main point at issue was whether anything concrete should be done to bring closer an all-party conference: specifically, whether or not to send out the draft let- let to the 81 parties suggesting the convocation of a "consultative preparatory conference" which in turn would "consider" whether to convene the all-party meet- ‘ing proper. The speeches at the March meeting show that the Italian and British parties were adamantly Opposed to sending the letter, that the Cubans were completely noncommittal, and that all others favored the letter.. . . ; However, the 15 parties which supported the CPSU's draft letter were themselves divided--depend- ing on their attitude toward the Chinese--in.what they’ wanted the letter to include and to accomplish. A few parties--notably the Poles--while supporting the draft as it stood (and as they had helped to write it) were opposed to the addition of anything that would tend to rush the preparations for the all-party conference. The Poles still professed to be hopeful that the Chinese could eventually be induced to ‘ soften their stand, despite the attitude shown in the Mao-Kosygin talks, and to this end proposed (as Kosygin had proposed to Mac) that the journal Prob- lems of Peace and Socialism be opened to all parties-- including the Chinese and their supporters--for the airing of differences in nonvituperative form.* . *Although thts proposal was endorsed by a few others at the meeting, tt ts not known to have been pursued subsequently by the Soviets, even in covert propaganda to other parties. As a practical. matter, the issue was moot, since the Chinese would not cooperate. -120- In contrast, a sizable bloc of parties were pressing for action, and some expressed bitterness and frustration at the delays which had already ac- ' curred. The French representative was sarcastic, and the CPUSA man.rather violent, in their refer- ences to.the attitude of the Italians and in their allusions to the concessions the CPSU had already made to the Italians. Eight parties--those of Finland, Bulgaria, France, the United States, Argentina, Hungary, India, - and Australia--explicitly stated or clearly implied that the. "consultative" conference of 81 parties proposed: in the draft letter must be held whether or not the Chinese and their friends agreed to attend. Several (including, surprisingly, the Hungarians, who in past years had sided with the Poles) advo- cated the amendment of the letter to specify a time period within which answers must be received and the conference organized. The CPSU appears to have rigged the order of the speakers to bring the maximum pressure to bear upon the Italians and British. The first two plenary debates--on the morning and afternoon of 2 March-- were devoted entirely to supporters of the CPSU draft letter and critics of the Italian position. At the third debate, on the morning of 3 March, the trouble- makers (the Italians, British, and neutral Cubans) ‘ were allowed to speak, with others following to re- but them. The Hungarians, who spoke immediately after the Italians, were evidently prompted by the CPSU to. urge the Italians to consult with their cen- tral committee concerning the views expressed by the majority and to consider revising their views ‘and agreeing to sign the letter. This was an old CPSU tactic, and had been used by the Soviets to bring pressure on the Chinese at the November 1960 Moscow conference--in vain. : , The tactic did not work this time, either. The Italians and British remained adamantly opposed, as the Italians put it, "to the organizational machine being put into gear before the political conditions are ripe for it"--that is, before the Chinese were willing to cooperate. Both parties reiterated that ~121- uncer no circumstances would they sign any letter. They intimated, however, that they were willing to have a brief reference to the possibility of an 81- party consultative conference at some unspecified -date included in the draft communique. In the end, this was done, and the draft letter over which the CPSU had expended so much effort was apparently ‘scrapped. Instead, the communique, signed by all 19 participants in the March meeting, was sent out to-all the parties with a covering note before publication on 10 March. Because the communique mentioned the-.possibility of a conference, the British CP representative, Palme Dutt, was report- edly reprimanded by his party leadership for sign- ing even the communique; and the British party sub-~ ‘sequently felt it necessary to issue a public state- ment again opposing any general conference without the Chinese. Along with the draft letter a Soviet plan was dropped which would have set up a permanent com- ‘mission in Moscow to handle correspondence with vari- ous parties concerning proposals relating to an all- party conference. The Albanians in February had charged publicly that the Soviets were hoping to make this commission into "a centralized body, an almost permanent forum of the Communist movement, to which they would impart the so-called function of watching over the unity of the movement" and which the CPSU could use to dictate its line to | other parties. The possibility that the Soviets would indeed try to do this struck too many raw nerves at. } the Moscow meeting for.the commission proposal to be ; acceptable. — The outcome of the Moscow meeting showed the CPSU clearly that a world Communist conference for the time being remained, as it had been for Khru- shchev, impossible to organize without unacceptable defections and political losses. For the next few j months the CPSU therefore, desisted from further ef- . - forts to promote a 1957 or 1960~type conference to ; lay down general guidelines for the world Communist -122- . Movement.* Instead, the CPSU took a-different tack, concentrating upon efforts to isolate the Chinese by. exposing Chinese rejection of appeals for “unity of action" to assist the North Vietnamese. To this ‘end, among other things, the Soviets fostered a steady stream of proposals--at first secretly, later pub- licly-~for multilateral meetings of various types with the Chinese (at: first tripartite, then bloc~ wide) on the specific subject of coordination of Support for the DRV. These proposals were advanced with the full knowledge and expectation that they would be rejected by the Chinese, and each successive ‘rejection further reduced Chinese influence; It was only in the fall of 1965, when the combined effect of Soviet and Chinese policies in this and other mat- ters had gone a considerable distance toward isolat~ ing the CCP, that the CPSU again began, cautiously to advance the world conference issue. *As already noted, this was far from the untversal view among the "Communist Loyaltst” parties around the CPSU, some of whom continued for some time to put pressure upon the Soviets to push for a general conference. The French party, for exzample--in dra- matte contrast to the reaction of the British party-- published the March meeting's communique under a head- tine, "For a New Internatiocal Communist Conference," and ran a Humanite article interpreting the communi- que as an endorsement of French views on the urgent need for a conference. ~123- A pr at ee posh ph a ce i INDEX to PART I AFRICA: new: Soviet leadership’ s attempt to curry favor of radical Africans during Congo episode, Nov-Dec 64, I 21-23. _AIDIT (Indonesia): reaction. to Khrushchev removal, I 44-47; rejects CPSU invitation to’ March meeting, I 49-50; complains to Soviets about Malaysia's UN _ Security Council seat,.I 51. " AKAHATA (Japan): 25 Oct 64 statement re Khrushchev ouster, I 40, 28 Dec 64 article refers to divisions in CPSU leadership, I 41-42. ALBANIA: JCP leaders's 5 Nov 64 Critical allusion to "extremist" Albanian stand on Khrushchev ouster, I 40-41; Albanian alarm during Sino-Soviet Nov 64 talks, and relief at subsequent resumption of CCP attacks on CPSU, I 108~109; Feb 65 Kosygin claim to Mao that Albanians had rejected overtures from post-Khrushchev Cpsu leadership, I 117; PKI Mar 65 public demand that Soviets "normalize" relations with Albania, I 50. ‘ ALICATA (Italy): signs militant PCI joint communique with Cubans dune 1965, I 68; criticizes Khrushchev foreign policy errors, July 1965, I 68. ANDROPOV (USSR): his CC section for liaison with bloc parties, I 85-86. ARGENTINA: Argentine CP representative's statement at Mar 65 Moscow maeneng about COordeneeten with Cubans, I-113. AUSTRALIA: ‘CP is encouraged By: CPSU in Mar 65 to increase ties and influence with PKI, I 50; at Mar 65 Moscow meeting, backs world conf with or without Chinese, I 121. BREZHNEV (USSR): attempts to mollify Chou En-lai at 7 Nov 64 Kremlin reception incident, I 75-76; his actions taken in Khrushchev's last year opposed to Khrushchev's policies, I 97-99; the range of poli- cies he has favored since Khrushchev's fall, I 99-100; I-1L BREZHNEV (USSR) (con't): his majority ideologically- oriented trend versus Kosygin's minority economically- oriented trend, I 74-77, 80-101; he holds talks with Chou, Nov 64, I 105-108. BRITAIN: CP opposes Khrushchev's plans for conference ; -without Chinese, fall 64, I 14; demands further post- . ponement of Moscow March meeting, Jan 65, I.115; helps obstruction of CPSU wishes: at the Mar meeting, I l21--: 122... CANADA: CP feels pressing need for formal break with cep, I 62. CASTRO (Cuba): attitude toward Khrushchev's policies ‘ and plans, I: 7-10; Nov 64 bargain with CPSU, I 20~ 21; final attempts to mollify Chinese, Jan-Feb 65, I 113. CHEN YI (CPR): alludes to Shelepin as strongest man in CPSU leadership, Nov 64, I 48; at. PKI request al- legedly urges Sukarno to ban BPS, Nov 64, I 52; lobbies with Sukarno against Soviet participation in Second Bandung, Nov 64, I 109. : CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION ~~Chinese Leadership: Chou En-lai refers CPSU Nov 64 proposals back to Mao, who rejects them, I 107; Chou leads walkout from Soviet banquet after being urged to oust Mao, I 107; Liu echoes Mao arrogant attack ‘on Dec 64 Cuban delegation, I 112-113; during Mao-Kosygin Feb 65 talks, Liu and Chou com- pete in arguing with Kosygin, to Mao's amusement, I 116. CHOU-EN-LAI (CPR): belittles effect of Goldwater can-. didacy on U.S. policy, July 64, I 12; argues with Mikoyan at Kremlim reception, 7 Nov 64, I 75-76; holds talks with CPSU in Moscow, Nov 64, I 105-108; vies with Liu in arguing with Kosygin during Mao-- . Kosygin talks, Feb 65; I 116. . | I | | | CONGO, LEOPOLDVILLE: Nov-Dec Soviet support for. air~lift, I 21-23; 28 Nov 64 demonstration over ' Congo at U.S. Embassy in Moscow breaks Khrushchev pattern of restraint, I 23, : I-2 $$“ For-veccer CUBA: Castro objects to Khrushchev policies re U.S., I 2; and re Chinese and world conference, I 7-10; the Nov 64 Havana conf and the Soviet deal with Castro, I 19-21; resultant Cuban clashes with Chi- nese, I 112-113; Feb 65 Havana meeting between Cu-~ ban and Latin American CPs, I 113; Cubans at Mar Moscow meeting -noncommital on conference issue, I 120-121, ; ; CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Leading E.E. advocate of hard line toward China, I 61. DANGE (India): adverse reaction to Khrushchev ouster, and adverse attitude of new CPSU leadership toward him, I 53-58. DE GROOT (Netherlands): past feud with Khrushchev, ‘ I 14; welcomes prospect of turn toward Stalinism after Khrushchev fall, I-70. DOKI (Japan): JCP organ prints his statement imply- ‘ing differences within the new CPSU leadership, Oct 64, I 40. DUTT (British) : reprimanded by his party for Signing communique of Mar 65 Moscow meeting, I 122. PRANCE: FrenchCP's desire and pressure for world Communist conf without Chinese, I 61~62; role at : 7 the Moscow Mar 65 meeting, I 119-121. 1 | | 1 GOMULKA (Poland): reported Nov 64 warning to CPSU not to make concessions to Chinese, I 106; Mar 66 remonstrances with CPSU in Moscow to head off 23rd CPSU congress formal move toward Stalin rehabilita- , tion, I 73. GUATEMALA: effect of Nov 64 CPSU concessions to Castro on balance of power within Guatemalan cP, I 20-21. : GUERRILLA WARFARE: harmful effects of adoption of. g.w. by Latin American CPs for CPSU efforts to re- gain control of those parties against Castro chal-~ lenge, I 20-31. TOP-SECRET ee ee GUEVARA (Cuba): his article reprinted by Chinese, fall 63, I 8; sets up Havana Conference in talks with CPSU in Moscow, Nov 64, I 19; leads vain mis- sion to Peking, Feb 65, I 113. HALL (U.S.): his Sept 64 polemical attack on Italian Communist Party's "opportunist" stand re Chinese, I 62-63; his Sept 64 defense of Khrushchev policy toward U.S. against attack by Togliatti Memorandum, I 65-66; his easy adjustment to post-Khrushchev - Soviet line toward’ U.S., I 69. HAN TOK-SU (N. Korea): early 65 statements to Chosen Soren leadership favorable to USSR, I 39, HAVANA CONFERENCES: of Latin American CPs, Nov 64, deal between Castro and Soviets, I 19-21; between Cubans and some L.A. parties, Feb 65, set stage for March Moscow meeting, I 113. ie HERMANSSON (Sweden): reason for his revisionist party's opposition to Khrushchev's tactics toward’ Chinese, I 14; profit from anti-U.S. sentiment over Vietnam war, I 68-69. HUNGARY: shows’ reluctance in 63-64 toward Khru- shchev's project of world Communist conf., I 16; shows surprising firmness at Moscow Mar 65 meeting in support setting deadline for world conf., and in bringing pressure on Italian party, I 121. INDIA: past vain Suslov efforts in 1950s to get CPI to build up its clandestine military capabili- ties, I 89; CPI/Left susceptibility in fall of 64 to toughening of Soviet line toward United States, I 1-2; reasons for CPI/Right hostile reaction to Khrushchev's ouster, I 53-55; CPSU longing to get rid of Dange, I 55-56; CPSU cultivation of CPI/Left, I 56-58; CPI/Right support at Mar 65 Moscow meet- ing for convening of world Communist conference, Io121. INDONESIA: PKI opposition to Khrushchev soft line toward U.S., I 1-2; reasons for Opposition to Khru-~ shchev plan for world conference without Chinese, I 4-5; Khrushchev warnings to Sukarno against PKI, I 6, 44; PKI reaction ‘to Khrushchev ouster, I 44-50; I-4 INDONESIA (ceon't):' hopes regarding evolution of new Soviet leadership; I 47~48; cultivation by CPSU, ; I 45, 50-51; anger at CPSU covert support for BPS, t I 52; rejection of CPSU letters pleading for attend- ance at Mar 65 Moscow meeting, I 111-112; restrained reac- tion to Moscow meeting communique, I 50; Mar 65 edi- torial warning to CPSU after Dange defeat in Kerala, I 58; critical reaction to Soviet suppression of Mar 65 Moscow demonstration, I 52. INTERNATIONAL FRONTS: ~-WFTU: Saviets reduce WFTU 1966 subsidies to In- dian party’s All-India Trade Union Confederation as means of clipping Dange's wings, I 56; Soviets make overtures to PKI in late 64-early 65 through visits to PKI's SOBSI trade union federation, 1. 45, 50, ITALY: 1963-1964 PCI demand for reappraisal of Khru- shchev policy toward U.S. and greater CPSU efforts to compete with Chinese among anti-U.S. radicals, I 3, 11-12; opposition to Khrushchev plan for world con~ ‘ference without Chinese, I 11; embodiment these points in Togliatti Memorandum, I 11-14; PCI's real motivation, I 12-13; Sept 64 CPUSA attack on PCI as apologists for Chinese, I 62-63; CPUSA attack on PCI's criticism of Khrushchev line toward U.S., I 65~66; PCI youth leader Occhetto attacks Khru- shchev foreign policy and peaceful coexistence in Mar 65 article, I 66-67; PCI May 65 delegation to DRV makes half-hearted defense of 20th CPSU Con- gress line against Le Duan attack, I 67-68; PCI right-wing leader Amendola attacked by CPSU in Kommunist, Jan 65, I 89; Océchetto claims Suslov support for denunciation Khrushchev revisionism, I 89; PCI joins in pressure on CPSU not to attack Khrushchev by name., I 70-71; joins in pressure on ‘CPSU over Stalin issue in 1966, I 72-73; tells CPSU to postpone Mar 65 Moscow meeting again, I 114-115; successfully obstructs CPSU plans at Mar 65 Moscow meeting, I 118-123. JAPAN: JCP opposition to Khrushchev line toward U.S., I 1-2; and to Khrushchev's plans for world conference without Chinese, I 4-5; worsening relations with I-5 JAPAN (con't): Khrushchev, I 6; reaction to Khru- shchev ouster, I 40-41; allusions to divisions in new CPSU leadership, I 40-42; disappointment at CPSU failure to abandon Japanese dissidents outright, I 42-43; cessation of CPSU direct attacks on JCP, I 44; Chinese belief Shelepin responsible for new CPSU ' tactics toward JCP,.I 97 footnote; JCP letter to CPSU rejects invitation to Mar 65 Moscow meeting, I 110-111. JOHNSON, President: Shelepin's Apr 65 statements attacking him, disowning any past Rbrusncuey com~ mitments to him, I 96, KADAR (Hungary): reported Nov 64 warning bs: CPSU not to make concessions to Chinese, I 106. KHRUSHCHEV (USSR): European party reaction to his ouster, I 59-60, 70-71; Asian party reaction to his ouster, I 24-58; the opposition to his 1963-64 plans for world Communist conference without Chi- nese, I 3-18; his past efforts to escape from pres- sures brought on him within CPSU leadership by Chinese using leverage of militant anti-U.S. par~ ties, I 77-80; his removal a fundamental blow to Mikoyan's position, I 81-82; his many past policy differences with Suslov, I B4- 95; his foolish ad- vancement of Shelepin, I 96; Shelepin' s attitude toward him and his policies, I 95-97; his foolish - return of Brezhnev to secretariat in July 63, I 98; Brezhnev's 1963-64 attempts to sabotage his U. Ss. and West German policies, I 98-99; Brezhnev's key role in his overthrow, I 97, 99; Brezhnev’ s sub- sequent modification of his policies, I 99-100; erroneous belief of some CPSU leaders that his re~ moval would bring more conciliatory attitudes from Chinese, I 105; Kosygin's Sept 65 conclusions that Sino~Soviet differences had been found to transcend Mao~Khrushchev personal differences, I 65; Italian Communist youth leader Occhetto'’s Mar 65 article attacking him and peaceful coexistence line, I 66~ 67; Le Duan's attack on him and 20th CPSU Congress in May 65 secret talks with Italian party, It 67-68. KIM IL-SUNG (N. Korea): welcomes Khrushchev ouster, I 36; Feb 65 Pyongyang talks with Kosygin, I 38. I-6 KOSYGIN (USSR): his Feb 65 visit to Hanoi, a decisive watershed in Soviet-DRV relations, I 31-34; his talks in N. Korea also a turning point for CPSU, I 38-39; his display of friend~ liness toward.u.S. inbassador evokes Chou En- lai protest at 7 Nov 64 Kremlin reception, I 75- 76; reasons for his personal préference for im- provement of relations with U.S., I 76-77; his _ views and actions as leader of économically-oriented ‘minority of CPSU leadership, I°82~83; his Feb 65 — talk with Mao fruitless because of Mao! s intransi-~ gence, I 116- 218. ‘LATIN AMERICA: “ 6pposition of Castro and Castroites. to Khrushchev soft line toward U.S., I 2, 7-9; and reluctance to back Khrushchev plans for world Communist conf without Chinese, I 9~10; Soviet~ Castro deal at Nov 64 Havana conference of L.A, parties, I 19-21; effect of deal upon Guatemalan party, I 20-21; Dec 64 delegation from conference greeted with hostility by Chinese, I 112-113; Feb 65 Havana,meeting of Cubans and some L.A. parties prepares wey for Moscow Mar meeting, = 113. LE DUAN (DRV) : ‘attacks Khrushchev in May 65 sept) ‘talks with Ttalian party delegation, I 67- 68. LIU SHAO-CHI (CPR) : echoes Mao's arrogant attack on Dec 64 Cuban delegation, I 112-113; during Mao- Kosygin Feb 65 talks, competes with Chou in arguing with Kosygin, I 116. MALAYSIA: Aidit 31 Dec 64 complaint to Soviet am- bassador over Soviet failure to prevent Malaysia from getting UN Security Council seat, I 51; So-. viet propaganda attempt to appeal to PKI interests re Malaysia, I 50-51, MALINOVSKIY (USSR): delivers tough anti-U.S. speech at 7 Nov 64 Kremlin reception, I 75; facetious pri- vate remarks about Vietnam in fall 65 and fall 66 possibly intended to reduce tensions, I 103; tells Chou En-lai in Nov 64 it is his turn to remove Mao, provoking Chou walkout from banquet, I 106. I-7 MAO TSE-TUNG (CPR): unlikelihood he would have sanc- tioned Chou request for nuclear weapons during Chou talks with CPSU in Nov 64, I 107-108; his rejection. of two proposals forwarded by Chou from CPSU, I 106- 107; his arrogant, hostile reception of Dec 64 Latin American delegation from Havana Conference, I 112-113; his implacable stand in Feb 65 talk with Kosygin, I 116-118; his suggestion Chinese weapons advances would change world balance of power in next 10-15 years, I 117-118. MIKOYAN (USSR): his argument with Chou at 7 Nov 64 Kremlin reception over Kosygin talk with U.S. Am- bassador, I 75-77; his policy views as the most lib- eral member of CPSU leadership on most issues, I 76- 77, 81; his position gravely weakened by Khrushchev ouster, leading to removal by end of 1965; I 81~82; sharp dichotomy between his views and functions -and Suslov's, I 84-85. “MIYAMOTO. (Japan): demands fundamental change in CPSU policies after Khrushchev fall, I 40; alludes to differences within new CPSU leadership, I 41. . NETHERLANDS: CP's past feud with Khrushchev, I 14; _ ‘welcomes prospect of turn toward Stalinism after Khrushchev's fall, I 70. NODONG SINMUN (N. Korea): 7 Nov 64 editorial sets forth N, Korean demands on‘CPSU policy, I 37; Dec 64 editorials indicate impatience with CPSU am- biguity, I 38. NORTH KOREA: opposition to Khrushchev's line toward U.S., I 1; opposition to Khrushchev plans for world Communist conf without Chinese, I 4~5; worsening relations with Khrushchev since late 62, I 6; Kim statement to Sov. ambassador upon Khrushchev's re- moval, IL 36-37; initial N. Korean estimate, I 37; Feb 65 Kosygin talks with Kim in Pyongyang a turn- ing point, I 38-39; promise to Kosygin not to attack March meeting, I 112. ; , NORTH VIETNAM: opposition to Khrushchev policy toward U.S., I 1; and toward Khrushchev plan for world Com- munist conf without Chinese, I 4~6; decay of Soviet NORTH VIETNAM (con't): relations with DRV 1963-64, I 6-7, 24-26; Sept 64 Soviet public criticism of DRV representative, I 26; DRV hopeful reaction to Khrushchev ouster, I 26-29; Pham Nov 64 visit to Moscow, I 27-29; Soviet antiaircraft guns seen near Hanoi in Jan 65, I 29; calculations within So- viet leadership on new policy toward DRV, I 29-31: Kosygin Feb 65 visit to Hanoi the turning point, I 31-36; N. Vietnamese agreement not to criticize. Moscow Mar meeting, I 31; 22 Feb DRV proposal for tripartite statement to warn U.S. put forward at | Kosygin suggestion, I 31-32; abortive Soviet mil- itary proposals to Chinese re Vietnam, Feb-Mar 65, I 32-33; Soviets burn fingers on negotiations is- sue, Feb-Mar 65, I 33-34; subsequent Soviet refusal to take political risks to try to make the war end, I 35-36. ; ‘ NOSAKA (Japan): JCP chairman alludes in Nov 64 to differences within anti-Khrushchev camp in world movement over significance Khrushchev removal, I 40-41. : OCCHETTO (Italy): Secretary-general Italian Commu- nist youth federation denounces Khrushchev soft pol- icy toward U.S. in Mar 65 article in his youth 7 organ, I 66-67; accompanies PCI delegation to Hanoi in May 65, I 67; returns from 1965 Moscow visit claiming Suslov agreement with his denunciation of Khrushchev revisionist. policies, I 8&9. PARTY LETTERS (for gists, see also chronological list at front of paper): -~CPSU-CCP: of 16 Feb 65, re Vietnam negotiations, I 33; of 25 Feb 65, re air corridor, I 32; of Mar 65 re China air bases, I 32; ; . ~-CCP-CPSU: of 27 Feb 65, re Vietnam negotiations, I 33; of°28 Feb 65, re air corridor, I 32; of Mar 65, re China air bases, I 32; --CPSU circular letter: of late Nov-early Dec 64, _ re postponement preparatory meeting, I 109-110. |. PHAM VAN DONG (DRV): his Nov 64 ‘visit to Moscow gives DRV some encouragement: re hangs in Soviet policy, I 27-29, : PODGORNYY (USSR) : his faipiy: liberal speech at 23rd . CPSU Congress is singled out for special praise — and. invidious comparisons by western CPs, I 73. POLAND: Polish attitude toward Khrushchev plan for . world Communist conference without Chinese, I 16; stand on conference issue.taken at Moscow Mar 65 meeting, I 120; stand taken against formal move ~ toward, rehabilitation of Stalin by 23rd CPSU Con- gress, I 73. PONOMAREV (USSR): ‘his central committee section for nonbloc affairs, organization and functions, I 85-87; helps set up Nov 64 Havana conference, I 19; -pos- sible differences between him and Suslov since 1965 over West European CPs, I 87 footnote. PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM (International, So- viet-controlled): Kosygin in Feb 65 interview with Mao offers to open up journal to Chinese, I 117; Poles reiterate this proposal at Mar 65 Moscow meeting, I 120; subject dropped thereafter because of chinese refusal, I 120 footnote. RED FLAG (CPR): 21 Nov 64 article “Why Khrushchev . Fell™ serves warning to new CPSU leadership, I 109. RODRIGUEZ (Cuba); leads Dec 64 mission to Peking from Nov 64 Havana Conference, meets hostile Chi- nese reception, I 112-113. : ROMANIA: reasons for opposition to Khrushchev plan for world conf without Chinese, I 15-16; correspond- ence with CPSU rejecting invitation to Mar 65 Mos- cow meeting, I 114, SHELEPIN (USSR): his savage hostility toward U.S., I 95-96; his disavowal of Khrushchev statements and commitments, I 95-96; probable allusions to him by Far Eastern militant CPs, I 96-97; Chen Yi's probable SHELEPIN (USSR): ‘allusion to him, I 48, 96; Chinese estimate of his role in shaping new CPSU policy toward JCP, I 97 footnote, SHIGA (Japan): rightist Communist dissident, fears abandonment by CPSU in Nov 64, I 42; CPSU continues to subsidize him but refuses. to recognize his party, I 42-43. Ae SINO-SOVIET BORDER: implausible. Soviet allegations about Chou En-lai border claims during Nov 64 talks, ‘I 107-108; Soviet use of Chinese border issue as argument for stronger anti-Chinese stand, I 108. SOVIET INTELLECTUALS: their use of pressure by Euro- pean CPs to protest Sinyavsky-Daniel trial and oppose - rehabilitation of Stalin, I 71-74. oa STALIN (USSR): Indonesian party's hope for a gradual CPSU return to Stalinist policies, I 47-48; Dutch ‘party's similar hope, I 70; fears of all other Euro- pean parties about possible Soviet return to Stalin- ist methods, I 69-74; pressures brought over question of denouncing Khrushchev by name, I 70-71; over Si- nyavsky~Daniel case, I 71-73; over a move toward , Stalin rehabilitation at 23rd CPSU Congress, I 72-73; no outcry over subsequent cautious CPSU steps toward more balanced picture of Stalin, I 72; Brezhnev the leading force behind partial Stalin rehabilitation, I 100. . SUKARNO (Indonesia): warned by PKI before Sept 64 . USSR visit about CPSU hositlity to PKI, I 44; Khru- shchev protests to him about PKI influence on his foreign policy, I 44; he bans anti-Communist BPI in Dec 64 after reported intercession by Chen Yi, I 52. SUNDARAYYA (India): general secretary of CPI/L, writes early 65 letter to Chinese apparently con-— nected with Chinese annoyance at CPI/L conduct, I 57; effect on him of later visit to USSR, I 57. SUSLOV (USSR); sets up Nov 64 Havana Conference in preliminary Moscow talks with Guevara, I 19; his past struggles with Khrushchev, I 84-95; his sharp . : Tor as x a SUSLOV (USSR) (con't): contrast with Mikoyan, I 84- 85; his role in supervising work of liaison sections of central committee, I 85-87; one possible differ- ence of view between him and Ponomarev, I 87 footnote; his differences with Khrushchev over line toward U.S., I 87-88; over degree of emphasis on "parliamentary path," I 89-90; over Yugoslavia, I 90-92; over 1963- . 1964 drive for world conference, I 92-94; his Feb 64 report to central committee on China, I 94-95; he be-. comes persona non grata with Chinese, I 95. SWEDEN: reason for revisionist CP's opposition to Khrushchev plan for world conference without Chi- nese, I 14; domestic profit this party has gained . from use of anti-U.S. theme, I 68-69. TOGLIATTI (Italy): his opposition in 63-64 to Khru-~ shchev's alienation of Far Eastern militant parties and Khrushchev's plans for world conf without Chi- nese, I 3, 11-14; the. Togliatti Memorandum of Aug 64, I 11; his appraisal of effect of Goldwater candidacy on U.S. policy is more radical than Chou En-lai's, I 12; the real motivation for his line, I 12-13; his heirs in PCI seize on his death to pub-.- lish his memorandum, I 13-14; effects of this PCI s blow against Khrushchev, I 14; North Vietnamese suspicions that Soviets killed him, I 13 footnote. TRIBUNA LUDU (Poland): Feb 66 endorsement of 20th CPSU Congress gocterons offers weenrag not to tamper with them, I 73. 23RD CPSU CONGRESS: foreign CP pressures brought on CPSU to prevent congress move toward rehabilitation of Stalin, I 73; letter to congress from Soviet in- tellectuals cites foreign parties' opposition to such rehabilitation, I 72; Sholokhov attack at con-~ gress on Soviet liberals and foreign parties' inter- ference, I 73; Podgornyy speech object of special - foreign praise, invidious comparisons, I 73. UNITED STATES: CP chairman's Sept 64 denunciation of Italian party's attack on Khrushchev's policy toward United States, I 3, 65-66; and of PCI refusal to — support Khrushchev measures against Chinese, I 62-63; CPUSA easy adjustment to post~-Khrushchev CPSU line re United States, I 69; CPUSA demands at Moscow Mar 65 meeting for early world conf, I 121. I-12 ate SSCREL ea UNITED STATES, SOVIET POLICY TOWARD: hostile attitude .of anti-U.S. militant Communist parties toward Khru- shchev line re U.S. and U.S. government, I 1-10; re- lations between Khrushchev's 63-64 policy toward U.S. and his 63-64 drive for world Communist conference without Chinese, I 3-18, 79-80, 92-95; hostile atti- tude of North Vietnamese to Khrushchev line re U.S., I 24-26; hostile Castro attitude, I 2, 8; signifi- : cance of Aug 64 Togliatti Memorandum as Italian CP pressure on Khrushchev to toughen line toward-U.S. to conciliate anti~U.S. Communist militants, I ll- 13; Khrushchev struggles in past years against pres- sures created within CPSU leadership by Chinese charges about his policy toward U.S., I 77-80, 84-95; the Apr 60 Chinese offensive and the May 60 U-2 incident, I 77-78, 87-88; past Khrushchev steps to appease the Communist militants, I 77-78; aspects of Khrushchev's ‘interpretation of the "peaceful coexistence" line un- acceptable to the militants, I 78-79; purpose and aftermath of the Cuban missile venture, I 79; Khru- * shchev's struggles with Suslov over U.S. and related policy, I 84-95; the Yugoslav issue in relation to Soviet policy toward the U.S., I 90~92; Brezhnev's disruptive actions in Khrushchev's last year, I 97- 100; the divisions in the post-Khrushchev CPSU lead- ership on policy toward the U.S., I 74-77, 80-101; the actions to conciliate anti-U.S. Communist ‘mili- - tants ordained by the new ideologically-oriented politburo majority, I 19~58; views of the economic- ally-oriented minority led by Kosygin, I 74~77, 80-83; unwillingness of new CPSU majority after Feb 65 mis- adventure over Vietnam negotiations to take political risks to make Vietnam war end, I 33-36; continued unwillingness to run serious risk of military con- flict with United States, I 101~104; the profitable new Soviet line of promoting "unity of action" in Opposing United States over Vietnam, I 122-123; pres- ent factors in attitude of CPSU politburo majority. toward U.S., I 117-126; the peculiar nature of the Aeroflot agreement, I 99-100 footnote. VENEZUELA: possibility that this CP would imitate Cubans if Castro refused to.attend Khrushchev's planned world Communist conf without Chinese, I 9; assumption of power in Venezuelan CP by Castroites in recent years as result of party's adoption of violent tactics, I 20-21. I-13 WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE: opposition to- Khrushchev's plans for, I 3-18; CPSU postponement of 15 Dec 64 preparatory meeting to 1 Mar 65, I 109-110; CPSU ef- forts to secure participation of waverers in prepara- - tory meeting, I 110-116; CPSU change in designation of-meeting from preparatory to consultative, I 11ll, 112, 115-116; CPSU battle with Italians and British at the March meeting, I 118-123; outcome of March .meeting abandons world conference for time being, To Ad22ai23., WU HSIU-CHUAN (CPR): probably chief, possibly first deputy chief, CCP central committee international liai- son dept, accompanies Chou En-lai in Nov 64 visit to Moscow, I 76. a : YUGOSLAVIA: reasons for opposition to Khrushchev's plans for world conference, I 15; bad relations with Suslov, I 90-92; struggle within CPSU over policy toward Y. related to Soviet policy toward United States, I 90-92.