TOP-SECRET COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY (1977 Prepared by the Command History Branch . ee Office of the Joint Secretary : Headquarters CINCPAC CAMP H. M. SMITH,-HAWAI 96861) 1978 TOP-SECRET. iii SECRET SECTION II--THE SOVIET THREAT The CINCPAC Assessment! pa apis The CINCPAC assessment of the Soviet threat in 1977 differed . ‘little from the assessment for 1976, except for the continuing qualitative improvement in Russian weapon systems. The Soviet Union was the only world power which had the potential to challenge the United States militarily. Detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Sino-Soviet con- frontation, steps toward normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC), Russian economic progress, and Strategic parity tended to reduce the probability of overt Soviet moves against the United States. The Soviets were expected to continue to use "detente" as a means of achieving their political, economic. and military objectives as well as to'enhance ‘their position in negotiations with the United States, (SANOFERNT -Militarily, the Soviet Union was expected to continue to empha- Size the research and development of superior forces. The Soviets placed high priorities on modernization of their tactical air forces, their anti-submarine warfare (ASW), their sea control téchnology, anti-satellite and advanced air defense systems, surveillance system, and command and control systems. A highly effective Soviet naval. force was designed to. challenge U.S. control of the seas’ and was capable in some areas of achieving that goal. Soviet submarines and aircraft were a particular problem; e.g., DELTA ballistic missile submarines équipped with a 4,900 nautical mile missile were assigned to the Soviet Pacific Fleet and more were expected. AS/NOEBGRNT Continued development and operational deployment of new genera- tions of aircraft and missiles gave the Soviets the capability to maintain local air superiority in many areas, as well as the ability to support ground forces. Tactical air forces were being modernized with new third generation tactical fighters having significantly improved range and payload, along. with improved . Tow altitude/high speed ordnance delivery capability. The potential of Soviet tactical air forces for conventional offensive operations against U.S. forward bases in Japan and Korea continued to increase... The Soviets had also developed improved air-delivered weapons including tactical air-to-surface missiles. Extensive investinents in ground radars and command and contro] systems, com- bined with modernization of their interceptor force, improved their capability in all aspects of air defense. Long range and intermediate range naval strike ee eS ee Ne mS eA Se Oh LS SS Nh SA SE Ch tm hth GED roy et ye me my es ee iy ed eS a Se enh ew nt em ms tm SECRET” aircraft capabilities had been increased by the introduction of the new air- to-surface missile systems. (S/NOEORNY —CINCPAC expected the large Soviet ground force to continue its modernization with new tanks, heavy mobile artillery, helicopters, missiles, armored vehicles and smal] arms. Because of the continuing Sino~Soviet border confrontation, the Soviet Union was expected not only to maintain but ae to increase its strength along the Chinese border. (S/NOEGRHF” In support of political and economic objectives | in the Pacific- Indian Ocean area, CINCPAC expected Soviet naval and long range air reconnais~ sance and ASW presence to continue. Russia was also expected to increase its capability to interfere with the air and sea lines of. communications {LOC) by establishing its own presence, including port and base facilities, in the. area. ‘(S/NOEORHY ' Soviet interpretation of peaceful coexistence and detente. included the support of local armed conflicts, intimidation through disptay of military might, propaganda , economic pressures, the use of surrogate. forces when appropriate ‘in "wars of liberation", and. the threat of nuclear war, Comparison of “U.S.-Soviet Forces! SS The most challenging threat to the Pacific Conmand (PACOM) was believed by CINCPAC to be a conventional worldwide war with the.Soyiets accompanied by ‘a North Korean attack into South Korea. The Soviets. probably. would accept the. risk of a two-front war, and would engage PACOM forces, in theater., Additionally, the Soviets probably would support a North Korean attack into the. ROUEN: 45) Soviet ground forces deployed ‘at the outset ‘of a war in he eagtarn part of Russia would be vastly superior in numbers to PACOM ground forces. However, it was unlikely that direct confrontation between United States, and. Soviet ground forces would occur. ; (S% Soviet combat tactical assets in the PACOM area consisted, of. some .. nine ‘hundred and fifty aircraft. Significant, numbers of their newest. fighters were deployed to the Pacific theater. In addition, one hundred. and eighty. - bombers were also khown to be deployed in the: ‘Soviet Far East. _By. comparisan,. the fighter/attack aircraft of the U.S. Air Force and the. U.S. Navy ‘in the . theater ‘consisted of 180 and 384 respectively. Marine air assets included..197 fighter/attack aircraft. In addition to the Russian. combat aircraft strengths in the maritime provinces, this force was backed up by some 160 operational surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. Given this threat, U.S. forces would be It I I | SECRET capable of providing for the air defense of U.S. territory and bases and assist- ing in the protection of vital LOC, but would be hard pressed to conduct exten- sive conventional offensive operations against the Soviet Far East forces or to prevent reinforcement of Warsaw Pact forces. (Si In the PACOM area, the Soviet Pacific Fleet had some 112 submarines and 64 principal surface combatants. Soviet naval forces were expected to attempt to interdict sea LOC and deny local sea control. By comparison, PACOM naval forces: included 6 aircraft carriers, 32 submarines and 80 principal sur- face combatants. United States naval strength and flexibility stemmed from its capability to deploy rapidly at least five carriers with 315 fighter/attack aircraft. The U.S. naval task groups would be subject to attack by Soviet sub- marines, aircraft armed with anti-submarine missiles, and elements of the Soviet surface fleet equipped with anti-ship missiles. In such a two-front conventional war scenario, PACOM efforts to protect essential LOC against the Soviets would be greatly reduced if substantial PACOM forces were redeployed to support NATO, In this case, the PACOM could provide p¥fotection only for sea LOC linking. the Continental United States with Hawaii, the Panama Canal and Alaska. ‘Soviet Pacific Fleet Dispersal (3. The Soviet Pacific Fleet was concentrated in Vladivostok ‘and péenenavs lovsk. Patterns of deployment’ inéluded “fwd YANKEE" ‘hucléar ballistic missile, submarines (SSBN) to the eastern Pacific and occasionally one DELTA SSBN age “the Northwest Pacific. Other areas of intermittent submarjne patrols included north ‘of Midway the Philippine Sea, the east’ Tthina Sea. and the. Indian Ocean,. Intelligence collectors maintained patrols off Kwajalein, Guam, the east. China Sea and sometimes Diego Garcia, the Hormuz Strait, and the U.S. West Coast. Hydrographic ships operated throughout the Pacific Ocean, the Philippines, east China and Arabian Seas. Although Soviet surface combatants normally operated in the area of VIadivostok and Petropavlovsk, they also deployed to the Indian Ocean and occasionally conducted exercises in the Philippine Seat (S). The Soviet Pacific Fleet's powerful force of 77 attack submarines, armed with cruise missiles and torpedos and backed by 64 principal surface combatants, posed a significant threat to Japan s sea LOC and to U.S. presence in Asia. The 32 Soviet ballistic missile Submarines were capable of strategic nuclear strikes against Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines. DELTA-class, SSBNs were capable of strikes on most (of the U.S. mainiand. from their homg waters off Petropavlovsk and Viadivostok. The Soviets also possessed inter- mediate and long-range bombers which posed a conventional and nuclear threat Oe we me ee ge ae a ee Fe ee ee ee I yO SF ls SU an hE an cnt hs an ee ae Pa ms se nb te fs ee Oe to a Ow 1. “IPAC:Point Paper, 29 Sep-77, Subj: Soviet Naval Presence in the Pacific. | SECRET 89 SECRET to all of Japan and to U.S. forces throughout all of Asia. Far East naval aviation in particular posed a serious threat to Japanese ports, harbors, naval forces and maritime LOC. (Sf There were many examples of fleet and air activity within the theater during the year. For example, on 7 January. 1977 two Soviet aircraft conducted intelligence collection missions against U.S. facilities: in the. Marianas: Feikands. The aircraft were spotted by U.S. high frequency direction finding equipment before they penetrated the Guam air defense identification zone (ADIZ), and were intercepted and accompanied by U.S. aircraft during their flight in the Guam ADIZ. The Soviet aircraft were operating without running Tights and, in addition to U.S. surveillance aircraft, one B-52 was airborne, This, had. bean the first penetration by Soviet aircraft. of the. Guam ADIZ since. "13 May - 19763% ‘(QF On 20 December 1976, 30-40 Soviet sstiGis landed at an atoll in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Istands, asking if the island had ties with the United States and if U.S. maneuvers were conducted on the island. In February 1977 the U.S. State Department directed the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to submit an oral statement regarding this incident to the Soviet Foreign Ministry. The Government of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands had asked the Depart- ment of State to invite the attention of the Soviet Government to the unauthor- ized landing of Russtan seaman in the Trust Territory. The Embassy was ~ requested to express ‘the concern of the Government of the Unites neers ee ing such unauthorized landings. In June 1977 the Commander of the U.S. Third Fleet was..informed by the Scripps Institute that one of their vessels, conducting bio-chemical ocean- ographic research north of Hawaii, had been harassed by a Soviet vessel.. The Scripps Institute reported that the Soviet vessel had attempted, during the. night, to retrieve instruments which had been placed in the water by the Scripps vessel. The Scripps vessel sent a boat to the Soviet ship in an, attempt to resolve the situation; however, with no interpreter, that attempt failed. The Scripps Institute signified its concern that the instruments which had been successfully placed in the water and were scheduled to rise.to.the surface later ‘in June would be retrieved by the Russian vessel, They were advised by the commander of the U.S. Third Fleet to obtain photographs and to document ail actions which were considered harassment.4 1. TPAC. Potnt Paper, 16 Nov 77, Subj: The Threat. “anaiast ‘Japaiv “anaes ekg ean ‘Posture. — 2. CINCPAC ALFA 65/080436Z Jan 77. 3. SECSTATE 039490/222112Z Feb 77, which cited CINCPACFLT 012100Z Feb 77. 4, CINCPACFLT 240131Z Jun 77, which transmitted COMTHIRDFLT 232337Z Jun 77. SECRET 90 wm 1 eens ti) [eed ——we —— Atay i ame, pon — oes — — — he SECRET Carine In August 1977 the: Strategic Air Command’ (SAC) advised of the addition.of ona YANKEE Class Soviet SSBN in the Pacific arid ‘two. in the’ Atlantic and, its concern about the permanency of: such deployments . SAC postulated ‘that if ‘the, extra deployments were related to a Russian naval alert exercise, ’ con- ducted from 29 July to 6 August, the extra deployments would appear to be “~~ one-time occurrences. SAC intelligence considered that the addition of two or three ‘SSBN in the patrol area for the exercise was a realistic stimilatjon ‘OF SSBN. operations-in a crisis. situation, because the Soviets would: robably augment the, day-to-day force of YANKEES on station during a pertdd of increased tension. However, if the larger force of YANKEES on patrol were maintained, a change in the Soviet's overall strategic targeting philosphy could have occurred. Although a shift to greater reliance on submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) could be a result of a temporary decrease in ICBM: capability because of launch site conversions, it waS also possible that the Soviets felt the need for more land-targeted SLBMs even without their temporary decrease in ICBMs. Soviet Penetration in the Southwest Pacific In 1976 ‘growing evidence From diplomatic and intelligence sources of Soviet and PRC initiatives to establish close diplomatic and economic ties with the developing States of the Southwest Pacific had caused CINCPAC to request a staff analysis ofthe situation. The military value of these island nations accrued because they were astride or near sea and air LOG not only to Australia and New Zealand but also to the mid-East. It was important, stated CINCPAC, that Russia or ‘any other unfriendly power be denied a significant foothold from which these. vital LOC could be interdicted.2 (BY The reasons for Soviet interest in the Southwest Pacific were summa- rized in a paper by the Intelligence Center of the Pacific (IPAC) in December 1977. One possible reason for Soviet interest was the need to exerctse the world-wide presence it:-perceived as the prerogative of a super power of equal rank to the United States. Another factor was Soviet competition with China, since the PRC had. diplomatic relations with Fiji, Tonga, Western Samoa, and Papua New Guinea. Port calls in the area by Soviet merchant and cruise ships had doubled since 1974. Regular merchant shipping services had been established with Australia, and Russia had shown interest in establishing the same services with New Zealand and Papua New Guinea.. By the end of 1977, there were between eight and 30 Soviet fishing trawlers operating off New Zealand. From the mili- tary standpoint, IPAC considered that Russia needed to acquire global know] edge of the oceans in order to broaden its options for contingency deployiafits of” its SSBNs: Moreover, the area covered the southern flank of LOC between the Oe oe ee one re ty een os mn 0 0k Ym, m0 ey Oe may ae nO fae a SO eR eet 8 PN PP fs OP MED Ha tO 1. $S0.SAG. 112030Z.Aug 77 (BOM). : 2. CINCPAC Command History 1976, Vol. I, Chapter II, pp. 82-88. SEGRET 91 SEGRET United States and Japan, between the United States and forward bases in the Philippines, Guam, and the Marianas Islands, and between United States and Australia and New Zealand. There was also the increase in intelligence col+ lection which could result from the use of Soviet aircraft, merchant: and research ships in the SOuE ness Pacific. (3) Soviet activity in the Southwest Pacific first occurred in 1947 when Russia began whaling in Antarctica. Little additional activity, abart from: the establishment of scientific research stations in Antarctica, was shown until Fiji and Tonga became independent in 1970. Since then Russia had estab- lished diplomatic relations with Fijt, Tonga, Western Samoa and Papua New’ Guinea. IPAC considered that the Soviets would continue to approach the South Pacific. countries, and provided the following recapitulation of Soviet activity as of the end of 1977:2 Fiji. In 1970, and again in 1974 and 1975, the Soviets reportedly offered economic assistance in return for shipping and port facilities. In 1971 the Soviets also offered schol- arships. None of these offers were accepted. In June 74, diplomatic relations were established. In 1977, the. Soviets reportedly attempted twice to establish a permanent missiofi (PRC has had a mission in Suva since May 76 and an embassy since May 77). The latest attempt in late Nov was. firmly. rejected by Fiji who claimed it was satisfied with present — conditions whereby the Soviet Ambassador in: Australia is accredited to Fiji. Fiji's suspicions have been underscored by Soviet eealinge with the often disruptive Fiji dock MarKSY er union, Tonga. Diplomatic relations were established in Oct: 75. In Apr 76 and in May 77, the Soviets offered economic assis- tance including airfield upgrading, fisheries assistance. and provisions of aircraft on concessionary terms. To date, nothing has resulted from these offers. ..: Western Samoa. Diplomatic relations were established in Jul 76. In the same month, the USSR proposed an agreement which included a fish cannery, fishing vessels and perhaps a 1. TPAC Point Pabiee 15 Dec 77, Subj: Reasons for Soviet Interest in the Southwest Pacific. 2. IPAC Point Paper, 15 Dec 77, Subj: Soviet Penetration in the Southwest Paci fic. SECRET 92 ote ay Remmi a end re ie ——— ——f : — SECRET dry-dock in return for the use of Western Samoa as a fishing base. In 1977, the Soviets reportedly offered 50 scholar- ships; these too were not accepted. Papua New Guinea. Diplomatic relations were established in May 76 after more than a year of negotiations. The USSR's attempts to establish a resident mission in Port Moresby have been firmly rejected. The-USSR has indicated its interest in economic and cultural cooperations, fishing, forestry, ship- ping projects and hydroelectric schemes. In mid-Jul 76, a senior PNG minister visited the USSR. -In 1977, the Soviet Council of Trade Unions reportedly offered funds to the Port Moresby Council of Trade Unions to establish an SCENT, center; these were not accepted. The Africa-Indian ceaan Area , . (U) Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean had increased since the - first actual deployment in 1968 untit 1972. Since that time the Soviet force level. had remained nearly constant. These activities, and the establishment of Soviet facilities and bases in Somalia, were discussed in several previous CINCPAC histories. By April 1977 the Soviets had completed construction on a new airfield at Berbera with.a runway exceeding 14,000 feet. This runway was long enough to accommodate Soviet long-range reconnaissance and transport aircraft. Construction of another airfield. at Dafet, ‘about 58 miles northwest of Mogadiscio, had also been completed. This runway was. over 10,000 feet’ long and Soviet MIG-21. aircraft were based there. The Soviets had also begun con- struction of SAM sites at Berbera and at Hargeisa in northern Somalia. © Suffi- cient, equipment was available for.at least four jaunch positions at Berbera and six at-Hargeisa. Prior to these developments, only Mogadiscio had ‘SAM sites. It was estimated that approximately 2,500 to 3,000 Soviet personnel were in Somalia. About 1,500 of those were believed to be mtlitary advisors and en working with the Somalia defense forces down to 1ONER unit levels. In April.1977 the. JCS requested CINCPAC's views on the subject of. arms control in, the Indian Ocean area. In reply, the CINCPAC Director for Plans provided a summary of U.S. security interests. and objectives in the Indian Ocean area, Regarding the facilities available to the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean, he noted that Russian seaborne logistics support was suffi- cient to maintain the readiness and mobility of the normally sepioves Russian ey a te an ME aD SS a0 OY NT GS tem cue SEED a ON cam ES lO oad SED US Ga OS Mo em A See OP (eA ae Ok te ln a la Bt ae ek Pe ee te One yy Oe ae 1. DIA 832-132261Z Apr 77. SECRET 33 SECRET™ naval squadron in the Indian Ocean. At that time, the support facilities at Berbera supplemented the capability and gave the Soviets the potential to increase the Indian Ocean force levels. In addition to the facilities at Berbera, the Soviets also had access to airfields at Mogadiscio, Hargeisa, Chisimaio and Dafet. Limited logistic support, such as fuel and subsistence, was also available in other Indian Ocean countries, including India, Iraq, South Yemen, Mauritius, and Sri Lanka. Russia also had a large merchant fleet which could be. used to augment military logistics vessels in support of Middle East/Indian. Ocean operations. The..typical Soviet presence: in'the-fhdian Ocean was comprised.of a naval $quadron consisting of at least’ one submarine, as many as three destroyers, a small amphibious contingent; and assorted auxiliary vessels as well as scientific research and merchant ships. On the other hand, the U.S. Middle East Force, consisting of a flag ship and‘two rotational des- troyers, was the only permanent U.S. presence in and around the Indian Ocean. Task Forces from the PACOM conducted an average of three deployments to the Indian Ocean per year, In addition, intelligence-gathering ships were occa- sionally deployed and maritime air patrol/logistics flights were made period- ically to Nairobi, Masirah, Bandar Abbas, and Diego Garcia. Thts periodic and modest deployment of PACFLT naval forces limited sea/atr“control capability to the immediate vicinity of deployed forces except for air strikes ‘from‘carriers. It was impossible for the United States forces to patrol all LOC and ‘choke - A points. emul tanesusly even on the surface and the ‘U.S;. ASW capabl ity was limited.1 : | aT By. November 1977 the Siviee indian beads naval feiadieh hiad been’ reduced from the norma] twenty ships to eighteen. IPAG speculated that this’ reduction in number could be related to the U.S.-Soviet Indian Ocean arms — limitation talks. Nearly all Soviet units continued to deploy from: the Pacific fleet bases via the Malacca Strait despite the reopening of the'Sv@z Canal,” which provided a potential route for rapid reinforcement of the Indian Ocean squadron. IPAC noted that Somalia had ejected the Russians in rétaliation’ for their support of Ethiopia, but the loss of access to the Somalian facilities — was not expected to preclude the maintenance of Some. level of ‘presence. in ne Indian Ocean.2 >{Saererny Soviet naval activities in the Indian Ocean were, of course, under U.S. surveillance. .One,example of such activity: involved’a SovTét:q@man- eorenile research. vessel which ‘appeared ee be Preeking: a UsS,. Submierifet “5 Oe ee Le ee jin dase eos co i ew ts a ko gs 1. CINCPAC 1307522 Apr 77, RADM McClendon to VADM “Hannifin (BOM). (The sub- ject of arms control in the Indian Ocean area is discussed in- the Political- Military Chapter: ) 2. IPAC Point Paper, 11 Nov 77, Subj: Soviet Naval Activities in the Indian Ocean, ; SEGREL 94 ne a a nn a ne oi sou Intelligence sources speculated that the mission of the Soviet vessel was to Jay an automatic buoy station (ABS) adjacent to Timor Straits, so that the ABS could be used to chart an underwater route into the eastern portion of the Indian Ocean, as well as to provide navigational assistance to Soviet submarines. It could also be used to position a vertical/horizontat/bottom sonar array to monitor U.S. submarine activity. The ABS.was believed to have the ability to collect, store and transmit such data. Although the Russians claimed that the purpose of the vessel was to study tidal waves, U.S. intelligence sources asses- sed the activities of the vessel to be unrelated to such an objective. The Soviet research vessel was observed to be operating in two separate positions some 200 nautical miles apart and some 50 nautical miles off the south Timor coast. Both these positions were astride the one-thousand meter bottom contour line, and had a geographic relationship to the southern exits/entrance to the strategically significant deep water Ombat/Sela Straits. If the assessment of the mission of the vessel was correct, it was speculated that Soviet efforts to monitor traffic into the Indian Ocean which by-passed the Malacca Strait would be enhanced.1 ee ak a eka tel ede a th eel oh a leneniee me ee ee ee ee ee eee Oe re) 1. USDAO Canberra 134/092319Z Feb 77. SECRET 95 (Reverse Blank p. 96}