Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2013
http://archive.org/details/warinairbeingsto04rale
r>
HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS
BY DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE
THE WAR IN THE AIR
Being the Story of
The part played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force
VOL. IV
BY
H. A. JONES
OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1934
^
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
AMEN HOUSE E.C. 4 London Edinburgh Glasgow
Leipzig New York Toronto Melbourne Capetown Bombay- Calcutta Madras Shanghai HUMPHREY MILFORD
PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY
D
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
PREFACE
This volume covers naval air developments and opera- tions in home waters throughout 191 7 and for the first quarter of 191 8. It includes a narrative of the anti-sub- marine work of the various types of aircraft during the period of unrestricted U-boat warfare, and of the diverse operations undertaken by naval aircraft based at or near Dunkirk. The remainder of the volume deals with air warfare on the Western front, beginning with the battle of Messines in June 191 7 and ending with the German offensives on the Somme and on the Lys in March and April 191 8.
A feature of the period dealt with was the development of air attacks against troops, transport, and similar targets on the ground. These attacks reached the peak of their intensity during the German advance on the Somme. When the situation on the Third Army front was most critical, on the 26th of March 19 18, thirty-seven squadrons, out of a total of sixty working with the British armies in France, operated over the Third Army front, and twenty- seven of them were specifically engaged on low-flying attacks, with bomb and machine-gun, against ground targets.
A point of interest, which a study of the air reports has revealed for the first time, is that when the German offensive opened on the 21st of March 19 18, the fog on the front of the Third Army was not so dense as along that of the Fifth Army on its right. While the happenings on the Fifth Army front were almost entirely obscured from the air in the morning, some of the observers who flew over the Third Army front saw and reported a fair amount. In other words, ground visibility, on which the defence schemes so largely depended, varied, and this must be taken into account when the varying fortunes of the defending troops are under consideration.
Throughout this volume the air story is told of necessity
vi PREFACE
against a background of naval and military operations. The reader, however, will remember that, although the air work is thus thrown into sharp relief, he is looking at only one aspect of the various battles here narrated. The background has been kept as colourless as possible, but the author has judged it necessary to make an occasional comment on the military operations. If a corrective is necessary it will be supplied by the military historian who will deal with the battles in France, covered by this volume, in subsequent volumes of the Military Opera- tions. In these volumes only can material be supplied for an adequate judgement of the campaign on the Western front.
The author has again received much assistance from the President of the Reichsarchiv, General Hans von Haeften, as from his predecessor, General Freiherr Mertz von Quirheim, who, in particular, supplied the material from which the German air concentrations for the various battles have been set out. He records his grateful thanks to these officers and, through them, to Archivrat Major Arndt. Apart from the matter supplied by the Reich s- archiv, published German works, wherever they show results of the British air operations, have been widely con- sulted. Such sources are acknowledged in the text. The author hoped, however, to visit Potsdam to consult the relevant German records so that he might add official evidence concerning the effect of the bombing and of the low-flying operations. He was informed that the German war records were not yet sufficiently collated and that an appreciable time must elapse before it would be possible to extract the required documents. If the information becomes available before the work is completed, it will be appended to the final volume.
The author has received much help from those officers, naval, military, and air, who played a part in the operations here described, and a great number of private documents have been freely placed at his disposal. For this help,
PREFACE vii
which has added truth and colour to the story, he acknow- ledges his indebtedness. He expresses his thanks, also, to the Military Branch of the Historical Section, for com- ments and advice on the military operations, and to Professor D. Nichol Smith, who read the volume in proof and made valuable suggestions. Finally he pays tribute to the assistance he has received, as before, from the staff of the Air Historical Branch.
H. A. JONES.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER I. Aircraft with the Fleet, 1917-
March 1918. .... pp. 1-44
Influence of the German U-boat campaign. A change of Government. Reorganization at the Admiralty.
The Grand Fleet Aircraft Committee . . p. 5
Admiral Beatty dissatisfied with the naval air situation. A Grand Fleet Committee appointed. Its recommendations. Aircraft-carriers. The Furious.
Aircraft Carrier Operations . . . . p. 14
The Manxman and mine-laying operations
Flying-boat Successes . . . . . p. 16
The development of the flying-boat. Commander J. C. Porte. Large and Small Americas. H.M.S. Baby. Hunting Zeppelins over the North Sea. The L. 22 and L. 43 destroyed. Flying-boat and aeroplane — a combined adventure.
Catapult Experiments . . . . p. 22
Catapults — hydraulic, electric, and compressed air. Experiments at Hendon and in the hopper Slinger.
Fighter Aeroplanes in Light Cruisers . . p. 23
Flying-off platforms in light cruisers. Harwich Force experiments in 1915. A platform fitted in the Yarmouth, 1917. A Sopwith 'Pup' flown off. The Zeppelin L. 23 destroyed by Flight Sub-Lieutenant B. A. Smart in the Yarmouth's Sopwith 'Pup'.
Deck Landings . . . . . p. 26
Squadron Commander E. H. Dunning lands on the forward deck of the Furious. Proposal to build a flying-on deck aft. Opinion divided. Admiralty air policy. Flying from gun-turret platforms.
New Proposals for Fleet Aircraft . . . p. 30
Admiralty plans for Fleet aircraft revised. Decisions of October 1917. And of January 191 8.
A proposed air offensive against the German High Sea Fleet. The torpedo-carrying Sopwith 'Cuckoo'.
The appointment of a Rear- Admiral for Air.
The Furious, fitted with a landing-deck, rejoins the Grand Fleet. Landing difficulties. The demand for a clear deck. The design of the Argus modified.
The Eagle, Glorious, Courageous, and Hermes. Flying two-seaters off turret platforms.
x TABLE OF CONTENTS
Kite Balloons with the Fleet . . . p. 38
The balloon, an advantage or disadvantage? A lively controversy. Admiralty policy.
Airships . . . . . . p. 40
Non-rigids. Trouble with, the 'North Sea' type. Reasons. Rigids and their poor performance. Towing 'Coastals' from light cruisers. Real value of the non-rigids. Grand Fleet Aircraft — a general summary.
CHAPTER II. Unrestricted U-boat Warfare pp. 45-77
An Anti-submarine Division formed at the Admiralty, December 1916. Additional air patrols. The South-Western Group of air stations. The detective work of the Naval Intelligence Division. Difficulty of distinguishing between hostile and friendly submarines. The critical period of April 1917. The convoy system adopted.
Felixstowe Flying-boats . . . p. 53
The Spider-web patrol. Successful attacks on U-boats.
Attacks by German 7 'orpedo- carrying Aircraft . p. 55
Surprise of a new form of attack, April 191 7. The sinking of the S.S. Gena, 1st May. All aircraft under suspicion. Admiralty action. Further attacks, May, June, and July. Germans abandon this form of attack.
Ocean Convoys . . . . . • P- 59
Organization of the convoy system. Aircraft patrols. The Mullion Airship Station. Difficulties of airship patrol in the southern part of the North Sea. Loss of the C.iy and C. 27. Airship patrols abandoned south of the Norfolk coast.
Kite Balloons . . . . . • P« 63
Controversy about the value of kite balloons. The Kite Balloon Destroyer Force. Stalking U-boats. The U. 6g destroyed. Additional balloon bases.
Flying-boats and U-boats . . . . p. 64
More Felixstowe flying-boat successes. Probable end of the U.B. 36. Felixstowe bombed. The U.C. 1 and U.B. 20 destroyed.
Handley-Page patrols off the Tees.
End of the U.C. 6.
A Porte flying-boat adventure.
TABLE OF CONTENTS xi
The North Sea Barrage . . . . p. 67
Minefield to close north-about route to U-boats. Aircraft patrols.
The French Coast . . . . p. 68
The Cherbourg station. A seaplane destroys the U.B. 32.
Anti-Submarine operations from Dunkirk. German seaplane stations on the Belgian Coast.
Flanders I and //.
Dunkirk seaplanes replaced by aeroplanes.
A Large America flying-boat from Dunkirk destroys the U.C. 72. Anti-submarine operations summarized.
CHAPTER III. Naval Air Operations from
Dunkirk, 1917-March 1918 . . pp. 78-108
Bombing operations. The Handley Page and the D.H. 4.
The Bombardments of Zeebrugge and Ostend . p. 82
Attack on the lock-gates at Zeebrugge 12th May 191 7, and on the dockyard at Ostend 5th June 1917. Aircraft co-operation.
The Belgian Coast Barrage . . . p. 86
The barrage reinstituted, July 1917. Aircraft patrols. German bombing attacks on the ships. The Fernlenkboot.
Bombardments of Ostend . . . p. 89
Attacks on Ostend by monitors of the barrage patrol, September- December 1917. Work of the naval aircraft. German smoke-screens.
A projected Landing . . . . p. 90
Landing operations dependent on progress of the battles of Ypres, 1917. Air photographic survey of the landing beaches.
Naval Air Co-operation in the Flanders offensive p. 92
Patrols by naval fighting aircraft. Day and night bombing.
The German Bombing Squadrons . . . p. 98
Daylight bombing attacks on England. Effect on the Dunkirk air squadrons. Concentrated bombing attacks on the naval aircraft depot, St. Pol. The depot goes out of action. Bombing by the Handley Pages and D.H. 4s. Importance of the photographic work of the Dunkirk squadrons. A general summary. War development of Bruges as an Imperial Dockyard.
xii TABLE OF CONTENTS
Duel between the bomb and ferro-concrete. Standard thickness of roof and walls of protected buildings. The submarine shelters in the North Darse.
Bruges, Zeebrugge, and Ostend, as important naval targets.
Bombing operations of Dunkirk air squadrons analysed. Dissipation of effort.
Flights in British aircraft by H.M. the King of the Belgians.
CHAPTER IV. The Battle of Messines, 7th-i4th
June 1917 pp. 109-137
General plan subsequent to failure of Nivelle offensive. Clearing the Belgian coast. Importance of the Messines- Wytschaete ridge. The British and German formations in the area. Air concentration for the preliminary battle. Importance of artillery operations. Main duties of the Royal Flying Corps. The scheme for the air offensive. The wireless interception organization. The German system of wireless warnings.
The opening bombardment. 'Bombardment Flights.' Air observa- tion for the artillery. Air fighting. Death of Lieutenant Schaefer. Air reconnaissances. Bombing operations. Rehearsals of the artillery barrage.
The Attack p. 125
The explosion of mines. Contact patrol reports. Failure of infantry to light flares. Progress of the battle.
Attacks by low-flying aircraft. Feat of Captain W. A. Bishop. Low- flying attacks of a sporadic kind.
Air observation for the artillery during the attack. Bombing. Air fighting.
Consolidation. Air work curtailed.
Freiherr von Richthofen returns from leave. German pilots become more active. Influence of German air raids on England. Fighting squadrons withdrawn from France. Effect on the air position on the Western front. Lessons of the battle.
CHAPTER V. The Battles of Ypres, 31st July-
10th November 1917 . . . pp. 138-226
The plan of operations. British take over the Nieuport sector from the French. The Fifth Army re-formed in Ypres area. The Fourth Army move north to the coast.
Air Concentration for the Offensive . . p. 140
The head-quarters of the V Brigade move north with the staff of the Fifth Army. Composition of the Brigade. The IV Brigade with the Fourth Army.
The air concentration, Allied and German, summarized.
TABLE OF CONTENTS xiii
Employment of Aircraft . . . . p. 143
Major-General Trenchard issues general instructions for the employ- ment of Allied aircraft in the battle. The air offensive ordered to begin on the 8th July. The Aerial Activity Office of the V Brigade.
The German Attack at Lombartzyde . . p. 146
The Germans deliver a surprise attack. Why the air observers failed to report German preparations. Success of the German attack. Counter-battery work of No. 52 Squadron. Development of co-opera- tion between aeroplanes and balloons. Also between aeroplanes and sound-ranging sections.
The Influence of Air Raids on England . . p. 152
London bombed for second time by daylight, 7th July. Sir Douglas Haig asked for two righting squadrons and to make a raid on Mann- heim. His protest. One squadron sent. Fighting aeroplanes diverted to Home Defence Squadrons. Sir Douglas Haig protests again. A comment.
The Preliminary Air Offensive . . . p. 155
Bombing German aerodromes. Large-scale clashes in the air.
The Battle Opens p. 160
Progress of the fighting, 31st July. Weather affects flying programme. Single-seater fighters used for low bombing. Explaining the air arm to the infantry. Bad weather delays renewal of the offensive.
The Attack on Hill yo [Loos']. . . .p. 169
A diversion near Lens. Hill 70 captured. Aircraft co-operation.
The Battle of Langemarck, 16 th-i 8th August . p. 172 The Ypres attacks resumed. A serious failure. The German 'pill- boxes'. Weather conditions prevent air observers reporting counter- attack concentrations. Work of the squadrons.
Minor Operations . . . . . p. 179
Ypres area a morass. Minor operations on other parts of the front. Low-flying attacks in co-ordination with infantry. Gillemont Farm and Cologne Hill Farm.
The Battle of the Menin Road Ridge, 20th-2$th
September . . . . . p. 180
The weather improves and ground recovers at Ypres. Offensive resumed. Scheme of employment of squadrons. Success of the battle.
xiv TABLE OF CONTENTS
Examples of low-flying attacks. Many warnings of concentrations for counter-attacks sent from the air. Enemy formations broken up by artillery fire. Bombing operations. Air Fighting. Death of Werner Voss.
The Battle of Polygon Wood, 26 th September-jrd
October p. 190
A successful advance. Counter-attack warnings from the air. Heavy German losses.
Low-flying attacks. Bombing and fighting.
Development of Night Flying. . . . p. 196
Night bombing by the Corps squadrons. First night flights in 'Camels' and Bristol Fighters. German night-bombing squadron. Attacks on the German aerodromes. Night bombing by single-seater fighters.
No. 56 Squadron. The Services and publicity. The views of Sir Douglas Haig. Air Statistics of the Ypres battles.
Broodseinde and Poelcappelle, 4th and 9 th October p. 202
The Broodseinde attack, 4th October. Rain. Restricted air work. General effect of bad weather on the operations. Major objectives impossible of attainment. Why the offensive was continued.
The attack of 9th October. Contact patrols and counter-attack patrols.
Continuous rain. The attack of 12th October.
Air reports of German movements.
The bombing attack on Rumbeke aerodrome.
20th October. Further infantry attacks. Aircraft co-operation.
Death of Lieutenant A. P. F. Rhys-Davids.
Passchendaele . . . . . . p. 21 1
The capture of Passchendaele.
Developments in Artillery Co-operation, 191 7 . p. 213
Increase in artillery and problems of co-operation. New battery com- manders arrive in France without knowledge of latest methods of co-operation between aeroplanes and artillery. One reason is diversity of methods in use. A memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Ludlow- Hewitt. The need for standardization.
Propaganda by air . . . . . p. 219
Dropping propaganda pamphlets from aeroplanes. Illegal according to German view. The Death Penalty. Royal Flying Corps officers sentenced to penal servitude. British Government protests. Protests effective. Propaganda by air a legitimate act of war. Special balloons.
TABLE OF CONTENTS xv
CHAPTER VI. The Battle of Cambrai, 20th
November-7th December 191 7 . pp. 227-259
The interest of the battle of Cambrai. Reasons for the battle. Plan of operations. Overwhelming air concentration. No preliminary bombardment. Special air arrangements. Discreet air patrols. Bad flying weather helps surprise. The experience of a German flying officer. The opening of the battle. Mist. Low-flying attacks by single-seater fighters.
The check at Flesquieres. Personal accounts of flying pilots. Heavy casualties to low-flying aeroplanes.
Corps aeroplanes in the mist. Nothing seen of the Flesquieres check.
Bombing operations.
The importance of Bourlon Wood. The advance resumed, 21st November. Rain and low clouds. The position on the evening of the 2 1 st. Disquiet. The case for withdrawal. Sir Douglas Haig decides to go on. Air reports of German reinforcements. The attack of 23rd November. Part played by German anti-aircraft guns used as anti-tank weapons. Richthofen's 'Circus' arrives from Flanders. All J agdstaffeln placed under Richthofen. Intense low-flying attacks, German and British, on the 23rd. Royal Flying Corps low-flying casualties, 30 per cent.
The struggle for Bourlon village.
Influence of the Richthofen 'Circus'. Provision of fighter escorts.
Warnings of a German counter-stroke. Confidence at General Head-quarters. Some of the bombing activity diverted to other fronts. The German counter-offensive, 30th November. Mist. A tactical surprise in the south. Reasons for the surprise. Part played by German low-flying aircraft. The attack at Bourlon. Concentration of aero- planes in the area. German low-flying attacks. Some of the results. Attack and counter-attack. The Bourlon positions abandoned.
General comments. Low-flying attacks the feature of the battle. German staff views on their value.
CHAPTER VII. The German Offensive, 1918. The First Battles of the Somme, 21st March~5th April . . . . pp. 260-365
Lessons of the Cambrai battle. Schemes for defence. Employment of Royal Flying Corps when army is on defensive. Importance of recon- naissance. Extension of British line. The German plans. Apprecia- tion of German intentions by Fifth Army commander. Views of G.H.Q. Influence of air reports. Value of air photographs. Infantry warned, 20th March, attack would be made next morning.
Air Concentrations for the battle . . . p. 271
Particulars of British and German concentrations. German air service outnumbers British in battle area. German air reorganization and expansion 1917-18 reviewed. Kriegspiele.
xvi TABLE OF CONTENTS
Air Operations before the battle . . .p. ^77
Guiding policy, 'interference with enemy preparations'. Co-operation with the artillery. A word about the Corps Squadrons. Bombing programmes and operations. Attacks on German aerodromes.
The air offensive. Discussion about size of fighting formations. Schemes of air patrol.
Air combats.
The Offensive begins . . . . .p. 290
Schemes for employment of squadrons once the German attack had begun. 4.45 a.m. on 21st March. Fog.
Morning visibility better on Third than on Fifth Army front. Air reconnaissances of Third Army front. Fog lifts about 1 p.m. Subsequent air work. Widespread German movements reported. German low-flying activities. Intense air fighting. Evidence from German side of effect of British air attacks. Extent of German ad- vance. Air squadrons move back.
Fog again, 22nd March. German advance renewed. A critical situation. Low-flying attacks. Strategic bombing. Air offensive patrols. Night bombers give information of German reinforcements. Fifth Army withdraw further. 23rd March, a gap in the line. Con- tact-patrol reports mirror the battle. Low-flying attacks, bombing, and air fighting. Germans exploit the gap, 24th March. Air reports show threat developing. British low-flying attacks intensified. Air fighting increases and at lower heights.
25th March, day of crisis. A wedge between French and British. Exploiting gaps on Third Army front. Air messages report German masses, but British guns mostly silent.
All available squadrons diverted to Third Army front to attack enemy. 'Very low flying is essential. All risks to be taken.'
Night bombing in hail and snow.
Low-flying attacks begin at dawn, 26th March. A day of bitter fighting. Third Army crisis ends.
Desperate plight of Fifth Army. Air reports of the threat to Roye. British and French diverging. Low-flying attacks to stem advance on Roye. Enemy air activity falls away.
The appointment of General Foch.
Night bombing operations.
Amiens as the German objective. Air operations on Third Army front, 27th March. V.C. award to Lieutenant A. A. McLeod. Con- centration of low-flying attacks south of the Somme. Night bombing to help Fifth Army.
Attack at Arras, 28th March, and fight for Amiens continued. Remnants of Fifth Army absorbed by Fourth Army. An appreciation of the Fifth Army. Low-flying attacks continued mainly south of the Somme.
Air fighters begin to return to the upper air.
TABLE OF CONTENTS xvii
Bombing railway junctions.
General Foch's air instructions. A comment. Change in air tactics. Air fighting formations concentrated.
German attacks on 5th April end in failure. The line settles down.
Aerodrome and Supply Organization . . p. 353
Difficulties of aerodrome accommodation and of maintenance during the retreat. How aerodromes were chosen. Emergency supply schemes of Brigadier-General Brooke-Popham. Removal of the depots from Candas and Fienvillers. A tribute to the air mechanics.
Work of the air squadrons in the March retreat. Service contro- versy. Breakdown of co-operation with the artillery. Reasons. General comments. Opportunties missed by the German air service. Breakdown in German air supply and in communications. Comments of General von Hoeppner.
CHAPTER VIII. The Battles of the Lys, 9th-
29th April 191 8 . . . . pp. 366-404
Air reports of an enemy concentration north of La Bassee. Views of G.H.Q.
British and German dispositions.
The Battle of ens . ..... p. 374
The attack made in fog, 9th April. Portuguese overwhelmed. No flying until 2 p.m. No. 208 Squadron burn their aeroplanes. Contact patrols in the afternoon plot the German advance. Low-flying at- tacks. Squadrons go on the move. The battle area extends, loth April. Ground mist and low clouds. Low-flying attacks in the mist. Casualties.
Contact patrols from low heights.
Gaps in the line, nth April. Fighter squadrons concentrated on low-bombing attacks.
Bombing railway junctions.
A critical day, 12th April. Sir Douglas Haig's 'backs to the wall' order. Fine weather leads to great air activity. The progress of the battle clearly reported by the contact-patrol observers. Low-flying attacks concentrated to stem advance on Hazebrouck.
Bombing the German lines of communication. Attacks on German observation balloons. Traffic to the battle area bombed by night. The German advance slackens.
The attack on Filler s-Bretonneux . . . p. 387
Indications of a renewal of the offensive on the Somme. Air reports of night activity at Chaulnes railway junction. The junction bombed. Germans attack with tanks, 24th April. Poor visibility. Contact patrols from a low height.
Death of Freiherr Manfred von Richthofen. His career and an estimate.
xviii TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Loss of Kemmel Hill . . . • P- 397
The Lys attack resumed, 25 th April. Germans take Kemmel. Air reports of traffic congestion. Long-range gun-fire and bombing attacks. Low bombing in the battle area. German aeroplanes very active.
Arrangements in being to divert all head-quarters fighter squadrons to low bombing. The battle dies down in bad weather.
Supply and repair difficulties during the battle. How they were overcome. The emergency depot at Guines. Subsidiary depots at Desvres and Motteville.
Wastage in British aircraft during the German March-April offen- sive. Losses in equipment and stores.
Difficulties of the German air service during the Lys battles. Air superiority passes to the Allies after second day. Complaints from the German infantry. German communications again break down. General von Hoeppner's comments.
TABLE OF CONTENTS xix
APPENDICES
PAGE
I. Admiralty Memorandum on Naval Air Policy (August 191 7) 407 II. Anti-Submarine Results. By Various Types of Aircraft, 191 7 408
III. Order of Battle, Royal Flying Corps, 7th June 1917
(Messines) ........ 409
IV. Daily Artillery Results by the Second (Corps) Wing — 15th
May to 9th June 1917 413
V. Order of Battle, Royal Flying Corps, 31st July 191 7
(Ypres) 414
VI. Battles of Ypres, 1917. R.F.C., H.Q. Orders for bombing
and machine-gun attacks . . . . . .418
VII. V Brigade R.F.C. Order, 31st July 1917 . . . .421
VIII. 9th Wing, R.F.C. Order, 31st July 1917. . . . 422
IX. The Battle of Cambrai 1917. R.F.C. H.Q. Instructions to
I Brigade and Ninth Wing. ..... 424
X. Order of Battle, Royal Flying Corps, 20th November 191 7
(Cambrai) ........ 426
XI. Battle of Cambrai. Ill Brigade, R.F.C. Special Operation
Order 431
XII. Employment of Battle Flights. German Memorandum of
February 1918 433
XIII. Extract from German Manual 'The attack in Position War- fare', dated 1st January 191 8. VL Air Forces . . 439
XIV. The Employment of the Royal Flying Corps in Defence.
(Memorandum issued by G.H.Q. January 191 8) . . 444
XV. Order of Battle, Royal Flying Corps, 21st March 1918
(German Offensive) ....... 446
XVI. Comparative Table of Changes in Strength of British and German Air Services during the German Somme Offensive 191 8
Table A. British and opposing German .
Table B. German Air Strength opposing the French .
XVII. Development of Aerial Fighting. (H.Q., R.F.C. Memoran- dum of December 191 7) 453
XVIII. Orders of General Foch (translated), 1st April 1918 . 456
XIX. Brigade Strength in Squadrons, 9th April 1918. (Battles! after of the Lys) J 458
INDEX 459
after 451
LIST OF MAPS
1. Sphere of Naval Air Operations in Home Waters 191 7-
1918 . • . To face p. 1
2. Seaplane and Flying-Boat Patrols. South-Western
Group of Air Stations, July 1917 .... 48
3. North Hinder Flying-Boat Patrol (Spider- Web), April
1917 53
4. Battle of Messines, 7th June 1917. Disposition of R.F.C.
Corps Squadrons ...... 109
5. Battles of Ypres, 1917 137
6. Battles of Ypres, 1917. Disposition of Royal Naval Air
Service and Royal Flying Corps Squadrons, 31st July
1917 212
7. Battle of Cambrai, 20th November-7th December 191 7 227
8. Battle of Cambrai. Scheme of Employment of the
Royal Flying Corps, 20th November 191 7 . . 244
9. German Offensive on the Somme, March 1918 . . 267
10. German Offensive on the Somme, March 191 8. Dis-
position of British and German Aircraft Units, 21st
March 1918 364
11. German Offensive on the Lys, April 1 91 8 . . 404
SPHERE OF NAVAL AIR OPERATIONS
IN HOME WATERS, 1917-1918.
CHAPTER I AIRCRAFT WITH THE FLEET
igiy-March igi8
Developments and Operations [Map facing.]
In 191 7 there were important developments in all branches of naval air work. Some were made possible by the trials and patient organization of the earlier years of warfare. One, the introduction of the aeroplane, or land aircraft, for fleet work, was revolutionary. Another, the development of the large flying-boat for reconnaissance, and as an offensive weapon, with the southern part of the North Sea for its field of operations, was due in great measure to the faith and persistence of one flying officer.
The direction of the naval air expansion was greatly influenced by the German U-boat campaign. The battle of Jutland left Admiral Scheer with no illusions. He knew, as he says in his book, Germany'' s High Sea Fleet in the World War (p. 169), that no possible action by the German fleet could overcome the British naval blockade and, in a report to the Emperor wherein he summarized his final impressions of the battle, said : 'A victorious end to the 'war at not too distant a date can only be looked for by 'the crushing of English economic life through U-boat 'action against English commerce.'
Before any decision was reached for an extension of U- boat warfare, Scheer had made his August 191 6 sortie into the North Sea. He did not, on that occasion, risk contact with Admiral Jellicoe's forces, but successful action by his U-boats had led to a revision of the policy of the employ- ment of the Grand Fleet. The light cruisers Nottingham and Falmouth had been torpedoed in the swept areas off the East Coast, and, in consequence, Admiral Jellicoe had urged that the Grand Fleet should not again be taken south of the Dogger Bank or east of longitude 40 E. unless every class of vessel was protected by anti-submarine screens ; with this view the Admiralty agreed.
In October 1916 a new, but restricted, U-boat campaign
2504»4 t.
2 AIRCRAFT WITH THE FLEET [ch. i
began, and Admiral Scheer no longer had the Ems and Flanders submarine flotillas at his disposal for operations with the High Sea Fleet. He tried a sortie without their help in this month, but nothing came of it, and the Ger- man Fleet went back to its harbours. There ensued a posi- tion of deadlock between the opposing fleets which endured until 191 8.
Meanwhile controversy on the subject of U-boat war- fare was having political and service reactions in Germany and in England. In Germany the naval chiefs, led by Admiral von HoltzendorfT, the Chief of the Naval Staff, conducted an intensive propaganda for the abolition of all restrictions against the employment of the U-boats. Holtzendorff knew that lawless submarine warfare might bring America into the war alongside the Allies, but he argued that America was not to be feared as she could do nothing effective. Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor, and Herr von Jagow, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, opposed the naval staff, on grounds of expediency rather than morality, but when the military chiefs, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, ranged themselves with their naval colleagues, it was obvious that a decision for unrestricted submarine warfare was merely a matter of time. The new policy, in fact, was put into operation on the 1st of February 1917. To the student of psychology, the shifts and manoeuvres by which Germany came to the final announcement of her intentions are of interest. The events which led to the decision are revealed in published German official documents and in the memoirs of the pro- tagonists: they are also well summarized in the British official naval history (Naval Operations, vol. iv, ch. vii).
In England those who were in the best position to judge foresaw that Germany would stake everything on the sub- marine. Admiral Jellicoe had continuously urged the adoption of more energetic measures to combat the U- boats. Tt seemed to me', he says, 'questionable whether 'our organization at the Admiralty included a sufficiently 'numerous and important staff, having as its sole business 'the work of dealing, rapidly and effectively, with the pro- 'blem which was assuming such very serious proportions.
i9i6] A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT 3
'It did not appear that new proposals and inventions 'for dealing with the submarine campaign were being 'pushed forward with the necessary rapidity, possibly be- 'cause of the absence of such an organization, and of the 'difficulties connected with labour and materiel '; and 'generally it seemed doubtful whether the dangers con- 'fronting us would be successfully combated.'1
In a letter to the Admiralty, written in October 191 6, Admiral Jellicoe had defined these dangers. 'Our losses in 'merchant ships,' he said, 'combined with the losses in 'neutral merchant ships, may, by the early summer of 191 7, 'have such a serious effect upon the import of food and 'other necessaries into the Allied countries as to force us 'into accepting peace terms which the military position on 'the Continent would not justify, and which would fall 'short of our desires.'
It was, indeed, clear that there must be a wide revision of our existing methods of conducting the war. On the 22nd of November 1916 Admiral Jellicoe, who had pre- viously been invited to London to confer with the Govern- ment, was offered the post of First Sea Lord. A week later he left the Iron Duke for Whitehall and was succeeded as Commander-in-Chief by Admiral Sir David Beatty. On the 4th of December Mr. Asquith, the leader of the Coalition Government, resigned, and Mr. Lloyd George formed his Coalition Government three days later. Mr. Lloyd George created the War Cabinet of four or five members, freed from departmental duties, whose decisions on all matters affecting the conduct of the war were to be absolute.
At the Admiralty Mr. Balfour was succeeded as First Lord by Sir Edward Carson, and a new Board of Admiralty was formed.2 On the 18th of December 1916 a special division for the co-ordination and control of all anti-submarine operations was set up at the Admiralty
1 The Grand Fleet igi 4-1916, by Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa, pp. 456-7.
2 Sir Edward Carson, First Lord; Admiral Sir John R. Jellicoe, First Sea Lord ; Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, Second Sea Lord; Rear- Admiral F. C. Tudor Tudor, Third Sea Lord; and Commodore Lionel Halsey, Fourth Sea Lord.
4 AIRCRAFT WITH THE FLEET [ch. i
under Rear-Admiral A. L. Duff, previously Second-in- Command of the 1st Battle Squadron.
It was not long before the Board of Admiralty was itself expanded. The War Cabinet, soon after its formation, approved proposals for a reorganization of the production and employment of aircraft which had been formulated by its predecessor, the War Committee, in November 1916. One of these proposals was for the addition to the Board of Admiralty of a Fifth Sea Lord, who would be able to speak, as the naval representative on the Air Board, with an authority similar to that of the War Office representa- tive, who was a member of the Army Council. Rear- Admiral C. L. Vaughan-Lee, who held the existing Admiralty appointment of Director of Air Services, was succeeded by Commodore G. M. Paine, who became Fifth Sea Lord on the 31st of January 1917.1
These political and service changes were destined to exert a powerful influence on naval air policy and expan- sion. With Admiral Jellicoe at the Admiralty, where he could give practical expression to his views, and with Admiral Beatty, a firm believer in the value of the air weapon, as Commander-in-Chief, progress in the develop- ment of aircraft co-operation with the Grand Fleet was rapid. The establishment of the special anti-submarine division at the Admiralty led also to a great increase in the activities of all types of anti-submarine aircraft. There was little in common between these two lines of progress. The expanded use of aircraft in anti- submarine warfare was chiefly a matter of training, reorganization, and systematized co-ordination with other U-boat counter-measures. But the development of aircraft co-operation with the Fleet at sea involved pro- blems of design and practice which necessitated much re- search work and pioneer experiments which called for a high degree of skill and cold courage. As shall be told, such
1 Commodore Godfrey Paine was an officer of great air experience. He had qualified as a pilot in May 191 2, and had thereupon been appointed first Commandant of the Central Flying School. He had held this appoint- ment until 191 5, when he took command of the Royal Naval Air Service Training Establishment at Cranwell.
1917] A GRAND FLEET COMMITTEE 5
progress was made towards the solution of these problems as laid the foundations for much of the immediate post- war organization of this branch of naval air work.
So long as the High Sea Fleet was in being, Admiral Scheer might decide at any moment to resume his sorties, and the Grand Fleet had, at all times, to be in a state of readiness. Operations, indeed, to attract Scheer to sea were planned from time to time, but the German Fleet, although it continued to be a menace, became, in effect, a coast defence force whose duty was to keep the Bight of Heligoland secure for the passage of the incoming and outgoing U-boats.
The major activities of the Grand Fleet were therefore directed to the covering of mine-laying operations in German waters to limit and define the passage of the U-boats. In January 191 7 Admiral Beatty urged that shallow and deep mines should be laid in a semicircle across the Heligoland Bight, and that the line, when complete, should be watched by light cruiser and destroyer sweeps, at varying intervals, and by sub- marines. This project could not be sanctioned because there were not sufficient mines to be had, and, instead, it was decided that independent minefields should be laid along a semicircle between Ameland and the Schleswig coast. The main air work with the fleet was associated with this mining policy. It was directed against the German airships and seaplanes which patrolled extensively, recon- noitred the minefields, assisted the German mine-sweep- ing flotillas, helped to guide the U-boats through the swept channels, and, at times, watched the British mine- layers at their work.
The Grand Fleet Aircraft Committee
On the 21st of January 1917 Admiral -Beatty, dissatisfied with the naval air situation, wrote to the Admiralty asking what policy their Lordships intended to pursue in regard to the Royal Naval Air Service. Five days later, before he received a reply, he set up a special committee of the Grand Fleet under Rear-Admiral Sir Hugh Evan-Thomas
6 AIRCRAFT WITH THE FLEET [ch. i
to report on the Fleet's air requirements. On the 5th of February 191 7 the Committee presented a comprehensive report.1
The members of the Committee, it was stated, had, in accordance with their terms of reference, considered the air requirements of the Grand Fleet as follows :
(i) Reconnaissance over the North Sea. (ii) Screening of the Fleet by aircraft while on passage, (iii) Heavier-than-air craft for duty with the Fleet, (iv) Seaplane Carriers, (v) Use of seaplanes and balloons as aids to gunnery.
They recommended that systematic reconnaissance of the North Sea should be a duty of large flying-boats supple- mented by non-rigid airships. Airships, also, of the 'Coastal' or 'North Sea' type, should provide a screen when the Fleet left its bases by daylight.2
The duties of the heavier-than-air craft were defined as close reconnaissance, and attacks on German airships. For the latter duty it was recommended that Sopwith Tup' aeroplanes should replace the Sopwith 'Baby' seaplanes in the Campania, as it had already been decided they should do in the Manxman.
This recommendation is of importance. The Manx- man, a former passenger steamer on the Isle of Man service, had been commissioned in December 1916 to carry seaplanes aft for reconnaissance and Sopwith 'Baby' seaplanes forward to fight Zeppelins. Flight Com- mander F. J. Rutland had been appointed to the new
1 The Report was signed by Rear-Admiral Sir Hugh Evan-Thomas, Captain C. M. de Bartolome, and Flag Commander Wilfred A. Egerton.
2 In Grand Fleet Battle Orders dated 24th of January 1917 this duty had been provided for. All available airships from Kirkwall, Longside, and East Fortune, were, by order of the Commander-in-Chief, to rendezvous with the Fleet if the Fleet concentration was west of longitude 2° E. The airships were to be informed of the course and speed of the Fleet and were then to scout ahead and to the flanks of the light cruiser screen. If U-boats were sighted, their positions were to be reported, and the airships were to attack with bombs. If enemy airships were sighted, the British airships were to fall back on the light cruiser line. These were the first naval orders of their kind to British airships.
1917] AEROPLANES IN CARRIERS 7
carrier before she was commissioned, and he was soon advocating that aeroplanes should be carried instead of the 'Baby' seaplanes. He argued that the Tup' aeroplane was the only craft capable of getting to the 'ceiling' of a Zeppelin, that, fitted with airbags, the Tups' were safer on the water than the 'Baby' seaplanes, that they were a better match for other aeroplanes which might be encountered at sea and, finally, that the adoption of a fighter which was being manufactured for the Western Front would ensure supplies being available and would also enable the Naval Air Service to take advantage of improvements embodied in the type from time to time as a result of fighting experience in France. This officer had made the first of two flights off the deck of the Manxman in January 1 91 7 in one of the 'Baby' seaplanes and he had found that the run given by the deck of the ship necessitated a good wind before the seaplane could get away. The adoption of aeroplanes, which could be flown off the deck under less exacting conditions, would increase the number of occasions when aircraft could be used. Largely as a result of his advocacy and of the trials with the 'Baby' seaplanes, Sopwith Tup' aeroplanes had been allotted to the Manx- man.
As fighters could be flown from the deck when the weather conditions were against the heavier two-seater seaplanes, the Committee recommended that the fighters should be fitted with a small wireless transmitting set of a range of about five miles. The fighting pilots would then be able, when the occasion arose, to communicate to the ships in the extended cruiser line important information about enemy vessels.
The estimate of the Committee was that the Grand Fleet would require twenty anti-Zeppelin aircraft and a similar number of reconnaissance aircraft. The latter, it was calculated, would provide for two aircraft in the air during the time the opposing fleets were gaining touch, and one in the air throughout the subsequent action.
It will be of interest to consider the resources, in air- craft, of the Grand Fleet at the time the Committee made
8 AIRCRAFT WITH THE FLEET [ch. i
their report. They were carried in the three aircraft