ae tree oe Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA- RDP83B00227R000100140004- 0 20XK1 yr, Directorate of op secret ef \ Intelligence China’s Troubled Frontier Regions — : 25X1 An Intelligence Assessment [State Dept. review completed Top Secret 25X1 [pri Copy 2 2 Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 : ; Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 25X1 —@& © oe Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 Directorate of Top Se Intelligence 25X1 China’s Troubled Frontier Regions| _| 25x1 An Intelligence Assessment Information available as of 27 March 1982 has been used in the preparation of this report. 25X11 Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 Top Secret. Key Judgments - 25XK1 China’s Troubled Frontier Regions; | 5X4 Two years after its inception, Beijing’s new minority policy appears to be stagnating. Chinese leaders have not, as they had hoped, been able to carry the policy far enough to overcome years of economic mismanagement, racial conflict, and leftist excesses, and thus to strengthen the security of China’s border regions and contain local nationalism. Implementation has done little to integrate the minority areas more fully into the mainstream and reduce their drain on the national budget. The government believed that a moderate, constructive policy toward minorities could play an important role in improving relations with India and the moderate Arab countries, which have indeed been impressed with China’s concessions to its Muslim minorities. 25X41 The policy, announced in May 1980, granted minority regions a measure of increased autonomy, called for minority personnel to replace significant numbers of Chinese officials, and sought to spur economic development by increasing aid and implementing incentive systems. Beijing also loosened restrictions on minority cultures and appointed prominent minority mem- bers to prestigious, though relatively powerless, positions in the national and regional governments. 25X1 The policy showed some initial success but now faces major obstacles. The ambitious economic program will almost certainly fall short of expectations because of the lack of infrastructure and the shortage of qualified personnel. The implacable hostility of most minorities toward the Chinese and the resilience of local nationalism make Beijing leery of permitting greater autonomy. In addition, ethnic Chinese and minority government officials and party cadre oppose the policy on a variety of grounds— including that of ideology—and they fear that their own positions will be weakened. . 25X14 Despite China’s efforts, the border regions will remain areas of tension and a drain on the country’s limited economic resources. The chronic and occasionally serious violence that has plagued the regions is certain to 25X14 continue, undermining political security and encouraging meddling by China’s neighbors, particularly the Soviet Union. Party Chairman Hu Yaobang is closely identified with minority policy. A lack of progress in minority affairs or an upsurge in violence could be used by his rivals as part of a larger campaign to discredit him. 25X1 iii . Top Secret 25X14 EA 82-10045C. 25X1 April 1982 Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 Top Secret : 25X11 Contents Page Key Judgments Introduction An Intractable Problem The New Minority Policy Implementation: The Case of Xizang Economic Development Regional Autonomy The Situation in Other Minority Regions Cadre Opposition oe fae pores WOPOLP ALN] Bl ele Security and Subversion bm So Outlook — to 25X11 Vv Top Secret ees] 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 , Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 Top Secret Figure 1 5 CHINA: Ethnolinguistic Groups ayy ae 6 v ac etlarbin ’ . &% OM, Y 2). Sa tof Bh ° aid aniyang y : : ) 2 pew : ¢ AS eae ese ne “ rat 7 one S ; Lanzhou é ¢ 1 \ og tae ei i ee 4 Sharghal? Wuhan i ) “hes . Chengdu 3 poe : 1 a) Chongqing. as a 3 Ve ‘ oy Pg ER m= ve : af . fas 7 3 4 SINO-TIBETAN INDO-EUROPEAN prc — ri “4 rr ‘ } Mandarin [7] Tajik ps aad : fog hk " 5 3 4. Northern ey Sy Rom eres 2. Eastern AUSTROASIATIC r? of iow p Suangzheu 3. Southwestern [ZZ] Mon-Khmer H te Se, Southern dialects ; — - I 1. Wu aLAe & 2. Gan i. , Turkic 3. Xiang 1. Kazakh 4. Min 2. Uighur ? 5. Hakka 3. Kirghiz 6. Cantonese 7 ~_] Mongolian ce "} Tibetan 1. Western (Torgut) net nebaaatly anilbHiaive 1. Western 2. Western (Khoshot) 2. Central 3. Western (Oirat) 3. Eastern 4. Southern (Ordor) ‘ [Tai = Bldordaiena 0 500 1000 Kilometers + @, [J Miao-Yao [C7] Tungusic (9) 500 1000 Miles [=] Korean 25X11 505155 4-82 a Secret vi Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004, China’s Troubled Frontier Regions Introduction China’s vast, sparsely populated minority areas are so ‘important strategically and economically that they are a perennial source of concern for the government in Beijing. These ‘regions contain important mineral reserves and sensitive military and intelligence facili- ties, including the Lop Nor nuclear test site. They share long borders with the Soviet Union and with its client states of Vietnam, Laos, Afghanistan, and Mongolia, as well as with its ally India. All Chinese regimes have been able to maintain only a tenuous grip on the border regions; the Communists are no exception. Beijing has failed to integrate these regions fully into the Chinese polity and economy. China does, however, strive to contain the tension so that hostile neighbors cannot exploit it{ Particularly from the late 1950s, economic misman- agement and political excesses, culminating in a campaign for total assimilation, led to heightened tensions between minority peoples and ethnic Chinese. Frequent and occasionally large-scale armed clashes aroused leadership concern about political stability in the minority areas, particularly in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The issue assumed sufficient importance that senior party leaders, in- cluding Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping, party Secre- tary Hu Yaobang, and Politburo member Wang Zhen, made troubleshooting trips to such areas. | Xinjiang and Xizang (Tibet) are the largest and most important minority areas, and Beijing’s problems seem more acute there than in Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Guangxi, and Yunnan—other provinces with large minority populations, This paper concen- trates on Xinjiang and Xizang because they are testing grounds for a minority policy announced in May 1980 roved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 ‘Lop Segret 25X1 25X1 An Intractable Problem Beijing’s relations with its ethnic minorities would be difficult and complex under the best of circumstances. Whereas the heartland is populated by sedentary, relatively homogeneous, ethnic Chinese, the border areas contain an extraordinarily diverse and predomi- nantly non-Chinese population. China has some 56 different minority groups practicing a variety of reli- gions and speaking a number of non-Chinese lan- guages. Yunnan alone has over 22 minority groups and Xinjiang has 13, predominantly Moslem, Turkic peoples with varying traditions as traders, farmers, or nomadic ae at 25X14 China’s minority areas are backward and, for the most part, abysmally poor, In Yunnan local tribesmen still practice primitive, slash-and-burn agriculture, 25X14 and the Chinese press reports that the basic literacy rate is less than 20 percent for adults. Even in the more developed areas of the northwest, the average annual per capita income of minorities is well below that of the interior; moreover, the social capital and economic infrastructure required for modernization are lacking.’ 25X1 Beijing’s relations with its minority areas are compli- cated by the overwhelming influence of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in frontier areas, especially in the far west, the most troubled area. Military officials have generally been less sympathetic than civilian 25X14 leaders to minority sensitivities, fearing that loosening control could undermine Chinese security. The Army has played the major role in managing and developing the economy of Xinjiang and Xizang, including open- ing state farms, setting up industries, building cities, ' Peasants in the largely Uighur minority areas of southern Xin- jiang, for example, have an average annual per capita income of 70 yuan (excluding income from private plots and sideline production), as compared to 107 yuan for the overall rural provincial average. Urban factory workers in Xinjiang, most of whom are Chinese and receive generous government subsidies in addition to their salaries, average 904 yuan per year. Embassy reporting, Chinese press reports, and the statements of Chinese leaders reinforce the fact 25X1 25X11 25X11 . mai Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 25X1 Figure 2 CHINA: Known Resources we Karamay “BDushanzl = am “ling laa s : , a“ wN Sl Lop : \ RIMHANG > eer \ os many ‘ith me ee *Lenghy pwn (ithan SA Dunese % eam ~, tae of, ~~: ae contra fe” _XIZANG ee a Chengdu + gNanchong elhasa ow As ‘Ghongqing Cu 7 Changsha 2 Luzkow ? bin @ oe T'ai-pei ? Cu cf ie Chi-lung FUELS ELECTRICAL NONFERROUS oy Kunming hae : '° Gf: Refinery era Sb Antimony FERROALLOY cu > Shale oi! {Q Thermal Cu Copper Fe Iron ore PbSn a1 > A Sinaia XX Hydro Pb Lead and zinc Mn Manganese ; ,W Kao-hsiung A Gasfield — Transmission M Magnesite Mo Molybdenum I Naoming Cc" rn line Hig Mercury W Tungsten . CA} Oil basin Major coal Sn Tin ; mine : Autonomous region boundary Boundary reprasentation is not necessarily authoritative, 0 500 1000 Kilometers Sennen EREeey oer 500 1000 Miles 505157 4-82 | 25X1 aa Secret 2 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004- Top Setret Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang.[ | constructing roads and railroads, and overseeing the settlement en masse of demobilized Chinese troops and down-to-the-countryside youth. PLA cadre also established and staffed the party organization in both areas during the 1950s, and leading PLA command- ers with longstanding ties to the border areas—such as Politburo troubleshooter Wang Zhen—continue to play an important role in local politics. Beijing’s erratic and often harsh minority policies during the 1950s and 1960s left ill will and suspicion that cannot be eradicated. During the Great Leap Forward (1958-60) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), advocates of a moderate policy that at- tempted to strike a balance between the interests of the party and those of the local peoples lost out to those favoring total assimilation. Minority cultures were viewed as subversive and antisocialist, and mi- nority leaders were labeled as class enemies. China’s leftists sought to impose the Maoist vision completely and to rout the “special characteristics” of the minor- ity areas, Collectivization was imposed on sedentary 3 China Pictorial© 25x11 and nomadic peoples alike, Islam and Buddhism were suppressed as “feudal vestiges,” and thousands of mosques and temples were destroyed. Maoist policies devastated the already weak econo- 20X1 mies of the border areas. Economic mismanagement was aggravated by Chinese insensitivity. In Xizang, for instance, the radicals, insisting that “grain is the key link,” forced the planting of wheat, which caused shortages of barley—the traditional Tibetan staple. Ideologically motivated crackdowns on private trade brought local commerce to a halt; yet the state proved incapable of providing needed goods and services. The human cost of leftist policies was severe both in personal suffering and the loss of potential adminis- 20X1 trative and technical personnel. Many minority intel- lectuals in Xinjiang, for example, were accused of having ties to the Soviet Union or of being “local 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 Orogeq hunters, northeast China. nationalists” and were imprisoned, some for more than 20 years. Several generations of some of the best educated and most respected families were wiped out. Inner Mongolia illustrates the scale of the persecu- tion. China Pictorial A Mongolian wrestler, Inner Mongolia. Although chiefly motivated by domestic political and The New Minority Policy security concerns, Beijing also saw possible diplomatic After the purge of the Gang of Four in 1976, party _ benefits from better relations with its minorities. leaders gradually began to modify the leftist policy of Beijing hoped to enhance its standing with Islamic total assimilation. By 1980 Beijing was convinced that states and to create a climate conducive -to improved a massive new program was needed. The leadership __ relations with India. Accordingly, China began en- was particularly alarmed by the continued intensity of couraging visits by religious delegations from Saudi anti-Chinese feeling as evidenced by the increase in | Arabia, Somalia, Iran, and Morocco, among others, minority-Chinese incidents and by the emotional re- and promoting stronger “people to people” ties be- ception given the Dalai Lama’s elder brother during a tween Chinese Muslims and the Islamic world. Mo- visit to Xizang in 1979. Chinese leaders also seemed roccan Prime Minister Bouabid, who visited Xian in concerned that the upsurge in Muslim fundamental- early 1982, became the first leader from a Muslim ism in Iran and Pakistan might spill over into Xin- country to attend public prayers in a Chinese mosque jiang, Ningxia, and Xizang. The Soviet invasion of , Afghanistan intensified fears regarding the vulner- ability of the frontier regions. ae Secret 4 Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R0001 00140004-0 25X1 25X11 25X1 25x11 29X1 25X11 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004 A Naxi couple registering their marriage, Sichuan-Yunnan area. since 1949, The Chinese have reportedly permitted the Saudis and others to make large donations to individual mosques and to the Chinese Islamic Associ- ation. Muslim associations from China now attend international Islamic meetings. In 1980 China was also attempting to improve rela- tions with India and to make progress on the border issue. New Delhi has viewed Beijing’s actions in Xizang—where Chinese treatment of its Tibetan mi- nority has been an irritant in Chinese-Indian rela- tions—as a gauge of its sincerity. A change in policy was clearly indicated. In May 1980 the new minority policy was announced amid great fanfare by Hu Yaobang, who was Party General Secretary at the time, during a trip to Xizang. The points made in his speech, which includ- ed specific proposals for Xizang, became the heart of Central Directive 31 of 1980. Beijing promised: ¢ Greater autonomy for minority areas and modifica- tion of central directives to fit the “special charac- teristics” of each region. China Pictorial@ * A “policy of recuperation” and economic develop- ment to revive the traditional economy—specifically the handicraft industry and animal husbandry. This included an exemption from taxes and state pur- chase quotas for two years and an increase in central payments for five years. 25X14 ¢ Replacement of Chinese officials by minority offi- cials, with minorities to hold roughly two-thirds of all positions at the upper levels of administration and almost all posts at grass-roots levels. Those guilty of abuses during leftist periods were to be removed. 25x41 Revival of traditional culture, including freedom of religion, provided that a fundamentally socialist orientation is maintained. 25x14 Beijing took a number of immediate steps to demon- strate its sincerity and to right old wrongs. It appoint- ed prominent minority figures to prestigious, although largely symbolic, positions in the central and local governments. The Panchen Lama, second only to the Top Sécret 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 Miao girls in ceremonial dress, China Pictorial@ Guizhou. Dalai Lama in Tibet’s religio-political order, for instance, was appointed to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. Beijing released scores of minority prisoners, including those con- demned as “local nationalists” in the 1950s, and Moslem and Tibetan dissidents whom the Chinese believed had participated in underground independ- ence movements. Perhaps the most dramatic gesture was Beijing’s invitation to the-Dalai Lama and his followers to return from exile in India. Beijing gave permission for four groups of the Dalai Lama’s senior advisers and followers to tour Tibet during 1980. The Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 As a corollary to economic development, Beijing has ordered greater attention to improving the education- al system in minority areas. The goal is universal elementary education by the end of the decade, with a - lesser effort on the development of middle and techni- cal schools. Beijing has also announced plans to create more universities in the minority regions and to give minorities preferential admission quotas. ee a Implementation: The Case of Xizang Xizang provides an excellent case study of the diffi- culties the government has encountered in implement- ing its new policy. Beijing considered Xizang a show- case for the new program, and authorities acted quickly to institute the promised reforms, This, plus better and more complete source material, means the experience in Xizang is also better documented than that of other minority regions; | Economic Development. Conditions have improved marginally in Xizang in the last two years, but eijing claims peasant income has risen, although significantly more for those in the pastoral than for those in the agricultural sector. More consumer goods are available in the cities, and the free market appears to be flourishing. Dalai Lama, however, refused to visit the region| _| Other sectors of the economy have not fared as well. The heart of the new minority policy is an ambitious economic recovery program whose announced goals include significantly improving the economies of “poor and backward” minority areas within two-or three years, surpassing the best post-1949 showing within five or six years, and achieving “affluence” within a decade. The plan permits more use of private plots, traditiohal crops, barter, and a greater reliance on material Ancentives. In Xizang, traditional cross- border trade with Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim has Beijing has begun projects designed to develop Xizang’s infrastructure and has assumed complete control over the region’s budget. It is funding new roads, power plants, and agrarian projects. Because of the central government’s recent budget cuts, alloca- tions for these projects are far below the level expect-. ed. In fact, much of the planned rebuilding has stopped, and the reorganization or closure of factories and mines has added to unemployment and has lowered productivity. The Xizang Daily announced in late June that industry did not fulfill the state plan and that production costs had risen significantly. Wet | 6 Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 25X11 25X1 e 25X11 25X1 25X11 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 20XK1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 Hu Yaobang and Wan Li meeting Tibetan women, May 1 90) | t oe). ae 5X1 (Se AM ti Regional Autonomy. Beijing began to transfer ethnic Chinese and appoint Tibetans to government and party positions soon after Hu Yaobang announced the new policy. Party First Secretary Ren Rong, a mili- tary man closely identified with the leftist period, was replaced with Yin Fatang, who, although an ethnic Chinese, is a Tibetan speaker with long experience in minority affairs, The Tibetan press also reports that leftists at lower levels are slowly being removed. Most of the appointments have been in the rural areas, although some local notables were named to senior government positions including that of Vice Chairman of the prestigious Standing Committee of the Xizang People’s Congress. The lowest levels of rural administration now appear to be dominated Al Tibetans. [ Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 China Pictorial@ 25x 25X1 25X1 25X1_ oe Secret 25X1 . Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 Top Secret aes 25X1 A Lhasa fair. ar 25X1 25X11 Beijing made some concessions to Tibetan nationalism by loosening restrictions on language, custom, cos- tume, and social practices but has moved cautiously in the area of religion. The regime has permitted monas- teries to reopen and encouraged pilgrims to visit holy 25x11 sites in Xizang, but Beijing has not enccur. Lsevival ofa priesthood to serve those sites. re | 1” Secret 8 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 Continuing deep concern about local nationalism is likely to preclude additional concessions to the Tibet- ans. These concerns were reinforced by the mass demonstrations that occurred in Lhasa in the summer of 1980 during visits by delegations representing the Dalai Lama. Beijing abruptly closed Xizang to outsid- ers and subsequently, in cooperation with Tibetan authorities, has sought to strengthen public order and to harness nationalist sentiments. deemphasized regional autonomy when discussing mi- nority policy, and it apparently believes it has gone about as far as it can on this issue. The Situation in Other Minority Regions Implementation of the new minority policy seems most advanced in Inner Mongolia. Mongols, who constitute just 11 percent of the population of the region, now hold a disproportionately large share of both senior and lower level government positions. Ethnic Chinese, however, still dominate the local party organization. As in Xizang, the regime has made concessions on culture and language, and Mon- gols make up approximately 40 percent of this year’s freshman class at Inner Mongolia University. The sensitivities of the large ethnic Chinese population will mie gai many additional concessions. Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R0001007140004- 25X1 25X1 ‘The economic portions of the policy, by contrast, still remain largely unfulfilled. Two years after the policy was announced, a party work team sent to the region — to assess conditions concluded that the standard of living remained far below that in the Mongolian People’s Republic and in most Chinese provinces, and that Mongols were worse off than their Chinese 25X1 neighbors. Chinese leaders believe living conditions in Inner Mongolia must eventually surpass those in the Mongolian People’s Republic. Although admittedly a long-term goal, Beijing remains committed to devel- ing the area as rapidly as possi steps are being 25X14 taken to reduce restrictions on the traditional econo- my. The lack of infrastructure and national budget 25X14 constraints, however, make it very unlikely that the 25X(1 goal will be achieved. 5X4 As in Xizang and Inner Mongolia, Beijing has made more progress in Xinjiang with cultural than with economic matters. Probably because of the long bor- der with the Soviet Union and the history of racial violence, Beijing has moved more cautiously. Fewer minority officials have been appointed although Beijing has promised to begin withdrawing ethnic Chinese officials within three years. We have no evidence that large numbers of Chinese have been transferred so far. Beijing has allowed the mosques and bazaars to reopen, bolstered minority education, permitted the use of local languages, and, as a major concession to Muslim sensibilities, allowed use of the revered Arabic script. “25X11 25X1 Cadre Opposition Several groups have an interest in seeing Beijing’s new policy fail. Leftists generally oppose greater autonomy for minorities and object to the economic ‘reforms on ideological grounds. Leftist sentiment is particularly strong in Xinjiang. Last August, 2,000 to 3,000 wallposters reportedly appeared in Urumai denouncing Deng Xiaoping and demanding the rein- statement of Hua Guofeng as party Chairman. The Xizang press indicates that entrenched leftists are causing problems for the provincial leadership there as well, 25X11 25X11 Top Segret 25XK1 Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 , Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 akin Rae 5+ELi po US Soe pe Z0D9 5 | palsies) iw no !3 tS (yw etaceyd 3) Anes pws L Smt Ser» Seedy 243.235 OSG. g-b Bows ozs Higa Ses paess lavas ay ida pAiiZ 3 BE SLY 55 6096 nated GES ip nid? 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Ss OV i iet™ nie * ue try BS c. i O: rere Ons 7 f “S$ Lai Karamay/ ‘ - i velar “ps \ aldy- Bol Qed | ¢ ‘ / Saryozets - Kurgan - a Sree r / ee ’ ~ IN om ne Manas ‘ ony Moan Yining Tak ee ie wen aus Soe ~ . e , Poa / ‘ = Ne Sh | goer NO out pe Ce By (TARIM BASIN) Ruogiang 5-7, 1 eet gee poets \ ee q we 7 \ “od Whett 4 2 Ke , Mlrgab ie Shache’ eat a ae = cas Rey Py Eng £m } i N i ; wg iemo, 7 \S Mangnai i) *~ a oo" eae He ad y 5 ; . x a sd ~ . 7] va yo fotan rn - vee YS Lowe ~~ Yitian ye atk G peer Oe & sade Oe A a CEQ, fie C a rae es ge sane Teen =i MQ. Uda SAY Phe, “ By PE ete eats 2 tJ ag . po SOE VRID to re lor ( "i SNe ae ee ee { ele Alger goles ae e, s feoews as Re aay elie : So ' Xizang x tagia YQ \ a _ SF ere eae Y oo Boundary representation [& C- Matog « te. oie + not nechvaarify anthoritative, ve 505156 ea7143) 4- 82 the continuing emigration of Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other minorities across the border. Although there has been no large emigration since 60,000 Kazakhs fled from Ili into the USSR in 1962, the Chinese are concerned about the continuous trickle of Uighur emigres. The 1979 Soviet census officially gives the ithe true figure is perhaps closer to 600,000, The Soviets support an anti-Chinese “Free Turkestan Movement” and its “Liberation Army,” number of Uighurs in the USSR as 211,000, but[__| that the Soviets are able to exploit the extensive 13 led by the aged Gen. Zunun Taipov, which has 25X1 headquarters in Alma Ata. Chinese officials believe 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 Top Secret family ties between Muslims in China and those in the Soviet Union to gather intelligence and interfere in Chinese internal amis] ; Despite a lack of firm evidence to document Soviet activities in the border areas, Chinese suspicions are at least partly justified. The Russians were always deeply involved in the Byzantine and sometimes cut- throat. minority politics of China’s northwestern bor- der regions, and there is every reason to assume that the present Soviet regime continues the practice. Chinese accusations that the Soviets are the primary cause of minority unrest, however, overstate the case. Improving relations with Moscow might relieve some of the stress, but the minority problem in the north- west, as well as in other minority areas, is based on grievances that are deep and longstanding. Outlook Two years after its inauguration, the new minority policy appears to be stagnating. Beijing has honored some of the promises: made in 1980—loosening re- strictions on minority peoples, making symbolic ap- pointments of minority personages to senior govern- ment positions, and granting concessions to local interests. These have improved life marginally in the border areas, but no significant progress has been achieved in the more difficult task of rebuilding the economies. An enormous task in itself, the revitaliza- tion of the minority areas is further complicated by the lack of economic infrastructure, by a desperate shortage of qualified personnel, and by continued Chinese-minority tensions. Although minority areas receive a greater percentage of the total national budget than before, overall economic retrenchment means that the,allocated funds will be far below the A resurgence of Chinese-minority violence in the border areas could complicate China’s foreign rela- tions. China is already competing with some of its neighbors for the allegiance of minorities. An out- break of serious violence in the northwest or in the south could exacerbate already tense relations with the Soviet Union or Vietnam. Similarly, a new crack- ’ down in Tibet would become an issue in relations with India, as such crackdowns have in the past. Any highly publicized incidents involving the Turkic peo- ples could set back efforts to win friends in the Middle East. Moderate Arab states, however, seem impressed by the lifting of restrictions on religion, and Beijing has used representatives of its Muslim minorities as ambassadors of good will. The minority problem could also become a factor in the leadership succession, especially after Deng leaves the scene and jockeying for influence intensifies. Hu and his supporters are closely identified with the new policy. Opponents, particularly in the military, might use the lack of progress or continuing violence— especially if it occurred in conjunction with other policy setbacks—to criticize Hu and thus question his qualifications for leadership. level.expected when the policy was announced, ane The border areas, with the possible exception of Inner Mongolia, are likely to remain areas of tension and a drain on Beijing. The strategic importance of the border regions and the resilience of local nationalism make it impossible for Beijing to loosen its grip much more than it already has. Chronic and occasionally violent incidents such as those that erupted in Xin- jiang cng last two years will continue. Regard- less of its g6od intentions, Beijing is unlikely ever to win over fhe minority groups, whose hostility toward se is, in most cases, implacable. Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 14 25X11 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X11 25X1 25X1 utios op Sylret Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0 er 4 t + ¢ t . Top Secret Approved For Release 2008/07/16 : CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0